Emergency Management
Observations on DHS's Preparedness for Catastrophic Disasters Gao ID: GAO-08-868T June 11, 2008The Homeland Security Act was enacted in November 2002, creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve homeland security following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. The act centralized the leadership of many homeland security activities under a single federal department and, accordingly, DHS has the dominant role in implementing this national strategy. This testimony discusses the status of DHS's actions in fulfilling its responsibilities to (1) establish policies to define roles and responsibilities for national emergency preparedness efforts and prepare for the transition between presidential administrations, and (2) develop operational plans and performance metrics to implement these roles and responsibilities and coordinate federal resources for disaster planning and response. This testimony is based on prior GAO work performed from September 2006 to June 2008 focusing on DHS's efforts to address problems identified in the many post-Katrina reviews.
DHS has taken several actions to define national roles and responsibilities and capabilities for emergency preparedness efforts in key policy documents and has begun preparing for the upcoming transition between presidential administrations. DHS prepared initial versions of key policy documents that describe what should be done and by whom (National Response Plan in 2004), how it should be done (the National Incident Management System in 2004) and how well it should be done (the interim National Preparedness Goal in 2005). DHS subsequently developed and issued revisions to these documents to improve and enhance its national-level policies, such as the National Preparedness Guidelines in 2007 which was the successor to the interim National Preparedness Goal. Most recently, DHS developed the National Response Framework (NRF), the successor to the National Response Plan, which became effective in March 2008. This framework describes the doctrine that guides national response actions and the roles and responsibilities of officials and entities involved in response efforts. Clarifying roles and responsibilities will be especially critical as a result of the coming change in administrations and the associated transition of key federal officials with homeland security preparedness and response roles. To cope with the absence of many political appointed executives from senior roles, DHS has designated career executives to carry out specific responsibilities in the transition between presidential administrations and recently provided information to this Committee on its transition plans. To assist in planning to execute an efficient and effective administration transition, DHS has also contracted with the Council for Excellence in Government to identify key roles and responsibilities for the Department and its homeland security partners for responding to disasters during the transition between administrations. DHS is still developing operational plans to guide other federal agencies' response efforts and metrics for assessing federal capabilities. Two essential supplements to the new National Response Framework--response guides for federal partners and an integrated planning system--are still under development. Also, DHS is still establishing a process to measure the nation's overall preparedness based on a list of targeted capabilities and has not yet completed an inventory of all federal response capabilities. The measures and metrics associated with these targeted capabilities are not standards, but serve as guides for planning, training, and exercise activities. However, DHS policy does not direct development of these capabilities to address national priorities for federal agencies. For example, for the national priority to "Strengthen Interoperable and Operable Communications Capabilities" the National Preparedness Guidelines state that communications capabilities are developed to target levels in the states, tribal areas, territories, and designated urban areas that are consistent with measures and metrics established for targeted capabilities; federal agencies' interoperability is not addressed.
GAO-08-868T, Emergency Management: Observations on DHS's Preparedness for Catastrophic Disasters
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight,
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, June 11, 2008:
Emergency Management:
Observations on DHS's Preparedness for Catastrophic Disasters:
Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr. Director: Homeland Security and
Justice:
GAO-08-868T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO 08-868T, a report to Subcommittee on Management,
Investigations and Oversight, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Homeland Security Act was enacted in November 2002, creating the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to improve homeland security
following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United
States. The act centralized the leadership of many homeland security
activities under a single federal department and, accordingly, DHS has
the dominant role in implementing this national strategy.
This testimony discusses the status of DHS‘s actions in fulfilling its
responsibilities to (1) establish policies to define roles and
responsibilities for national emergency preparedness efforts and
prepare for the transition between presidential administrations, and
(2) develop operational plans and performance metrics to implement
these roles and responsibilities and coordinate federal resources for
disaster planning and response. This testimony is based on prior GAO
work performed from September 2006 to June 2008 focusing on DHS‘s
efforts to address problems identified in the many post-Katrina
reviews.
What GAO Found:
DHS has taken several actions to define national roles and
responsibilities and capabilities for emergency preparedness efforts in
key policy documents and has begun preparing for the upcoming
transition between presidential administrations. DHS prepared initial
versions of key policy documents that describe what should be done and
by whom (National Response Plan in 2004), how it should be done (the
National Incident Management System in 2004) and how well it should be
done (the interim National Preparedness Goal in 2005). DHS subsequently
developed and issued revisions to these documents to improve and
enhance its national-level policies, such as the National Preparedness
Guidelines in 2007 which was the successor to the interim National
Preparedness Goal. Most recently, DHS developed the National Response
Framework (NRF), the successor to the National Response Plan, which
became effective in March 2008. This framework describes the doctrine
that guides national response actions and the roles and
responsibilities of officials and entities involved in response
efforts. Clarifying roles and responsibilities will be especially
critical as a result of the coming change in administrations and the
associated transition of key federal officials with homeland security
preparedness and response roles. To cope with the absence of many
political appointed executives from senior roles, DHS has designated
career executives to carry out specific responsibilities in the
transition between presidential administrations and recently provided
information to this Committee on its transition plans. To assist in
planning to execute an efficient and effective administration
transition, DHS has also contracted with the Council for Excellence in
Government to identify key roles and responsibilities for the
Department and its homeland security partners for responding to
disasters during the transition between administrations.
DHS is still developing operational plans to guide other federal
agencies‘ response efforts and metrics for assessing federal
capabilities. Two essential supplements to the new National Response
Framework”response guides for federal partners and an integrated
planning system”are still under development. Also, DHS is still
establishing a process to measure the nation‘s overall preparedness
based on a list of targeted capabilities and has not yet completed an
inventory of all federal response capabilities. The measures and
metrics associated with these targeted capabilities are not standards,
but serve as guides for planning, training, and exercise activities.
However, DHS policy does not direct development of these capabilities
to address national priorities for federal agencies. For example, for
the national priority to ’Strengthen Interoperable and Operable
Communications Capabilities“ the National Preparedness Guidelines state
that communications capabilities are developed to target levels in the
states, tribal areas, territories, and designated urban areas that are
consistent with measures and metrics established for targeted
capabilities; federal agencies‘ interoperability is not addressed.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this testimony. GAO has
made recommendations in the prior reports identified in this testimony,
and DHS has generally concurred with these recommendations and is
taking action to implement them.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-868T]. For more
information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr., at (202) 512-8777 or
jenkinswo@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) preparedness to
lead federal efforts to prepare for, prevent, mitigate the effects of,
respond to, and recover from all domestic disasters, whether natural or
man-made, including acts of terror. My remarks today focus on the
preparation for and response to major and catastrophic disasters which
require substantial federal coordination with and assistance to state
and local responders. My statement is grounded in the work GAO has done
to-date on DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in
preparing for, responding to and recovering from major disasters and
catastrophes.
The need for federal leadership in homeland security efforts was never
greater than in the hours and days following the attacks of September
11, 2001, which ultimately led to the creation of DHS and the
establishment of the Department's roles to provide strategic, national
leadership as the focal point for federal response and coordination.
This role is defined in law and executive order and described in
federal emergency management strategies, policies, and procedures. In
order to provide the coordinated national homeland security effort
directed by the Congress and the President, DHS must provide leadership
across a broad spectrum of stakeholders including: federal agencies and
departments, and DHS's own components; state, local and tribal
governments, their emergency management agencies and other state
agencies; sector-specific businesses and industry; voluntary
organizations; and academia. It is an enormous challenge and
responsibility. In leading national preparedness efforts, DHS through
FEMA is responsible for developing national-level policies and doctrine
to guide the efforts of these stakeholders to establish operational
plans to carry out their roles and responsibilities and build, measure,
and sustain their ability to do so effectively.
The effectiveness of DHS and FEMA in assuming these responsibilities
was severely tested--and in some cases clearly found wanting--in the
aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season and its catastrophic impact on
the Gulf Coast. Numerous reports,[Footnote 1] along with our own
observations,[Footnote 2] identified concerns about leadership of the
federal response to Hurricane Katrina and questions regarding the
roles, and responsibilities of DHS, FEMA and other federal agencies, as
well as state and local officials and non-governmental organizations.
As we reported in September 2006, effective preparation and response
for catastrophic disasters requires that roles and responsibilities be
clearly defined and understood and that responsible officials know what
capabilities are needed to fulfill their roles and responsibilities,
develop the operational plans to implement those roles and
responsibilities, and establish, realistically test, and maintain the
needed capabilities. To address many of the issues and problems
highlighted by the Katrina response, Congress passed the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of October 2006 (Post-Katrina Act),
[Footnote 3] which charged FEMA with the primary responsibility for
coordinating and implementing key aspects of federal emergency
preparedness and response.
The Post-Katrina Act defines a catastrophic incident as any natural
disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster that results in
extraordinary levels of casualties or damage or disruption severely
affecting the population (including mass evacuations), infrastructure,
environment, economy, national morale, or government functions in an
area. Effective federal preparation for and response to such an event
requires planning, coordination, cooperation, and leadership within DHS
and between DHS and other federal agencies--civilian and military--as
well as state and local governments, and the private and nonprofit
sectors who have resources and capabilities needed for the response.
Today, I'd like to briefly discuss the status of DHS's actions in
fulfilling its responsibilities to:
* establish policies to define roles and responsibilities for national
emergency preparedness efforts and prepare for the transition between
presidential administrations; and;
* develop operational plans and performance metrics to implement these
roles and responsibilities and coordinate federal resources for
disaster planning and response:
My observations on DHS's and FEMA's development of policies, plans and
metrics to lead federal efforts in this statement are based on our
prior work, focusing on DHS's efforts to address problems identified in
the many post-Katrina reviews from September 2006 to June 2008, as well
as related work by the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). We have
issued a number of GAO reports that have examined a wide variety of
operational and management issues, made observations and
recommendations, and followed up on our reports assessing DHS's
leadership capabilities in working with other federal agencies.
Examples relevant to the hearing today include our reviews of emergency
communications interoperability,[Footnote 4] evacuations of
disadvantaged populations,[Footnote 5] national preparedness for
pandemic flu,[Footnote 6] and coordination with the Department of
Defense (DOD).[Footnote 7]
Summary:
DHS has taken several actions to define national roles and
responsibilities and capabilities for preparedness and response in key
policy documents and has begun preparing for the upcoming transition
between presidential administrations. However, it needs to better
integrate stakeholders in its revision of key policy documents,
particularly the National Response Framework. To implement requirements
of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and HSPDs 5 and 8,[Footnote 8] DHS
issued initial versions of key policy documents in 2004 (NIMS and the
National Response Plan) and 2005 (National Preparedness Goal) and has
developed and issued revisions intended to improve and enhance its
national-level policies. Most recently, the National Response Framework
(NRF), the successor to the National Response Plan, became effective in
March 2008; it describes the doctrine that guides national response
actions and the roles and responsibilities of officials and entities
involved in response efforts. Clarifying roles and responsibilities
will be especially critical as a result of the coming change in
administrations and the associated transition of key federal officials
with homeland security preparedness and response roles. To cope with
the absence of many political appointed executives from senior roles,
DHS has designated career executives to carry out specific
responsibilities in the transition between presidential administrations
and recently provided information to this Committee on its transition
plans. To assist in planning to execute an efficient and effective
administration transition, DHS has also contracted with the Council for
Excellence in Government to identify key roles and responsibilities for
the Department and its homeland security partners for responding to
disasters during the transition between administrations.
DHS's efforts to develop operational plans to guide other federal
agencies' response efforts and metrics for assessing federal
capabilities are incomplete. In addition, DHS is still establishing a
process to measure the nation's overall preparedness based on the
Target Capabilities List (TCL)[Footnote 9] and has not yet developed a
complete inventory of all federal response capabilities. For example,
for the national priority to "Strengthen Interoperable and Operable
Communications Capabilities" the National Preparedness Guidelines state
that communications capabilities are developed to target levels in the
states, tribal areas, territories, and designated urban areas that are
consistent with measures and metrics established for targeted
capabilities; federal agencies' interoperability is not addressed.
Background:
DHS's federal leadership role and responsibilities for emergency
preparedness as defined in law and executive order are broad and
challenging. To increase homeland security following the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, President Bush issued the
National Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002,[Footnote 10] and
signed the Homeland Security Act in November 2002 creating DHS. The act
centralized the leadership of many homeland security activities under a
single federal department and, accordingly, DHS has the dominant role
in implementing the strategy. As we noted in our review of DHS's
mission and management functions, the National Strategy for Homeland
Security underscores the importance for DHS of partnering and
coordination.[Footnote 11] For example, 33 of the strategy's 43
initiatives are required to be implemented by 3 or more federal
agencies. If these entities do not effectively coordinate their
implementation activities, they may waste resources by creating
ineffective and incompatible pieces of a larger security program.
In addition, more than 20 Homeland Security Presidential Directives
(HSPDs) define DHS's and other federal agencies' roles in leading
efforts to prepare for and respond to disasters, emergencies, and
potential terrorist threats. Directives that focus on DHS's leadership
role and responsibilities for homeland security include HSPD-5 and HSPD-
8 which are summarized below:
* Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5), issued on
February 28, 2003, identifies the Secretary of Homeland Security as the
principal federal official for domestic incident management and directs
him to coordinate the federal government's resources utilized in
response to or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or
other emergencies.[Footnote 12] The Secretary of DHS, as the principal
federal official, is to provide standardized, quantitative reports to
the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security on the readiness
and preparedness of the nation--at all levels of government--to
prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents
and develop and administer a National Response Plan (NRP). To
facilitate this role, HSPD-5 directs the heads of all federal
departments and agencies to assist and support the Secretary in the
development and maintenance of the NRP. (The plan was recently revised
and is now called the National Response Framework.
* Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8), issued in
December 2003, called for a new national preparedness goal and
performance measures, standards for preparedness assessments and
strategies, as well as a system for assessing the nation's overall
preparedness. According to the HSPD, the Secretary is the principal
federal official for coordinating the implementation of all-hazards
preparedness in the United States. In cooperation with other federal
departments and agencies, the Secretary coordinates the preparedness of
federal response assets. In addition, the Secretary, in coordination
with other appropriate federal civilian departments and agencies, is to
develop and maintain a federal response capability inventory that
includes the performance parameters of the capability, the time (days
or hours) within which the capability can be brought to bear on an
incident, and the readiness of such capability to respond to domestic
incidents. Last year, the President issued an annex to HSPD-8 intended
to establish a standard and comprehensive approach to national planning
and ensure consistent planning across the federal government.
After the hurricane season of 2005, Congress passed the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, that, among other things, made
organizational changes within DHS to consolidate emergency preparedness
and emergency response functions within FEMA. Most of the
organizational changes, such as the transfer of various functions from
DHS's Directorate of Preparedness to FEMA, became effective as of March
31, 2007. According to the act, the primary mission of FEMA is to:
"reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all
hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-
made disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based,
comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection,
response, recovery, and mitigation."[Footnote 13] The act kept FEMA
within DHS and enhanced FEMA's responsibilities and its autonomy within
DHS.[Footnote 14] As a result of the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA is the DHS
component now charged with leading and supporting the nation in a risk-
based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness,
protection, response, recovery, and mitigation.
DHS Has Issued and Revised National-Level Preparedness Policies to
Define Roles and Responsibilities:
DHS Has Taken Action to Revise National Preparedness Policies But
Should Plan for Better Integrating Stakeholders in the Future:
DHS has taken action to define national roles and responsibilities and
capabilities for preparedness and response which are reflected in
several key policy documents: the National Response Framework, (what
should be done and by whom); the National Incident Management System
(NIMS) (how it should be done), and the National Performance Guidelines
(how well it should be done). To implement requirements of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and HSPDs 5 and 8,[Footnote 15] DHS issued initial
versions of these documents in 2004 (NIMS and the National Response
Plan) and 2005 (National Preparedness Goal) and has developed and
issued revisions intended to improve and enhance these national-level
policies. Most recently, the National Response Framework (NRF), the
successor to the National Response Plan, became effective in March
2008; it describes the doctrine that guides national response actions
and the roles and responsibilities of officials and entities involved
in response efforts. The NRF also includes a Catastrophic Incident
Annex, which describes an accelerated, proactive national response to
catastrophic incidents, as well as a Supplement to the Catastrophic
Incident Annex--both designed to further clarify federal roles and
responsibilities and relationships among federal, state and local
governments and responders. Together, these documents are intended to
provide a comprehensive structure, guidance, and performance goals for
developing and maintaining an effective national preparedness and
response system.
Because there are a range of federal and nonfederal stakeholders with
important responsibilities for emergency preparedness and response, it
is important that FEMA and DHS include these stakeholders in its
development and revisions of national policies and guidelines. Today we
are issuing a report on the process DHS used to revise the NRF,
including how DHS integrated key stakeholders. DHS included non-federal
stakeholders in the revision process during the initial months when
issues were identified and draft segments written, and during the final
months when there was broad opportunity to comment on the draft that
DHS had produced. However, DHS deviated from the work plan it
established for the revision process that envisioned the incorporation
of stakeholder views throughout the process and did not provide the
first full revision draft to non-federal stakeholders for their
comments and suggestions before conducting a closed, internal federal
review of the draft. DHS's approach was also not in accordance with the
Post-Katrina Act's requirement that DHS establish a National Advisory
Council (NAC) to incorporate non-federal input into the revision
process. Although the NAC was to be established within 60 days of the
Act (i.e., December 4, 2006), FEMA, which assumed responsibility for
selecting members, did not name NAC members until June 2007 because of
the additional time needed to review hundreds of applications and
select a high quality body of advisors, according to the FEMA
Administrator. The NAC's first meeting took place in October 2007 after
DHS issued the revised plan for public comment. We are recommending
that, as FEMA begins to implement and eventually review the 2008
National Response Framework, the Administrator develop and disseminate
policies and procedures describing the conditions and time frames under
which the next NRF revision will occur and how FEMA will conduct the
next NRF revision. These policies and procedures should clearly
describe how FEMA will integrate all stakeholders, including the NAC
and other non-federal stakeholders, into the revision process and the
methods for communicating to these stakeholders. FEMA agreed with our
recommendation.
The importance of involving stakeholders, both federal and non-federal,
was underscored in our review of The National Strategy for Pandemic
Influenza (National Pandemic Strategy) and The Implementation Plan for
the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (National Pandemic
Implementation Plan) which were issued in November 2005 and May 2006
respectively, by the President and his Homeland Security Council.
[Footnote 16] Key non-federal stakeholders, such as state and local
governments, were not directly involved in developing the National
Pandemic Strategy and Implementation Plan, even though these
stakeholders are expected to be the primary responders to an influenza
pandemic. While DHS collaborated with the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) and other federal agencies in developing the
National Pandemic Strategy and Implementation Plan, we found that there
are numerous shared leadership roles and responsibilities, leaving
uncertainty about how the federal government would lead preparations
for and response to a pandemic. Although the DHS Secretary is to lead
overall non-medical support and response actions and the HHS Secretary
is to lead the public health and medical response, the plan does not
clearly address these simultaneous responsibilities or how these roles
are to work together, particularly over an extended period and at
multiple locations across the country. In addition to the two
Secretaries, we observed that the FEMA Administrator is now the
principal domestic emergency management advisor to the President, the
Homeland Security Council, and the DHS Secretary, pursuant to the Post-
Katrina Act, adding further complexity to the leadership structure in
the case of an influenza pandemic. Most of these leadership roles and
responsibilities have not been tested under pandemic scenarios, leaving
it unclear how they will work. We therefore recommended that DHS and
HHS work together to develop and conduct rigorous testing, training,
and exercises for pandemic influenza to ensure that federal leadership
roles are clearly defined and understood and that leaders are able to
effectively execute shared responsibilities to address emerging
challenges, and ensure these roles are clearly understood by all key
stakeholders. We also recommended that, in updating the National
Pandemic Implementation Plan, the process should involve key non-
federal stakeholders. DHS and HHS agreed with our recommendations, and
said that they were taking or planned to take actions to implement our
recommendations.
Presidential Transition Period Poses Challenges for DHS Leadership of
National Preparedness Efforts:
As we noted in our report on the preparation for and response to
Hurricane Katrina issued in September 2006,[Footnote 17] clearly
defined and understood roles and responsibilities are essential for an
effective, coordinated response to a catastrophic disaster.
In any administration, the number of political appointees who depart
rises as the President's term nears an end. Many cabinet secretaries
and agency heads --in addition to the DHS Secretary and the FEMA
Administrator--have response responsibilities in a major or
catastrophic disaster, which could occur at any time. As political
appointees depart, it is therefore essential that there be career
senior executives who are clearly designated to lead their respective
department and agency responsibilities for emergency response and
continuity of operations. It is also important that they clearly
understand their roles and responsibilities and have training to
exercise them effectively.
DHS has designated career executives to carry out specific
responsibilities in the transition between presidential administrations
and recently provided information to this Committee on its transition
plans. DHS has also contracted with the Council for Excellence in
Government to map key roles and responsibilities for responding to
disasters during the transition between administrations. The Council is
to produce a visual mapping of these roles, plus supplementary
documentation to support/explicate the mapping. Once those materials
had been developed, the Council plans to hold a series of
trainings/workshops for career civil servants in acting leadership
positions and nominated political appointees based on the roles mapped
out by the Council. In addition, the project includes training and
workshops for those in acting leadership positions outside DHS.
DHS Has Not Yet Developed Comprehensive Operational Plans and Metrics
to Coordinate Federal Response Resources:
DHS Still Developing Ways to Lead National Planning:
DHS is responsible for, but has not yet completed, leading the
operational planning needed for an effective national response. Two
essential supplements to the new National Response Framework--Federal
Partner Response Guides and DHS's Integrated Planning System--are still
under development. The partner guides are designed to provide a ready
reference of key roles and actions for federal, state, local, tribal,
and private-sector response partners. According to DHS, the guides are
to provide more specific "how to" handbooks tailored specifically to
the federal government and the other non-federal stakeholders: state,
local and tribal governments, the private sector and nongovernmental
organizations. DHS has not established a schedule for completing these
guides.
On December 3, 2007, President Bush issued Annex I to HSPD-8, entitled
National Planning. The Annex describes the development of a national
planning system in which all levels of government work together in a
collaborative fashion to create plans for various scenarios and
requires that DHS develop a standardized, integrated national planning
process. This Integrated Planning System (IPS) is intended to be the
national planning system used to develop interagency and
intergovernmental plans based upon the National Planning Scenarios. The
National Response Framework states that local, tribal, state, regional,
and federal plans are to be mutually supportive. Although the Annex
calls for the new system to be developed in coordination with relevant
federal agencies and issued by February 3, 2008, DHS has not yet
completed the IPS, and HSPD-8 Annex 1 (i.e. the White House) does not
lay out a timeframe for release of the IPS.
According to FEMA's Administrator, the agency's National Preparedness
Directorate, in coordination with its Disaster Operations Directorate
and the DHS's Office of Operations Coordination, has begun to develop a
common federal planning process that will support a family of related
planning documents. These related planning documents will include
strategic guidance statements, strategic plans, concept plans,
operations plans, and tactical plans. The Annex to HSPD-8 is designed
to "enhance the preparedness of the United States by formally
establishing a standard and comprehensive approach to national
planning" in order to "integrate and effect policy and operational
objectives to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from
all hazards." According to the Administrator, FEMA continues to be a
significant contributor to the draft IPS, and will also be involved in
developing the family of plans for each of the national planning
scenarios as required by the Annex.
In following up on the status of recommendations we made after
Hurricane Katrina related to planning for the evacuation of
transportation disadvantaged populations,[Footnote 18] we found that
DHS's leadership in this area had led to the implementation of some,
but not all of our recommendations.[Footnote 19] For example, we
recommended that DHS clarify within the National Response Plan that
FEMA is the lead and coordinating agency to provide evacuation
assistance when state and local governments are overwhelmed, and
clarify the supporting federal agencies' responsibilities. In April
2008, we noted that DHS's draft Mass Evacuation Incident Annex to the
National Response Framework appears to clarify the role of FEMA and
supporting federal agencies, although the annex is still not finalized.
Similarly, we recommended that DHS improve its technical assistance by,
among other things, providing more detailed guidance on how to plan,
train, and conduct exercises for the evacuation of transportation
disadvantaged populations. DHS had developed basic guidance on the
evacuation of transportation disadvantaged populations and was
currently working on targeted guidance for states and localities.
However, we had also recommended that DHS require, as part of its grant
programs, all state and local governments plan, train, and conduct
exercises for the evacuation of transportation-disadvantaged
populations, but DHS had not done so. DHS agreed to consider our
recommendation.
We also recommended that DHS clearly delineate how the federal
government will assist state and local governments with the movement of
patients and residents out of hospitals and nursing homes to a
mobilization center where National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)
[Footnote 20] transportation begins. DHS and HHS have collaborated with
state and local health departments in hurricane-prone regions to
determine gaps between needs and available resources for hospital and
nursing home evacuations and to secure local, state, or federal
resources to fill the gaps. Based on this analysis, HHS and DHS
contracted for ground and air ambulances and para-transit services for
Gulf and East Coast states.
At a more tactical level of planning, FEMA uses mission assignments to
coordinate the urgent, short-term emergency deployment of federal
resources to address disaster needs. Mission assignments may be issued
for a variety of tasks, such as search and rescue missions or debris
removal, depending on the performing agencies' areas of expertise.
According to DHS, the Department has agreements and pre-scripted
mission assignments with 31 federal agencies for a total of 223
assignments that essentially pre-arrange for the deployment of health
equipment, a national disaster medical system, military equipment, and
a whole host of other services in the event that they are necessary to
support a state or a locality. FEMA officials said these assignments
are listed in the operational working draft of the "Pre-Scripted
Mission Assignment Catalogue," which FEMA intends to publish this
month.
We have previously made recommendations aimed at improving FEMA's
mission assignment process and FEMA officials concurred with our
recommendations and told us that they are reviewing the management of
mission assignments.[Footnote 21] In addition, reviews by the DHS OIG
regarding mission assignments concluded that FEMA's management controls
were generally not adequate to ensure that deliverables (missions
tasked) met requirements; costs were reasonable; invoices were
accurate; federal property and equipment were adequately accounted for
or managed; and FEMA's interests were protected.
According to the DHS OIG, mission assignment policies, procedures,
training, staffing, and funding have never been fully addressed by
FEMA, creating misunderstandings among federal agencies concerning
operational and fiduciary responsibilities and FEMA's guidelines
regarding the mission assignment process, from issuance of an
assignment through execution and close-out, are vague. Reflecting upon
lessons learned from Hurricane Dean, the California wildfires, and the
national-level preparedness exercise for top officials in October 2007,
FEMA's Disaster Operations Directorate formed an intra/interagency
Mission Assignment Working Group to review mission assignment processes
and procedures and develop recommendations for the management of
mission assignments, according to the OIG. Most recently, we
reported[Footnote 22] on mission assignments for emergency transit
assistance and recommended that DHS draft prescripted mission
assignments for public transportation services to provide a frame of
reference for FEMA, FTA, and state transportation departments in
developing mission assignments after future disasters. DHS agreed to
take our recommendation under consideration.
DHS Still Developing Ways to Define and Measure Federal Agencies'
Capabilities:
DHS issued an update to the national goal for preparedness in National
Preparedness Guidelines in September 2007 to establish both readiness
metrics to measure progress, and a system for assessing the nation's
overall preparedness and response capabilities. However, DHS has not
yet completed efforts to implement the system and has not yet developed
a complete inventory of all federal response capabilities. According to
the September 2007 Guidelines, DHS was still establishing a process to
measure the nation's overall preparedness based on the Target
Capabilities List (TCL), which accompanies the Guidelines. Our ongoing
work on national preparedness and the national exercise program is
reviewing DHS's plans and schedules for completing this process.
In the Guidelines, the description for each capability includes a
definition, outcome, preparedness and performance activities, tasks,
and measures and metrics that are quantitative or qualitative levels
against which achievement of a task or capability outcome can be
assessed. According to the Guidelines, they describe how much, how
well, and/or how quickly an action should be performed and are
typically expressed in a way that can be observed during an exercise or
real event. The measures and metrics are not standards, but serve as
guides for planning, training, and exercise activities. However, the
Guidelines do not direct development of capabilities to address
national priorities to federal agencies. For example, for the national
priority to "Strengthen Interoperable and Operable Communications
Capabilities" the Guidelines state that interoperable and operable
communications capabilities are developed to target levels in the
states, tribal areas, territories, and designated urban areas that are
consistent with measures and metrics established in the TCL; federal
agencies' interoperability is not addressed.
Prior disasters and emergencies, as well as State and Urban Area
Homeland Security Strategies and status reports on interoperable
communications, have shown persistent shortfalls in achieving
communications interoperability. [Footnote 23] These shortfalls
demonstrate a need for a national framework fostering the
identification of communications requirements and definition of
technical standards. State and local authorities, working in
partnership with DHS, need to establish statewide interoperable
communications plans and a national interoperability baseline to assess
the current state of communications interoperability. Achieving
interoperable communications and creating effective mechanisms for
sharing information are long-term projects that require Federal
leadership and a collaborative approach to planning that involves all
levels of government as well as the private sector. In April 2007, we
reported[Footnote 24] that DHS's SAFECOM program intended to strengthen
interoperable public safety communications at all levels of government
had made limited progress in and had not addressed interoperability
with federal agencies, a critical element to interoperable
communications required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004.[Footnote 25] We concluded that the SAFECOM
program has had a limited impact on improving communications
interoperability among federal, state, and local agencies. The
program's limited effectiveness can be linked to poor program
management practices, such as the lack of a plan for improving
interoperability across all levels of government, and inadequate
performance measures to fully gauge the effectiveness of its tools and
assistance. We recommended, among other things, that DHS develop and
implement a program plan for SAFECOM that includes goals focused on
improving interoperability among all levels of government. DHS agreed
with the intent of the recommendation and stated that the Department
was working to develop a program plan.
DHS had also not yet developed a complete inventory of federal
capabilities, as we reported in August 2007,[Footnote 26] in assessing
the extent to which DHS has met a variety of mission and management
expectations. As a result, earlier this year Senate Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs Committee sent letters requesting information
from 15 agencies with responsibilities under the National Response
Framework to respond in the event of a nuclear or radiological
incident. The committee asked for information on a variety of issues--
for example, about evacuation, medical care, intelligence, forensics,
and tracking fallout--to assess agencies' current capabilities and
responsibilities in the event of a nuclear attack. Other federal
agencies also need this information from DHS; in reviewing the
Department of Defense's (DOD) coordination with DHS, we reported in
April 2008 that DOD's Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has difficulty
identifying requirements for capabilities it may need in part because
NORTHCOM does not have more detailed information from DHS on the
specific requirements or capabilities needed from the military in the
event of a disaster.
This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any
questions that your or other members of the subcommittee may have at
this time.
Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements:
For further information about this statement, please contact William O.
Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on (202)
512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. In addition to the contact named above
the following individuals from GAO's Homeland Security and Justice Team
also made major contributors to this testimony: Chris Keisling,
Assistant Director; John Vocino, Analyst-in-Charge, and Adam Vogt,
Communications Analyst.
[End of testimony]
Footnotes:
[1] See reports: A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for And
Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006), U.S.
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May
2006), White House Homeland Security Council The Federal Response to
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006),
Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General A
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response
to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006).
[2] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-618], (Washington, D.C., Sept.
2, 2006).
[3] The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120
Stat. 1355 (2006).
[4] GAO, First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications
Interoperability, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
301] (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007).
[5] GAO, Status of Implementation of GAO Recommendations on Evacuation
of Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations and Patients and Residents
of Health Care Facilities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-544R] (Washington, D.C. Apr. 1, 2008).
[6] GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are Needed to Ensure
Clearer Leadership Roles and an Effective National Strategy,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-781] (Washington,
D.C.: Aug. 14, 2007).
[7] GAO, Homeland Defense U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but
Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and Other
Issues, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-251]
(Washington, D.C., Feb. 16, 2008), Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been
Taken to Improve U.S. Northern Command's Coordination with States and
the National Guard Bureau, but Gaps Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-252] (Washington, D.C., April
16, 2008), and Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for
Civil Support Missions May Depend on DOD's Implementation of the 2008
National Defense Authorization Act. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-311] (Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008).
[8] The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and HSPD 5 required DHS to
develop a comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS) and
a comprehensive National Response Plan. Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-8 (HSPD-8) of December 17, 2003 directed the Secretary of
Homeland Security to develop a national domestic all-hazards
preparedness goal.
[9] The TCL is a comprehensive catalog of capabilities to perform
homeland security missions, including performance measures and metrics
for common tasks. The 37 capabilities referenced in the Guidelines span
the full spectrum of homeland security missions. While the listing does
not yet encompass every function that must be accomplished to prevent,
protect against, respond to, or recover from a major event, it
nonetheless offers a comprehensive starting point for planning.
[10] White House Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for
Homeland Security (Washington, D.C., Jul. 16, 2002).
[11] GAO Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on
Implementation of Mission and Management Functions [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-454] (Washington, D.C.: August
17, 2007).
[12] If and when any one of the following four conditions applies: (1)
a Federal department or agency acting under its own authority has
requested the assistance of the Secretary; (2) the resources of State
and local authorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been
requested by the appropriate State and local authorities; (3) more than
one Federal department or agency has become substantially involved in
responding to the incident; or (4) the Secretary has been directed to
assume responsibility for managing the domestic incident by the
President.
[13] 6 U.S.C. 313(b)(1).
[14] GAO Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-395T] (Washington,
D.C. Mar 9, 2007).
[15] The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and HSPD 5 required DHS to
develop a comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS) and
a comprehensive National Response Plan. Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-8 (HSPD-8) of December 17, 2003 directed the Secretary of
Homeland Security to develop a national domestic all-hazards
preparedness goal.
[16] GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are Needed to Ensure
Clearer Federal Leadership Roles and an Effective National Strategy,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-781] (Washington,
D.C.: Aug 14, 2007).
[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-618].
[18] GAO, Disaster Preparedness: Limitations in Federal Evacuation
Assistance for Health Facilities Should be Addressed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-826] (Washington, D.C.: July
20, 2006) and Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed
to Clarify Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-44] (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 22, 2006).
[19] GAO, Status of Implementation of GAO Recommendations on Evacuation
of Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations and Patients and Residents
of Health Care Facilities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-08-544R] (Washington, D.C., Apr.1, 2008).
[20] Under the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, primary
authority for the National Disaster Medical System was transferred from
DHS to HHS in January 2007. HHS and DHS are collaborating to implement
this recommendation.
[21] GAO, Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect
and Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding
for the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-834] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
[22] GAO, Emergency Transit Assistance: Federal Funding for Recent
Disasters, and Options for the Future, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-243] (Washington, D.C., Feb.
15, 2008).
[23] According to the National Preparedness Guidelines, communications
interoperability is the ability of public safety agencies (including
police, fire, EMS, etc.) and service agencies (including public works,
transportation, hospitals, etc.) to talk within and across agencies and
jurisdictions via radio and associated communications systems; exchange
voice, data, and/or video with one another on demand; and do so in real
time, when needed, and when authorized.
[24] GAO, First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications
Interoperability, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-
301] (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007).
[25] Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, section 7303, 118 Stat. 3638, 3843-44, Dec. 17, 2004.
[26] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-454].
[End of section]
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