Supply Chain Security
Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers
Gao ID: GAO-08-533T June 12, 2008
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for preventing weapons of mass destruction from entering the United States in cargo containers that are shipped from more than 700 foreign seaports. The Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act calls for testing the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers, and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Act) requires scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers by 2012. To fulfill these requirements, CBP created the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) and has initiated a pilot program at seven seaports. This testimony discusses challenges related to the SFI pilot program and implementation of the requirement to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo. This testimony is based on GAO products issued from July 2003 through April 2008 and ongoing work. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed reports from CBP and international partners on SFI and other container security programs, and interviewed CBP and foreign customs officials.
GAO identified challenges in nine areas that are related to the continuation of the SFI pilot program and the longer-term 100 percent scanning requirement: (1) Workforce planning: The SFI pilot program could generate an increased quantity of scan data. Therefore, more CBP officers will be required to review and analyze data for participating seaports. (2) Host nation examination practices: The SAFE Port and 9/11 Acts require DHS to develop standards for the scanning systems, but CBP lacks information on host nation equipment and practices. (3) Measuring performance: CBP has had difficulties defining performance measures for its container security programs; therefore, it will be difficult to assess if 100 percent scanning achieves increased security. (4) Resource responsibilities: Neither the SAFE Port Act nor the 9/11 Act specifies whether the United States would bear the costs of implementing 100 percent scanning. (5) Logistics: Space constraints can require seaports to place scanning equipment miles from where cargo containers are stored, and some containers are only available for scanning for a short period of time and may be difficult to access. (6) Technology and infrastructure: Environmental conditions can damage equipment and cause delays, and infrastructure capacity and equipment compatibility have presented difficulties in the SFI pilot program. (7) Use and ownership of data: Legislation specifies that scan data should be available to CBP officials, but the data are often generated and collected by foreign seaports and, in some cases, will require international agreements for transfer to CBP officials. (8) Consistency with risk management: International partners state that 100 percent scanning is inconsistent with accepted risk management principles and diverts resources away from other security threats. (9) Reciprocity and trade concerns: Foreign governments could call for reciprocity of 100 percent scanning, requiring the United States to scan cargo containers, and some view this requirement as a barrier to trade.
GAO-08-533T, Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine
Infrastructure, Safety, and Security, Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, June 12, 2008:
Supply Chain Security:
Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers:
Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security and
Justice:
GAO-08-533T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-533T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Surface Transportation, and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety and
Security, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S.
Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for preventing weapons of mass
destruction from entering the United States in cargo containers that
are shipped from more than 700 foreign seaports. The Security and
Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act calls for testing the
feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers, and
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Act)
requires scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers by 2012.
To fulfill these requirements, CBP created the Secure Freight
Initiative (SFI) and has initiated a pilot program at seven seaports.
This testimony discusses challenges related to the SFI pilot program
and implementation of the requirement to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound
container cargo. This testimony is based on GAO products issued from
July 2003 through April 2008 and ongoing work. To conduct this work,
GAO reviewed reports from CBP and international partners on SFI and
other container security programs, and interviewed CBP and foreign
customs officials.
What GAO Found:
GAO identified challenges in nine areas that are related to the
continuation of the SFI pilot program and the longer-term 100 percent
scanning requirement:
* Workforce planning: The SFI pilot program could generate an increased
quantity of scan data. Therefore, more CBP officers will be required to
review and analyze data for participating seaports.
* Host nation examination practices: The SAFE Port and 9/11 Acts
require DHS to develop standards for the scanning systems, but CBP
lacks information on host nation equipment and practices.
* Measuring performance: CBP has had difficulties defining performance
measures for its container security programs; therefore, it will be
difficult to assess if 100 percent scanning achieves increased
security.
* Resource responsibilities: Neither the SAFE Port Act nor the 9/11 Act
specifies whether the United States would bear the costs of
implementing 100 percent scanning.
* Logistics: Space constraints can require seaports to place scanning
equipment miles from where cargo containers are stored, and some
containers are only available for scanning for a short period of time
and may be difficult to access.
* Technology and infrastructure: Environmental conditions can damage
equipment and cause delays, and infrastructure capacity and equipment
compatibility have presented difficulties in the SFI pilot program.
* Use and ownership of data: Legislation specifies that scan data
should be available to CBP officials, but the data are often generated
and collected by foreign seaports and, in some cases, will require
international agreements for transfer to CBP officials.
* Consistency with risk management: International partners state that
100 percent scanning is inconsistent with accepted risk management
principles and diverts resources away from other security threats.
* Reciprocity and trade concerns: Foreign governments could call for
reciprocity of 100 percent scanning, requiring the United States to
scan cargo containers, and some view this requirement as a barrier to
trade.
Figure: Congested Conditions of Ports Present Challenges to 100 Percent
Scanning of Containers:
This figure is a picture of congested conditions of ports present
challenges to 100 percent scanning of containers.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommended in prior reports that DHS develop human capital plans,
enhance performance measures, and gather information on the efficacy of
host government systems. DHS generally concurred with our
recommendations and is taking steps to address them.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-533T]. For more information,
contact Stephen Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss challenges to 100 percent
scanning of U.S.-bound cargo containers. More than 700 foreign seaports
ship cargo containers to the United States and over 11 million
oceangoing cargo containers arrived at U.S. seaports last year. The
terrorist attacks of 2001 heightened concerns about the potential
vulnerability of U.S.-bound cargo containers to terrorist exploitation,
and the prevention of such activity became a goal for the federal
government.
Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for preventing terrorists and
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from entering the United States,
including the potential WMD threat posed by the movement of oceangoing
cargo containers. As it performs this mission, CBP maintains two
overarching and sometimes conflicting goals--increasing security while
facilitating legitimate trade. To address these goals, CBP has
developed a layered security strategy that includes the Container
Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT). The CSI program, begun in 2002, aims to deter and
detect the smuggling of WMD via cargo containers before they reach U.S.
seaports. At the 58 seaports participating in the CSI program as of
January 2008, foreign governments allow CBP personnel to be stationed
at the seaports and use intelligence and automated risk assessment
information to determine whether U.S.-bound shipments are at risk of
containing WMD or other terrorist contraband--a process referred to as
targeting. CBP personnel can then request that host government customs
officials scan the identified high-risk cargo.[Footnote 1] CBP also
operates C-TPAT, a voluntary partnership with the trade community, in
which member companies commit to improving the security of their supply
chains and develop security profiles that outline the companies'
security measures. Because of their cooperation, and after verification
by CBP that such stronger measures are in place, C-TPAT members are
generally subjected to reduced levels of CBP scrutiny of their
shipments.
To further address container security concerns, Congress passed, and
the President signed, the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE)
Port Act in October 2006, which includes provisions that codified CSI
and C-TPAT, both of which had been CBP initiatives but not previously
required by law.[Footnote 2] In addition, the act calls for the
establishment of a pilot program to test the feasibility of scanning
100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers and directs CBP to require
transmission of additional data from importers and cargo carriers for
improved targeting of U.S.-bound cargo containers. CBP is implementing
these requirements as part of its Secure Freight Initiative (SFI)
program. The SAFE Port Act also requires that 100 percent of U.S.-bound
cargo containers be scanned using nonintrusive imaging equipment and
radiation detection equipment at foreign seaports as soon as feasible.
The SFI pilot program tests the feasibility of using this equipment and
implementing 100 percent scanning at seven foreign seaports. In August
2007, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11
Act) was enacted, which revised the SAFE Port Act provision on 100
percent scanning to require implementation by 2012, with possible
exceptions for seaports for which DHS certifies that specified
conditions exist.[Footnote 3] These conditions include that adequate
scanning equipment is not available or cannot be integrated with
existing systems, a port does not have the physical characteristics to
install the equipment, or use of the equipment will significantly
impact trade capacity and the flow of cargo.
We have issued several reports over the past few years relating to
cargo container security that include challenges that are also
applicable to 100 percent scanning because of the similarities in the
operations of the programs reviewed and their overall purpose to
strengthen cargo security.[Footnote 4] This statement discusses these
and other challenges that relate to the continuation of the SFI pilot
program and the longer-term requirement to scan 100 percent of all
cargo containers bound for the United States.
The information in this testimony is based on GAO reports and
testimonies issued from July 2003 through April 2008 addressing cargo
container security operations and programs, as well as ongoing work
concerning CBP's international efforts for the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation; the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs and its Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations; and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, to be
published later this year. For this ongoing work, we reviewed CBP
documents, such as the report on the SFI program required by the 2007
DHS Appropriations Act.[Footnote 5] We also reviewed documentation from
the World Customs Organization (WCO) related to international
initiatives for enhancing supply chain security.[Footnote 6] We also
analyzed documents from some of CBP's international partners, which
include European Commission comments on the SFI Pilot Seaport at
Southampton, United Kingdom (UK); a position paper from the Association
of German Port Operators; and reports on 100 percent scanning issued by
the World Shipping Council and the WCO. In addition, we reviewed
available documentation, such as reports and international agreements,
related to CBP's work in the international trade community. We also met
in Washington, D.C., with CBP officials who have program
responsibilities for international affairs and trade, as well as with
representatives from the European Commission, the WCO, and industry
representative groups to discuss multilateral and bilateral efforts to
promote security of the supply chain--the flow of goods from
manufacturer to retailer. We also visited six CSI seaports located
overseas to meet with local customs officials, selecting the locations
based on geographic and strategic significance, container volume to the
United States, the dates when the seaports began conducting CSI
operations. Although the perspectives of the officials we spoke with
cannot be generalized across the wider population of countries that
participate in the CSI or C-TPAT programs or that ship container cargo
to the United States, they provided us with an overall understanding of
how CSI operations were conducted, as well as views on scanning 100
percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers.
We conducted our work from May 2006 to June 2008 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our
audit objectives.
Summary:
In our previous and ongoing work on maritime container security issues,
we have identified numerous challenges related to the continuation of
the SFI pilot and the longer-term requirement to scan 100 percent of
all cargo containers bound for the United States. These challenges are
in the following nine areas:
* Workforce planning: Given the additional scanning equipment used--as
well as the additional cargo containers to be scanned--the SFI pilot,
as well as 100 percent scanning, program could generate an increased
quantity of scan data. Therefore, CBP could face even greater staffing
challenges because more CBP officers will be required to review and
analyze these data for participating seaports. Furthermore, our past
work on maritime container security found weaknesses in CBP's workforce
planning.
* Host nation examination practices: While the SAFE Port and 9/11 Acts
require DHS to develop operational and equipment standards for the
scanning systems used for 100 percent scanning, CBP does not
systematically collect information on the efficacy of host government
examination systems.
* Measuring performance: While the intention of the SFI pilot program
and 100 percent scanning is to increase security for the United States,
CBP has had ongoing difficulties in defining performance measures for
its maritime container security programs to indicate whether security
is increased.
* Resource responsibilities: It is unclear who will pay for additional
resources--including increased staff, equipment, and infrastructure--
and who will be responsible for operating and maintaining the equipment
used for the statutory requirement to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound
cargo containers at foreign seaports. Neither the SAFE Port Act nor the
9/11 Act specifies whether the federal government will bear the cost of
scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers.
* Logistics: Scanning equipment is sometimes placed miles from where
cargo containers are stored, which could add to the time and cost
requirements for scanning these containers. Also, transshipment cargo
containers--containers moved from one vessel to another--are only
available for scanning for a comparatively short period of time and may
be difficult to access.
* Technology and infrastructure: Issues, such as environmental
conditions that damage equipment and cause delay, limited bandwidth
capacity of local infrastructure, and compatibility with older
equipment have presented difficulties in the SFI pilot program.
* Use and ownership of data: While the SAFE Port Act specifies that
scan data produced in the SFI pilot program should be available for
review by U.S. officials, legal restrictions in foreign countries may
make it difficult to share this information with CBP. In some cases,
transferring such information to U.S. officials could require new
international agreements.
* Consistency with risk management: International partners state that
100 percent scanning is inconsistent with widely accepted risk
management principles, and some CBP international partners have stated
that the requirement could potentially reduce the security of the
supply chain by diverting scarce resources away from other essential
security measures.
* Reciprocity and trade concerns: Foreign governments could call for
reciprocity of 100 percent scanning, requiring the United States to
scan container exports to those countries. This will be a challenge, as
CBP officials have stated that the agency does not have the resources
to scan other countries' exports leaving the United States. Further,
some view this scanning requirement as a barrier to trade.
Background:
CBP Has Developed a Layered Security Strategy to Help Implement Its
Risk Management Approach:
CBP has developed a layered security strategy that provides multiple
opportunities to mitigate threats and allows CBP to focus its limited
resources on cargo containers that are the most likely to pose a risk
to the United States. Risk management is a strategy called for by
federal law and presidential directive and is meant to help
policymakers and program officials most effectively mitigate risk while
allocating limited resources under conditions of uncertainty. This
layered security strategy is composed of different but complementary
initiatives and programs, such as CSI and C-TPAT, which build on each
other and work with other federal security programs, such as the
Department of Energy's (DOE) Megaports Initiative.[Footnote 7] This
layered strategy attempts to address cargo container security
comprehensively while ensuring that security attention is directed
toward the highest-risk containers within the supply chain.
The Container Security Initiative:
CBP's CSI program aims to identify and examine U.S.-bound cargo that
pose a high risk of concealing WMD or other terrorist contraband by
reviewing advanced cargo information sent by ocean cargo carriers. As
of January 2008, CBP operated CSI in 58 foreign seaports, which, at the
time, accounted for 86 percent of all U.S.-bound cargo containers. As
part of the CSI program, CBP officers, usually stationed at foreign
seaports, seek to identify high-risk U.S.-bound cargo containers by
using information from cargo carriers as well as reviewing databases
and interacting with host government officials. When requested by CBP,
host government customs officials examine the high-risk container cargo
by scanning it using various types of nonintrusive inspection (NII)
equipment, such as large-scale X-ray machines, or by physically
searching a container's contents before it is sent to the United
States.[Footnote 8]
Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism:
Initiated in November 2001, the C-TPAT program aims to secure the flow
of goods bound for the United States by developing a voluntary
antiterrorism partnership with stakeholders from the international
trade community.[Footnote 9] To join C-TPAT, a company submits a
security profile, which CBP compares to its minimum security
requirements for the company's trade sector. CBP then reviews the
company's compliance with customs laws and regulations and any
violation history that might preclude the approval of benefits--which
includes reduced scrutiny or expedited processing of the company's
shipments. CBP data show that from 2004 through 2006, C-TPAT members
were responsible for importing about 30 percent of U.S.-bound cargo
containers, specifically importing 29.5 percent of the 11.7 million
oceangoing cargo containers off-loaded in the United States in the
first 9 months of 2007. As of May 2008, there were over 8,400 C-TPAT
members from the import trade community that had various roles in the
supply chain.
The Importance of International Partnerships:
To more effectively implement the components of its layered security
strategy, CBP has worked to promote international partnerships to
enhance security so that high-risk cargo can be identified before it
arrives in the United States. For the CSI program, CBP has negotiated
and entered into nonbinding, reciprocal arrangements with foreign
governments, specifying the placement of CBP officials at foreign
seaports and the exchange of information between CBP and foreign
customs administrations. These arrangements allow participating foreign
governments the opportunity to place their customs officials at U.S.
seaports and request inspection of cargo containers departing from the
United States that are bound for their respective countries. CBP also
works with other customs organizations to enhance international supply
chain security. For example, CBP has taken a lead role in working with
foreign customs administrations and the WCO to establish and implement
international risk-based management principles and standards, similar
to those used in the CSI and C-TPAT programs, to improve the ability of
member customs administrations to increase the security of the global
supply chain while facilitating international trade. The member
countries of the WCO, including the United States, adopted such risk-
based principles and standards through the WCO Framework of Standards
to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (commonly referred to as the SAFE
Framework), in June 2005.
The SAFE Port Act Requires a Pilot Program to Test the Feasibility of
100 Percent Scanning:
To improve maritime container security, the SAFE Port Act was enacted
in October 2006 and requires, among other things, that CBP conduct a
pilot program to determine the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of
U.S.-bound containers. It also specifies that the pilot should test
integrated scanning systems that combine the use of radiation portal
monitors and NII equipment, building upon CSI and the Megaports
Initiative. To fulfill this and other requirements of the SAFE Port
Act, CBP and DOE jointly announced the formation of SFI in December
2006. The first phase of SFI is the International Container Security
project--commonly known as the SFI pilot program.[Footnote 10] The SFI
pilot program tests the feasibility of 100 percent scanning of U.S.-
bound container cargo at seven overseas seaports and involves the
deployment of advanced cargo scanning equipment and an integrated
examination system. The advanced cargo scanning equipment--NII and
radiation detection equipment--produce data to indicate the presence of
illicit nuclear and radiological material in containers. The integrated
examination system then uses software to make this information
available to CBP for analysis. According to CBP, it will review the
scan data at the foreign seaport or at CBP's National Targeting Center-
Cargo (NTCC) in the United States.[Footnote 11] If the scanning
equipment indicates a potential concern, both CSI and host government
customs officials are to simultaneously receive an alert and the
specific container is to be further inspected before it continues on to
the United States.
As shown in table 1, under the SFI pilot program, three SFI seaports
are to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo that passes
through those seaports, while the other four seaports are to deploy
scanning equipment in a more limited capacity.
Table 1: Information on the Seven Foreign Seaports Participating in the
SFI Pilot Program:
SFI port: Qasim, Pakistan;
Deployment level when pilot operational: Full[C];
Testing date[A]: March 2007;
Operational date[B]: October 12, 2007;
Volume of U.S.-bound containers, fiscal year 2006: 2,058.
SFI port: Puerto Cortez, Honduras;
Deployment level when pilot operational: Full[C];
Testing date[A]: April 2007;
Operational date[B]: October 12, 2007;
Volume of U.S.-bound containers, fiscal year 2006: 77,707.
SFI port: Southampton, UK;
Deployment level when pilot operational: Full[C];
Testing date[A]: August 2007;
Operational date[B]: October 12, 2007;
Volume of U.S.-bound containers, fiscal year 2006: 31,780.
SFI port: Busan, South Korea;
Deployment level when pilot operational: Limited[D];
Testing date[A]: April 2008 (projected);
Operational date[B]: To be determined;
Volume of U.S.-bound containers, fiscal year 2006: 610,061.
SFI port: Salalah, Oman;
Deployment level when pilot operational: Limited[D];
Testing date[A]: May 2008 (projected);
Operational date[B]: To be determined;
Volume of U.S.-bound containers, fiscal year 2006: 81,333.
SFI port: Singapore;
Deployment level when pilot operational: Limited[D];
Testing date[A]: June 2008 (projected);
Operational date[B]: To be determined;
Volume of U.S.-bound containers, fiscal year 2006: 376,846.
SFI port: Hong Kong;
Deployment level when pilot operational: Limited[D];
Testing date[A]: November 2007;
Operational date[B]: January 2008;
Volume of U.S.-bound containers, fiscal year 2006: 1,333,812.
Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
[A] Testing date is defined as the date when the scanning systems are
in place and operational testing begins.
[B] Operational date is defined as the date when the SFI scanning data
are transmitted successfully to the local central alarm station and to
the CBP network in the United States.
[C] Fully operational seaports are to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound
container cargo under the SFI pilot program.
[D] Limited operation seaports are to scan less than 100 percent of
U.S.-bound container cargo. For these seaports, CBP plans to conduct
SFI operations at a reduced level, typically limited to one terminal in
the port, such as Gamman Terminal in Busan.
[End of table]
As required by the SAFE Port Act, CBP was to issue a report in April
2008 on the lessons learned from the SFI pilot program and the need and
feasibility of expanding the 100 percent scanning system to other CSI
seaports, among other things.[Footnote 12] As we prepared this
statement, CBP had not yet issued this report. Every 6 months after the
issuance of this report, CBP is to report on the status of full-scale
deployment of the integrated scanning systems at foreign seaports to
scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo.
The SFI Pilot Program and 100 Percent Scanning Face a Number of
Challenges:
We identified challenges in nine areas that are related to the
continuation of the SFI pilot program and the longer-term 100 percent
scanning requirement: (1) workforce planning, (2) the lack of
information about host government cargo examination systems,(3)
measuring performance outcomes, (4) undefined resource responsibilities
for the cost and labor for implementation, (5) logistical feasibility
for scanning equipment and processes, (6) technological issues, (7) the
use and ownership of scanning data, (8) a perceived disparity between
100 percent scanning and the risk management approach of CBP's
international partners, and (9) potential requests for reciprocity from
foreign governments.
Workforce Planning Will Be Critical to Success:
In our prior work examining the CSI and C-TPAT programs, we reported
that CBP faced challenges identifying an appropriate number of
positions for the programs and finding enough qualified people to fill
these positions.[Footnote 13] For example, we reported in 2005 and
again in 2008 that CBP's human capital plan did not systematically
determine the optimal number of officers needed at each CSI seaport to
carry out duties that require an overseas presence (such as
coordinating with host government officials or witnessing the
examinations they conduct) as opposed to duties that could be performed
remotely in the United States (such as reviewing databases).[Footnote
14] Determining optimal staffing levels is particularly important since
CBP reports facing ongoing challenges identifying sufficient numbers of
qualified employees to staff the program. For example, CBP officials
reported that 9 qualified applicants applied for 40 permanent positions
at CSI seaports. We also reported that according to CBP officials, to
fill open CSI positions, officers have in some cases been deployed who
have not received all required training. We recommended in April 2005
that CBP revise the CSI staffing model to consider (1) what functions
need to be performed at CSI seaports and what can be performed in the
United States, (2) the optimum levels of staff needed at CSI seaports
to maximize the benefits of targeting and inspection activities in
conjunction with host nation customs officials, and (3) the cost of
locating targeters overseas at CSI seaports instead of in the United
States.[Footnote 15] CBP agreed with our recommendation on CSI's
staffing model and said that modifications to the model would allow
program objectives to be achieved in a more cost-effective manner. CBP
said that it would evaluate the minimum level of staff needed at CSI
seaports to maintain ongoing dialogue with host nation officials, as
well as assess the staffing levels needed domestically to support CSI
activities. However, as of January 2008, CBP's human capital plan did
not systematically make these determinations.
The ability of the SFI pilot program--and by extension the 100 percent
scanning requirement of the SAFE Port and 9/11 Acts--to operate
effectively and enhance maritime container security depends, in part,
on the success of CBP's ability to manage and deploy staff in a way
that ensures that critical security functions are performed. Under the
CSI program, CBP operated and conducted cargo container scanning at 58
foreign seaports as of January 2008; however, given that additional
scanning equipment will be used in the SFI pilot program, and
fulfilling the 100 percent scanning requirement will naturally increase
the number of containers to be scanned at the more than 700 seaports
that ship cargo to the United States, the SFI pilot program and 100
percent scanning requirement will generate an increased quantity of
scan data. According to European customs officials, for there to be
value added in these additional scans, the scan data must be reviewed.
Therefore, in implementing the 100 percent scanning requirement, CBP
will face staffing challenges because more CBP officers will be
required to review and analyze these data from participating seaports.
CBP Generally Lacks Key Information on Host Government Examination
Systems Because of Sovereignty Constraints:
As we reported in January 2008, CBP does not systematically collect
information on CSI host governments' examination equipment or
processes.[Footnote 16] We noted that CBP must respect the sovereignty
of countries participating in CSI and, therefore, cannot require that a
country use specific scanning equipment or follow a set of prescribed
examination practices. Thus, while CBP has set minimum technical
criteria to evaluate the quality and performance of equipment being
considered for use at domestic seaports, it has no comparable standards
for scanning equipment used at foreign seaports. In addition, CBP
officials stated that there are no plans to evaluate examination
equipment at foreign seaports against the domestic criteria. CBP
officials added, however, that the capabilities of scanning equipment
are only one element for determining the effectiveness of examinations
that take place at CSI seaports. It is better, in their view, to make
assessments of the processes, personnel, and equipment that
collectively constitute the host governments' entire examination
systems. However, in January 2008, we reported that CBP does not gather
this type of information and recommended that CBP, in collaboration
with host government officials, improve the information gathered at
each CSI port by (1) establishing general guidelines and technical
criteria regarding the minimal capability and operating procedures for
an examination system that can provide a basis for determining the
reliability of examinations and related CSI activities; (2)
systematically collecting data for that purpose; and (3) analyzing the
data against the guidelines and technical criteria to determine what,
if any, mitigating actions or incentives CBP should take to help ensure
the desired level of security. CBP partially concurred with this
recommendation in terms of improving the information gathered about
host governments' examination systems. In particular, CBP agreed on the
importance of an accepted examination process and noted that it
continues to improve the information it gathers. CBP did not indicate
that it would systematically pursue information on these host
government examination systems. It did state that it was working
through the WCO to address uniform technical standards for equipment.
We reported that while CBP engaged with international trade groups to
develop supply chain security requirements, these requirements do not
specify particular equipment capabilities or examination practices.
Both the SAFE Port and 9/11 Acts require DHS to develop technical and
operational standards for scanning systems; therefore, the challenges
that CSI has faced in obtaining information about host governments'
examination systems are relevant to the SFI pilot program and the 100
percent scanning requirement.[Footnote 17] However, as noted earlier in
this statement, the United States cannot compel foreign governments to
use specific equipment for the SFI pilot program or the 100 percent
scanning requirement, thus challenging CBP's ability to set and enforce
standards. In addition, because CBP does not systematically collect
information on the efficacy of host governments' examinations systems,
it lacks reasonable assurance that these examinations could reliably
detect and identify WMD unless it implements our January 2008
recommendation to determine actions to take to ensure the desired level
of security. This is particularly important since currently, under CSI,
most high-risk cargo containers examined at international seaports are
not re-examined upon arrival at domestic seaports.
Measuring Performance, Particularly Outcomes, Will Be Difficult:
In our reviews of the CSI and C-TPAT programs, we identified challenges
with CBP's ability to measure program performance because of, among
other things, the difficulty in determining whether these programs were
achieving their desired result of increasing security for the United
States.[Footnote 18] In the past, we and the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) have acknowledged the difficulty in developing outcome-
based performance measures for programs that aim to deter or prevent
specific behaviors.[Footnote 19] In the case of C-TPAT, we noted in our
March 2005 and April 2008 reports that CBP had not developed a
comprehensive set of performance measures and indicators for the
programs, such as outcome-based measures, to monitor the status of
program goals. A senior CBP official stated that developing these
measures for C-TPAT, as well as other CBP programs, has been difficult
because CBP lacks the data necessary to determine whether a program has
prevented or deterred terrorist activity. We recommended that CBP
complete the development of performance measures, to include outcome-
based measures and performance targets, to track the program's status
in meeting its strategic goals. CBP agreed with our recommendation on
developing performance measures, and had developed initial measures
relating to membership, inspection percentages, and validation
effectiveness. However, as we reported in April 2008, CBP had yet to
develop measures that assess C-TPAT's progress toward achieving its
strategic goal to ensure that its members improve the security of their
supply chains pursuant to C-TPAT security criteria.
Given that, as with CSI and C-TPAT, the purpose of the SFI pilot
program and the 100 percent scanning provision is to increase security
for the United States, the same challenges related to defining and
measuring performance could also apply to the SFI pilot program and the
100 percent scanning provision. Without outcome-based performance
measures, it will be difficult for CBP and DHS managers and Congress to
effectively provide program oversight and determine whether 100 percent
scanning achieves the desired result--namely increased security for the
United States.
Resource Responsibilities for Implementing 100 Percent Scanning Have
Not Been Determined:
While CBP and DOE have purchased security equipment for foreign
seaports participating in the SFI pilot program, it is unclear who will
pay for additional resources--including increased staff, equipment, and
infrastructure--and who will be responsible for operating and
maintaining the equipment used for the statutory requirement to scan
100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers at foreign seaports.
According to CBP, the average cost of initiating operations at CSI
seaports was about $395,000 in 2004 and $227,000 in 2005.[Footnote 20]
By comparison, CBP reported that it and DOE have spent approximately
$60 million, collectively, to implement 100 percent scanning at the
three foreign seaports fully participating in the SFI pilot
program.[Footnote 21] The SAFE Port and 9/11 Acts did not require nor
prohibit the federal government from bearing the cost of scanning 100
percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers.[Footnote 22] According to
customs officials in the UK who participated in the SFI pilot program
at the Port of Southampton, resource issues will inhibit their ability
to implement permanently the 100 percent scanning requirement. For
example, these customs officials commented that to accommodate the SFI
pilot program at the Port of Southampton, existing customs staff had to
be reallocated from other functions. The UK customs officials further
stated that this reallocation was feasible for the 6-month pilot
program, but it would not be feasible on a permanent basis. Similarly,
a customs official from another country with whom we met told us that
while his country does not scan 100 percent of exports, its customs
service has increased its focus on examining more exported container
cargo, and this shift has led to a 50 percent increase in personnel.
European government officials expressed concerns regarding the cost of
equipment to meet the 100 percent scanning requirement, as well as the
cost of additional personnel necessary to operate the new scanning
equipment, view and transmit the images to the United States, and
resolve false alarms. Though CBP and DOE have provided the bulk of
equipment and other infrastructure necessary to implement the SFI pilot
program, they have also benefited from host nation officials and port
operators willing to provide, to varying degrees, the resources
associated with additional staffing, alarm response protocols,
construction, and other infrastructure upgrades. However, according to
CBP, there is no assurance that this kind of mutual support is either
sustainable in the long term or exists in all countries or at all
seaports that export goods to the United States.
Logistical Feasibility Could Vary by Seaport:
Logistical issues, such as crowded terminal facilities and the variety
of transportation modes at terminals, could present challenges to the
SFI pilot program and implementation of 100 percent scanning. Seaports
may lack the space necessary to install additional scanning equipment
needed to comply with the 100 percent scanning requirement. For
example, we observed that scanning equipment at some seaports is
located several miles away from where cargo containers are stored,
which could add to the time and cost requirements for scanning these
containers. Similarly, while some seaports have natural bottlenecks
that allow for container scanning equipment to be placed such that all
outgoing containers would have to pass through the equipment, not all
seaports are so configured, and the potential exists for containers to
be shipped to the United States without being scanned. Another
potential logistical vulnerability is related to the transportation
modes by which cargo containers arrive and pass through seaports. For
example, cargo containers that arrive at a seaport by truck or rail are
generally easier to isolate, whereas transshipment cargo containers--
those moved from one vessel to another--are only available for scanning
for a comparatively short time and may be more difficult to
access.[Footnote 23] For example, UK customs officials stated that it
was not possible to route transshipment containers that arrived by sea
through the SFI equipment. As a consequence, the scanning of
transshipment containers has not begun at the Port of Southampton. CBP
and European customs officials evaluating the SFI pilot program stated
that while the pilot has been comparatively successful at relatively
lower-volume seaports, such as Southampton, implementing 100 percent
scanning would be significantly more challenging at seaports with a
higher volume of cargo container traffic or greater percentages of
transshipment cargo containers.
Technology and Compatibility Issues Could Present Challenges:
The SFI pilot program currently faces technology challenges, such as
mechanical breakdowns of scanning equipment because of environmental
factors, inadequate infrastructure for the transmission of electronic
information, and difficulties in integrating different generations of
scanning equipment. Environmental conditions at some sites can
compromise the effectiveness of radiation detection equipment used in
the SFI pilot program. For example, two of the three seaports fully
participating in the SFI pilot program experienced weather-related
mechanical breakdowns of scanning equipment. Specifically, at the Port
of Southampton, a piece of radiation scanning equipment failed because
of rainy conditions and had to be replaced, resulting in 2 weeks of
diminished scanning capabilities. Additionally, Port Qasim in Pakistan
has experienced difficulties with scanning equipment because of the
extreme heat. Because of the range of climates at the more than 700
other international seaports that ship cargo to the United States,
these types of technological challenges could be experienced elsewhere.
The limited infrastructure at some foreign seaports poses a challenge
to the installation and operation of radiation detection equipment, as
well as to the electronic transmission of scan data to CBP officers in
the United States. Many seaports are located in remote areas that often
do not have access to reliable supplies of electricity or
infrastructure needed to operate radiation portal monitors and
associated communication systems. For example, at Port Salalah in Oman,
a key challenge has been the cost of data transmission, because of low
bandwidth communications infrastructure, to send data to the CBP
officers who review the scans. Prior to SFI, the CSI office in Port
Salalah already used transmission technology that cost annually about
10 times that of other SFI seaports. To participate in SFI, CBP
originally planned to procure additional technology costing
approximately $1.5 million each year to transmit the SFI data from Port
Salalah. However, CBP was able to devise a lower-cost option that
involved sharing communications infrastructure with existing CSI
operations at the port because U.S.-bound container volume is
relatively low in Oman. While CBP reported that this solution could
keep data transmission costs down at other low-volume seaports, it is
unclear whether this could be accomplished at higher-volume seaports.
In addition to compatibility with existing infrastructure, SFI seaports
have experienced compatibility issues with equipment from different
generations. According to CBP, there are various manufacturers of
equipment used at CSI seaports, and although the integration of
equipment and technology at SFI pilot program seaports has generally
been successful, it has not been without challenges. For example, at
Port Salalah integration of a large number of new pieces of equipment
by new vendors caused operational delays.
Use and Ownership of Data Have Not Been Determined:
The legislation that mandated the SFI pilot program and 100 percent
scanning does not specify who will have the authority or responsibility
to collect, maintain, disseminate, view, or analyze scan data collected
on cargo containers bound for the United States. While the SAFE Port
Act specifies that SFI pilot program scan data should be available for
review by U.S. government officials, neither it nor the 9/11 Act
establishes who is to be responsible for managing the data collected at
foreign seaports. Other unresolved questions include ownership of data,
how proprietary information is to be treated, and how privacy concerns
are to be addressed. For example, officials from UK Customs stated that
UK privacy legislation barred sharing information on cargo containers
with CBP unless a specific risk was associated with the containers. To
comply with UK laws, while still allowing CBP to obtain scan data on
container cargo, UK Customs and CBP negotiated working practices to
allow CBP to use its own handheld radiation scanning devices to
determine whether cargo containers emitted radiation, but this was only
for purposes of the SFI pilot program. According to the European
Commission, for 100 percent scanning to go forward, the transfer of
sensitive information would have to take place systematically, which
would only be possible if a new international agreement between the
United States and the European Union (EU) was enacted. In the absence
of agreements with the host governments at the more than 700 seaports
that ship cargo to the United States, access to data on the results of
container scans could be difficult to ensure.
CBP International Partners Have Stated That 100 Percent Scanning Is
Inconsistent with Widely Accepted Risk Management Practices:
Some of CBP's international partners, including foreign customs
services, port operators, trade groups, and international
organizations, have stated that the 100 percent scanning requirement is
inconsistent with widely accepted risk management principles, and some
governments have expressed to DHS and Congress that 100 percent
scanning is not consistent with these principles as contained in the
SAFE Framework.[Footnote 24] Similarly, some European customs officials
have told us that the 100 percent scanning requirement is in contrast
to the risk-based strategy behind CSI and C-TPAT, and the WCO has
stated that implementation of 100 percent scanning would be "tantamount
to abandonment of risk management." In addition, some of CBP's
international partners have stated that the requirement could
potentially reduce security. For example, the European Commission noted
that there has been no demonstration that 100 percent scanning is a
better means for enhancing security than current risk-based methods.
Further, CBP officials have told us that the 100 percent scanning
requirement may be a disincentive for foreign countries or companies to
adopt risk-based security initiatives, such as CSI, C-TPAT, or the SAFE
Framework. Similarly, in April 2008, the Association of German Seaport
Operators released a position paper that stated that implementing the
100 percent scanning requirement would undermine mutual, already
achieved, security successes and hinder maritime security by depriving
resources from areas that present a more significant threat and warrant
closer scrutiny.
100 Percent Scanning Could Lead to Calls for Reciprocity and Be Viewed
as a Barrier to Trade:
Implementation of the 100 percent scanning requirement could result in
calls for reciprocity of scanning activities from foreign officials and
be viewed as a barrier to trade. European customs officials, as well as
officials from the WCO, have objected to the unilateral nature of the
100 percent scanning requirement, noting that this requirement
contrasts with prior multilateral efforts CBP has implemented.
Similarly, the Association of German Port Operators published a
position paper stating that the legislative requirement inherently
ignores the international character of global maritime trade and is a
classic example of an issue that should have been discussed with and
passed by the legislative body of an international organization, such
as the WCO. In its report on the SFI pilot program, the European
Commission expressed concern that it would be difficult for EU customs
administrations to implement a measure designed to protect the United
States that would divert resources away from strengthening EU security.
Customs officials from Europe, as well as members of the World Shipping
Council and the Federation of European Private Port Operators,
indicated that should implementation of the 100 percent scanning
requirement be pursued, foreign governments could establish similar
requirements for the United States, forcing U.S. export cargo
containers to undergo scanning before being loaded at U.S. seaports.
According to CBP officials, the SFI pilot program, as an extension of
CSI, allows foreign officials to ask the United States to reciprocate
and scan 100 percent of cargo containers bound for their respective
countries. CBP officials told us that CBP does not have the personnel,
equipment, or space to scan 100 percent of cargo containers being
exported to other countries, should it be requested to do so.
In addition to the issue of reciprocity, European and Asian government
officials, as well as officials from the WCO, have stated that 100
percent scanning could constitute a barrier to trade. For example, the
Association of German Seaport Operators stated that the 100 percent
mandate would amount to an unfair nontariff trade barrier between the
United States and foreign seaports. Similarly, senior officials from
the European Commission expressed concern that a 100 percent scanning
requirement placed on foreign seaports could disrupt the international
trading system.[Footnote 25] Further, the WCO passed a unanimous
resolution in December 2007, expressing concern that implementation of
100 percent scanning would be detrimental to world trade and could
result in unreasonable delays, port congestion, and international
trading difficulties.[Footnote 26]
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. We look forward to working with CBP and the
Congress to track progress of the SFI pilot and to identify the way
forward for supply chain security. I would be happy to respond to any
questions you may have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For information about this testimony, please contact Stephen L.
Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-
9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. This testimony was prepared under the direction
of Christopher Conrad, Assistant Director. Other individuals making key
contributions to this testimony include Frances Cook, Stephanie Fain,
Emily Hanawalt, Valerie Kasindi, Robert Rivas, and Sally Williamson.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced
Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in
Verifying Security Practices. GAO-08-240. Washington, D.C.: April 25,
2008.
Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign
Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance
Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2008.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One
Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Maritime Security: One Year Later: A Progress Report on the SAFE Port
Act. GAO-08-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2007.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our Nation's
Seaports. GAO-08-86T. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2007.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure
Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. GAO-
07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.
Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port
Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007.
Customs Revenue: Customs and Border Protection Needs to Improve
Workforce Planning and Accountability. GAO-07-529. Washington, D.C.:
April 12, 2007.
Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of
Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T.
Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006.
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection
Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T.
Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005.
Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved. GAO-05-
466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:
May 17, 2005.
Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment
Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts.
GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005.
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in
Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign
Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005.
Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny
with Limited Assurance of Improved Security. GAO-05-404. Washington,
D.C.: March 11, 2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport
Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.:
January 14, 2005.
Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime
Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.:
December 10, 2004.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning
Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington,
D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing
Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March
31, 2004.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require
Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,
D.C.: July 25, 2003.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Examining cargo containers involves using radiation detection
equipment or nonintrusive imaging equipment, which may include X-ray or
gamma ray technology, or both, to determine if a cargo container poses
a WMD risk.
[2] Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884.
[3] Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1701(a), 121, Stat. 266, 489-90 (amending 6
U.S.C. § 982(b)).
[4] See the end of this statement for a list of related GAO products.
[5] In addition to this report, the SAFE Port Act also required that
CBP produce a report on lessons learned from the SFI pilot program;
however, this report was not available as of the time we prepared this
statement.
[6] The WCO is an independent international organization whose mission
is to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of customs
administrations.
[7] Begun in 2003, DOE's Megaports Initiative complements CBP's layered
security strategy by providing foreign nations with radiation detection
equipment, such as radiation portal monitors, to scan cargo containers
moving through their seaports. As of February 2008, the Megaports
Initiative was fully operational at 12 foreign seaports and in various
stages of implementation at 17 others.
[8] There are generally two types of CSI cargo container examinations-
-scanning with NII equipment and physical searches. To scan cargo
containers, CSI depends on imaging equipment, which may use X-rays or
gamma rays to create images of the container's contents, and radiation
detection equipment. CBP officials, along with host government
officials, may review the information produced with the scanning
equipment to determine the presence of WMD. Depending on the results of
the scans, physical searches may be conducted.
[9] Stakeholders of the international trade community include
importers; customs brokers; air, sea, and land carriers; and other
logistics service providers, such as freight consolidators.
[10] The second phase of SFI is still in development. This phase
involves the advance transmission of cargo information from importers
and cargo carriers.
[11] According to CBP, the National Targeting Center (NTC) was
established in response to the need for proactive targeting aimed at
preventing acts of terror and to seize, deter, and disrupt terrorists
and implements of terror. NTC originally combined both passenger and
cargo targeting in one facility. It was later divided into NTCC and the
National Targeting Center-Passenger. For purposes of this report, we
use NTCC in our references since its mission is to support CBP cargo-
targeting operations.
[12] 6 U.S.C. § 981(d). The DHS Appropriations Act for fiscal year
2007, enacted shortly before the SAFE Port Act, also required a pilot
program to test 100 percent scanning at three ports, and established
similar, but not identical, requirements for the program. For example,
the report to Congress on lessons learned is to include a plan and
schedule to expand the scanning system developed under the pilot to
other CSI ports rather than an assessment of the need and feasibility
of such an expansion.
[13] For our prior recommendations and observations on C-TPAT's
workforce challenges, see GAO, Container Security: Expansion of Key
Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success
Factors, GAO-03-770 (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2003). Also, see GAO,
Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny
with Limited Assurance of Improved Security, GAO-05-404 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 11, 2005).
[14] GAO, Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum
Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection
Efforts, GAO-05-557 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005) and GAO, Supply
Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports
Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures
Are Needed, GAO-08-187 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2008).
[15] GAO-05-557.
[16] GAO-08-187.
[17] The SAFE Port Act directs DHS to (1) establish technical criteria
and standard operating procedures for the use of NII equipment at CSI
seaports and (2) require CSI seaports to operate the equipment in
accordance with the criteria and operating procedures established by
DHS. The act states that the technical criteria and operating
procedures should not be designed to conflict with the sovereignty of
host countries, but it did not address host government s' sovereignty
related to requirements for CSI seaports to operate the equipment in
accordance with the criteria and procedures. The 9/11 Act directs DHS
to establish technological and operational standards for systems to
conduct 100 percent scanning of containers and to ensure that this and
other actions taken to implement 100 percent scanning are consistent
with the United States' international obligations.
[18] For more information on the difficulty that CSI has had in
developing outcome-based performance measures and in measuring the
deterrence effect of the program, see GAO-08-187.
[19] According to OMB, outcome measures describe the intended result of
carrying out a program or activity. For example, for a tornado warning
system, a measure of outcome could be the number of lives saved and
amount of property damage averted.
[20] CBP had used the average cost per CSI port to achieve operational
status as a performance measure. However, agency officials told us that
they stopped using the measure in 2006 because at that point, the
majority of CSI seaports had already become operational and because
there were too many variables beyond CBP's control in the calculation.
[21] Under the SFI pilot program, three seaports will scan 100 percent
of U.S.-bound container cargo while the remaining four will scan less
than 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo. CBP will conduct a
reduced level of SFI operations at these four seaports, typically
limited to one terminal in the port, such as Gamman Terminal in Busan
or the Brani Terminal in Singapore.
[22] The Congressional Budget Office assumed in its analysis of
estimates for implementing this requirement that the cost of acquiring,
installing, and maintaining systems necessary to comply with the 100
percent scanning requirement would be borne by foreign seaports so that
they could maintain trade with the United States.
[23] Similarly, it may be difficult to scan cargo containers that
remain on board a vessel as it passes through a foreign seaport.
[24] Currently, the CSI program employs a risk management approach to
identify cargo containers at high risk of containing WMD for scanning
with nonintrusive imaging equipment and possible physical inspection
before being placed on vessels bound for the United States. In
contrast, the 100 percent scanning approach subjects to all U.S.-bound
cargo containers to scanning with nonintrusive imaging equipment
regardless of risk.
[25] The European Commission is the EU's policy-making and executive
engine. The commission is composed of 27 commissioners, one from each
member state. Among its many powers, the commission proposes
legislation for approval by the EU Council and European Parliament in
matters relating to economic integration, ensures that EU laws are
applied and upheld throughout the EU, implements the budget, and
represents the European community in international trade negotiations.
[26] The United States abstained from the vote.
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