Aviation Security
Transportation Security Administration May Face Resource and Other Challenges in Developing a System to Screen All Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft Gao ID: GAO-08-959T July 15, 2008The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requires the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to implement a system to physically screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft by August 2010. To fulfill these requirements, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) TSA is developing the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP), which would allow the screening of cargo to occur prior to placement on an aircraft. This testimony addresses four challenges TSA may face in developing a system to screen 100 percent of cargo: (1) deploying effective technologies; (2) changing TSA air cargo screening exemptions; (3) allocating compliance inspection resources to oversee CCSP participants; and (4) securing cargo transported from a foreign nation to the United States. GAO's comments are based on GAO products issued from October 2005 through February 2008, including selected updates conducted in July 2008.
DHS has taken steps to develop and test technologies for screening and securing air cargo; however, TSA has not completed assessments of the technologies it plans to use as part of the CCSP. TSA has reported that there are several challenges that must be overcome to effectively implement any of these technologies, including the nature, type, and size of cargo to be screened and the location of air cargo facilities. In addition, the air cargo industry voiced concern about the costs associated with purchasing the screening equipment. GAO will likely review this issue in future work. TSA plans to revise and eliminate screening exemptions for some categories of air cargo, thereby reducing the percentage of cargo transported on passenger aircraft that is subject to alternative methods of screening. However, TSA plans to continue to exempt some types of domestic and outbound cargo (cargo transported by air from the United States to a foreign location) after August 2010. TSA based its determination regarding the changing of exemptions on professional judgment and the results of air cargo vulnerability assessments. However, TSA has not completed all of its air cargo vulnerability assessments, which would further inform its efforts. TSA officials stated there may not be enough compliance inspectors to oversee implementation of the CCSP and is anticipating requesting an additional 150 inspectors for fiscal year 2010. They further stated that they have not formally assessed the number of inspectors the agency will need. Without such an assessment, TSA may not be able to ensure that CCSP entities are meeting TSA requirements to screen and secure cargo. To ensure that existing air cargo security requirements are being implemented as required, TSA conducts audits, referred to as compliance inspections, of air carriers that transport cargo. The compliance inspections range from a comprehensive review of the implementation of all security requirements to a review of at least one security requirement by an air carrier or freight forwarder (which consolidates cargo from many shippers and takes it to air carriers for transport). GAO reported in October 2005 that TSA had conducted compliance inspections on fewer than half of the estimated 10,000 freight forwarders nationwide and, of those, had found violations in over 40 percent of them. GAO also reported that TSA had not analyzed the results of compliance inspections to systematically target future inspections. GAO reported in April 2007 that more work remains for TSA to strengthen the security of cargo transported from a foreign nation to the United States, referred to as inbound air cargo. Although TSA is developing a system to screen 100 percent of domestic and outbound cargo, TSA officials stated that it does not plan to include inbound cargo because it does not impose its security requirements on foreign countries. TSA officials said that vulnerabilities to inbound air cargo exist and that these vulnerabilities are in some cases similar to those of domestic air cargo, but stated that each foreign country has its own security procedures for flights coming into the United States.
GAO-08-959T, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration May Face Resource and Other Challenges in Developing a System to Screen All Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft
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Testimony before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and
Infrastructure Protection, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST:
Tuesday, July 15, 2008:
Aviation Security:
Transportation Security Administration May Face Resource and Other
Challenges in Developing a System to Screen All Cargo Transported on
Passenger Aircraft:
Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-08-959T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-959T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
requires the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to implement
a system to physically screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger
aircraft by August 2010. To fulfill these requirements, the Department
of Homeland Security‘s (DHS) TSA is developing the Certified Cargo
Screening Program (CCSP), which would allow the screening of cargo to
occur prior to placement on an aircraft. This testimony addresses four
challenges TSA may face in developing a system to screen 100 percent of
cargo: (1) deploying effective technologies; (2) changing TSA air cargo
screening exemptions; (3) allocating compliance inspection resources to
oversee CCSP participants; and (4) securing cargo transported from a
foreign nation to the United States. GAO‘s comments are based on GAO
products issued from October 2005 through February 2008, including
selected updates conducted in July 2008.
What GAO Found:
DHS has taken steps to develop and test technologies for screening and
securing air cargo; however, TSA has not completed assessments of the
technologies it plans to use as part of the CCSP. TSA has reported that
there are several challenges that must be overcome to effectively
implement any of these technologies, including the nature, type, and
size of cargo to be screened and the location of air cargo facilities.
In addition, the air cargo industry voiced concern about the costs
associated with purchasing the screening equipment. GAO will likely
review this issue in future work.
TSA plans to revise and eliminate screening exemptions for some
categories of air cargo, thereby reducing the percentage of cargo
transported on passenger aircraft that is subject to alternative
methods of screening. However, TSA plans to continue to exempt some
types of domestic and outbound cargo (cargo transported by air from the
United States to a foreign location) after August 2010. TSA based its
determination regarding the changing of exemptions on professional
judgment and the results of air cargo vulnerability assessments.
However, TSA has not completed all of its air cargo vulnerability
assessments, which would further inform its efforts.
TSA officials stated there may not be enough compliance inspectors to
oversee implementation of the CCSP and is anticipating requesting an
additional 150 inspectors for fiscal year 2010. They further stated
that they have not formally assessed the number of inspectors the
agency will need. Without such an assessment, TSA may not be able to
ensure that CCSP entities are meeting TSA requirements to screen and
secure cargo. To ensure that existing air cargo security requirements
are being implemented as required, TSA conducts audits, referred to as
compliance inspections, of air carriers that transport cargo. The
compliance inspections range from a comprehensive review of the
implementation of all security requirements to a review of at least one
security requirement by an air carrier or freight forwarder (which
consolidates cargo from many shippers and takes it to air carriers for
transport). GAO reported in October 2005 that TSA had conducted
compliance inspections on fewer than half of the estimated 10,000
freight forwarders nationwide and, of those, had found violations in
over 40 percent of them. GAO also reported that TSA had not analyzed
the results of compliance inspections to systematically target future
inspections.
GAO reported in April 2007 that more work remains for TSA to strengthen
the security of cargo transported from a foreign nation to the United
States, referred to as inbound air cargo. Although TSA is developing a
system to screen 100 percent of domestic and outbound cargo, TSA
officials stated that it does not plan to include inbound cargo because
it does not impose its security requirements on foreign countries. TSA
officials said that vulnerabilities to inbound air cargo exist and that
these vulnerabilities are in some cases similar to those of domestic
air cargo, but stated that each foreign country has its own security
procedures for flights coming into the United States.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO has made recommendations to DHS and TSA in prior reports to
increase the security and screening of air cargo, including completing
vulnerability assessments and developing a plan for analyzing
compliance inspections. TSA generally agreed with these recommendations
and plans to address them.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-959T]. For more
information, contact Cathleen A. Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or
berrickc@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Ms. Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the security of the air cargo transportation system. In
response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act was enacted in November 2001, which
created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and required
it to provide for the screening of all passengers and property,
including cargo, U.S. mail, and carry-on and checked baggage that is
transported onboard passenger aircraft. Recognizing the need to
strengthen the security of air cargo, Congress enacted, and the
President signed into law, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, which requires TSA to implement a system to
physically screen 50 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft by February
2009, and 100 percent of such cargo by August 2010.[Footnote 1] To
fulfill the requirements of the Act, TSA is developing a program,
referred to as the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP), which
would allow the screening of air cargo to take place at various points
throughout the air cargo supply chain. Under the CCSP, Certified Cargo
Screening Facilities (CCSF), such as shippers, manufacturing
facilities, and freight forwarders that meet security requirements
established by TSA, will volunteer to screen cargo prior to its loading
onto an aircraft.[Footnote 2] Participation of the air cargo industry
is critical to the successful implementation of the CCSP. According to
TSA officials, air carriers will ultimately be responsible for
screening 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft should
air cargo industry entities not volunteer to become a CCSF.
My testimony today focuses on the challenges TSA may face as it works
to develop a system to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on
passenger aircraft by August 2010. Our comments are based on GAO
reports and testimonies issued between October 2005 and February 2008
addressing the security of the air cargo transportation system,
including selected updates to this work conducted in July 2008. In
addition, this statement includes selected information collected during
our review of TSA's report on its air cargo screening exemptions as
mandated by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007[Footnote 3]. This review was completed in July 2008 and has yet
to be publicly issued. We will initiate a review of TSA's efforts to
meet the requirement to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on
passenger aircraft in the near future, at the request of the Chairman
of the House Committee on Homeland Security and Congressman Edward
Markey.
We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
TSA has taken actions to strengthen the security of air cargo, but may
face four major challenges as it proceeds with its plans to implement a
system to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft
by August 2010.[Footnote 4] These challenges are: (1) deploying
effective technologies to screen and secure air cargo; (2) determining
whether to revise, maintain or eliminate existing TSA air cargo
screening exemptions; (3) allocating compliance inspection resources to
oversee CCSP participants; and (4) securing inbound cargo.[Footnote 5]
First, TSA has identified some technologies that the agency plans to
allow certified facilities to use for screening and securing cargo, but
has not yet completed assessments of these technologies. As a result,
TSA cannot be assured that the technologies it plans to approve for use
as part of the CCSP can effectively screen cargo. In addition, the air
cargo industry has expressed concern regarding the costs associated
with purchasing the screening equipment under the CCSP. Second,
although TSA has taken steps to eliminate the majority of exempted
domestic and outbound cargo that it has not required to be screened,
the agency currently plans to continue to exempt some types of domestic
and outbound cargo from screening after August 2010.[Footnote 6] TSA
determined whether to change its exemptions based on professional
judgment and, to some extent, the results of air cargo vulnerability
assessments. However, TSA has yet to complete its air cargo
vulnerability assessments, which could help to identify other potential
security vulnerabilities associated with the exemptions. In addition,
while TSA has plans to complete its vulnerability assessments, the
agency has not established a time frame for doing so. Third, the agency
has also begun analyzing the results of air cargo compliance
inspections and has hired additional compliance inspectors dedicated to
air cargo. TSA officials reported, however, that the agency will need
additional air cargo inspectors to oversee the efforts of the
potentially thousands of entities that may participate in the CCSP once
it is fully implemented. Finally, more work remains in order for TSA to
strengthen the security of inbound cargo. Specifically, the agency has
not yet finalized its strategy for securing inbound cargo or determined
how, if at all, inbound cargo will be screened as part of its proposed
CCSP.
Background:
Air cargo ranges in size from 1 pound to several tons, and in type from
perishables to machinery, and can include items such as electronic
equipment, automobile parts, clothing, medical supplies, other dry
goods, fresh cut flowers, fresh seafood, fresh produce, tropical fish,
and human remains. Cargo can be shipped in various forms, including
large containers known as unit loading devices that allow many packages
to be consolidated into one container that can be loaded onto an
aircraft, wooden crates, assembled pallets, or individually wrapped/
boxed pieces, known as break bulk cargo. Participants in the air cargo
shipping process include shippers, such as individuals and
manufacturers; indirect air carriers, also referred to as freight
forwarders; air cargo handling agents who process and load cargo onto
aircraft on behalf of air carriers; and air carriers that store, load,
and transport cargo. A shipper may also send freight by directly
packaging and delivering it to an air carrier's ticket counter or
sorting center where either the air carrier or a cargo handling agent
will sort and load cargo onto the aircraft.
According to TSA's Air Cargo Strategic Plan, issued in November 2003,
the agency's mission for the air cargo program is to secure the air
cargo transportation system while not unduly impeding the flow of
commerce. TSA's responsibilities for securing air cargo include, among
other things, establishing security requirements governing domestic and
foreign passenger air carriers that transport cargo, and domestic
freight forwarders.[Footnote 7] TSA is also responsible for overseeing
the implementation of air cargo security requirements by air carriers
and freight forwarders through compliance inspections, and, in
coordination with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science
and Technology (S&T) Directorate, for conducting research and
development of air cargo security technologies. Air carriers are
responsible for implementing TSA security requirements, predominantly
through a TSA-approved security program that describes the security
policies, procedures, and systems the air carrier will implement and
maintain to comply with TSA security requirements. These requirements
include measures related to the acceptance, handling, and screening of
cargo; training of employees in security and cargo screening
procedures; testing employee proficiency in cargo screening; and access
to cargo areas and aircraft. If threat information or events indicate
that additional security measures are needed to secure the aviation
sector, TSA may issue revised or new security requirements in the form
of security directives or emergency amendments applicable to domestic
or foreign air carriers. Air carriers must implement the requirements
set forth in the security directives or emergency amendments in
addition to those requirements already imposed and enforced by TSA.
DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has primary
responsibility for preventing terrorists and implements of terrorism
from entering the United States. Specifically, CBP screens inbound air
cargo upon its arrival in the United States to ensure that cargo
entering the country complies with applicable laws and does not pose a
security risk. CBP's efforts include analyzing information on cargo
shipments to identify high-risk cargo arriving in the United States
that may contain terrorists or weapons of mass destruction, commonly
known as targeting, and physically screening this cargo upon its
arrival.[Footnote 8]
Air carriers use several methods and technologies to screen cargo.
These currently include manual physical searches and the use of
approved technology, such as X-ray systems; explosives trace detection
systems; decompression chambers; explosive detection systems (EDS); and
certified explosives detection canine teams.[Footnote 9] Under TSA's
security requirements for domestic and inbound cargo, passenger air
carriers are currently required to randomly screen a specific
percentage of nonexempt cargo pieces listed on each airway bill. As of
October 2006, domestic freight forwarders are also required, under
certain conditions, to screen a certain percentage of cargo prior to
its consolidation. TSA does not regulate foreign freight forwarders, or
individuals or businesses that have their cargo shipped by air to the
United States.
DHS Is in the Early Stages of Testing Technologies to Screen and Secure
Air Cargo:
DHS has taken some steps to develop and test technologies for screening
and securing air cargo, but has not yet completed assessments of the
technologies TSA plans to approve for use as part of the CCSP.
According to TSA officials, there is no single technology capable of
efficiently and effectively screening all types of air cargo for the
full range of potential terrorist threats, including explosives and
weapons of mass destruction. We reported in October 2005, and again in
April 2007, that TSA, working with DHS's S&T Directorate, was
developing and pilot testing a number of technologies to screen and
secure air cargo with minimal impact on the flow of commerce. DHS
officials stated that once the department determines which technologies
it will approve for use with domestic air cargo, it will consider the
use of these technologies for enhancing the security of inbound cargo
shipments. These pilot programs seek to enhance the security of cargo
by improving the effectiveness of air cargo screening through increased
detection rates and reduced false alarm rates, while addressing the two
primary threats to air cargo identified by TSA--hijackers on an all-
cargo aircraft and explosives on passenger aircraft. A description of
these pilot programs and their status is included in table 1.
Table 1: TSA and S&T's Pilot Programs to Test Technologies to Screen
and Secure Air Cargo with Minimal Impact on the Flow of Commerce:
Pilot program: Air cargo explosives detection pilot program;
Description: Tests the use of explosive detections systems, explosives
trace detectors, standard X-ray machines, canine teams, technologies
that can locate a stowaway through detection of a heartbeat or
increased carbon dioxide levels in cargo, and manual screening of air
cargo;
Status: Consistent with the Conference Report accompanying the
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, DHS's S&T is
reporting on the initial results of the pilots every 6 months after
initiation of the first pilot.[A] DHS last submitted a report dated
June 2007, and the latest update is currently undergoing DHS executive
review. In July 2008, TSA officials provided an update that this pilot
is complete and that its final report to Congress is due July 2008.
Pilot program: Explosive detection system (EDS);
Description: Tests the use of computer-aided tomography to compare the
densities of objects to locate explosives in air cargo and to determine
the long-term feasibility of using EDS equipment as a total screening
process for break bulk air cargo;
Status: TSA planned to complete this pilot program in May 2008. In July
2008, TSA officials provided an update that the pilot will be completed
by the end of 2008.
Pilot program: Air cargo security seals;
Description: Explores the viability of potential security
countermeasures, such as tamper-evident security seals, for use with
certain classifications of exempt cargo;
Status: Contract was awarded in June 2007 and TSA planned to start
evaluating various seals in the spring of 2008. However, in July 2008,
TSA officials provided an update that the agency is not conducting a
pilot program in this area.
Pilot program: Hardened unit loading devices;
Description: Tests the use of containers made of blast-resistant
materials that could withstand an explosion onboard an aircraft;
Status: TSA is finalizing its pilot program to evaluate hardened unit
loading devices. In July 2008, TSA officials provided an update that
this pilot will be completed by the end of August 2008.
Pilot program: Pulsed fast neuron analysis (PFNA);
Description: Identifies the chemical signatures of contraband,
explosives and other threat objects;
Status: In the research and development phase. However, in July 2008,
TSA officials provided an update that the agency does not plan to
conduct a pilot program in this area.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by TSA.
[A] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-241, at 53 (2005) (accompanying Pub. L. No.
109-90, 119 Stat. 2064 (2005)).
[End of table]
Although TSA is moving forward with its plans to implement a system to
screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft, the
agency has not completed all of its assessments of air cargo screening
technologies. According to TSA officials, the results of its technology
tests will need to be analyzed before the agency determines which
technologies will be certified for screening cargo, and whether it will
require air carriers and other CCSP participants to use such
technology. Although TSA has not completed all of its pilot programs or
set time frames for completing all of them, TSA is planning on allowing
CCSFs to use explosives trace detection, explosive detection system
(EDS), X-ray, and other technology under CCSP for screening cargo.
Without all of the results of its pilot programs or a time frame for
their completion, however, TSA cannot be assured that the technologies
the agency plans to approve for screening cargo as part of the CCSP are
effective. GAO will likely review this issue as part of our planned
review of TSA's efforts to meet the requirement to screen 100 percent
of cargo transported on passenger aircraft.
According to TSA officials, tamper-evident/resistant security seals
will be essential for ensuring that cargo screened under the CCSP has
not been tampered with during transport from the CCSF to the air
carrier. Officials noted that the agency recognizes that the weakest
link in the transportation of air cargo is the chain of custody to and
from the various entities that handle and screen cargo shipments prior
to its loading onto an aircraft. Officials stated that the agency has
taken steps to analyze the chain of custody of cargo under the CCSP,
and is drafting a security program that will address all entities
involved in the transportation and screening of cargo under the CCSP to
ensure that the chain of custody of the cargo is secure. However, as of
July 2008, TSA officials stated that the agency is not conducting a
pilot program to test tamper-evident/resistant security seals.
Therefore, the effectiveness of security seals to effectively prevent
cargo shipments from tampering is unknown. GAO will likely review this
issue as part of our planned review of TSA's efforts to meet the
requirement to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger
aircraft.
In addition, we reported in April 2007 that several air carriers we met
with were using large X-ray machines at facilities abroad to screen
entire pallets of cargo transported on passenger aircraft. These
machines allow for cargo on pallets to undergo X-ray screening without
requiring the pallet to be broken down.[Footnote 10] We also noted that
CBP uses this technology to screen inbound air cargo once it enters the
United States. TSA officials recently stated that the agency planned to
pilot test large X-ray machines, identifying that large X-ray machines
could be used to screen certain types of cargo that are currently
exempt from TSA's screening requirements, as part of the agency's
efforts to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger
aircraft. TSA officials stated that the agency plans to evaluate this
equipment beginning late 2008 as part of its CCSP pilot program and to
complete the evaluation at the conclusion of the CCSP pilot in August
2010.
In addition, as part of the agency's plans to screen 100 percent of
cargo transported on passenger aircraft, TSA is taking steps to expand
the use of TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams to screen
cargo before it is placed onto passenger aircraft. In 2004, TSA
conducted a pilot program that determined that canine teams had an
acceptable rate of detecting explosives in an air cargo environment,
even when the teams were not specifically trained in this area. TSA is
in the process of adding 170 canine teams to support aviation security
efforts, of which 85 will be primarily used to screen air cargo.
[Footnote 11] These teams are to be primarily located at the 20
airports that receive approximately 65 percent of all air cargo
transported within the United States. TSA officials, however, could not
identify whether the additional 85 canine teams will meet the agency's
increasing screening needs as part of its efforts to screen 100 percent
of such cargo, thus raising questions regarding the future success of
the CCSP.
According to TSA officials, the federal government and the air cargo
industry face several challenges that must be overcome to effectively
implement any of these technologies to screen or secure cargo. These
challenges include factors such as the nature, type and size of cargo
to be screened; environmental and climatic conditions that could impact
the functionality of screening equipment; low screening throughput
rates; staffing and training issues for individuals who screen cargo;
the location of air cargo facilities; employee health and safety
concerns, such as worker exposure to radiation; and the cost and
availability of screening technologies. As TSA takes steps to implement
the CCSP, it will be critical for the agency to address these
challenges to ensure the effectiveness of the program.
As TSA proceeds from piloting to implementing the CCSP, the issue of
who purchases the technologies to support the program will have to be
resolved. Specifically, TSA officials stated that under the CCSP,
certified facilities and air carriers will be responsible for
purchasing equipment to screen cargo. Officials noted that many air
carriers already have screening equipment in place at their facilities
to support this screening, and stated that TSA will reimburse CCSFs for
the cost of the equipment, such as EDS, for up to $375,000 per facility
as long as these entities continue to meet security requirements
established by TSA. The CCSF, however, will be responsible for
maintaining the screening equipment and purchasing new equipment in the
future. In addition, CCSFs will be required to train their staff to
operate the equipment using TSA's training standards. Air cargo
industry stakeholders have already raised concerns regarding the cost
of purchasing and maintaining screening equipment to support the CCSP.
According to some industry estimates, the cost of purchasing air cargo
screening equipment will be much more than the $375,000 TSA plans to
reimburse each CCSP participant. In addition, the air cargo industry
has expressed concern regarding the costs associated with training
those individuals who will be operating the air cargo screening
equipment.
TSA Plans to Revise and Eliminate Screening Exemptions for Some
Categories of Air Cargo, but Has Not Completed Air Cargo Vulnerability
Assessments to Inform Its Efforts:
TSA plans to revise and eliminate current exemptions for some
categories of cargo, thereby reducing the percentage of cargo
transported on passenger aircraft that is subject to alternative
methods of screening.[Footnote 12] These changes will go into effect in
early 2009. However, according to agency officials, TSA made these
determinations based on a limited number of vulnerability assessments,
as well as professional judgment.[Footnote 13] In February 2008, TSA
issued a report assessing existing screening exemptions for certain
kinds of cargo transported on passenger aircraft and evaluated the risk
of maintaining those exemptions. As part of its assessment, TSA
officials stated that they considered and determined the threat to and
vulnerability of the exempted cargo types. TSA officials also stated
they based their determinations on which screening exemptions to
revise, maintain or eliminate in part on results from air cargo
vulnerability assessments at Category X airports they completed in
accordance with law.[Footnote 14] TSA has completed assessments at 6 of
the 27 Category X airports. Absent the completed assessments, which
could help to identify potential security vulnerabilities associated
with the exemptions, TSA does not have complete information with which
to make risk-based decisions regarding the security of air cargo. TSA
officials have acknowledged the importance of completing air cargo
vulnerability assessments and stated that they will complete them by
the end of 2009. Officials further stated that as the agency conducts
additional air cargo vulnerability assessments, they will assess the
results to determine whether existing screening exemptions should be
revised, maintained or eliminated.
TSA Has Taken Actions to Strengthen Air Cargo Compliance Inspections,
but More Resources May Be Needed to Ensure CCSP Participants Are
Meeting TSA Screening Requirements:
To ensure that existing air cargo security requirements are being
implemented as required, TSA inspects air carriers and freight
forwarders that transport cargo. Under the CCSP, TSA will also have to
inspect other entities, such as shippers, who volunteer to participate
in the program. These compliance inspections range from an annual
comprehensive review of the implementation of all air cargo security
requirements to a more frequent review of at least one security
requirement by an air carrier or freight forwarder. In October 2005, we
reported that TSA had conducted compliance inspections on less than
half (49 percent) of the estimated 10,000 freight forwarder facilities
nationwide, and of those freight forwarders they had inspected, the
agency found violations in over 40 percent of them. We also reported
that TSA had not determined what constitutes an acceptable level of
performance related to compliance inspections, or compared air
carriers' and freight forwarders' performance against this standard;
analyzed the results of inspections to systematically target future
inspections on those entities that pose a higher security risk to the
domestic air cargo system; or assessed the effectiveness of its
enforcement actions taken against air carriers and freight forwarders
to ensure that they are complying with air cargo security requirements.
We recommended that TSA develop a plan for systematically analyzing and
using the results of air cargo compliance inspections to target future
inspections and identify systemwide corrective actions. We also
recommended that TSA assess the effectiveness of enforcement actions in
ensuring air carrier and freight forwarder compliance with air cargo
security requirements. TSA officials stated that, since our report was
issued, the agency has increased the number of inspectors dedicated to
conducting domestic air cargo compliance inspections. Officials also
told us that TSA has begun analyzing compliance inspection results to
prioritize their inspections on those entities that have the highest
rates of noncompliance, as well as newly approved freight forwarders
and air carriers that have yet to be inspected. However, in recent
discussions with TSA officials regarding their plans to implement the
CCSP, they stated that there may not be enough compliance inspectors to
conduct compliance inspections of all the entities that could be a part
of the CCSP, which TSA officials told us could number in the thousands,
once the program is fully implemented by August 2010. As a result, TSA
is anticipating requesting an additional 150 cargo Transportation
Security Inspectors for fiscal year 2010 to supplement its existing
allocation of 450 Transportation Security Inspectors. However, TSA
officials stated that they have not formally assessed the number of
Transportation Security Inspectors the agency will need. Without such
an assessment, TSA may not be able to ensure that entities involved in
the CCSP are meeting TSA requirements to screen and secure cargo. GAO
will likely review this issue as part of our planned review of TSA's
efforts to meet the requirement to screen 100 percent of cargo
transported on passenger aircraft.
TSA Has Not Identified a Strategy for Securing Inbound Air Cargo:
We reported in April 2007 that more work remains in order for TSA to
strengthen the security of inbound cargo. As previously stated, TSA is
currently taking steps to develop a system of screening 100 percent of
domestic and outbound cargo transported on passenger aircraft. TSA does
not, however, currently plan to include inbound cargo as part of this
system. TSA officials acknowledge that vulnerabilities to inbound cargo
exist, but stated that each foreign country has its own security
procedures for flights coming into the United States, and further
stated that TSA does not impose its security requirements on foreign
countries. According to TSA, it will continue to work with other
countries to encourage the adoption of uniform measures for screening
cargo flights bound for the United States as it enhances its
requirements for screening cargo originating in the United States. TSA
has begun working with foreign governments to develop uniform air cargo
security standards and to mutually recognize each other's security
standards, referred to as harmonization. We reported, however, that
duplicative air cargo security standards exist, which can impede the
flow of commerce, expose air cargo shipments to security risk, and
damage high-value items. For example, to meet TSA requirements,
passenger air carriers transporting cargo into the United States must
screen a certain percentage of nonexempt cargo shipments, even though
these shipments may have already been screened by a foreign government.
Air carrier representatives stated that meeting TSA screening
requirements is problematic in certain foreign countries because air
carriers are not permitted to rescreen cargo shipments that have
already been screened by foreign government employees and deemed
secure. These conflicts and duplication of effort could potentially be
avoided through harmonization.
According to TSA officials, pursuing harmonization would improve the
security of inbound cargo and assist TSA in performing its mission. For
example, officials stated that the harmonization of air cargo security
standards would provide a level of security to those entities not
currently regulated by the agency, such as foreign freight forwarders
and shippers. However, achieving harmonization with foreign governments
may be challenging because these efforts are voluntary and some foreign
countries do not share the United States' view regarding air cargo
security threats and risks. Additionally, foreign countries may lack
the resources or infrastructure needed to develop an air cargo security
program as comprehensive as that of the United States. In April 2007,
we recommended that TSA, in collaboration with foreign governments and
the United States air cargo industry, systematically compile and
analyze information on air cargo security practices used abroad to
identify those that may strengthen TSA's overall air cargo security
program. TSA agreed with this recommendation and, since the issuance of
our report, has reviewed the air cargo screening models of two foreign
countries. According to TSA officials, this review led to the design of
their proposed CCSP.
Opportunities exist for TSA to further strengthen its screening efforts
for inbound cargo in the following three key areas:
Conducting air cargo vulnerability assessments for inbound cargo. As
noted earlier, TSA is currently conducting air cargo vulnerability
assessments at Category X airports, but is not including inbound cargo
in these assessments. While TSA has plans to conduct vulnerability
assessments as part of its risk-based approach to securing inbound
cargo, the agency has not established a time frame for doing so. Such
assessments could provide information on the potential vulnerabilities
posed by the transport of inbound cargo. We reported in April 2007 that
TSA officials stated that they would conduct vulnerability assessments
of inbound cargo after they had assessed the vulnerability of domestic
cargo. Nevertheless, TSA officials acknowledged that vulnerabilities to
inbound cargo exist and that these vulnerabilities are in some cases
similar to those facing the domestic and outbound air cargo supply
chain.
Assessing the vulnerability posed by maintaining screening exemptions
for inbound air cargo. TSA has not assessed the potential
vulnerabilities posed by inbound air cargo screening exemptions. In
April 2007, we reported on the potential vulnerabilities associated
with inbound air cargo screening exemptions. Specifically, we reported
that screening exemptions could pose a risk to the inbound air cargo
supply chain because TSA has limited information on the background of
and security risks posed by foreign freight forwarders and shippers
whose cargo may fall into one of the exemption categories. We
recommended that TSA assess whether existing inbound air cargo
screening exemptions pose an unacceptable vulnerability to the air
cargo supply chain and if necessary, address these vulnerabilities. TSA
agreed with this recommendation and noted that the agency had recently
revised and eliminated domestic and outbound air cargo screening
exemptions. However, TSA has yet to address our recommendation for
assessing inbound air cargo screening exemptions.
Updating TSA's Air Cargo Strategic Plan to address inbound cargo. As
part of TSA's risk-based approach, TSA issued an Air Cargo Strategic
Plan in November 2003 that focused on securing the domestic air cargo
supply chain. However, in April 2007, we reported that this plan did
not include goals and objectives for securing inbound cargo, which
presents different security challenges than cargo transported
domestically. To ensure that a comprehensive strategy for securing
inbound cargo exists, we recommended that DHS develop a risk-based
strategy to address inbound cargo security that should define TSA's and
CBP's responsibilities for ensuring the security of inbound cargo. In
response to our recommendation, CBP issued its International Air Cargo
Security Strategic Plan in June 2007. While this plan identifies how
CBP will partner with TSA, it does not specifically address TSA's
responsibilities in securing inbound cargo. According to TSA officials,
the agency plans to revise its Air Cargo Strategic Plan in the fall of
2008, and will address TSA's strategy for securing cargo from
international last points of departure, as well as its collaborative
efforts with CBP to secure this cargo.
Ms. Chairwoman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may
have at this time.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen
Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or at berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this statement.
Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Steve D.
Morris, Assistant Director; Lara Kaskie; Tom Lombardi; Meg Ullengren;
and Margaret Vo.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1602, 121 Stat. 266, 477-80 (2007)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g) (mandating the screening of all cargo
transported on passenger aircraft and defining "screening" for purposes
of satisfying the mandate)).
[2] A freight forwarder consolidates cargo from many shippers and takes
it to air carriers for transport.
[3] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1602(b), 121 Stat. 266, 479-80 (2007).
[4] "Screening" as defined by the Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 means a physical examination or
nonintrusive methods of assessing whether cargo poses a threat to
transportation security. See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)(5). Such methods of
screening include X-ray systems, explosives detection systems (EDS),
explosives trace detection, explosives detection canine teams certified
by TSA, or a physical search together with manifest verification. While
additional methods may be approved to ensure that cargo does not pose a
threat to transportation security, these additional methods cannot
include solely performing a review of information about the contents of
cargo or verifying the identity of a shipper of the cargo if not
performed in conjunction with other authorized security methods,
including whether a shipper is registered in the known shipper
database.
[5] Inbound air cargo is cargo that is transported into the United
States from abroad by either U.S. or foreign-operated air carriers.
[6] Cargo transported by air within the United States is referred to as
domestic air cargo, and cargo transported by air from the United States
to a foreign location is referred to as outbound air cargo.
[7] TSA also establishes security requirements for domestic and foreign
all-cargo carriers that transport cargo to, from, and within the United
States.
[8] For the purpose of the statement, the term "targeting" refers to
the use of information obtained from the screening process to identify
high-risk air cargo shipments for inspection.
[9] Explosives Trace Detection requires human operators to collect
samples of items to be screened with swabs, which are chemically
analyzed to identify any traces of explosive material. Decompression
chambers simulate the pressures acting on an aircraft by simulating
flight conditions, which cause explosives that are attached to
barometric fuses to detonate. An explosive detection system uses
computer-aided tomography X-rays to examine objects inside baggage and
identify the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. Certified
explosives detection canine teams have been evaluated by TSA and shown
to effectively detect explosive devices.
[10] GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air
Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-660] (Washington, D.C.: April
2007).
[11] There are currently 370 TSA-certified explosives detection canine
teams that are cross-trained to work in multiple aviation environments,
including air cargo.
[12] For certain types of cargo, TSA has authorized the use of TSA-
approved alternative methods for screening cargo transported on
passenger aircraft. Alternative methods can include verifying shipper
information and conducting a visual inspection of the cargo shipment.
[13] TSA officials made these statements during our review of TSA's
report on its air cargo screening exemptions. We completed this review
in July 2008 and the results have yet to be publicly issued.
[14] See Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 112, 140-41 (2007) (providing
that the $80 million appropriated for air cargo shall be used to
complete air cargo vulnerability assessments for all Category X
airports, among other purposes). TSA classifies the commercial airports
in the United States into one of five security risk categories (X, I,
II, III, and IV). In general, category X airports have the largest
number of passenger boardings, and category IV airports have the
smallest. Categories X, I, II, and III airports account for more than
90 percent of the nation's air traffic.
[End of section]
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