Emergency Management
GAO Responses to Post-hearing Questions for the Record Gao ID: GAO-08-1003R July 15, 2008Members of the Committee requested that GAO provide additional comments to a number of post-hearing questions after GAO testified before the Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Preparedness for Catastrophic Disasters. The responses are generally based on work associated with previously issued GAO products, which were conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Because the responses are based on prior work, we did not obtain comments from DHS.
GAO-08-1003R, Emergency Management: GAO Responses to Post-hearing Questions for the Record
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July 15, 2008:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
U.S. House of Representatives:
Subject: Emergency Management: GAO Responses to Post-hearing Questions
for the Record:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On June 11, 2008, I testified before the Subcommittee on Management,
Investigations, and Oversight on the Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) Preparedness for Catastrophic Disasters.[Footnote 1] Members of
the Committee requested that GAO provide additional comments to a
number of post-hearing questions. The questions and our answers are
provided in the enclosure. The responses are generally based on work
associated with previously issued GAO products, which were conducted in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Because the responses are based on prior work, we did not obtain
comments from DHS.
We will make copies of this letter available to others upon request,
and it will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you have any questions about this
letter or need additional information please contact me on:
(202) 512-8757 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this letter. Key contributors to this letter were Orlando
Copeland, Christopher Keisling, and Perry Lusk.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
William O. Jenkins, Jr.
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice:
[End of section]
Enclosure:
GAO Responses to Questions for the Record:
1. Based on your years of work, is there a time when FEMA was more
successful at working within the interagency? If so, when was it and
what do you think was different then?
While Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has always faced
challenges in managing interagency working relationships with other
federal organizations, we reported favorably on FEMA's inter-
governmental efforts as the lead federal agency responsible for
consequence management in 2001 prior to 9/11 and FEMA's incorporation
into DHS.[Footnote 2] Specifically, we reviewed FEMA's efforts to
enhance preparedness for a terrorist attack and concluded that, in
policy and practice, FEMA had generally addressed the key lessons
learned from its experience in coordinating federal consequence
management activities after the Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995. As
we reported, in analyzing the lessons learned after the bombing, FEMA
updated the Federal Response Plan to address how federal agencies,
states, and localities would work together to respond to an act of
terrorism.
In May 2001, as one approach to achieving a more integrated federal
terrorism preparedness response, the President created an Office of
National Preparedness within FEMA to coordinate all federal programs
that support state and local preparedness. In our September 2001
testimony after the events of 9/11, we recommended a move beyond
coordination--program consolidation.[Footnote 3] We believed that
consolidation of assistance programs would best eliminate overlapping
assistance programs and provide a single federal liaison for state and
local officials. The need for consolidation of preparedness and
response assistance efforts had been similarly expressed in the Gilmore
Commission's reports on assessing domestic response capabilities for
terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. Likewise, the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act)
restored FEMA's preparedness functions, which DHS had transferred to
another component in July 2005, thereby consolidating within FEMA the
spectrum of emergency management functions from preparedness to
response and recovery.[Footnote 4]
2. Do you agree that a basic "roles and responsibilities" document like
the NRF is important? If so, why? And do you think it would have been
useful in the days immediately before and after Katrina?
A basic "roles and responsibilities" document like the National
Response Framework (NRF) is an important guiding document for national
response. It is important because many stakeholders can and do have
unique and potentially overlapping responsibilities, depending on the
scale of the incident and the response required. Such a document has
been in place since April 1992 when FEMA issued the Federal Response
Plan which outlined how the federal government would implement the
Stafford Act.[Footnote 5] The Homeland Security Act of 2002[Footnote 6]
required DHS to consolidate existing federal government emergency
response plans, such as the Federal Response Plan, into a single,
coordinated national response plan. In December 2004, DHS responded
with the 2004 National Response Plan. Thus, a basic "roles and
responsibilities" document was in place and was useful in the days
immediately before and after Katrina and provided basic doctrine for
the federal response. However, Katrina revealed unresolved issues in
the National Response Plan regarding lines of authority with respect to
the Secretary of Homeland Security and the FEMA Administrator, as well
as the key officials reporting to them, the Principal Federal Officer
(PFO) to the secretary, and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) to
the FEMA Administrator. For example, in response to Katrina, the
Secretary of Homeland Security initially designated the FEMA
Administrator as the PFO, who appointed separate FCOs for Alabama,
Louisiana, and Mississippi. It was not, however, clear who was
responsible for coordinating the overall federal effort at a strategic
level. Our fieldwork indicated that this lack of clarity in leadership
roles and responsibilities resulted in disjointed efforts of many
federal agencies involved in the response, a myriad of approaches and
processes for requesting and providing assistance, and confusion about
who should be advised of requests and what resources would be provided
within specific time frames. Because of confusion concerning the key
leadership roles of the secretary, the administrator, the PFO and the
FCO, we recommended in March 2006 that DHS clarify these roles[Footnote
7] and test, train and exercise its clarification of them.[Footnote 8]
On October 4, 2006, Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Act. The act
designated the FEMA Administrator--the new title of the official who
leads FEMA--as the principal advisor to the President, the Homeland
Security Council, and the Secretary for all matters relating to
emergency management. In January 2008, DHS issued the final NRF that
generally describes the doctrine that guides national response actions
and the roles and responsibilities of officials and entities involved
in response efforts. However, the NRF is not an operational document so
it is important that it be supplemented by documents that provide more
detail on the operational implementation of the roles and
responsibilities it describes. Accordingly, the NRF also includes
Emergency Support and Incident Annexes that provide additional detail
on the roles and responsibilities and functions for specific emergency
support functions, such as mass care and shelter, and for catastrophic
incidents (although, the catastrophic incident annex has not yet been
revised to reflect the changes in the NRF). In addition, FEMA plans to
include four partner guides to the NRF that describe key roles and
actions for local, tribal, state, federal and private sector entities
involved in response activities. These supplemental planning documents
should enhance the usefulness of the NRF by providing needed
clarification and specificity, but FEMA has set no firm date for their
completion.
3. What is the impact on state, local, and tribal governments when
interagency disputes break out during disaster preparedness and
response?
Interagency disputes during disaster preparedness and response can
impair partnership and coordination and, thereby, the speed and
effectiveness of the overall response and recovery effort. After
Hurricane Katrina, many states sent supplies, first responders,
National Guard personnel, and other resources to assist the areas
hardest hit by the disasters. But coordinating the implementation of
the assistance was faulty and the timeliness of needed resources and
assistance was affected. As events unfolded in the immediate aftermath
and ensuing days after Hurricane Katrina's final landfall, responders
at all levels of government--many victims themselves--encountered
significant breakdowns in vital areas such as emergency communications
as well as obtaining and deploying essential supplies and equipment.
4. Mr. Jenkins, in your testimony you talked about DHS and FEMA working
together to develop the Integrated Planning System. From what you've
seen, are DHS and FEMA coordinating well in this area, or have you seen
problems?
We have not identified any problems with DHS and FEMA coordination in
developing the new integrated system, based on our discussions with
FEMA and DHS officials. Officials from FEMA's National Preparedness
Directorate, in coordination with the Disaster Operations Directorate
and DHS's Office of Operations Coordination, said they have begun to
develop a common federal planning process that will support a family of
related planning documents; these related planning documents are to
include strategic guidance statements, strategic plans, concept plans,
operations plans, and tactical plans. They said the outline of the
system is currently undergoing final review prior to approval. The
effectiveness of DHS's and FEMA's coordination efforts will be
reflected, in my view, in the timeliness and quality of the system that
is developed and implemented.
5. Would you please elaborate on how direct line authority with respect
to DHS operations centers would strengthen not just departmental
coordination but also interagency coordination efforts?
While GAO has not recommended that the Operations Directorate have
direct line authority for all DHS operations centers, we have reported
that the Directorate, established in November 2005 to improve
operational efficiency and coordination, does provide DHS with an
opportunity to more fully implement the key practices that are
important to enhancing and sustaining collaboration at its multi-agency
operations centers. Although the Operations Directorate does not
possess administrative, budgetary, or operational control over the
other component's operations centers, guidance from the Operations
Directorate could help the other components responsible for multi-
agency operations centers make key advances in each collaborative
practice. To provide a setting for enhanced collaboration among the
staff at each operations center, we recommended in October 2006 that
the Director of the Operations Directorate provide guidance and help
ensure the component agencies of the multi-agency operations centers
take the following actions: define common goals and joint strategies;
clarify the roles and responsibilities for watchstanders;[Footnote 9]
apply standards, policies, and procedures for using DHS's information
network; conduct staffing needs assessments; prepare mechanisms to
monitor, evaluate, and report on the results of collaborative efforts;
and address collaborative efforts at the four multi-agency operations
centers in plans and reports.[Footnote 10]
As we reported last month, integration of operations centers is
essential for effective planning and response capabilities.[Footnote
11] We noted that DHS has taken the first of three steps toward
integrating its operations centers responsible for planning for,
monitoring, and responding to disruptions to the communications
infrastructure, including voice and data networks, and the security of
data and applications that use these networks. Specifically, in
November 2007, DHS moved the operations center for communications
infrastructure to office space adjacent to the center for data and
applications. This close proximity allows the approximately 41
coordination center and 95 readiness team analysts to, among other
things, readily collaborate on planned and ongoing activities. We
reported that a key factor contributing to DHS's lack of progress in
implementing the latter two steps is that completing the integration
has not been a top DHS priority. Ultimately, the better DHS coordinates
its own operations (and operations centers), the better equipped it
will be to coordinate with other departments and agencies.
6. Based on your review, do you believe the current coordination among
departmental operations centers is sufficient to avoid unnecessary
duplication or confusion in response to a catastrophic incident?
In conducting the most recent assessment of DHS's management of its
operations centers in June 2008, as discussed above, we concluded that
until DHS completes the integration of the two centers, it risks being
unable to efficiently plan for and respond to disruptions to
communications infrastructure, and the data and applications that
travel on this infrastructure, increasing the probability that
communications will be unavailable or limited in times of
need.[Footnote 12] The objective of our October 2006 was to assess the
collaboration among the 4 operations centers that employed staff from
multiple DHS organizations, rather than the effectiveness of their
response capabilities.[Footnote 13] Nonetheless, we found that the
centers lack joint strategies for collaboration and staffing needs
assessments, and also lacked standards and procedures for using DHS's
primary information-sharing network. GAO's previous work has shown that
such practices are effective in enhancing and sustaining collaboration
among federal agencies. These practices could also help DHS avoid
unnecessary duplication or confusion in response to a catastrophic
incident.
7. According to your work reviewing DHS, in which areas do you believe
the department has been most effective in leading national preparedness
efforts? Has the department been more effective in leading preparedness
efforts at the federal level as opposed to the state or local level?
In comprehensively assessing DHS's progress in implementing its mission
and management functions in August 2007, we concluded that DHS had made
limited progress in its emergency preparedness and response
efforts.[Footnote 14] DHS and FEMA have had mixed success at both the
federal and state and local levels. Among the successes are the
development of pre-scripted mission assignments for federal agencies
that can be activated as needed following a disaster. However, DHS and
FEMA are still developing operational plans to guide other federal
agencies' response efforts and metrics for assessing federal
capabilities. Two essential supplements to the new National Response
Framework--response guides for federal partners and an integrated
planning system--are still under development and federal agencies must
develop also operational plans to reflect the roles and
responsibilities described in the NRF, these partner guides, and the
more detailed functional and incident annexes that accompany the NRF.
At the most fundamental level, DHS has not yet developed a means of
measuring the nation's overall preparedness--at federal, state, and
local levels--based on a list of targeted capabilities and has not yet
completed an inventory of all federal response capabilities required by
the Post-Katrina Act.
8. In what areas of needed capabilities are we as a nation most
prepared for a catastrophic disaster and why? In what areas are we
least prepared and why?
One of the key concerns that our work has identified is that DHS, as
the federal organization with primary responsibility for assessing and
reporting on the status of national capabilities, cannot with any
certainty answer that question. As I testified in March 2008,[Footnote
15] DHS's and FEMA's current efforts do not provide information on the
effectiveness of homeland security funds in improving the nation's
capabilities or reducing risk. According to FEMA officials, DHS
leadership has identified this issue as a high priority and is trying
to develop a more quantitative approach to accomplish the goal of
capturing and using information for the more strategic purpose of
monitoring the achievement of program goals.
Following Katrina, we reported that there were major capability
problems in several key areas, including: (1) situational assessment
and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3) evacuations,
particularly for those who do not have transportation or otherwise have
mobility limitations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6)
mass care and sheltering.[Footnote 16] These areas continue to present
challenges, although DHS and FEMA have taken actions to address the
problems that surfaced in Katrina. Our recent discussions with DHS and
FEMA officials indicate that FEMA has initiated a Catastrophic Disaster
Response Planning Initiative to ensure that FEMA and its federal,
tribal, state and local partners are well prepared to affect an
appropriate, timely, and efficient response to such a catastrophic
disaster. According to DHS, the Disaster Operations Directorate is
continuing venue-specific catastrophic planning and disaster readiness
initiatives focused on four specific areas - Southeast Louisiana, New
Madrid Seismic Zone, the State of Florida, and the State of California.
Key areas of potential concern regarding national preparedness for
catastrophic events include pandemic influenza and response to nuclear
attack:
* In reporting on the issue of pandemic influenza preparation in 2007,
we noted that federal government leadership roles and responsibilities
for preparing for and responding to a pandemic continue to evolve, and
will require further clarification and testing before the relationships
of the many leadership positions are well understood.[Footnote 17]
Although the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Secretary
is to lead the public health and medical response and the DHS Secretary
is to lead overall nonmedical support and response actions, the
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan (Plan)
does not clearly address how these roles and responsibilities are to
work together or simultaneously, particularly over an extended period
and at multiple locations across the country. We reported that
important gaps exist that could hinder the ability of key stakeholders
to effectively execute their responsibilities. State and local
jurisdictions that will play crucial roles in preparing for and
responding to a pandemic were not directly involved in developing the
Plan, relationships and priorities among actions were not clearly
described, performance measures focused on activities that are not
always linked to results, insufficient information is provided about
how the documents are integrated with other key related plans, and no
process is provided for monitoring and reporting on progress.
* Regarding the nation's preparedness for a nuclear incident, we
reported in June 2008 that, while DHS and other agencies have taken
steps to improve homeland defense, local first responders do not have
tools to accurately and immediately identify what, when, where, and how
much chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials
are released in U.S. urban areas, either accidentally or by
terrorists.[Footnote 18] We reported that DHS's Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) is responsible for acquiring and supporting the
deployment of radiation detection equipment. However, this DNDO has
primarily emphasized developing and deploying radiation detection
equipment to secure cargo container shipments at U.S. ports of entry to
prevent smuggling radioactive material into the United States. DNDO's
Chief of Staff told us that it does not consider its mission to include
the development of radiological detection equipment for local first
responders to use in identifying the release of radiological materials
in the atmosphere. It does not evaluate radiological detection
equipment for first responder use in consequence management. Among
other things, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security
reach agreement with other agencies on which agency should have the
mission and responsibility to develop, test, and certify detection
equipment that first responders use to detect hazardous material
releases in the atmosphere. DHS concurred with our recommendations but
stated that GAO should consider other scenarios as alternative ways of
looking at the present national capabilities for CBRN response and the
current status of testing and certification of detection equipment.
9. Do you believe that DHS is prepared for the 2008 Hurricane season?
Planning and exercising of capabilities at the federal, state, and
local levels is essential for developing and assessing national
response capabilities. Because FEMA has not yet issued its plans or the
results of its recent hurricane preparedness exercises, there is no way
to objectively determine whether DHS is prepared for the 2008 Hurricane
season.
* Planning: According to FEMA officials, the agency is coordinating
closely with its federal interagency partners to develop the 2008
National Hurricane Season Contingency Plan. However, we are already
into the hurricane season, and have found no evidence of an approved
plan.
* Exercising: The Department of Homeland Security's National Exercise
Program (NEP), the nation's overarching homeland security exercise
program, conducted a combined exercise in May 2008 to test hurricane
preparedness planning, assess federal interagency Continuity of
Operations procedures, exercise a response to terrorist attacks in
Washington State and test Defense Support of Civil Authorities. These
linked exercises were referred to as National Level Exercise 2-08. The
exercise took place May 1 to 8 with a wide range of participants from
federal and state departments and agencies. The evaluation of this
exercise with regard to hurricane preparedness has not yet been
released.
10. What is your assessment of the roles and responsibilities of the
Principal Federal Office (PFO) and Federal Coordinating Office (FCO)?
Do you believe these roles have been sufficiently clarified? Do you
think DHS is taking the necessary steps to ensure that state and local
responders and emergency management personnel are aware of the
distinctions?
The experience of Hurricane Katrina revealed problems with the National
Response Plan (NRP), identifying uncertainty and confusion regarding
the roles, responsibilities and lines of authority with respect to the
DHS Secretary and the FEMA Administrator as well as the key officials
reporting to them, the PFO to the Secretary and the FCO to the
Administrator. In our March 8, 2006 testimony, we recommended that DHS
clarify these key leadership roles consistent with the provisions of
the Stafford Act and the Homeland Security Act of 2002.[Footnote 19]
Shortly after our testimony, in May 2006, DHS issued revisions to the
NRP that addressed the PFO and FCO roles, pending a more comprehensive
review of the NRP. In light of the persistent confusion regarding key
leadership roles, we recommended in our September 2006 report on
catastrophic disasters that DHS should rigorously re-test, train, and
exercise its recent clarification of roles, responsibilities and lines
of authority in the NRP and implement changes to remedy any identified
coordination problems.[Footnote 20]
In October 2006, Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Act, which, among
other things, addressed the PFO's relationship with the FCO and other
federal and state officials. Specifically, the Post-Katrina Act
provided that the PFO shall not direct or replace the incident command
structure established at the incident or have directive authority over
the FCO or other federal and state officials.[Footnote 21] The
enactment of the Post-Katrina Act coincided with the start of DHS's
comprehensive review of the NRP, which culminated with the issuance of
the NRF in January 2008. The NRF repeats the Post-Katrina Act's
prohibition that the PFO shall not direct or replace the incident
command structure or have directive authority over the FCO or other
federal and state officials. The NRF also generally distinguishes
between the PFO and the FCO. For example, the NRF describes the PFO as
representing the Secretary of Homeland Security in the field to provide
a primary point of contact and situational awareness for the secretary.
The PFO's duties include promoting federal interagency collaboration
and conflict resolution where possible, presenting to the secretary any
policy issues that require resolution, and acting as the primary
federal spokesperson for coordinated media and public communications.
The FCO, on the other hand, represents the FEMA Administrator in the
field to coordinate Stafford Act support to state, local and tribal
governments. The FCO's duties include the commitment of FEMA resources
and the issuance of mission assignments to other federal departments or
agencies. The FCO is the primary federal representative with whom the
State Coordinating Officer and other state, tribal and local response
officials interact to determine most urgent needs and to set objectives
for meeting them.
Whether the NRF revisions will be effective in promoting a common
understanding of the PFO and FCO roles remains to be seen. As I
discussed in response to Question 2, the NRF is not an operational
document, so it is important that it be supplemented by documents that
provide more detail on the operational implementation of the roles and
responsibilities it describes--operational roles and responsibilities
that must be tested and evaluated in realistic exercises. Unlike the
NRP, the NRF is to include four partner guides that will supplement the
core NRF document and further describe key roles for local, tribal,
state, federal and private sector entities involved in response
activities. These supplemental planning documents should enhance the
usefulness of the NRF by providing needed clarification and
specificity, but FEMA has set no firm date for their completion. In
addition to the need for supplemental planning documents, FEMA also
needs to engage in rigorous testing, training and exercising of the
recently issued NRF, just as we recommended following the May 2006
revisions to the NRP. Without testing, training and exercising, it is a
matter of speculation as to whether state and local responders and
emergency management personnel have a common understanding of the
revised PFO and FCO roles and responsibilities, or whether further
refinements need to be made to remedy any identified coordination
issues.
We have ongoing work that will assess actions FEMA and DHS have taken
to define the roles and responsibilities of key governmental and
nongovernmental stakeholders to promote a more consistent national
response and the extent to which related issues have surfaced in
national preparedness exercises. The results of this work should
provide more information for evaluating the extent to which the roles
and responsibilities of the PFO and FCO are clearly understood at the
federal, state, and local levels.
11. What do you believe are DHS's greatest challenges in effectively
preparing for and responding to catastrophic disasters?
Effective federal preparation for and response to a catastrophic event
requires planning, coordination, cooperation, and leadership within DHS
and between DHS and other federal agencies--both civilian and military-
-as well as state and local governments, and the private and nonprofit
sectors that have resources and capabilities needed for the response.
The single biggest challenge is getting all those who have major
responsibilities for responding to a major or catastrophic disaster to
work together to identify the capabilities each participant needs for
effective response, then to develop, test, and maintain those
capabilities. DHS must provide leadership across a broad spectrum of
stakeholders including federal agencies and departments, and DHS's own
components; state, local and tribal governments, their emergency
management agencies and other state agencies; sector-specific
businesses and industry; voluntary organizations; and academia. It is
an enormous challenge and responsibility. In leading national
preparedness efforts, DHS through FEMA is responsible for developing
national-level policies and doctrine to guide the efforts of these
stakeholders to establish operational plans to carry out their roles
and responsibilities and to build, measure, and sustain their ability
to do so effectively. However, DHS's efforts to develop operational
plans to guide other federal agencies' response efforts and metrics for
assessing federal capabilities are incomplete. In addition, DHS is
still establishing a process to measure the nation's overall
preparedness and has not yet developed a complete inventory of all
federal response capabilities. These are significant challenges, not
likely to be easily or quickly resolved.
12. What are you views on the role of detection canines in responding
to catastrophes?
The 28 Urban Search and Rescue teams have detection canines (primarily
to detect people in rubble). However, we have not examined the
prevention (e.g., explosive detection) and response requirements for
which canine teams would be needed nor have we evaluated the
performance of canine teams, whether for weapon(s) of mass destruction
(WMD) detection or search and rescue operations. Consequently, we have
no basis on which to assess whether DHS has the appropriate number of
canine teams.
However, GAO currently has a review underway of the Transportation
Security Administration's (TSA) National Explosives Detection Canine
Team Program whose explosives detection canine teams (each of which
consist of a dog and a handler) are trained, certified, and deployed to
airports and mass transit systems nationwide. Section 1307 of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007[Footnote 22] requires increases in the number of TSA-certified
canine teams over the next 3 years. The Act also requires GAO to report
on the use of these teams and the capacity of TSA's canine program. Our
objective is to determine if TSA has a plan to increase its number of
teams as required by statute and, if so, to evaluate the extent to
which TSA has the capacity to do so and is on track with its plan. We
plan to report on the results of this review later this year.
13. Do you believe we have enough canine teams for the homeland
security mission? If not, how many should DHS acquire?
See the response to Question 12.
14. Based on your experience, what recommendations do you have to
develop training and certification standards for detection canines?
See the response to Question 12.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO Emergency Management: Observations on DHS's Preparedness for
Catastrophic Disasters, GAO-08-868T (Washington, D.C., June 11, 2008).
[2] GAO, Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in
Coordinating Preparedness and Response, GAO-01-15 (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 20, 2001).
[3] GAO, Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's
Issues, GAO-01-1158T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2001).
[4] Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006). Section 611 of the
Post- Katrina Act (6 U.S.C. 315) gave FEMA all its responsibilities and
programs as constituted on June 1, 2006, as well as those of the
Preparedness Directorate, with certain exceptions.
[5] The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(Stafford Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206.
[6] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 115 Stat. 2135 (2002).
[7] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 8, 2006).
[8] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
[9] The term "watchstander" refers to an individual required to work
full-time on a rotating 24-hour schedule, 7 days per week, to maintain
situational awareness, conduct information assessment and threat
monitoring to deter, detect, and prevent terrorist incidents. A
watchstander may also act as a liaison between his agency and other
agency representatives at the center, and may manage response to
critical threats and incidents.
[10] GAO, Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance
Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS
Agencies, GAO-07-89 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 2006).
[11] GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Further Efforts Needed to
Integrate Planning for and Response to Disruptions on Converged Voice
and Data Networks, GAO-08-607 (Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2008).
[12] GAO-08-607.
[13] GAO-07-89.
[14] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on
Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO-07-454
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 2007).
[15] GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant
Programs' Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs'
Impact on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge, GAO-08-488T
(Washington, D.C., Mar. 15, 2008).
[16] GAO-06-618.
[17] GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are Needed to Ensure
Clearer Federal Leadership Roles and an Effective National Strategy,
GAO-07-781 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 14, 2007).
[18] GAO, Homeland Security: First Responders' Ability to Detect and
Model Hazardous Releases in Urban Areas Is Significantly Limited, GAO-
08-180 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2008).
[19] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery, GAO-06-442T (Washington, D.C.:
March 8, 2006).
[20] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities,
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006)
[21] 6 U.S.C. § 319(c)(2).
[22] Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007).
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