Critical Infrastructure Protection
DHS Needs to Fully Address Lessons Learned from Its First Cyber Storm Exercise Gao ID: GAO-08-825 September 9, 2008Federal policies establish the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the focal point for the security of cyberspace. As part of its responsibilities, DHS is required to coordinate cyber attack exercises to strengthen public and private incident response capabilities. One major exercise program, called Cyber Storm, is a large-scale simulation of multiple concurrent cyber attacks involving the federal government, states, foreign governments, and private industry. To date, DHS has conducted Cyber Storm exercises in 2006 and 2008. GAO agreed to (1) identify the lessons that DHS learned from the first Cyber Storm exercise, (2) assess DHS's efforts to address the lessons learned from this exercise, and (3) identify key participants' views of their experiences during the second Cyber Storm exercise. To do so, GAO evaluated documentation of corrective activities and interviewed federal, state, and private sector officials.
As a result of its first Cyber Storm exercise, in February 2006, DHS identified eight lessons that had significant impact across sectors, agencies, and exercise participants. These lessons involved improving (1) the interagency coordination groups; (2) contingency planning, risk assessment, and roles and responsibilities; (3) integration of incidents across infrastructures; (4) access to information; (5) coordination of response activities; (6) strategic communications and public relations; (7) processes, tools, and technology; and (8) the exercise program. While DHS has demonstrated progress in addressing the lessons it learned from its first Cyber Storm exercise, more remains to be done to fully address the lessons. In the months following its first exercise, DHS identified 66 activities that address one or more of the lessons, including hosting meetings with key cyber response officials from foreign, federal, and state governments and private industry, and refining their operating procedures. To date, DHS has completed a majority of these activities. However, key activities have not yet been completed. Specifically, DHS identified 16 activities as ongoing and 7 activities as planned for the future. Further, while DHS has identified completion dates for its planned activities, it has not identified completion dates for its ongoing activities. Until DHS schedules and completes its remaining activities, the agency risks conducting subsequent exercises that repeat the lessons learned during the first exercise. Commenting on their experiences during the second Cyber Storm exercise, in March 2008, participants observed both progress and continued challenges in building a comprehensive national cyber response capability. Their observations addressed several key areas, including the value and scope of the exercise, roles and responsibilities, public relations, communications, the exercise infrastructure, and the handling of classified information. For example, many participants reported that their organizations found value in the exercise because it led them to update their contact lists and improve their response capabilities. Other participants, however, reported the need for clarifying the role of the law enforcement community during a cyber incident and for improving policies governing the handling of classified information so that key information can be shared. Many of the challenges identified during Cyber Storm II were similar to challenges identified during the first exercise.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-825, Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Fully Address Lessons Learned from Its First Cyber Storm Exercise
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2008:
Critical Infrastructure Protection:
DHS Needs to Fully Address Lessons Learned from Its First Cyber Storm
Exercise:
GAO-08-825:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-825, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Federal policies establish the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as
the focal point for the security of cyberspace. As part of its
responsibilities, DHS is required to coordinate cyber attack exercises
to strengthen public and private incident response capabilities. One
major exercise program, called Cyber Storm, is a large-scale simulation
of multiple concurrent cyber attacks involving the federal government,
states, foreign governments, and private industry. To date, DHS has
conducted Cyber Storm exercises in 2006 and 2008.
GAO agreed to (1) identify the lessons that DHS learned from the first
Cyber Storm exercise, (2) assess DHS‘s efforts to address the lessons
learned from this exercise, and (3) identify key participants‘ views of
their experiences during the second Cyber Storm exercise. To do so, GAO
evaluated documentation of corrective activities and interviewed
federal, state, and private sector officials.
What GAO Found:
As a result of its first Cyber Storm exercise, in February 2006, DHS
identified eight lessons that had significant impact across sectors,
agencies, and exercise participants. These lessons involved improving
(1) the interagency coordination groups; (2) contingency planning, risk
assessment, and roles and responsibilities; (3) integration of
incidents across infrastructures; (4) access to information; (5)
coordination of response activities; (6) strategic communications and
public relations; (7) processes, tools, and technology; and (8) the
exercise program.
While DHS has demonstrated progress in addressing the lessons it
learned from its first Cyber Storm exercise, more remains to be done to
fully address the lessons. In the months following its first exercise,
DHS identified 66 activities that address one or more of the lessons,
including hosting meetings with key cyber response officials from
foreign, federal, and state governments and private industry, and
refining their operating procedures. To date, DHS has completed a
majority of these activities (see table). However, key activities have
not yet been completed. Specifically, DHS identified 16 activities as
ongoing and 7 activities as planned for the future. Further, while DHS
has identified completion dates for its planned activities, it has not
identified completion dates for its ongoing activities. Until DHS
schedules and completes its remaining activities, the agency risks
conducting subsequent exercises that repeat the lessons learned during
the first exercise.
Commenting on their experiences during the second Cyber Storm exercise,
in March 2008, participants observed both progress and continued
challenges in building a comprehensive national cyber response
capability. Their observations addressed several key areas, including
the value and scope of the exercise, roles and responsibilities, public
relations, communications, the exercise infrastructure, and the
handling of classified information. For example, many participants
reported that their organizations found value in the exercise because
it led them to update their contact lists and improve their response
capabilities. Other participants, however, reported the need for
clarifying the role of the law enforcement community during a cyber
incident and for improving policies governing the handling of
classified information so that key information can be shared. Many of
the challenges identified during Cyber Storm II were similar to
challenges identified during the first exercise.
Table: Summary of Status of Activities:
Status of DHS activities: Reported and validated as completed;
Number of activities: 42.
Status of DHS activities: Reported as completed, but not validated due
to insufficient evidence;
Number of activities: 1.
Status of DHS activities: Reported as ongoing;
Number of activities: 16.
Status of DHS activities: Reported as planned for the future;
Number of activities: 7.
Status of DHS activities: Total;
Number of activities: 66.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that DHS schedule and complete the corrective
activities identified to address lessons learned during the first Cyber
Storm exercise, many of which were reiterated during the second Cyber
Storm exercise. In written comments, DHS agreed with this
recommendation and reported on its efforts to complete corrective
activities.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-825]. For more
information, contact David Powner at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DHS Identified Eight Lessons during Cyber Storm I:
DHS Has Demonstrated Progress in Addressing Lessons from Its First
Cyber Storm Exercise, but More Remains to Be Done:
Cyber Storm II Participants Observed Progress and Continued Challenges
in Exercising the National Cyber Response Capability:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: DHS Activities to Address Lessons from Cyber Storm I:
Appendix III: GAO Analysis of DHS Efforts to Address Lessons from Cyber
Storm I:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Critical Infrastructure Sectors and Their Lead Agencies:
Table 2: Recent and Planned Cyber Exercises:
Table 3: Summary of Status of Activities:
Table 4: DHS's Planned Activities and the Lessons They Address:
Figure:
Figure 1: Activity Status, as of June 2008, by Lesson30:
Abbreviations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
ISAC: Information Sharing and Analysis Center:
NCRCG: National Cyber Response Coordination Group:
NCSD: National Cyber Security Division:
US-CERT: United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 9, 2008:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable James R. Langevin:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and
Technology:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
Since the early 1990s, increasing computer interconnectivity--most
notably growth in the use of the Internet--has revolutionized the way
that our government, our nation, and much of the world communicate and
conduct business. While the benefits of this technology have been
enormous, this widespread interconnectivity poses significant risks to
the government's and our nation's computer systems and, more important,
to the critical operations and infrastructures they support.
Federal policies establish the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as
the focal point for the security of cyberspace--including analysis,
warning, information sharing, vulnerability reduction, mitigation, and
recovery efforts for public and private critical infrastructure
systems.[Footnote 1] To accomplish this mission, DHS is to work with
federal agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector.
Federal policy also recognizes the importance of building public/
private partnerships because the private sector owns a large percentage
of the nation's critical infrastructure--including banking and
financial institutions, telecommunications networks, and energy
production and transmission facilities.
As part of DHS's cybersecurity responsibilities, the agency is required
to coordinate cyber attack simulation exercises to strengthen public
and private incident response capabilities. One major exercise program,
called Cyber Storm, is a large-scale simulation of multiple concurrent
cyber attacks involving the federal government, states, foreign
governments, and private industry. To date, DHS has conducted Cyber
Storm exercises in 2006 and 2008, and it is currently planning a third
for 2010. Because of your interest in these exercises, we agreed to (1)
identify the lessons that DHS learned from the first Cyber Storm
exercise, (2) assess DHS's efforts to address the lessons learned from
this exercise, and (3) identify key participants' views of their
experiences during the second Cyber Storm exercise.
To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant DHS documents,
including the Cyber Storm I Exercise Report, a list of planned post-
Cyber Storm activities, and artifacts showing actions taken to address
activities. We attended the second Cyber Storm exercise, held in
Washington, D.C., in March 2008. We also interviewed DHS officials
responsible for planning the exercises as well as participants in the
Cyber Storm exercises, including officials representing three federal
agencies, three private industry sectors, and one representing state
governments. In addition, this work builds on a body of work we have
done over the last several years on the cyber aspects of critical
infrastructure protection.[Footnote 2]
We performed our work from January to September 2008 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives. Additional details on our objectives,
scope, and methodology are provided in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
As a result of its first Cyber Storm exercise, in February 2006, DHS
identified eight lessons that had significant impact across sectors,
agencies, and exercise participants. These lessons involved improving
(1) the interagency coordination groups; (2) contingency planning, risk
assessment, and roles and responsibilities; (3) integration of
incidents across infrastructures; (4) access to information; (5)
coordination of response activities; (6) strategic communications and
public relations; (7) processes, tools, and technology; and (8) the
exercise program.
While DHS has demonstrated progress in addressing the lessons it
learned from its first Cyber Storm exercise, more remains to be done to
fully address the lessons. In the months following its first exercise,
DHS identified 66 activities that address one or more of the lessons,
including hosting meetings with key cyber response officials from
foreign, federal, and state governments and private industry; refining
operating procedures; and obtaining new tools and technologies to
support incident response operations. Since that time, DHS has
completed 42 of these activities.[Footnote 3] However, key activities
have not yet been completed. DHS identified 16 activities as ongoing
and 7 as planned for the future. In addition, while DHS identified
completion dates for its planned activities, it has not identified
completion dates associated with activities that are reported as
ongoing. For example, DHS reports that it has work under way to issue
guidance to information sharing and analysis centers on public
communications related to cybersecurity, but has not established a
milestone for completing this activity. Until DHS schedules and
completes its remaining activities, the agency risks conducting
subsequent exercises that repeat the lessons learned during the first
exercise.
Commenting on their experiences during the second Cyber Storm exercise
in March 2008, participants observed both progress and continuing
challenges in building a comprehensive national cyber response
capability. Their observations addressed several key areas, including
the value and scope of the exercise, roles and responsibilities, public
relations, communications, the exercise infrastructure, and the
handling of classified information. For example, many participants
reported that their organizations found value in the exercise because
it led them to update their contact lists and improve their response
capabilities. Other participants, however, reported the need for
clarifying the role of the law enforcement community during a cyber
incident and for improving policies governing the handling of
classified information so that key information can be shared. Many of
the challenges noted during Cyber Storm II were similar to ones
identified during the first exercise.
We are making a recommendation to the Secretary of Homeland Security to
direct the Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications to
oversee the completion of corrective activities resulting from Cyber
Storm I, many of which were reiterated during Cyber Storm II. DHS
provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app. IV). In
its comments, DHS concurred with our recommendation and reported that
the department is working to complete applicable activities identified
during the first Cyber Storm exercise. DHS officials also provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate.
Background:
Critical infrastructures are physical or virtual systems and assets so
vital to the nation that their incapacitation or destruction would have
a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security,
national public health or safety, or any combination of these matters.
These systems and assets--such as the electric power grid, chemical
plants, and water treatment facilities--are essential to the operations
of the economy and the government. Recent terrorist attacks and threats
have underscored the need to protect our nation's critical
infrastructures. If vulnerabilities in these infrastructures are
exploited, they could be disrupted or disabled, leading to physical
damage, economic losses, and even loss of life.
The Federal Government Plays a Critical Role in Helping Secure Critical
Infrastructures:
Federal law and policies call for critical infrastructure protection
activities to enhance the physical and cybersecurity of both public and
private infrastructures that are essential to national security,
economic well-being, and national public health and safety.[Footnote 4]
Federal policies identify 18 critical infrastructure sectors and
designate certain federal agencies as lead points of contact for each
(see table 1). Further, they assign these agencies responsibility for
infrastructure protection activities in their assigned sectors and for
coordination with other relevant federal agencies, state and local
governments, and the private sector. In addition, federal policies
establish DHS as the focal point for the security of cyberspace--
including analysis, warning, information sharing, vulnerability
reduction, mitigation, and recovery efforts for public and private
critical infrastructure systems.
Table 1: Critical Infrastructure Sectors and Their Lead Agencies:
Sector: Agriculture and food;
Description: Provides for the fundamental need for food. The
infrastructure includes supply chains for feed and crop production,
processing, and retail sales;
Lead agency: Department of Agriculture, Department of Health and Human
Services, Food and Drug Administration [A].
Sector: Banking and finance;
Description: Provides the financial infrastructure of the nation. This
sector consists of commercial banks, insurance companies, mutual funds,
government-sponsored enterprises, pension funds, and other financial
institutions that carry out transactions, including clearing and
settlement;
Lead agency: Department of the Treasury.
Sector: Chemical;
Description: Transforms natural raw materials into commonly used
products benefiting society's health, safety, and productivity. The
chemical industry produces more than 70,000 products that are essential
to automobiles, pharmaceuticals, food supply, electronics, water
treatment, health, construction, and other necessities;
Lead agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Commercial facilities;
Description: Includes prominent commercial centers, office buildings,
sports stadiums, theme parks, and other sites where large numbers of
people congregate to pursue business activities, conduct personal
commercial transactions, or enjoy recreational pastimes;
Lead agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste;
Description: Includes 104 commercial nuclear reactors; research and
test nuclear reactors; nuclear materials; and the transportation,
storage, and disposal of nuclear materials and waste;
Lead agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Dams;
Description: Comprises approximately 80,000 dam facilities, including
larger and nationally symbolic dams that are major components of other
critical infrastructures that provide electricity and water;
Lead agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Defense industrial base;
Description: Supplies the military with the means to protect the nation
by producing weapons, aircraft, and ships and providing essential
services, including information technology and supply and maintenance;
Lead agency: Department of Defense.
Sector: Drinking water and water treatment systems;
Description: Sanitizes the water supply through about 170,000 public
water systems. These systems depend on reservoirs, dams, wells,
treatment facilities, pumping stations, and transmission lines;
Lead agency: Environmental Protection Agency.
Sector: Emergency services;
Description: Saves lives and property from accidents and disasters.
This sector includes fire, rescue, emergency medical services, and law
enforcement organizations;
Lead agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Energy;
Description: Provides the electric power used by all sectors and the
refining, storage, and distribution of oil and gas. This sector is
divided into electricity and oil and natural gas;
Lead agency: Department of Energy.
Sector: Government facilities;
Description: Includes the buildings owned and leased by the federal
government for use by federal entities;
Lead agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Information technology;
Description: Produces hardware, software, and services that enable
other sectors to function;
Lead agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: National monuments and icons;
Description: Includes key assets that are symbolically identified with
traditional American values and institutions or U.S. political and
economic power;
Lead agency: Department of the Interior.
Sector: Manufacturing;
Description: Includes key critical manufacturing operations based on
highly integrated and interdependent supply chains. This sector
provides metal, machinery, electrical equipment, appliances,
components, and transportation equipment;
Lead agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Postal and shipping;
Description: Delivers private and commercial letters, packages, and
bulk assets. The United States Postal Service and other carriers
provide the services of this sector;
Lead agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Public health and health care;
Description: Mitigates the risk of disasters and attacks and also
provides recovery assistance if an attack occurs. This sector consists
of health departments, clinics, and hospitals;
Lead agency: Department of Health and Human Services.
Sector: Telecommunications;
Description: Provides wired, wireless, and satellite communications to
meet the needs of businesses and governments;
Lead agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Sector: Transportation systems;
Description: Enables movement of people and assets that are vital to
our economy, mobility, and security, using aviation, ships, rail,
pipelines, highways, trucks, buses, and mass transit;
Lead agency: Department of Homeland Security.
Source: GAO analysis of The National Infrastructure Protection Plan,
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, and the National Strategy
for Homeland Security.
[A] The Department of Agriculture is responsible for food (meat,
poultry, and eggs) and agriculture; and the Department of Health and
Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, is responsible for food
other than meat, poultry, and egg products.
[End of table]
DHS Organization Is the Focal Point for National Cybersecurity Efforts:
In June 2003, DHS created the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD),
to serve as a national focal point for addressing cybersecurity issues
and to coordinate the implementation of the National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace (the Cyberspace Strategy). Its mission is to secure
cyberspace and America's cyber assets in cooperation with public,
private, and international entities. NCSD reports to the Assistant
Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications.
A key component of NCSD, the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-
CERT), is an operational organization responsible for analyzing and
addressing cyber threats and vulnerabilities and disseminating cyber
threat warning information. In the event of an Internet disruption, US-
CERT facilitates coordination of recovery activities with the network
and security operations centers of owners and operators of the Internet
and with government incident response teams. We recently reported on US-
CERT's challenges in establishing a comprehensive national cyber
analysis and warning capability.[Footnote 5]
NCSD also co-chairs the National Cyber Response Coordination Group
(NCRCG), which includes officials from the agencies that have a
responsibility for cybersecurity as well as the lead agencies for
different critical infrastructure sectors.[Footnote 6] This group is
the principal federal interagency mechanism for coordinating the
response to and recovery from significant national cyber incidents. In
the event of a major incident, NCRCG is responsible for providing
subject matter expertise, recommendations, and strategic policy support
to the Secretary of Homeland Security.
In addition, DHS recently announced that it is establishing a new
National Cyber Security Center that is to report directly to the
Secretary of Homeland Security. According to the Assistant Secretary
for Cybersecurity and Communications, this center will be responsible
for ensuring coordination among the cyber-related efforts across the
federal government and improving situational awareness and information
sharing to support the entities defending government networks,
including US-CERT.
DHS Is Responsible for Conducting and Coordinating Cyber Exercises to
Improve National Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Capabilities:
Federal policies call for DHS to establish a national exercise program
to improve the nation's ability to prevent, prepare for, respond to,
and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies.[Footnote 7] More specifically, the Cyberspace Strategy
calls for DHS to conduct cybersecurity exercises to evaluate the impact
of cyber attacks on governmentwide processes and to explore the use of
such exercises to test coordination of public and private incident
management, response, and recovery capabilities. Further, in its
National Infrastructure Protection Plan, DHS states that it will
conduct national cyber exercises to improve cyber preparedness,
response, coordination, and recovery capabilities. [Footnote 8]
To address its cyber exercise responsibilities, DHS works with other
federal agencies, state and city governments, regional coalitions, and
international partners. DHS's role can range from providing cyber
scenarios or expertise to local or regional exercises, cosponsoring
exercises, or conducting its own large-scale cyber attack simulations
(called Cyber Storm exercises). See table 2 for examples of recent and
planned cyber exercises.
Table 2: Recent and Planned Cyber Exercises:
Date: September 2004;
Exercise name: Blue Cascades II;
Description: Cosponsored by DHS and organized by members of the Pacific
Northwest Economic Region. This exercise tested regional capabilities
to deal with threats, interdependencies, and cascading impacts by
simulating a series of attacks that disrupted infrastructures and
organizations, including critical telecommunications and electricity
assets;
Participant(s): Federal, state, and local governments and private
industry.
Date: October 2004;
Exercise name: Purple Crescent II;
Description: Sponsored by the Gulf Coast Regional Partnership for
Infrastructure Security and funded by DHS. The exercise was designed to
raise awareness of infrastructure interdependencies and identify how to
improve regional preparedness by simulating cyber attacks on regional
infrastructures as well as government and private organizations during
an approaching hurricane;
Participant(s): Federal, state, and local governments; academic
institutions; and private industry.
Date: April 2005;
Exercise name: Top Officials-3;
Description: Sponsored by DHS, this exercise was to evaluate decision
making by federal, state, and local governments by simulating terrorist
threats and attacks involving chemicals, biological agents, and
explosives;
Participant(s): Federal, state, local, and foreign governments and
private industry.
Date: April 2005;
Exercise name: Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center's
Tabletop Exercise;
Description: Cosponsored by DHS and the Multi-State Information Sharing
and Analysis Center during the center's annual meeting. This tabletop
exercise was designed to offer an opportunity for the state information
technology participants to discuss their state policies and procedures
and to prepare for the Cyber Storm I exercise;
Participant(s): State governments.
Date: February 2006;
Exercise name: Cyber Storm I;
Description: Sponsored by DHS, Cyber Storm I was the first large-scale
national cyber exercise to improve incident response and coordination
capabilities by simulating multiple cyber incidents affecting the
energy, information technology, telecommunications, and transportation
critical infrastructure sectors;
Participant(s): Federal, state, and foreign governments and private
industry.
Date: March 2006;
Exercise name: Blue Cascades III;
Description: Cosponsored by DHS and organized by members of the Pacific
Northwest Economic Region. This exercise was designed to focus on
efforts to recover and restore services by simulating the impact of a
major earthquake in the area;
Participant(s): Federal, state, local, and foreign governments and
private industry.
Date: October 2006;
Exercise name: Delaware Cyber Security Tabletop Exercise;
Description: Sponsored by the state of Delaware, with assistance from
DHS. This exercise was designed to discuss the technical implications
of a pandemic disaster scenario;
Participant(s): State government.
Date: December 2006;
Exercise name: Cyber Tempest;
Description: Cosponsored by DHS and the New York State Office of Cyber
Security and Critical Infrastructure Coordination. This exercise was
designed to focus on regional stakeholders' procedures for response and
coordination during emergencies;
Participant(s): State governments.
Date: April 2007;
Exercise name: Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center's
Tabletop Exercise;
Description: Cosponsored by DHS and the Multi-State Information Sharing
and Analysis Center during the center's annual meeting. This exercise
was designed to offer an opportunity for the state information
technology participants to discuss their state policies and procedures
and to prepare for the Cyber Storm II exercise;
Participant(s): State governments.
Date: September 2007;
Exercise name: ChicagoFIRST Exercise;
Description: Cosponsored by DHS and ChicagoFIRST, a nonprofit
organization representing financial institutions. This exercise was
designed to offer the city government an opportunity to collaborate
with greater Chicago regional stakeholders;
Participant(s): Local/regional government.
Date: October 2007;
Exercise name: Top Officials-4;
Description: Sponsored by DHS. This exercise was designed to test
federal, state, territorial, and local response capabilities by
simulating coordinated attacks using a radiological dispersal device;
Participant(s): Federal, state, local, and foreign governments and
private industry.
Date: October 2007;
Exercise name: Illinois Cyber Tabletop Exercise;
Description: Sponsored by the state of Illinois, with assistance from
DHS. This exercise was designed to provide participants with an
opportunity to discuss a cyber scenario affecting multiple state
critical infrastructures, resulting in cascading effects across the
state;
Participant(s): State government.
Date: October 2007;
Exercise name: Delaware Cyber Security Tabletop Exercise;
Description: Sponsored by the state of Delaware, with assistance from
DHS. The exercise was designed to discuss the increasing threat of
financial and identify thefts with stakeholders;
Participant(s): State government.
Date: March 2008;
Exercise name: Cyber Storm II;
Description: Sponsored by DHS, this exercise was to improve national
incident response and coordination capabilities by simulating physical
and cyber attacks against the transportation, information technology,
and chemical critical infrastructure sectors;
Participant(s): Federal, state, and foreign governments and private
industry.
Date: May 2008;
Exercise name: Massachusetts Cyber Exercise;
Description: Cosponsored by DHS and the state of Massachusetts. This
exercise was to examine processes, procedures, and the operational
architecture of system operators, law enforcement officials, local/
state government, and several private sector partners in response to
specific cyber attack scenarios;
Participant(s): State and local governments.
Date: September 2008;
Exercise name: ChicagoFIRST Exercise;
Description: Cosponsored by DHS and ChicagoFIRST. This exercise is
planned to focus on the financial sector;
Participant(s): Private industry.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of table]
DHS's Cyber Storm Exercises:
DHS's Cyber Storm exercises are intended to examine national
preparedness, response, coordination, and recovery efforts when faced
with a large-scale cyber incident. Participants include federal and
state agencies, private industry representatives, and selected foreign
governments. DHS conducted Cyber Storm exercises in 2006 and 2008, and
is planning to conduct a third exercise in 2010.
In February 2006, DHS conducted Cyber Storm I at a cost of about $3.7
million. The exercise simulated a large-scale attack affecting the
energy and transportation infrastructures, using the telecommunications
infrastructure as a medium for the attack. Participants included eight
federal departments and three agencies, three states, and four foreign
countries. The exercise also involved representatives from the private
sector--including 11 information technology companies, 7 electric
companies, 1 banking and finance company, and 2 airlines--and over 100
public and private agencies, associations, and corporations. DHS
officials conducted the exercise primarily on a separate network to
minimize the impact on "real world" information systems. The objectives
of Cyber Storm I were to:
* exercise interagency coordination by convening NCRCG and the
Interagency Incident Management Group, a multi-agency team of federal
executives responsible for providing strategic advice during nationally
significant incidents;[Footnote 9]
* exercise intergovernmental and intragovernmental coordination and
incident response;
* identify policies and issues that hinder or support cybersecurity
requirements;
* identify public/private interface communications and thresholds of
coordination to improve cyber incident response and recovery, as well
as identify critical information sharing paths and mechanisms;
* identify, improve, and promote public and private sector interaction
in processes and procedures for communicating appropriate information
to key stakeholders and the public;
* identify cyber and physical infrastructure interdependencies with
real world economic and political impact;
* raise awareness of the economic and national security impacts
associated with a significant cyber incident; and:
* highlight available tools and technologies with analytical cyber
incident response and recovery capabilities.
In March 2008, DHS conducted its second broad-scale exercise, called
Cyber Storm II. The exercise cost about $6.4 million, and simulated a
large-scale cyber attack affecting the communications, information
technology, chemical, and transportation infrastructures. According to
DHS, the exercise involved 18 federal agencies, 9 states, 10
information sharing and analysis centers, 5 foreign countries, and over
40 industry representatives from the private sector. The objectives of
Cyber Storm II were to:
* examine the capabilities of participating organizations to prepare
for, protect from, and respond to the effects of cyber attacks;
* exercise senior leadership decision making and interagency
coordination of incident responses in accordance with national-level
policies and procedures;
* validate information sharing relationships and communication paths
for the collection and dissemination of cyber incident situational
awareness, response, and recovery information; and:
* examine the means and processes to share sensitive and classified
information across standard boundaries in safe and secure ways without
compromising proprietary or national security interests.
DHS plans to issue a report on what it learned from Cyber Storm II by
the end of 2008.
DHS Identified Eight Lessons during Cyber Storm I:
While Cyber Storm I participants reported that the exercise was
valuable in that it helped them establish and improve interagency and
public/private response relationships, DHS also identified eight
lessons during the Cyber Storm I exercise that affected all
participating sectors and agencies. These lessons involved improving
(1) the interagency coordination groups; (2) contingency planning, risk
assessment, and roles and responsibilities; (3) integration of
incidents across infrastructures; (4) access to information; (5)
coordination of response activities; (6) strategic communications and
public relations; (7) processes, tools, and technology; and (8) the
exercise program.
Interagency Coordination Groups:
DHS reported that during the exercise, the two key interagency
coordination groups--NCRCG and the Interagency Incident Management
Group--were convened appropriately and that they worked well together.
For example, the two groups coordinated to develop a refined awareness
of the attack situation and to assess effects on the nation's critical
infrastructure. However, the agency found that a broader understanding
of how these groups operate would improve coordination, both within the
government and with the private sector. Specifically, participants
reported that:
* greater collaboration could be achieved if the private sector was
allowed interaction with NCRCG during major incidents,
* additional work was needed to determine how to effectively elevate
the alert levels in response to cyber attacks or threats,
* NCRCG did not have enough technical experts on staff to fully
leverage the large volume of incident information,
* communication procedures were needed to deliver key technical
messages at a layman's level to organizations' public affairs groups in
a timely manner, and:
* an established information sharing process between NCRCG and allied
nations would facilitate communication and help ensure a more effective
response.
Contingency Planning, Risk Assessment, and Roles and Responsibilities:
DHS found that formal contingency planning, risk assessment, and the
definition of roles and responsibilities across the entire cyber
community must continue to be solidified. It reported that in cases
where procedures were clear and fully understood by participants,
incident responses were timely and well coordinated. However, in cases
where there were no previously established relationships and procedures
for coordinating responses and assessing risks were not clear,
participants had difficulty determining which organizations and people
to contact. In addition, DHS found that contingency planning for backup
or resilient communications was critical. The agency noted that during
the exercise many participants relied heavily on communications systems
that could be vulnerable to attack or failure.
Integration of Incidents across Infrastructures:
According to DHS, the integration of multiple incidents across multiple
infrastructures and between the public and private sectors remained a
challenge. DHS reported that the cyber incident response community was
generally effective in addressing single threats or attacks and, to
some extent, in addressing multiple threats and attacks when these
incidents were treated as individual and discrete events. However,
participants were challenged when attempting to develop an integrated
situational awareness and to understand the impact of multiple attacks
across sectors. As the organization responsible for analyzing cyber
threats and disseminating warnings, US-CERT had a lead role in forming
an integrated situational awareness. However, during the exercise, US-
CERT was inundated with information and questions from both the public
and the private sectors. The US-CERT team found that the volume of
information limited its ability to simultaneously provide situational
awareness coordination and conduct technical analyses. Participants
reported that a prioritization scheme is needed in order to rapidly
assess cyber incidents, their sources, and their applicability to the
broad-scale attack. In addition, DHS noted that there needs to be
greater clarification of US-CERT's roles, responsibilities, and
procedures.
Access to Information:
While DHS reported that a continuous flow of information created a
common framework for responding to the incidents, the majority of
exercise participants reported difficulty in identifying accurate and
up-to-date sources of information. For example, during the exercise,
participants received multiple alerts on a single issue, which created
confusion and made it more difficult to establish a single coordinated
response. Participants observed that establishing a single point of
contact for information would allow a common framework for responses,
and noted that US-CERT is the correct agency to disseminate time
sensitive and critical information to the appropriate organizations. In
addition, while US-CERT provided significant information in the form of
alerts and technical bulletins, participants stated that US-CERT's
capabilities to post information in a timely, secure, and accurate
manner needed to be further explored.
Coordination of Response Activities:
DHS found that coordinating responses became more challenging as the
number of cyber events increased, thus highlighting the importance of
cooperation and communication. For example, during the exercise,
participants noted the overwhelming effects that multiple,
simultaneous, and coordinated attacks had on their response activities,
which proved that the ability to accurately fuse information is crucial
for responding appropriately to simultaneous attacks. Participants
reported that clarifying roles and responsibilities across government,
as well as the expectations between public and private sectors, is
needed to coordinate preventive measures and responses to disruptions.
Strategic Communications and Public Relations:
DHS reported that public messaging must be an integral part of plans
for responding to a cyber incident in order to provide critical
information to the response community and to empower the public to take
appropriate actions. Exercise participants stated that publicly
released information could undermine consumer confidence, and noted the
importance of aligning both public and private sector public relations
plans in order to have a coordinated approach during a crisis. In
addition, DHS found that federal responses to cyber incidents must
include public affairs teams to ensure that press releases and accurate
situation updates are provided to partner organizations and media
outlets.
Processes, Tools, and Technology:
DHS reported that improved processes, tools, and training for analyzing
and prioritizing the physical, economic, and national security impacts
of cyber attack scenarios would enhance the quality, speed, and
coordination of response. In particular, participants reported that
exchanging and sharing classified information was a challenge and
suggested that processes be developed to downgrade classified
information so that it could be shared throughout the response
community.
The Exercise Program:
DHS reported that recurring exercises would strengthen participants'
awareness of organizational cyber incident response, roles, policies,
and procedures. Participants observed that ongoing training,
discussions, and exercises are needed to build relationships among
organizations and to strengthen the coordination of responses to cyber
incidents. In addition, several participants in Cyber Storm I
recommended the execution of smaller, more routine exercises.
DHS Has Demonstrated Progress in Addressing Lessons from Its First
Cyber Storm Exercise, but More Remains to Be Done:
While DHS has demonstrated progress in addressing the lessons it
learned from its first Cyber Storm exercise, more remains to be done to
fully address the lessons. Federal policy requires that DHS develop and
maintain a system to collect, analyze, and disseminate lessons learned,
best practices, and information from exercises, training events, and
other sources.[Footnote 10] In addition, DHS's homeland security
exercise program guidance requires that, following an exercise,
planners must identify a list of corrective actions and track their
implementation.[Footnote 11]
DHS has begun to fulfill these requirements. Specifically, DHS
documented the lessons it learned during the first Cyber Storm exercise
and identified 66 activities that address one or more of the lessons.
These activities included hosting meetings with key cyber response
officials from foreign, federal, and state governments and private
industry; refining the procedures under which these entities operate;
and participating in smaller cyber exercises to test these refined
procedures (see app. II for a list of activities).
In addition, DHS has made progress in completing its planned
activities, but more remains to be done. Of the 66 activities intended
to address the lessons, 42 activities have been completed. These
completed activities range from clarified procedures to improved
technology for emergency responders, and they should improve
communications and response activities during a significant cyber
incident. DHS reported that another activity had been completed, but
was unable to provide evidence demonstrating its completion. However,
key activities needed to improve coordination and response during a
significant cyber incident have not yet been completed. The remaining
23 activities include 16 activities that are ongoing and 7 activities
that are planned for the future. While DHS has identified completion
dates for its planned activities, it has not identified completion
dates associated with activities that are reported as ongoing. For
example, DHS reported that it has work under way to issue guidance to
information sharing and analysis centers on public communications
related to cybersecurity, but has not identified a milestone for
completing this activity. Table 3 provides the number of activities in
each of these categories.
Table 3: Summary of Status of Activities:
Status of DHS activities: Reported and validated as completed;
Number of activities: 42.
Status of DHS activities: Reported as completed, but not validated due
to insufficient evidence;
Number of activities: 1.
Status of DHS activities: Reported as ongoing;
Number of activities: 16.
Status of DHS activities: Reported as planned for the future;
Number of activities: 7.
Status of DHS activities: Total;
Number of activities: 66.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of table]
Focusing on each of the eight lessons, DHS has completed selected
activities within each lesson, but has more to do. The department's
progress on each of the lessons learned during the first Cyber Storm
exercise is discussed below. In reviewing this progress, it is
important to note that because many of DHS's activities are intended to
address more than one lesson, the sum of the activities supporting all
eight lessons is higher than the net number of activities.
Specifically, DHS listed 121 activities to address lessons 1 through 8,
but 55 of these repeat a prior activity. A complete list of the
activities supporting each lesson and their status are provided in
appendix III.
* Interagency coordination groups--DHS identified 32 activities to
address the need for improving the interagency coordination groups. Of
these, 24 activities have been completed and 8 are ongoing or planned
for the future. DHS completed activities such as researching and
procuring situation awareness visualization and communication tools and
conducting a tabletop exercise among NCRCG, the Homeland Security
Operations Center, the Crisis Action Team, and US-CERT. Activities that
still remain to be completed include establishing secure communications
with all international partners and working with leadership to frame
possible changes in rules for raising alert levels.
* Contingency planning, risk assessment, and roles and
responsibilities--DHS identified 15 activities to address the need for
improved contingency planning, risk assessment, and roles and
responsibilities. Of these, 8 activities had been completed and 7 are
ongoing or planned for the future. DHS completed activities such as
researching secure cell phone capability for NCRCG members and
procuring satellite phones. Activities that still remain to be
completed include coordinating standard operating procedures and
concepts of operations with several information sharing and analysis
centers and establishing a continuity-of-operations plan.
* Integration of incidents across infrastructures--DHS identified 16
activities to address the need for improved integration of incidents
across infrastructures. Of these, 9 have been completed and 7 are
ongoing or planned for the future. Completed activities include meeting
with international participants to share capabilities and establish
working relationships and researching alternatives to the Emergency
Notification System. Activities that still remain to be completed
include filling open spots at US-CERT to better address its mission and
coordinating standard operating procedures with US-CERT and the
information technology and communications information sharing and
analysis centers.
* Access to information--DHS identified 15 activities to address the
need for improved access to information. Of these, 8 activities have
been completed and 7 are ongoing or planned for the future. DHS
completed developing a contact list of key public and private sector
subject matter experts and meeting with international participants to
share capabilities and establish working relationships. Activities that
still remain to be completed include identifying and organizing a
private sector counterpart for NCRCG and establishing processes,
procedures, and physical means to communicate securely with
counterparts.
* Coordination of response activities--DHS identified 15 activities to
address the need for improved coordination of response activities. Of
these, 11 have been completed and 4 are ongoing or planned for the
future. DHS completed activities such as significantly revising the
NCRCG's standard operating procedures and refining situation report
development and communication within those procedures. Activities that
still remain to be completed include developing policies for handling
classified information and educating the law enforcement community on
the role and function of NCRCG.
* Strategic communications and public relations plan--DHS identified 5
activities to address the lesson that public messaging must be an
integral part of contingency planning and incident response. Of these,
1 activity has been completed and 4 are ongoing or planned for the
future. DHS completed efforts to establish a mechanism for
communicating real world implications of cyber incidents to DHS Public
Affairs and the Public Affairs Working Group. Activities that still
remain to be completed include issuing guidance to information sharing
and analysis centers on a set of policies for cybersecurity-related
public communications and developing public affairs messaging
coordination between public and private information technology
organizations for normal and emergency operations.
* Processes, tools, and technology--DHS identified 12 activities to
address the need for improved processes, tools, and technology. Of
these, 8 activities have been completed and 4 are ongoing or planned
for the future. Completed activities include developing a comprehensive
set of cyber scenarios to support the exercises and clarifying
interfaces and expectations at every level of NCRCG engagement.
Activities that still remain to be completed include requesting that
all federal computer emergency response teams obtain secure
communications and developing policies for handling classified
information.
* Exercise program--DHS identified 11 activities to address the need
for improvements to the exercise program. Of these, 9 activities have
been completed and 2 are ongoing or planned for the future. Completed
activities include participating in a tabletop exercise and a full-
scale exercise, and improving the communications infrastructure for the
exercise. DHS has not yet completed activities including implementing a
relational database consistent with industry standards in order to
allow better correlation, analysis, and communication of incidents.
Until DHS schedules and completes its planned corrective activities,
the agency risks wasting resources on subsequent exercises that repeat
the lessons it learned in its first exercise.
Cyber Storm II Participants Observed Progress and Continued Challenges
in Exercising the National Cyber Response Capability:
Commenting on their experiences during Cyber Storm II, participants
observed both progress and continued challenges in building a
comprehensive national cyber response capability. Their observations
addressed several key areas, including the value and scope of the
exercise, roles and responsibilities, public relations, communications,
the exercise infrastructure, and the handling of classified
information.
Exercise value and scope--The participants we met with reported that
their organization found value in participating in the exercise. For
example, one agency official stated that the exercises were invaluable
because they allowed the agency to update call lists and to practice
how it would respond to cyber events. In addition, a participant stated
that the exercise had a positive outcome for his organization and that
the real benefit of the exercise was in sharing information.
However, participants agreed that smaller, more frequent exercises
would be helpful in planning for cyber incidents. One agency official
stated that the "doomsday" scenarios made it difficult to test
agencies' responses to less dramatic cyber incidents. Another agency
official reported that the sheer number of e-mail alerts received
during the exercise was difficult to handle. Another participant
suggested that DHS conduct exercises focusing on different
infrastructure sectors during every quarterly meeting of NCRCG.
Roles and responsibilities--Cyber Storm II participants reported having
a much better understanding of the various organizations' roles and
whom to contact within those organizations during a cyber incident. For
example, a participant noted that NCRCG has had time to stabilize over
the 2 years since the first Cyber Storm exercise.
However, participants also reported that there is room for improvement
in defining the roles and responsibilities of both NCRCG and the law
enforcement community. Specifically, selected Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (ISAC) members reported that there is still confusion
in the private sector on NCRCG's role during a cyber incident. ISAC
officials stated that it was unclear to the private sector what NCRCG
is responsible for, what it means when the group is activated, and what
this activation means to the private sector. In addition, Cyber Storm
II participants reported the need for further clarification of the
roles and responsibilities of the law enforcement community during a
cyber incident. Specifically, law enforcement participants noted that
other exercise participants may not have been properly reporting
incidents to the law enforcement community, even though most scenarios
involved criminal violations. They stated that not being appropriately
involved in the exercise scenarios made it difficult to fully test
investigative and legal processes.
Public relations--While participants generally agreed that media
relations went well during the exercise, they also identified the need
for further improvements. To address prior concerns, DHS included a
public relations specialist in the NCRCG membership to help develop
messages for NCRCG and other organizations involved in the exercise,
and provided a technical specialist to the department's public affairs
office to ensure cyber issues were described accurately. However, a
private sector participant commented that there appeared to be minimal
alignment of communications and public relations plans between the
public and private sectors during the exercise.
Communications--Participants also reported a need for further
improvement in communication between participants during the exercise.
For example, a private sector participant cited a breakdown in
communication where participants were not aware that the US-CERT alert
level had been raised. Another participant reported that US-CERT did
not resolve conflicting data before issuing information--even after
this individual's ISAC contacted US-CERT. In another instance, a
private sector participant reported not knowing how to contact US-CERT
during the exercise. Another participant reported that there were
instances where private sector players were sharing information with
DHS, but the information appeared never to have made it to the decision
makers.
Exercise infrastructure--Participants generally agreed that
improvements to the exercise's infrastructure could be made. For
example, several participants reported that DHS was not able to use an
encrypted communications system it developed for the exercise because
the technology failed. However, DHS reported that the technology did
not fail, but rather that it turned off the technology because of
security concerns. Participants also reported issues with receiving e-
mails of the exercises, downloading the exercise directory, and
accessing the exercise's Web page. Another participant stated that his
organization did not have time to run some of the exercise scenarios
due to technical issues it encountered during the exercise.
Classified information handling--Participants stated that there is a
continuing challenge in accessing sensitive information on cyber
threats and incidents, and that policies dealing with classified
information need to be improved. For example, one private sector
participant stated that it is not clear how information gets classified
or what information is available to the private sector. An agency
official stated that it has been a challenge to pull unclassified
information out of classified information systems in order to share it.
Other participants stated that they would like to see additional effort
expended on sharing unclassified information on the government's public
response portal--the Government Forum of Incident Response and Security
Teams portal--which is available to federal agencies and to a limited
number of local agencies and organizations. Participants noted that the
portal is too open for truly secure communication but not open enough
to share information between public and private sectors.
Many of the challenges that participants noted during Cyber Storm II
were similar to challenges identified during the first Cyber Storm
exercise. For example, comments regarding the need for better
understanding of roles and responsibilities after Cyber Storm II were
similar to comments made in four of the eight lessons resulting from
Cyber Storm I. Also, both exercises resulted in comments calling for
improvements to the exercise program and for better internal and
external communications.
Conclusions:
Both public and private sector participants in DHS's Cyber Storm
exercises agreed that the exercises are valuable in helping them
coordinate their responses to significant cyber incidents. After the
completion of the first Cyber Storm exercise in February 2006, DHS
identified 8 lessons and 66 activities to address these lessons,
ranging from revising operating procedures to holding tabletop
exercises to test and evaluate those revised procedures. While DHS has
made progress in completing over 60 percent of these activities, it has
more to do to complete key activities--including those that are planned
for the future as well as those identified as ongoing without a
completion date. More recently, key federal, state, and private sector
officials who participated in the second Cyber Storm exercise in March
2008 observed areas of progress as well as continued challenges--many
similar to challenges identified during the first exercise. Until DHS
schedules and completes its corrective activities, the agency risks
wasting resources on subsequent exercises that repeat the lessons it
learned in 2006.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Given the importance of continuously improving cyber exercises, we are
making one recommendation to the Secretary of Homeland Security to
direct the Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity and Communications to
ensure the scheduling and completion of the corrective actions
addressing lessons learned during Cyber Storm I before conducting the
next Cyber Storm Exercise.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We received written comments on a draft of this report from DHS (see
app. IV). In the department's response, the Director of the
Departmental GAO/Office of Inspector General Liaison Office concurred
with our recommendation and stated that DHS will continue to address
actions related to Cyber Storm I findings. DHS also reported that after
receiving the draft report, it has completed additional items, raising
the percentage of corrective actions completed to over 70 percent. We
did not modify the status of the activities identified in our report
because DHS has not yet provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate
that these activities have been completed.
In its comments, DHS also stated that end dates are not applicable for
many of the remaining corrective actions because they are either
dependent upon outside stakeholder actions or are ongoing or long-term
activities that are being addressed incrementally over time. However,
we found that most of the remaining activities are finite in nature and
could be associated with a time frame. For example, it would be
possible to establish time frames for issuing guidance to the
information sharing and analysis centers on public communications,
requesting that all computer emergency response teams have secure
communications, and identifying international counterparts to NCRCG.
Further, while we agree that some activities may involve other
stakeholders or take more time, it is important for DHS to identify
interim and final milestones for these activities so that they can
monitor their progress. This approach is consistent with DHS's guidance
for its exercise programs, which requires that each corrective action
have a time frame for implementation.
DHS officials also provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of the report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and
other interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at
no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions on matters discussed in this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to
this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
David A. Powner:
Director, Information Technology Management Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to (1) identify the lessons that the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) learned from the first Cyber Storm exercise,
(2) assess DHS's efforts to implement lessons learned from this
exercise, and (3) identify key participants' views of their experiences
during the second Cyber Storm exercise.
To identify the lessons learned from DHS's cyber attack simulations, we
reviewed the agency's Cyber Storm Exercise Report. We also interviewed
agency officials to obtain clarification on this exercise and the
lessons learned.
To assess DHS's efforts to address the lessons it learned from its
exercise, we analyzed DHS's list of planned activities and the status
of these activities. We analyzed documentation of the activities that
were reported as completed, including concepts of operations and
standard operating procedures for relevant organizations as well as
evidence of additional staff hires and completion of tabletop
exercises. We also visited the United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT) to observe network and technology changes that
were made to address lessons identified during Cyber Storm I. We
interviewed DHS officials from the National Cyber Security Division
(NCSD) and US-CERT to obtain clarification on documentation and plans.
To identify key participants' views of their experiences during the
second Cyber Storm exercise, we interviewed Cyber Storm planners,
observers, and participants from federal agencies, state governments,
and the private sector. Specifically, we interviewed representatives
from the Departments of Transportation, Justice, and Energy because
these organizations were identified by DHS as key participants in the
Cyber Storm exercises--either as an organization that was subject to
simulated cyber incidents or as an organization critical to the
recovery from the incidents. We interviewed the Multi-State Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) because it was able to represent
multiple state governments that participated in the exercises. We also
interviewed private sector officials representing the Information
Technology ISAC, the Electricity ISAC, and the chemical sector. We
asked participants about the issues raised during Cyber Storm I and
whether these were improved or remained as challenges during Cyber
Storm II. After discussing both Cyber Storm exercises with these
participants, we analyzed their observations for commonalities and
organized them into broad categories. These observations are not
intended to be generalized to other exercise participants.
We performed our work at the headquarters of the Departments of
Homeland Security, Transportation, Energy, and Justice and in
Washington, D.C. In addition, we attended the Cyber Storm II exercise
held in Washington, D.C., in March 2008. We performed our work from
January 2008 to September 2008 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: DHS Activities to Address Lessons from Cyber Storm I:
DHS identified 66 activities to address lessons identified in Cyber
Storm I. Almost half of these activities are intended to address
multiple lessons. Table 4 shows the list of activities and which
lessons they are intended to address.
Table 4: DHS's Planned Activities and the Lessons They Address:
Activity identification number: 1;
DHS activity: Significantly revise standard operating procedures for
the National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG);
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8.
Activity identification number: 2;
DHS activity: Refine definition of Cyber Incident of National
Significance;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1.
Activity identification number: 3;
DHS activity: Conduct meeting with member agencies to ensure they
understand the needed resources to support NCRCG during activation;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1.
Activity identification number: 4;
DHS activity: Establish in standard operating procedures a means of
quickly and clearly communicating changes in NCRCG engagement status
with interfacing organizations;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 4.
Activity identification number: 5;
DHS activity: Within standard operating procedures, refine situation
reports and situation report development and communication procedures;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 4, 5, 7, 8.
Activity identification number: 6;
DHS activity: Research and procure appropriate situation awareness
visualization and communication tools;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1.
Activity identification number: 7;
DHS activity: Request access to classified DHS networks in NCRCG's
room;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 4, 5, 7, 8.
Activity identification number: 8;
DHS activity: Hold meeting among NCRCG, Homeland Security Operations
Center, Interagency Advisory Council (now the Crisis Action Team), and
US-CERT;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1.
Activity identification number: 9;
DHS activity: Conduct a tabletop exercise among NCRCG, the Homeland
Security Operations Center, the Interagency Advisory Council (now the
Crisis Action Team), and US-CERT;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1.
Activity identification number: 10;
DHS activity: Work with the Office of Public Affairs to ensure NCRCG
receives situation reports;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1.
Activity identification number: 11;
DHS activity: Provide a liaison to an interfacing group from NCRCG;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1.
Activity identification number: 12;
DHS activity: During the meeting in June 2006 with international
participants, discuss coordination with entities similar to NCRCG;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1.
Activity identification number: 13;
DHS activity: Clarify interfaces and expectation at every level of
NCRCG engagement;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 7.
Activity identification number: 14;
DHS activity: Move triage capability into US-CERT main facility;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 3, 5.
Activity identification number: 15;
DHS activity: Create four new positions to ensure staffing and
continuity in US-CERT through normal and emergency operations;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 7.
Activity identification number: 16;
DHS activity: Refine and prioritize use and purposes of key US-CERT
communications portals to eliminate redundancy and streamline
communication with subscribers and counterparts;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 4.
Activity identification number: 17;
DHS activity: Meet in June 2006 with all international participants to
share capabilities and establish working relationships;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 2, 3, 4.
Activity identification number: 18;
DHS activity: Discuss an initial international participant tabletop
exercise and additional follow-on exercise activities with
international participants and policy representatives in order to build
clear way ahead for Cyber Storm II in 2008;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 3.
Activity identification number: 19;
DHS activity: Coordinate support of DHS's Operations office as noted in
its revised standard operation procedures;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 3, 4, 5, 7.
Activity identification number: 20;
DHS activity: Once refined standard operating procedures are
established for NCRCG, US-CERT, National Operations Center, and
Interagency Advisory Council (now the Crisis Action Team) organize and
support the tabletop exercise to validate and refine interaction;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1.
Activity identification number: 21;
DHS activity: Support the development of a contact list of key public
and private sector subject matter experts;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 4, 5.
Activity identification number: 22;
DHS activity: Once clear engagement thresholds are established, ensure
that all interfacing organizations are aware of thresholds, levels of
engagement, and implications of each;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1.
Activity identification number: 23;
DHS activity: Establish a mechanism for communicating real world
implications of cyber incidents to DHS Public Affairs and the Public
Affairs Working Group;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 6.
Activity identification number: 24;
DHS activity: Modify standard operating procedures to reflect any
changes in Homeland Security Advisory System policy;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 3.
Activity identification number: 25;
DHS activity: Work to identify and contact NCRCG counterpart
organizations within international partners;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 2, 4.
Activity identification number: 26;
DHS activity: Develop the capability to reach back to the private
sector;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: Activity identification number:
1.
Activity identification number: 27;
DHS activity: Move to develop public affairs messaging coordination
among NCRCG, NCSD, the Information Technology Information Sharing and
Analysis Center, and the Information Technology Sector Coordinating
Council for both normal and emergency operations;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 3, 6.
Activity identification number: 28;
DHS activity: Engage in conversations with leadership to frame possible
changes in rules for raising alert levels based on threats to cross-
sector support structure;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 3.
Activity identification number: 29;
DHS activity: Establish processes, procedures, and physical means to
communicate securely with NCRCG counterparts at a policy level;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 2, 4.
Activity identification number: 30;
DHS activity: Once Situation Awareness Toolset is established, arrange
for appropriate centers to have it;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1, 4.
Activity identification number: 31;
DHS activity: In meeting with international participants, address
coordination of standard operating procedures and concept of
operations;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1.
Activity identification number: 32;
DHS activity: Work to establish secure communications with all
international partners;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 1.
Activity identification number: 33;
DHS activity: Procure Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
cards for all NCRCG members;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 2.
Activity identification number: 34;
DHS activity: Research secure cell phone capability for NCRCG members;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 2.
Activity identification number: 35;
DHS activity: Work with a foreign computer emergency response team to
cosponsor another foreign computer emergency response team into an
intragovernmental incident response forum;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 2.
Activity identification number: 36;
DHS activity: Install Critical Infrastructure Warning Information
Network terminal in US-CERT;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 2.
Activity identification number: 37;
DHS activity: Add redundant network support to US-CERT;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 2.
Activity identification number: 38;
DHS activity: Procure 15 satellite phones;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 2.
Activity identification number: 39;
DHS activity: Work to identify and organize a private sector
counterpart for NCRCG with appropriate concepts of operations and
standard operating procedures;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 2, 4, 5, 7.
Activity identification number: 40;
DHS activity: Address public policy issues for industry incident
response activities in cooperation with the industry and leadership;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 2.
Activity identification number: 41;
DHS activity: Facilitate the development and implementation of cyber
risk assessment methodologies across the information technology sector
and in coordination with other sectors;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 2.
Activity identification number: 42;
DHS activity: Coordinate standard operating procedures and concepts of
operations with several ISACs;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 2, 3, 5.
Activity identification number: 43;
DHS activity: Submit request for continuity-of-operations space and
establish continuity-of-operations plan;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 2.
Activity identification number: 44;
DHS activity: Research alternatives to the Emergency Notification
System;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 3.
Activity identification number: 45;
DHS activity: Add dedicated support staff person to focus on processes
and procedures;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 3.
Activity identification number: 46;
DHS activity: Establish better e-mail connection during exercise to
avoid spam filtering of injects;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 3, 5.
Activity identification number: 47;
DHS activity: Execute semiannual tabletop exercise with accompanying
education workshops focused on high-risk scenarios and cyber risk
assessment;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 3, 5, 7, 8.
Activity identification number: 48;
DHS activity: Coordinate standard operating procedures with US-CERT and
the Information Technology and Communication ISACs;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 3, 4.
Activity identification number: 49;
DHS activity: Transfer ticket tracking system over to an industry
standard relational database tracking system for better correlation,
analysis, and communication of incidents;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 3, 8.
Activity identification number: 50;
DHS activity: Fill open spots with qualified personnel to gain
bandwidth necessary to better address all aspects of US-CERT mission;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 3, 8.
Activity identification number: 51;
DHS activity: Continue to expand network of informal and semiformal
relationships with cyber-related associations and interest groups;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 4.
Activity identification number: 52;
DHS activity: Forward request to require all federal computer emergency
response teams to have secure communications, up to at least Secret;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 4, 7.
Activity identification number: 53;
DHS activity: Request additional NCRCG support staff to address
planning, correlation, and communication requirements;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 5.
Activity identification number: 54;
DHS activity: Plan for significant pre-Cyber Storm II intelligence and
law enforcement buildup exercise segment;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 5.
Activity identification number: 55;
DHS activity: Complete permanent home of US-CERT, allowing classified
operations to occur on-site;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 5.
Activity identification number: 56;
DHS activity: Work to educate law enforcement on role and function of
the NCRCG and establish sharing of cyber issues;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 5, 7.
Activity identification number: 57;
DHS activity: Work to expedite tear-line policies (policies for
organizing official documents so that unclassified information can be
easily separated from classified information and disseminated);
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 5, 7.
Activity identification number: 58;
DHS activity: Advocate inclusion of cyber public affairs in all
exercises where appropriate;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 6.
Activity identification number: 59;
DHS activity: Issue guidance to ISACs on a set of policies for
cybersecurity-related public communications;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 6.
Activity identification number: 60;
DHS activity: Establish baseline of public messaging based on cyber
probable scenarios to include best channels for message delivery;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 6.
Activity identification number: 61;
DHS activity: Develop comprehensive set of cyber scenarios to support
exercises and planning;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 7.
Activity identification number: 62;
DHS activity: Develop reporting process in coordination with reporting
entities;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 8.
Activity identification number: 63;
DHS activity: Participate in Internet Disruption Working Group tabletop
exercise;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 8.
Activity identification number: 64;
DHS activity: Plan and support cyber aspects of Top Officials 4
exercise;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 8.
Activity identification number: 65;
DHS activity: Plan and execute Cyber Storm II;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 8.
Activity identification number: 66;
DHS activity: Coordinate and develop situation report reporting process
with National Operations Center and NCRCG;
Lesson(s) targeted by this activity[A]: 8.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[A] The lessons are:
Lesson 1: Interagency Coordination Groups:
Lesson 2: Contingency Planning, Risk Assessment, and Roles and
Responsibilities:
Lesson 3: Integration of Incidents across Infrastructures:
Lesson 4: Access to Information:
Lesson 5: Coordination of Response Activities:
Lesson 6: Strategic Communications and Public Relations:
Lesson 7: Processes, Tools, and Technology:
Lesson 8: The Exercise Program:
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Analysis of DHS Efforts to Address Lessons from Cyber
Storm I:
Figure 1 shows, for each lesson learned during Cyber Storm I, the
status of the activity as reported by DHS and whether the status could
be validated by GAO. The activities are identified by number in
appendix II.
Figure 1: Activity Status, as of June 2008, by Lesson:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a chart depicting the following data:
Interagency Coordination Groups
Lesson 1: Interagency Coordination Groups;
Activity: Completed and validated:
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,31;
Activity: Completed but not validated: None;
Activity: Ongoing: 24,25,26,27,28,29;
Activity: Planned for the future: 30,32;
Activity: Not applicable: 33 through 66.
Lesson 2: Contingency Planning, Risk Assessment, and Roles and
Responsibilities;
Activity: Completed and validated: 1, 17, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38;
Activity: Completed but not validated: None;
Activity: Ongoing: 25, 29, 39, 40, 41;
Activity: Planned for the future: 42, 43;
Activity: Not applicable: 2 through 16; 18 through 24; 26, 27, 28, 30,
31, 32, 44 through 66.
Lesson 3: Integration of Incidents across Infrastructures;
Activity: Completed and validated: 1, 14, 17, 18, 19, 44, 45, 46, 47;
Activity: Completed but not validated: None;
Activity: Ongoing: 24, 27, 28;
Activity: Planned for the future: 42, 48, 49, 50;
Activity: Not applicable: 2 through 13; 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26,
31 through 41, 43, 51 through 66.
Lesson 4: Access to Information;
Activity: Completed and validated: 1, 4, 5, 7, 16, 17, 19, 21;
Activity: Completed but not validated: None;
Activity: Ongoing: 25, 29, 39, 51, 52;
Activity: Planned for the future: 30, 48;
Activity: Not applicable: 2, 3, 6, 8 through 15, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24,
26, 27, 28, 31 through 38, 40 through 47, 49, 50, 53 through 66.
Lesson 5: Coordination of Response Activities;
Activity: Completed and validated: 1, 5, 7, 14, 19, 21, 46, 47, 54, 55;
Activity: Completed but not validated: 54;
Activity: Ongoing: 39, 56, 57;
Activity: Planned for the future: 42;
Activity: Not applicable: 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 through 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20,
22 through 38, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 58 through 66.
Lesson 6: Strategic Communications and Public Relations Plan;
Activity: Completed and validated: 23;
Activity: Completed but not validated: None;
Activity: Ongoing: 2758, 59, 60;
Activity: Planned for the future: None;
Activity: Not applicable: 1 through 22, 24, 25, 26, 28 through 57, 61
through 66.
Lesson 7: Processes, Tools, and Technology;
Activity: Completed and validated: 1, 5, 7, 13, 15, 19, 47, 61;
Activity: Completed but not validated: None;
Activity: Ongoing: 39, 52, 56, 57;
Activity: Planned for the future: None;
Activity: Not applicable: 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18,
20 through 38, 40 through 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60,
62 through 66.
Lesson 8: The Exercise Program;
Activity: Completed and validated: 1, 5, 7, 47, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66;
Activity: Completed but not validated: None;
Activity: Ongoing: None;
Activity: Planned for the future: 49, 50;
Activity: Not applicable: 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 through 46, 48, 51 through 61.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
[hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov]
August 22, 2008:
Mr. David Powner:
Director:
Information Technology Management Issues:
United States Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Powner:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO's) draft report entitled Critical
Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Fully Address Lessons Learned
from Its First Cyber Storm Exercise (GAO-08-825). Technical comments
have been provided under separate cover.
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) efforts to develop and
refine procedures for addressing and tracking corrective actions have
benefited from this GAO engagement. DHS fully agrees with GAO
assertions that continuous progress and validation of exercise findings
is essential to improving our Nation's cyber security, preparedness
posture, and ensuring the best use of resources.
GAO states in its draft report that DHS addressed and completed 43 of
the 66 corrective actions. The remaining 23 corrective actions included
16 items labeled `"ongoing" and 7 items labeled "planned for the
future." DHS addressed and completed over 66 percent of the total
corrective actions at the time the GAO's report was drafted. Since the
release of GAO's draft report, DHS completed additional
items, raising the percentage of corrective actions completed to over
70 percent. A full breakdown of recent actions undertaken and
discussion of their status is enclosed as Appendix A.
Recommendation: Given the importance of continuously improving cyber
exercises, we are making one recommendation to the Secretary of
Homeland Security to direct the Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity
and Communications to ensure the scheduling and completion of the
corrective actions addressing lessons learned during Cyber Storm I
before conducting the next Cyber Storm exercise.
Response: DHS concurs with the draft GAO report's recommendation and
will continue to address actions related to Cyber Storm I findings.
Many of the remaining corrective actions, however, are inherently long-
term or ongoing in nature. Some corrective actions are within DHS's
direct power to manage or perform, while others require extensive
coordination with stakeholders.
Fulfilling the report's recommendation that the Department take action
to ensure these remaining corrective actions are scheduled and
completed before executing the next Cyber Storm exercise is dependent
on various factors. DHS suggests that the remaining corrective actions
are either: (1) long-term activities and are being incrementally
addressed over time; (2) dependent upon outside stakeholder action; or
(3) ongoing, addressed in different capacities over time, and a
specific "end date" does not apply.
DHS appreciates the thorough analysis and very constructive points
raised by the GAO draft report. To best capitalize on this analysis and
recommendation, DHS plans an enhanced emphasis on how corrective action
categories are defined for purposes of planning and integration into
future exercises. DHS is willing to work with GAO as these efforts go
forward. Finally, we ask that GAO modify the report to reflect the
additional items the National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) has
completed since the draft report's release.
Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this draft report and
we look forward to working with you on future homeland security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286, or pownerd@gao.gov.
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact person named above, Colleen Phillips,
Assistant Director; Neil Doherty; Nancy Glover; Jim MacAulay; Lee
McCracken; and Jessica Waselkow made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The White House, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
(Washington, D.C.: February 2003), and Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization,
and Protection (Dec. 17, 2003).
[2] GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland
Security Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-434] (Washington,
D.C.: May 26, 2005); Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in
Addressing Cybersecurity, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-05-827T] (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2005); Internet
Infrastructure: DHS Faces Challenges in Developing a Joint
Public/Private Recovery Plan, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-672] (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006); Internet
Infrastructure: Challenges in Developing a Public/Private Recovery
Plan, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-863T]
(Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006); Critical Infrastructure Protection:
DHS Leadership Needed to Enhance Cybersecurity Elements, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1087T] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 13, 2006); Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multiple Efforts
to Secure Control Systems Are Under Way, but Challenges Remain,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1036] (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 10, 2007); Critical Infrastructure Protection: Multiple
Efforts to Secure Control Systems Are Under Way, but Challenges Remain,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-119T] (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 17, 2007); Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector-
Specific Plans' Coverage of Key Cyber Security Elements Varies,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-113] (Washington,
D.C.: Oct. 31, 2007).
[3] DHS reported that one other activity had been completed, but the
department was unable to provide evidence demonstrating its completion.
[4] The law and policies include the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(Pub. L. No. 107-296, Nov. 25, 2002); Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization,
and Protection (Dec. 17, 2003); and The National Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace (February 2003).
[5] GAO, Cyber Analysis and Warning: DHS Faces Challenges in
Establishing a Comprehensive National Capability, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-588] (Washington, D.C.: July
31, 2008).
[6] The Department of Justice's Computer Crime and Intellectual
Property Section and the Department of Defense also co-chair this
group.
[7] Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness
(Dec. 17, 2003) and The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
(February 2003).
[8] Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection
Plan (Washington, D.C.: June 2006).
[9] The Interagency Incident Management Group was later reorganized and
renamed the Crisis Action Team.
[10] Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National Preparedness
(Dec. 17, 2003).
[11] Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and
Evaluation Program (Washington, D.C.: 2007).
[End of section]
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