Information Sharing
Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and Terrorism Information with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, but Additional Efforts Are Needed Gao ID: GAO-10-41 December 18, 2009Information is a crucial tool in securing the nation's borders against crimes and potential terrorist threats, with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the FBI, having key information sharing roles. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) local and tribal officials in border communities received useful information from their federal partners, (2) federal agencies supported state fusion centers'--where states collaborate with federal agencies to improve information sharing--efforts to develop border intelligence products, and (3) local and tribal agencies were aware of the suspicious activities they are to report. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed relevant laws, directives, policies, and procedures; contacted a nongeneralizable sample of 20 agencies in border communities and five fusion centers (based on geographic location and size); and interviewed DHS and FBI officials.
Officials from 15 of the 20 local and tribal law enforcement agencies in the border communities GAO contacted said they received information directly from at least one federal agency in the vicinity (Border Patrol, ICE, or the FBI) that was useful in enhancing their situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats. Nine of the 20 agencies reported receiving information from all three federal agencies. Overall, where federal officials had discussed local and tribal officials' information needs and had established information sharing partnerships and related mechanisms to share information with them--consistent with the National Strategy for Information Sharing and best practices--the majority of the local and tribal officials reported receiving useful information. However, most local and tribal officials that reported federal agencies had not discussed information needs and had not established partnerships with them also said they had not received useful information. By more fully identifying the information needs of local and tribal agencies along the borders and establishing information sharing partnerships, federal agencies could be better positioned to provide local and tribal agencies with information that enhances their situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats. Federal officials at two of the five state fusion centers we visited were supporting fusion center efforts to develop border intelligence products or reports that contained information on border crimes and potential terrorist threats, as discussed in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. DHS recognizes that it needs to add personnel to other fusion centers in border states to, among other things, support the creation of such products, and is developing plans to do so, but cited funding issues and competing priorities as barriers. The creation of border intelligence products--such as those developed by two of the fusion centers we visited--represent potential approaches that DHS and the FBI could use to identify promising practices that other fusion centers could adopt. Identifying such practices is important because of the central role the federal government places on fusion centers to facilitate the sharing of information. Also, DHS had not obtained feedback from local and tribal officials on the utility and quality of the border intelligence products that its analysts in fusion centers have helped to develop. Additional efforts to obtain such feedback would support DHS and FBI efforts to improve the utility and quality of future products. Officials from 13 of the 20 local and tribal agencies in the border communities we contacted said that federal agencies had not defined what suspicious activities or indicators rise to the level of potential terrorist threats and should be reported to federal agencies or fusion centers. Recognizing this problem, federal agencies are participating in national efforts to standardize suspicious activity reporting. Until such efforts are implemented, defining suspicious activity indicators and current reporting processes would help better position local and tribal officials along the borders to identify and report incidents indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorist threats.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-10-41, Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and Terrorism Information with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, but Additional Efforts Are Needed
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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
December 2009:
Information Sharing:
Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and Terrorism Information with
Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, but Additional Efforts Are
Needed:
GAO-10-41:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-41, a report to the Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Information is a crucial tool in securing the nation‘s borders against
crimes and potential terrorist threats, with the Department of Homeland
Security‘s (DHS) Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), and the FBI, having key information sharing roles. GAO was asked
to assess the extent to which (1) local and tribal officials in border
communities received useful information from their federal partners,
(2) federal agencies supported state fusion centers‘”where states
collaborate with federal agencies to improve information sharing”
efforts to develop border intelligence products, and (3) local and
tribal agencies were aware of the suspicious activities they are to
report. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed relevant laws, directives,
policies, and procedures; contacted a nongeneralizable sample of 20
agencies in border communities and five fusion centers (based on
geographic location and size); and interviewed DHS and FBI officials.
What GAO Found:
Officials from 15 of the 20 local and tribal law enforcement agencies
in the border communities GAO contacted said they received information
directly from at least one federal agency in the vicinity (Border
Patrol, ICE, or the FBI) that was useful in enhancing their situational
awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats. Nine of the
20 agencies reported receiving information from all three federal
agencies. Overall, where federal officials had discussed local and
tribal officials‘ information needs and had established information
sharing partnerships and related mechanisms to share information with
them”consistent with the National Strategy for Information Sharing and
best practices”the majority of the local and tribal officials reported
receiving useful information. However, most local and tribal officials
that reported federal agencies had not discussed information needs and
had not established partnerships with them also said they had not
received useful information. By more fully identifying the information
needs of local and tribal agencies along the borders and establishing
information sharing partnerships, federal agencies could be better
positioned to provide local and tribal agencies with information that
enhances their situational awareness of border crimes and potential
terrorist threats.
Federal officials at two of the five state fusion centers we visited
were supporting fusion center efforts to develop border intelligence
products or reports that contained information on border crimes and
potential terrorist threats, as discussed in the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. DHS recognizes that
it needs to add personnel to other fusion centers in border states to,
among other things, support the creation of such products, and is
developing plans to do so, but cited funding issues and competing
priorities as barriers. The creation of border intelligence products”
such as those developed by two of the fusion centers we visited”
represent potential approaches that DHS and the FBI could use to
identify promising practices that other fusion centers could adopt.
Identifying such practices is important because of the central role the
federal government places on fusion centers to facilitate the sharing
of information. Also, DHS had not obtained feedback from local and
tribal officials on the utility and quality of the border intelligence
products that its analysts in fusion centers have helped to develop.
Additional efforts to obtain such feedback would support DHS and FBI
efforts to improve the utility and quality of future products.
Officials from 13 of the 20 local and tribal agencies in the border
communities we contacted said that federal agencies had not defined
what suspicious activities or indicators rise to the level of potential
terrorist threats and should be reported to federal agencies or fusion
centers. Recognizing this problem, federal agencies are participating
in national efforts to standardize suspicious activity reporting. Until
such efforts are implemented, defining suspicious activity indicators
and current reporting processes would help better position local and
tribal officials along the borders to identify and report incidents
indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorist threats.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DHS and the FBI more fully identify the information
needs of and establish partnerships with local and tribal officials
along the borders; identify promising practices in developing border
intelligence products within fusion centers and obtain feedback on the
products; and define the suspicious activities that local and tribal
officials in border communities are to report and how to report them.
DHS agreed and the FBI did not comment.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-41] or key
components. For more information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-
6510 or larencee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Most Local and Tribal Agencies in Border Communities We Contacted Found
Information from Federal Partners Useful for Situational Awareness, but
Adopting Further Measures Could Close Other Information Sharing Gaps:
Federal Agencies Are Supporting Some Fusion Center Efforts to Develop
Border Intelligence Products, but Additional DHS Personnel and Other
Measures Could Strengthen Future Efforts:
Local and Tribal Agencies in Border Communities We Contacted Could
Better Support National Counterterrorism Efforts If They Were More
Aware of the Suspicious Activities They Are to Report:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Number of Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That
Reported Receiving Information from Federal Agencies in Their Vicinity:
Figure 2: Number of Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That
Reported Discussing Their Information Needs with Federal Agencies in
the Vicinity:
Figure 3: Number of Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That
Reported Having or Were Developing an Information Sharing Partnership
with Federal Agencies in the Vicinity:
Figure 4: DHS Personnel Assigned to Land Border State Fusion Centers,
August 2009:
Abbreviations:
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
I&A: DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis:
ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 18, 2009:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified terrorism as
one of the primary threats the United States faces on the northern and
southwest international land borders, along with illegal immigration
and drug trafficking, among others. In many border communities, the
individuals who are best positioned to observe suspicious activities
that may be related to these threats and report the activities to the
federal government are local and tribal law enforcement officers,
particularly in communities with a minimal federal presence. Therefore,
it is critical that federal agencies with key responsibilities for
securing the nation's borders--including DHS's U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
and the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI)--share information with local and tribal officials in border
communities that enhances their situational awareness of border crimes
and potential terrorist threats.[Footnote 1]
Since information sharing weaknesses were a major contributing factor
to the nation's lack of preparedness for the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the federal government has called for a number of
information sharing initiatives. One theme common to many of these
efforts is for federal agencies to share information on terrorism-
related matters with local and tribal law enforcement agencies--
including those in border communities--to enhance their situational
awareness of potential terrorist threats.[Footnote 2] The initiatives
also recognize that an improved information sharing environment is to
be constructed on a foundation of trusted partnerships at all levels of
government based on a shared commitment to detect, prevent, disrupt,
preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism. Further, most states
and some local governments have established fusion centers that address
gaps in terrorism-related information sharing that the federal
government cannot address alone and provide a conduit for information
sharing within the state.[Footnote 3] Finally, since late 2007, the
federal government has been working with state and local law
enforcement agencies to establish a nationwide process for reporting
suspicious activities that may be related to terrorism.
Our prior work on the importance of including state, local, and tribal
entities in information sharing has shown that this sharing continues
to be a significant challenge for the federal government. In January
2005, we designated information sharing for homeland security a high-
risk area because the government had continued to face formidable
challenges in analyzing and disseminating this information in a timely,
accurate, and useful manner. We reported that information is a crucial
tool in fighting terrorism and that its timely dissemination is
critical to maintaining the security of our nation. This area remained
on the high-risk list for our January 2009 update.[Footnote 4] As a
result of this designation, we continuously monitor federal information
sharing efforts.
Recognizing that local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border
communities are important partners in our first line of defense against
criminals and terrorists entering the United States, you asked us to
assess information sharing between federal agencies and local and
tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities. Specifically,
our work addressed to what extent:
* local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are
receiving information from their federal partners that enhances the
agencies' situational awareness of border crimes and potential
terrorist threats;
* federal agencies are assisting fusion centers' efforts to develop
border intelligence products that enhance local and tribal agencies'
situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats;
and:
* local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are
aware of the specific types of suspicious activities related to
terrorism they are to report and to whom, and the process through which
they should report this information.
To identify criteria for answering these questions, we analyzed
relevant laws, directives, policies, and procedures related to
information sharing, such as the October 2007 National Strategy for
Information Sharing and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act).[Footnote 5] The 9/11
Commission Act provides for the establishment of a State, Local, and
Regional Fusion Center Initiative at DHS and contains numerous
provisions that address the federal government's information sharing
responsibilities to state and local fusion centers, including those
that serve border communities.
To examine the information sharing that occurs between local and tribal
law enforcement agencies in border communities and federal agencies
that have a local presence in these communities (CBP's Border Patrol,
ICE, and the FBI), we conducted site visits to five states that are
geographically dispersed along the northern and southwest borders
(Arizona, Montana, New York, Texas, and Washington). Within these
states, we met with county sheriffs, local police chiefs, and tribal
police chiefs from a total of 23 law enforcement agencies and asked
them about the information they received from federal agencies in their
localities.[Footnote 6] We also asked them about whether federal
officials had discussed local and tribal officials' information needs
and had established information sharing partnerships and related
mechanisms to share information with them--consistent with the National
Strategy for Information Sharing and best practices described in GAO
reports.[Footnote 7] After our visits, we sent follow-up questions to
all 23 local and tribal agencies we visited in order to obtain
consistency in how we requested and obtained information for reporting
purposes. Three agencies did not respond to our follow-up efforts and
were excluded from our analysis. Thus, our analysis and reporting is
based on our visits and subsequent activities with the 20 local and
tribal agencies that responded to our follow-up questions. We also met
with local representatives of Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI to
discuss their perspectives on the information sharing that occurred,
and compared this information to that provided by local and tribal
agencies in order to identify barriers to sharing.
To assess the extent to which federal agencies assisted fusion centers
in developing border intelligence products, as discussed in the 9/11
Commission Act, we reviewed products developed by fusion centers to
determine the extent to which they provided border security-relevant
information.[Footnote 8] We also met with and conducted subsequent
follow-up conversations with fusion center directors and other senior
fusion center officials in the five states we visited to obtain their
views on the importance of developing such products and about the level
of support federal agencies were providing in developing these
products. We asked each of the 20 local and tribal law enforcement
agencies we contacted whether they received border intelligence
products from their state's primary fusion center and, if so, we
discussed their views on the usefulness of such products. We also
interviewed senior officials from DHS's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis (I&A)--the office responsible for coordinating the federal
government's support to fusion centers--and headquarters components of
Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI to discuss their efforts to support
fusion centers' development of border intelligence products, identify
promising practices for developing such products, and obtain feedback
from local and tribal officials on the usefulness of the products.
Finally, to determine the extent to which local and tribal agencies in
border communities were aware of the suspicious activities they are to
report, we asked officials from the 20 agencies what, if any,
information federal agencies or fusion centers had provided them on the
kinds of suspicious activities that could be indicators of or
precursors to terrorism and what processes they had in place for
reporting information on these activities.[Footnote 9] We also reviewed
the Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report
(SAR) Support and Implementation Project to determine the extent to
which the federal government recognizes the role of suspicious activity
reporting for detecting and mitigating potential terrorist
threats.[Footnote 10] We also examined indicators of various suspicious
activities the FBI and fusion centers developed to determine if they
contained border-specific content. We interviewed DOJ officials who
were leading the national initiative to standardize suspicious activity
reporting--as well as those from headquarters components of DHS and the
FBI--to discuss the status of the national initiative and whether
border-specific indicators were needed and are being considered as part
of this initiative.
Because we selected a nonprobability sample of agencies in border
communities to contact, the information we obtained at these locations
may not be generalized across the wider population of law enforcement
agencies in border communities. However, because we selected these
border communities based on the variety of their geographic location,
proximity to federal agencies, and other factors, the information we
gathered from these locations provided us with a general understanding
of information sharing between federal agencies and state, local, and
tribal law enforcement agencies along the border. Appendix I provides
more details about our objectives, scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2007 through December
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Information Sharing Roles of Key Federal and State Entities:
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and subsequently enacted laws--
including the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
and the 9/11 Commission Act--assigned DHS responsibility for sharing
information related to terrorism and homeland security with its state,
local, and tribal partners, and authorized additional measures and
funding in support of carrying out this mandate.[Footnote 11] DHS
designated I&A as having responsibility for coordinating efforts to
share information that pertains to the safety and security of the U.S.
homeland across all levels of government, including federal, state,
local, and tribal government agencies. In June 2006, DHS tasked I&A
with the responsibility for managing DHS's support to fusion centers.
I&A established a State and Local Fusion Center Joint Program
Management Office as the focal point for supporting fusion center
operations and to maximize state and local capabilities to detect,
prevent, and respond to terrorist and homeland security threats. The
office was also established to improve the information flow between DHS
and the fusion centers, as well as provide fusion centers with access
to the federal intelligence community.
Two DHS components--CBP and ICE--have responsibilities for securing the
nation's land borders against terrorism and other threats to homeland
security. Specifically, CBP's Border Patrol agents are responsible for
preventing the illegal entry of people and contraband into the United
States between ports of entry. This includes preventing terrorists,
their weapons, and other related materials from entering the country.
Border Patrol's national strategy calls for it to improve and expand
coordination and partnerships with state, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies to gain control of the nation's borders. ICE is
charged with preventing terrorist and criminal activity by targeting
the people, money, and materials that support terrorist and criminal
organizations. According to the agency's 2008 annual report, ICE
recognizes the need for strong partnerships with other law enforcement
agencies, including those on the local level, in order to combat
criminal and terrorist threats.
The FBI serves as the nation's principal counterterrorism investigative
agency, and its mission includes protecting and defending the United
States against terrorist threats.[Footnote 12] The FBI conducts
counterterrorism investigations through its field offices and Joint
Terrorism Task Forces.[Footnote 13] In addition, each FBI field office
has established a Field Intelligence Group, which consists of
intelligence analysts and special agents who gather and analyze
information related to identified threats and criminal activity,
including terrorism. Each group is to share information with other
Field Intelligence Groups across the country, FBI headquarters, and
other federal, state, and local law enforcement and intelligence
agencies to fill gaps in intelligence.
Fusion centers serve as the primary focal points within the state and
local environment for the receipt and sharing of information related to
terrorist and homeland security threats. In March 2006, DHS released
its Support and Implementation Plan for State and Local Fusion Centers.
In this plan, DHS describes its responsibility to effectively
collaborate with its federal, state, and local partners to share
information regarding these threats. To facilitate the effective flow
of information among fusion centers, DHS, other federal partners, and
the national intelligence community, the plan calls for DHS to assign
trained and experienced operational and intelligence personnel to
fusion centers and includes the department's methodology for
prioritizing the assignments. The plan also notes that identifying,
reviewing, and sharing fusion center best practices and lessons learned
is vital to the success of DHS's overall efforts. Accordingly, it
recommends that DHS develop rigorous processes to identify, review, and
share these best practices and lessons learned. In December 2008, DHS
issued a document entitled Interaction with State and Local Fusion
Centers Concept of Operations. According to the document, each DHS
component field office whose mission aligns with the priorities of the
fusion center is to establish a relationship with that center. This
relationship should include but not be limited to routine meetings and
consistent information sharing among DHS and state and local personnel
assigned to each center.
The FBI's role in and support of individual fusion centers varies
depending on the level of functionality of the fusion center and the
interaction between the particular center and the local FBI field
office. FBI efforts to support fusion centers include assigning special
agents and intelligence analysts to fusion centers, sharing
information, providing space or rent for fusion center facilities in
some locations, and ensuring that state and local personnel have
appropriate security clearances as well as access to FBI personnel.
Statutory Provisions and National Strategies Governing Information
Sharing:
Since September 11, 2001, several statutes have been enacted into law
designed to enhance the sharing of terrorism-related information among
federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, and the federal government
has developed related strategies, policies, and guidelines to meet its
statutory obligations.[Footnote 14] Regarding border threats, the 9/11
Commission Act contains several provisions that address the federal
government's efforts to share information with state and local fusion
centers that serve border communities.[Footnote 15] For example, the
act provides for the Secretary of DHS to assign, to the maximum extent
practicable, officers and intelligence analysts from DHS components--
including CBP and ICE--to state and local fusion centers participating
in DHS's State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative, with
priority given to fusion centers located along borders of the United
States.[Footnote 16] The act provides that federal officers and
analysts assigned to fusion centers in general are to assist law
enforcement agencies in developing a comprehensive and accurate threat
picture, and to create intelligence and other information products for
dissemination to law enforcement agencies.[Footnote 17] In addition,
federal officers and analysts assigned to fusion centers along the
borders are to have, as a primary responsibility, the creation of
border intelligence products that (1) assist state, local, and tribal
law enforcement agencies in efficiently helping to detect terrorists
and related contraband at U.S. borders; (2) promote consistent and
timely sharing of border security-relevant information among
jurisdictions along the nation's borders; and (3) enhance DHS's
situational awareness of terrorist threats in border areas.[Footnote
18] The act further directed the Secretary of DHS to create a mechanism
for state, local, and tribal law enforcement officers to provide
voluntary feedback to DHS on the quality and utility of the
intelligence products developed under these provisions.[Footnote 19]
Also, in October 2007, the President issued the National Strategy for
Information Sharing. According to the strategy, an improved information
sharing environment is to be constructed on a foundation of trusted
partnerships at all levels of government, based on a shared commitment
to detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of
terrorism. The strategy identifies the federal government's information
sharing responsibilities to include gathering and documenting the
information that state, local, and tribal agencies need to enhance
their situational awareness of terrorist threats and calls for
authorities at all levels of government to work together to obtain a
common understanding of the information needed to prevent, deter, and
respond to terrorist attacks. Specifically, the strategy requires that
state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have access to
timely, credible, and actionable information and intelligence about
individuals and organizations intending to carry out attacks within the
United States; their organizations and their financing; potential
targets; activities that could have a nexus to terrorism; and major
events or circumstances that might influence state, local, and tribal
actions. The strategy also recognizes that fusion centers are vital
assets that are critical to sharing information related to terrorism,
and will serve as primary focal points within the state and local
environment for the receipt and sharing of terrorism-related
information.
Past GAO Work on Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Efforts:
In October 2001, we reported on the importance of sharing information
about terrorist threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, and lessons
learned.[Footnote 20] Specifically, we identified best practices in
building successful information sharing partnerships that could be
applied to entities trying to develop the means of appropriately
sharing information. Among the best practices we identified were (1)
establishing trusted relationships with a wide variety of federal and
nonfederal entities that may be in a position to provide potentially
useful information and advice; (2) agreeing to mechanisms for sharing
information, such as outreach meetings and task forces; and (3)
institutionalizing roles to help ensure continuity and diminish
reliance on a single individual.
Since we designated terrorism-related information sharing a high-risk
area in January 2005, we have continued to monitor federal information
sharing efforts.[Footnote 21] Also, as part of this monitoring, in
April 2008, we reported on our assessment of the status of fusion
centers and how the federal government is supporting them. Our fusion
center report and subsequent testimony highlighted continuing
challenges--such as the centers' ability to access information and
obtain funding--that DHS and DOJ needed to address to support the
fusion centers' role in facilitating information sharing among federal,
state, and local governments.[Footnote 22] We also recognized the need
for the federal government to determine and articulate its long-term
fusion center role and whether it expects to provide resources to help
ensure their sustainability, and we made a recommendation to that
effect to which DHS agreed. At the time of this review, DHS was in the
process of implementing the recommendation.
Most Local and Tribal Agencies in Border Communities We Contacted Found
Information from Federal Partners Useful for Situational Awareness, but
Adopting Further Measures Could Close Other Information Sharing Gaps:
In general, local and tribal officials in the border communities we
contacted who reported to us that they received information directly
from the local office of Border Patrol, ICE, or the FBI said it was
useful for enhancing their situational awareness of crimes along the
border and potential terrorist threats. Overall, where information
sharing among federal, local, and tribal agencies along the borders
occurred, local and tribal officials generally said they had discussed
their information needs with federal agencies in the vicinity and had
established information sharing partnerships with related mechanisms to
share information with federal officials--consistent with the National
Strategy for Information Sharing--while the agencies that reported not
receiving information from federal agencies generally said they had not
discussed their needs and had not established partnerships.
Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That Received Information from
Their Federal Partners Found It Useful in Enhancing Their Situational
Awareness of Border Crimes and Potential Terrorist Threats:
Officials from three-quarters (15 of 20) of the local and tribal law
enforcement agencies in the border communities we contacted said they
received information directly from the local office of at least one
federal agency (Border Patrol, ICE, or the FBI), and 9 of the 20
reported receiving information from the local office of all three of
these federal agencies. However, 5 of the 20 reported that they did not
receive information from any of these three agencies, in part because
information sharing partnerships and related mechanisms to share
information did not exist. We discuss information sharing partnerships
and other factors that affect information sharing between federal
agencies and local and tribal agencies in border communities later in
this report. Figure 1 shows the number of local and tribal agencies
that reported receiving information directly from the local office of
Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI.
Figure 1: Number of Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That
Reported Receiving Information from Federal Agencies in Their Vicinity:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Federal agency: Border Patrol;
Local and tribal agencies reported receiving information: 14;
Local and tribal agencies reported not receiving information: 6.
Federal agency: ICE;
Local and tribal agencies reported receiving information: 10;
Local and tribal agencies reported not receiving information: 10.
Federal agency: FBI;
Local and tribal agencies reported receiving information: 13;
Local and tribal agencies reported not receiving information: 7.
Source: GAO analysis of interviews and other contacts with officials
from local and tribal law enforcement agencies.
[End of figure]
Overall, the local and tribal law enforcement agencies we contacted
that received information from federal agencies in the vicinity found
it useful in enhancing their situational awareness of border crimes and
potential terrorist threats.
Border Patrol:
Local and tribal law enforcement officials in 14 of 20 border
communities we contacted said they received a range of information
directly from local Border Patrol officials, including incident reports
and alerts regarding specific individuals with potential links to
criminal activity--such as illegal immigration and drug trafficking--as
well as border-related threat assessments and reports of suspicious
activity. According to the local and tribal officials, they received
this information through direct outreach or visits, phone calls, and e-
mails, as well as through issued alerts and bulletins. Of the 14 local
and tribal officials that reported receiving information from Border
Patrol officials in the vicinity, 12 said it was useful and enhanced
their situational awareness of criminal activities and potential
terrorist threats along the border and 2 did not take a position when
asked about the information's usefulness. For example, one tribal
police department official reported that Border Patrol provides an area
assessment that specifically targets the illicit smuggling of humans
and contraband in and around the tribal lands, and depicted the threat
posed by illegal activity occurring in the area. The official said that
this assessment helped the department identify and emphasize those
areas on which to focus. Local and tribal officials from the remaining
6 border communities we contacted said they did not receive any
information directly from Border Patrol officials in the vicinity, in
part because information sharing partnerships and related mechanisms to
share information did not exist.
Border Patrol officials in the communities we visited said they shared
information related to various types of crimes with their local and
tribal partners, including information related to illegal immigration
and drug trafficking. The officials said this information is shared
primarily through established information sharing partnerships and
related mechanisms, including joint border operations and task forces,
such as Integrated Border Enforcement Teams.[Footnote 23] The officials
noted that they generally did not have specific terrorism-related
information to share with local and tribal agencies, but that the
information they share is intended to enhance situational awareness of
border crimes that terrorists could potentially exploit, such as
illegal immigration.
ICE:
Local and tribal law enforcement officials in 10 of 20 border
communities we contacted said they received information from ICE
officials in the vicinity, including specific persons of interest they
should be on the lookout for, as well as information on drug smuggling
and drug cartel activities, human smuggling, and other crimes. The
officials said such information is important because it provides
information that is pertinent to their immediate area. These agencies
reported receiving information by e-mail or in person, as well as
through participation in task forces, such as Border Enforcement
Security Task Forces.[Footnote 24] For example, in one southwest border
location, law enforcement officials said that the department receives
information about potential criminal activities in their jurisdiction
from ICE based on joint investigations it has conducted with the
agency.
Of the 10 local and tribal officials that reported receiving
information from local ICE officials, 8 said it was useful and enhanced
their situational awareness of criminal activities and potential
terrorist threats along the border and 2 did not take a position when
asked about the information's usefulness. Officials from the remaining
10 local and tribal agencies we contacted said they did not receive any
information from local ICE officials, in part because information
sharing partnerships and related mechanisms to share information did
not exist.
According to ICE headquarters officials, in addition to sharing
information at the local level, ICE has significantly expanded its
interaction with state, local, and tribal law enforcement officials
through automated systems that allow these officials to access and
search certain DHS and ICE law enforcement and investigative
information.[Footnote 25]
The FBI:
Local and tribal law enforcement officials in 13 of 20 border locations
we contacted said they received a range of information directly from
local FBI officials, including intelligence assessments and bulletins,
threat assessments and terrorism-related alerts, and information on
criminal activity. Of the 13 local and tribal officials that reported
receiving information from local FBI officials, 12 said it was useful
and enhanced their situational awareness of potential terrorist threats
along the border and 1 did not take a position when asked about the
information's usefulness. Local and tribal officials in 7 of the 20
border locations we contacted said they did not receive any information
directly from local FBI officials, in part because information sharing
partnerships and related mechanisms to share information did not exist.
FBI officials in the border communities we visited said that they
understood the desire of local and tribal law enforcement agencies to
receive terrorism-related information that is specific to the border or
to their geographic area in particular. However, the officials
explained that in many cases, such information is classified, so the
FBI can only share it with officials that have a need to know the
information and have the requisite security clearances, as well as
secure systems, networks, or facilities to safeguard the information.
FBI officials also said that information related to ongoing
investigations is generally only shared with local officials that
participate in an FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, since sharing the
information outside the task force could jeopardize the investigations.
Finally, the officials said that at times, terrorism-related
information that is specific to the border simply may not exist. Local
and tribal law enforcement officials we met with recognized that the
FBI has limits on what it can share--including information that is
classified--and said they had no intention of interfering with ongoing
investigations. However, they also thought the FBI could better
communicate when these limits were in effect and when the agency simply
had no information to share. We discuss the importance of establishing
information sharing partnerships to facilitate discussions between the
parties and minimize expectation gaps later in this report.
According to FBI officials at the locations we contacted, information
that is not related to ongoing investigations is shared with local and
tribal agencies through a variety of mechanisms, including task forces
(e.g., Safe Trails Task Forces) and working groups; periodic outreach
meetings the FBI conducts with local and tribal agencies to both share
and solicit information; and through ongoing information sharing
partnerships.[Footnote 26] FBI headquarters officials noted that each
FBI field office--through its Field Intelligence Group--is to routinely
assess the terrorism and criminal threats and risks in its geographic
area of responsibility and report the results to FBI headquarters.
The officials said that the assessments incorporate border-specific
issues when appropriate, such as the illegal entry of possible
terrorists, identification of human smuggling organizations, and the
smuggling of weapons and other material which could be employed in
terrorist attacks. However, the officials said that the results of the
assessments are classified and are generally not shared with local and
tribal officials, although in some cases selected information is
declassified and distributed through alerts and bulletins.
Further, according to FBI headquarters, much of the FBI's information
sharing with other law enforcement entities occurs at the officer or
investigator level, often without the specific knowledge of the state
and local personnel we interviewed for this report. The FBI also
emphasized that most Indian Reservations and tribal law enforcement
agencies are located in remote areas of the United States--100 miles or
more away from an FBI office--where information sharing between FBI
agents and tribal law enforcement occurs on an ad hoc basis usually
focused on investigations of crimes occurring on Indian reservations.
We recognize that information sharing can occur at the officer or
investigator level and on an ad hoc basis. However, as discussed later
in this report, limiting information sharing to the officer and
investigator level will not ensure that information sharing
partnerships are established between agencies. Rather, discussions at
senior levels--including the county sheriffs, local police chiefs, and
tribal police chiefs we met with--could help ensure continuity in
information sharing and diminish reliance on any one individual, which
is a best practice in building successful information sharing
partnerships.[Footnote 27]
FBI headquarters also noted that in addition to sharing information
directly with local and tribal officials in border communities, the FBI
disseminates information to these officials through information
systems--such as the FBI's Law Enforcement Online and eGuardian
system[Footnote 28]--and the FBI's participation in state and local
fusion centers and other interagency task forces and intelligence
centers throughout the country (e.g., High Intensity Drug Trafficking
Area Investigative Support Centers). The FBI noted that it is through
these venues that the FBI also accomplishes its information sharing
responsibilities to other federal, state, and local partners.
More Fully Identifying Information Needs Could Help Federal Agencies in
Border Communities Ensure That Local and Tribal Agencies Receive Useful
Information:
The National Strategy for Information Sharing identifies the federal
government's information sharing responsibilities to include gathering
and documenting the information that state, local, and tribal agencies
need to enhance their situational awareness of terrorist threats.
Figure 2 shows the number of the local and tribal agencies in the
border communities we contacted that reported discussing their
information needs with federal officials in the vicinity.
Figure 2: Number of Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That
Reported Discussing Their Information Needs with Federal Agencies in
the Vicinity:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Federal Agency: Border Patrol;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Did not discuss information needs:
7;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Discussed information needs: 11;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Did not report on information
needs discussed: 2.
Federal Agency: ICE;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Did not discuss information needs:
9;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Discussed information needs: 9;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Did not report on information
needs discussed: 2.
Federal Agency: FBI;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Did not discuss information needs:
11;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Discussed information needs: 8;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Did not report on information
needs discussed: 1.
Source: GAO analysis of interviews and other contacts with officials
from local and tribal law enforcement agencies.
[End of figure]
Overall, where local and tribal law enforcement officials in border
communities had discussed their information needs with federal
officials in the vicinity, they also reported receiving useful
information from the federal agencies that enhanced their situational
awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats.
Specifically:
* Officials from 7 of the 11 localities that had discussed their
information needs with Border Patrol officials in the vicinity also
reported receiving useful information from them.[Footnote 29]
* Officials from each of the 9 localities that had discussed their
information needs with ICE officials in the vicinity reported receiving
useful information from them.
* Officials from each of the 8 localities that had discussed their
information needs with FBI officials in the vicinity reported receiving
useful information from them.[Footnote 30]
Local and tribal officials in the border communities we contacted said
they shared their information needs with federal officials through a
variety of methods, including regularly scheduled meetings, periodic
outreach performed by federal agencies, ad hoc meetings, and
established working relationships. For example, one police chief along
the southwest border said that he discussed his need for real-time
information about border crimes that could affect his area with local
federal agency officials. He noted that after he held these
discussions, the federal officials took steps to provide his department
with this type of information.
Nevertheless, as shown in figure 2 above, officials from about one-half
of the local and tribal agencies in the border communities we contacted
reported that federal officials had not discussed information needs
with them, as called for in the National Strategy for Information
Sharing. Our discussions with local and tribal officials revealed that
where the needs were not discussed, local and tribal agencies also were
less likely to have received information from federal agencies than in
the localities where needs were discussed. Specifically:
* Officials from 4 of the 7 localities that had not discussed their
information needs with Border Patrol officials in the vicinity also
reported not receiving information from them, while the other 3 had
received information from Border Patrol.
* Officials from each of the 9 localities that had not discussed their
information needs with ICE officials in the vicinity also reported not
receiving information from them.
* Officials from 7 of the 11 localities that had not discussed their
information needs with FBI officials in the vicinity also reported not
receiving information from them, while the other 4 reported receiving
information from the FBI.
While the data above show that federal agencies shared information with
local and tribal officials in several cases where information needs had
not been discussed, identifying these needs could better support
federal agency efforts to provide local and tribal agencies with useful
information that is relevant to their jurisdiction.
A primary reason why federal agencies had not identified the
information needs of local and tribal agencies in many of the border
communities we visited was because the methods federal agencies used to
solicit the needs, while effective for some localities, were not
effective for others. Specifically, Border Patrol and ICE officials
said that the information needs of these agencies were generally
identified through outreach meetings or through working relationships
with local and tribal law enforcement officers. Where these
interactions did not exist, the federal agencies generally had not
identified the information needs of local and tribal agencies. Also,
according to a local police chief, while information needs may be
discussed between local officers and federal agents on an ad hoc basis,
his department cannot rely on these interactions to ensure that federal
agencies have identified the overall information needs of the
department.
According to FBI headquarters officials, in developing field office
area assessments, Field Intelligence Group personnel are required to
gather information on terrorism and criminal threats and risks from
local and tribal law enforcement agency officials, wherein the
information needs of these agencies would be identified. FBI
headquarters also noted that through outreach meetings and
participation in task forces and working groups, FBI field offices
continually evaluate the information needs of their local and tribal
partners, as well as their own, and take actions to identify and fill
any information gaps. Despite these efforts, less than one-half of the
local and tribal agencies we contacted reported discussing their
information needs with FBI officials in the vicinity.
By more consistently and more fully identifying the information needs
of local and tribal agencies in border communities, as called for in
the National Strategy for Information Sharing, federal agencies could
be better positioned to provide these local and tribal agencies with
useful information that enhances their situational awareness of border
crimes and potential terrorist threats.
Most Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That Received Information
from Federal Agencies in Their Localities Had Established or Were
Developing Partnerships and Related Mechanisms That Facilitated
Information Sharing:
The National Strategy for Information Sharing recognizes that effective
information sharing comes through strong partnerships among federal,
local, and tribal partners. In addition, the current strategic plans of
DHS and the FBI both acknowledge the need to establish information
sharing partnerships with state, local, and tribal law enforcement
agencies to help the agencies fulfill their missions, roles, and
responsibilities. Figure 3 shows the number of local and tribal agency
officials in the border communities we contacted that reported having
established or were developing an information sharing partnership with
Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI officials in the vicinity.
Figure 3: Number of Local and Tribal Agencies We Contacted That
Reported Having or Were Developing an Information Sharing Partnership
with Federal Agencies in the Vicinity:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Federal Agency: Border Patrol;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Reported not having an information
sharing partnership: 5;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Reported having or developing an
information sharing partnership: 14;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Did not comment: 1.
Federal Agency: ICE;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Reported not having an information
sharing partnership: 7;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Reported having or developing an
information sharing partnership: 13;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Did not comment: 0.
Federal Agency: FBI;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Reported not having an information
sharing partnership: 9;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Reported having or developing an
information sharing partnership: 11;
Number of local and tribal agencies: Did not comment: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of interviews and other contacts with officials
from local and tribal law enforcement agencies.
[End of figure]
Overall, where local and tribal law enforcement officials in border
communities had established or were developing information sharing
partnerships with federal officials in the vicinity, they also reported
receiving information from the federal agencies that enhanced their
situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats.
Specifically:
* Officials from 13 of the 14 localities that had or were developing an
information sharing partnership with Border Patrol officials in the
vicinity also reported receiving information from them.[Footnote 31]
* Officials from 10 of 13 localities that had an information sharing
partnership with ICE officials in the vicinity also reported receiving
information from them, while the other 3 were not receiving information
from ICE.[Footnote 32]
* Officials from each of the 11 localities that had an information
sharing partnership with FBI officials in the vicinity also reported
receiving information from them.
The local and tribal agencies that had developed partnerships with
federal agencies in the vicinity had established a variety of
mechanisms to share information, including regularly scheduled
meetings, periodic outreach performed by federal agencies, ad hoc
meetings, task forces and working groups, established working
relationships, phone calls, e-mails, and issued alerts and bulletins.
In some locations, Border Patrol and local law enforcement officials
worked together in operational efforts that provided opportunities for
federal and local officials to develop information sharing
partnerships. For example, Operation Border Star in Texas--a state-led,
multiagency effort focused on reducing crime, such as illegal
immigration and drug trafficking, in targeted regions along the Texas-
Mexico border--draws resources from local law enforcement agencies, the
Texas Department of Public Safety, and others to support Border Patrol.
Also, in upstate New York, a county sheriff's department conducted
joint patrols with Border Patrol, which extended into Canada. The
patrols are designed to prevent the illegal entry of individuals into
the United States and the smuggling of contraband. These operations
provide an opportunity for officers from all of the agencies to work
together and facilitate information sharing.
Most of the local and tribal officials that had developed information
sharing partnerships with ICE officials reported establishing them
through personal contacts made either while working on various task
forces alongside ICE personnel or between agents and officers in both
agencies. For example, one tribal police chief said that his department
has a memorandum of understanding with ICE, which allows the tribal
police to perform certain ICE duties in the enforcement of customs laws
and facilitates information sharing between the agencies.
Nevertheless, as shown in figure 3 above, officials from several local
and tribal agencies in the border communities we contacted reported
that they had not established information sharing partnerships with
Border Patrol, ICE, or FBI officials in the vicinity. Where
partnerships were not established, local and tribal agencies also were
less likely to have received information from federal agencies than in
the localities where partnerships were established. Specifically:
* Officials from each of the 5 localities that did not have an
information sharing partnership with local Border Patrol officials in
the vicinity also reported they had not received information from them.
* Officials from each of the 7 localities that did not have an
information sharing partnership with ICE officials in the vicinity also
reported they had not received information from them.
* Officials from 7 of the 9 localities that said they did not have an
information sharing partnership with FBI officials also reported they
had not received information from them FBI.
The local and tribal officials that did not have a partnership with
federal officials and were not receiving information said that
effective mechanisms for sharing information--a best practice in
building successful information sharing partnerships--had not been
established. One reason why the officials said established mechanisms
were not effective was because they did not have enough resources or
funding to participate in the regular meetings or forums that Border
Patrol, ICE, and FBI officials in the vicinity used to share
information, establish face-to-face contact, and build trusting
relationships. For example, an official from one local police
department said he was aware of Border Patrol's efforts to share
information through such meetings, but the department did not have the
resources needed to participate, since doing so would leave the office
short one out of eight patrol officers. Officials at another location
said they no longer received invitations to Border Patrol meetings.
Similarly, local and tribal officials in other localities said they did
not have enough resources to send individuals to participate in
outreach meetings that FBI officials said were used to share
information, because in some cases the meetings were held more than 100
miles away. A local county sheriff also said that the FBI's meetings
were initially productive but interest faded because of the lack of
useful information that was shared during the meetings. An FBI official
from another locality noted that FBI officials are sometimes limited in
what they can discuss during these meetings if the local and tribal
representatives in attendance do not have the appropriate security
clearances or do not have a need to know about the information. These
examples illustrate the importance of establishing partnerships to
facilitate discussions between the parties and minimize expectation
gaps regarding the availability of and limits in sharing information.
Border Patrol, ICE, and FBI officials also said that information is
shared with local and tribal agencies through multiagency task forces,
such as ICE Border Enforcement Security Task Forces and FBI Joint
Terrorism Task Forces. However, local and tribal officials--especially
those in small departments in rural border communities--said these
mechanisms to share information were not effective for them, because
they did not have enough resources to dedicate personnel to the task
forces.
Police chiefs and other senior local and tribal officials recognized
that ad hoc discussions between officers and investigators are also
mechanisms federal agencies in the vicinity use to share information
with local and tribal agencies. The officials noted, however, that
limiting information sharing to the officer and investigator level is
not sufficient to ensure that senior-level department officials are
aware of the information, which in turn could be disseminated to other
personnel within the department. For example, a police chief in a local
community along the southwest border said that he does not need the FBI
to brief his entire department, but the FBI should at least brief the
police chief. Best practices in building information sharing
partnerships call for institutionalizing information sharing through
discussions at senior levels to ensure continuity in sharing and
diminishing the reliance on single individuals.
We recognize that developing and maintaining information sharing
partnerships with the numerous local and tribal law enforcement
agencies along the borders is a significant challenge, and that Border
Patrol, ICE, and the FBI have made progress in this area. However,
additional efforts by these federal agencies to periodically assess the
extent to which partnerships and related mechanisms to share
information exist, fill gaps, and address barriers to establishing such
partnerships and mechanisms, could help ensure that information is
shared with local and tribal law enforcement agencies that enhances
their situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist
threats.
Federal Agencies Are Supporting Some Fusion Center Efforts to Develop
Border Intelligence Products, but Additional DHS Personnel and Other
Measures Could Strengthen Future Efforts:
Federal agencies at two of the five fusion centers we visited were
supporting fusion center efforts to develop border intelligence
products that enhanced local and tribal agencies' situational awareness
of border crimes and potential terrorist threats. DHS recognizes that
it needs to add personnel to fusion centers in border states to support
the creation of such products, and is developing related plans, but
cited funding issues and competing priorities as barriers to deploying
such personnel. Further, additional DHS and FBI actions to (1) identify
and market promising practices from fusion centers that develop border
intelligence products and (2) obtain feedback from local and tribal
officials on the utility and quality of the products and use the
feedback to improve those products would strengthen future fusion
center efforts to develop such products.
DHS and FBI Personnel at Two of the Five Fusion Centers We Visited Were
Supporting Efforts to Develop Border Intelligence Products to Enhance
Local and Tribal Agencies' Situational Awareness of Border Crimes and
Potential Terrorist Threats:
Federal personnel at two of the five fusion centers we visited--the
Arizona Counterterrorism Information Center and the New York State
Intelligence Center--were routinely contributing to border
intelligence products that were designed to enhance local and tribal
law enforcement agencies' situational awareness of border crimes and
potential terrorist threats. Fusion center officials in these states
emphasized that the physical presence of federal personnel at the
fusion center--including intelligence analysts from I&A, Border Patrol,
ICE, and the FBI--was critical to developing the border products, in
part because their presence facilitated regular meetings with center
personnel and access to federal information systems.
According to local and tribal officials in the border communities we
contacted in Arizona and New York, the border intelligence products
they received generally enhanced their situational awareness of border-
related crimes that could have a nexus to terrorism, such as drug
trafficking and illegal immigration. However, the border products
usually did not contain terrorism-related information that was specific
to the border because such information did not exist or a link between
a border crime and terrorism had not been established, according to
fusion center officials. The two fusion centers also routinely
generated terrorism information products that were provided to local
and tribal agencies throughout the state to enhance their situational
awareness of terrorist threats. Officials from the two fusion centers
said that any terrorism-related information that is specific to the
border would be included in both the border product and terrorism
product. Below is additional information about the border intelligence
products developed by the two fusion centers:
* Arizona Counterterrorism Information Center: The center issues a
border-specific product (the "Situational Awareness Bulletin") twice a
week with input from the state's Department of Public Safety and
numerous federal agencies, including DHS's I&A, Border Patrol, and ICE,
and the FBI. The center initiated the bulletin in 2008 to enhance the
situational awareness of local law enforcement officials along the
Arizona border as drug-related violence on the Mexican side of the
border increased. The bulletin now provides information about all types
of crimes occurring in the vicinity of the border, as well as incidents
from around the country and around the world. Topics have included
immigration issues, burglaries at public safety offices, suspicious
activities around critical infrastructure, stolen military uniforms,
and stolen blank vehicle certificates of title.
* New York State Intelligence Center: The center's Border Intelligence
Unit issues a border-specific report quarterly with input from the New
York State Police and numerous federal agencies, including DHS's I&A,
Border Patrol, and ICE, and the FBI. The report is intended to compile
information on all types of crimes along the entire border between New
York and Canada into one product for the convenience of local and
tribal law enforcement agencies. This report covers crimes--such as
illegal immigration and drug trafficking--and includes the results of
joint federal and state operations conducted along the border. The
report also contains news and updates on policies related to border
security. According to center officials, the report grew out of
recognition that various federal component agencies have offices that
cover the border territory and could, therefore, collectively provide
consistent intelligence information that would be helpful in enhancing
the situational awareness of law enforcement agencies in border
communities throughout the state. The Border Intelligence Unit also
issues bulletins with actionable information on border-related crimes
on an as-needed basis.
In addition to the benefits that officials from the two fusion centers
cited from having on-site input and collaboration from representatives
of three DHS components, the FBI, and other agencies, the majority of
local and tribal agencies in the border communities we contacted found
the border intelligence products to be useful. Specifically, six of the
seven local and tribal law enforcement agencies we contacted in Arizona
and New York were receiving border intelligence products from the
fusion center in their state and all six found that the products were
useful or met their information needs. For example, one local law
enforcement official said that his agency receives the quarterly border
report developed by the New York fusion center and that he finds it
useful as it sometimes contains issues directly related to his
jurisdiction. The remaining locality did not comment on why the
products were not received.
According to officials from the other three fusion centers we visited,
the presence of additional federal personnel would support their
efforts to develop border intelligence products that help to provide
local and tribal law enforcement agencies along the borders with
situational awareness of potential terrorist threats. For example:
* Washington Fusion Center: The Washington state fusion center is
colocated with the local Joint Terrorism Task Force, which facilitates
access to FBI information, and has representatives from DHS's I&A and
ICE. According to Border Patrol headquarters officials, as of August
2009, the agency was in the process of assigning a full-time
representative to the fusion center. The fusion center director noted
that this official, once integrated into the center's report
development process, would contribute greatly towards producing a
border intelligence product. The fusion center director added that the
border intelligence product would focus on all border crime issues,
including any suspected terrorist activity.
* Montana All Threat Intelligence Center: The Montana All Threat
Intelligence Center is colocated with the local Joint Terrorism Task
Force, which facilitates access to FBI information. According to the
fusion center director, a CBP analyst has supported the center part-
time, though most of the time that person is working at the CBP office
located 90 miles away. In August 2009, Border Patrol headquarters
officials said that a full-time representative had been assigned to the
fusion center. The fusion center director said that he expected an
analyst from I&A to be assigned to the fusion center, but was unsure
when that would happen. According to the director, additional federal
personnel and their ability to analyze border-related information would
enhance the fusion center's efforts to routinely produce a border
intelligence product.
* Texas Intelligence Center: The Texas Intelligence Center is located
within the Texas Department of Public Safety, and currently has
representatives from I&A, ICE, and the FBI. Although the center
prepares and disseminates a number of products, including a daily brief
covering, among other issues, significant arrests, seizures and
homeland security, it does not prepare an intelligence product that
focuses on border issues. Officials at the center said that the state's
Border Security Operations Teams located along the border distribute
information on border security issues to local and tribal agencies.
According to the officials, the center will consider developing a
border intelligence product once personnel from other appropriate
agencies, such as Border Patrol, are in place at the fusion center.
DHS Plans to Deploy Additional DHS Personnel to Support Fusion Center
Efforts to Develop Border Intelligence Products, but Cited Funding
Issues and Competing Priorities as Barriers:
The director of I&A's State and Local Fusion Center Program Management
Office--the office responsible for managing the relationship between
I&A and fusion centers--acknowledged the value of having personnel from
DHS components physically present at fusion centers, not only for state
and local law enforcement but for federal agencies as well. The
director noted that deploying DHS analysts to fusion centers is
critical to developing trusted partnerships, which in turn will
facilitate collaboration and information sharing among federal, state,
local, and tribal officials. But to date, the director explained that
the office has not received the funding needed to deploy the personnel
to other centers and has other competing priorities.
DHS has had a plan for deploying personnel from its component agencies
to fusion centers since June 2006, when the DHS Secretary signed the
Support Implementation Plan for State and Local Fusion Centers. The
plan calls for embedding DHS personnel with access to information,
technology, and training in fusion centers to form the basis of a
nationwide homeland security information network for collaboration and
information sharing. According to the director of I&A's State and Local
Fusion Center Program Management Office, in part because of limited
resources, the department is taking a risk-based approach to
determining where to deploy officers and analysts. As such, the
department considers several factors in addition to available funding,
including population density, the number of critical infrastructure
facilities, and the results of fusion center assessments the office
conducts to determine the readiness of the center to use the
department's resources. Senior I&A officials noted that the department
places some priority on deploying DHS personnel to state and local
fusion centers located in border states, but that other factors also
have to be considered under the department's risk-based approach.
According to DHS, as of September 2009, I&A had deployed 41
intelligence analysts to state, local, and regional fusion centers. DHS
plans to have a total of about 70 I&A analysts at fusion centers by the
end of fiscal year 2010 and an equal number of officers and analysts
from DHS component agencies (e.g., Border Patrol and ICE). Figure 4
shows DHS personnel that were assigned to fusion centers in the 14 land
border states as of August 2009.
Figure 4: DHS Personnel Assigned to Land Border State Fusion Centers,
August 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map of the U.S.]
State: Arizona;
DHS personnel assigned to DHS Components:
I&A;
CBP;
ICE.
State: California;
DHS personnel assigned to DHS Components:
I&A;
CBP;
ICE.
State: Michigan;
DHS personnel assigned to DHS Components:
I&A;
CBP.
State: Minnesota;
DHS personnel assigned to DHS Components:
I&A;
CBP.
State: Montana;
DHS personnel assigned to DHS Components:
CBP.
State: New York;
DHS personnel assigned to DHS Components:
I&A;
CBP;
ICE.
State: North Dakota;
DHS personnel assigned to DHS Components:
CBP.
State: Texas;
DHS personnel assigned to DHS Components:
I&A;
ICE.
State: Vermont;
DHS personnel assigned to DHS Components:
CBP.
State: Washington;
DHS personnel assigned to DHS Components:
I&A;
ICE.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data and Art Explosion.
[End of figure]
According to CBP headquarters officials, the agency has only a limited
number of Border Patrol intelligence analysts, and is currently working
with I&A to identify priority fusion centers. Officials from ICE's
Office of Intelligence also said that the agency is working with I&A to
develop a strategy to enhance ICE participation at state and local
fusion centers. Further, although the 9/11 Commission Act included an
authorization for $10 million for each of the fiscal years 2008 through
2012 for DHS to carry out the State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center
Initiative--including the assignment of CBP, ICE, and other DHS
stakeholder personnel to fusion centers--DHS did not specifically
request funding for the initiative and no funds were appropriated for
fiscal years 2008 or 2009 for this specific purpose. Rather, for fiscal
years 2008 and 2009, DHS reprogrammed funds from other activities to
support the fusion center initiative. According to the director of
I&A's State and Local Fusion Center Program Management Office, DHS
requested funding for the initiative in its fiscal year 2010 budget.
Although the 9/11 Commission Act did not address FBI participation at
fusion centers, FBI intelligence analysts and special agents were
dedicated to fusion centers in 8 of the 14 land border states as of
September 2009, in addition to FBI personnel at Joint Terrorism Task
Forces or Field Intelligence Groups that were colocated with these
fusion centers. The FBI noted that it has committed millions of dollars
over the years to ensure that its classified computer system and other
databases and equipment were deployed to support FBI personnel assigned
on a full-or part-time basis to fusion centers. According to the FBI,
the bureau has worked with DHS to develop uniform construction
standards and security protocols specifically designed to facilitate
the introduction of federal classified computer systems in fusion
centers. Further, the FBI noted that it has deployed the eGuardian
system--an unclassified counterterrorism tool--to fusion centers and
other entities.
Identifying and Sharing Promising Practices from Fusion Centers That
Develop Border Intelligence Products and Soliciting Feedback on Their
Usefulness Would Support Other Fusion Center Efforts to Develop Such
Products:
The creation of border intelligence products--such as those developed
by the Arizona and New York fusion centers--represent potential
approaches that other border state fusion centers could use to target
products for local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border
communities. I&A has a framework in place to identify and collect
promising practices at fusion centers nationwide, as called for in the
department's March 2006 Support Implementation Plan for State and Local
Fusion Centers and the December 2008 Interaction with State and Local
Fusion Center Concept of Operations. Specifically, the implementation
plan for fusion centers recommended that rigorous processes be used to
identify, review, and share information regarding promising practices
and lessons learned. Consistent with that recommendation, the concept
of operations identifies leveraging promising practices for information
sharing and revising existing processes when necessary and advisable as
one of the guiding principles of interaction with fusion centers.
However, as of July 2009, I&A had not yet identified or explored
promising practices related to fusion center efforts to develop border
intelligence products. According to the director of I&A's Border
Security Division, such analysis has potential value but has not yet
occurred because the division has been focusing on developing its own
products and providing other support to fusion centers.[Footnote 33]
While it is understandable that I&A would focus on its own activities,
DHS could benefit from identifying promising practices related to
fusion center border intelligence products because of the importance
the federal government places on fusion centers to facilitate the
sharing of information. By identifying such practices, DHS would be
better positioned to leverage existing resources and help ensure that
local and tribal agencies in border communities receive information
that enhances their situational awareness of potential terrorist
threats.
Also, DHS had not obtained feedback on the utility and quality of the
border intelligence products that its analysts in fusion centers have
helped to develop. The 9/11 Commission Act requires DHS to (1) create a
voluntary feedback mechanism for state, local, and tribal law
enforcement officers and other consumers of the intelligence and
information products developed by DHS personnel assigned to fusion
centers under the act and (2) provide annual reports to committees of
Congress describing the consumer feedback obtained and, if applicable,
how the department has adjusted its own production of intelligence
products in response to that consumer feedback.[Footnote 34] However,
DHS's December 2008 and August 2009 reports to Congress did not
describe the feedback obtained on the intelligence products that its
analysts in fusion centers helped to produce--including border
intelligence products--or adjustments made in response to the feedback.
DHS recognizes that it needs to take additional actions to obtain
feedback from local and tribal law enforcement officers who are
consumers of the intelligence products that I&A produces. For example,
in mid-2009, I&A hired a contractor to initiate feedback pilot
projects, including one currently underway to evaluate and implement
processes for gathering and evaluating feedback responses. However,
these projects are designed to solicit feedback on products developed
by I&A and do not specifically include products that DHS personnel in
fusion centers help to develop, including border intelligence products.
Therefore, these projects may not support I&A efforts to obtain
feedback under the 9/11 Commission Act on products that DHS personnel
in fusion centers help to develop.
DHS's August 2009 report to Congress generally illustrates the value in
obtaining feedback on intelligence products. For example, in one
instance, the report notes that a state fusion center expressed
concerns that the perspectives of three southwest border state fusion
centers were not included in an assessment that I&A headquarters
produced on border violence. The feedback resulted in teleconferences
and other I&A actions to ensure that state and local perspectives are
included in future assessments of border violence. Similarly, obtaining
feedback on the border intelligence products that DHS analysts in
fusion centers help to produce would support other fusion center
efforts to develop such products and the department's efforts to adjust
its own production of intelligence products in response to that
consumer feedback.
The two fusion centers we contacted that were creating border
intelligence products with the support of DHS personnel (Arizona and
New York) had established their own mechanisms for obtaining feedback
from local and tribal consumers of the products. Specifically, the
fusion centers attached feedback forms to the border products, but have
received low response rates, according to center officials. As a
result, the fusion centers took other actions to solicit feedback on
the border products, such as through direct outreach with local and
tribal consumers of the information. Officials from both fusion centers
said that the feedback has generally been positive and that the border
products have been modified in response to this feedback. According to
the officials, since these products are developed by the fusion
centers, the centers do not routinely provide related feedback to DHS
on the value of the contributions of its staff and intelligence input.
However, the fusion centers' efforts to obtain feedback on the border
intelligence products--in addition to using feedback forms--
demonstrate the feasibility of DHS taking additional actions to collect
feedback on the products and report its findings to congressional
committees under the 9/11 Commission Act. DHS agrees that it could take
additional actions to collect this feedback, which could be done as
part of the department's ongoing feedback pilot projects.
By working with fusion centers to obtain feedback on the border
intelligence products developed, DHS could better support fusion center
efforts to maintain and improve the utility and quality of information
provided to local and tribal law enforcement agencies along the
borders. This information could also be useful to I&A in modifying its
own border intelligence products to better meet the needs of fusion
centers, assist the department in making decisions on how to best
utilize its limited resources at fusion centers, and be responsive to
its statutory reporting requirements.
Local and Tribal Agencies in Border Communities We Contacted Could
Better Support National Counterterrorism Efforts If They Were More
Aware of the Suspicious Activities They Are to Report:
Detecting the warning signs of potential terrorist activities and
sharing the information with the proper agencies provides an
opportunity to prevent a terrorist attack. However, most of the local
and tribal officials in the border communities we contacted did not
clearly know what suspicious activities federal agencies and fusion
centers wanted them to report, how to report them, or to whom. The
federal government is working with state and local entities to develop
a standardized suspicious activity reporting process that, when
implemented, could help address these issues. In the meantime,
providing local and tribal officials with suspicious activity
indicators that are associated with criminal activity along the borders
could assist the officials in identifying potential terrorist threats.
Most Local and Tribal Agencies in Border Communities We Contacted Did
Not Know What Suspicious Activities Federal Agencies and Fusion Centers
Wanted Them to Report or How to Report Them:
According to an October 2008 intergovernmental report on suspicious
activities, fundamental to local and tribal law enforcement agencies'
efforts to detect and mitigate potential terrorist threats is ensuring
that front-line personnel recognize and have the ability to document
behaviors and incidents indicative of criminal activity associated with
international terrorism.[Footnote 35] Unlike behaviors, activities, or
situations that are clearly criminal in nature--such as car thefts,
burglaries, or assaults--suspicious activity reporting involves
suspicious behaviors that have been associated with terrorist
activities in the past and may be predictive of future threats to
public safety. Examples include surveillance, photographing of
facilities, site breaches or physical intrusion, cyber attacks, and the
probing of security.
To varying degrees, federal agencies and fusion centers provided local
and tribal agencies in the border communities we contacted with alerts,
warnings, and other information that enhanced the local and tribal
agencies' situational awareness of potential terrorist threats. As an
additional tool, the FBI and fusion centers in two of the five states
we contacted had developed lists of suspicious activities--in the form
of reference cards or brochures--to help local and tribal agencies
determine what behaviors, activities, or situations are indicators of
potential terrorist activities and should be reported for further
analysis. However, officials from 13 of the 20 local and tribal
agencies we contacted said they did not recall being provided with a
list of the suspicious activities or indicators that rise to the level
of potential terrorist threats and should be reported, while officials
from 7 of the 20 agencies said they had received such indicators from
either the FBI, the state fusion center, or another entity. According
to the October 2008 intergovernmental report on suspicious activities,
local law enforcement agencies are critical to efforts to protect local
communities from another terrorist attack. The report also notes that
to effectively conduct these duties, it is critical that the federal
government ensure that local law enforcement personnel can recognize
and have the ability to document behaviors and incidents indicative of
criminal activity associated with domestic and international terrorism.
While federal agencies and fusion centers had taken steps to
disseminate or discuss terrorism-related indicators with local and
tribal officials--such as through mass mailings and during outreach
meetings and law enforcement conferences--these actions did not ensure
that local and tribal agencies were aware of them, in part because the
mechanisms used to share information were not always effective, as
discussed earlier in this report. As a result of not being aware of the
suspicious activity indicators, local officials in three border
communities we contacted said they did not clearly know what
information federal agencies and fusion centers wanted them to collect
and report. Increased awareness of these indicators would better
position local and tribal agencies along the border to identify and
report behaviors and incidents indicative of criminal activity
associated with terrorism.
Also, in about half of the border communities we contacted, local and
tribal agency officials were not aware of the specific processes they
were to use to report terrorism-related suspicious activities or to
whom this information should be reported because federal agencies had
not yet defined such processes. Absent defined processes, the local and
tribal officials had independently developed policies and procedures
for gathering and reporting suspicious activities and they provided
varying responses regarding how and to whom they would submit
suspicious activities that may have a nexus to terrorism. Responses
included reporting suspicious activities to a fusion center, the FBI,
or another federal agency. Several local and tribal officials we
contacted said they would report this information to the local federal
official--e.g., Border Patrol, ICE, or the FBI--with whom they had
developed a relationship. By defining reporting processes, federal,
local, and tribal agencies would be in a better position to conduct
more efficient collection and analysis of suspicious activities and
share the results on a regional or national basis. Also, internal
control standards call for management to ensure that there are adequate
processes for communicating with and obtaining information from
external stakeholders that may have a significant effect on the agency
achieving its goals and that information should be recorded and
communicated to the entities who need it in a form and within a time
frame that enables them to carry out their responsibilities.[Footnote
36]
At the national level, the federal government is working with state and
local law enforcement entities on the National Suspicious Activity
Reporting Initiative to standardize the reporting of suspicious
activities that may be related to terrorism.[Footnote 37] The long-term
goal of the initiative is to develop and implement consistent national
policies, processes, and best practices by employing a standardized,
integrated approach to gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing,
and sharing information about suspicious activity that is potentially
related to terrorism. One of the immediate goals of the initiative is
to help ensure that suspicious activity reports with a potential
connection to terrorism are expeditiously provided by local and tribal
law enforcement agencies to the FBI. As of September 2009, related
pilot projects were ongoing at fusion centers in 12 major cities.
According to the DOJ official who is overseeing the initiative, an
evaluation of the pilots will be completed by late 2009, but fully
implementing the initiative across the country could take up to 2
years.
Until the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative is fully
implemented, additional federal agency efforts to establish defined
processes for local and tribal officials in border communities to
report suspicious activities could help ensure that information is
collected and shared with the most appropriate entity.
Suspicious Activity Indicators That Are Associated with Criminal
Activity along the Borders Could Assist Local and Tribal Officials in
Identifying Potential Terrorist Threats:
According to the director of I&A's Border Security Division, senior
intelligence officials at fusion centers in two of the five border
states we contacted, and other subject matter experts--including
federal and state officials who were involved in developing suspicious
activity indicators for local and tribal agencies in border
communities--the suspicious activity indicators could be more useful if
they also contained terrorism-related behaviors, activities, or
situations that were more applicable to the border or border crimes and
were periodically updated to reflect current threats. Officials from
three of the local law enforcement agencies we contacted also suggested
that border-specific indicators would help them link potential
terrorism-related activities to crimes they are more likely to
encounter along the border, such as illegal immigration and currency
smuggling. However, our review of the suspicious activity indicators
being utilized by the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative
and those that were developed by the FBI and fusion centers generally
did not include indicators that were specific to the border.
According to the DOJ official who was overseeing the implementation of
the national initiative, the primary suspicious activity indicators
that were validated by the law enforcement and intelligence community
for use in the major city pilot projects were designed to be general
and applicable to local and tribal officials located anywhere in the
country. The official noted that the automated system that is being
used by law enforcement agencies to record the suspicious activities
during the pilot projects was designed to accommodate "sub-lists" that
contain indicators that are applicable to specific sectors, such as the
critical infrastructure sector. The official said that there was not a
sub-list for border-specific indicators, but that he saw the potential
for developing such a list. The official said that I&A would be the
entity with the requisite expertise for developing such a list.
In April 2009, I&A deployed an intelligence analyst from its Border
Security Division to DHS's Homeland Security Intelligence Support Team
to develop terrorism indicators that are specific to the southwest
border.[Footnote 38] According to the director of the Border Security
Division, the analyst is looking for trends and patterns in terrorism-
related incident reports that are generated by local and tribal law
enforcement officials along the southwest border. The director said
that I&A has not yet determined a final date for developing the
suspicious activity indicators since there is a lot of information that
has to be analyzed. The official noted that I&A is considering
deploying another intelligence analyst to the northern border to
perform similar analyses.
According to the director of I&A's Border Security Division, in his
former position as a border analyst in the intelligence community, he
worked with CBP and ICE to develop border-related indicators that were
potential precursors to terrorist activities. The official noted the
importance of periodically updating and consistently disseminating
these indicators of terrorism-related behaviors, activities, or
situations that reflect current border threats. According to Border
Patrol and ICE headquarters and field personnel, neither agency had
developed suspicious activity indicators that were specific to the
borders.
Additional DHS and FBI actions to develop, periodically update, and
consistently disseminate indicators of terrorism-related activities
that focus on border threats could help to maximize the utility of
suspicious activity indicators as a counterterrorism tool in border
communities.
Conclusions:
As discussed in the National Strategy for Information Sharing, state,
local, and tribal government officials are critical to our nation's
efforts to prevent future terrorist attacks. Because these officials
are often in the best position to identify potential threats that exist
within their jurisdictions, they must be partners in information
sharing that enhances situational awareness of border crimes and
potential terrorist threats. In border communities, this partnership is
particularly important because of the vulnerability to a range of
criminal activity that exists along our nation's borders. Therefore, a
more robust effort by federal agencies to identify the information
needs of local and tribal law enforcement agencies along the borders
and periodically assess the extent to which partnerships exist and
related mechanisms to share information are working--and fill gaps and
address barriers where needed--could better enable federal agencies to
provide useful information to their local and tribal partners that
enhances situational awareness.
The work of state-run fusion centers is also critical to the nation's
efforts to prevent terrorist attacks. Fusion centers in the border
states we visited demonstrated a range of practices related to
developing border intelligence products that could serve as a model for
other fusion centers. By identifying and sharing these promising
practices, DHS and the FBI could help strengthen the work of fusion
centers nationally in addition to enhancing situational awareness of
local and tribal law enforcement. Also, by working with the centers to
obtain feedback on border intelligence products, DHS and the FBI could
enhance the utility of those products that fusion centers share with
local and tribal law enforcement agencies.
Finally, until a national suspicious activity reporting process is in
place, more consistently providing local and tribal officials in border
communities with information on the suspicious terrorism-related
activities they should report--including those related to border
threats--and establishing processes for reporting this information
could help ensure that critical information is reported and reaches the
most appropriate agency to take action.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border
communities receive information from local federal agencies that
enhances their situational awareness of border crimes and potential
terrorist threats, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security
and Director of the FBI, as applicable, require Border Patrol, ICE, and
FBI offices in border communities to take the following two actions:
(1) more consistently and fully identify the local and tribal agencies'
information needs and (2) periodically assess the extent to which
partnerships and related mechanisms to share information exist, fill
gaps as appropriate, and address barriers to establishing such
partnerships and mechanisms.
To promote future efforts to develop border intelligence products
within fusion centers, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Director of the FBI collaborate with fusion centers to
take the following two actions: (1) identify and market promising
practices used to prepare these products and (2) take additional
actions to solicit feedback from local and tribal officials in border
communities on the utility and quality of the products generated.
To maximize the utility of suspicious activity indicators as a
counterterrorism tool, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Director of the FBI collaborate with fusion centers to
take the following two actions: (1) take steps to ensure that local and
tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are aware of the
specific types of suspicious activities related to terrorism that they
are to report and the process through which they should report this
information and (2) consider developing, periodically updating, and
consistently disseminating indicators of terrorism-related activities
that focus on border threats.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
On November 10, 2009, we provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ
for comment. In its written response, DHS noted that CBP, ICE, and I&A
are continuing and expanding efforts to share information. DHS agreed
with all of our recommendations in this report.
Specifically, DHS agreed with our recommendation related to the need
for Border Patrol and ICE to (1) more fully identify the information
needs of local and tribal agencies along the borders and (2)
periodically assess the extent to which partnerships and related
mechanisms to share information exist. For example, CBP agreed that a
systematic and standardized process to disseminate information and
receive feedback is vital to situational awareness for local and tribal
law enforcement partners who are within the immediate areas adjacent to
the border. CBP noted that Border Patrol plans to develop a list of
individuals who will serve as liaisons to local and tribal agencies and
also develop a list of local and tribal contacts. According to CBP, the
Border Patrol liaisons will then make initial efforts to assess the
information needs of the law enforcement partners and take other
actions to determine and publish guidance on information sharing. To
ensure that information shared is useful, Border Patrol plans to
conduct annual surveys of its partners. Border Patrol envisions that
this standardized process will be in place by the end of fiscal year
2010. When implemented, the Border Patrol's actions should meet the
intent of our recommendation. ICE also agreed with the recommendation
and plans to work with CBP and the FBI to enhance local and tribal law
enforcement agencies' situational awareness, but ICE did not provide
details on the specific actions it will take. I&A provided, or
otherwise highlighted, additional information on the current status of
information sharing among federal, state, and local agencies as it
pertains to border security.
DHS also agreed with our recommendation related to the need for DHS and
the FBI to collaborate to (1) identify and market promising practices
used to prepare border intelligence products within fusion centers and
(2) take additional actions to solicit feedback from local and tribal
officials on the utility and quality of the products generated.
According to I&A--the DHS component that has the lead in addressing
this recommendation--the department has initiated the creation of a
broad Joint Fusion Center Program Management Office, which represents a
departmentwide effort that seeks to more closely coordinate support to
fusion centers with department component agencies, including CBP and
ICE. I&A also noted that its intelligence specialists that are in
fusion centers also act as conveyers of information about promising
practices to develop border information products. Finally, I&A noted
that the department hosts the Lessons Learned and Best Practices Web
site that can be utilized to promote future efforts to develop border
intelligence products within fusion centers. While these actions could
potentially support DHS efforts to identify and market promising
practices used to prepare border intelligence products within fusion
centers, I&A did not provide any specific information on the extent to
which such practices have been identified and marketed. I&A's comments
also did not address what actions, if any, are ongoing or planned to
solicit feedback from local and tribal officials on the utility and
quality of the products generated. ICE also agreed with the
recommendation and noted that it will work with the FBI to implement
it, but ICE did not provide details on the specific actions it will
take.
Finally, DHS agreed with our recommendation related to the need for DHS
and the FBI to collaborate to (1) ensure that local and tribal law
enforcement agencies in border communities are aware of the suspicious
activities related to terrorism they are to report and the process for
reporting this information and (2) consider developing and
disseminating indicators of terrorism-related activities that focus on
border threats. ICE agreed with the recommendation but deferred to I&A
on the implementation specifics. I&A provided additional information on
the status of the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative and
efforts to test and evaluate related policies, procedures, and
technology. According to I&A, the evaluation phase of the initiative at
participating sites concluded at the end of September 2009 and a final
report will be issued that will document lessons learned and best
practices. I&A noted that the initiative will then be transitioned from
a preoperational environment to a broader nationwide implementation.
However, as discussed in our report, the DOJ official who is overseeing
the initiative noted that the nationwide implementation could take up
to 2 years. Therefore, our recommendation is intended for DHS and the
FBI to take interim actions until the national initiative is fully
implemented, such as more consistently providing local and tribal
officials in border communities with information on the suspicious
terrorism-related activities they should report--including those
related to border threats--and establishing processes for reporting
this information.
The full text of DHS's written comments is reprinted in appendix II.
DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in this
report where appropriate.
On December 8, 2009, DOJ's Audit Liaison Office, within the Justice
Management Division, stated by e-mail that the department will not be
submitting technical or formal comments on the draft report.
As agreed with your office, we plan no further distribution of this
report until 30 days from its date, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and other interested parties.
In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Eileen R. Larence:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The objectives of our review were to determine the extent to which (1)
local and tribal law enforcement agencies in border communities are
receiving information from their federal partners that enhances the
agencies' situational awareness of border crimes and potential
terrorist threats; (2) federal agencies are assisting fusion centers'
efforts to develop border intelligence products that enhance local and
tribal agencies' situational awareness of border crimes and potential
terrorist threats; and (3) local and tribal law enforcement agencies in
border communities are aware of the specific types of suspicious
activities related to terrorism they are to report and to whom, and the
process through which they should report this information.
To identify criteria for answering these questions, we analyzed
relevant laws, directives, policies, and procedures related to
information sharing, such as the October 2007 National Strategy for
Information Sharing and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act).[Footnote 39] The 9/11
Commission Act provides for the establishment of a State, Local, and
Regional Fusion Center Initiative at the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and contains numerous provisions that address the
federal government's information sharing responsibilities to state and
local fusion centers, including those that serve border communities.
To examine the information sharing that occurs between local and tribal
law enforcement agencies in border communities and federal agencies
that have a local presence in these communities--U.S. Customs and
Border Protection's Border Patrol and U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)--we
conducted site visits to five states that are geographically dispersed
along the northern and southwest borders (Arizona, Montana, New York,
Texas, and Washington). Within these states, we selected a
nonprobability sample of 23 local and tribal law enforcement agencies
to visit based on one or more of the following characteristics:
[Footnote 40]
* locations known to be or suspected of being particularly vulnerable
to illegal entry or criminal activity;
* land ports of entry with heavy inbound passenger traffic;
* locations in proximity to areas at the border where there is little
or no continuous federal border enforcement presence;
* locations that include Native American tribal communities with lands
that abut the border;
* locations where federal, state, and local communities have in the
past, or are currently working with federal agencies to support border
security either informally or through pilot programs for sharing
information;
* locations in proximity to federal agencies at the border; and:
* geographically dispersed locations along the northern and southwest
land borders.
We met with county sheriffs, local police chiefs, and tribal police
chiefs from the 23 law enforcement agencies and asked them about the
information they received from federal agencies in their localities. We
also asked whether federal officials had discussed local and tribal
officials' information needs and had established information sharing
partnerships and related mechanisms to share information with them--
consistent with the National Strategy for Information Sharing and best
practices described in GAO reports.[Footnote 41]
After our visits, we sent follow-up questions to all 23 local and
tribal agencies we visited in order to obtain consistency in how we
requested and obtained information for reporting purposes. Three
agencies did not respond to our follow-up efforts and were excluded
from our analysis. Thus, our analysis and reporting is based on our
visits and subsequent activities with the 20 local and tribal agencies
that responded to our follow-up questions. We also met with local
representatives of Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI to discuss their
perspectives on the information sharing that occurred, and compared
this information to that provided by local and tribal agencies in order
to identify barriers to sharing and related causes.
Because we selected a nonprobability sample of agencies in border
communities to contact, the information we obtained at these locations
may not be generalized across the wider population of law enforcement
agencies in border communities. However, because we selected these
border communities based on the variety of their geographic location,
proximity to federal agencies, and other factors, the information we
gathered from these locations provided us with a general understanding
of information sharing between federal agencies and state, local, and
tribal law enforcement agencies along the border.
To assess the extent to which federal agencies assisted fusion centers
in developing border intelligence products, as discussed in the 9/11
Commission Act, we reviewed products developed by fusion centers to
determine the extent to which they provided border security-relevant
information.[Footnote 42] We also met with and conducted subsequent
follow-up conversations with fusion center directors and other senior
fusion center officials in the five states we visited (Arizona,
Montana, New York, Texas and Washington) and obtained their views on
the importance of developing such products and about the level of
support federal agencies were providing in developing these products.
We asked each of the 20 local and tribal law enforcement agencies we
contacted whether they received border intelligence products from their
state's primary fusion center and, if so, we discussed their views on
the usefulness of such products.
We also interviewed senior officials from DHS's Office of Intelligence
and Analysis--the office responsible for coordinating the federal
government's support to fusion centers--and headquarters and field
components of Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI to discuss their efforts
to support fusion centers' development of border intelligence products,
identify promising practices for developing such products, and obtain
feedback from local and tribal officials on the usefulness of the
products. We also reviewed applicable documents that address fusion
centers, including the 9/11 Commission Act, the National Strategy for
Information Sharing, fusion center guidelines, and DHS planning
documents and reports.
Finally, to determine the extent to which local and tribal agencies in
border communities were aware of the suspicious activities they are to
report, we asked officials from the 20 agencies what, if any,
information federal agencies or fusion centers had provided them on the
kinds of suspicious activities that could be indicators or precursors
to terrorism and what processes they had in place for reporting
information on these activities. In general, suspicious activity is
defined as observed behavior or incidents that may be indicative of
intelligence gathering or preoperational planning related to terrorism,
criminal, espionage, or other illicit intentions. We also reviewed the
Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR)
Support and Implementation Project to determine the extent to which the
federal government recognizes the role of suspicious activity reporting
for detecting and mitigating potential terrorist threats.[Footnote 43]
We compared the processes for reporting suspicious activities with
GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.
[Footnote 44]
We also examined indicators of various suspicious activities the FBI
and fusion centers developed to determine if they contained border-
specific content. We interviewed Department of Justice officials who
were leading the national initiative to standardize suspicious activity
reporting--as well as those from headquarters components of DHS and the
FBI--to discuss the status of the national initiative and whether
border-specific indicators were needed and are being considered as part
of this initiative.
We conducted this performance audit from October 2007 through December
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
December 10, 2009:
Ms. Eileen R. Larence:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Larence:
Re: Draft Report GAO-10-41, Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are
Sharing Border and Terrorism Information with Local and Tribal Law
Enforcement Agencies, but Additional Efforts Are Needed (GAO Job Code
440632):
The Department of Homeland Security (Department) appreciates the
opportunity to review and comment on the U.S. Government Accountability
Office's (GAO's) draft report referenced above.
GAO determined that most contacted local and tribal law enforcement
agencies in the border communities found information from federal
partners useful for situational awareness but adopting further measures
could close other information sharing gaps. GAO also found that federal
agencies are supporting some fusion center efforts to develop border
intelligence products but additional Department personnel and other
measures could strengthen efforts. In addition, GAO noted that local
and tribal agencies in border communities could better support national
counterterrorism efforts if they were more aware of the suspicious
activity report.
The draft GAO report includes three recommendations directed to the
Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) commented on
the draft report. These Department entities, as described below, are
continuing and expanding efforts to share information, thereby meeting
the intent of the recommendations.
Recommendation 1:
The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of the FBI require
Border Patrol, ICE, and FBI offices in border communities to take the
following two actions to help ensure that local and tribal law
enforcement agencies receive information that enhances their
situational awareness of border crimes and potential terrorist threats:
(1) more consistently and fully identify the local and tribal agencies'
information needs and (2) periodically assess the extent to which
partnerships and related mechanisms to share information exist, fill
gaps as appropriate, and address barriers to establishing such
partnerships and mechanisms.
Response:
The Department agrees with the recommendation. Specifically, CBP agreed
that a systematic and standardized process to disseminate information
and receive feedback is vital to situational awareness for local and
tribal law enforcement partners who are within the immediate areas
adjacent to the border. Toward this endeavor, the Office of Border
Patrol (OBP) will develop a list of contacts at Headquarters Border
Patrol, sectors, and stations who will serve as the local and tribal
liaisons. Further, each sector and station will have a list of local
and tribal contacts. Once this contact list is established, either the
sector or station will make initial contact to assess the information
needs of the law enforcement partners. The sectors, in concert with
Headquarters, will determine and publish guidance on information
sharing above the "For Official Use Only" designation to ensure that
only partners with a "need-to-know" requirement receive this additional
secure information. This guidance will also cover the "Third Agency
Rule;" derogatory information on participating partner agencies; and
the security requirements for partner agencies, such as obtaining and
maintaining security clearance levels of the participants and the need
to possibly acquire secure equipment such as computers, faxes, and
telephones. One possible means of disseminating information that may be
studied is the use of fusion centers. Any information sharing liaison
program at the fusion center will require either a memorandum of
agreement or standard operating procedure. Lastly, to ensure that
information shared is useful to partners, the sectors or stations will
conduct an annual survey. The results of the survey will be reviewed
and originals maintained at the local level with copies sent to OBP
Headquarters. OBP envisions this standardized process to be in place by
end of fiscal year 2010.
CBP is moving forward on several fronts and making an effort to ensure
that information sharing with federal, state, local and tribal partners
is maintained at the highest possible level. Examples of these efforts
are:
* Establishment of Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers;
* Expansion of Intelligence Coordination Teams at strategic CBP
locations nationwide;
* Working as a team with the Department's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis in a coordinated effort to support State and Local Fusion
Centers (SLFCs) with needed border security information and expertise;
and;
* Embedding CBP personnel, as needed, in SLFCs.
CBP is working in conjunction with I&A and other Department components
to support and provide information sharing opportunities with SLFCs.
Additionally, the Field Coordination Division within CBP's Office of
Intelligence Operations and Coordination will work closely with the
other CBP offices to identify the SLFCs to which federal intelligence
or liaison personnel could be assigned to ensure state and local law
enforcement information and intelligence is exchanged between all
stakeholders operating near the borders.
ICE also agreed with the recommendation and will work with CBP and the
FBI to enhance local and tribal law enforcement agencies situational
awareness.
In responding to the draft report, the Department's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis provided, or otherwise highlighted,
additional information on the current state of information sharing
among federal, state, and local agencies as it pertains to border
security. On-going and planned I&A actions discussed below are
consistent with meeting the intent of the recommendation.
I&A information sharing with state and local agencies and law
enforcement organizations on the border and throughout the United
States is conducted primarily through the 72 designated state and urban
area fusion centers. In order to effectively share homeland security
information with the 18,000 law enforcement organizations and myriad of
other crucial state and local agencies, the Department, through several
components and offices, has made a conscious effort to focus its
information sharing efforts on the fusion centers. These efforts
include, but are not limited to, the deployment of Intelligence
Operations Specialists and the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) to
fusion centers, the build-out of secure space required for HSDN
installation in fusion centers, granting security clearances to state,
local, and tribal partners, and providing training and Technical
Assistance.
I&A deploys Intelligence Operations Specialists to fusion centers in
order to build relationships and information sharing partnerships with
state, local, and tribal partners. These officers also assess the
information needs of the fusion centers and the needs of partners
engaged in the fusion centers. They relate that information back to the
Department and serve as the conduit for information flow between the
states and I&A. As I&A expands its deployment of these officers to each
of the 72 designated fusion centers, these information sharing
relationships and awareness of information needs will only increase.
To facilitate the development of a national fusion center capability,
the Department's National Protection and Programs Directorate and the
U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Assistance partnered in
2007 to develop the Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program. This
program has been developed in support of I&A and in coordination with
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; the Office of the
Program Manager, Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE); the FBI; and
experts from the state and local community”including the Global Justice
Information Sharing Initiative, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating
Council, and the Global Intelligence Working Group.
Two of these offerings assist fusion centers with the development of
Terrorism Liaison Officer Programs. The Fusion Liaison Officer Program
Development institutionalizes multidisciplinary fusion center
participation via the replication of the Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO)
Program. The FLO Program Implementation executes the foundational plan
developed during the FLO Program Development technical assistance
service, bringing together fusion center management and identified
fusion liaison officers. These programs, through the building of far-
reaching networks of law enforcement officers, enable the communication
of information needs as well as create new information sharing
partnerships and are instrumental in addressing the recommendation.
The Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program has also developed the
Information and Intelligence Sharing Fellowship Pilot Program
(Fellowship Program) to further strengthen relations with state and
local personnel. Through the program, selected fusion center or law
enforcement officers will serve three to four month fellowships within
various Department offices. The formal inclusion of state/local
representatives in information and intelligence offices will increase
transparency and partnership on critical information sharing issues.
In addition to the Fellowship Program, several state and local law
enforcement agencies maintain a rotation presence in the Department's
National Operations Center. This type of exposure forges lasting
partnerships between state and federal entities and facilitates an
ongoing two-way exchange of relevant information and intelligence.
Recommendation 2:
To promote future efforts to develop border intelligence products
within fusion centers, the Secretary and FBI Director [should]
collaborate with fusion centers to take the following two actions: (1)
identify and market promising practices used to prepare these products
and (2) take additional actions to solicit feedback from local and
tribal officials in border communities on the utility and quality of
the products generated.
Response:
The Department agrees with the recommendation. I&A has the lead on
taking action to address the recommendation and their comments follow.
ICE independently agreed with the recommendation and will work with the
FBI to implement it.
In order to best meet the needs of state, local, tribal, and
territorial partners, the Department has initiated the creation of a
broad Joint Fusion Center Program Management Office (JFCPMO). This
office represents a Department-wide effort that seeks to more closely
coordinate support to fusion centers with Department component
agencies, including ICE and CBP.
The Intelligence Operations Specialists in fusion centers also act as
conveyors of information about promising practices to develop border
information products. In addition, the Department, through the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, hosts the Lessons Learned Information
Sharing (LLIS.gov) Web site, the national network of Lessons Learned
and Best Practices for emergency response providers and homeland
security officials. LLIS.gov's secure, restricted-access information is
designed to facilitate efforts to prevent, prepare for and respond to
acts of terrorism and other incidents across all disciplines and
communities throughout the United States. This resource can be utilized
to promote future efforts to develop border intelligence products
within fusion centers.
Recommendation 3:
The Secretary and the FBI Director collaborate with fusion centers by
taking two actions to maximize the utility of suspicious activity
indicators as a counterterrorism tool: (1) ensure that local and tribal
law enforcement agencies in border communities are aware of the
specific types of suspicious activities related to terrorism that they
are to report and the process through which they should report this
information, and (2) consider developing, periodically updating, and
consistently disseminating indicators of terrorism-related activities
that focus on border threats.
Response:
The Department agrees with the recommendation. ICE specifically agreed
but deferred to I&A on the implementation specifics. The Department's
I&A noted that the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR)
Initiative (NSI) is an outgrowth of a number of separate but related
activities that respond directly to the mandate to establish a "unified
process for reporting, tracking, and accessing SARs" as called for in
the National Strategy for Information Sharing (October 2007). For the
last two years, the Program Manager for the Information Sharing
Environment (PM-ISE), working with a number of federal, state, and
local partner organizations, has been "conducting an evaluation
environment (EE)" at state and major urban area fusion centers and
local law enforcement organizations across the country to test and
evaluate policies, procedures, and technology needed to implement a
unified process that fosters a broader sharing of SARs that are
reasonably indicative of potential intelligence gathering or pre-
operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity.
The major objective of the EE is to establish, at each of the
participating sites, policies and business processes that support the
gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing of SARs
while ensuring that privacy and civil liberties are adequately
protected in accordance with federal, state, and local laws and
regulations. A residual benefit of the NSI is that state and local
partners now have access to "eGuardian" data which the FBI downloads
into the NSI shared environment. In addition, eGuardian is now
integrated with the PM-ISE Shared Space environment. This integration
is two-way. First, all incidents that are referred from eGuardian
become visible to PM-ISE Shared Space users. Second, PM-ISE Shared
Space users can send incidents into eGuardian, where they can be
referred to the Joint Terrorism Task Force and made visible to the
entire eGuardian community. These are major advancements in sharing of
information.
The ISE-SAR EE concluded at the end of September 2009 and a final
report will be issued that will document "Lessons Learned" and "Best
Practices." Based on informal assessments of progress to date, the NSI
will then be transitioned from a pre-operational environment to a
broader nationwide implementation. When the NSI rollout is complete, a
unified SAR process and supporting policies and standards will be in
place nationwide. To support this unified process, a common set of
capabilities will have been institutionalized at approximately 72
locations nationwide. These locations have been selected to provide
broad nationwide geographic coverage and in recognition of the fact
that individual states and localities are governed by unique privacy
and civil liberties laws and regulations.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the person named above, Eric Erdman, Assistant Director;
Frances Cook; Cindy Gilbert; Kristen Hughes; Christopher Jones; Thomas
Lombardi; Ronald Salo; Edith Sohna; Adam Vogt; and Maria Wallace made
key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] This report focuses on the border information sharing efforts of
CBP's Border Patrol, ICE, and the FBI and is not intended to assess or
compare the overall efforts of DHS and DOJ, which include many other
component agencies.
[2] Terrorism-related information includes homeland security,
terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction information.
[3] In general, fusion centers are collaborative efforts of two or more
agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the
center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent,
investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.
[4] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271] (Washington D.C.: January
2009).
[5] See generally Pub. L. No. 110-53, tit. V, 121 Stat. 266, 306-35
(2007).
[6] App. I contains additional information on our criteria for
selecting the local and tribal agencies we visited.
[7] See, for example, GAO, Information Sharing: Practices That Can
Benefit Critical Infrastructure Protection, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-24] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15,
2001).
[8] In general, border security-relevant information includes
information on border crimes--such as illegal immigration and drug
trafficking--and potential terrorist threats.
[9] In general, suspicious activity is defined as observed behavior or
incidents that may be indicative of intelligence gathering or
preoperational planning related to terrorism, crime, espionage, or
other illicit intentions.
[10] DOJ, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Major Cities
Chiefs Association, and DHS, Findings and Recommendations of the
Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Support and Implementation Project
(October 2008).
[11] See Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004); Pub. L. No. 107-
296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
[12] In addition to the FBI, several other DOJ component agencies are
involved in sharing information related to the border, including the
Drug Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives; and the United States Marshals Service. This
report focuses on the FBI's role in sharing terrorism-related
information and does not include the activities of other DOJ component
agencies.
[13] Joint Terrorism Task Forces are investigative units consisting of
law enforcement and other specialists from federal, state, and local
law enforcement and intelligence agencies, led by DOJ and the FBI.
There is a Joint Terrorism Task Force in each of the FBI's 56 main
field offices, and additional task forces are located in smaller FBI
offices.
[14] These initiatives are included in the National Strategy for
Homeland Security and the National Strategy for Information Sharing;
the President's December 16, 2005, Memorandum to Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, including Information Sharing Guidelines,
calling for the establishment of an Information Sharing Environment to
facilitate the sharing of terrorism and homeland security information;
and statutes, such as the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, and the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
[15] Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. at 317 (codified at 6 U.S.C.
§ 124h).
[16] 6 U.S.C. § 124h(c), (e)(1).
[17] Id. § 124(d).
[18] Id. § 124(e)(2).
[19] Id. § 124(g)(1).
[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-24].
[21] GAO, Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to
Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and
Sensitive but Unclassified Information, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-385 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17,
2006) and GAO, Information Sharing Environment: Definition of the
Results to Be Achieved in Improving Terrorism-Related Information
Sharing Is Needed to Guide Implementation and Assess Progress,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-492] (Washington, D.C.:
June 25, 2008).
[22] GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate
Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion
Centers, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-35]
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007) and GAO, Homeland Security: Federal
Efforts Are Helping to Address Some Challenges Faced by State and Local
Fusion Centers, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-636T]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2008).
[23] For example, Border Patrol participates in Integrated Border
Enforcement Teams at 24 locations along the northern border, which are
comprised of both Canadian and U.S. law enforcement agencies and can
include state, local, and tribal agencies. These intelligence-led teams
were developed to enhance border security by identifying,
investigating, and interdicting persons and organizations that pose a
threat to national security or are engaged in other organized criminal
activity.
[24] ICE has partnered with federal, state, local, and foreign law
enforcement counterparts to create the Border Enforcement Security Task
Force initiative, a series of multiagency task forces that were
developed to identify, disrupt, and dismantle criminal organizations
posing significant threats to border security. The task forces are
designed to increase information sharing and collaboration among the
agencies combating these threats.
[25] ICE is making certain law enforcement information available
through the DHS Law Enforcement Information Sharing Service. This
service establishes bidirectional connectivity between DHS and federal,
state, local, and tribal law enforcement entities. The service shares
subject records related to valid law enforcement needs. DHS began
deploying the system in 2008 to DOJ and law enforcement information
sharing systems in San Diego, Los Angeles, and the Puget Sound region
of Washington state. In fiscal year 2009, DHS anticipates expanding the
service to systems in Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and the Washington,
D.C., area.
[26] The Safe Trails Task Force program is designed to unite the FBI
with other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in a
collaborative effort to combat the continuing growth of violent crime
on Indian reservations, including areas along the borders. Task force
participating agencies include the FBI, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, tribal police
departments, and state and local law enforcement agencies. The FBI
supports 15 Safe Trails Task Forces, 10 of which are in states along
the northern and southwest borders of the United States.
[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-24].
[28] The FBI's Law Enforcement Online serves as a real-time, online
controlled-access communications and information sharing data
repository for sensitive but unclassified information about
antiterrorism, intelligence, law enforcement, and criminal justice
efforts, among other things. Law Enforcement Online is available to
more than 18,000 law enforcement agencies nationwide. The FBI's
eGuardian system is an unclassified counterterrorism tool that allows
state, local, and tribal law enforcement partners to share threat
information directly with the FBI.
[29] Of the remaining 4 localities that had discussed their information
needs with Border Patrol officials, 2 reported receiving information
from the agency but did not take a position on its usefulness and 2
reported that they had not received information from the agency.
[30] Two localities did not report if they had discussed their
information needs with Border Patrol, 2 did not report if they had
discussed information needs with ICE, and 1 did not report if it had
discussed information needs with the FBI.
[31] Officials from 1 of the 14 localities said they were in the
process of developing an information sharing partnership with Border
Patrol officials in the vicinity. One of the 20 localities did not
report if it had established an information sharing partnership with
Border Patrol officials in the vicinity.
[32] Officials from 3 of the 13 localities said they had an information
sharing partnership with ICE officials in the vicinity but had not
received any information.
[33] According to the director of I&A's Border Security Division, the
division's products are designed to provide information about border
threats and other information that is applicable to border communities
throughout the country. In contrast, fusion center products are
generally designed to provide information that is specific to a
geographic location.
[34] DHS is to submit its annual reports to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives. See 6 U.S.C.
§124h(g)(2).
[35] DOJ, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Major Cities
Chiefs Association, and DHS, Findings and Recommendations of the
Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Support and Implementation Project.
[36] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). These standards, issued pursuant to
the requirements of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of
1982, provide the overall framework for establishing and maintaining
internal control in the federal government. Also pursuant to the 1982
act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued circular A-123,
revised December 21, 2004, to provide the specific requirements for
assessing the reporting on internal controls. Internal control
standards and the definition of internal control in OMB Circular A-123
are based on GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government.
[37] Entities participating in the National Suspicious Activity
Reporting Initiative include the Program Manager-Information Sharing
Environment, DHS, the FBI, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, state and local fusion centers, the Major Cities Chiefs
Association, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the
Major County Sheriffs' Association, and the National Sheriffs'
Association.
[38] In 2007, DHS created the Homeland Security Intelligence Support
Team at the El Paso Intelligence Center to improve information sharing
among federal agencies and with state, local, and tribal partners.
[39] See generally Pub. L. No. 110-53, tit. V, 121 Stat. 266, 306-35
(2007).
[40] Nonprobability sampling is a method of sampling where observations
are selected in a manner that is not completely random, generally using
specific characteristics of the population as criteria. Results from a
nonprobability sample cannot be used to make inferences about an entire
population because some elements of the population being studied had no
chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part of the sample.
[41] See, for example, GAO, Information Sharing: Practices That Can
Benefit Critical Infrastructure Protection, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-24] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15,
2001).
[42] In general, border security-relevant information includes
information on border crimes--such as illegal immigration, drug
trafficking, and border violence--and potential terrorist threats.
[43] DOJ, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Major Cities
Chiefs Association, and DHS, Findings and Recommendations of the
Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) Support and Implementation Project
(October 2008).
[44] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). These standards, issued pursuant to
the requirements of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of
1982, provide the overall framework for establishing and maintaining
internal control in the federal government. Also pursuant to the 1982
act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued circular A-123,
revised December 21, 2004, to provide the specific requirements for
assessing the reporting on internal controls. Internal control
standards and the definition of internal control in OMB Circular A-123
are based on GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government.
[End of section]
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