Emergency Management
Actions to Implement Select Provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act Gao ID: GAO-09-433T March 17, 2009Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements--leadership, capabilities, and accountability--of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from disasters. In its 2006 work on the response to Hurricane Katrina, GAO noted that these elements needed to be strengthened. In October 2006, Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Act to address issues identified in the response to Hurricane Katrina. GAO reported in November 2008 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had at least preliminary efforts under way to address most of the provisions, but also identified a number of areas that required further action. This statement discusses select issues within the basic elements related to (1) findings from the response to Hurricane Katrina, (2) provisions of the Post-Katrina Act, and (3) specific actions DHS and FEMA have taken to implement these provisions. GAO's comments are based on GAO products issued from February 2006 through November 2008, and selected updates in March 2009. To obtain updated information, GAO consulted program officials.
GAO reported in September 2006 that the experience of Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve leadership at all levels of government to respond to catastrophic disasters. For example, GAO reported that, in the response to Hurricane Katrina, there was confusion over roles and responsibilities under the National Response Plan, including the roles of the DHS Secretary, the FEMA Administrator, the Principal Federal Official (PFO), and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The Post-Katrina Act clarified FEMA's mission within DHS and set forth the role and responsibilities of the FEMA Administrator. The act also required that the FEMA Administrator provide a clear chain of command that accounts for these roles. In revising the National Response Plan--now called the National Response Framework--FEMA articulated specific roles for the PFO and FCO, which are described in GAO's November 2008 report. GAO reported in September 2006 that various congressional reports and GAO's own work on FEMA's performance before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina suggested that FEMA's capabilities were insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the degree of damage and the number of hurricane victims. The capabilities issues GAO identified related to, among others, (1) emergency communications, (2) evacuations, (3) logistics, (4) mass care, (5) planning and training, and (6) human capital. The Post-Katrina Act included a variety of provisions that related to these issues. For example, related to emergency communications, the act established an Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) within DHS. GAO reported in November 2008 that, in response to specific responsibilities outlined in its authorizing provision, OEC has been working with Urban Area Working Groups and states to assess gaps in communications infrastructure and to determine technical requirements to enhance interoperable communications systems. GAO reported in February 2006 that accountability mechanisms--specifically, internal controls--were lacking or nonexistent in processing applications for individual and household assistance following Hurricane Katrina, which left the government vulnerable to fraud and abuse. For example, GAO estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about 16 percent ($1 billion) in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to applicants who used invalid information to apply for disaster assistance. The Post-Katrina Act required the development of a system, including an electronic database, to counter improper payments. GAO reported in November 2008 that FEMA established a process to identify and collect duplicative payments by, among other things, enabling its disaster assistance database to check automatically for duplicate applications.
GAO-09-433T, Emergency Management: Actions to Implement Select Provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness and
Response, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, March 17, 2009:
Emergency Management:
Actions to Implement Select Provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act:
Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr.
Homeland Security and Justice:
GAO-09-433T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-433T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Emergency Communications, Preparedness and Response, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal,
state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic
elements”leadership, capabilities, and accountability”of preparing for,
responding to, and recovering from disasters. In its 2006 work on the
response to Hurricane Katrina, GAO noted that these elements needed to
be strengthened. In October 2006, Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Act
to address issues identified in the response to Hurricane Katrina. GAO
reported in November 2008 that the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had at least
preliminary efforts under way to address most of the provisions, but
also identified a number of areas that required further action. This
statement discusses select issues within the basic elements related to
(1) findings from the response to Hurricane Katrina, (2) provisions of
the Post-Katrina Act, and (3) specific actions DHS and FEMA have taken
to implement these provisions. GAO‘s comments are based on GAO products
issued from February 2006 through November 2008, and selected updates
in March 2009. To obtain updated information, GAO consulted program
officials.
What GAO Found:
GAO reported in September 2006 that the experience of Hurricane Katrina
showed the need to improve leadership at all levels of government to
respond to catastrophic disasters. For example, GAO reported that, in
the response to Hurricane Katrina, there was confusion over roles and
responsibilities under the National Response Plan, including the roles
of the DHS Secretary, the FEMA Administrator, the Principal Federal
Official (PFO), and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The Post-
Katrina Act clarified FEMA‘s mission within DHS and set forth the role
and responsibilities of the FEMA Administrator. The act also required
that the FEMA Administrator provide a clear chain of command that
accounts for these roles. In revising the National Response Plan”now
called the National Response Framework”FEMA articulated specific roles
for the PFO and FCO, which are described in GAO‘s November 2008 report.
GAO reported in September 2006 that various congressional reports and
GAO‘s own work on FEMA‘s performance before, during, and after
Hurricane Katrina suggested that FEMA‘s capabilities were insufficient
to meet the challenges posed by the degree of damage and the number of
hurricane victims. The capabilities issues GAO identified related to,
among others, (1) emergency communications, (2) evacuations, (3)
logistics, (4) mass care, (5) planning and training, and (6) human
capital. The Post-Katrina Act included a variety of provisions that
related to these issues. For example, related to emergency
communications, the act established an Office of Emergency
Communications (OEC) within DHS. GAO reported in November 2008 that, in
response to specific responsibilities outlined in its authorizing
provision, OEC has been working with Urban Area Working Groups and
states to assess gaps in communications infrastructure and to determine
technical requirements to enhance interoperable communications systems.
GAO reported in February 2006 that accountability mechanisms”
specifically, internal controls”were lacking or nonexistent in
processing applications for individual and household assistance
following Hurricane Katrina, which left the government vulnerable to
fraud and abuse. For example, GAO estimated that through February 2006,
FEMA made about 16 percent ($1 billion) in improper and potentially
fraudulent payments to applicants who used invalid information to apply
for disaster assistance. The Post-Katrina Act required the development
of a system, including an electronic database, to counter improper
payments. GAO reported in November 2008 that FEMA established a process
to identify and collect duplicative payments by, among other things,
enabling its disaster assistance database to check automatically for
duplicate applications.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO has made recommendations to DHS in prior reports, with which DHS
generally agreed, regarding leadership, capabilities, and
accountability controls for disaster management.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-433T] or key
components. For more information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr. at
(202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the efforts of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to strengthen emergency
management by implementing provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act), which Congress
enacted in October 2006 to address shortcomings in the preparation for
and response to Hurricane Katrina.[Footnote 1] My remarks today are
grounded in our prior work on FEMA's and DHS's response to Hurricane
Katrina and the actions they have taken to implement the Post-Katrina
Act.[Footnote 2] In September 2006, we identified leadership,
capabilities, and accountability as elements that FEMA and DHS needed
to strengthen to respond to catastrophic disasters. This testimony
discusses these three elements in terms of our 2006 findings about
select issues within the elements; provisions of the Post-Katrina Act
that relate to those issues; the actions we reported in November 2008
that FEMA and DHS have taken to implement those provisions; and where
possible, updates to these actions as of March 2009.
To conduct our 2006 work on Hurricane Katrina we visited the areas
affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita--Alabama, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas--and interviewed the governors of those states
and the mayor of New Orleans. We also interviewed senior federal
officials. To conduct our 2008 work about actions to implement
provisions of the Post-Katrina Act, we analyzed the text of the act and
identified well over 300 discrete provisions within the legislation
that called for FEMA or DHS action to implement requirements or
exercise authorities. We reviewed agency documents and discussed the
act's implementation with numerous senior-level program officials at
FEMA and DHS to identify the actions that had been taken. In March
2009, we consulted program officials about the status of select actions
to provide updates in this statement.
We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. More detailed information on our scope and
methodology appears in our published work.
This statement provides information about select actions related to our
2006 work on the response to Hurricane Katrina that FEMA and DHS have
taken to implement the Post-Katrina Act. The actions described are
drawn from our November 2008 report and, where possible, March 2009
updates from program officials. As we reported in November 2008, for
most of the provisions we examined, FEMA and DHS had at least
preliminary efforts underway to address them. We also identified a
number of areas that still required action, and noted that it was clear
that FEMA and DHS have work remaining to implement the act.
Background:
On August 29, 2005, and in the ensuing days, Hurricanes Katrina, Rita,
and Wilma devastated the Gulf Coast region of the United States.
Hurricane Katrina alone affected more than a half million people
located within approximately 90,000 square miles spanning Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama, and ultimately resulted in over 1,600 deaths.
Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal,
state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements
of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a catastrophic
disaster. Beginning in February 2006, reports by the House Select
Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to
Hurricane Katrina, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, the White House Homeland Security Council, the DHS
Inspector General, DHS, and FEMA all identified a variety of failures
and some strengths in the preparation for, response to, and initial
recovery from Hurricane Katrina. Our findings about the response to
Hurricane Katrina in a March 2006 testimony and a September 2006 report
focused on the need for strengthened leadership, capabilities, and
accountability to improve emergency preparedness and response.[Footnote
3]
The Post-Katrina Act was enacted to address various shortcomings
identified in the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.
The act enhances FEMA's responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS.
FEMA is to lead and support the nation in a risk-based, comprehensive
emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response,
recovery, and mitigation. Under the act, the FEMA Administrator reports
directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security; FEMA is now a distinct
entity within DHS; and the Secretary of Homeland Security can no longer
substantially or significantly reduce the authorities,
responsibilities, or functions of FEMA or the capability to perform
them unless authorized by subsequent legislation. The act further
directs the transfer to FEMA of many functions of DHS's former
Preparedness Directorate. The statute also codified FEMA's existing
regional structure, which includes 10 regional offices, and specified
their responsibilities. It also contains a provision establishing in
FEMA a National Integration Center, which is responsible for the
ongoing management and maintenance of the National Incident Management
System (NIMS)--which describes how emergency incident response is to be
managed and coordinated--and the National Response Plan (NRP)--now
revised and known as the National Response Framework (NRF). In
addition, the act includes several provisions to strengthen the
management and capability of FEMA's workforce. For example, the statute
calls for a strategic human capital plan to shape and improve FEMA's
workforce, authorizes recruitment and retention bonuses, and
establishes requirements for a Surge Capacity Force.
The Post-Katrina Act extends beyond changes to FEMA's organizational
and management structure and includes legislative reforms in other
emergency management areas that were considered shortcomings during
Hurricane Katrina. For example, the Post-Katrina Act includes an
emergency communications title that requires, among other things, the
development of a National Emergency Communications Plan, as well as the
establishment of working groups within each FEMA region dedicated to
emergency communications coordination. The act also addresses
catastrophic planning and preparedness; for example, it charges FEMA's
National Integration Center with revising the NRF's catastrophic
incident annex, and it makes state catastrophic planning a component of
one grant program. In addition, the act addresses evacuation plans and
exercises and the needs of individuals with disabilities.
In November 2008, we reported the actions FEMA and DHS had taken in
response to more than 300 distinct provisions of the Post-Katrina Act
that we had identified. We also reported on areas where FEMA and DHS
still needed to take action and any challenges to implementation that
FEMA and DHS officials identified during our discussions with them. In
general, we found that FEMA and DHS had made some progress in their
efforts to implement the act since it was enacted in October 2006. For
most of the provisions we examined, FEMA and DHS had at least
preliminary efforts under way to address them. We also identified a
number of areas that still required action, and noted that it was clear
that FEMA and DHS had work remaining to implement the provisions of the
act. Throughout this statement, unless otherwise noted, the actions
reported that DHS and FEMA have taken to address provisions of the Post-
Katrina Act are drawn from our November 2008 report.
Leadership:
Our 2006 report noted that in preparing for, responding to, and
recovering from any catastrophic disaster, the legal authorities, roles
and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of
government must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well
understood in order to facilitate rapid and effective decision making.
We further noted that the experience of Hurricane Katrina showed the
need to improve leadership at all levels of government to better
respond to a catastrophic disaster. Specifically, we reported that in
the response to Hurricane Katrina there was confusion regarding roles
and responsibilities under the NRP, including the roles of the
Secretary of Homeland Security and two key federal officials with
responsibility for disaster response--the Principal Federal Official
(PFO), and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO).
Updating the National Response Framework and Clarifying the Role of the
FEMA Administrator:
The Post-Katrina Act clarified FEMA's mission within DHS and set forth
the role and responsibilities of the FEMA Administrator. These
provisions, among other things, required that the FEMA Administrator
provide advice on request to the President, the Homeland Security
Council, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, and that the FEMA
Administrator report directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security
without having to report through another official.[Footnote 4]
As a result of the limitations in the NRP revealed during the response
to Hurricane Katrina and as required by the Post-Katrina Act, DHS and
FEMA undertook a comprehensive review of the NRP. The result of this
process was the issuance, in January 2008, of the NRF (the name for the
revised NRP).[Footnote 5] The NRF states that it is to be a guide to
how the nation conducts an all-hazards response and manages incidents
ranging from the serious but purely local to large-scale terrorist
attacks or catastrophic natural disasters. The NRF became effective in
March 2008.
As reflected in the NRF and confirmed by FEMA's Office of Policy and
Program Analysis and FEMA General Counsel, there is a direct reporting
relationship between the FEMA Administrator and the Secretary of
Homeland Security. According to officials in FEMA's Office of Policy
and Program Analysis, the FEMA Administrator gives emergency management
advice as a matter of course at meetings with the President, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Homeland Security Council.
The NRF also states that the Secretary of Homeland Security coordinates
with other appropriate departments and agencies to activate plans and
applicable coordination structures of the NRF, as required. The FEMA
Administrator assists the secretary in meeting these responsibilities.
FEMA is the lead agency for emergency management under NRF Emergency
Support Function #5, which is the coordination Emergency Support
Function for all federal departments and agencies across the spectrum
of domestic incident management from hazard mitigation and preparedness
to response and recovery.
Clarifying the Roles of the PFO and FCO:
We reported in 2006 that in response to Hurricane Katrina, the
Secretary of Homeland Security initially designated the head of FEMA as
the PFO, who then appointed separate FCOs for Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi. It was not clear, however, who was responsible for
coordinating the overall federal effort at a strategic level. Our
fieldwork indicated that the lack of clarity in leadership roles and
responsibilities resulted in disjointed efforts of federal agencies
involved in the response, a myriad of approaches and processes for
requesting and providing assistance, and confusion about who should be
advised of requests and what resources would be provided within
specific time frames.
The Post-Katrina Act required that the Secretary of Homeland Security,
through the FEMA Administrator, provide a clear chain of command in the
NRF that accounts for the roles of the FEMA Administrator, the FCO, and
the PFO.[Footnote 6] According to the NRF, the Secretary of Homeland
Security may elect to designate a PFO to serve as his or her primary
field representative to ensure consistency of federal support as well
as the overall effectiveness of federal incident management. The NRF
repeats the Post-Katrina Act's prohibition that the PFO shall not
direct or replace the incident command structure or have directive
authority over the FCO or other federal and state officials. Under the
NRF, the PFO's duties include providing situational awareness and a
primary point of contact in the field for the secretary, promoting
federal interagency collaboration and conflict resolution where
possible, presenting to the secretary any policy issues that require
resolution, and acting as the primary federal spokesperson for
coordinated media and public communications.
According to DHS officials, at the time of our 2008 report, no PFO had
been operationally deployed for any Stafford Act event since the
response to Hurricane Katrina. DHS's appropriations acts for fiscal
years 2008 and 2009 have each included a prohibition that "none of the
funds provided by this or previous appropriations acts shall be used to
fund any position designated as a Principal Federal Official" for any
Stafford Act declared disasters or emergencies.[Footnote 7] Our Office
of General Counsel plans to address the implications of this funding
prohibition in future work.[Footnote 8]
According to the NRF, the primary role and responsibilities of the FCO
include four major activities:
* representing the FEMA Administrator in the field and discharging all
FEMA responsibilities for the response and recovery efforts under way;
* administering Stafford Act authorities, including the commitment of
FEMA resources and the issuance of mission assignments to other federal
departments or agencies;
* coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing the federal response,
within the Unified Coordination Group at the Joint Field Office; and:
* interfacing with the State Coordinating Officer and other state,
tribal, and local response officials to determine the most urgent needs
and set objectives for an effective response in collaboration with the
Unified Coordination Group.
Updating the Catastrophic Incident Annex and Supplement:
The Catastrophic Incident Annex to the NRP (now NRF) was a source of
considerable criticism after Hurricane Katrina. The purpose of this
annex is to describe an accelerated, proactive national response to
catastrophic incidents and establish protocols to pre-identify and
rapidly deploy essential resources expected to be urgently needed. Lack
of clarity about the circumstance under which the annex should be
activated contributed to issues with clear roles and lines of
responsibility and authority. Because questions surrounded whether the
annex should apply only to events that occur with little or no notice
rather than events with more notice that have the potential to evolve
into incidents of catastrophic magnitude, like a strengthening
hurricane, it did not provide a clear guidance about the extent to
which the federal government should have been involved in the
accelerated response role that it describes. We noted in 2006 that our
review of the NRP and its catastrophic incident annex--as well as
lessons from Hurricane Katrina--demonstrated the need for DHS and other
federal agencies to develop robust and detailed operational plans to
implement the catastrophic incident annex and its supplement in
preparation for and response to future catastrophic disasters.
Under the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA's National Integration Center is
statutorily responsible for revising the Catastrophic Incident Annex
and for finalizing and releasing an operational supplement--the
Catastrophic Incident Supplement.[Footnote 9] The annex was revised and
released in November 2008.[Footnote 10] Officials from FEMA's National
Preparedness Directorate told us in March 2009 that operational annexes
of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement are being updated to reflect
the current response capabilities of the federal government. FEMA
officials told us that the annex and its operational supplement were
not activated during the 2008 hurricane season because none of the
storms resulted in a catastrophic incident that would require their
use.
Capabilities:
In our 2006 report, we noted that developing the capabilities needed
for large-scale disasters is part of an overall national preparedness
effort that is designed to integrate and define what needs to be done,
where, based on what standards, how it should be done, and how well it
should be done. The response to Hurricane Katrina highlighted the
limitations in the nation's capabilities to respond to catastrophic
disasters. Various reports from Congress and others, along with our
work on FEMA's performance before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina
suggested that FEMA's human, financial, and technological resources and
capabilities were insufficient to meet the challenges posed by the
unprecedented degree of damage and the resulting number of hurricane
victims. Among other things, in 2006 we reported on problems during
Hurricane Katrina with (1) emergency communications, (2) evacuations,
(3) logistics, (4) mass care, (5) planning and training, and (6) human
capital.
Emergency Communications:
Our 2006 report noted that emergency communications is a critical
capability common across all phases of an incident. Agencies'
communications systems during a catastrophic disaster must first be
operable, with sufficient communications to meet internal and emergency
communication requirements. Once operable, they then should have
communications interoperability whereby public safety agencies (e.g.,
police, fire, emergency medical services) and service agencies (e.g.,
public works, transportation, hospitals) can communicate within and
across agencies and jurisdictions in real time as needed. Hurricane
Katrina caused significant damage to the communication infrastructure-
-including commercial landline and cellular telephone systems--in
Louisiana and Mississippi, which further contributed to a lack of
situational awareness for military and civilian officials.
Among other provisions aimed at strengthening emergency communications
capabilities, the Post-Katrina Act established an Office of Emergency
Communications (OEC) within DHS. The statutory responsibilities of OEC
include, but are not limited to, conducting outreach, providing
technical assistance, coordinating regional emergency communications
efforts, and coordinating the establishment of a national response
capability for a catastrophic loss of local and regional emergency
communications.[Footnote 11]
Stakeholder Outreach:
OEC's stakeholder outreach efforts have included coordinating with 150
individuals from the emergency response community to develop the
National Emergency Communications Plan. OEC officials stated that the
outreach was primarily carried out through several organizations that
represent officials from federal, state, and local governments and
private-sector representatives from the communications, information
technology, and emergency services sectors.
Technical Assistance:
Through the Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program,
OEC has been working with Urban Area Working Groups and states to
assess their communications infrastructure for gaps and determine
technical requirements that can be used to design or enhance
interoperable communications systems. According to the Deputy Director
of OEC, OEC provided technical assistance to 13 recipients of the 2007
Urban Area Security Initiative grants by providing guidance on
technical issues such as engineering solutions and drafting requests
for proposals, as well as providing best practices information. In
addition, OEC offered assistance to states and territories in
developing their Statewide Communication Interoperability Plans and, as
of August 1, 2008, had conducted plan development workshops for the 30
states and five territories that requested such help.
Coordinating Regional Communications:
Officials from OEC stated that they have been coordinating to minimize
any overlap between the roles and responsibilities of various DHS
regional staff offices related to emergency communications. According
to the officials, officials from these regional staff offices plan to
attend and share information through the Regional Emergency
Communications Coordination Working Groups--also established by the
Post-Katrina Act.[Footnote 12] OEC officials said that OEC had hired a
federal employee to represent OEC at working group meetings. In
addition, OEC officials stated their intention to hire regional
interoperability coordinators for each of the 10 FEMA regions in fiscal
year 2009 to work with FEMA on the activities of the working groups.
FEMA officials told us in March 2009 that FEMA's Disaster Emergency
Communications Division has filled one national and nine regional
positions to coordinate the working groups. FEMA's Region II has not
yet filled the regional position. As of March 2009, all working groups,
with the exception of Regions II and IX, have been established.
According to FEMA officials, the eight established groups have had
various levels of activity, with the number of meetings ranging from
one time (Regions VI and X) to eight times (Regional IV). No updated
information about specific efforts to minimize overlap or to achieve
the Post-Katrina Act objectives for the working groups was provided.
Establishing a National Response Capability:
To establish a national response capability for a catastrophic loss of
local and regional emergency communications, OEC officials told us they
had been working with FEMA and the National Communications System (NCS)
[Footnote 13] to coordinate policy and planning efforts relating to the
existing response capability managed through the NRF's Communication
Annex, Emergency Support Function 2.[Footnote 14] According to OEC
officials, an example of this coordination was the inclusion of
continuity of emergency communications and response operations in the
National Emergency Communications Plan.
The officials also said that OEC would represent NCS in regions where
the system has no presence and would support the system's private-
sector coordination role, as appropriate. In addition, the Director and
Deputy Director of OEC told us that OEC, FEMA, and the NCS were
developing a strategy that involved the OEC's regional interoperability
coordinators providing technical support, playing a role as needed in
Emergency Support Function 2, and providing response capabilities
within their designated regions, among other things.
FEMA officials told us in March 2009 that FEMA and NCS have worked
closely to develop revised operating procedures that define their roles
and responsibilities under Emergency Support Function 2. In addition,
they said that NCS recently hired three Regional Emergency
Communications Coordinators with responsibility for coordinating with
regional, private-sector communications providers. The NCS coordinators
are working with FEMA regional coordinators to ensure that
infrastructure communications restoration efforts are supported by and
consistent with FEMA tactical communications support to state and local
response efforts.
To improve the national response capability, FEMA officials also
reported in March 2009 that they had defined an integrated response
framework and five critical disaster emergency communications incident
support functions--mission operations, facilities, tactical,
restoration, and planning and coordination. Additionally, the officials
also reported acquiring assets, assessing networks, and establishing
prescripted mission assignments to enhance response capabilities.
Finally, the officials said that FEMA Disaster Emergency Communications
Division has coordinated the development of 24 state and territory
disaster emergency communications annexes. They noted that some of
these state and territorial annexes were used in Hurricanes Gustav and
Ike, as well as during the Presidential Inauguration to support
response activities, understand state and local communications
capabilities, and prepare for any shortfalls that may arise.
In terms of tactical support, FEMA officials told us that FEMA's Mobile
Emergency Response Support mission carried out a variety of support
activities during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. For example, among other
activities reported by the officials, FEMA provided mobile emergency
communications infrastructure to support continuity of local government
and supported maintenance and repair of communications equipment for
local first responders on Galveston Island.
Evacuations:
We reported in 2006 that by definition, a catastrophic disaster like
Hurricane Katrina would impact a large geographic area necessitating
the evacuation of many people--including vulnerable populations, such
as hospital patients, nursing home residents, and transportation-
disadvantaged populations who were not in such facilities.
Transportation Assistance:
The Post-Katrina Act amended the Stafford Act to authorize
transportation assistance to relocate displaced individuals to and from
alternate locations for short-or long-term accommodations, or to return
them to their predisaster primary residences.[Footnote 15] FEMA
officials in the Disaster Assistance Directorate told us that they have
developed a draft policy for implementing the transportation assistance
authority. They noted that it would require implementation of proposed
regulatory changes before becoming effective, and as of March 2009, it
was on hold due to these required changes. In addition, they noted that
according to FEMA's July 2006 Mass Sheltering and Housing Assistance
Strategy, if the scale of the evacuation overwhelms affected states'
sheltering capabilities, FEMA will coordinate and provide air or
surface transportation in support of interstate evacuation. If the
evacuated area is without extensive damage to residences, as stated in
the strategy, FEMA will coordinate and fund return mass transportation
to the point of transportation origin. If the evacuated area suffered
extensive damage to residences, eligible evacuees are authorized, with
host state consent, to use FEMA funding known as Other Needs Assistance
to purchase return transportation when they are able to do so.
Mass Evacuation Planning and Technical Assistance:
The Post-Katrina Act authorized grants made to state, local, and tribal
governments through the State Homeland Security Program or the Urban
Area Security Initiative to be used to establish programs for mass-
evacuation plan development and maintenance, preparation for execution
of mass evacuation plans, and exercises.[Footnote 16] According to the
Director of Grants Development and Administration, FEMA informed state,
local, and tribal governments that they may use the grant awards to
assist mass evacuation planning via the fiscal year 2008 Homeland
Security Grant Program written guidance, which covers both grants.
The act also required the FEMA Administrator, in coordination with the
heads of other federal agencies, to provide evacuation preparedness
technical assistance to state, local, and tribal governments.[Footnote
17] FEMA developed the Mass Evacuation Incident Annex to the NRF, which
provides an overview of mass evacuation functions, agency roles and
responsibilities, and overall guidelines for the integration of
federal, state, tribal, and local support for the evacuation of large
numbers of people during incidents requiring a coordinated federal
response. However, according to officials in FEMA's Disaster Operations
Directorate, as of March 10, 2009, FEMA had not finalized the Mass
Evacuation Incident Annex Operational Supplement to the NRF to provide
additional guidance for mass evacuations.
Officials in FEMA's Disaster Operations Directorate also noted that the
states participating in FEMA's Catastrophic Disaster Planning
Initiative--an effort to strengthen response planning and capabilities
for select scenarios (e.g., a Category 5 hurricane making landfall in
southern Florida)--benefit from detailed federal, state, and local
catastrophic planning that includes examination of evacuation topics.
These states include Florida, Louisiana, California, and the eight
Midwestern states in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. National Preparedness
Directorate officials also told us that FEMA had conducted mass
evacuation workshops in Georgia and Florida and had provided technical
assistance to the state of Louisiana, helping to develop a mass
evacuation plan. FEMA officials told us that this plan--the Gulf Coast
Evacuation Plan--was successfully implemented during Hurricane Gustav
to evacuate 2 million people from New Orleans within 48 hours of the
incident using a multimodal approach (air, bus, and rail) and to enable
their return within 4 days.
The Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA to provide mass evacuation planning
assistance to institutions that house individuals with special needs
upon request by a state, local, or tribal government.[Footnote 18] FEMA
officials in the Disaster Operations Directorate told us that they had
not received any requests for such assistance. These officials said
that the draft Mass Evacuation Incident Annex Operational Supplement
will include a tab on evacuation issues related to people with special
needs and, once issued, can provide guidance to hospitals, nursing
homes, and other institutions that house individuals with special
needs. Officials from FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate also
noted that the Homeland Security Preparedness Technical Assistance
Program provides technical assistance upon request to jurisdictions
interested in planning for mass evacuations. Additionally, they said
the directorate was developing evacuation and reentry planning guidance
for use by state and local governments, which is scheduled for interim
release in the summer of 2009.
Evacuation for Special Needs Populations:
In establishing a Disability Coordinator within FEMA to ensure that the
needs of individuals with disabilities are addressed in emergency
preparedness and disaster relief, the Post-Katrina Act charged the
Disability Coordinator with specific evacuation-related
responsibilities, among other things. First, the act required the
coordinator to ensure the coordination and dissemination of model
evacuation plans for individuals with disabilities. Second, the act
charged the coordinator with ensuring the availability of accessible
transportation options for individuals with disabilities in the event
of an evacuation.[Footnote 19] At the time of our 2008 report, FEMA had
efforts under way for each provision, but provided little specific
detail on the status of those efforts. The Disability Coordinator told
us that FEMA was in the process of developing model evacuation plans
for people with disabilities. She also told us that FEMA had begun to
work with state emergency managers to help develop evacuation plans
that include accessible transportation options, and that FEMA was
working with states to develop paratransit options as well as to
coordinate the use of accessible vans for hospitals and nursing homes.
Family and Child Locators:
In 2006, we conducted work examining the nation's efforts to protect
children after the Gulf Coast hurricanes and identified evacuation
challenges for this population. We noted that thousands of children
were reported missing to the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children, which used its trained investigators to help locate missing
children after the evacuation. Officials from this Center stated that
both the American Red Cross and FEMA had some information on the
location of children in their databases; however, they said it was
difficult to obtain this information because of privacy concerns. These
officials told us that standing agreements for data sharing among
organizations tracking missing children, the Red Cross, and FEMA could
help locate missing persons more quickly.
The Post-Katrina Act established two mechanisms to help locate family
members and displaced children. First, the act established the National
Emergency Child Locator Center within the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children and enumerated the responsibilities of the
center, among other things, to provide technical assistance in locating
displaced children and assist in the reunification of displaced
children with their families.[Footnote 20] Second, the act required the
FEMA Administrator to establish the National Emergency Family Registry
and Locator System to help reunify families separated after an
emergency or major disaster.[Footnote 21]
The National Emergency Child Locator Center and the Family Registry and
Locator System have each established a hotline and a Web site. The
family locator system has a mechanism to redirect any request to search
for or register displaced children to the National Emergency Child
Locator Center.
FEMA officials told us in March 2009 that the family locator system was
activated and used during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike after it was
determined that the coastal evacuations of Louisiana and Texas would
involve millions of people. Once activated, FEMA's Public Affairs
Office informed the media in the affected areas about the availability
of the service. Officials noted that use of the family locator system
during Hurricane Gustav resulted in 558 registrants and 862 searches,
and use during Hurricane Ike resulted in 1,162 registrants and 1,034
searches. The National Emergency Child Locator Center was not
activated, but three referrals (one during Hurricane Gustav and two
during Hurricane Ike) were forwarded to the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children through the family locator system Web site.
At the time of our 2008 report, FEMA had established a memorandum of
understanding (MOU), effective March 6, 2007, with the following
organizations: the Department of Justice, the Department of Health and
Human Services, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children,
and the American Red Cross that, among other things, requires signatory
agencies to participate in a cooperative agreement, and for FEMA,
through the National Emergency Family Registry and Locator System, to
provide relevant information to the National Emergency Child Locator
Center. The Disaster Assistance Directorate Unit Leader told us that
the child locator center was, at that time, in the process of
finalizing cooperative agreements with federal and state agencies and
other organizations such as the American Red Cross to help implement
its mission. FEMA officials told us that, as of March 2009, a
cooperative agreement between FEMA and the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children was being finalized. They said they expected the
agreement to be tested during the 2009 hurricane season.
Logistics:
We reported in 2006 that our work and that of others indicated that
logistics systems--the capability to identify, dispatch, mobilize, and
demobilize and to accurately track and record available critical
resources throughout all incident management phases--were often totally
overwhelmed by Hurricane Katrina. Critical resources apparently were
not available, properly distributed, or provided in a timely manner.
The result was duplication of deliveries, lost supplies, or supplies
never being ordered.
FEMA is responsible for coordinating logistics during disaster response
efforts, but during Hurricane Katrina, FEMA quickly became overwhelmed,
in part because it lacked the people, processes, and technology to
maintain visibility--from order through final delivery--of the supplies
and commodities it had ordered. Similarly, our 2006 work examining the
coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross to provide relief to
disaster victims found that FEMA did not have a comprehensive system to
track requests for assistance it received from the Red Cross on behalf
of voluntary organizations and state and local governments for items
such as water, food, and cots.The Post-Katrina Act required FEMA to
develop an efficient, transparent, and flexible logistics system for
procurement and delivery of goods and services necessary for an
effective and timely emergency response.[Footnote 22]
Logistics Management:
In November 2008, we reported that FEMA had taken multiple actions to
improve its logistics management. First, seeking to develop an
effective and efficient logistics planning and operations capability,
FEMA elevated its logistics office from the branch to the directorate
level, establishing the Logistics Management Directorate (LMD) in April
2007.
Second, FEMA and the U.S. General Services Administration--FEMA's co-
lead for Emergency Support Function 7[Footnote 23]--sponsored the
National Logistics Coordination Forum in March 2008. The forum was
intended to open a dialogue between the sponsors and their logistics
partners, and to discuss how to better involve the private sector in
planning for and recovering from disasters. The forum was attended by
representatives from other federal agencies, public and private sector
groups, nongovernmental organizations, and other stakeholders.
Third, to improve its supply chain management, FEMA brought in a supply
chain expert from the United Parcel Service through its Loaned
Executive Program. FEMA also has a Private Sector Office to exchange
information on best practices and to facilitate engagement with the
private sector. In addition, FEMA established a Distribution Management
Strategy Working Group in January 2008 to analyze and develop a
comprehensive distribution and supply chain management strategy.
Finally, in 2007, FEMA conducted the Logistics Management
Transformation Initiative, a comprehensive assessment of FEMA's
logistics planning, processes, and technology. LMD officials intend for
this initiative to help inform the development of a long-term strategy
to transform FEMA's business processes and identify information
technology development opportunities. According to LMD officials, FEMA
plans to complete this transformation by 2009, and review and refine
business processes by 2014.
We noted in our November 2008 report, as an area to be addressed, that
the DHS Office of Inspector General reported in May 2008 that, while
FEMA had developed a logistics planning strategy that calls for
developing three levels of logistics plans (strategic, operational, and
tactical), the FEMA Incident Logistics Concept of Operations and a
Logistics Management Operations Manual were still in draft.
Total Asset Visibility:
Our 2006 findings about logistics challenges included FEMA's inability
to maintain visibility over supplies, commodities, and requests for
assistance. As of August 1, 2008, FEMA had fully implemented Total
Asset Visibility (TAV) programs in FEMA Regions IV and VI to manage and
track, electronically and in real time, the movement of its disaster
commodities and assets. At that time, according to FEMA LMD officials,
TAV was partially available in the other eight FEMA regions. FEMA
officials told us in March 2009 that the strategy to fully implement
TAV by 2011 was undergoing a comprehensive review. LMD had restricted
spending to critical mission functions, pending completion of the
review. In the meantime, they said LMD would focus on capabilities that
could have the most significant impact during the 2009 hurricane
season, specifically, the aspect of TAV used for warehouse management
and the aspect that would allow FEMA to use the system to order
materials and from and track shipments of its response partners.
Initially LMD is working with four partners--the Defense Logistics
Agency, the General Services Administration, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, and the American Red Cross. According to LMD officials, at
the time of our November 2008 report, the aspect of TAV FEMA uses for
warehouse management was only available at distribution centers in
Atlanta, Georgia, and Fort Worth, Texas. The officials stated that FEMA
expected to deploy the warehouse management portion of TAV to the other
six FEMA distribution centers--in Berryville, Virginia; Frederick,
Maryland; San Jose, California; Guam; Hawaii; and Puerto Rico--in
fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Further, the officials said that shipments
from FEMA's logistics partners were not yet tracked through TAV, but
FEMA and the four initial partners were working to provide full
visibility of critical shipments to disaster areas.
FEMA officials told us in March 2009 that during Hurricanes Gustav and
Ike, they used TAV to create and track commodity requirements fulfilled
by FEMA or its partners and to track FEMA shipments in-transit. The
officials noted that they were not able to track shipments from
partners before they arrived at FEMA sites but that deficiency could be
corrected when the partner-tracking aspect of TAV was fully
implemented. They also said they used TAV's warehouse management
system, where available, to track and manage shipments, receipts and
inventory for eight critical commodities daily. Other commodities that
could not yet be tracked through TAV's warehouse management system had
to be manually entered into the system. Finally, they said they used
TAV to track in-transit visibility of ambulances, buses, and temporary
housing units.
In March 2009, FEMA officials also shared four major lessons learned
and planned corrective actions resulting from the response to
Hurricanes Ike and Gustav. The four lessons learned related to: (1)
inconsistent use of TAV in the field during Hurricane Ike, (2) lack of
TAV specialists to support all distribution sites, (3) slow and
unreliable connectivity to the TAV system, and (4) use of standard
operating procedures. To address inconsistent use of TAV, FEMA
officials say they have increased standardized training and awareness
at all levels within FEMA and have developed a TAV communications plan
intended increase awareness of TAV capabilities. To address issues with
the availability of TAV specialists, FEMA officials told us they have
identified and screened additional TAV specialists, are planning to
hire additional Disaster Assistance Employees, and are planning to
crosstrain additional employees. To address connectivity issues, FEMA
officials said they are testing use of portable satellite equipment and
scanners that are hardwired to a satellite. They also said they are
seeking to use extended wireless access to support operations during
the 2009 hurricane season. To address issues with standard operating
procedures, FEMA officials said they are reviewing and updating the
procedures and reemphasizing the appropriate use of TAV through
training.
Mass Care:
Mass care is the capability to provide immediate shelter, feeding
centers, basic first aid, and bulk distribution of needed items and
related services to affected persons. As we reported in 2006, during
Hurricane Katrina, charities and government agencies that provide human
services, supported by federal resources, helped meet the mass care
needs of the hundreds of thousands of evacuees. The Post-Katrina Act
contained multiple provisions aimed at strengthening capabilities to
provide for immediate mass care and sheltering needs, particularly for
special needs populations.
Accelerated Federal Assistance:
The Post-Katrina Act amended the Stafford Act to authorize the
President to provide accelerated federal assistance in the absence of a
specific request where necessary to save lives, prevent human
suffering, or mitigate severe damage in a major disaster or emergency.
The act required the President to promulgate and maintain guidelines to
assist governors in requesting the declaration of an emergency in
advance of a disaster event.[Footnote 24] FEMA issued an interim
Disaster Assistance Policy in July 2007, which provides guidelines to
assist governors in requesting the declaration of an emergency in
advance of a disaster.
According to officials in FEMA's Disaster Operations Directorate, FEMA
has established a program to preposition goods and services in advance
of a potential disaster. For example, the officials explained that FEMA
was able to respond quickly to a state that had been affected by ice
storms because the agency, acting without an initial request from the
state, had prepositioned goods in advance of the storms. FEMA officials
told us FEMA was reviewing a draft policy directive that would allow
FEMA to provide federal assistance without a declaration if a state
would agree to assume the normal cost share after a declaration has
been made or to assume total cost if no declaration is made.
Special Needs Populations:
In establishing a Disability Coordinator within FEMA to ensure that the
needs of individuals with disabilities are addressed in emergency
preparedness and disaster relief, the Post-Katrina Act charged the
coordinator with coordinating and disseminating best practices for
special needs populations.[Footnote 25] The Disability Coordinator
shared with us two such practices that were in progress at the time of
our November 2008 report. First, FEMA was developing "go kits" for
people with developmental impairments, the hearing impaired, and the
blind. The go kits are to contain visual and hearing devices. For
example, the go kit for the hearing impaired will include a
teletypewriter, a keyboard with headphones, and a clipboard with sound
capabilities. The go kits are to be stored in the regions and include a
list of their contents and directions for use. Second, the Disability
Coordinator said FEMA was developing a handbook for federal, state, and
local officials to use in the field to help them better accommodate
those with disabilities.
In addition, the Post-Katrina Act required that the FEMA Administrator,
in coordination with the National Advisory Council, the National
Council on Disabilities, the Interagency Coordinating Council on
Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities, and the Disability
Coordinator, develop guidelines to accommodate individuals with
disabilities.[Footnote 26]
FEMA has published a reference guide titled Accommodating Individuals
with Disabilities in the Provisions of Disaster Mass Care, Housing, and
Human Services. The reference guide describes existing legal
requirements and standards relating to access for people with
disabilities, with a focus on equal access requirements related to mass
care, housing, and human services. The reference guide states that it
is not intended to satisfy all of the guideline requirements contained
in the Post-Katrina Act.
In addition to the reference guide, FEMA released for public comment
guidance titled Interim Emergency Management Planning Guide for Special
Needs Populations. This interim guidance--also known as the
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 301--addressed some of the
requirements contained in the Post-Katrina Act, such as access to
shelters and portable toilets and access to emergency communications
and public information. However, it did not address other requirements,
such as access to first-aid stations and mass-feeding areas.
FEMA officials told us in March 2009 that they had received final
comments on CPG 301 and expected to release the final document in
spring 2009. In addition, FEMA officials stated that they have
developed guidance for the Functional Needs Support Unit, which they
expect to publish by the end of March 2009. According to the interim
version of CPG 301, the Functional Needs Support guidance will serve as
a template for developing sheltering plans for special needs
populations. Once the Functional Needs Support program is in place, the
Functional Needs Support Unit can be used in shelters, so that trained
and certified shelter staff will be assigned to serve as caregivers and
provide the assistance normally supplied by a family member or
attendant. FEMA officials told us that the agency will contract to
provide training to states and localities on how to implement the
Functional Needs Support guidance--such as how to provide staff,
caregivers, durable medical equipment, and facility access.
FEMA officials stated that, in the absence of completed guidance for
the 2008 hurricane season, shelters received the Justice Department's
Americans with Disabilities Act Checklist for Emergency Shelters. They
also said that the 2008 hurricane season highlighted the need for a
standardized but scalable approach to sheltering special needs
populations, with attention given to durable medical equipment,
caregivers, trained staff, and special diets for evacuees.
Planning and Exercises:
As we reported in 2006, ensuring that needed capabilities are available
requires effective planning and coordination, as well as training and
exercises, in which the capabilities are realistically tested, and
problems identified and lessons learned and subsequently addressed in
partnership with other federal, state, and local stakeholders. Clear
roles and coordinated planning are necessary, but not sufficient by
themselves to ensure effective disaster management. It is important to
test the plans and participants' operational understanding of their
roles and responsibilities through robust training and exercise
programs.
National Exercise and Training Programs:
The Post-Katrina Act required the FEMA Administrator, in coordination
with the heads of appropriate federal agencies, the National Council on
Disabilities, and the National Advisory Council, to carry out a
national training program and a national exercise program.[Footnote 27]
FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate has established a National
Exercise Program. According to officials from FEMA's National
Preparedness Directorate, the National Exercise Program conducts four
Principal-Level Exercises and one National-Level Exercise annually.
These FEMA officials said that the Principal-Level Exercises are
discussion-based (i.e., tabletop or seminar) to examine emerging issues
and that one is conducted in preparation for the annual National-Level
Exercise. The National-Level Exercises are operations-based exercises
(drills, functional exercises, and full-scale exercises) intended to
evaluate existing national plans and policies, in concert with other
federal and nonfederal entities. We have ongoing work examining the
National Exercise Program, and we expect to publish a report on the
results of our work this spring.
FEMA's Deputy for National Preparedness told us that DHS and FEMA were
developing the Homeland Security National Training Program to oversee
and coordinate homeland security training programs, increase training
capacity, and ensure standardization across programs.
National Exercise Simulation Center:
The Post-Katrina Act also required the President to establish a
National Exercise Simulation Center (NESC) that uses a mix of live,
virtual, and constructive simulations to, among other things, provide a
learning environment for the homeland security personnel of all federal
agencies, and that uses modeling and simulation for training,
exercises, and command and control functions at the operational level.
[Footnote 28]
According to FEMA officials, FEMA has been using FEMA Simulation
Centers, Department of Defense facilities, and other facilities to
support exercise simulation while it develops the NESC. For example,
FEMA officials said that FEMA has provided initial exercise simulation
support for exercises requiring the two highest levels of federal
interagency participation in the National Exercise Program. According
to an official in FEMA's National Integration Center, the NESC is
currently under development and is estimated to take 3 to 4 years to
fully establish.
Remedial Action Management Program:
The Post-Katrina Act also required the FEMA Administrator, in
coordination with the National Council on Disabilities and the National
Advisory Council, to establish a remedial action management program to,
among other things, track lessons learned and best practices from
training, exercises, and actual events.[Footnote 29]
FEMA launched the Remedial Action Management Program (RAMP) in 2003 and
released it as a Web application for all FEMA intranet users in January
2006. RAMP uses FEMA facilitators to conduct sessions immediately after
exercises or events, and these facilitators are responsible for
developing issue descriptions for remedial actions. In addition, FEMA
has a related program called the Corrective Action Program (CAP) that
is to be used for governmentwide corrective action tracking by federal,
state, and local agencies. While RAMP is FEMA's internal remedial
action program, CAP is designed to serve as an overarching program for
linking federal, state, and local corrective actions. FEMA developed
RAMP prior to enactment of the Post-Katrina Act. However, FEMA has not
yet established any mechanisms to coordinate ongoing implementation of
RAMP or CAP with the National Council on Disabilities or the National
Advisory Council. We have ongoing work related to FEMA's efforts to
track corrective actions from exercises and actual events. We plan to
publish a report this spring.
Human Capital Issues:
In 2006, we reported that the various Congressional reports and our own
work on FEMA's performance before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina
suggest that FEMA's human resources were insufficient to meet the
challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage and the
resulting number of hurricane victims.
Surge Capacity:
The Post-Katrina Act requires the FEMA Administrator to prepare and
submit to Congress a plan to establish and implement a Surge Capacity
Force for deployment to disasters, including catastrophic incidents.
The act requires the plan to include procedures for designation of
staff from other DHS components and executive agencies to serve on the
Surge Capacity Force. It also required that the plan ensure that the
Surge Capacity Force includes a sufficient number of appropriately
credentialed individuals capable of deploying to disasters after being
activated, as well as full-time, highly trained, credentialed
individuals to lead and manage.[Footnote 30]
The Director of FEMA's Disaster Reserve Workforce explained that unlike
in the military model, FEMA's disaster reservists are the primary
resource for disaster response and recovery positions, filling 70-80
percent of all Joint Field Office positions. FEMA has interpreted Surge
Capacity Force to include its Disaster Reserve Workforce of 5,000-6,000
reserve Disaster Assistance Employees, who are full-time and contract
staff. If additional capacity is necessary, another approximately 2,000
Disaster Assistance Employees are available to perform immediate,
nontechnical functions that require large numbers of staff. Other
sources FEMA has identified include local hires--additional staff hired
from the affected area to perform the same functions as disaster
reservists; contract support for activities that require specialized
skill sets and for general disaster assistance functions; other full-
time FEMA staff detailed to perform disaster assistance work; and other
resources--particularly employees from other DHS components--detailed
to perform disaster assistance work.
FEMA's Disaster Reserve Workforce provided information on the
deployment of FEMA workforce in response to Hurricanes Gustav and Ike,
as outlined in table 1.
Table 1: Workforce Deployment during Hurricanes Ike and Gustav, 2008:
Disaster reserve workforce: 1,987;
Local hire: 4;
Other: 1;
Permanent full time: 486;
Temporary full time: 46;
Total: 2,524.
Disaster reserve workforce: 3,127;
Local hire: 213;
Other: 2;
Permanent full time: 519;
Temporary full time: 62;
Total: 3,923.
Source: FEMA.
[End of table]
FEMA contracted to perform a baseline assessment and preliminary design
for professionalizing the Disaster Reserve Workforce and its supporting
program management function, including FEMA's Surge Capacity Force
planning. The contractor developed a preliminary design for the
Disaster Reserve Workforce, which included an organizational concept,
workforce size and composition, concept of operations, and a policy
framework. An Interim Surge Capacity Force Plan was announced in a
meeting of the DHS Human Capital Council in March 2008 and communicated
to the heads of DHS components in a May 2008 memorandum from the FEMA
Administrator.
Despite the initial actions FEMA has taken to assess its baseline
capabilities and draft an interim Surge Capacity Force Plan, according
to the Director of the Disaster Workforce Division, FEMA has not yet
provided Congress with a plan for establishing and implementing a Surge
Capacity Force. The director stated that her goal is to submit a plan
to implement a surge capacity force by summer 2009 with timelines and
information on select--but not all--positions in the disaster reserve
workforce.
In May 2008, FEMA sent a list of job titles and positions needed in the
Surge Capacity Force to all DHS Human Capital Officers and asked them
to identify approximately 900 employees throughout DHS for the Surge
Capacity Force. According to the director of the Disaster Reserve
Workforce Division, the initial DHS Agency Surge Capacity designation
lists were submitted in June 2008. However, she stated that upon
review, there were inconsistencies with the different agencies'
interpretation of requirements for personnel, training, and skill sets.
Therefore, a Surge Capacity Force Working Group met to review surge
staffing requirements and to develop a timeline for the development of
processes and a Concept of Operations Plan. Agency participants in the
working group included FEMA, the Transportation Security
Administration, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. The
Disaster Reserve Workforce Division told us that, as of March 2009, a
draft of the Concept of Operations Plan was being reviewed within these
three component agencies and a final product is expected to be
delivered for DHS review by June 30, 2009. According to the Disaster
Reserve Workforce Division, because internal FEMA resources were
sufficient to respond effectively to Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, FEMA
did not require the assistance of other federal agency employees for
those events.
The Disaster Reserve Workforce Division, in partnership with FEMA's
Emergency Management Institute, has been developing standardized
credentialing plans, which will incorporate existing position task
books for the Disaster Assistance Employee workforce (a total of 230
positions organized in 23 cadres). FEMA officials told us in March 2009
that they had either initiated development of or completed
credentialing plans for 102 positions. They said they expected to
complete the remaining credentialing plans for all cadres and positions
by spring 2010. Disaster Reserve Workforce Division officials explained
that development of the credentialing plans in conjunction with the
position task books will highlight gaps in the training curriculum that
will assist in prioritizing curriculum development.
Apart from the Disaster Reserve Workforce Division's credentialing
initiative, the FEMA workforce is to be credentialed by the National
Preparedness Directorate's NIMS credentialing program, the
administrative process for validating the qualifications of personnel,
assessing their background, and authorizing their access to incidents
involving mutual aid between states. FEMA officials told us in March
2009 that the NIMS Credentialing Guideline was posted to the Federal
Register and issued for public comment on December 22, 2008, and the
comment period closed on January 21, 2009. They said comments have been
collected and were to be adjudicated March 11, 2009. According to the
officials, following adjudication, the guideline is to be revised and
submitted to the Executive Secretariat for formal FEMA adoption and
release. According to FEMA officials, experiences from the 2008
hurricane season confirmed the basic need for the credentialing
program.
Strike Teams and Emergency Response Teams:
The Post-Katrina Act requires each FEMA Regional Office to staff and
oversee one or more strike teams within the region to serve as the
focal point of the federal government's initial response efforts and to
build federal response capabilities within their regions.[Footnote 31]
The act also requires the President, acting through the FEMA
Administrator to establish emergency response teams (at least three at
the national level and a sufficient number at the regional level).
[Footnote 32]
According to Disaster Operations Directorate officials, "strike teams"
and "emergency response teams," the Post-Katrina Act's terms for the
support teams deployed to assist in major disasters and emergencies
under the Stafford Act, are now called Incident Management Assistance
Teams (IMAT). IMATs are interagency national-or regional-based teams
composed of subject matter experts and incident-management
professionals, and are designed to manage and coordinate national
response emergencies and major disasters. According to the officials,
Regional Administrators oversee IMATs based within their regions. IMAT
personnel are intended to be permanent, full-time employees whose
duties and responsibilities are solely focused on their IMAT functions.
The officials said that the IMATs' other functions include working with
state and local emergency managers to plan, prepare, and train for
disasters; running exercises; and building relationships with emergency
managers and other IMAT personnel. National IMATs are to consist of 26
positions, including a designated team leader and senior managers for
operations, logistics, planning, and finance and administration
sections. This sectional organization mirrors the incident command
structure presented in the NIMS.
FEMA has established a national IMAT in the National Capital Region and
a second national IMAT in Sacramento, California, according to FEMA
officials in the Disaster Operations Directorate. At the regional
level, Disaster Operations Directorate officials said that IMATs had
been established in FEMA Regions II, IV, V, and VI. According to these
officials, they are in the process of establishing a fifth regional
IMAT in Region VII, to become operational later this year. They said
that FEMA's intention is to establish IMATs in all 10 regions by the
end of fiscal year 2010 and a third national team in fiscal year 2011.
According to FEMA officials in the Disaster Operations Directorate,
although the National IMAT established in the National Capital Region
was fully staffed, when we reported in November 2008, some IMAT
positions were not yet filled with permanent full-time employees, but
rather with FEMA detailees who had been selected for their advanced
training and expertise. In general, the detailees were to provide
guidance and support to the permanent full-time employees until the
teams were fully staffed with personnel capable of managing their
respective IMATs.
According to officials in FEMA's Disaster Operations Directorate, at
the time of our November 2008 report, FEMA had procured personal
equipment for IMAT members and had ordered communications vehicles. In
addition, the National IMAT had participated in the National-Level
Exercise 2008. Also, Disaster Operations Directorate officials told us
that IMATs supported a number of disasters and special events in 2008
(including recent storms and hurricanes and the Democratic and
Republican National Conventions).
FEMA has established mandatory training courses for all IMAT personnel,
in addition to the standard training required for all FEMA employees.
According to officials in FEMA's Disaster Operations Directorate, they
have been implementing a credentialing program for the IMATs. FEMA
planned to incorporate training and credentialing for all hazards by
identifying core competencies required for each IMAT position and
assessing the competencies against existing task descriptions to guide
the development of mandatory training and credentialing plans.
According to these officials, as of March 2009, a draft of the
credentialing plan was under review and they indicated that the
credentialing process will be consistent with FEMA's Disaster Workforce
Credentialing Plan.
At the time of our November 2008 report, Disaster Operations
Directorate officials told us that FEMA was finalizing an IMAT doctrine
and a Concept of Operations Plan. However, FEMA did not describe to us
how it established or intended to establish target capabilities for the
IMATs, which are required by the Post-Katrina Act as the basis for
determining whether the IMATs consist of an adequate number of properly
planned, organized, equipped, trained, and exercised personnel.
[Footnote 33]
Accountability:
Our 2006 report noted that when responding to the needs of the victims
of a catastrophic disaster, FEMA must balance controls and
accountability mechanisms with the immediate need to deliver resources
and assistance in an environment where the agency's initial response
efforts must focus on life-saving and life-sustaining tasks. We
reported in February 2006 that weak or nonexistent internal controls in
processing applications left the government vulnerable to fraud and
abuse, such as duplicative payments.[Footnote 34] We estimated that
through February 2006, FEMA made about 16 percent ($1 billion) in
improper and potentially fraudulent payments to applicants who used
invalid information to apply for disaster assistance.
The Post-Katrina Act required the development of a system, including an
electronic database, to counter improper payments in the provision of
assistance to individuals and households.[Footnote 35]
FEMA has established a process to identify and collect duplicative
Individual and Households Program (IHP) payments. This process
includes, among other things, FEMA's disaster assistance database
automatically checking specific data fields in every applicant record
for potentially duplicate applications, having a FEMA caseworker and a
supervisor review potentially duplicate applications to determine if
FEMA is entitled to collect a payment already made, and notifying the
applicant of FEMA's decision to collect a duplicate payment while
providing an appeal process for the applicant.
In addition, FEMA provides applicants with a copy of its application
and a program guide, Help after a Disaster: Applicant's Guide to the
Individuals and Households Program. Updated and reissued in July 2008,
this guide provides applicants with information on the proper use of
IHP payments.
Moreover, according to FEMA, the agency established identity
verification processes, which include verifying that the applicant's
social security number is valid, matches the applicant's name, and does
not belong to a deceased individual. Further, FEMA reported that it has
implemented procedures to validate that the address an applicant
reports as damaged was the applicant's primary residence during the
time of the disaster and that the address is located within the
disaster-affected area.
According to FEMA's Information Technology Report submitted to Congress
in September 2007 under section 640 of the Post-Katrina Act,[Footnote
36] FEMA uses the National Emergency Management Information System to
perform numerous disaster-related activities, including providing
disaster assistance to individuals and communities. Although this
system interfaces with FEMA's financial accounting system through a
special module, FEMA has not yet taken action to ensure that applicant
information collected in the system is integrated with disbursement and
payment records to determine ineligible applicants.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my statement.
I would be pleased to respond to any questions you or other Members of
the Committee may have.
[End of section]
Appendix I: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William Jenkins, (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Leyla Kazaz, Assistant
Director, and Kathryn Godfrey, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this
assignment. Lara Kaskie, Christine Davis and Janet Temko made
significant contributions to the work. Other contributors to the work
include Jonathan Tumin, Sara Margraf, and Michael Blinde.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120
Stat. 1355 (2006). The provisions of the Post-Katrina Act are codified
in numerous sections of the U.S. Code. The applicable U.S. Code
citations are included in this statement. The provisions of the Post-
Katrina Act became effective upon enactment, October 4, 2006, with the
exception of certain organizational changes related to FEMA, most of
which took effect on March 31, 2007.
[2] The results of this work were included in products published from
February 2006 through November 2008. GAO, Emergency Preparedness and
Response: Some Issues and Challenges Associated with Major Emergency
Incidents, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-467T]
(Washington, D.C.: February 2006); GAO, Catastrophic Disasters:
Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will
Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's Preparedness, Response, and
Recovery System, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618]
(Washington, D.C.: September 2006); and GAO, Actions Taken to Implement
the Post- Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-59R] (Washington, D.C.: November
2008).
[3] See GAO, Hurricane Katrina GAO's Preliminary Observations
Regarding, Preparedness, Response and Recovery, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-442T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8,
2006) and GAO-06-618.
[4] See generally 6 U.S.C. §§ 313-14. For specific information on the
Administrator's reporting relationship and role as principal advisor on
emergency management, see 6 U.S.C. § 313(c).
[5] The Post-Katrina Act predated the NRF and referred to the NRF's
predecessor, the NRP, which was then the name of the document that
served as the nation's comprehensive framework for the management of
domestic incidents where federal involvement was necessary. Because the
Post-Katrina Act encompasses any successor plan to the NRP, it applies
to the NRF just as it did the NRP. See 6 U.S.C. § 701(13). Therefore,
this statement uses the term NRF, rather than NRP, in discussing any
relevant Post-Katrina Act provisions and the status of their
implementation, unless otherwise appropriate.
[6] 6 U.S.C. § 319(c).
[7] The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(Stafford Act) , 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5208, primarily establishes the
programs and processes for the federal government to provide major
disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal
nations, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations.
Upon a governor's request, the President can declare an "emergency" or
a "major disaster" under the Stafford Act, which triggers specific
types of federal relief.
[8] The funding prohibition is set forth at Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, Div. E, Title V, § 541, 121 Stat. 1844,
2079 (2007) and Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, Div. D, §
526, 122 Stat. 3574 (2008).
[9] 6 U.S.C. § 319(b)(2)(C)
[10] The Catastrophic Incident Annex is available online via the NRF
Resource Center, [hyperlink, http://www.fema.gov/nrf].
[11] 6 U.S.C. § 571.
[12] 6 U.S.C. § 575(a).
[13] Established by Presidential Memorandum on August 21, 1963, the
National Communications System was created to be a single unified
communications system to serve the President, Department of Defense,
diplomatic and intelligence activities, and civilian leaders. The
National Communications System mandate included linking, improving, and
extending the communications facilities and components of various
federal agencies, focusing on interconnectivity and survivability. NCS
membership currently stands at 24 federal department and agency members
and is managed by the DHS Under Secretary for National Protection and
Programs.
[14] Emergency Support Function 2 provides a structure for coordinating
federal actions to assist in the restoration of public communications
infrastructure, public safety communications systems, and first
responder networks.
[15] 42 U.S.C § 5189c.
[16] 6 U.S.C. § 321a.
[17] 6 U.S.C. § 721.
[18] 6 U.S.C. § 321a(c)(2).
[19] 6 U.S.C. § 321b(b)(4), (b)(8).
[20] 6 U.S.C. § 774.
[21] 6 U.S.C. § 775.
[22] 6 U.S.C. § 724.
[23] Under Emergency Support Function #7: Logistics Management and
Resource Support, FEMA is responsible for providing a comprehensive
national disaster logistics planning, management, and sustainment
capability that uses the resources of federal partners, public and
private groups, and other stakeholders to meet disaster response and
recovery needs.
[24] 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170a(5), 5192(a)(8), (c).
[25] 6 U.S.C. 321b(b)(4).
[26] 6 U.S.C. 773.
[27] 6 U.S.C. § 748.
[28] 6 U.S.C. § 764.
[29] 6 U.S.C. § 750.
[30] 6 U.S.C. § 711.
[31] 6 U.S.C. § 317(c)(2)(D).
[32] 42 U.S.C. § 5144(b)(1).
[33] 42 U.S.C. § 5144(b)(2)-(3).
[34] See GAO, Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita: FEMA's Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to
Significant Fraud and Abuse, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-403T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13,
2006).
[35] 42 U.S.C. § 5174(i).
[36] 6 U.S.C. § 727(b).
[End of section]
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