Maritime Security
Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed Gao ID: GAO-09-337 March 17, 2009U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal approaches are part of a system handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually. With the many possible threats--including transportation and detonation of weapons of mass destruction, suicide attacks against vessels, and others--in the maritime domain, awareness of such threats could give the Coast Guard advance notice to help detect, deter, interdict, and defeat them and protect the U.S. homeland and economy. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard's efforts to achieve awareness about activity in the maritime domain. This report addresses: the extent to which the Coast Guard (1) has vessel tracking systems in place, (2) can use these systems to track vessels that may be threats, and (3) has coordinated the development and implementation of these systems. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed relevant statutes, regulations, and plans for vessel tracking systems, compared the roles of the planned systems, and interviewed appropriate officials.
At sea or in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, the Coast Guard is currently relying on a diverse array of vessel tracking systems operated by various entities, but its attempts to develop systems to track vessels at sea are facing delays. For tracking vessels at sea, the Coast Guard uses existing national technical means--classified methods of tracking vessels--and plans to obtain vessel identification and tracking information from two more sources, long-range identification and tracking system (LRIT), and commercially provided long-range automatic identification system (AIS). However, one source of this information has just become available and the other has been delayed due to technical and operational difficulties. International LRIT requirements generally came into effect on January 1, 2009. The Coast Guard estimates that commercially provided long-range AIS will be operational in 2014. For tracking vessels in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, the Coast Guard operates a land-based AIS, and also either operates, or has access to, radar and cameras in some ports. The existing and planned sources of vessel tracking information may allow the Coast Guard to track larger vessels at sea, but systems and other equipment that track smaller and noncommercial vessels in coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports may prove ineffective in thwarting an attack without advance knowledge. The means of tracking vessels at sea--national technical means, LRIT, and commercially provided long-range AIS--are potentially effective, but each has features that could impede its effectiveness. The systems used in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports--AIS, radar, and video cameras--have more difficulty tracking smaller and noncommercial vessels because they are not required to carry AIS equipment and because of the technical limitations of radar and cameras. In studies GAO reviewed and discussions with maritime stakeholders, there was widespread agreement that vessel tracking systems and equipment will be challenged to provide a warning if a small vessel is moving in a threatening manner. The Coast Guard has not coordinated its plans for obtaining vessel tracking information at sea, and is planning on obtaining potentially duplicative information, but in coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, the various tracking methods complement each other. Once operational, the two new planned means for tracking vessels at sea--LRIT and commercially provided long-range AIS--will both provide vessel identification and position information for almost all the same vessels. Commercially provided long-range AIS provides additional information about each vessel and its voyage, but almost all of that information is available through reports filed by vessel operators. The primary need cited by the Coast Guard to develop both systems--to detect anomalies--can be met by the national technical means already operational, combined with information from the reports filed by vessel operators and LRIT. Furthermore, the Coast Guard has not coordinated or analyzed the information each source can provide and the need for information from both.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-337, Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed
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Report to the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2009:
Maritime Security:
Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for
Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed:
Maritime Security:
GAO-09-337:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-337, a report to the Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal approaches are part of a system
handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually. With the many
possible threats”including transportation and detonation of weapons of
mass destruction, suicide attacks against vessels, and others”in the
maritime domain, awareness of such threats could give the Coast Guard
advance notice to help detect, deter, interdict, and defeat them and
protect the U.S. homeland and economy. GAO was asked to review the
Coast Guard‘s efforts to achieve awareness about activity in the
maritime domain. This report addresses: the extent to which the Coast
Guard (1) has vessel tracking systems in place, (2) can use these
systems to track vessels that may be threats, and (3) has coordinated
the development and implementation of these systems. To answer these
questions, GAO analyzed relevant statutes, regulations, and plans for
vessel tracking systems, compared the roles of the planned systems, and
interviewed appropriate officials.
What GAO Found:
At sea or in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, the Coast
Guard is currently relying on a diverse array of vessel tracking
systems operated by various entities, but its attempts to develop
systems to track vessels at sea are facing delays. For tracking vessels
at sea, the Coast Guard uses existing national technical
means”classified methods of tracking vessels”and plans to obtain vessel
identification and tracking information from two more sources, long-
range identification and tracking system (LRIT), and commercially
provided long-range automatic identification system (AIS). However, one
source of this information has just become available and the other has
been delayed due to technical and operational difficulties.
International LRIT requirements generally came into effect on January
1, 2009. The Coast Guard estimates that commercially provided long-
range AIS will be operational in 2014. For tracking vessels in U.S.
coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, the Coast Guard operates a
land-based AIS, and also either operates, or has access to, radar and
cameras in some ports.
The existing and planned sources of vessel tracking information may
allow the Coast Guard to track larger vessels at sea, but systems and
other equipment that track smaller and noncommercial vessels in coastal
areas, inland waterways, and ports may prove ineffective in thwarting
an attack without advance knowledge. The means of tracking vessels at
sea”national technical means, LRIT, and commercially provided long-
range AIS”are potentially effective, but each has features that could
impede its effectiveness. The systems used in U.S. coastal areas,
inland waterways, and ports”AIS, radar, and video cameras”have more
difficulty tracking smaller and noncommercial vessels because they are
not required to carry AIS equipment and because of the technical
limitations of radar and cameras. In studies GAO reviewed and
discussions with maritime stakeholders, there was widespread agreement
that vessel tracking systems and equipment will be challenged to
provide a warning if a small vessel is moving in a threatening manner.
The Coast Guard has not coordinated its plans for obtaining vessel
tracking information at sea, and is planning on obtaining potentially
duplicative information, but in coastal areas, inland waterways, and
ports, the various tracking methods complement each other. Once
operational, the two new planned means for tracking vessels at sea”LRIT
and commercially provided long-range AIS”will both provide vessel
identification and position information for almost all the same
vessels. Commercially provided long-range AIS provides additional
information about each vessel and its voyage, but almost all of that
information is available through reports filed by vessel operators. The
primary need cited by the Coast Guard to develop both systems”to detect
anomalies”can be met by the national technical means already
operational, combined with information from the reports filed by vessel
operators and LRIT. Furthermore, the Coast Guard has not coordinated or
analyzed the information each source can provide and the need for
information from both.
What GAO Recommends:
To ensure efficient use of resources, GAO recommends that the
Commandant of the Coast Guard determine the extent to which duplicate
vessel tracking information from LRIT and commercially provided long-
range AIS is needed to accomplish Coast Guard missions, particularly in
light of information already available through national technical
means. DHS agreed with this recommendation.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-337]. For more
information, contact Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or
caldwells@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Multiple Systems Track Vessels at Sea and in U.S. Coastal Areas, Inland
Waterways, and Ports, but Delays Could Affect the Implementation of
Planned Systems with Greater Tracking Ability:
Existing and Planned Technology Can Track Most Larger Vessels at Sea,
but Tracking of Smaller Vessels in U.S. Coastal Areas, Inland
Waterways, and Ports Is Often Limited and May Present Challenges in
Preventing an Attack:
Long-Range Tracking Systems Are Potentially Duplicative, While Systems
for Vessel Tracking in U.S. Coastal Areas, Inland Waterways, and Ports
Provide Complementary Information That Covers Additional Vessels:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT):
Appendix II: Automatic Identification System (AIS):
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Maritime Stakeholders and Their Roles in Maritime Security and
Domain Awareness:
Table 2: Information to Be Provided by Two Planned Long-Range Vessel
Tracking Systems Combined with Information Provided by Notices of
Arrival for Vessels Traveling to a U.S. Port:
Figures:
Figure 1: Vessel Traffic Service Watch Stander and AIS Screen View:
Figure 2: AIS Coverage Prior to Implementation of NAIS Increment 1:
Figure 3: AIS Coverage after Implementation of NAIS Increment 1:
Figure 4: Small Vessels Operating among Large Commercial Vessels:
Figure 5: Brochures for New Jersey State Police's Maritime Security
Initiative and Coast Guard's America's Waterways Watch Outreach
Efforts:
Abbreviations:
AIS: automatic identification system:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
HSPD-13: Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13:
IMO: International Maritime Organization:
LRIT: long-range identification and tracking:
MDA: Maritime Domain Awareness:
MISNA: Maritime Information Service of North America:
MTSA: Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002:
NAIS: Nationwide Automatic Identification System:
RFP: Request for Proposal:
SAFE Port Act: Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006:
SOLAS: International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 17, 2009:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The U.S. maritime transportation system is one of the nation's most
valuable infrastructures and is a potential target for terrorists.
Because U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal approaches are part of an
economic engine handling more than $700 billion in merchandise
annually, an attack on this system could have a widespread impact on
global shipping, international trade, and the world economy. Protecting
this system is a daunting undertaking, in part because it is so vast:
the United States has over 95,000 miles of coastline, 361 ports
(including 8 of the world's 50 highest-volume ports), and 10,000 miles
of navigable waterways. Nearly 700 vessels arrive from overseas in U.S.
ports daily, while domestic vessels include fleets of tugs, barges, and
cargo vessels, along with 110,000 commercial fishing vessels and over
70 million recreational boats. To protect the nation's ports and
waterways, the Coast Guard must be able to identify those who intend to
do harm while at the same time minimize disruption to the maritime
transportation system. To gain a better understanding and knowledge of
vessels, the companies that own and operate them, the cargo they carry,
and the people who travel on them, the U.S. government, largely through
the U.S. Coast Guard, has enacted programs and systems for gathering
information about the maritime transportation system. This effort is
called Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA).
The National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness--a part of The
National Strategy for Maritime Security--lays out the need for MDA. The
plan states that the maritime domain provides an expansive pathway
around the world that terrorist organizations have recognized. Such
organizations realize the importance of exploiting the maritime domain
for the movement of equipment and personnel, as well as a medium for
launching attacks. The Coast Guard needs timely awareness of the
maritime domain and knowledge of threats in order to detect, deter,
interdict, and defeat adversaries.
The threats to the United States and its economy from the maritime
domain are many and varied. Rogue governments and terrorist groups
could use large merchant vessels to move weapons of mass destruction or
powerful conventional explosives for detonation in a port or alongside
an offshore facility. Terrorists have shown that they have the
capability to use explosives-laden suicide boats as weapons. This
capability could easily be used to attack other vessels, port
facilities, or offshore platforms. Modern day pirates and other
criminals are well organized and equipped to conduct smuggling of
people, drugs, weapons, and other contraband.
Vessel tracking is vital to the MDA effort, both when vessels are at
sea and when they are in coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports.
Vessel tracking at sea involves either using national technical means
or requiring vessels to carry equipment that broadcasts radio signals
with information about their identity, position, speed, and
course.[Footnote 1] When radio signal-broadcasting systems were
originally developed, however, they were used primarily for such
purposes as search and rescue or improved navigation safety, not
homeland security. The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
(MTSA) enacted the first federal vessel tracking requirements to
improve the nation's security.[Footnote 2] It mandated that certain
vessels operate an automatic identification system (AIS) while in U.S.
waters. On board vessels, AIS equipment transmits information such as
the name of the vessel, its position, speed, course, and destination to
receivers within range of its broadcast, allowing these vessels to be
tracked when they are operating in coastal areas, inland waterways, and
ports. Receivers may be installed on other vessels, land stations, or
other locations. Coast Guard personnel, known as watch standers,
monitor screens transmitting information on the tracked vessels.
MTSA also allowed the development of a long-range automated vessel
tracking system that would track vessels at sea, based on existing
onboard radio equipment and data communication systems that can
currently transmit the vessel's identity and position to rescue forces
in the case of an emergency. Later, the Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act of 2004 amended MTSA to require, rather than just
allow, the development of a long-range tracking system.[Footnote 3]
Current laws and implementing regulations for AIS apply in general to
larger commercial vessels, such as those 300 gross tons or more, not to
smaller vessels, such as most commercial fishing boats or recreational
boats. Coast Guard regulations on long-range tracking generally apply
to passenger ships and cargo ships 300 gross tons or more and to mobile
offshore drilling rigs. The Coast Guard uses other means to track
smaller vessels, ranging from cameras and radar to partnerships with
marine operators who can act as "eyes and ears" to help identify
suspicious or unusual behavior. To identify and track vessels, it is
crucial that the Coast Guard coordinate the various systems to maximize
coverage and eliminate unnecessary duplication. The Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 recognized the need for the
coordination of maritime information collection, including vessel-
tracking information, and the avoidance of unwanted redundancy--or
duplication--in these efforts.
Since the enactment of MTSA, the use of AIS has evolved. At the time
MTSA was enacted, only certain areas--known as Vessel Traffic Service
or Vessel Movement Reporting Service areas--as well as the St. Lawrence
Seaway operated or planned AIS land stations.[Footnote 4] These
services used vessel position information reported by AIS to improve
navigation safety and warn vessels of potential navigation hazards.
Coast Guard regulations implementing MTSA required vessels in these
areas, and those on international voyages to operate AIS equipment. See
figure 1 for a Vessel Traffic Service watch stander and an example of
an AIS screen view.
Figure 1: Vessel Traffic Service Watch Stander and AIS Screen View:
This figure is a photograph of a vessel traffic service watch stander
and and screen shot of AIS screen view.
[Refer to PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
The U.S. and Canadian governments and maritime industry groups, such as
maritime exchanges that represent private sector stakeholders in ports,
also realized that AIS information could be used for the efficient
scheduling of maritime operations along waterways and in ports. For
example, with accurate vessel position information, St. Lawrence Seaway
operators could minimize waiting time at locks located along the seaway
by scheduling vessels to arrive when the locks' gates were open and the
water in the locks was at the same level as the vessel. Similarly,
maritime exchange members could schedule tugs and longshore workers to
be ready as the vessels arrived. To help develop their vessel tracking
efforts, a group of maritime exchanges formed the Maritime Information
Service of North America (MISNA). More recently, the Coast Guard
expanded its AIS monitoring capabilities to cover 55 critical ports and
9 coastal areas. The Coast Guard is further expanding AIS through a
major acquisition program called the Nationwide Automatic
Identification System (NAIS), which will be carried out in three
contracting increments. Even as NAIS expands the area that can be
monitored using AIS, the primary means of tracking vessels in U.S.
coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports is still AIS, which can only
track vessels that carry and operate AIS equipment. Currently, only
larger vessels, such as commercial cargo vessels, are required to carry
this equipment, but the Coast Guard issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in December 2008 that would increase the types of vessels
required to carry AIS equipment and the locations where they must do
so. While larger vessels can possibly carry terrorists as passengers or
crew and contraband or weapons of mass destruction as cargo, they can
also be the target of attacks by smaller vessels such as recreational
boats. AIS cannot track these smaller vessels unless they carry and
operate AIS equipment, which they are currently not required to do.
Achieving MDA is particularly challenging because it requires working
with many nations with differing maritime standards and levels of
technology. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), an agency of
the United Nations to which the United States belongs, is the
international body responsible for improving maritime safety, including
combating acts of violence or crime at sea. The organization primarily
regulates maritime safety and security through the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS), as amended, an
international treaty with 159 contracting, or signatory, states. In
2006, amendments to the treaty were adopted that mandated the creation
of an international long-range identification and tracking (LRIT)
system that requires vessels on international voyages to report their
locations; the creation of data centers that will, among other roles,
receive LRIT information from the vessels; and an information exchange
network, centered on an international data exchange, for receiving and
transmitting LRIT information to authorized nations.[Footnote 5]
As acknowledged by such groups as the 9/11 Commission, no amount of
money or effort can totally insulate seaports from attack by a well-
funded and determined enemy. Because the United States cannot afford to
protect itself against all risks, Congress has charged the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) with coordinating homeland security programs
through the application of a risk management framework. Broadly
defined, risk management is a process that helps policymakers assess
the risks that exist, strategically allocate finite resources, and take
actions under conditions of uncertainty. For vessel tracking, this
effort requires identifying high-risk vessels as a priority and
developing a layered system of security to reduce the risks associated
with them. An example of the use of risk management is the Coast
Guard's effort to determine which vessels bound for the United States
may pose the greatest threat to the United States and which, given the
limited resources available to the Coast Guard, should be boarded to
determine if they pose an undue risk.
You requested that we evaluate efforts to improve MDA by assessing the
Coast Guard's vessel tracking efforts. This report answers three
questions:
* What are the Coast Guard's vessel tracking systems and to what extent
does the Coast Guard have these systems in place?
* To what extent will the Coast Guard be able to use these systems to
track vessels that may prove to be threats?
* To what extent has the Coast Guard coordinated the development and
implementation of its vessel tracking systems to maximize coverage and
minimize unnecessary duplication?
This is a public version of a classified report we issued in March 2009
that contained information related to efforts to track vessels and
prevent attacks. The Department of Defense (DOD) and DHS deemed
specific details regarding methods used by the Coast Guard and others
for long-range tracking of vessels at sea, as well as information on
the difficulties involved in detecting threatening activities by
vessels in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, as
confidential or for official use only, which must be protected from
public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits those details. Although
information provided in this report is more limited in scope, it
addresses the same questions as the classified report. Also, the
overall methodology used for both reports is the same. The conclusions
and recommendation contained in our March 2009 classified version of
this report remain generally unchanged.
To determine the Coast Guard's vessel tracking systems and the extent
to which the Coast Guard has them in place as well as the extent to
which these systems are able to track vessels that may prove to be
threats, we reviewed relevant federal statutes and regulations
including MTSA, the Coast Guard Maritime Transportation Act of 2004,
and the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE
Port Act). We analyzed relevant international regulations regarding
vessel tracking developed through the IMO. We also analyzed descriptive
and analytic information and reports regarding the overall plans for
vessel tracking system infrastructure, studies of coverage areas,
progress reports, and any information regarding delays of the
implementation of the systems. In addition, we interviewed Coast Guard
officials responsible for the tracking systems and Coast Guard
personnel with MDA intelligence-gathering responsibilities. We also
conducted site visits to a non-probability sample of Coast Guard field
units. We selected these field units based on their current vessel
tracking capability considering their assets, technology, and missions.
While the information we obtained at the locations we visited cannot be
generalized across the United States, the stakeholders in these
locations provided us with a general overview and perspective on vessel
tracking activities and capabilities at the selected locations. In
addition to interviewing Coast Guard officials, we also interviewed
officials at federal, state, and local agencies that have a role in MDA
and vessel tracking, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
Maritime Liaison Agents, and state and local police officials. Finally,
we interviewed representatives from the maritime industry, such as
officials from commercial maritime exchanges that represent the
commercial interests at ports, to gain private sector perspectives.
To determine to what extent the Coast Guard coordinated the development
and implementation of its vessel tracking systems, we conducted a
comparative analysis on the performance and roles of LRIT, commercially
provided long-range AIS, and national technical means. We reviewed
relevant technical documentation regarding all three tracking systems,
and interviewed knowledgeable Coast Guard officials responsible for the
development and implementation of the tracking system to determine the
progress and capabilities of each tracking system to date. We conducted
this performance audit from November 2007 to March 2009 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
At sea or in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, the Coast
Guard is currently relying on a diverse array of vessel tracking
systems operated by various entities, but its efforts to use newer,
more comprehensive systems are facing delays.
* For tracking vessels at sea, the Coast Guard uses existing national
technical means and plans to utilize two additional sources of offshore
vessel identification and tracking information. The Coast Guard
anticipated that the first of these new sources, LRIT, would be able to
track more than 40,000 vessels worldwide by December 2008. Due to
preexisting IMO requirements, most of these vessels already have the
necessary equipment to allow tracking by the Coast Guard and others
once LRIT becomes operational. Although the Coast Guard expected to
begin to receive some LRIT reports on schedule, it acknowledged that
not all countries would be ready to participate. An additional source
of offshore vessel identification and tracking information,
commercially provided long-range AIS, is expected to provide more
information than the LRIT system. Once available, the Coast Guard
expects commercially provided long-range AIS to be able to track
vessels up to 2,000 nautical miles at sea. However, the contractor
working on the project for the Coast Guard experienced a number of
delays. As currently scheduled, the Coast Guard does not expect
commercially provided long-range AIS to be fully operational until
2014.
* In U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, the Coast Guard
operates a land-based AIS system as the primary means of tracking AIS-
equipped vessels, and also either operates, or has access to, other
tracking systems in various locations. The Coast Guard can track AIS-
equipped vessels in 55 critical ports and 9 coastal areas around the
country, out to approximately 24 nautical miles from the coast using
the land-based AIS system currently in place. The Coast Guard plans to
expand land-based AIS tracking coverage to 50 nautical miles from the
coast nationwide, but has experienced several delays in the contracting
process for the project due to the need to revise the Request for
Proposal. In some ports, the Coast Guard also uses camera or radar
networks operated either by Coast Guard personnel or by other entities
which allow some tracking of vessels that do not operate AIS equipment.
Additionally, in some ports and river systems the Coast Guard has
access to tracking systems installed by other maritime stakeholders.
For example, local Coast Guard units have access to information from
AIS systems operated by maritime organizations on the Delaware and
Columbia Rivers, access to cameras and radar installed by the Navy at
its major home ports, and access to some state transportation
department cameras located near bridges and other critical
infrastructure.
The existing and planned tracking systems may allow the Coast Guard to
track larger vessels traveling at sea. However, given the number of
potential threats in many areas and short period of time in which to
respond to a threat, thwarting an attack by a smaller vessel without
advance knowledge of the threat may prove challenging even with
available systems and other equipment that track smaller and
noncommercial vessels in coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports.
* The three existing and planned sources of offshore vessel
identification and tracking information--national technical means,
LRIT, and commercially provided long-range AIS--if implemented as
planned, are potentially effective, but each has features that could
impede its effectiveness. Each system's ability to track vessels has
been demonstrated. National technical means, for example, have
performed this function for many years. Similarly, although information
from both LRIT and the commercially provided long-range AIS systems is
not yet fully available to the Coast Guard, both have been demonstrated
as effective in tracking vessels. LRIT's effectiveness in tracking
vessels offshore has been demonstrated by the Maritime Information
Service of North America which, in conjunction with the Coast Guard,
tracked vessels in the North Pacific and off the coast of Alaska. AIS,
while not yet tested at sea, is a proven technology where installed in
coastal areas, inland waterways and ports. However, the Coast Guard
acknowledges that the deployment of commercially provided long-range
AIS is not far enough along to know whether the technology will work as
planned or what it will ultimately cost. In addition, both the LRIT and
AIS systems are dependent on the good will of the vessels' owners and
operators: vessel operators can turn off AIS and LRIT systems. National
technical means are capable of tracking vessels, but the classified
tracking information cannot be passed to staff of other agencies
without proper clearances.
* The systems used in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports--
primarily AIS, but also radar and video cameras in some ports--are less
effective in tracking smaller and noncommercial vessel traffic in these
locations because these vessels are generally not required to carry AIS
equipment and because of the technical limitations of radar and
cameras. Although most large commercial vessels arriving from overseas
should still be transmitting AIS information and the Coast Guard can
readily track them, noncommercial vessels of any size, commercial
vessels on domestic voyages in many locations, and vessels smaller than
65 feet generally do not need to carry AIS equipment or transmit AIS
information. A Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued by the Coast Guard
in December 2008, however, would require AIS to be carried by more
commercial vessels in all navigable waterways of the United
States.[Footnote 6] Although some ports have video cameras and radar,
these systems have limitations: radar has difficulty detecting small
vessels, especially when the vessels are sailing in high seas, and
cameras may not cover the entire port or may not work in bad weather or
at night.
* In studies we reviewed and discussions with maritime stakeholders,
there was widespread agreement that detecting threatening activity by
vessels is very difficult without prior knowledge. The Coast Guard is
developing software programs for tracking the expected activity of a
port over time and warning the Coast Guard when unexpected activity
occurs, but according to Coast Guard officials, such programs will take
years to be fully operational. In part because of the need for advance
knowledge of a threat, officials representing all the Coast Guard
sectors we visited, as well as members of the intelligence community
and local law enforcement in locations we visited, said they have
developed cooperative relationships and mechanisms to share information
about potential threats. In addition, DHS's April 2008 Small Vessel
Security Strategy emphasizes the importance of developing and
leveraging strong partnerships with the small-vessel community and
public and private sectors to enhance MDA with respect to small
vessels.
The Coast Guard has not coordinated the planning for the use of LRIT
and commercially provided long-range AIS, resulting in potential
duplication of information provided, but in coastal areas, inland
waterways, and ports, the various tracking methods complement each
other.
* Once fully operational, the two sources of offshore vessel
identification and tracking information--LRIT and commercially provided
long-range AIS--will largely duplicate each other both in terms of the
vessels they can track and the information they provide. LRIT will be a
global system, while commercially provided long-range AIS is intended
to cover an area extending 2,000 nautical miles from U.S. shores. Both
will report vessel location and name, although the use of commercially
provided long-range AIS will provide additional information on speed,
course, and cargo. However, for most vessels traveling to a U.S. port,
most of this information is also available through the advance Notice
of Arrival that vessels, other than U.S. registered recreational
vessels, must typically provide the Coast Guard 96 hours prior to their
arrival.[Footnote 7] Coast Guard officials said they are planning to
use commercially provided long-range AIS because it will provide
another useful way to uncover anomalies in information received from
offshore vessels.
* As of September 2008, the Coast Guard had not coordinated or analyzed
the information LRIT and commercially provided long-range AIS can
provide and the need for information from both. Coast Guard officials
we spoke with said coordination of the development of the different
vessel tracking systems to meet MDA should take place at an interagency
level, rather than program, level. However, officials at the
interagency body referred to by the Coast Guard--the Office of Global
Maritime Situational Awareness--said that their role is to facilitate
cross-government coordination of requirements and that they did not see
coordination of programs within the Coast Guard as part of that role.
The documents that currently act as the road map for MDA needs, the
National Concept of Operations for Maritime Domain Awareness and
National MDA Study Interagency Investment Strategy Document, do not
mention any coordination in tracking system development. However, Coast
Guard and Navy officials said that other federal agencies have vessel
tracking needs and that a national strategy for AIS was being
developed. Additionally, Coast Guard officials said that they plan to
analyze the information they receive from the concept demonstration of
commercially provided long-range AIS. However, they also said that they
will not be able to determine the cost to utilize commercially provided
long-range AIS data until it is more commonly available. While a
certain amount of redundancy can be beneficial if it occurs by design,
our previous work has found that unintended duplication indicates the
potential for inefficiency and waste.[Footnote 8]
* By contrast, while the development of multiple tracking systems--such
as AIS, cameras, and radar--in coastal areas, inland waterways, and
ports was not coordinated, the complementary capabilities of these
different systems mean that one system may be able to address what the
others cannot. For example, AIS tracks large commercial vessels, but
cannot track vessels that are not AIS-equipped, such as noncommercial
vessels that are not required to install AIS equipment. Cameras and
radar provide some coverage of these vessels when they are installed in
a port.
To ensure efficient and effective use of Coast Guard resources
available for long-range vessel tracking, we are recommending that--
upon completion of the commercially provided long-range AIS concept
demonstration and the national AIS strategy, and after the cost of
obtaining long-range AIS information from commercial providers becomes
known--the Commandant of the Coast Guard determine the extent to which
duplicate vessel tracking information from LRIT and commercially
provided long-range AIS is needed to accomplish Coast Guard missions,
particularly in light of information already available through national
technical means.
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretaries of
Defense and Homeland Security and the Attorney General or their
designees. DHS agreed with our recommendation. DHS further commented
that, in addition to the cost and duplication concerns we expressed,
the Coast Guard's review of the need for the two systems would also
include factors such as the Coast Guard's statutory requirements, risk
assessments, MDA objectives, and the United States' obligations under
international agreements.
DHS also said, however, that LRIT and commercially provided long-range
AIS are two complementary systems that provide different information,
apply to different classes and sizes of vessels, and are being
developed and operated under separate statutory and international
obligations. DHS commented that LRIT does not presently, nor will it
when fully implemented, meet all the Coast Guard's requirements for
identification and tracking of vessels either in navigable waters or
off shore areas of the United States. While we acknowledge that as a
stand-alone system, commercially provided long-range AIS is to provide
more information on vessels traveling to the United States than LRIT,
when the information from each is combined with other readily available
sources, the information will be duplicative. Also, current rules for
AIS and LRIT apply, in general, to similar classes and sizes of
vessels. We agree that LRIT and the Coast Guard's use of commercially
provided long-range AIS are being developed under separate statutory
and international obligations, but the Coast Guard is not specifically
required to use commercially provided long-range AIS under any U.S. law
or international agreement.
Department of Homeland Security officials also provided technical
comments on the draft that have been incorporated, as appropriate.
The Departments of Defense and Justice responded that they did not have
any comments on the report.
Background:
Maritime Domain Awareness: National Requirements:
According to the Coast Guard, MDA is an effort to achieve an
understanding of anything in the global maritime environment that can
affect the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United
States. The process of achieving MDA includes: (1) collection of
information, (2) fusion of information from different sources, (3)
analysis through the evaluation and interpretation of information, and
(4) dissemination of information to decision makers, with the goal of
identifying risks and threats before they turn into catastrophic
events. One of the important tasks needed to achieve MDA is vessel
tracking. Through the collection of vessel position information,
comparison of that information with historical movements of the same
and similar vessels, and additional information related to the vessel-
-such as its ownership and history--the Coast Guard attempts to
determine the degree of risk presented by each vessel.
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, a number of
improvements in maritime security and MDA have been provided for in
three main statutory enactments.
* MTSA. MTSA provides for a wide range of security improvements to
maritime systems, ports, and vessels. Among its provisions, MTSA
requires the implementation of a system to collect, integrate, and
analyze information concerning vessels operating on, or bound for,
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. To help meet
this requirement, MTSA initially authorized the development and
implementation of a long-range automated vessel tracking system for all
vessels in U.S. waters equipped with a Global Maritime Distress and
Safety System or equivalent satellite technology.[Footnote 9] MTSA
requires the system to be capable of receiving information on vessel
positions at intervals appropriate to deter security incidents. MTSA
further allows the use of existing maritime organizations, such as IMO,
to collect and monitor tracking information under the system. In
addition, MTSA requires that certain vessels, including commercial
vessels over 65 feet in length, carry AIS technology that broadcasts
information, such as the vessel's name, location, course, and speed
while operating in U.S. waters.
* Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004. This act
includes a provision that amended MTSA to mandate the development and
implementation of the long-range automated vessel tracking system for
all vessels in U.S. waters. The act also calls for the Secretary of
Homeland Security to submit to specific congressional committees a plan
that, among other things, (1) establishes a lead agency within DHS to
coordinate the efforts of other agencies within DHS in the collection
of maritime information and to identify and avoid unwanted redundancy
of those efforts, (2) identifies redundancy in the collection and
analysis of maritime information by agencies within DHS, and (3)
establishes a timeline for incorporating information on vessel
movements derived through the newly required long-range tracking system
and AIS into the system for collecting and analyzing maritime
information. DHS delivered this plan on June 28, 2005.
* Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port
Act).[Footnote 10] This act further amends the MTSA provisions for a
long-range vessel tracking system. It sets a deadline of April 1, 2007,
for the development of the tracking system. The SAFE Port Act also
allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a voluntary long-
range vessel tracking system for the period before regulations are
issued for the mandated system.
To help implement these laws, the Coast Guard has issued rules relating
to both long-range tracking and AIS. In October 2007, the Coast Guard
issued a proposed rule, entitled Long Range Identification and Tracking
of Ships, and in April 2008 issued a final rule that requires certain
vessels, including U.S.-registered vessels and foreign-registered
vessels traveling to or from the United States, to report identifying
and position data electronically through a long-range vessel tracking
system.[Footnote 11] These vessels consist of passenger vessels,
including high-speed passenger craft; cargo vessels, including high-
speed craft, of 300 gross tons or more; and mobile offshore drilling
units while underway and not engaged in drilling operations. The Coast
Guard also issued an interim rule in July 2003 and a final rule in
October 2003 delineating AIS requirements. The vessels covered depend
on whether they are on an international voyage or operating in a Vessel
Traffic Service or Vessel Movement Reporting Service area. The
requirements to carry and operate AIS equipment for vessels on
international voyages generally apply to (1) all self-propelled vessels
65 feet or more in length, other than passenger and fishing vessels,
engaged in commercial service; (2) passenger vessels of 150 gross tons
or more; (3) tankers, regardless of tonnage; and (4) other vessels of
300 gross tons or more on international voyages. The requirements for
vessels operating in Vessel Traffic Service or Vessel Movement
Reporting Service areas generally cover self-propelled vessels engaged
in commercial service of 65 feet or more in length, but do not include
fishing vessels and passenger vessels certified to carry less than 151
passengers. However, towing vessels in commercial service that are 26
feet or more in length with more than 600 horsepower engines and
passenger vessels certificated to carry more than 150 passengers are
also covered.
The Coast Guard issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in December 2008
that would substantially change these requirements. If the final rule
is implemented as proposed, more commercial vessels will be required to
carry and operate AIS equipment in all navigable waterways of the
United States. The vessels that are covered under the proposed rule
include, (1) self-propelled vessels of 65 feet or more in commercial
service, (2) towing vessels of 26 feet or more and more than 600
horsepower in commercial service, (3) self-propelled vessels carrying
50 or more passengers in commercial service, (4) vessels carrying more
than 12 passengers for hire and capable of speeds greater than 30
knots, (5) certain dredges and floating plants, and (6) self-propelled
vessels carrying certain dangerous cargos.
The Administration has also called for improvements to maritime
security, primarily through Homeland Security Presidential Directive-
13 (HSPD-13, also referred to as National Security Presidential
Directive-41), issued on December 21, 2004. HSPD-13 directs the
coordination of maritime security policy through the creation of a
National Strategy for Maritime Security.[Footnote 12] The directive
required the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to lead a
joint effort to draft the strategy, which was issued in September 2005.
Additionally, HSPD-13 directed relevant federal departments and
agencies to develop eight supporting implementation plans to address
the specific threats and challenges in the maritime environment. One of
these supporting plans was the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain
Awareness, developed by the Department of Defense and DHS and issued in
October 2005. This plan provides an approach for improving information
collection and sharing in the maritime domain to identify threats as
early and as distant from U.S. shores as possible. For example, in
terms of enhancing information collections, the plan calls for
coordinating with international organizations to expand information
requirements for data such as the Notice of Arrival. The plan also
recommends expanding the application of AIS to improve the
identification and tracking of marine vessels and leveraging national
and international commercial and governmental relationships to produce
dependable AIS and other vessel tracking.
Maritime Domain Awareness: International Requirements:
The IMO is an agency of the United Nations whose main task is to
develop and maintain a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping.
Under its purview are vessel safety, environmental concerns, maritime
legal matters, technical cooperation, and maritime security. Amendments
to SOLAS, to which the United States is a party, contain two provisions
that relate specifically to MDA.
Chapter V, Regulation 19-1, which generally became effective January 1,
2009, has phased-in implementation for vessels requires cargo vessels
of 300 gross tons or more, passenger vessels, and self-propelled mobile
offshore drilling units, to be equipped with technology enabling the
automatic transmission of the identity of the vessel, its position, and
the time and date the position was transmitted. The regulation also
lays out what countries are authorized to receive this information and
when. This SOLAS regulation is the basis for the Coast Guard's LRIT
rule.
* IMO also set performance standards and functional requirements for
LRIT in a resolution of its Maritime Safety Committee.[Footnote 13]
This resolution establishes the role of LRIT data centers and the
international data exchange, which are central to the distribution of
LRIT information. These data centers, which can represent a single
country or multiple countries, have three primary roles.
* Data centers will forward LRIT information from vessels at sea to the
international data exchange for transmission to authorized countries.
* When LRIT information is forwarded by the international data exchange
to an authorized country, the data center representing that country
receives the information.
* Data centers make requests for LRIT information through the
international data exchange.
The international data exchange acts as a facilitator for the exchange
of LRIT between vessels and countries. As discussed above, when a
vessel transmits LRIT information to its data center, that data center
will forward the information to the international data exchange. The
international data exchange then forwards the vessel's LRIT information
to the data centers representing the countries that are authorized to
receive the LRIT information from that vessel.
Another regulation contained in SOLAS deals with AIS. In general,
Chapter V, Regulation 19, requires certain vessels of 300 gross tons or
more on international voyages, passenger vessels regardless of size,
and cargo vessels of 500 gross tons or more not engaged on
international voyages to be equipped with AIS. According to the
regulation AIS shall provide information, such as identity and
position, and monitor and track vessels.
Evolution of Long-Range Tracking Systems:
The United States' history of using national technical means for remote
tracking of vessels on the high seas goes back many years, but at the
time Soviet warships--rather than commercial vessels--were the target
of this tracking. Such means have been continually in place since that
time, but their mission has grown from tracking potential military
adversaries to tracking a wide variety of vessels, both military and
nonmilitary, that are of interest to the United States. The actual
vessels tracked are not necessarily limited by size.
Similarly, the capabilities of LRIT and AIS have been expanded as their
purposes have changed. LRIT was primarily envisioned to utilize long-
range technology to facilitate search and rescue operations and assist
oceangoing vessels in distress. In order to respond to such an
emergency at sea, the technology automatically transmits the identity,
position, and time of position of a vessel in distress. To increase the
likelihood of assistance to vessels in distress at sea, in 1988 IMO
adopted phased-in requirements for vessels to install specific
satellite and radio-telephone equipment capable of automatic distress
alerting. The same equipment and technology can be used for LRIT;
however, in addition to reporting information on vessels in distress,
vessels would send periodic position reports that would permit them to
be tracked by authorized governments.
AIS technology was originally designed to improve maritime safety,
including the prevention of collisions among vessels. The system was
originally designed to transmit identification, location, and
maneuvering information (1) between vessels and (2) between vessels and
land-based stations that are typically within 20 to 30 miles of one
another. IMO requirements for the installation of AIS equipment include
passenger vessels irrespective of size, vessels that weigh 300 gross
tons or more on international voyages, and cargo vessels of 500 gross
tons or more not on international voyages. By using commercially
provided long-range AIS, the Coast Guard hopes to greatly expand the
distance it can receive AIS signals, up to 2,000 nautical miles from
the coast.
Numerous Stakeholders Are Involved in Maritime Security and Maritime
Domain Awareness:
Although numerous entities are responsible for maritime security and
MDA within the United States, the federal government has primary
responsibility and shares this role with numerous other stakeholders in
the state, local, and private sectors. For example, DHS--with its
component agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, acting as executive agent--has
the lead role in maritime homeland security, while the Department of
Defense leads efforts to further integrate maritime intelligence and
increase MDA. In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has a
lead role in investigating domestic maritime terrorism incidents. As
shown in table 1, state and local governments and the private sector,
as well as the federal government, have responsibilities for maritime
security and domain awareness.
Table 1: Maritime Stakeholders and Their Roles in Maritime Security and
Domain Awareness:
Stakeholders: Federal government: Department of Homeland Security:
* U.S. Coast Guard;
Selected mission-related activities: Federal government: Department of
Homeland Security: * Conducts vessel escorts, boardings of selected
vessels, and security patrols of key port areas;
* Ensures vessels in U.S. waters comply with domestic and international
maritime security standards;
* Reviews U.S. vessel and facility security plans and oversees
compliance with these plans;
* Meets with foreign governments and visits foreign port facilities to
observe security conditions;
* Shares responsibility for implementation and operationalization of
MDA with U.S. Navy.
Stakeholders: Federal government: Department of Homeland Security:
* Customs and Border Protection;
Selected mission-related activities: Federal government: Department of
Homeland Security: * Has principal responsibility for inspecting cargo,
including cargo containers that commercial vessels bring into U.S.
ports;
* Detects and prevents the illegal entry of persons and goods into the
country.
Stakeholders: Federal government: Department of Defense: * U.S. Navy;
Selected mission-related activities: Federal government: Department of
Defense: * Provides support to Department of Homeland Security as
requested for maritime homeland security operations; * Maintains a
credible maritime interdiction capability to deal with identified
hostile vessels at any location when authorized to do so; * Builds
relationships with partner nations' navies to enhance cooperation and
information sharing; * Shares responsibility for implementation and
operationalization of MDA with U.S. Coast Guard.
Stakeholders: Federal government: Department of Justice: * Federal
Bureau of Investigation;
Selected mission- related activities: Federal government: Department of
Justice: * Federal Bureau of Investigation Maritime Liaison Agents,
stationed at key ports in the U.S., help disseminate maritime
intelligence to port stakeholders; * Leads Joint Terrorism Task Forces;
* Leads investigations of maritime terrorism incidents.
Stakeholders: State and local governments: * Law enforcement agencies;
Selected mission-related activities: State and local governments:
* Conducts land-based patrols of port facilities; * If the agency
operates a marine unit, it typically conducts water patrols and
sometimes escorts larger vessels.
Stakeholders: Private sector: * Facility and commercial vessel
operators;
Selected mission-related activities: Private sector: * Develops and
implements facility or vessel security plans that meet MTSA standards;
* Provides security for the facility or vessel.
Stakeholders: The public: * General public, recreational vessel
operators, and marina employees;
Selected mission-related activities: The public: * Reports suspicious
activity; * Respects security rules regulations, such as those
governing security zones.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Risk Management:
The 9/11 Commission pointed out that no amount of money or effort can
fully protect against every type of threat. Rather, a risk management
approach is often used that considers, among other things, the relative
risks various threats pose in determining how best to use limited
resources to prevent threats, where possible, and to respond
effectively if they occur. While the Homeland Security Act of
2002[Footnote 14] and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 call
for the use of risk management in homeland security, little specific
federal guidance or direction exists as to how risk management should
be implemented. In previous work examining risk management efforts for
homeland security and other functions, we developed a framework
summarizing the findings of industry experts and best
practices.[Footnote 15] For tracking vessels, this effort requires
identifying high-risk vessels as a priority and developing a layered
system of security to reduce the risks associated with them. For
example, the Coast Guard uses a risk management approach in its effort
to determine which vessels bound for the United States may pose the
greatest threat to the United States and which, given the limited
resources available to the Coast Guard, should be boarded to determine
if they pose an undue risk.
Multiple Systems Track Vessels at Sea and in U.S. Coastal Areas, Inland
Waterways, and Ports, but Delays Could Affect the Implementation of
Planned Systems with Greater Tracking Ability:
The Coast Guard currently relies on a variety of systems to provide MDA
and is also working on additional systems to provide additional
capabilities, but these systems have been delayed by various factors.
To track vessels at sea, the Coast Guard currently has access to data
provided by national technical means with some limitations. However,
the Coast Guard, as well as other federal agencies, has determined that
it needs to expand its knowledge of vessel movements up to 2,000
nautical miles from the United States. To do so, the Coast Guard is
leading the U.S. implementation of the IMO-mandated LRIT system and is
pursuing the use of commercially provided long-range AIS capabilities.
In U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, the Coast Guard
uses a network of land-based AIS and, in selected areas, additional
sensors such as radar and video cameras.
To Track Vessels at Sea, the Coast Guard Is Planning to Use National
Technical Means, LRIT, and Commercially Provided Long-Range AIS:
To track vessels up to 2,000 nautical miles from U.S. shores, the Coast
Guard is currently using classified national technical means and
developing the use of two additional unclassified technologies--LRIT
and commercially provided long-range AIS. Coast Guard officials told us
that they cannot depend on full time access to information provided by
national technical means. The Coast Guard does not control the tasking
of these resources, and they may be redirected to priorities greater
than Coast Guard or DHS missions. While we cannot provide more details
on national technical means because of their classified nature, the
information below describes the Coast Guard's plans for LRIT and AIS.
To Ensure Its Widespread Use Domestically and Internationally, the
Coast Guard Has Taken Substantial Responsibility for the International
Implementation of LRIT:
LRIT is an international system that uses onboard radio equipment to
transmit identification and position information to satellites. From
the satellites, the information is forwarded to ground stations and
then on to recipient countries, including the United States. While the
a system requires cooperation from the vessel--the radio equipment must
be turned on--it is a closed system in that only countries with rights
to the information can receive it.[Footnote 16] The Coast Guard expects
the LRIT program to cost approximately $5.3 million in fiscal year 2009
and about $4.2 million per year thereafter. See appendix I for a full
description of LRIT.
The regulatory framework for the LRIT system is in place. As previously
mentioned, the Coast Guard issued a final rule on April 29, 2008,
setting requirements for many U.S.-registered vessels to transmit their
identity and location with LRIT equipment wherever they are located.
This rule implemented domestic requirements set forth in MTSA, as
amended by both the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of
2004, and the SAFE Port Act; and IMO's international requirements laid
out in SOLAS. As well as implementing requirements for most U.S vessels
subject to the SOLAS regulation, the rule also sets specific
requirements for foreign vessels traveling to or near the United States
to broadcast their identification and location. For example, under the
rule, foreign vessels bound for a U.S. port must transmit their
identity and location once they have announced their intention to enter
a U.S. port, typically 96 hours prior to their arrival (which equates
to approximately 2,000 nautical miles from the U.S. coastline at speeds
traveled by typical ocean-going vessels). It also calls for foreign
vessels on international voyages to typically transmit their identity
and location when they are within 1,000 nautical miles of the U.S.
coast, even if they are not calling on a U.S. port. The requirements
for both foreign and domestic vessels include the specific data items
to be transmitted, the timetable for reporting, the types of equipment
that can be used to report the information, and the capabilities of the
reporting equipment. The rule has phased-in implementation dates
beginning on December 31, 2008, depending on factors such as when a
vessel was built and where it operates. The rule exempts certain
vessels such as those that will be traveling exclusively within 20
nautical miles of the U.S. coastline and are equipped with operating
AIS.
In addition to setting U.S. requirements for LRIT, the Coast Guard is
also taking on international responsibilities to help ensure that LRIT
position information is available on schedule. To ensure the
appropriate distribution of LRIT information, the IMO mandated the
creation of an international data exchange to facilitate the
distribution of this information to authorized countries. For example,
if a vessel registered in China is sailing to a U.S. port, the Chinese
data center would have to begin to send the LRIT information to the
U.S. data center through the international data exchange when the
vessel announces it intention to enter a U.S. port. However, the
mandate did not address which country or international organization
would be responsible for developing, operating, and maintaining the
international data exchange or how it would be funded. Because the
United States and other SOLAS signatories were concerned that the data
exchange would not be operational when the rule took effect, and
because no other country had agreed to set up the exchange, the Coast
Guard has agreed to develop and operate the data exchange for an
interim period from January 1, 2009, to December 31, 2010. As of
February 2009, it was unclear who would operate the international data
exchange following this 2-year period.
Although the Coast Guard expected to begin receiving some countries'
LRIT reports on schedule, it acknowledged that not all countries would
be ready to participate. Coast Guard officials told us that the
international data exchange and the U.S. national data center (the
facility that will receive all LRIT transmissions from U.S.-registered
vessels and forward them on to the data exchange) are operational. The
Coast Guard also expected very few U.S.-registered vessels will need
new equipment to transmit LRIT information because existing
requirements already mandate the installation of radio equipment
capable of the required transmissions. In contrast, the Coast Guard
recognized that not all countries may have operational national or
multinational data centers to forward information to the international
data exchange by the time the rule goes into effect. The final rule
states that the Coast Guard will still hold vessels coming to the
United States responsible for providing LRIT information at that time.
If the Coast Guard does not receive LRIT information from a vessel
covered by the rule, it has a range of enforcement options available.
In general, the Coast Guard plans to leave the response up to their
local Captains of the Port--the Coast Guard official responsible for
maritime safety and security in a port area--to decide how to address
these situations on a case-by-case basis. Under their regulatory
authorities, these officials have the authority to, among other things,
level civil penalties for noncompliance as well as refer knowing and
willful violations to the Department of Justice for criminal
prosecution. The Captain of the Port will make a risk-based decision
given the information he or she has available from existing sources,
and, depending on his or her finding, will decide on a response ranging
from taking no action, boarding the vessel at sea, setting fines, or
denying entry.
The Coast Guard Is Planning on Full Capability of Commercially Provided
Long-Range AIS by 2014, Despite a 2-Year Delay:
To have an additional means to receive vessel information that includes
identification and location of vessels at sea, the Coast Guard is
demonstrating another tracking system that uses commercially provided
long-range AIS. AIS receivers take in a set of radio signals from
equipment on board vessels and then forward them to the Coast Guard via
the commercial provider. AIS is an open system, and anyone who has an
AIS receiver can track vessels using AIS signals. See appendix II for a
full description of AIS. The Coast Guard's use of commercially provided
long-range AIS is part of the NAIS, a comprehensive effort to track AIS-
equipped vessels[Footnote 17] in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways,
and ports, and those as far as 2,000 nautical miles from the U.S.
shore.
While the Coast Guard has made development of commercially provided
long-range AIS a substantial part of its long-range vessel tracking
efforts, the program has fallen behind schedule. In 2004, the Coast
Guard signed a contract with a commercial communications company to
demonstrate the ability of commercial AIS to receive and forward AIS
broadcasts from vessels at sea. This demonstration was originally
scheduled for mid-2006, but did not occur until June 19, 2008. Coast
Guard officials said the delays were primarily caused by difficulties
the contractor experienced in obtaining needed services for the Coast
Guard demonstration as well as technical issues.
As a concession for the delays, the contractor provided the Coast Guard
access to vessel position data sent via AIS through other means.
According to Coast Guard officials and to a filing made by the
contractor to the Securities and Exchange Commission, terms of the
contract state that once operational testing is completed, the Coast
Guard will receive 90 days of AIS data to determine the characteristics
of commercially provided long-range AIS, such as the amount of data
that would flow from each source. The Coast Guard can also receive data
from the concept demonstration for an additional 2 years, based on
original contract options and pricing. If the Coast Guard wishes to
continue to receive these data it will have to pay additional fees to
the contractor.
In spite of the 2-year delay in the demonstration, the Coast Guard does
not believe that its use of commercially provided long-range AIS will
delay the full implementation of NAIS. Coast Guard officials stated
that there were development issues related to using these AIS receivers
that are different from those related to developing a land-based AIS
network that will cover the U.S. coastline. According to the Coast
Guard, the completion of its assessment of the commercially provided
long-range AIS demonstration, including coverage areas, potential
interference, and data rates, will allow it to compare commercially
provided long-range AIS with other long-range tracking methods or, as
they become available, among different commercial providers of long-
range AIS services.
To Track Vessels in Coastal Areas, Inland Waterways, and Ports, Land-
Based AIS Is the Primary National Tracking System but Other Systems
Provide Coverage in Limited Areas:
To track AIS-equipped vessels in 55 major U.S. ports and 9 coastal
areas, the Coast Guard has installed a widespread network of ground-
based AIS receivers it uses to monitor those areas. In some of these
locations, the Coast Guard also makes use of radar and cameras,
installed by the Coast Guard and other maritime security stakeholders,
to help track vessels not equipped with AIS.
Coast Guard's Ground-Based AIS Is the Primary Means to Track AIS-
Equipped Vessels in and around U.S. Ports:
The Coast Guard installed ground-based AIS equipment in 55 ports and 9
coastal areas as the first increment of NAIS. Before Increment 1, AIS
coverage in the United States was very limited. AIS-covered areas
included Vessel Traffic Service and Vessel Movement Reporting Service
areas, AIS prototyping and testing locations, and the St. Lawrence
Seaway. This level of coverage, however, left out some major ports. As
of September 2007, this first NAIS increment reached full operating
capability, allowing near real-time tracking of vessels carrying and
operating AIS equipment in all 55 covered ports and 9 coastal areas. In
the coastal areas, the system generally provides coverage to within 24
nautical miles of shore. This tracking is performed by the local Coast
Guard sector.
See figure 2 for a map of AIS coverage prior to NAIS Increment 1 and
figure 3 for a map of AIS coverage after the implementation of NAIS
Increment 1.
Figure 2: AIS Coverage Prior to Implementation of NAIS Increment 1:
Map of AID coverage prior to implementation of NAIS increment 1.
[Refer to PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
Figure 3: AIS Coverage after Implementation of NAIS Increment 1:
Map of AIS coverage after implementation of NAIS increment 1.
[Refer PDF for image]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
Note: Coverage gaps between port coastal areas that exist that are not
discernable in this figure due to its scale.
[End of figure]
NAIS Increment 2 will further expand the coverage area of ground-based
AIS. However there have been repeated delays in awarding the initial
Increment 2 contract. Increment 2 is to provide the Coast Guard the
capability to (1) receive AIS signals from up to 50 nautical miles from
shore and (2) transmit information to vessels with AIS up to 24
nautical miles from the U.S. coastline. Sensitive areas on inland
rivers, such as locks and dams, will also be covered. The Coast Guard
plans to implement Increment 2 in two phases. In the first phase,
coverage will expand in the areas of responsibility for three Coast
Guard field units--Sectors Delaware Bay, Hampton Roads, and Mobile.
This will serve as a test for the expanded system. Once the capability
of the system is established, the second phase will bring coverage to
the rest of the United States. The Coast Guard, however, has repeatedly
delayed the contracting process for Increment 2 to make modifications
in the contract's Request for Proposal (RFP). After the release of
draft contract solicitation documents for the first phase in December
2006, the expected release date of the final RFP was pushed back from
July 2007 to November 2007, and the RFP was finally released in
December 2007. The Coast Guard continued to make amendments to the RFP
through February 2008 and the expected date to award the contract for
the first phase of Increment 2 was delayed from March 2008 to September
2008.
While AIS is capable of tracking AIS-equipped vessels in many ports
around the United States, as previously stated, many vessels in U.S.
waters are not required to install or operate AIS equipment. According
to Coast Guard regulations in effect on February 1, 2009, outside of
the Vessel Traffic Service and Vessel Movement Reporting Service areas
only vessels that arrive from a foreign port are required to operate
AIS equipment, regardless of size or cargo. Outside of the Vessel
Traffic Service and Vessel Movement Reporting Service areas, all
vessels less than 65 feet in length and all noncommercial vessels less
than 300 gross tons--except for tankers and certain passenger vessels-
-are never required to operate AIS equipment in U.S. waters. A Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking issued by the Coast Guard in December 2008
demonstrates the Coast Guard's intention to expand these requirements.
The Coast Guard Can Track Vessels Not Equipped with AIS with Other
Sensors in Some Ports:
At 8 of the 10 sectors we visited, the Coast Guard can use additional
sensors, such as radar and video cameras, to complement AIS. In 4 of
the 8 sectors where these additional sensors are available, the local
Coast Guard works directly with other port security stakeholders in the
sector command center. For example, in some ports the Coast Guard has
access to sensor feeds provided by the Navy. Similarly, in other ports,
the Coast Guard has access to cameras installed by local governments
and private industry. These were installed to monitor conditions at
specific locations such as bridge abutments or entrances to secure
facilities. Other Coast Guard locations are far less equipped. In some
ports, local Coast Guard units are dependent solely on AIS technology
to track vessels.
Existing and Planned Technology Can Track Most Larger Vessels at Sea,
but Tracking of Smaller Vessels in U.S. Coastal Areas, Inland
Waterways, and Ports Is Often Limited and May Present Challenges in
Preventing an Attack:
The three primary means for vessel tracking at sea are proven
technologies and can track most larger vessels sailing to the United
States. Two of these systems, however, are dependent on cooperation on
the part of vessel operators. In U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways,
and ports, AIS, the primary means of tracking AIS-equipped vessels is
capable of detecting only a fraction of vessels operating in these
locations. Other means, such as radar and video cameras, can enhance
tracking to a degree. However, even if multiple systems are in place
for tracking vessels in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and
ports, tracking small vessels such as potential suicide attack boats is
difficult.
At Sea, Where Most Vessels Are Larger and Equipped with AIS or Other
Radio-Based Equipment, Tracking and Response Can Be Effective, but
Tracking Systems Have Limitations:
As long as vessel operators comply with international and U.S.
requirements to properly operate LRIT and AIS equipment, these systems
should be able to accurately track vessel movements up to 2,000
nautical miles from the U.S. coastline. Given the distance from the
U.S. coastline that such vessels will first begin to be tracked, the
Coast Guard and the Navy have approximately 4 days to investigate and
respond to potential vessel-borne threats. When vessel operators do not
comply with requirements, the Coast Guard can use national technical
means.
National Technical Means Can Support the Coast Guard in Meeting Its MDA
Goals:
National technical means have been used by the United States to track
vessels at sea for many years. We cannot, however, discuss the
technology these means use. These assets are available to the Coast
Guard and can be used to increase MDA. In April 2007, for example, the
Commandant of the Coast Guard announced that it was meeting the SAFE
Port Act mandate to track all large commercial vessels within U.S.
waters, using, in part, classified information. However, information
gathered through the use of national technical means cannot usually be
shared with other government agencies and port partners, which,
according to the Coast Guard, may complicate a multiagency response to
a potential threat.
LRIT Is a Proven Technology for Tracking Vessels at Sea:
The effectiveness of Global Maritime Distress and Safety System-based
LRIT to track vessels at sea has already been demonstrated. According
to officials from MISNA, their organization has satellite-based
tracking capability that it has used to track vessels at sea, including
the North Pacific and off the coast of Alaska. Using in part the on-
board Global Maritime Distress and Safety System equipment, available
software, and organizational infrastructure and databases, MISNA has
provided information to the Coast Guard for tracking vessels at sea and
aiding MDA. Since it became operational, the Global Maritime Distress
and Safety System has, as originally envisioned, provided position
information and communications capability to search and rescue efforts
for vessels in distress.
The Global Maritime Distress and Safety System coverage includes most
of the earth with the exception of the polar regions. This is not an
issue in the Southern Hemisphere because the area without satellite
coverage is on land. In the Northern Hemisphere, however, some areas,
including parts of the Arctic Ocean north of the Canadian mainland,
around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, and north of the Russian
mainland that are at least seasonally navigable are out of range of the
satellites.
The Coast Guard's final rule requires vessels to broadcast their
identification and position information every 6 hours, but the Coast
Guard can obtain information on their position more frequently. This
rule is based on IMO's standards for LRIT. Again, the Coast Guard rule
requires, and IMO's standards direct, that installed LRIT equipment
automatically respond to a remote request for a position report. This
allows the Coast Guard to establish the location of vessels coming to
the United States at least every 6 hours. A Coast Guard official said
the system will be capable of handling such polling up to four times
per hour per vessel.
While shipboard LRIT equipment must be able to transmit position
information, as discussed earlier in this report, the Coast Guard's
ability to receive it depends on the establishment of national or
multinational data centers which serve as information conduits between
the vessels and the international data exchange. If, for example, a
foreign-registered vessel was sailing to the United States and the
nation registering that vessel had not either established or
participated in an LRIT data center, there would be no approved way for
that vessel to transmit its position report to the international data
exchange and then on to the Coast Guard. As of August 27, 2008, seven
countries are participating in data center prototype testing and the
Coast Guard reported that four additional countries have requested to
commence testing of their centers.
Commercially Provided Long-Range AIS Is in Early Stages of Development:
While the Coast Guard is working toward a solution that will provide
AIS coverage for certain vessels at sea up to 2,000 nautical miles from
the U.S. coastline, its efforts are in the initial stages.
The extent of the commercial system needed to provide long-range AIS
data and its costs are unclear. Coast Guard officials are uncertain
about how much commercially provided long-range equipment they will
need because they are still developing the operational objectives for
the system. For example, Coast Guard officials said the ability of the
equipment to provide the data as frequently as desired depends to some
extent on the how much equipment is in place. The greater amount in
place, the greater the probability of receiving the AIS data once every
hour--but the Coast Guard is not yet ready to commit to a specific
amount. Coast Guard officials said the price of the data set by the
provider will help them determine the amount of data they are willing
to contract for. Further, Coast Guard officials said they may not
necessarily adopt the system currently being considered if the results
from the system's demonstration and tests are not promising. They said
there are other companies and equipment they plan to consider as they
determine the best means to meet their offshore AIS needs.
Tracking with LRIT and Commercially Provided Long-Range AIS Depends on
Vessel Operator Compliance and Correctly Operating Equipment:
The major systems the Coast Guard envisioned for tracking vessels at
sea depend on the compliance of vessel operators. Both LRIT and AIS
equipment onboard vessels can be easily turned off if the vessel
operator does not want to be tracked. IMO requirements even allow both
types of equipment to be turned off in certain conditions, such as when
the vessel's master believes the operation of the LRIT equipment will
compromise the vessel's safety or security.[Footnote 18] If the
equipment is turned off, such vessels will be invisible to these
systems. Additionally, for AIS, some information that is transmitted
must be programmed by the vessel operator. If that information is
improperly programmed, either intentionally or not, the Coast Guard
will not receive accurate information about the vessel. This has
already happened with shore-based AIS. According to Coast Guard
officials, in these cases, some AIS users were not updating their
equipment to accurately reflect voyage-related information such as
destination and estimated time of arrival. Further, the Coast Guard had
encountered AIS equipment that either did not transmit at all or
improperly transmitted the vessel's dynamic data, such as position,
course, speed, and heading. While the causes of the problems were not
clear, the Coast Guard noted that such problems could have been due to
lack of diligence on the part of the vessel operator, improper
installation, or problems with the operation of external sensors with
input into the AIS.
A Wider Variety of Tracking Systems Are Used in Coastal Areas, Inland
Waterways, and Ports, but Providing Needed Information in Time to Stop
an Attack Is Difficult:
While tracking systems for coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports
are more fully developed, preventing attacks can prove difficult in
spite of effective tracking systems.
AIS Is a Proven Mechanism That Can Track Vessels with Necessary
Equipment Properly Installed and Operating:
AIS technology relies upon proven global positioning systems, shipboard
sensors, and radio communication equipment that allow the exchange of
navigation information between vessels and shore-side receiving
stations. The ability to track vessels has been demonstrated since its
earliest installations. For example, the Saint Lawrence Seaway
Development Corporation and the Canadian St. Lawrence Seaway Management
Corporation implemented a comprehensive vessel communications and
tracking network to identify and track all commercial vessels
navigating on the seaway. This system included the first fully
operational AIS network in North America and enabled automatic vessel
position reporting from vessels equipped with AIS transponders from
Montreal to eastern Lake Erie.
While AIS can track vessels with installed and operating equipment,
many vessels that are common in coastal areas, inland waterways, and
ports are not currently required by current U.S. laws or regulations to
operate AIS equipment. These vessels include:
* most vessels not in commercial service, including recreational boats,
* most fishing vessels,
* most commercial vessels less than 65 feet long, and:
* vessels not on international voyages and not navigating designated
Vessel Traffic Service or Vessel Movement Reporting Service
areas.[Footnote 19]
The proposed rule issued by the Coast Guard would substantially expand
the types of vessels required to use AIS equipment and the locations
where the operation of AIS equipment is required in the United States.
The proposed rule would require the following types of vessels install
and operate AIS: (1) self-propelled vessels of 65 feet or more in
commercial service, (2) towing vessels of 26 feet or more and more than
600 horsepower in commercial service, (3) self-propelled vessels
carrying 50 or more passengers in commercial service, (4) vessels
carrying more than 12 passengers for hire and capable of speeds greater
than 30 knots, (5) certain dredges and floating plants, and (6) self-
propelled vessels carrying certain dangerous cargos. A major change
included in this proposed rule was the inclusion of commercial fishing
vessels that were not previously required to carry AIS equipment. Most
noncommercial vessels, such as small recreational speed boats are not
covered under the proposed rule. Besides adding new classes of vessels
under AIS requirements, the geographic areas covered would also be
greatly expanded. Under the proposed rule the specified vessel
categories would have to operate AIS on all United States navigable
waters.
Radar and Cameras in Ports Have Their Own Limitations:
Radar and video cameras are used in some ports to detect the many
vessels that are not required to operate AIS equipment, but these
sensors have their own limitations. Radar is an effective means to
track many vessels, but has difficulty detecting smaller vessels. Given
their size, small vessels do not produce strong radar reflections.
Also, waves can produce reflections that may be mistaken for vessels.
In addition, if a large vessel sails between radar and a smaller
vessel, the smaller vessel may be masked from detection. Finally,
radar, unlike AIS, has no ability to identify a vessel. Different types
of video cameras have also been installed in ports, and each has its
own advantages and disadvantages. Some cameras have the capability to
move and follow targets and zoom in to get a more magnified view of the
target. Other cameras are fixed in place to cover specific locations,
such as specific facilities or bridge abutments, and can only see
vessels as they pass within the line of sight of the camera. Other
installed cameras cannot zoom. Certain cameras, such as some in place
in one port, also have the ability to operate in low light or use
infrared images that distinguish objects by the heat they emanate.
These capabilities allow them to be effective when cameras using
visible light prove ineffective, such as at night or in bad weather.
These, however, can still be affected by atmospheric or surf
conditions.
Even with All Sensors in Place, the Coast Guard May Be Challenged in
Preventing Attacks without Prior Knowledge:
In studies we reviewed and discussions with maritime stakeholders,
there was widespread agreement that detecting threatening activity by
vessels is very difficult without prior knowledge. See figure 4 for
small vessels operating in main shipping lanes of New York harbor.
Figure 4: Small Vessels Operating among Large Commercial Vessels:
Photograph of small vessels operating among large commercial vessels.
[Refer to PDF for image]
Source: Sandy Hook Pilots.
[End of figure]
The Coast Guard is trying to develop means to detect suspicious
behaviors that do not require human input. For example, the Coast Guard
is testing software in one port to develop the ability to determine
suspicious behavior without human intervention. Sensors would be
monitored by software that learns the expected activity of the port and
would sound an alarm when unexpected activity occurs. According to
Coast Guard officials, it takes years for the software to learn the
normal behavior at the port.
The Coast Guard and Other Stakeholders Rely on Relationships to
Increase Their Awareness of Activities on the Water, and DHS Has
Developed a Small Vessel Security Strategy That Emphasizes the
Importance of These Relationships:
In part to help obtain this intelligence and expand their awareness of
activities on the water, the Coast Guard and other port security
stakeholders have engaged in outreach efforts with the port community.
All of the Coast Guard locations we visited had long- standing
relationships with local professional mariners, such as pilots and tug
operators. The Coast Guard officials we spoke with thought these
relationships were beneficial in enhancing MDA. For example, several
Delaware River Pilots alerted Sector Delaware Bay of two small armed
vessels traveling at high speed from the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal
into the Delaware River. Coast Guard boats responded to these craft on
the basis of this information, and the suspect craft turned out to be
Navy Seals on an unannounced exercise, but the pilots provided the only
notice to the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has also implemented a
nationwide program called America's Waterways Watch to engage all those
who work, live, or recreate on or near the water to be aware and report
suspicious activity that may indicate possible threats. This type of
effort is a major recommendation in the DHS Small Vessel Security
Strategy. The strategy considers the small vessel community as the
single largest asset in addressing the threat from small boat attacks.
Coast Guard sectors have also developed information-sharing agreements
with state, local, and law enforcement agencies that are intended to
increase awareness and cooperation. Some state and local outreach
efforts are especially active. For example, the New Jersey State
Police's program, the Maritime Security Initiative, follows the
America's Waterways Watch model, but goes even further. State Police
officers make regular--sometimes weekly-- proactive visits to locations
such as marinas, boat ramps, and waterfront properties to ask
individuals in these areas about any suspicious or out of place
behavior they may have witnessed. See figure 5 for brochures on state
and federal outreach efforts.
Figure 5: Brochures for New Jersey State Police's Maritime Security
Initiative and Coast Guard's America's Waterways Watch Outreach
Efforts:
This figure is a photograph if a brochure for New Jersey State police's
maritime security initiative and Coast Guard's America's waterways
watch outreach efforts.
[Refer PDF for image]
Source: New Jersey State Police; U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
Long-Range Tracking Systems Are Potentially Duplicative, While Systems
for Vessel Tracking in U.S. Coastal Areas, Inland Waterways, and Ports
Provide Complementary Information That Covers Additional Vessels:
While current plans for vessel tracking systems lead to potential
duplication in vessels tracked and information received, systems that
track vessels in coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports are
complementary in that they track different types of vessels and vary in
their capabilities. The long range systems--LRIT, commercially provided
long-range AIS, and national technical means-- were initially developed
independently of each other and for different purposes, but the Coast
Guard was unable to provide evidence that the planning for the current
and future use of LRIT and commercially provided long-range AIS was
coordinated. Furthermore, the Coast Guard has yet to consider the costs
and benefits of obtaining offshore vessel identification and tracking
information from the multiple sources currently, or soon to be,
available to the Coast Guard. In coastal areas, inland waterways, and
ports, there are greater differences among the tracking systems. AIS
provides extensive information but its use is limited to larger vessels
while radar and video cameras, sensors that are located in some ports,
provide limited information but can pick up varied vessels.
Additionally, cameras can be affected by environmental conditions,
unlike AIS and radar.
Plans for Use of Commercially Provided Long-Range AIS and LRIT Were Not
Coordinated:
Despite the likelihood that the multiple sources of offshore vessel
identification and tracking information would produce duplicative
information, the Coast Guard was unable to provide evidence that its
efforts to obtain this information were coordinated. Coast Guard
officials we spoke with said the coordination of the development of
LRIT and NAIS should take place not at the Coast Guard, but at an
interagency level. When we met with officials at one of the interagency
bodies with a role in MDA mentioned by the Coast Guard officials--the
Office of Global Maritime Situational Awareness--they said that their
role is to facilitate cross government coordination of requirements and
that they did not see coordination of programs within the Coast Guard
as part of that role. The documents that are the planning guides for
MDA, the National Concept of Operations for Maritime Domain Awareness
and National MDA Study Interagency Investment Strategy Document do not
mention any coordination being done in tracking system development or
why both systems are necessary. Similarly, the plan DHS developed in
response to the requirement in the Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act of 2004 for a plan to address unwanted redundancy in
the collection and analysis of maritime information by agencies within
DHS did not address coordination of the two systems or the need for
both. In addition, while NAIS was regularly mentioned in the issues of
the MDA Director's Newsletter we obtained, no mention was made of LRIT.
In the Maritime Domain Awareness Business Plan, Year End Summary for
April 2006 to May 2007, NAIS and LRIT are listed as separate projects,
and there is no mention of commercially provided long-range AIS.
Similarly, the Coast Guard did not analyze the costs and benefits of
using multiple sources to obtain similar information. Coast Guard
officials said that when they complete their assessment of the results
of the commercially provided long-range AIS demonstration they will be
able to compare its capabilities to other long-range tracking
capabilities. However, they also said that they will not be able to
determine the cost for commercially provided long-range AIS data until
more AIS-equipped commercial equipment is available. In the meantime,
according to Navy and Coast Guard officials, there is a growing
awareness of the need for offshore vessel identification and tracking
among other agencies of the federal government, such as the Navy and
DHS's Office of Customs and Border Protection. In recognition of this
need, these officials said the federal government is developing a
national strategy for AIS. While a certain amount of redundancy can be
beneficial if it occurs by design, as part of a management strategy,
our previous work has found that unintended duplication indicates the
potential for inefficiency and waste.[Footnote 20] In addition, our
prior work at DOD has shown that the absence of an integrated
management approach can contribute to duplication in programs and
equipment that do not operate effectively together.[Footnote 21]
Other Data Sources Are Available to Provide Commercially Provided Long-
Range AIS's Expanded Information:
As a stand-alone system, commercially provided long-range AIS is to
provide more information on vessels traveling to the United States than
LRIT, but when the information from each is combined with other readily
available sources, the information will be duplicative. Current plans
have both commercially provided long-range AIS and LRIT providing
information about vessels bound for a U.S. destination at 2000 nautical
miles from the U.S. coastline. At approximately this location, vessels
bound for the United States are typically required to send an advance
Notice of Arrival to the Coast Guard, providing detailed information
about the vessel, its voyage, its cargo, and its crew. When AIS or LRIT
information is combined with the information provided in the Notice of
Arrival, the Coast Guard will have available much the same information
regardless of whether it is using commercially provided long-range AIS
or LRIT to track a vessel. (See table 2.)
Table 2: Information to Be Provided by Two Planned Long-Range Vessel
Tracking Systems Combined with Information Provided by Notices of
Arrival for Vessels Traveling to a U.S. Port:
Static information: information that rarely changes over the
operational life of the vessel;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Vessel name[A];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: Vessel name[B].
Static information: information that rarely changes over the
operational life of the vessel;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Identification numbers[A];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: Identification numbers[B].
Static information: information that rarely changes over the
operational life of the vessel;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Radio call sign[A, C];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: Radio call sign[C].
Static information: information that rarely changes over the
operational life of the vessel;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Vessel type[A];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: [Empty].
Static information: information that rarely changes over the
operational life of the vessel;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Vessel dimensions[A];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: [Empty].
Static information: information that rarely changes over the
operational life of the vessel;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Name of registered owner[C];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: Name of registered owner[C].
Static information: information that rarely changes over the
operational life of the vessel;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Name of operator[C];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: Name of operator[C].
Voyage-specific information: information that changes with each
sailing;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Port destination in U.S[A, C];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: Port Destination in U.S[C].
Voyage-specific information: information that changes with each
sailing;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Specific facility and port destination in
U.S.[C];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: Specific port and facility destination in
U.S.[C].
Voyage-specific information: information that changes with each
sailing;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Estimated time of arrival[A, C];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: Estimated time of arrival[C].
Voyage-specific information: information that changes with each
sailing;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Estimated time of departure[C];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: Estimated time of departure[C].
Voyage-specific information: information that changes with each
sailing;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Cargo type[A, C];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: Cargo type[C].
Voyage-specific information: information that changes with each
sailing;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Name and date of last five ports
visited[C];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: Name and date of last five ports
visited[C].
Voyage-specific information: information that changes with each
sailing;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Name, date of birth, nationality, and
passport number of everyone on board[C];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: Name, date of birth, nationality, and
passport number of everyone on board[C].
Dynamic information: information that changes continuously;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Location[A];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: Location[B].
Dynamic information: information that changes continuously;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Course[A];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: [Empty].
Dynamic information: information that changes continuously;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Speed[A];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: [Empty].
Dynamic information: information that changes continuously;
AIS with Notice of Arrival: Rate of turn[A];
LRIT with Notice of Arrival: [Empty].
Source: GAO analysis.
[A] Information supplied through AIS signals.
[B] Information provided through LRIT signals.
[C] Information supplied by the Notice of Arrival.
[End of table]
Other characteristics of the two planned systems vary. Ordinarily,
commercially provided long-range AIS will transmit information much
more often (from every 2 seconds to every 6 minutes depending on the
information) than LRIT (every 6 hours). However, if the Coast Guard
needs location information more frequently, LRIT will allow it to
remotely poll inbound vessels and receive an automatic reply for
location reports up to every 15 minutes. However, since vessels are
being tracked while they are several days from port, the Coast Guard is
unlikely to need this information more frequently. Additionally, while
the vessel transmitters for both tracking systems can be turned off by
the crew, Coast Guard officials we spoke with said it is easier to
change the programming of onboard AIS equipment to transmit false
position reports than it is for LRIT.
Although the Coast Guard says it wants both commercially provided long-
range AIS and LRIT to detect anomalies, such as vessels broadcasting
false position reports or not broadcasting position reports at all, the
Coast Guard has other sources to corroborate such information. For
example, the Coast Guard can use national technical means along with
either LRIT or NAIS to detect anomalies. While the capabilities and
information provided by national technical means are classified, the
Coast Guard is able to obtain important benefits from the use of these
means. According to the Coast Guard, to obtain the full benefit
provided by national technical means, Coast Guard analysts track that
information over time and combine it with information provided by other
sources, such as Notices of Arrival and commercial reporting. Through
analysis of the information available from national technical means,
the Coast Guard should be able to provide sufficient information to
verify the identification and location of vessels provided through LRIT
or commercially provided long-range AIS.
Complementary Capabilities of Systems in Coastal Areas, Inland
Waterways, and Ports Provide the Potential That Vessels Missed by One
System Can Be Picked Up by Others:
As explained earlier in this report, each system in place in coastal
areas, inland waterways, and ports has limitations, but these
limitations can be mitigated with different sensors. In locations where
all these sensors are available, their complementary nature allows for
almost a complete picture of the port and surrounding area. For
example, in one port, Navy, and local agencies have installed a wide
array of sensors that cover 90 percent of the port and much of the
coastal area. There, radar can detect larger noncommercial vessels that
do not carry AIS. Cameras that can operate in daylight, dusk, and at
night can follow smaller vessels that do not carry AIS and are
difficult to pick up on radar. For vessels that do carry AIS equipment,
the land-based AIS receivers can provide a wide range of information
that neither radar nor cameras can. As stated earlier in this report,
we saw similar capabilities in other locations where the Coast Guard
worked directly with other maritime security stakeholders to track
vessels in ports and multiple sensors were installed. While the
presence of multiple sensors allows this broad coverage, these sensors
are only available where other agencies have installed them. In other
locations, few sensors beyond AIS are available. In these locations,
tracking is limited to those vessels transmitting via AIS equipment.
Conclusions:
Threats to the maritime transportation system include the use of large
merchant vessels to transport weapons of mass destruction; explosive
laden suicide boats as weapons; and vessels to smuggle people, drugs,
weapons, and other contraband. The importance and vulnerabilities of
the maritime transportation system require that efforts be made to
reduce the risk of a terrorist attack. The Coast Guard has acknowledged
that it needs to close the gaps in maritime security, including long-
range tracking of vessels and threats presented by small vessels.
Knowledge of activities, such as vessel movements that take place
within the system, is vital to reducing the vulnerability of the
maritime transportation system. Classified national technical means to
do so have been operational for many years and LRIT--a statutorily
required long-range tracking system--is now available to the Coast
Guard to monitor the movements of larger commercial vessels at sea.
Along with the Notice of Arrival, these systems provide a complete
picture of larger commercial vessel movements and other pertinent
information. Furthermore, these three sources of information provide
the necessary overlap for the Coast Guard to be able to detect
anomalies. In the longer term, the Coast Guard is also planning on
obtaining offshore vessel identification and tracking information
through commercially provided long-range AIS, which, according to Coast
Guard plans, will not be fully operational until 2014, at an unknown
final cost. At this point, the Coast Guard has not determined whether
the concept will work as planned. However, beyond the Coast Guard, some
other federal agencies may have a need for commercially provided long-
range AIS and a national strategy for the use of commercially provided
long-range AIS is to consider these needs. Still, the Coast Guard has
not coordinated its programs to obtain offshore vessel-tracking
information or analyzed the costs and benefits of using the multiple
sources. As a result, the Coast Guard could potentially invest its
limited resources to procure additional information that may not be
necessary for its MDA mission. Given the limited resources available,
the Coast Guard needs to determine how to best spend those resources
for offshore vessel identification and tracking.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To ensure efficient and effective use of Coast Guard resources
available for long-range vessel tracking, we recommend that--upon
completion of the commercially provided long-range AIS concept
demonstration and the national AIS strategy and after the cost of
commercially provided long-range AIS information becomes known --the
Commandant of the Coast Guard determine the extent to which duplicate
vessel-tracking information from LRIT and commercially provided long-
range AIS is needed to accomplish Coast Guard missions, particularly in
light of information already available through national technical
means.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland
Security, Defense, and Justice for their review and comment. The
Departments of Defense and Justice responded that they did not have any
comments on the report. In an October 31, 2008, letter, the Department
of Homeland Security provided written comments, which are summarized
below. However, we were unable to include the full text of the written
comments in this report because they contain sensitive information.
DHS agreed with our recommendation that--upon completion of the
commercially provided long-range AIS concept demonstration and the
national AIS strategy and after the cost of commercially provided long-
range AIS information becomes known--the Commandant of the Coast Guard
determine the extent to which duplicate vessel-tracking information
from LRIT and commercially provided long-range AIS is needed to
accomplish Coast Guard missions, particularly in light of information
already available through national technical means. Further, DHS
commented that, in addition to the cost and duplication concerns we
expressed, the Coast Guard's review of the need for the two systems
would also include factors such as the Coast Guard's statutory
requirements, risk assessments, Maritime Domain Awareness objectives,
and the United States' obligations under international agreements.
DHS also said, however, that LRIT and commercially provided long-range
AIS are two complementary systems that provide different information,
apply to different classes and sizes of vessels, and are being
developed and operated under separate statutory and international
obligations. Furthermore, DHS commented that LRIT does not presently,
nor will it when fully implemented, meet all the Coast Guard's
requirements for identification and tracking of vessels either in
navigable waters or off shore areas of the United States. While we
acknowledge that as a stand-alone system, commercially provided long-
range AIS is to provide more information on vessels traveling to the
United States than LRIT, when the information from each is combined
with other readily available sources, the information will be
duplicative. For example, at approximately 2,000 nautical miles from
the U.S. coastline--the same distance at which AIS and LRIT will
provide information about vessels bound for a U.S. destination--vessels
are typically required to send an advance Notice of Arrival to the
Coast Guard providing detailed information about the vessel, its
voyage, its cargo, and its crew. When AIS or LRIT information is
combined with this information, the Coast Guard will have available
much the same information regardless of whether it is using
commercially provided long-range AIS or LRIT to track a vessel.
Furthermore, current rules for AIS and LRIT apply, in general, to
similar classes and sizes of vessels. For example, under SOLAS, AIS
covers larger commercial vessels, such as those 300 gross tons or more
on international voyages, cargo vessels 500 gross tons or more not on
international voyages, and passenger vessels regardless of size. LRIT
regulations in SOLAS apply to cargo vessels of 300 gross tons or more,
as well as to passenger ships and mobile offshore drilling rigs. We
agree that LRIT and commercially provided long-range AIS are being
developed under separate statutory and international obligations.
However, the Coast Guard is not specifically required to implement
commercially provided long-range AIS under any U.S. law or
international agreement. In addition, we did not find evidence that the
Coast Guard had gone through a deliberative process to identify
requirements and determine the optimal assets or asset mix to meet
them.
Department of Homeland Security officials also provided technical
comments on the draft that have been incorporated, as appropriate.
As arranged with your offices we plan no further distribution until 30
days after the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies
of this report to the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and
Justice; and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be
available on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Stephen L. Caldwell:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT):
This appendix provides additional information on long-range
identification and tracking (LRIT). In 2002, the Maritime
Transportation Security Act authorized the Secretary of Homeland
Security to develop and implement an automated long-range
identification and tracking program for certain vessels in U.S.
waters.[Footnote 22] In turn, the Secretary delegated the authority to
the Coast Guard which subsequently pursued the implementation of such a
system with International Maritime Organization (IMO) to achieve the
full benefits of LRIT. From 2002 to 2006, the Coast Guard worked with
IMO to establish a legal mechanism whereby governments can access
vessel position information while on international voyages. A 2006
amendment to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, 1974 (SOLAS) required vessels on international travel to report
their identity, position, and the date and time of the report, which
are collectively called LRIT information. The amendment applies to
passenger vessels carrying more than 12 passengers, cargo vessels of
300 tons or more and self-propelled mobile offshore drilling units.
The LRIT system primarily consists of the vessel-borne
equipment,[Footnote 23] maritime communication satellites, satellite
ground stations, LRIT data centers, and an international data exchange.
The vessel-borne equipment consists of radio equipment capable meeting
the following requirements:
* transmitting and receiving data information to and from maritime
communication satellites,
* obtaining vessel position information from onboard global navigation
satellite system equipment or its own internal positioning capability,
* automatically transmitting the vessel's LRIT information at 6-hour
intervals to an LRIT data center,
* being remotely configured to transmit LRIT information at variable
intervals up to every 15 minutes, and:
* transmitting LRIT information upon request.
[End of section]
The LRIT information from a vessel (vessel identity and position) is
picked up by the satellites, retransmitted to the ground stations, and
routed to a data center that serves the country where the vessel is
registered. LRIT data centers are the conduits for LRIT information to
and from vessels at sea. They can serve individual countries, regional
groups of countries, or a broad collection of various countries. For
example, the United States will operate its own data center and LRIT
information from U.S. registered vessels will be routed to the U.S.
data center. Requests from nations for more frequent position
information from U.S. vessels are also made to the U.S. data center.
After receiving LRIT information from a vessel, the data center sends
it to the international data exchange. The international data exchange
is the clearinghouse for LRIT information and distributes the
information to data centers serving countries entitled to receive the
information. To continue the previous example, the U.S. data center
sends the position and identification information from the U.S. vessel
to the international data exchange. Because in this example the U.S.
vessel is sailing to China, the international data exchange will send
the vessel's LRIT information to the data center serving China when the
vessel announce its intention to enter a Chinese port. Because the U.S.
vessel is also within 1,000 nautical miles of the Japanese coastline,
the international data exchange will also send the vessel's LRIT
information to the data center serving Japan.
The LRIT system is intended to provide secure communication. All data
transmissions are to be made in secure formats and all data centers are
to establish and maintain systems to ensure that LRIT data users are
only provided with information for which they are entitled. To ensure
data security, the international data exchange is required to be
configured in a way that prevents it from viewing or accessing the LRIT
data. Rather, it will only have access to the information stating where
the LRIT data are to be sent.
The SOLAS amendment place the financial responsibility for the
transmission of LRIT information on the country that receives the
information. For example, information from a vessel that is sailing to
the United States would be sent to the United States starting when the
vessel was 2,000 nautical miles from the coastline. When the United
States starts receiving that information, it would be liable for paying
for the information from that point. The Coast Guard estimated in the
final rule implementing the SOLAS amendment that the charges would be
approximately $.25 per message.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Automatic Identification System (AIS):
This appendix provides additional information on the automated
identification system (AIS). As a tool to improve navigation safety,
AIS has been under development worldwide since the early 1990s. As a
safety aid, AIS equipment allows a vessel's crew to "see" and track the
movements of similarly equipped vessels and to receive pertinent
navigational information from shore. The enactment of the Maritime
Transportation and Security Act of 2002 and its implementing
regulations gave AIS an added homeland security mission. To fulfill
this mission, the Coast Guard is in the process of constructing a
nationwide network of shore-based and other receiving stations to allow
it to track the position and movements of AIS-equipped vessels.
An AIS unit onboard a vessel consists of a global navigation satellite
system; computer hardware and software; three radio receivers; and one
radio transmitter-receiver, or transceiver. The information to be
transmitted by the AIS unit is obtained in different ways. Some
information that does not change during a voyage is manually entered by
the vessel's crew. Examples of this type of information include the
vessel's name, identification number, dimensions, and cargo.
Information that changes as the vessel proceeds on its voyage is
entered by instruments onboard the vessel, including the navigation
satellite receiver and the vessel's compass. This type of information
includes position, course, speed, and rate of turn. The unit transmits
the information on designated radio frequencies at rates ranging from
every 2 seconds to every 6 minutes.
Once transmitted, the AIS signals are received by AIS stations within
range. Typically, these stations are installed on other vessels or on
shore, but the Coast Guard is working to expand its network of
receiving stations to include offshore platforms, ocean buoys, and
other locations. The land-based AIS stations require considerable
infrastructure on shore--including antennas and base stations equipped
with electric power, transceivers, computers, and displays--to monitor
vessel activity and transmit information or instructions back to
vessels. In locations where Coast Guard vessel traffic services are
operational or where existing AIS capabilities existed, AIS signals
received on local antennas are routed directly to the local vessel
traffic center or Coast Guard sector command center. AIS signals
received in other locations are first routed to the Coast Guard's
Operations System Center in West Virginia and then distributed
throughout the Coast Guard, and to other authorized agencies, as part
of the Coast Guard's aggregated information system that includes vessel-
tracking information from all unclassified sources known as the Common
Operating Picture.
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Susan Quinlan, Assistant
Director, and Jonathan Bachman, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this
assignment. R.E. Canjar, Odilon Cuero, Erin Henderson, and Daniel
Kaneshiro made significant contributions to the work. Stanley Kostyla
assisted with design and methodology. Geoffrey Hamilton provided legal
support. Stan Stenersen and Adam Vogt provided assistance in report
preparation. Josh Ormond developed the report's graphics.
[End of section]
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Footnotes:
[1] National technical means is an unclassified term used to describe
vessel tracking through classified means. The specific capabilities and
methods of tracking using national technical means involve the use of
national security assets, are classified, and cannot be discussed in
this report.
[2] Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
[3] Pub. L. No. 108-293, 118 Stat. 1028 (2004).
[4] Vessel Traffic Service and Vessel Movement Reporting Service areas
are waterways where due to their confined or busy circumstances and the
probability of maritime accidents the Coast Guard provides monitoring
and navigational advice. Coast Guard regulations list the following
areas as Vessel Traffic Service or Vessel Movement Reporting Service
areas: the waters around Houston-Galveston, Texas; Los Angeles/Long
Beach, California; Louisville, Kentucky during high water; Morgan City,
Louisiana; New Orleans, Louisiana; New York, New York; Port Arthur,
Texas; Prince William Sound, Alaska; Puget Sound, Washington; San
Francisco, California; and St. Mary's River, Michigan.
[5] Under the IMO regulation only certain countries are allowed to
receive LRIT information. A vessel's position information is always
available to the country that registered the vessel. A country can
typically receive position information from vessels that sail within
1,000 nautical miles of its coastline, even if it is not the
destination of the vessel. The destination country of a vessel can
receive position information when a vessel states its intention to
enter a port or place within that country. For example, vessels sailing
to the United States are typically required to report their intention
to enter a U.S. port 96 hours prior to arrival. At typical speeds of
ocean-going vessels, this is approximately 2,000 nautical miles off the
U.S. coastline.
[6] 73 Fed. Reg. 76295 (Dec. 16, 2008).
[7] The Coast Guard requires that most vessels 300 gross tons or more
notify the Coast Guard of their intent to call on a U.S. port and
submit a broad range of information about the vessel and persons on
board typically 96 hours prior to their entering port.
[8] GAO, Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission
Fragmentation and Program Overlap, [[hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-97-146] (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
29, 1997).
[9] Global Maritime Distress and Safety System equipment was already
required by the IMO for many larger vessels and was originally intended
to provide for automatic distress alerting and locating in cases where
a radio operator does not have time to send an SOS or MAYDAY call.
[10] Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006).
[11] 73 Fed. Reg. 23310 (Apr. 29, 2008).
[12] For our evaluation of this strategy, see GAO, Maritime Security:
National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were Generally Well-Developed
and Are Being Implemented, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-
08-672] (Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2008).
[13] Resolution MSC.210(81) (adopted on May 19, 2006).
[14] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
[15] For more detailed information on risk management and GAO's
framework for risk management, see GAO, Risk Management: Further
Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures
at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-91] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15,
2005), and Highlights of a Forum Convened by the Comptroller General of
the United States: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management Principles
in Homeland Security, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-
627SP] (Washington, D.C.: April 2008).
[16] As laid out by IMO in SOLAS, access to LRIT information varies by
the country's relationship to the vessel or status as a flag, port, or
coastal state. As a flag state, the contracting government may purchase
LRIT information on a vessel anywhere in the world as long as the
vessel is entitled to fly its flag. As a port state, a contracting
government may purchase LRIT information on a vessel calling at its
port after the vessel has indicated its intention to do so unless the
vessel is within the internal waters of another contracting government.
As a coastal state, the contracting government may purchase LRIT
information on a vessel that is within a specified distance-not more
than 1,000 nautical miles-off the coastal state's baseline unless the
vessel is within its territorial sea or the internal waters of another
contracting government.
[17] IMO requirements provide that all passenger vessels, regardless of
size, all vessels of 300 gross tons and larger on international
voyages, and all cargo vessels of 500 gross tons not on international
voyages shall be fitted with AIS equipment. The Coast Guard refined
these requirements to generally include commercial vessels 65 feet or
longer, passenger vessels of 150 tons or more, and all tankers, either
on international voyages or in Vessel Tracking Service areas.
[18] For example, a vessel's master is allowed to turn off the vessel's
AIS equipment while it is sailing in waters known to be frequented by
pirates. Since AIS is an open system, pirates can use AIS signals to
track their targets.
[19] The following vessels navigating in Vessel Traffic Service or
Vessel Movement Reporting Service areas are required to operate AIS
equipment: commercial vessels 65 feet or more in length except for
fishing boats or passenger vessels certified to carry less than 150
persons, commercial towing vessels 26 feet or more in length and more
than 600 horsepower, and passenger vessels certified to carry more than
150 passengers for hire.
[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-97-146].
[21] GAO, Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach
to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD's Acquisition Outcomes,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-388] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 30, 2007).
[22] These vessels include all those that are equipped with the Global
Maritime Distress and Safety System, which includes vessel-borne
equipment and the International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT-C) or
equivalent satellite technology.
[23] According to the Coast Guard, Global Maritime Distress and Safety
System equipment that is already onboard U.S. vessels due to
preexisting SOLAS requirements meets the IMO performance standards for
transmitting the required LRIT data.
[End of section]
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441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
