National Preparedness
FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts Gao ID: GAO-09-369 April 30, 2009Hurricane Katrina was the most destructive disaster in our nation's history and it highlighted gaps in preparedness for a catastrophic disaster. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a component within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal agency responsible for developing a national preparedness system. The system includes policies and plans as well as exercises and assessments of capabilities across many public and private entities. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which FEMA has (1) developed policies and plans that define roles and responsibilities; (2) implemented the National Exercise Program, a key tool for examining preparedness; (3) developed a national capabilities assessment; and (4) developed a strategic plan that integrates these elements of the preparedness system. GAO analyzed program documents, such as after-action reports, and visited six states located in disaster regions. While the results of these visits are not generalizable, they show how select states carry out their efforts.
While most policies (41 of 50) that define roles and responsibilities have been completed, such as the National Response Framework, 68 percent (49 of 72) of the plans to implement these policies, including several for catastrophic incidents, are not yet complete. As a result, the roles and responsibilities of key officials involved in responding to a catastrophe have not been fully defined and, thus, cannot be tested in exercises. The lack of clarity in response roles and responsibilities among the diverse set of responders contributed to the disjointed response to Hurricane Katrina and highlighted the need for clear, integrated disaster preparedness and response policies and plans. Although best practices for program management call for a plan that includes key tasks and their target completion dates, FEMA does not have such a plan. With such a plan, FEMA would be better positioned to ensure that the policies and plans are completed and integrated with each other as intended as well as with other elements of the preparedness system. Since 2007, FEMA has taken actions to implement the National Exercise Program at the federal and state levels by developing, among other things, program guidance and systems to track corrective actions; however, FEMA faces challenges in ensuring that the exercises are carried out consistent with program guidance. For example, the Homeland Security Council (an interagency entity responsible for coordinating homeland security policy) and state participants did not systematically track whether corrective actions had been taken to address deficiencies identified by exercises as called for by program guidance. As a result, FEMA lacks reasonable assurance that entities have taken actions aimed at improving preparedness. FEMA has made progress in developing a system for assessing national preparedness capabilities by, among other things, establishing reporting guidance for state preparedness, but it faces challenges in completing the system and required reports to assess preparedness. While FEMA has developed a project management plan for the new system, the plan does not fully identify milestones and program risks for developing quantifiable metrics necessary for measuring preparedness capabilities. A more complete project plan that identifies milestones and program risks would provide FEMA with greater assurance that it can produce a system to assess capabilities and inform decisions related to improving national preparedness. FEMA's strategic plan for fiscal years 2008-2013 recognizes that each of its components need to develop its own strategic plans that integrate the elements of national preparedness. FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate has yet to develop its strategic plan, but instead plans to use a draft annual operating plan to guide its efforts. This plan does not include all elements of a strategic plan, such as how the directorate will integrate the various elements of the system over time to improve national preparedness. Having a strategic plan would provide FEMA with a roadmap for addressing the complex task of guiding and building a national preparedness system.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-369, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete and Integrate Plannning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-369
entitled 'National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to
Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts'
which was released on May 29, 2009.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
April 2009:
National Preparedness:
FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to Complete and Integrate Planning,
Exercise, and Assessment Efforts:
GAO-09-369:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-369, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Hurricane Katrina was the most destructive disaster in our nation‘s
history and it highlighted gaps in preparedness for a catastrophic
disaster. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a component
within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal
agency responsible for developing a national preparedness system. The
system includes policies and plans as well as exercises and assessments
of capabilities across many public and private entities. GAO was asked
to assess the extent to which FEMA has (1) developed policies and plans
that define roles and responsibilities; (2) implemented the National
Exercise Program, a key tool for examining preparedness; (3) developed
a national capabilities assessment; and (4) developed a strategic plan
that integrates these elements of the preparedness system. GAO analyzed
program documents, such as after-action reports, and visited six states
located in disaster regions. While the results of these visits are not
generalizable, they show how select states carry out their efforts.
What GAO Found:
While most policies (42 of 50) that define roles and responsibilities
have been completed, such as the National Response Framework, 68
percent (49 of 72) of the plans to implement these policies, including
several for catastrophic incidents, are not yet complete. As a result,
the roles and responsibilities of key officials involved in responding
to a catastrophe have not been fully defined and, thus, cannot be fully
tested in exercises. The lack of clarity in response roles and
responsibilities among the diverse set of responders contributed to the
disjointed response to Hurricane Katrina and highlighted the need for
clear, integrated disaster preparedness and response policies and
plans. Although best practices for program management call for a plan
that includes key tasks and their target completion dates, FEMA does
not have such a plan. With such a plan, FEMA would be better positioned
to ensure that the policies and plans are completed and integrated with
each other as intended as well as with other elements of the
preparedness system.
Since 2007, FEMA has taken actions to implement the National Exercise
Program at the federal and state levels by developing, among other
things, program guidance and systems to track corrective actions;
however, FEMA faces challenges in ensuring that the exercises are
carried out consistent with program guidance. For example, the Homeland
Security Council (an interagency entity responsible for coordinating
homeland security policy) and state participants did not systematically
track whether corrective actions had been taken to address deficiencies
identified by exercises as called for by program guidance. As a result,
FEMA lacks reasonable assurance that entities have taken actions aimed
at improving preparedness.
FEMA has made progress in developing a system for assessing national
preparedness capabilities by, among other things, establishing
reporting guidance for state preparedness, but it faces challenges in
completing the system and required reports to assess preparedness.
While FEMA has developed a project management plan for the new system,
the plan does not fully identify milestones and program risks for
developing quantifiable metrics necessary for measuring preparedness
capabilities. A more complete project plan that identifies milestones
and program risks would provide FEMA with greater assurance that it can
produce a system to assess capabilities and inform decisions related to
improving national preparedness.
FEMA‘s strategic plan for fiscal years 2008-2013 recognizes that each
of its components need to develop its own strategic plans that
integrate the elements of national preparedness. FEMA‘s National
Preparedness Directorate has yet to develop its strategic plan, but
instead plans to use a draft annual operating plan to guide its
efforts. This plan does not include all elements of a strategic plan,
such as how the directorate will integrate the various elements of the
system over time to improve national preparedness. Having a strategic
plan would provide FEMA with a roadmap for addressing the complex task
of guiding and building a national preparedness system.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that FEMA improve national preparedness by, among other
things, establishing a program management plan, better ensuring
exercises follow program guidance, enhancing its project management
plan for assessing capabilities, and developing a strategic plan that
integrates system elements. DHS concurred with our recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369]. For more
information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr., at (202) 512-8757 or
jenkinswo@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Most Policies That Define Roles and Responsibilities and Planning
Processes Have Been Completed, but Work Remains to Complete Emergency
Plans:
FEMA Has Taken Actions to Implement the National Exercise Program, but
Faces Challenges in Meeting Statutory and Program Requirements:
FEMA Has Taken Actions to Develop and Implement a Comprehensive System
for Assessing National Preparedness Capabilities, but Faces Challenges
in Completing and Implementing the System:
FEMA's Implementation of the National Preparedness System Would Be
Enhanced by a Strategic Plan That Includes Desirable Characteristics:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Overview of Policies and Plans to Define Roles and
Responsibilities and Planning Processes for Developing Emergency Plans:
Appendix III: Information Regarding Assessments Used to Develop the
Comprehensive Assessment System:
Appendix IV: GAO's Description of the Six Characteristics of an
Effective National Strategy:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
Tables:
Table 1: FEMA's Actions to Implement the National Exercise Program:
Table 2: Summary of Assessment Approaches:
Table 3: Summary of Desirable Characteristics for a National Strategy:
Table 4: Description and Status of the 46 Policies That Define Roles
and Responsibilities:
Table 5: Description and Status of the Four Policies That Define the
Planning Processes to Be Used for Developing Emergency Plans:
Table 6: Description and Status of the 72 Plans That Define Roles and
Responsibilities:
Figures:
Figure 1: Elements of the National Preparedness System:
Figure 2: Selected FEMA Components Involved in Preparedness Programs:
Figure 3: Organizational Changes to the National Exercise Program (2001-
2008):
Figure 4: Description of Tiers I-IV Exercises:
Figure 5: Exercise Participants Observing a Federal, State, and Local
Response to a Terrorist Attack Involving a Chemical Release during a
May 2008 Tier II Exercise:
Figure 6: Selected Stakeholders That Have Roles and Responsibilities
for Emergency Response Activities:
Figure 7: Range and Relative Relationship of Policies That Define Roles
and Responsibilities and Planning Processes for Developing Emergency
Plans:
Figure 8: Range and Relative Relationship of Plans That Define Roles
and Responsibilities:
Figure 9: Schedule for the Development and Finalization of Plans Called
for Under HSPD 8 Annex 1, Utilizing the Integrated Planning System:
Figure 10: Range and Relative Relationship of Policies and Plans That
Define Roles and Responsibilities and Planning Processes for Developing
Emergency Plans:
Figure 11: Status of Development of Policies and Plans That Define
Roles and Responsibilities and Planning Processes for Developing
Emergency Plans:
Abbreviations:
9/11 Act: Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007:
CAP: Corrective Action Program:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
ESF: Emergency Support Function:
FACA: Federal Advisory Committee Act:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
FMFIA: Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982:
HHS: Department of Health and Human Services:
HSAC: Homeland Security Advisory Council:
HSC: Homeland Security Council:
HSEEP: Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program:
HSGP: Homeland Security Grant Program:
HSPD: Homeland Security Presidential Directive:
JFO: Joint Field Office:
NEXS: National Exercise Schedule:
NIMS: National Incident Management System:
NIMSCAST: National Incident Management System Compliance Assessment
Support Tool:
NMSZ: New Madrid Seismic Zone:
NPD: National Preparedness Directorate:
NRF: National Response Framework:
NRP: National Response Plan:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
PMBOK: Project Management Body of Knowledge:
Post-Katrina Act: Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act:
PPPA: Office of Preparedness Policy, Planning, and Analysis:
TOPOFF 4: Top Officials 4 Exercise:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 30, 2009:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina were, respectively, the most
destructive terrorist and natural disasters in our nation's history and
highlighted gaps in the nation's readiness to respond effectively to
large-scale catastrophes. Among the gaps were a lack of clarity in
roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local officials;
limitations in assisting those with special needs, such as residents in
nursing homes; and logistical problems in providing food, water, and
other goods to those in areas affected by the disaster. To strengthen
the nation's preparedness for such incidents, in December 2003 the
President issued a directive that called on the Secretary of Homeland
Secretary to enhance capabilities of federal, state, and local
entities.[Footnote 1] In October 2006, the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act (Post-Katrina Act) charged the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA)--a major component of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)--with responsibility for leading the nation in
developing a national preparedness system.[Footnote 2]
The size and complexity of the nation's preparedness activities and the
number of organizations involved make developing a national
preparedness system a difficult task. To lead national preparedness
efforts effectively, FEMA is to coordinate with a wide range of federal
departments and agencies, such as the Departments of Defense, Health
and Human Services, and Justice; 50 states, the District of Columbia,
and 5 territories; city and county governments; a wide range of
nonprofit organizations; and private entities, such as debris removal
contractors. Each of these entities has many stakeholders with whom
FEMA is to coordinate and partner, such as governors and mayors, state
and local emergency managers, and first responders.
The national preparedness system, as shown below in figure 1, is a
continuous cycle of (1) establishing policy and doctrine, (2) planning
and allocating resources, (3) conducting training and exercises to
gather lessons learned, and (4) assessing and reporting on the training
and exercises to evaluate preparedness, including identifying any gaps
in capabilities. The results of these assessments and reports are then
used to inform decision makers on what improvements are needed in
policies and plans and how to target finite resources to improve
preparedness for disasters.
Figure 1: Elements of the National Preparedness System:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
National Preparedness System: elements are illustrated in an
interlocking circle:
Policy and Doctrine[A];
Planning and Resource Allocation[B];
Training, Exercises, and Lessons Learned[C];
Assessment and Reporting[D].
Source: Adapted from FEMA website: [hyperlink,
http://www.dhs.gov/gov/prepesp/publications].
[A] Policy and Doctrine involves ongoing management and maintenance of
national policy and doctrine for operations and preparedness. For
purposes of this report, policy and doctrine includes certain laws and
executive orders that are relevant to national preparedness, as well as
the policy documents that derive from them, such as the National
Preparedness Guidelines. Issued by DHS in September 2007, the National
Preparedness Guidelines involve several key elements, including the
National Preparedness Vision, which provides a concise statement of the
core preparedness of the nation.
[B] Planning and Resource Allocation involves application of common
planning processes to identify requirements, allocate resources, and
build and maintain coordinated capabilities that are prioritized based
upon risk. The application of these planning processes results in the
development of strategic, conceptual and operational plans, as well as
scenario-specific plans.
[C] Training, Exercises, and Lessons Learned involves delivery of
training and exercises and performance evaluation to identify lessons
learned and share effective practices.
[D] Assessment and Reporting involves assessments based on established
readiness metrics and reporting on progress and effectiveness of
preparedness efforts.
[End of figure]
Since 2005, we have issued several reports on the progress, challenges,
and weaknesses that exist in carrying out various preparedness
programs, including exercises and assessment efforts.[Footnote 3] Given
the critical role that FEMA plays in homeland security and emergency
response, you asked us to review the progress that FEMA has made to
develop key elements of the national preparedness system.[Footnote 4]
As a result, this report examines several key parts of the system in
more detail: policy and doctrine; planning, exercises and lessons
learned; and assessments and reporting. Policies broadly define roles
and responsibilities, while plans operationalize policies by providing
more specific information on roles and responsibilities and associated
tasks.[Footnote 5] FEMA's National Exercise Program carries out
exercises which are a key tool for testing and evaluating preparedness.
Assessments include not only assessments of individual exercises and
other preparedness efforts, but of capabilities to determine what gaps,
if any, exist in capability levels. FEMA's ability to establish the
national preparedness system depends, in part, on the effectiveness
with which it integrates the elements of the system and coordinates
with stakeholders, including federal, state, and local agencies,
involved in national preparedness.[Footnote 6]
Specifically, this report addresses the extent to which FEMA has:
* developed policies and plans to define roles and responsibilities and
planning processes for national preparedness;
* taken actions since 2007 to implement the National Exercise Program
and to track corrective actions at the federal and state levels and
what challenges remain;
* made progress in conducting a nationwide capabilities-based
assessment, including developing required preparedness reports, and
what issues, if any, it faces in completing the system; and:
* developed a strategic plan for implementing the national preparedness
system.
To address the questions above, we analyzed information and data on
FEMA's policies and plans for preparedness, implementation of the
National Exercise Program, its approach for developing a comprehensive
system for assessing nationwide capabilities, and its strategy for
integrating elements of the preparedness system. We analyzed key
legislation such as the Post-Katrina Act and the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 ("9/11 Act") as well
as presidential directives related to preparedness efforts.[Footnote 7]
We interviewed FEMA officials responsible for preparedness programs to
learn more about the actions they had taken and planned to take related
to preparedness efforts. Specifically,
* To analyze the extent to which FEMA has developed policies and plans
to define roles and responsibilities and planning processes for
national preparedness, we reviewed the policies and plans that form the
basis of the preparedness system. These policies and plans include,
among others, the National Response Framework (NRF) and National
Preparedness Guidelines, as well as the national integrated planning
system and preliminary versions of related guidance to develop and
integrate plans across federal, state, tribal, and local governments.
[Footnote 8],[Footnote 9] We summarized lessons learned from after-
action reports for federal exercises from 2005 through 2008 to
determine whether the exercises revealed unclear or conflicting roles
and responsibilities between federal departments and agencies, and
whether additional policies or plans were identified as needed
corrective actions. We also compared FEMA's approach for ensuring
policies and plans are completed with best practices for program
management established by the Project Management Institute.[Footnote
10]
* To assess the extent to which FEMA has taken actions since 2007 to
implement a National Exercise Program and to track corrective actions,
we evaluated key program documents, such as the National Exercise
Program Implementation Plan (hereafter referred to as the
implementation plan); the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation
Program (HSEEP)--FEMA's guidelines for carrying out exercises; and data
on the program's performance measures. We evaluated actions taken by
FEMA since 2007 because the implementation plan was issued in April
2007. We examined after-action reports for Principal Level Exercises--
which involve senior federal officials, such as deputy secretaries of
departments or agencies--that were produced from April 2007 through
August 2008 to determine whether a system was in place to ensure that
lessons learned were incorporated into national preparedness.[Footnote
11] We also interviewed Homeland Security Council (HSC) staff and the
Associate Counsel to the President on the role and responsibilities of
the council in designing, executing, and following up on corrective
actions resulting from Principal Level Exercises because these staff
were responsible for summarizing lessons learned and corrective actions
for such exercises. For information that would provide a broader
perspective on FEMA's efforts, we examined several FEMA databases,
including the FEMA Secure Portal--the FEMA repository of after-action
reports; the National Exercise Schedule (NEXS) system--a scheduling
system for all exercises; and the Corrective Action Program (CAP)
System--which was designed for tracking capability improvement plans
entered by federal, state, and local exercise participants. We assessed
the reliability of these databases by checking them against documents,
such as after-action reports produced by states, and by interviewing
staff responsible for the data. We concluded the data in the FEMA
Secure Portal, NEXS system, and CAP system were not reliable for use in
this report. We discuss the reliability of these data later in this
report. Finally, we compared FEMA's policies and procedures for
implementing the National Exercise Program with criteria in GAO's
standards for internal control in the federal government.[Footnote 12]
* To determine the extent to which FEMA has made progress and what
issues, if any, remain in conducting a nationwide capabilities-based
assessment and developing required preparedness reports, we analyzed
information pertinent to FEMA's assessment approach, such as State
Preparedness Reports and the Federal Preparedness Report.[Footnote 13]
We also examined FEMA's plans for implementing the comprehensive
assessment system. We interviewed FEMA staff responsible for developing
FEMA's assessment system and performance objectives for measuring
capabilities. Finally, we reviewed our prior reports on FEMA's
preparedness programs.
* To determine the extent to which FEMA has developed a strategic plan
that integrates the national preparedness system, we analyzed key FEMA
documents including the agencywide Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2008
through 2013, the Grant Programs Directorate Strategic Plan, and the
draft annual National Preparedness Directorate Operating Plan. We
interviewed FEMA National Preparedness Directorate staff on strategic
planning and policy and procedures for the national preparedness
system. We also compared FEMA's current approach for developing a
national preparedness system with the desirable characteristics of
effective national strategies we identified in February 2004.[Footnote
14]
To supplement our analyses of FEMA's preparedness activities, we
visited six states--California, Georgia, Illinois, New York, Texas, and
Washington. While we cannot generalize our work from these visits to
all states, we chose these locations for their geographic diversity and
to provide examples of the way in which states carry out their exercise
and preparedness programs. In selecting these states, we considered
factors such as states' participation in national level exercises;
states located in hurricane-prone regions; and states with varying
percentages of homeland security grant funding planned to support
exercises. At each location, we interviewed staff in FEMA's regional
offices responsible for implementing regional requirements of the
National Exercise Program and regional preparedness activities. We also
interviewed officials in each state on their progress and challenges in
carrying out preparedness activities, including exercises and
assessments of capability. In addition, we evaluated after-action
reports produced by each of the six states.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 through April
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I
contains more details on our scope and methodology.
Results in Brief:
DHS, FEMA, and other federal entities have completed most of the key
policies (42 of 50), such as the base NRF, that define roles and
responsibilities for emergency preparedness and response and the
planning processes for developing emergency plans. However, about 68
percent (49 of 72) of the associated plans to implement these policies,
such as certain operational plans for terrorism response, are
incomplete. In 2008, DHS published the base NRF, which broadly
describes national response doctrine and the roles and responsibilities
of officials involved in response efforts, and certain related annexes,
but DHS has not yet completed other components of the NRF, such as the
four response partner guides that are to provide stakeholder-specific
references describing key roles for federal and nonfederal leaders.
Real-world events have shown that incomplete policies and plans may
adversely impact response efforts. For example, the White House and GAO
concluded that incomplete policies and plans contributed to the lack of
clarity in leadership roles and responsibilities in the response to
Hurricane Katrina. This problem resulted in disjointed efforts by
emergency responders that may have caused increased losses of life and
property. Best practices for program management state that a key step
in managing a program involves developing and utilizing a program
management plan, which defines how a program will be planned, executed,
monitored, and controlled.[Footnote 15] FEMA has not established a
program management plan, in coordination with other federal departments
and agencies, to help ensure the development and integration of
outstanding policies and plans. However, based in part on our work, in
February 2009 FEMA officials acknowledged that a program management
plan should be established. Further, until the national preparedness
system includes a complete and integrated set of policies and plans
that lay out roles and responsibilities and planning processes, FEMA's
ability to prepare officials responsible for responding to natural and
man-made disasters will be limited. By establishing a program
management plan, FEMA would be better positioned to ensure that the
policies and plans are developed and integrated with each other and the
national preparedness system as envisioned by law and presidential
directive.
Since 2007, FEMA has taken actions to implement the National Exercise
Program and track corrective actions, including developing an
implementation plan which establishes requirements for exercises that
involve participation among federal entities; however, FEMA faces
challenges in meeting statutory requirements for tracking corrective
actions and for measuring the effectiveness and progress of the
National Exercise Program. First, although the Post-Katrina Act
requires FEMA to track corrective actions from exercises, FEMA has not
been able to do so in an effective manner because neither HSC--a
federal entity responsible for coordinating interagency homeland
security policy--nor all the states have followed up on corrective
actions in a way that ensured improvements in national preparedness.
For example, the after-action reports we reviewed from HSC did not
include information on the time frames or entities responsible for
completing corrective actions and whether federal entities carried out
corrective actions, as called for by program guidelines. Without such
information, federal agencies cannot be held accountable for
implementing corrective actions that aim to improve preparedness.
Moreover, this problem is not new. More than 3 years ago, a February
2006 White House report on Hurricane Katrina stated that DHS should
ensure that all federal and state entities carry out remedial actions
in a timely way. This problem occurred, in part, because FEMA does not
have procedures in place that detail how it will work with HSC to
ensure that corrective actions are tracked and implemented. In addition
to weaknesses at the federal level, five of the six states we visited
did not have a program for tracking corrective actions, as required by
program requirements. This weakness occurred because FEMA lacked
procedures for effectively monitoring compliance by states with
National Exercise Program requirements. Weaknesses in procedures for
tracking corrective actions has led, in turn, to a second challenge
faced by FEMA, which involves the reliability of several databases used
by FEMA to measure the progress of the National Exercise Program. For
example, HSC did not use a FEMA database that tracks the status of
corrective actions or otherwise provide FEMA with necessary corrective
action information. Program guidelines encourage the use of this
database, but do not require that federal agencies use it. Without
complete information on the status of corrective actions, FEMA cannot
effectively assess the progress and performance of the National
Exercise Program in making improvements in national preparedness.
FEMA has made progress in developing and implementing a system for
assessing national preparedness capabilities, but faces methodological
and coordination challenges in completing the system and issuing
required reports on national preparedness. The Post-Katrina Act
requires that FEMA establish a comprehensive system to assess the
nation's prevention capabilities and overall preparedness. Such a
system should assess, among other things, (1) the nation's preparedness
capability levels against levels defined by desired, or "target"
capabilities needed to prevent, respond to, and recover from natural
and man-made disasters and (2) resources needed to meet the desired
target capabilities. FEMA has established reporting guidance for state
preparedness and has created a program office to develop and implement
an assessment approach that considers past efforts and integrates its
ongoing efforts related to measuring the results of federal grants and
assessing gaps in disaster response capabilities. However, FEMA faces
challenges in developing and completing this approach. As noted in the
January 2009 Federal Preparedness Report, efforts to assess
capabilities and make needed improvements are the least mature elements
of the national preparedness system because these efforts are composed
of a wide range of systems and approaches with varying levels of
integration. FEMA faces methodological challenges that include deciding
how information and data from different sources will be used to inform
the system and developing an approach for coordinating with federal,
state, and local stakeholders in developing and implementing the system
and reporting on its results. Moreover, FEMA has faced similar
challenges in three previous attempts to assess capabilities since at
least 1997. For example, from 2006 through 2008, FEMA spent $15 million
on a Web-based system to identify capability data among states.
However, FEMA discontinued the effort, in part because the data
produced were not meaningful. Best practices for project management
call for milestone dates; an assessment of risks, such as the
methodological challenges described above, in carrying out a project
successfully; and identification of ways to mitigate such risks. While
FEMA has developed a project management plan for completing the
comprehensive assessment system, this plan does not fully identify
program elements to complete the system, such as milestones and program
risks for developing quantifiable metrics necessary for measuring
target capability levels. FEMA's ability to establish a system that
produces meaningful data will be enhanced by detailed plans that
include milestone dates and program risks.
FEMA's agencywide strategic plan for fiscal years 2008 through 2013
calls on its components to develop individual strategic plans; however,
the National Preparedness Directorate has yet to complete a plan for
the national preparedness system.[Footnote 16] Instead, according to
the former director of the Preparedness Directorate, the directorate
uses the Post-Katrina Act and an annual draft operating plan to guide
its strategic approach. The Post-Katrina Act and the draft operating
plan contain some, but not all elements of a strategic plan. For
example, they do not describe how the directorate will (1) measure its
progress in developing the preparedness system, (2) address risks as
they relate to preparedness activities, (3) coordinate with its
stakeholders in developing and carrying out the various elements of the
National Preparedness System, and (4) implement and integrate the
system. The complexity, difficulty, and importance of the preparedness
system underscore the importance of a strategic plan in the
development, implementation, and integration of the system. In February
2004, we identified six characteristics of effective strategies that
strengthen program success that could be applied to the National
Preparedness System. Those characteristics are: (1) a statement of
purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk
assessment; (3) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and
performance measures; (4) resources, investments, and risk management;
(5) organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and (6)
integration and implementation. Developing a strategic plan for the
national preparedness system that outlines clear, measurable objectives
and goals, including who is responsible for achieving them, would
assist FEMA in improving accountability of organizational entities
involved in preparedness efforts and enhance the likelihood of its
success in using program results to improve policies, plans, exercises,
and capabilities related to national preparedness.
We make a number of recommendations to the Administrator of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency to help address weaknesses in efforts to
develop policies and plans that define roles and responsibilities,
carry out the National Exercise Program, develop the comprehensive
assessment system, and implement a strategic approach for the national
preparedness system. These recommendations cover such matters as
developing a program management plan to help ensure the completion of
policies and plans that define roles and responsibilities, developing
procedures that detail how FEMA will work with HSC to help ensure that
the council documents and tracks corrective actions resulting from
exercises, revising FEMA's procedures for monitoring compliance by
states with National Exercise Program requirements, developing a more
detailed project management plan for implementing the comprehensive
assessment system, and developing a strategic plan to help ensure the
implementation of the national preparedness system.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS said it generally agreed
with our recommendations. However, DHS expressed concern that the
report suggests that DHS/FEMA should hold other federal agencies and
departments or state, local or tribal governments accountable for
compliance with program requirements, while also recognizing that FEMA
did not always have the explicit authority to compel compliance. The
Post-Katrina Act designates FEMA as the federal leader and coordinator
for developing and implementing the national preparedness system. We
recognize that FEMA's authority is generally to coordinate, guide, and
support, rather than direct, and that collaboration is an essential
element of FEMA's efforts. At the same time, we believe that FEMA's
expanded leadership role under the Post-Katrina Act provides it with
opportunities for and a responsibility to further develop its
relationships with national preparedness stakeholders at the local,
state and federal levels and to instill a shared sense of
responsibility and accountability on the part of all stakeholders for
the successful development and implementation of the national
preparedness system. Several of our recommendations aim to enhance such
collaboration and cooperation.
Background:
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina dramatically illustrated the adverse
consequences that can occur when the nation is unprepared to respond
effectively to a catastrophic disaster. Emergency preparedness
strengthens the nation's ability to prevent, protect, respond to, and
recover from a natural disaster, terrorist attack, or other man-made
disaster. It has received widespread attention and support from
Congress, the President, and the Secretary of Homeland Security as
manifested by legislation, presidential directives, the development of
DHS policy documents, and grants to state and local governments. The
lessons learned from the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Hurricane
Katrina focused attention on the need for preparedness programs that
could (1) guide decisions on how to improve policies and plans that
define roles and responsibilities across the broad spectrum of
governmental and nongovernmental organizations involved in prevention,
protection, response, and recovery activities and (2) help managers
prioritize the use of finite resources to narrow gaps in needed
capabilities.
FEMA--a component in DHS--is the federal agency responsible for leading
the nation's preparedness activities. In December 2003, the President
issued guidance that called on the Secretary of Homeland Security to
carry out and coordinate preparedness activities with public, private,
and nonprofit organizations involved in such activities.[Footnote 17]
In the wake of the problems that marked the response to Hurricane
Katrina in 2005, Congress passed the Post-Katrina Act in October 2006.
The act strengthened FEMA's role within DHS and defined FEMA's primary
mission as: "to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the
Nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of
terrorism, and other man-made disasters, by leading and supporting the
nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency management system of
preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation."[Footnote
18] The act required FEMA to establish a national preparedness system
for ensuring that the nation has the ability to deal with all hazards,
including those incidents with catastrophic consequences. Among other
things, the act directs FEMA to provide funding, training, exercises,
technical assistance, planning, and other assistance to build tribal,
local, state, regional, and national capabilities (including
communications capabilities) necessary to respond to any type of
disaster. It also requires FEMA to develop and coordinate the
implementation of a risk-based all-hazards strategy for preparedness
that builds those common capabilities necessary to any type of
disaster, while also building the unique capabilities necessary to
respond to specific types of incidents that pose the greatest risk to
the United States.[Footnote 19] The act includes a number of other
specific requirements including the development of quantifiable
performance measurements to support each component of the national
preparedness system, such as capabilities assessment, training, and
exercises.[Footnote 20] The system provides a basis for improvements in
policies, plans, and capabilities that aim to save lives and protect
and preserve property.
National Preparedness Aims to Clarify Roles and Responsibilities and
Close Gaps in Disaster Response Capability:
DHS has defined national preparedness as a continuous cycle that
involves four main elements: (1) policy and doctrine, (2) planning and
resource allocation, (3) training and exercises, and (4) an assessment
of capabilities and reporting.[Footnote 21] The following is a brief
description of each element of the system.
Policy: This element involves ongoing management and maintenance of
national policy and doctrine for operations and preparedness. Disaster
response is primarily handled by local or tribal governments with the
state and federal governments and private and nonprofit sectors playing
supporting and ad hoc roles, respectively, as needed or as requested.
[Footnote 22] One of the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina is that
a lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities across these
levels of government and sectors can result in a less coordinated
national response and delay the nation's ability to provide life-saving
support when needed.[Footnote 23] Broadly speaking, FEMA's role, in
cooperation with other federal and nonfederal entities, is to define
the roles and responsibilities for all response stakeholders so that
each understands how it supports the broader national response. This
approach calls for a national response based on partnerships at and
across all levels.
Planning and resource allocation: This element involves application of
common planning processes and tools by government officials, working
with the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and individual
citizens to identify requirements, allocate resources, and build and
maintain coordinated capabilities that are prioritized based upon risk.
Among other things, this element involves developing planning processes
so that roles and responsibilities of stakeholders are clearly defined
for specific homeland security scenarios, such as a hurricane or a
terrorist attack involving nuclear or radiological weapons.
Training and exercises: Exercises provide opportunities to test plans
and improve proficiency in a risk-free environment. Exercises assess
the adequacy of capabilities as well as the clarity of established
roles and responsibilities. Short of performance in actual operations,
exercise activities provide the best means to evaluate returns on
homeland security investments. The Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA to
carry out a National Training Program and National Exercise Program.
[Footnote 24] On January 26, 2007, the National Security Council and
the HSC approved the establishment of a new iteration of the National
Exercise Program to conduct exercises to help senior federal government
officials prepare for catastrophic crises ranging from terrorism to
natural disasters. Well-designed and executed exercises can improve
interagency coordination and communications, highlight capability gaps,
and identify opportunities for improvement[Footnote 25]. Tracking
corrective actions resulting from exercises is a key step in the
process.
Assessing capabilities and reporting: According to the Post-Katrina
Act, FEMA is required to develop a comprehensive assessment system to
assess the nation's prevention capabilities and overall preparedness. A
key part of the system involves the development of quantifiable
standards and metrics--called target capabilities--that can be used to
assess existing capability levels compared with target capability
levels.[Footnote 26] The act requires FEMA to include the results of
its comprehensive assessments in an annual Federal Preparedness Report
to Congress. To assist in this effort, FEMA is to receive annual State
Preparedness Reports from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and
5 territories that receive DHS preparedness assistance.[Footnote 27]
FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate has primary responsibility for
carrying out the key elements of the national preparedness system, in
coordination with other federal, state, local, tribal, nonprofit, and
private-sector organizations. The directorate includes the National
Integration Center and the Office of Preparedness Policy, Planning, and
Analysis (PPPA).[Footnote 28] The National Preparedness Directorate and
FEMA's Disaster Operations Directorate[Footnote 29] share
responsibility for ensuring plans that describe roles and
responsibilities are developed. FEMA's National Exercise Division--a
division of the National Integration Center--leads exercise activities.
Finally, PPPA is responsible for assessing capabilities. See figure 2
for an organizational chart of select FEMA components involved in
preparedness programs.
Figure 2: Selected FEMA Components Involved in Preparedness Programs:
[Refer to PDF for image: organizational chart]
Top level:
Department of Homeland Security;
Second level, reporting to Department of Homeland Security:
Federal Emergency Management Agency;
Third level, reporting to Federal Emergency Management Agency:
Disaster Operations Directorate;
National Preparedness Directorate;
Grant Program Directorate;
Fourth level, reporting to National Preparedness Directorate:
National Integration Center;
The Office of Preparedness Policy, Planning and Analysis;
Fifth level, reporting to National Integration Center:
National Exercise Division.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
Developing and Integrating the Elements of the National Preparedness
System Is a Challenging Responsibility:
FEMA faces two main challenges in developing and integrating the
elements of the national preparedness system.
* First, the size and complexity of the nation's preparedness
activities and the number of organizations involved--both public and
private--pose a significant challenge to FEMA as it leads the nation's
efforts to develop and sustain a national preparedness system.[Footnote
30],[Footnote 31] To develop an effective system, FEMA is to coordinate
and partner with a broad range of stakeholders involved in the
preparedness system. In addition, the Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA to
coordinate with the National Advisory Council and the National Council
on Disability when implementing various requirements, including
establishing the National Exercise Program and the comprehensive
assessment system.[Footnote 32],, Such extensive coordination requires
a multidisciplinary approach involving planning, training, and program
activities that must address challenges related to different
organizational cultures, varying procedures and work patterns among
organizations, and lack of communication between departments and
agencies. The progress that FEMA makes in developing the preparedness
system will depend, in part, on how it involves these preparedness
stakeholders in plans that define roles and responsibilities,
exercises, and assessments of capabilities.
* Second, FEMA has experienced a number of organizational and staffing
changes as a result of its incorporation into DHS, subsequent
departmental reorganizations, and, most recently, the enactment of the
Post-Katrina Act. Following DHS's formation, the President issued
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 in December 2003, requiring
the Secretary of Homeland Security to carry out elements of national
preparedness, such as resource allocation to states, exercises and
training, and capability assessments. In carrying out this directive,
non-FEMA components in DHS conducted preparedness activities. In July
2005, the Secretary of Homeland Security separated preparedness
programs from response and recovery. All preparedness programs,
including planning, training, exercising, and funding, were placed in a
new DHS Directorate for Preparedness. Meanwhile, FEMA was a separate
component that was responsible for response and recovery. In October
2006, the Post-Katrina Act reversed this organizational change,
restoring to FEMA most of the functions that the Preparedness
Directorate had assumed, effective March 31, 2007.[Footnote 33] As a
result of this statutory transfer of authority, FEMA inherited the
preparedness programs that had been carried out by other elements of
DHS pursuant to HSPD-8. For example, the National Exercise Program was
moved to FEMA from DHS's Office of Grants and Training in January 2007.
[Footnote 34] Similarly, parts of the comprehensive assessment system
were previously carried out by non-FEMA components in DHS, according to
FEMA officials. For example, target capabilities were developed by the
Office of Policy Analysis and other capability assessments were
developed by DHS programs outside of FEMA.[Footnote 35] In January
2008, FEMA established the PPPA component within the National
Preparedness Directorate to develop the comprehensive assessment
system. Such organizational changes have resulted in turnover of staff
and loss of institutional knowledge of previous efforts. For example,
in March 2008 half of the staff positions in the PPPA office were
vacant and these positions were not filled until November 2008,
according to FEMA officials. In addition, FEMA did not hire a permanent
director for the PPPA office until October 2008. Reorganization of the
National Exercise Program also brought about staffing changes,
according to FEMA officials. Among other things, in the fall of 2008
FEMA hired a new director for the National Exercise Division--a
position that had been vacant for several months, according to FEMA
officials.[Footnote 36] Figure 3 illustrates the organizational changes
related to the National Exercise Program.
Figure 3: Organizational Changes to the National Exercise Program (2001-
2008):
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Department of Justice:
2001: The Exercise Program is in the Office of Domestic Preparedness;
2001: 9/11 occurs.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS):
2003: DHS established;
2003: The Office of Domestic Preparedness and the Exercise Program are
transferred to DHS;
2004: The Office of Domestic Preparedness becomes the Office of State
and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness;
2005: The Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness becomes the Office of Grants and Training.
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA):
2003: FEMA is moved into DHS;
2007: The National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) is created in FEMA
and the Office of Grants and Training is transferred to FEMA; Grants
are separated from training and exercises and moved to a new Grant
Programs Directorate; Training and exercises are moved to the National
Integration Center, a subcomponent in NPD.
Source: Department of Homeland Security and GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
Most Policies That Define Roles and Responsibilities and Planning
Processes Have Been Completed, but Work Remains to Complete Emergency
Plans:
Defining roles and responsibilities is a key step in developing the
national preparedness system. While most key policies that define roles
and responsibilities have been completed, 68 percent (49 of 72) of
plans that operationalize such policies have not been completed.
Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and emergency response exercises
demonstrated the need for the development of complete policies and
plans to address potential problems with stakeholders not understanding
their roles and responsibilities in response to a catastrophic
disaster. Although best practices for program management state that a
program management plan is an essential tool for implementing a
program, FEMA, in coordination with DHS and other federal entities, has
not yet fully developed such a plan to help ensure the development and
integration of policies and plans that define roles and
responsibilities and planning processes for emergency response.
Defining Roles and Responsibilities Is Key to Developing the
Preparedness System:
Legislation and presidential directives call for the development of
policies and plans that define roles and responsibilities, which is key
to FEMA's ability to develop the preparedness system. For example, the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended by the Post-Katrina Act,
requires FEMA to consolidate existing federal government emergency
response plans into a single, coordinated National Response Plan, now
known as the National Response Framework.[Footnote 37] To develop the
preparedness system, FEMA is to partner and coordinate with key
stakeholders, including other DHS components as well as other federal,
state, and local entities. For example, the Post-Katrina Act requires
the FEMA Administrator, under the leadership of the Secretary of
Homeland Security, to coordinate with other agencies and offices in DHS
to take full advantage of their range of available resources.[Footnote
38] In addition, the Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA to coordinate with
other federal departments and agencies and the National Advisory
Council to develop and refine key national policy documents that
broadly define roles and responsibilities, including the National
Incident Management System (NIMS) and the NRF.[Footnote 39]
Plans developed using established planning processes operationalize
policy documents, such as the NRF, by providing additional details on
the roles and responsibilities for each individual and organization
that may be involved in responding to high-risk or catastrophic
incidents.[Footnote 40] For example, during the planning process, FEMA
may need to coordinate with other federal departments and agencies--
such as the Department of Defense (DOD), Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and other components in DHS--to define roles and
responsibilities for responding to a chemical attack. Per the Post-
Katrina Act, each federal agency with responsibilities under the NRF is
responsible for developing its own operational plans.[Footnote 41]
The act further requires the President to certify to selected
committees of Congress on an annual basis that each federal agency has
complied with statutory requirements in the development of its
operational plan, including a requirement that the plan "be coordinated
under a unified system with a common terminology, approach, and
framework."[Footnote 42] Although the Post-Katrina Act does not charge
FEMA with developing or certifying the federal agency plans, FEMA is
statutorily responsible for the basic architecture of the national
preparedness system, in coordination with other federal departments and
agencies, among others. This principle of integration and coordination
is also embodied in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 Annex 1
(HSPD 8 Annex 1), which tasked DHS with developing a national planning
system to develop and integrate plans that define preparedness roles
and responsibilities, both horizontally across federal departments and
agencies (i.e., integration of plans that have been developed by more
than one federal department or agency) and vertically with state and
local emergency response plans (i.e., integration of plans that have
been developed by more than one level of government). Thus, the federal
preparedness framework depends on DHS's--and, in particular, FEMA's--
ability to coordinate with its federal department and agency partners
to ensure that their plans are integrated in a way that avoids
duplication of effort and confusion during an interagency response.
Most Key Policies That Define Roles and Responsibilities and Planning
Processes Have Been Completed:
DHS, FEMA, and other federal entities with a role in national
preparedness have completed most of the key policies that broadly
define roles and responsibilities and planning processes for developing
more detailed emergency plans.[Footnote 43] Among the 50 policies that
define roles and responsibilities or planning processes, 42 have been
completed, 2 have been partially completed, and the remaining 6 are
incomplete.
A more detailed breakdown of the 50 policies shows that 46 define roles
and responsibilities and 4 define planning processes for developing
emergency plans. Forty of the 46 policies that define roles and
responsibilities have been completed.[Footnote 44] Among the policies
that have been completed, for example, DHS issued the revised NIMS in
December 2008 to further clarify roles and responsibilities when
multiagency, intergovernmental entities are involved in a response and
to address, in part, the confusion about roles and responsibilities
that resulted in a poor response to Hurricane Katrina.[Footnote 45] Key
components of the NRF have also been completed, including the base NRF
document, 15 Emergency Support Function Annexes, and 8 Support Annexes.
[Footnote 46] However, other components of the NRF have not been
completed, such as the 4 Partner Guides that are to provide abbreviated
descriptions of the key roles and responsibilities of specific federal,
state, local, and private sector and nongovernmental stakeholders under
the NRF.[Footnote 47] Also uncompleted is the development of new Joint
Field Office (JFO) guidance under the NRF which, according to FEMA
officials, is to provide functional guidance for the organization and
staffing of JFOs, as well as their establishment, operation, and
demobilization.[Footnote 48] In addition, DHS has not completed the
National Homeland Security Plan, which is to serve as an overarching
strategic plan to guide national efforts to execute the National
Strategy for Homeland Security. For details on, and the status of, all
46 policies that are to define roles and responsibilities, see table 4
in appendix II.
In addition to the 46 policies that define roles and responsibilities,
4 other policies are to define planning processes for developing
emergency plans.[Footnote 49] Two of these 4 policies have been
completed. According to FEMA officials, FEMA issued planning guidance
for its operational planners in March 2009 and will update this
guidance each fiscal year. The other 2 policies that define planning
processes have been partially completed--1 has been issued as an
interim policy (Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 301) while the other
has been drafted (Integrated Planning System) and is being used by
federal interagency incident management planners although it has not
been publicly released.[Footnote 50] Additional details describing
these 4 policies and their status are included in table 5 in appendix
II.
Although Action Has Been Taken to Develop and Complete Some Plans That
Define Roles and Responsibilities, 68 Percent of the Plans Have Not
Been Completed:
While DHS, FEMA, and other federal entities with a role in national
preparedness have taken action to develop and complete some plans that
detail and operationalize roles and responsibilities for federal and
nonfederal entities, these entities have not completed 68 percent of
the plans required by existing legislation, presidential directives,
and policy documents as of April 2009.[Footnote 51] Specifically, of
the 72 plans we identified, 20 have been completed (28 percent), 3 have
been partially completed (that is, an interim or draft plan has been
produced--4 percent), and 49 (68 percent) have not been completed.
Detailed plans supplement and operationalize key policy documents.
Among the plans that have been completed, FEMA published the Pre-
Scripted Mission Assignment Catalog in 2008, which defines roles and
responsibilities for 236 mission assignment activities to be performed
by federal government entities, at the direction of FEMA, to aid state
and local jurisdictions during a response to a major disaster or an
emergency.[Footnote 52] See table 6 in appendix II for additional
details on the other 19 plans that have been completed.
One of the three plans that FEMA has partially completed is the Federal
Contingency Plan--New Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic Earthquake.
[Footnote 53] This plan addresses major issues the federal government
expects to encounter if a catastrophic earthquake occurs in the New
Madrid Seismic Zone with no warning. FEMA published this plan in an
interim form in June 2008 and intends to finalize it by May 2010. While
FEMA has engaged in significant planning efforts regarding threats that
are specific to certain regions, such as hurricanes and earthquakes,
through its Catastrophic Disaster Planning Initiative, those planning
efforts are ongoing and have not been concluded.[Footnote 54] See table
6 in appendix II for additional details on the other two plans that
have been partially completed.
Among the 49 plans that have not been completed are the NRF incident
annexes for terrorism and cyber incidents as well as the NRF incident
annex supplements for catastrophic disasters and mass evacuations. The
NRF incident annexes and incident annex supplements are to address the
roles and responsibilities and unique aspects of how the United States
responds to broad incident types.[Footnote 55] In addition, operational
plans for responding to the consolidated national planning scenarios,
as called for in HSPD 8 Annex 1, remain outstanding. For additional
details and the status of each of these plans, as well as other plans
that are to define roles and responsibilities, see table 6 in appendix
II.
Developing plans to operationalize policies that define roles and
responsibilities is one key to an effective response. According to DHS,
effective response hinges upon well-trained leaders and responders who
have invested in response preparedness, developed engaged partnerships,
and are able to achieve shared objectives. Until outstanding policies
and plans, especially those that are new, are completed, FEMA, in
coordination with DHS and other federal departments and agencies,
cannot provide associated training on such policies and plans, and,
relatedly, cannot validate the new policies, plans, and training though
exercises--the next step in the national preparedness system cycle.
According to FEMA, certain plans that have yet to be completed are
refinements of existing plans, and training has been provided on the
existing plan. However, such existing training will need to be adapted
and modified to enable response stakeholders to be trained on the
revised plans. Incomplete policies and plans, especially those that are
new, and the resulting lack of associated training and validation
through exercises, increase the risk that response to an incident may
be disjointed, delayed, or ineffective because stakeholders may not
understand their roles and responsibilities.
The issue of completing emergency policies and plans that define roles
and responsibilities is not new. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, based on a
summary of lessons learned from exercises conducted in fiscal year
2005, DHS determined that plans for specific incidents were potentially
needed to clarify how the National Response Plan (now the NRF) would be
implemented under several types of domestic scenarios, such as the
threat of an improvised nuclear device detonation, large-scale
biological events, and suicide bombings. In February 2006, the White
House issued its report on lessons learned from the response to
Hurricane Katrina and concluded that two of four critical deficiencies
in the response involved policies and plans, or the lack thereof, that
were to detail roles and responsibilities.[Footnote 56] Among other
things, the report noted that federal departments and agencies were
required to develop supporting operational plans and standard operating
procedures for national response activities, but in almost all cases,
these required plans and procedures were either nonexistent or still
under development. In addition, the report stated that additional
structural deficiencies in the national preparedness system included
weak regional response planning and coordination structures.[Footnote
57] Further, in our September 2006 report on Hurricane Katrina, we
recommended that FEMA develop detailed and robust operational
implementation plans for the National Response Plan (now NRF) and its
Catastrophic Incident Annex and Supplement in preparation for and
response to future catastrophic disasters.[Footnote 58]
In addition, in October 2006, the Post-Katrina Act required FEMA to
develop prescripted mission assignments and each federal agency with
NRF responsibilities to develop operational plans and corresponding
capabilities in support of the NRF to ensure a coordinated federal
response.[Footnote 59] In December 2007, the President signed HSPD 8
Annex 1, which called for the development of an integrated set of
scenario-based response plans, including federal agency operational
plans that are also needed to satisfy the Post-Katrina Act. More
recently, in September 2008, the Homeland Security Advisory Council
(HSAC)[Footnote 60] for DHS identified the work of strengthening the
nation's disaster response capabilities, which includes developing and
publishing outstanding emergency response policies and plans that
define roles and responsibilities for national preparedness, as 1 of
the top 10 DHS challenges for the incoming presidential administration.
[Footnote 61]
Despite Exercises Demonstrating the Need for the Development of
Complete Policies and Plans, FEMA Has Not Fully Developed a Program
Management Plan for Their Development and Integration:
Recent Exercises Have Demonstrated the Importance of the Development of
Complete Policies and Plans to Define Roles and Responsibilities:
In addition to the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, recent
exercises have demonstrated the ongoing need for the development of
complete policies and plans that define roles and responsibilities for
national preparedness. For example, we reviewed 16 after-action reports
for national or principal level or equivalent exercises that were
conducted from 2005 to 2008, and all of the reports (16 of 16) called
for further clarification of roles and responsibilities across federal
departments and agencies or between federal and nonfederal
organizations, as shown in the following examples.
* As a result of a February 2007 exercise that tested a joint response
by federal agencies to an attack using improvised explosive devices,
HSC determined that the federal government needed to further refine the
delineation of roles and responsibilities for the Departments of
Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security. The same exercise also
identified the need for the federal government to increase outreach to
governors in order to achieve a common understanding of federal and
state governments' respective roles and responsibilities during such an
incident. Finally, this exercise demonstrated that policies and plans
were needed to clearly articulate, prior to an incident occurring, the
circumstances in which the use of military assets and resources for
civilian response is appropriate. Not addressing these recommended
corrective actions, among others, may result in less efficient and
effective responses.
* In a September 2007 exercise, the HSC identified the need for senior
federal officials to be rapidly informed of the possible courses of
action available to them in responding to a major disaster or an
emergency. To do so, HSC asserted that the senior federal officials'
respective organizations should have in place detailed plans to inform
and execute the senior federal officials' decisions, as such plans
would serve to better integrate interagency response activities. HSC
made this recommendation in September 2007, and it was acted on by the
President through the establishment of HSPD 8 Annex 1 in December 2007,
more than a year after the Post-Katrina Act called for the development
of federal agency operational plans.[Footnote 62]
FEMA Has Not Established a Program Management Plan for the Development
and Integration of Outstanding Emergency Response Policies and Plans:
FEMA has not established a program management plan, in coordination
with DHS and other federal entities, to ensure the development and
integration of outstanding policies and plans that are to define roles
and responsibilities and planning processes. The Post-Katrina Act makes
the FEMA Administrator, in coordination with other entities,
responsible for the development of the national preparedness system.
According to the National Preparedness Guidelines, the national
preparedness system, in part, consists of the policies and plans that
define roles and responsibilities and planning processes for developing
emergency plans. Although the Post-Katrina Act requires federal
agencies to develop their own operational plans, those plans are to be
"coordinated under a unified system with a common terminology,
approach, and framework."[Footnote 63] This coordination and
unification is central to FEMA's mission as the lead agency in charge
of national preparedness, and it requires that the policies and plans
that have been called for are developed and integrated so that
emergency response roles and responsibilities and planning processes
are fully defined and implemented.
Best practices for program management, established by the Project
Management Institute in The Standard for Program Management, state that
managing a program includes, among other things, (1) establishing clear
and achievable objectives; (2) balancing the competing demands for
quality, scope, time, and cost; and, (3) adapting the specifications,
plans, and approach to the different concerns and expectations of the
various stakeholders involved in the program's projects.[Footnote 64] A
key step in managing a program involves developing a program management
plan, which is an approved document that defines how a program will be
executed, monitored, and controlled. The program management plan
defines the tactical means by which the program will be carried out.
According to The Standard for Program Management, a program management
plan should, among other things:
* identify the specific schedule of activities that need to be
performed to complete and identify dependencies among policy and
planning development activities;
* identify the types and quantities of resources required to perform,
and amount of time needed to complete, all policy and planning
development activities;
* analyze activity sequences, durations, resource requirements, and
schedule constraints to create and update the policy and planning
project schedules; and:
* control for changes to the project schedules precipitated by outside
forces.
Because FEMA has not established, in coordination with DHS and other
federal entities, such a plan to ensure the development and integration
of outstanding policies and plans, it is unclear when the full set of
policies and plans will be completed, and FEMA cannot determine whether
it or other entities with policy and plan development responsibilities,
such as DHS, are on schedule. Further, because FEMA cannot determine
whether other entities with policy and plan development
responsibilities are on schedule, it cannot determine when and how it
will integrate into the national preparedness cycle the range of
policies and plans required by legislation, presidential directives,
and other policy. Based in part on our work, in February 2009 FEMA
officials acknowledged that a program management plan should be
established. Without active utilization of a program management plan,
FEMA, in coordination with DHS and other federal entities, may
experience unforeseen delays in completing its efforts to develop and
integrate these policies and plans that define roles and
responsibilities and planning processes. While FEMA, in coordination
with DHS and other federal entities, may experience unanticipated or
uncontrollable delays in developing outstanding policies and plans, it
would be better positioned to identify the effect of those delays and
assess measures to mitigate them with a program management plan in
place and utilized.
FEMA Has Taken Actions to Implement the National Exercise Program, but
Faces Challenges in Meeting Statutory and Program Requirements:
FEMA has developed guidance to implement the National Exercise Program;
however, it faces challenges in meeting statutory and program
requirements in conducting the program. These challenges have arisen
because FEMA lacks procedures that detail how it will work with federal
entities and monitor states to ensure these entities carry out program
requirements. In addition, FEMA faces challenges in measuring the
effectiveness of the program because the databases it uses to measure
program performance are incomplete.
FEMA Has Developed Guidance and Other Tools to Assist in Designing and
Implementing the National Exercise Program:
Exercises are a key element of the national preparedness system. The
purpose of the National Exercise Program is to test and improve the
nation's ability to prevent, prepare for, and respond to events such as
terrorist attacks and natural and man-made disasters. To meet this
purpose, exercises should test existing capabilities against desired,
or target capabilities as well as verify and validate policies and
plans that define roles and responsibilities.
Developing and implementing the National Exercise Program is a
difficult task because the magnitude of the effort involves
coordinating with and relying on the cooperation of other DHS
components such as the Coast Guard, numerous federal entities such as
the Homeland Security Council (HSC)--which is responsible for
coordinating federal interagency homeland security policy--and state
governments, among others. This coordination is especially critical at
the federal level because FEMA lacks the authority to compel federal
agencies to comply with program requirements. At the state level, FEMA
is able to use its grant programs to ensure that states follow program
guidelines. Since 2007, FEMA has taken a number of actions to implement
the National Exercise Program. Several of these actions are summarized
in table 1.
Table 1: FEMA's Actions to Implement the National Exercise Program:
Actions taken: Executed an implementation plan[A] for nine federal
departments or agencies[B];
Summary: The implementation plan establishes the foundation for the
National Exercise Program by outlining policy and guidance for federal
interagency coordination and participation and establishes four tiers
of exercises. (See figure 6 for more details on Tier I-IV exercises.)
The plan requires that FEMA develop and annually revise a 5-year
schedule for Tier I and Tier II exercises, that senior officers of the
federal government participate in exercise activities, that federal
departments and agencies budget and plan for exercise participation,
and that federal departments, agencies, or offices responsible for
coordinating exercises adhere to the principles of the National
Exercise Program.
Actions taken: Refined Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation
Program (HSEEP) guidance;
Summary: This is the primary guidance for all four tiers of exercises.
FEMA requires that entities that receive Homeland Security Grant
Program (HSGP) funding for their exercises to adhere to specific HSEEP
guidance for exercise program management, design, conduct, evaluation,
and improvement planning (FEMA revised HSEEP in February 2007).
Actions taken: Developed and refined tools;
Summary:
* The National Exercise Schedule (NEXS) system is the nation's online
tool that facilitates scheduling and synchronization of national,
federal, state, and local level exercises. (FEMA relaunched NEXS in
November 2006; a previous Exercise Scheduling and Reporting System was
originally released in June 2004);
* Secure Portal is a Web-based repository for federal and state
exercise program managers' plans, after-action reports, and improvement
plans. (The FEMA Secure Portal was fully implemented by June 2004; it
was originally procured in 2002);
* The Corrective Action Program (CAP) system is a Web-based database
for tracking capability-based improvement plans. (FEMA launched it in
March 2007);
* The HSEEP toolkit is a collection of tools to assist managers in
exercise scheduling, design, and evaluation. These provide users with
templates and guidance for conducting exercises. (FEMA updated it in
February 2008);
* The Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) system is an online
library of homeland security-related documents, including lessons
learned and after-action reports, which are voluntarily submitted by
federal and state officials. (FEMA launched LLIS in April 2004).
Source: GAO, based on FEMA information.
[A] On January 26, 2007, the National Security Council and HSC
unanimously reached agreement on a charter for the National Exercise
Program and on April 11, 2007, the President approved the National
Exercise Program's Implementation Plan. As of February 2009, the plan
had been revised, but had not yet been approved by the White House,
according to FEMA officials. Our report will refer to the 2007 plan
unless otherwise noted.
[B] Seven departments ( the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense,
Energy, Justice, Transportation, State, and Health and Human Services)
and two agencies (the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence) are signatories to the National
Exercise Program's Implementation Plan.
[End of table]
FEMA has also identified four tiers of exercises that comprise the
National Exercise Program (see figure 4). Among the exercises that
involve federal interagency coordination are Tier I National Level
Exercises, which are operations-based exercises that evaluate existing
national plans and policies, in concert with federal and nonfederal
entities; and Principal Level Exercises, which are discussion-based
exercises among senior federal officials that examine emerging issues.
Figure 4: Description of Tiers I-IV Exercises:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Tier I:
White House directed, U.S. government-wide strategy and policy focus,
full federal agency participation. Five Tier I exercises conducted
annually (One National Level Exercise and four Principal Level
Excercises).
Tier II:
Federal department/agency directed, U.S. government-wide strategy and
policy focus. Full federal agency participation in person or through
simulation. No more than three Tier II exercises conducted annually.
Tier III:
Other federal exercises, regional operational, tactical or
organizational-specific focus. Full federal agency participation is
optional. The number of exercises conducted annually depends upon
individual entities‘ needs and requirements.
Tier IV:
Non-federal exercises, state, territorial, local, and/or tribal
governments and/or private sector focus. Federal agency participation
is optional. The number of exercises conducted annually depends upon
individual entities‘ needs and requirements.
Source: FEMA.
[End of figure]
Officials at all six states we visited cited actions taken by FEMA to
implement the National Exercise Program as positive contributions to
their exercise efforts. For example, officials in five of the six
states indicated that HSEEP guidance was beneficial because it
establishes consistency in how exercises are designed and conducted.
State officials who were involved in a National Level Exercise
indicated that it not only allowed them to test and validate local
emergency response plans, but also gave them the opportunity to meet
federal stakeholders as well as first responders from neighboring
counties and cities, thus enabling them to establish working
relationships before an event occurs. Similarly, exercise planners in
New York noted that a benefit of FEMA's regional training and exercise
plan workshop was the positive relations that were developed with FEMA
officials.[Footnote 65]
States Have Also Taken Actions to Implement Exercise Programs:
In addition to actions by FEMA, the six states we visited have also
taken actions to implement exercise programs (FEMA considers exercises
conducted by states to be Tier IV exercises.) For example, exercise
planners in Washington conducted a half-day senior leadership workshop
for federal, state, and local officials in May 2008 that identified a
number of issues related, among other things, to intergovernmental
communications during an incident. Based on the workshop, officials in
Washington identified corrective actions that could be taken. For
example, they identified the need to increase postdisaster
communications to help speed recovery efforts and said they were taking
corrective actions to address this issue. In California, state exercise
planners involved planners from other departments or other states in
their design and planning workshops as a way to share information on
exercise design and conduct, thereby increasing the interagency
participation in their exercise program efforts. According to the
workshop sponsors, participants benefited from the multidisciplinary
participation in the conference. In Illinois, the state used real-world
events, such as sporting events, to test or "exercise" response by
local law enforcement and first responders. State exercise officials
said these efforts were an effective supplement to their regular
exercise program.
FEMA Faces Challenges in Meeting Statutory and Program Requirements in
Conducting and Measuring the Effectiveness of the National Exercise
Program:
While FEMA has taken actions to implement the National Exercise
Program, it faces challenges in meeting statutory and program
requirements in conducting and measuring the effectiveness of the
program. First, FEMA does not have procedures in place to detail how it
is to (1) work with other federal entities and (2) monitor states to
help ensure that these entities promptly prepare after-action reports
and track and implement corrective actions for federal-and state-level
exercises. Second, the National Exercise Program's ability to simulate
a catastrophic event to strain, or "stress", the preparedness system is
limited. Third, FEMA lacks data to measure the effectiveness and
progress of the National Exercise Program.
FEMA Does Not Have Procedures to Help Ensure that After-Action Reports
from National and Principal Level Exercises Are Promptly Prepared and
That Corrective Actions Are Tracked and Implemented:
FEMA must design the National Exercise Program to provide, among other
things, for the prompt development of after-action reports and plans
for quickly incorporating lessons learned into future operations.
[Footnote 66] In addition, the Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA to
establish a program to conduct remedial action tracking and long-term
trend analyses.[Footnote 67] According to the implementation plan for
the National Exercise Program, after-action reports for Tier I
exercises (National Level Exercises or Principal Level Exercises) must
be issued within 180 days, or 6 months, after the completion of an
exercise, and the release of an after-action report should not be
delayed to reach consensus on all issues identified during the
exercise. FEMA executes Tier I exercises in coordination with HSC and
others. Although the Post-Katrina Act does not give FEMA the authority
to compel other federal entities to comply with the objectives of the
National Exercise Program, it places responsibility for implementing
the National Exercise Program on FEMA, in coordination with other
appropriate federal agencies and other entities. Therefore, it is
incumbent on FEMA to coordinate with HSC and other federal entities to
better ensure that FEMA obtains the information it needs to meet its
statutory responsibility to track corrective actions. However, FEMA has
not ensured that after-action reports for Tier 1 exercises are issued
in a prompt manner, nor has it tracked and documented implementation of
corrective actions for such exercises. These challenges occurred, in
part, because FEMA has not established procedures that detail how the
agency will work with other federal entities to ensure National
Exercise Program requirements are met.
For example, FEMA conducted a Tier I National Level Exercise--Top
Officials 4 (TOPOFF 4)--in October 2007, but as of February 2009, or
more than 15 months later, FEMA had not yet issued the after-action
report or tracked and implemented corrective actions.[Footnote 68] When
an after-action report on an exercise is delayed and not provided to
stakeholders, the "lessons learned" from the exercise diminish in
importance, limiting stakeholders' ability to make improvements in
preparedness.[Footnote 69] In February 2009, FEMA officials stated that
the draft after-action report for TOPOFF 4 had been written, and
various departments and agencies have approved the report, but it was
not approved by DHS prior to the change in administration related to
the 56TH Presidential Inauguration.[Footnote 70] According to FEMA
officials, a complicating factor in releasing the report is the
political sensitivity of information, as those who write after-action
reports may face internal pressure not to identify weaknesses in an
entity's emergency preparedness. As a result of these delays,
stakeholders may not be able to promptly make improvements in
preparedness.
FEMA has also had limited success in ensuring that program requirements
for the National Exercise Program have been followed for Principal
Level Exercises.[Footnote 71] HSEEP guidance and the implementation
plan state that the results of exercises should be documented and
corrective action responsibilities assigned and tracked. Specifically,
HSEEP guidance calls for organizations to (1) complete an after-action
report with an improvement plan and (2) track corrective actions to
ensure that they are implemented. Based on our review of four after-
action reports issued by HSC between April 2007 and August 2008, three
did not meet program requirements[Footnote 72]. In one case, the after-
action report was drafted but not finalized. In two other cases, the
report did not identify officials who were responsible for ensuring
corrective actions were implemented.[Footnote 73] For example, the
after-action report for the February 2008 Principal Level Exercise on
pandemic influenza stated that the integration of strategic
communications and policy remains difficult and should be addressed by
an interagency group. However, the after-action report did not identify
a department or an agency official who was to be responsible for
ensuring that this corrective action was implemented. FEMA officials
said they relied on the National Exercise Program Implementation Plan
as the guiding policy for HSC's responsibilities for documenting after-
action reports and tracking and resolving corrective actions. However,
the plan does not describe a procedure for ensuring that these
requirements are met by HSC. Based in part on our review of Principal
Level Exercises, FEMA has subsequently taken action to identity
officials who are responsible for nearly all of the corrective actions
outlined in these after-action reports.
The implementation plan for the National Exercise Program also requires
entities responsible for Tier I level exercises, including Principal
Level Exercises, to ensure that corrective actions are resolved.
However, HSC did not follow the required corrective action process.
According to HSC staff, the council does not use the CAP system or
another tracking procedure for determining whether corrective actions
were implemented. Rather, it delegates the responsibility of taking
corrective actions to the appropriate agencies or departments.
FEMA officials agreed that tracking corrective actions for Principal
Level Exercises is problematic and impairs their ability to fulfill
FEMA's statutory obligation to track corrective actions from exercises.
[Footnote 74] However, they stated that they do not have the authority
to direct HSC or other federal entities to track corrective actions and
report this information to FEMA. FEMA officials said that they rely on
the National Exercise Program Implementation Plan to set forth HSC's
responsibilities for documenting after-action reports and tracking and
resolving corrective actions.
Although the Post-Katrina Act does not give FEMA the authority to
compel other federal entities to comply with the objectives of the
National Exercise Program, the act places responsibility for
implementing the National Exercise Program on FEMA, in coordination
with other appropriate federal entities. Therefore, it is incumbent on
FEMA to coordinate with HSC and other federal entities to better ensure
that FEMA obtains the information it needs to meet its statutory
responsibility to track corrective actions. In this regard, the
implementation plan for the National Exercise Program does not set
forth FEMA's statutory responsibility to track corrective actions, nor
does it require federal departments and agencies to report corrective
action information to FEMA. On the contrary, the implementation plan
provides that departments and agencies "may submit issues to the DHS
Corrective Action Program (DHS CAP) through the web-based DHS CAP
system," but does not instruct them to do so or to otherwise provide
FEMA with corrective action tracking information that would enable FEMA
to fulfill its statutory responsibilities under the Post-Katrina Act.
Therefore, the implementation plan lacks procedures that call on HSC
and other federal entities to report corrective action information to
FEMA. FEMA's inability to fully track and analyze areas that need
improvement is also due, in part, to its lack of an effective internal
controls environment. GAO's Standards for Internal Controls in the
Federal Government state that an effective internal control environment
is a key method to help agency managers achieve program objectives and
enhance their ability to address weaknesses.[Footnote 75] The standards
state, among other things, that agencies should have policies and
procedures for ensuring that the findings of audits and reviews are
promptly resolved. The standards also state that internal controls
should generally be designed to assure that ongoing monitoring occurs.
Developing procedures for working with federal entities, such as HSC,
to help ensure that corrective actions are tracked, implemented, and
reported to FEMA would strengthen FEMA's ability to determine emergency
management areas that need improvement.
Lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina identified similar concerns with
tracking corrective actions from exercises. For example, in February
2006 the White House report on Hurricane Katrina stated that "too
often, after-action reports for exercises and real-world incidents
highlight the same problems that do not get fixed".[Footnote 76]
According to the report, DHS should ensure that all federal and state
entities are accountable for the timely implementation of remedial
actions in response to lessons learned. According to the report, the
success of the preparedness system depends, in part, on feedback
mechanisms for tracking corrective actions. When federal entities carry
out processes that are incompatible with FEMA's responsibilities for
tracking corrective actions, FEMA managers do not have the necessary
data to measure progress, identify gaps in preparedness, and track
corrective actions--key objectives of the National Exercise Program.
FEMA Does Not Have Procedures to Help Ensure That After-Action Reports
from State-Level Exercises Are Properly Prepared and Submitted and That
Corrective Actions Are Tracked and Implemented:
Similar to the problems we found with Principal Level Exercises, we
identified weaknesses in the way in which selected states prepared and
submitted after-action reports to FEMA.[Footnote 77] Among other
things, HSEEP requires that exercise program managers prepare after
action-reports that include improvement plans to identify corrective
actions, track whether the actions were implemented, and continually
monitor and review corrective actions as part of an organizational
corrective action program.[Footnote 78] Exercise program managers are
to submit these after-action reports to FEMA through its Secure Portal--
a FEMA database containing after-action reports. Of the six states we
visited, (1) none systematically recorded or submitted after-action
reports to FEMA, (2) only one had improvement plans in all of its after-
action reports and only one said it had a corrective action tracking
program, and (3) none used a capabilities-based approach in all of
their exercises.[Footnote 79] The following are additional details on
each of these issues.
* HSGP guidance requires exercise program managers to submit after-
action reports within 60 days following the completion of an exercise
to FEMA through its Secure Portal. Although the portal has been
operational for about 5 years, FEMA did not have procedures in place to
fully monitor state actions and to ensure that this occurred.[Footnote
80] While 3 of 44 after-action reports provided by officials from the
six states we visited were submitted to FEMA in the requisite area of
the portal, these reports all came from one state. The remaining five
states did not submit any after-action reports through the portal.
Officials from these five states cited technical difficulties, lack of
staff resources, or unclear guidance from FEMA as reasons why after-
action reports were not submitted to the portal. FEMA is aware that the
portal contains incomplete information, noting in its quarterly
newsletter that "The Secure Portal serves as the repository for after
action reports and improvement plans; however, postings have been
inconsistent.[Footnote 81] At times, it has been difficult to locate
After Action Reports as many are posted in draft form and never
finalized and posted outside the respective State folder." In February
2009 FEMA announced, a National Exercise Division Exercise Support
System that is an online tool for facilitating exercise planning to
replace the Secure Portal as a repository for after-action reports.
* HSEEP requires that entities include an improvement plan as part of
their after-action reports and that they have a corrective action
program. While each of the six states we visited had produced at least
one draft after-action report that included an improvement plan, only
one state included an improvement plan in all of its reports. Fifteen
of the 44 after-action reports we reviewed had an improvement plan. In
addition, only one state had a corrective action program that tracked
whether corrective actions were implemented. Officials from one state
attributed the lack of a corrective action program to competing
priorities. Specifically, states are involved in many exercises and
officials are more likely to place the priority on designing and
conducting of the next exercise than on tracking corrective actions
from prior exercises.
* Another HSEEP requirement calls for exercises to be designed and
conducted using a capability-based approach.[Footnote 82] Doing so
would help FEMA analyze whether gaps in capability have narrowed and
improvements in capabilities have occurred from the use of grant funds
by states. However, 20 of the 44 after-action reports provided by
officials in the six states we visited used target capabilities, while
the remaining 24 did not. According to officials from three of the six
states we visited, not all exercise participants have a good
understanding of target capabilities and how they should be used in the
design, conduct, and evaluation of exercises. For example, exercise
officials from one state said their state does not use target
capabilities because it has its own set of assessment standards.
FEMA's lack of procedures for monitoring states to ensure compliance
with HSEEP requirements contributed to limited adherence to such
requirements in the states we visited. As discussed earlier in this
report, internal control standards call for (1) an effective internal
control environment to help agency managers achieve program objectives
and enhance their ability to address weaknesses, (2) agencies to have
policies and procedures for ensuring that the findings of audits and
reviews are promptly resolved, and (3) internal controls to generally
be designed to assure that ongoing monitoring occurs.[Footnote 83] FEMA
officials in the National Preparedness Directorate told us they have a
process for monitoring HSEEP compliance by, among other things, having
FEMA regional exercise support program managers discuss HSEEP
compliance with state exercise program officials at planning
conferences or during grant monitoring discussions. While discussing
HSEEP requirements at annual conferences may enhance the awareness of
state officials about requirements for HSEEP compliance, this does not
track compliance. In addition, officials from FEMA's Grant Programs
Directorate said they do not monitor states' compliance with HSEEP
requirements. For example, the grant monitoring reports for the six
states we visited did not address whether the states were in compliance
with HSEEP requirements. Such reports are based, in part, on a
checklist of items that officials use to monitor compliance with grant
requirements. However, FEMA's checklist does not include specific
items, such as compliance with HSEEP requirements, as called for by
HSGP guidance. States' noncompliance with HSEEP hinders their ability
to systematically track corrective actions and assess capabilities.
This in turn impacts FEMA's ability to measure progress of the National
Exercise Program. Having procedures in place to monitor actions by
states to ensure compliance with HSEEP requirements would assist FEMA
in obtaining more complete data about the results of exercises and
corrective actions taken to systematically evaluate readiness through
the National Exercise Program, as required by the Post-Katrina Act.
FEMA's Ability to Design Exercises That Stress the Preparedness System
Is Limited:
The Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA to stress the preparedness system
through the National Exercise Program to evaluate preparedness for a
catastrophic event.[Footnote 84] The National Exercise Program
Implementation Plan identifies domestic incident management for
catastrophic events as the principal focus of the National Exercise
Program.[Footnote 85] According to the Tier I exercise cycle
established in the implementation plan, FEMA plans to test for a
catastrophic domestic nonterrorism event in fiscal year 2010.[Footnote
86] However, FEMA's ability to meet this testing requirement is limited
by three factors: (1) the lack of key planning documents, (2) exercise
artificiality, and (3) limited coordination with groups that have
expertise in populations with special needs.
First, the effectiveness of exercises is based, in part, on the degree
to which plans that define roles and responsibilities have been
developed. The fact that key planning documents for response to a
catastrophic incident, such as the supplement to the catastrophic
incident annex and regional response plans, have not yet been completed
means that the National Exercise Program will have difficulty in
designing exercises that test whether the plans are understood and
executed effectively by stakeholders.[Footnote 87],[Footnote 88] As we
described earlier in this report, while DHS and FEMA are working on
these plans, it is unclear when they will complete the plans. According
to the former director of FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate,
FEMA's ability to design and conduct exercises that evaluate a response
to a catastrophic incident is limited by the fact that plans such as
those described above have yet to be developed. However, the official
indicated that FEMA was taking preliminary actions to build its
capacity to conduct such exercises through regional catastrophic
planning initiatives.
Second, in addition to its catastrophic testing requirements, the Post-
Katrina Act requires that exercises be "as realistic as practicable...
and designed to stress the national preparedness system."[Footnote 89]
An important factor limiting FEMA's ability to stress the national
preparedness system is the difficulty of simulating real-world
conditions. All exercises involve some degree of artificiality. Two
exercises, TOPOFF 4 and a Tier II exercise conducted in May 2008,
reflected the challenges FEMA faces in conducting realistic exercises
that stress the preparedness system. For example, during TOPOFF 4, the
governor's helicopter landed in a contaminated area but was not
required to undergo the decontamination procedures that would have been
required in a real-world situation. During a May 2008 Tier II exercise,
certain scenarios of the exercise, such as a response to a terrorist
attack involving an industrial chemical release (see figure 5), did not
involve the National Operations Center, which would have participated
in a real-world event. For example, an exercise manager with the U.S.
Northern Command noted that the nonparticipation of the National
Operations Center was a limiting factor in testing roles and
responsibilities with other federal entities. According to the National
Exercise Program's Implementation Plan, such participation from other
federal stakeholders is not required for Tier II exercises such as the
one held in May 2008.
Figure 5: Exercise Participants Observing a Federal, State, and Local
Response to a Terrorist Attack Involving a Chemical Release during a
May 2008 Tier II Exercise:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Third, another challenge in creating exercises that stress the
preparedness system and simulate real-world conditions is finding ways
to test response capabilities for populations with special needs. To
address some of the problems experienced in Hurricane Katrina in
dealing with populations with special needs, such as residents in
nursing homes, the Post-Katrina Act, as amended by the 9/11 Act, called
on FEMA to design exercises to address the unique requirements of
populations with special needs, including the elderly, and to
coordinate the National Exercise Program with the National Council on
Disability, among other entities.[Footnote 90] In TOPOFF 4, FEMA
integrated specific objectives for special needs populations in the
Oregon venue, according to FEMA officials. For example, according to
FEMA officials, FEMA utilized special needs actors to enhance realism.
However, HSEEP guidance does not address special needs populations.
Further, while FEMA has corresponded with the Council on Disability,
council officials believe that FEMA could do more to ensure that
exercises are designed to address the unique requirements of
populations with special needs. For example, council officials stated
that the council was not involved in the design and planning for TOPOFF
4 or the May 2008 Tier II exercise. According to officials from the
National Preparedness Directorate, it coordinated with FEMA's Special
Needs Office to integrate special needs population objectives into
exercises. FEMA officials agree that special needs populations should
be included in exercises and they said that they will redouble their
efforts to do so. However, FEMA officials also noted that some
exercises, for example, the National Level Exercise planned in July
2009, may not involve special needs populations because the point of
such exercises is to prevent a terrorist attack, rather than to test
response and recovery efforts. Enhancing coordination with the National
Council on Disability could improve FEMA's ability to ensure that key
issues concerning populations with special needs are addressed in the
design and conduct of exercises.
The limitations the National Exercise Program faces in designing
approaches that stress the preparedness system highlight the difficulty
in validating whether roles and responsibilities are well understood
and major gaps in capabilities remain for responding to and recovering
from catastrophic events. The 2006 White House report on the federal
response to Katrina concluded that the "national preparedness system
must be oriented toward greater challenges. We must not shy away from
creating scenarios that stress the current system of response to the
breaking point——Until we meet the standards set by the most demanding
scenarios, we should not consider ourselves adequately prepared."
[Footnote 91] In 2006, we reported that effective exercises should
involve scenarios that stress responders with the highest degree of
realism possible, even to the breaking point if possible.[Footnote 92]
Exercises that stress the preparedness system in a realistic way are
key to testing the prospective reliability of a response and
determining whether plans have accounted for potential breakdowns with
relatively greater consequences.
In February 2009, we met with FEMA officials to discuss this issue and
they agreed that developing exercises to the point of system failure is
a valid objective; however, they described several factors that may
limit their ability to do so. For example, FEMA officials told us that
exercising to the "breaking point" requires significant resources that
under current, and likely future funding streams, are unlikely to be
available. We agree with FEMA that these are important considerations;
however, these considerations, in part, are addressed through the
implementation plan for the National Exercise Program, which describes
a 5-year schedule of exercises to give federal departments and agencies
lead time to budget for participation in such events.[Footnote 93]
FEMA's Data for Measuring the Effectiveness of Its National Exercise
Program Is Incomplete:
The three databases that FEMA uses to measure the effectiveness and
progress of the National Exercise Program have incomplete data. FEMA
uses (1) the NEXS system to identify DHS-funded exercises, (2) the FEMA
Secure Portal as a repository for DHS funded exercise after-action
reports, and (3) the CAP system as a tool for tracking corrective
actions.[Footnote 94] The following provides details on problems with
the reliability of each of these databases.
* FEMA calls on state entities to use the NEXS system to schedule all
exercises, and one of the performance measures that FEMA uses to assess
and report on the performance of the National Exercise Program is the
number of DHS-funded state exercises that occur per year. However, 26
of the 44 after-action reports we reviewed did not have the exercise
entered into the NEXS system. Incomplete NEXS system data limit FEMA's
ability to accurately report on the number of DHS-funded exercises.
Furthermore, while FEMA created the NEXS system to schedule,
synchronize, and avoid conflicts in all national, federal, state, and
local exercises, it cannot do so with incomplete data. When we
discussed this problem with state and FEMA officials, they agreed that
the NEXS system did not contain a comprehensive list of all state and
local exercises supported by HSGP funds. For example, when we asked
FEMA for a complete list of all exercises to be conducted under the
National Exercise Program, the agency could not produce such a list.
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that
program managers need data to determine whether they are meeting their
performance targets and that controls should be designed to validate
the integrity of organizational performance measures and indicators.
[Footnote 95] FEMA has initiated actions to validate the accuracy of
data used in the NEXS system by using training and exercise plan
workshops with states to determine what exercises states have
scheduled. We agree that the training and exercise plan workshops are a
good starting point for verifying the completeness of NEXS; however,
when we attended a training and exercise plan workshop, we were told by
FEMA officials that not all federal agencies or local entities
participated, thus, all exercises were not discussed at the workshop.
In addition, FEMA officials recognize that the workshops alone do not
ensure that the NEXS database is complete and accurate. In the absence
of systematic and comprehensive information on the number of federally
funded exercises, FEMA cannot measure its progress in implementing the
National Exercise Program.
* A second database used by FEMA is the Secure Portal--the primary
database that FEMA uses to measure the degree to which states comply
with HSEEP. Even though FEMA requires state exercise program managers
to place their after-action reports in the Secure Portal when federal
grant funds are used to support the exercise, this requirement was not
completely met by any of the six states we visited. In addition,
although state and FEMA officials agreed that the Secure Portal does
not contain all state exercise after-action reports, FEMA uses
information from the portal to assess and report on the performance of
the National Exercise Program, including the measure that FEMA uses to
assess the percent of DHS-funded exercises demonstrating the use of
HSEEP guidance.[Footnote 96] Since the Secure Portal contains
incomplete information and neither FEMA nor the six states we visited
have controls to ensure that all state-level exercise after-action
reports are uploaded to the Secure Portal, this measure may not
accurately reflect the percent of DHS-funded exercises that demonstrate
the use of HSEEP guidance.
* Third, although federal entities involved in Tier 1 exercises are
encouraged to use FEMA's CAP system, it does not contain all corrective
actions from such entities. According to FEMA officials, the CAP system
was designed to capture all relevant and necessary information related
to the implementation of corrective actions. However, the HSC did not
use the CAP system to track corrective actions. The problem with having
incomplete data in the CAP system is that FEMA uses information from
the system to measure the percentage of corrective actions that have
been implemented as one of its performance measures.[Footnote 97] A key
reason for this problem is that FEMA has not established procedures to
ensure that the information in the CAP system is complete. For example,
the implementation plan does not require the nine federal departments
and agencies that are signatories to the implementation plan to use the
CAP system. Instead, FEMA strongly urges stakeholders to use the
system, but the decision to do so is discretionary. FEMA officials
cited the tension between requiring entities to use the CAP system and
providing enough flexibility to those entities to carry out their
programs as a reason for not making the use of the CAP system a
requirement. Nonetheless, entities could submit a report to FEMA on the
status of their corrective actions resulting from such exercises.
Finally, the CAP system does not include corrective actions from real-
world incidents and FEMA has not established requirements or guidelines
for agencies to do so. As a result, FEMA is unable to meet Post-Katrina
Act requirements for conducting long-term trend analyses of corrective
actions that include real-world events. The Presidential Inaugural
Ceremony held in Washington D.C. on January 20, 2009, provides an
example of the importance of tracking corrective actions for real-world
events. During the event, problems with managing crowds prevented a
large number of ticket holders from reaching their designated area to
observe the inauguration ceremony. According to the Joint Congressional
Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies, a complete examination will take
place to provide a foundation of lessons learned for future inaugural
planners, so that they can avoid similar problems in the future.
[Footnote 98] FEMA officials agreed that the CAP system could be used
to track corrective actions from real-world events, and in February
2009 they indicated that developing procedures to do so would aid their
ability to conduct long-term trend analyses of real-world events as
required by the Post-Katrina Act.
FEMA Has Taken Actions to Develop and Implement a Comprehensive System
for Assessing National Preparedness Capabilities, but Faces Challenges
in Completing and Implementing the System:
FEMA has taken initial actions to collect information on state
preparedness capabilities and develop a comprehensive assessment system
for assessing capabilities at all levels of government, but faces
methodological and coordination challenges in completing the system.
Assessing and reporting on national preparedness is a long-standing and
complex effort that presents methodological, integration, and
coordination challenges. Effectively addressing these challenges
requires that FEMA take a measured and planned approach; however,
FEMA's project management plan does not fully identify the numerous
program elements and how and when they will be developed and
integrated.
FEMA Has Taken Initial Actions to Develop a Comprehensive Assessment
System and Collect Information for State and Federal Capability
Reporting:
The Post-Katrina Act requires that FEMA establish a comprehensive
assessment system to assess the nation's capabilities and overall
preparedness for preventing, responding to, and recovering from natural
and man-made disasters.[Footnote 99] The act also requires that FEMA
collect information on state capability levels and report on federal
preparedness to Congress, including, among other things, the results of
the comprehensive assessment system.[Footnote 100] In response to these
requirements, FEMA established guidance for reporting on state
preparedness and created the Office of Preparedness Policy, Planning
and Analysis (PPPA) to develop and implement a new assessment approach
that considers past efforts and integrates ongoing assessment efforts.
[Footnote 101] FEMA plans to integrate the state preparedness reports--
along with a variety of existing assessment efforts and data sources--
into the new comprehensive system it is establishing. In addition, it
is considering the historical experiences and lessons learned from
prior assessment efforts in developing the new system.
FEMA has also made progress in collecting information for federal and
state reporting. In January 2009, FEMA issued its first federal
preparedness report. The Post-Katrina Act requires that FEMA, in
coordination with the heads of appropriate federal agencies, submit a
federal preparedness report to Congress beginning in October 2007 and
annually thereafter, which is to include, among other things, the
results of the comprehensive assessment.[Footnote 102] In addition,
states, territories, and the District of Columbia completed and
submitted their first state preparedness reports to FEMA in the spring
of 2008--a total of 56 reports from the 56 jurisdictions receiving
homeland security grant funding. FEMA officials said they prepared
summaries of the 56 reports and provided the summaries to FEMA's
regional offices. In addition, in November 2008, FEMA issued guidance
for the 2008 state preparedness reports, which grantees are to submit
to FEMA by March 2009.
FEMA Faces Methodological and Coordination Challenges in Completing the
Comprehensive Assessment System and Reporting on Its Results:
FEMA faces methodological challenges with the four assessment systems
it plans to use as the basis for the new system and has not determined
how to overcome problems faced in historical assessments. The
challenges FEMA faces reflect the lack of guidance from PPPA in how the
assessment system will comprehensively inform and incorporate feedback
from other elements of the National Preparedness System and information
from a variety of other data sources. Finally, FEMA faces challenges in
coordinating with state, local, and federal stakeholders in developing
and implementing the system and reporting on its results.
Methodological Challenges with Using Four Proposed Assessment
Approaches:
In December 2008, FEMA provided us with a project management plan
outlining efforts to establish the comprehensive assessment system by
May 2010 to "function as a central repository for national preparedness
data." The system "will integrate data from prior reports and legacy
assessment systems." To establish the system, FEMA plans to administer
a Web-based survey to all states and territories in the summer of 2009
to assess capabilities using the 37 target capabilities. FEMA plans to
use a Web-based system known as the National Incident Management System
Compliance Assessment Support Tool (NIMSCAST) to administer the
capability assessment survey. In addition, FEMA noted that NIMSCAST
will serve as the technical foundation for the comprehensive assessment
system, and that the system is used by all states and territories as
well as by 18,000 local and tribal entities, which helps to mitigate
challenges FEMA faces in coordinating with stakeholders in developing
and implementing the comprehensive assessment system. However, FEMA
faces methodological challenges with regard to (1) differences in data
available, (2) variations in reporting structures across states, and
(3) variations in the level of detail within data sources requiring
subjective interpretation, as summarized in table 2 below. Additional
information regarding these assessments is outlined in appendix III.
Table 2: Summary of Assessment Approaches:
Assessment/FEMA Directorate: State Preparedness Reports; Led by FEMA's
National Preparedness Directorate;
Limitations: FEMA could not use information in the 2007 reports to
compare capability gaps between states because reports are in narrative
format and information is not based on common metrics for assessing
capabilities.
Assessment/FEMA Directorate: National Incident Management System
Compliance Assessment Support Tool (NIMSCAST); Led by FEMA's National
Preparedness Directorate;
Limitations: NIMSCAST assesses states' and territories' compliance with
the National Incident Management System, which is a standardized
process for conducting response operations, rather than a method for
assessing capabilities. As a result, it is unclear how FEMA will
integrate NIMSCAST with efforts related to target capabilities, as it
plans to do.
Assessment/FEMA Directorate: Gap Analysis Program (GAP); Led by FEMA's
Disaster Operations Directorate;
Limitations: Provides information related to 7 of 37 target
capabilities, such as sheltering or debris removal, but does not
include comprehensive information for activities related to all 37
target capabilities.
Assessment/FEMA Directorate: Cost to Capability Initiative; Led by
FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate;
Limitations: Grantees will not be required to submit information to the
Cost to Capability Initiative, the purpose of which is to help FEMA,
states, and localities better measure the results of federal grants.
Thus FEMA cannot have assurance that it will collect comprehensive
information to assess how grant funds have improved capabilities.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS and FEMA information.
[End of table]
Methodological Challenges Identified in Historical Assessment
Approaches:
In addition to the methodological challenges in its current approach to
assessing capabilities, previous efforts at assessing capabilities
experienced challenges and have been discontinued.
The National Preparedness System was discontinued by DHS officials
because it was time-consuming and did not produce meaningful data,
according to FEMA officials. The system was pilot tested in 10 states
and according to budget documentation, FEMA spent nearly $15 million in
total for 2006, 2007, and 2008 on the system before it was
discontinued.[Footnote 103]
The Pilot Capability Assessment was labor-intensive and did not
generate meaningful data, according to FEMA officials. This assessment,
piloted in six states, was intended to measure jurisdictions' progress
in achieving needed target capabilities.[Footnote 104] Because it was
only piloted, FEMA did not generate meaningful preparedness information
from the data collected, according to officials.
The Capability Assessment for Readiness, which was proposed as a one-
time nationwide assessment of capabilities, lacked controls for
validating the accuracy of self-reported assessment data. The
assessment was conducted in 1997 but concerns regarding self-reporting
and the lack of controls for validating information reported by states
limited the reliability and, therefore, the value of the data,
according to the DHS Inspector General.
Additional information regarding these efforts is outlined in appendix
III.
FEMA Faces Integration Challenges in Completing the Comprehensive
Assessment System:
FEMA has not established an approach for how information and data from
different sources will be integrated into the comprehensive assessment
system. FEMA officials have established a charter between the National
Preparedness Directorate and Grant Programs Directorate to coordinate
preparedness efforts related to the Cost to Capability Initiative and
refinement of the target capabilities. FEMA has also begun sharing
information between staff involved in developing the assessment system
and staff involved in other elements of the National Preparedness
System. For example, staff from the National Exercise Program said they
shared information on their exercise efforts with staff developing the
comprehensive assessment system and FEMA officials said they
established a working group of officials from other federal agencies to
communicate efforts to develop the comprehensive assessment system. In
March 2009, FEMA officials acknowledged that they had not finalized a
charter for this working group to outline the specific actions that the
working group will undertake to develop the comprehensive assessment
system. FEMA explained that this working group will (1) identify
existing sources of data related to preparedness plans, organization,
equipment, training, and exercises; (2) vet the relevancy of each data
source for assessments; (3) identify data gaps and redundancies; and,
(4) develop recommendations for streamlining data collection and
reporting. However, FEMA has not established an approach for
integrating information and data from other stakeholders, including
grantees and other FEMA divisions such as the Disaster Operations
Directorate.
In October 2008, FEMA officials said they also plan to consider or
incorporate into the new system a multitude of other data and analysis
sources within and outside of DHS, such as FEMA's Biannual Strategy
Implementation Reports; Homeland Security Grant Program Investment
Justification; and Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan
Scorecards.[Footnote 105] In addition, FEMA plans to use the CAP system
and LLIS to inform the comprehensive assessment system. In February
2009, FEMA officials further explained that they plan to rely on three
indicators of preparedness to develop the comprehensive assessment
system: (1) state and federal preparedness reports, which are required
to use target capabilities; (2) the results of exercise corrective
action findings; and (3) operational plans outlining specific
operational requirements for all levels of government. However, FEMA
has not established an approach for how the three indicators of
preparedness will be collected and developed into reporting mechanisms
that meet Post-Katrina Act requirements for the comprehensive
assessment system. In its first federal preparedness report, FEMA
acknowledged that its efforts to evaluate and improve preparedness are
the least mature elements of the national preparedness system because
these efforts are composed of a wide range of systems and approaches
with varying levels of integration. Given the relative immaturity of
FEMA's evaluation and improvement efforts, without an approach for
integrating its comprehensive assessment system efforts, FEMA faces
increased risks that inconsistencies may occur or that data and
information are not shared, limiting FEMA's ability to fulfill the
requirements of the Post-Katrina Act for developing the system.
FEMA Faces Coordination Challenges in Establishing Quantifiable Metrics
and Collecting Information for Implementing the Comprehensive
Assessment System:
In addition to methodological and coordination challenges in developing
and completing the comprehensive assessment system, FEMA faces
coordination challenges in establishing quantifiable metrics for target
capabilities outlined in the Target Capabilities List. Establishing
quantifiable metrics for target capabilities is a prerequisite to
developing assessment data that can be compared across all levels of
government.[Footnote 106] At the time of our review, FEMA was in the
process of refining the target capabilities to make them more
measurable and to provide local and state jurisdictions with additional
guidance on the levels of capability they need. FEMA plans to develop
quantifiable metrics--or performance objectives--for each of the 37
target capabilities that are to outline specific capability "targets"
that jurisdictions, including but not limited to cities, of varying
size should strive to meet. FEMA plans to complete quantifiable metrics
for all 37 target capabilities by the end of 2010. As of February 2009,
FEMA noted that 6 of the 37 capabilities were undergoing stakeholder
review and that FEMA planned to develop quantifiable metrics for a
total of 12 capabilities during the 2009 calendar year. However, as of
March 2008, FEMA had not developed milestones for completing
quantifiable metrics for the remaining 25 target capabilities.
Cognizant of the fact that there is not a "one size fits all" approach
to preparedness, FEMA also plans to develop performance classes for
each target capability in order to account for differences in levels of
preparedness across jurisdictions of varying size and risk. FEMA plans
to incorporate the new performance objectives and performance classes
into the comprehensive assessment system, the federal preparedness
report, and the guidance for the state preparedness reports, but has
not established a time frame for doing this.
FEMA recognizes the need to coordinate with federal, state, and local
stakeholders and ensure that their views are effectively integrated in
the development of the metrics, but FEMA historically has faced
challenges in coordinating with stakeholders. For example, as we
reported in June 2008, FEMA's efforts to coordinate with stakeholders
in developing the NRF were inconsistent and needed to be improved.
[Footnote 107] In addition, such coordination can be time consuming.
For example, in July 2005 we reported on DHS's prior effort to develop
a tiered system of metrics based on population density and critical
infrastructure in order to (1) assign jurisdictions responsibility for
developing and maintaining target capability levels and (2) use the
metrics to implement a national "balanced investment program" (with the
purpose of directing federal preparedness assistance to the highest
priority capability gaps) for national preparedness capabilities. DHS
scheduled this system to be developed and completed by October 2008.
[Footnote 108] At the time of our review, these efforts to develop
quantifiable metrics for target capabilities were not complete,
illustrating the fact that developing metrics in coordination with a
variety of stakeholders can take longer than anticipated. In developing
the quantifiable capability metrics, FEMA officials told us that they
plan to conduct extensive coordination with stakeholders that will
entail conducting stakeholder workshops in all 10 FEMA regions and
coordinating with all federal agencies with lead and supporting
responsibility for Emergency Support Function (ESF) activities
associated with each of the 37 target capabilities.[Footnote 109],
[Footnote 110] Officials said they also plan on briefing the National
Advisory Council and the National Council on Disability, and soliciting
public comment on the draft quantifiable metrics for each target
capability.
One of FEMA's coordination efforts--working with nonfederal
stakeholders and federal agencies responsible for ESF activities--
illustrates the large number of stakeholders with whom FEMA plans to
coordinate in developing quantifiable metrics for the target
capabilities. FEMA also plans to post each revised capability to the
Federal Register for comment.[Footnote 111] With respect to federal
agency coordination, FEMA plans to coordinate with each federal agency
that has lead and supporting responsibility for ESF activities
associated with each of the 37 target capabilities in developing
quantifiable capability metrics.[Footnote 112] For example, for the
medical surge capability, the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) is the primary federal agency responsible for coordinating
necessary medical surge capabilities needed during a disaster to
provide triage and medical care services. In addition to HHS, 15 other
federal agencies and the American Red Cross are designated as
supporting agencies and organizations for medical surge capabilities.
Coordinating with other federal agencies responsible for ESF activities
in developing quantifiable capability metrics would likely entail time,
effort, and unforeseen risks. For example, in September 2008 we
reported on the risks that FEMA faces in coordinating with external
stakeholders, namely the American Red Cross, in collecting and
integrating preparedness information necessary to develop the
comprehensive assessment system.[Footnote 113] In that report, we
recommended that FEMA take steps to better incorporate information from
voluntary organizations related to sheltering and feeding capabilities,
which are elements of the mass care target capability, and noted that a
comprehensive assessment of the nation's capabilities should account as
fully as possible for the voluntary organizations' capabilities in mass
care. FEMA disagreed with the recommendation, noting that it cannot
control the resources of nonprofit and private organizations. In
response, we (1) noted that taking steps to assess capabilities more
fully does not require controlling these resources, but rather
cooperatively obtaining and sharing information and (2) reiterated that
such efforts are important for assessing the nation's prevention
capabilities and overall preparedness.
FEMA's efforts to collect information needed to draft and issue the
first federal preparedness report, required by the Post-Katrina Act,
also reflect the coordination challenges FEMA faces in implementing the
comprehensive assessment system. The Post-Katrina Act requires that
FEMA, in coordination with the heads of appropriate federal agencies,
submit a federal preparedness report to Congress beginning in October
2007 and annually thereafter, which is to include, among other things,
the results of the comprehensive assessment[Footnote 114]. FEMA issued
the first federal preparedness report in January 2009. In response to
our comment that the draft report had been under review for 8 months
between March 2008 and November 2008, FEMA noted that after completing
a review of the report by FEMA and DHS, the report was submitted to the
Office of Management and Budget to disseminate to all federal
departments and agencies for review and comment. Officials explained
that in developing the report, they faced challenges in obtaining
information and data from federal agencies because of bureaucratic
obstacles for collecting information and also faced challenges in
analyzing information from multiple sources. FEMA officials said they
may develop a National Preparedness Report to combine two Post-Katrina
Act reporting requirements--the requirement for an annual federal
preparedness report and an annual catastrophic resources report--and to
include information from state preparedness reports as part of this
consolidated report, which they tentatively plan to issue in the Spring
of 2009.[Footnote 115]
FEMA Has Not Developed an Approach and Assessed Risks for Completing
and Implementing the Comprehensive Assessment System as Part of Its
Project Management Plan:
Despite the methodological and coordination challenges associated with
developing a new comprehensive assessment system and establishing
related quantifiable metrics for target capabilities, FEMA has not
developed an approach that addresses program risks as part of its
project management plan for how it will develop the comprehensive
assessment system. While FEMA has developed a project management plan
for completing the comprehensive assessment system by 2010, the lack of
(1) milestones for establishing quantifiable metrics for all 37 target
capabilities and (2) specific actions for how FEMA will integrate
preparedness information to develop the system, coupled with the (3)
the lack of risk assessment information for the system raises questions
about FEMA's ability to establish the system in accordance with its
anticipated 2010 completion date. FEMA has described several steps for
completing an effective comprehensive assessment system that include
developing methodologies to translate the information from the
assessments FEMA has identified into a target capabilities-based
framework and integrating necessary preparedness information from
disparate and not necessarily comparable sources such as state
preparedness reports. FEMA also plans to coordinate with relevant
stakeholders to refine the target capabilities. However, FEMA's plan
does not outline specific actions it plans to take to do so.
Certain factors, such as challenges in coordinating with stakeholders
or difficulties in obtaining necessary data, could affect FEMA's
ability to implement the comprehensive assessment system. Best
practices for project management established by the Project Management
Institute state that managing a project involves project risk
management, which serves to increase the probability and impact of
positive events, and decrease the probability and impact of events
adverse to the project. Project risk management entails determining
which risks might affect a project, prioritizing risks for further
analysis by assessing their probability of occurrence, and developing
actions to reduce threats to the project. Other practices include (1)
establishing clear and achievable objectives; (2) balancing the
competing demands for quality, scope, time, and cost; (3) adapting the
specifications, plans, and approach to the different concerns and
expectations of the various stakeholders involved in the project; and
(4) developing milestone dates to identify points throughout the
project to reassess efforts underway to determine whether project
changes are necessary.[Footnote 116] FEMA has demonstrated its
awareness of the value of these practices. For example, in planning
another project--an effort to transition the FEMA Secure Portal to an
alternate information technology platform known as the National
Exercise Division Exercise Support System --FEMA identified key
elements such as phases, milestones, and risks that could affect the
project goals.[Footnote 117]
Furthermore, a risk assessment could help FEMA define the specific
actions to take to complete the comprehensive assessment system,
anticipate potential delays in completing its efforts to refine the
target capabilities by 2010, and deal with the associated risks in its
efforts to do so, such as the time it takes to coordinate with
stakeholders. Information from a risk assessment could also enhance
FEMA's ability to coordinate with federal agencies to obtain
preparedness information needed to produce a timely annual federal
preparedness report and catastrophic resources report.[Footnote 118]
Until FEMA assesses ways to mitigate the risks associated with its
capability assessment efforts, it will be difficult for FEMA to provide
reasonable assurance that it can produce a comprehensive assessment
system that (1) fulfills the requirements of the Post-Katrina Act and
in the long term, (2) informs decisions related to improving national
preparedness.
FEMA's Implementation of the National Preparedness System Would Be
Enhanced by a Strategic Plan That Includes Desirable Characteristics:
FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate does not have a strategic plan
for implementing the national preparedness system. The complexity and
difficulty of implementing the national preparedness system, which we
describe earlier in this report, underscore the importance of strategic
planning. The six desirable characteristics of a national strategy can
help the National Preparedness Directorate in developing a strategic
plan.
FEMA's National Preparedness Directorate Does Not Have a Strategic Plan
for Implementing the National Preparedness System:
While FEMA has recognized that its components need to develop strategic
plans that detail program goals, objectives, and strategies, FEMA's
National Preparedness Directorate (Preparedness Directorate) has not
yet developed such a plan for the national preparedness system.
[Footnote 119] In January 2008, FEMA issued its agencywide strategic
plan, which set a common direction for its components in carrying out
their responsibilities in preparedness, response, and recovery
programs.[Footnote 120] [Footnote 121] While a Preparedness Directorate
official acknowledged that the Preparedness Directorate does not have a
strategic plan (this is the responsibility of FEMA's Office of
Preparedness Policy, Planning and Analysis), the official said the Post-
Katrina Act provides a roadmap that contains the preparedness strategy
and FEMA uses an annual operating plan (in draft form at the time of
our review) to guide the directorate's approach for implementing the
national preparedness system.[Footnote 122]
Although the Post-Katrina Act and the directorate's draft annual
operating plan outline certain elements of a strategy, such as the
directorate's vision, mission, and goals, they do not include several
other desirable characteristics of a strategic plan, such as a
discussion of how the directorate will (1) measure its progress in
developing the national preparedness system, (2) address risk as it
relates to preparedness activities, (3) coordinate with its
preparedness stakeholders in developing and carrying out the various
elements of the national preparedness system, and (4) integrate the
elements of the national preparedness system. For example, FEMA has not
included information on performance measures for meeting one of the
objectives outlined in the operating plan--to support an integrated
planning system for the federal preparedness-related agencies that
links to regional, state, and local planning activities. The operating
plan also does not define the problem or assess the risks that FEMA's
national preparedness program faces. Specifically, it does not describe
the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences of a major homeland
security incident or what FEMA's approach will be for addressing risk
through its national preparedness system activities. While the draft
operating plan identifies subcomponents in the Preparedness Directorate
that will be responsible for carrying out segments of the national
preparedness system, it does not discuss the roles and responsibilities
of preparedness stakeholders, the coordination that will occur between
them, or how the four elements of the national preparedness system will
be integrated.
The Post-Katrina Act calls on FEMA to develop and coordinate the
implementation of a strategy for preparedness, and the complexity and
difficulty of developing a national preparedness system underscore the
importance of strategic planning.[Footnote 123] [Footnote 124] An
important element of strategic planning is that it presents an
integrated system of high-level decisions that are reached through a
formal, visible process. The resulting strategy is thus an effective
tool with which to communicate the mission and direction to
preparedness stakeholders. The conditions we describe earlier in this
report--such as incomplete plans on roles and responsibilities,
unresolved corrective actions from exercises, and potential
difficulties and historical delays in capability assessments--show that
FEMA faces significant challenges in developing the key elements of the
national preparedness system.
The Desirable Characteristics of a National Strategy Can Help FEMA's
National Preparedness Directorate in Developing a Strategic Plan:
In 2004, we identified six desirable characteristics of an effective
national strategy that help achieve strategy success. These
characteristics are summarized in table 3.[Footnote 125]
Table 3: Summary of Desirable Characteristics for a National Strategy:
Desirable characteristic: Purpose, scope, and methodology;
Description: Addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of its
coverage, and the process by which it was developed.
Desirable characteristic: Problem definition and risk assessment;
Description: Addresses the particular national problems and threats the
strategy is directed towards.
Desirable characteristic: Goals, subordinate objectives, activities,
and performance measures;
Description: Addresses what the strategy is trying to achieve, steps to
achieve those results, as well as the priorities, milestones, and
performance measures to gauge results.
Desirable characteristic: Resources, investments, and risk management;
Description: Addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and
types of resources and investments needed, and where resources and
investments should be targeted based on balancing risk reductions with
costs.
Desirable characteristic: Organizational roles, responsibilities, and
coordination;
Description: Addresses who will be implementing the strategy, what
their roles will be compared to others, and mechanisms for them to
coordinate their efforts.
Desirable characteristic: Integration and implementation;
Description: Addresses how a national strategy relates to other
strategies' goals, objectives, and activities, and to subordinate
levels of government and their plans to implement the strategy.
Source: GAO data.
[End of table]
We believe these characteristics can assist responsible parties, such
as FEMA, in further developing and implementing national strategies as
well as enhancing these strategies' usefulness for policy decisions to
help achieve program results and accountability. The characteristics
are a starting point for developing a strategic plan. However, we
believe that an approach incorporating the substance of these
characteristics is likely to increase success in strategy
implementation. The following describes how each of these
characteristics applies to the work of FEMA's National Preparedness
Directorate.
Purpose, scope, and methodology: National preparedness is an important
part of homeland security efforts outlined in legislation, presidential
directives, and policy documents. The National Strategy for Homeland
Security recognized the importance of fostering a Culture of
Preparedness that permeates all levels of our society, including all
preparedness stakeholders.[Footnote 126] In summarizing lessons learned
from Hurricane Katrina, the White House report made over 100
recommendations and concluded that an immediate priority for correcting
the shortfalls in the federal response to Hurricane Katrina was to
define and implement a comprehensive national preparedness system. We
believe a strategic plan for implementing the national preparedness
system that includes a clearly stated purpose, scope, and methodology
could help the Preparedness Directorate convey to preparedness
stakeholders the importance of integrating the multiple elements of the
national preparedness system and interagency coordination.
Problem definition and risk assessment: As shown by 9/11 and Hurricane
Katrina, the nation faces risks from terrorist attacks and man-made and
natural disasters. These threats may vary between localities and
regions, but responders are to be able to effectively work together in
a common language on operational tasks when required. According to the
National Preparedness Guidelines, responders must identify and assess
risk to ensure the necessary capabilities are available for selecting
the appropriate response.[Footnote 127] In addition, understanding risk
involves assessing what vulnerabilities and weaknesses require further
attention. The lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina show that federal
agencies were not prepared for a catastrophic disaster. Confusion by
emergency responders over their roles and responsibilities was
widespread and resulted in a slow or fragmented response. To improve
response and recovery to all hazards including a catastrophic disaster,
the Post-Katrina Act called on FEMA to develop the national
preparedness system.
Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures:
The cultural shift of the preparedness community from a response and
recovery strategy to a proactive preparedness strategy emphasizes the
importance of a strategic plan that includes clear goals, objectives,
activities, and measures. Identifying performance measures for the
various components of the national preparedness system, which is also a
requirement under the Post-Katrina Act, will help policymakers
determine what progress has been made and what remains to be done,
especially as it relates to preparedness for a catastrophic disaster.
[Footnote 128] A strategic plan that outlines an overarching goal,
subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures for the
various components of the national preparedness system would help FEMA
prioritize future efforts and allow decision makers to measure
progress.
Resources, investments, and risk management: Preparedness agencies are
to manage their likely risks and direct finite resources to the most
urgent needs. The national preparedness system helps inform decision
makers in federal and state agencies on their use of resources relative
to their level of capabilities achievement. Different states and areas
face different risks, and thus should have different capabilities to
mitigate those risks. As we reported in March 2008, although DHS has
taken some steps to establish goals, gather information, and measure
progress, its monitoring of homeland security grant expenditures does
not provide a means to measure the achievement of desired program
outcomes. FEMA's current efforts do not provide information on the
effectiveness of those funds in improving the nation's capabilities or
reducing risk.[Footnote 129] The National Strategy for Homeland
Security describes how resources and risk management must be addressed
in a comprehensive approach.[Footnote 130] For example, the strategy
states that "We must apply a risk-based framework across all homeland
security efforts in order to identify and assess potential hazards,
determine what levels of relative risk are acceptable, and prioritize
and allocate resources among all homeland security partners, both
public and private, to prevent, protect against, and respond to and
recover from all manner of incidents." A strategic plan that outlines
resources, investments, and risk management would help FEMA coordinate
a prioritized approach.
Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination: Achieving
national preparedness, especially for catastrophic incidents, requires
sharing responsibility horizontally with other federal departments and
agencies. It also requires a robust vertical integration of the
federal, state, local, and tribal governments, as well as private
entities. FEMA's Preparedness Directorate faces the challenge of
aligning operations of the nation's preparedness stakeholders to
coordinate activities and plans to implement a national preparedness
program capable of dealing with catastrophic incidents. A key part of a
national preparedness strategic plan would be the clear delineation of
organizations and their roles and responsibilities, as well as
processes to coordinate their responsibilities.
Integration and implementation: A national preparedness strategic plan
would help describe how preparedness agencies at all government levels
and sectors will integrate their various standards, policies, and
procedures into the national preparedness system. Plans describing how
to integrate and implement the various elements of the national
preparedness system would help FEMA inform emergency managers, first
responders, and decision makers on how the individual elements of the
national preparedness system will improve capabilities, training, and
plans for all hazards, including catastrophic disasters. A strategic
plan to implement the national preparedness system would enable FEMA's
Preparedness Directorate to improve its likelihood of achieving its
vision, evaluating progress, and ensuring accountability of federal
agencies and other organizations in aligning their efforts to develop
and improve the national preparedness system. While it may be
impossible to have absolute compatibility because of the many public
and private organizations involved, the danger in organizations using
different methods or systems, without some overall guidance to assure
consistent application of approaches, is that the elements of the
national preparedness system will have little ability to inform one
another. More importantly, these systems may produce unreliable or
incomplete data on how to improve programs related to response and
recovery. FEMA plays a crucial role in this regard through its
statutory responsibility of carrying out the Post-Katrina Act
requirements for the national preparedness system.
Conclusions:
The nation looks to FEMA for leadership to ensure that stakeholders
involved in preparedness activities can effectively provide a
coordinated response to man-made or natural disasters. The nation's
experiences after the events of 9/11 and the 2005 hurricane season
dramatically demonstrated our emergency preparedness capabilities and
where they were lacking. The Post-Katrina Act's centralization of
responsibility in FEMA for exercises and the other primary activities
that form the national preparedness system provides an unprecedented
opportunity for comprehensive integration and coordination. While FEMA
has made progress in implementing each of these interdependent and
essential preparedness activities, it is difficult to measure this
progress. FEMA lacks a comprehensive approach to managing the
development of policies and plans and overseeing the National Exercise
Program. Additionally, FEMA has not established a clearly defined
course of action to assess capabilities based on quantifiable metrics.
Finally, FEMA has not established a strategic plan for integrating
these elements of the national preparedness system. These conditions
show that much remains to be done. In the short term, progress is
heavily dependent on continuing to improve basic policies and
procedures, management tools, and project plans for key elements of the
system. Developing each element of the system is undoubtedly a complex
task, but progress has to be built on these incremental but critical
steps. In the long term, progress will be increasingly dependent on how
well FEMA coordinates with the thousands of stakeholders in the system
and the degree to which it can integrate the plans, exercises, and
assessments into a cohesive approach that improves national
preparedness. This need centers attention on leadership and guidance
from the Preparedness Directorate and success will depend on linking
the various elements of the system and showing how data and information
from the system will inform program and budget decisions related to
improving preparedness.
A complete, integrated set of national preparedness policies and plans
that defines stakeholders' roles and responsibilities at all levels is
needed to ensure that federal, state, and local resources are invested
in the most effective exercises. As one program official told us, "If
an exercise is testing an inadequate plan, then the exercise is just an
experiment..." Until all national preparedness policies are developed
and operational plans are created or revised to reflect changes in the
roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders, FEMA's ability to
update requisite training to prepare officials responsible for
fulfilling these roles and reflect the preparedness lessons of the
unprecedented disasters of the last decade in exercises and real-world
response will be limited. Without a program management plan, FEMA
cannot effectively ensure, in coordination with DHS and other federal
entities, that it will complete and integrate key policies and plans
with each other and the national preparedness system as envisioned by
law and presidential directive.
In implementing the latest iteration of the National Exercise Program,
FEMA has issued guidance and requirements for exercise design,
execution, evaluation, and corrective action resolution. However,
federal and state exercise officials have not yet fully embraced the
essential program components. In addition, opportunities to make
exercises as realistic as possible by coordinating more fully with all
preparedness stakeholders, including the National Council on
Disability, and translating the experiences of real-world incidents
into corrective actions could further enhance the value of the exercise
program. Establishing policies and procedures that detail how FEMA
would work with federal entities as well as monitor states' compliance
in implementing the program would help stakeholders meet program
requirements and FEMA develop complete and accurate information on
program implementation. More importantly, these key program controls,
once more systematically established and applied, will enhance FEMA's
ability to assess the extent to which corrective actions have been
implemented and, ultimately, describe strengths and weaknesses in the
nation's preparedness capabilities.
Because a comprehensive assessment of national preparedness
capabilities is a monumental task, it is understandable that FEMA's
efforts to develop and implement an assessment approach have been
underway for more than a decade. Program officials with responsibility
for this most recent effort have recognized the need for a
comprehensive set of metrics to identify needed capabilities in
equipment, personnel, skills, or processes and to prioritize national
investments in preparedness. Given the complexity of this effort, they
would benefit from a clear roadmap that details their analytical
approach for integrating disparate information sources, identifies
associated program risks, establishes more specific milestones to help
avoid unexpected setbacks, and provides a basis for assessing program
progress and making revisions, if needed, to the agency's
implementation plans. Such mitigation efforts would not eliminate the
risks associated with the development of the comprehensive assessment
system and target capabilities metrics, but they would provide a basis
for holding officials responsible for timely and quality results and
hold them harmless for unavoidable or unforeseen events that could
delay their efforts.
Finally, effective coordination, integration, and implementation of
these elements of the national preparedness system require the combined
contributions of a broad range of federal, state, and local
stakeholders. FEMA has started this integration effort and has had some
success in issuing guidelines and requirements that seek greater
uniformity of effort. But our work shows that issuing guidelines alone
does not assure consistent application across organizations. While it
may be impossible to have absolute compatibility because of the many
public and private organizations involved in preparedness, the danger
in organizations using different methods or systems--without some
overall guidance, direction, and controls in place to assure consistent
application of preparedness approaches--is that the elements of the
preparedness system will have little ability to inform one another.
Perhaps, more important, these systems may produce unreliable or
incomplete data on how to allocate resources or to improve programs
related to response and recovery, especially with respect to
catastrophic incidents. In this regard, FEMA officials have noted that
their authority is limited to coordinating with, but not directing,
other federal agencies. This condition highlights the importance of
developing a strategic approach that leads to partnerships with
stakeholders whose cooperation is necessary for developing the
preparedness system. Making progress with regard to this challenge is a
necessary step to assessing our nation's capabilities and dealing with
gaps in preparedness. The scope and breadth of this critical national
effort suggests that an explicit description and elaboration of the
elements of the system and the level of effort associated with its
effective application could enhance stakeholder acceptance and
participation. In addition, defining the end state of the preparedness
system will help translate requirements from presidential directives
and the Post-Katrina Act into measurable steps for achieving an
integrated national system. Developing goals and metrics to measure
progress towards achieving an integrated system will help FEMA
prioritize actions, requirements, and national investments in
preparedness. A strategic plan for the National Preparedness
Directorate that describes how it will approach these challenges and
mitigate these weaknesses would help FEMA partner with the many
organizations whose cooperation and resources are necessary for
success.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that key elements of the national preparedness system are
developed in a timely and integrated fashion, we recommend that the
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency take the
following 11 actions:
Direct the Disaster Operations Directorate and the National
Preparedness Directorate to improve their approach to developing
policies and plans that define roles and responsibilities and planning
processes.
* Develop a program management plan, in coordination with DHS and other
federal entities, to ensure the completion of the key national
preparedness policies and plans called for in legislation, presidential
directives, and existing policy and doctrine, to define roles and
responsibilities and planning processes, as well as to fully integrate
such policies and plans into other elements of the national
preparedness system. The program management plan, among other things,
should:
* identify the specific schedule of activities that needs to be
performed to complete, and identify dependencies among, all policy and
planning development and integration activities;
* identify the type and quantities of resources required to perform,
and the schedule for completing, all policy and planning development
and integration activities;
* analyze activity sequences, durations (including the time required to
partner and coordinate on an interagency basis with other federal
entities), resource requirements, and schedule constraints to create
and update the individual policy and plan development project
schedules; and:
* control for changes to the project schedules precipitated by outside
forces.
When outstanding policies and plans are completed, integrate them into
training and exercise efforts to ensure that roles and responsibilities
are fully communicated and fully understood by emergency response
stakeholders.
Direct the National Exercise Division to improve its implementation of
statutory and program requirements.
* Coordinate with the Department of Homeland Security to develop
policies and procedures for issuing after-action reports for National
Level Exercises (i.e., TOPOFF) in 6 months or less, as required by the
implementation plan for the National Exercise Program.
* Collaborate with the Homeland Security Council to establish policies
and procedures for documenting corrective actions from Principal Level
Exercises that are consistent with HSEEP guidance and the
implementation plan for the National Exercise Program.
* Collaborate with the Homeland Security Council to provide FEMA with
the information it needs from past principal level exercises to enable
it to conduct remedial action tracking and long-term trend analysis, as
required by the Post-Katrina Act.
* Ensure compliance by states that receive grant funds with HSEEP
requirements by revising FEMA's grant monitoring guidance, for example
by including a checklist of specific HSEEP requirements for state
validation and certification.
* Involve the National Council on Disability on committees involved in
the design and execution of national level exercises, especially on
issues related to populations with special needs.
* Develop internal control policies and procedures that validate the
completeness and accuracy of data used to measure program performance.
Such procedures could involve checking whether states and federal
agencies are providing data and information needed to measure the
performance of the program.
* Revise the National Exercise Program Implementation Plan to require
the use of FEMA's Corrective Action Program for all federal exercises
that involve interagency testing of roles and responsibilities or
require that federal agencies submit a report to FEMA on the status of
their corrective actions resulting from such exercises.
* Develop procedures for including "lessons learned" from real-world
incidents in the Corrective Action Program system.
Direct the Office of Preparedness Policy, Planning, and Analysis to
improve its approach for developing a comprehensive assessment system.
* Enhance its project management plan to include milestone dates, an
assessment of risk, and related mitigation strategies for (1)
comprehensively collecting and reporting on disparate information
sources, (2) developing quantifiable metrics for target capabilities
that are to be used to collect and report preparedness information, and
(3) reporting on the results of preparedness assessments to help inform
homeland security resource allocation decisions.
Direct the National Preparedness Directorate to take a more strategic
approach to developing the national preparedness system.
* Develop a strategic plan for implementing the national preparedness
system that includes the key characteristics of a strategic plan,
including coordination, integration, and implementation approaches.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for comment. In commenting on
our draft report, DHS noted that while it may not agree with all the
assertions in the report, it generally agreed with our recommendations.
DHS stated that GAO's recommendations provide a useful methodology and
sound counsel for revision of FEMA's current portfolio of national
preparedness policy, plans, protocols, and procedures. Specifically,
DHS stated that FEMA has already made significant inroads in each
aspect of the GAO recommended characteristics for sound strategic
planning.
DHS also expressed concern that the report suggests that DHS/FEMA
should hold other federal agencies and departments or state, local, or
tribal governments accountable for compliance with program
requirements, while also recognizing that FEMA did not generally have
the explicit authority to compel compliance. The Post-Katrina Act
designates FEMA as the federal leader and coordinator for developing
and implementing the national preparedness system. We recognize that
FEMA's authority is generally to coordinate, guide, and support, rather
than direct, and that collaboration is an essential element of FEMA's
efforts. At the same time, we believe that FEMA's expanded leadership
role under the Post-Katrina Act provides FEMA opportunities for and a
responsibility to further develop its relationships with national
preparedness stakeholders at the local, state, and federal levels and
to instill a shared sense of responsibility and accountability on the
part of all stakeholders for the successful development and
implementation of the national preparedness system. Several of our
recommendations aim to enhance such collaboration and cooperation.
DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the
report as appropriate. Appendix V contains written comments from DHS.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days
from the date of this report. At that time we will send copies of this
report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, and interested congressional
committees. We will also make copies available to others on request. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8757 or e-mail at jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this
report are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
William O. Jenkins, Jr.
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
[End of section]
This review examined key elements of the national preparedness system,
including the National Exercise Program. Specifically, our reporting
objectives were to review the extent to which the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) has:
1. developed policies and plans that define roles and responsibilities
and planning processes for national preparedness;
2. taken actions since 2007 to implement the National Exercise Program
and track corrective actions at the federal and state levels and what
challenges remain;
3. made progress in conducting a nationwide capabilities-based
assessment, including developing required preparedness reports, and
what issues, if any, it faces in completing the system; and,
4. developed a strategic plan for implementing the national
preparedness system.
To address these objectives, we analyzed information and data on FEMA's
policies and plans for preparedness, the National Exercise Program, its
approach for developing a comprehensive system for assessing nationwide
capabilities, and its strategy for integrating elements of the
preparedness system. GAO explored the option of selecting exercises to
review, but there is no national database that captures all exercises
conducted using Homeland Security Grant Program funds. Therefore we
selected six states--California, Georgia, Illinois, New York, Texas,
and Washington--that provide examples of how exercises are planned and
conducted and visited these six states. While we cannot generalize our
work from these visits to all states, we chose these locations to
provide examples of the way in which states carry out their exercise
and preparedness programs. In selecting these states, we considered
factors such as states' participation in national-level exercises;
states located in different geographic locations, such as those in
hurricane-prone regions; and states with varying percentages of
homeland security grant funding planned to support exercises. At each
location, we interviewed staff in FEMA's regional offices responsible
for regional preparedness activities. We interviewed state and local
officials on their progress and challenges in carrying out preparedness
activities, including exercises and assessments of capability. We
analyzed key legislation such as the Post-Katrina Act and the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
[Footnote 131] (9/11 Act) as well as presidential directives related to
preparedness efforts. We also interviewed FEMA officials responsible
for preparedness programs to learn more about the actions they had
taken and planned to take related to preparedness efforts and compared
FEMA's policies and procedures with criteria in GAO's standards for
internal control in the federal government.[Footnote 132]
To analyze the extent to which policies and plans have been developed
to define roles and responsibilities and planning processes for
national preparedness, we analyzed key legislation, presidential
directives, and DHS-and FEMA-issued policies that identify required
preparedness policies and plans to define roles and responsibilities
for emergency response as well as establish guidance for planning
processes for developing emergency response plans. We identified the
resulting policies that define roles and responsibilities and that form
the basis of the national preparedness system, including the National
Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Response Framework (NRF),
the National Preparedness Guidelines, and the National Incident
Management System. In addition, we identified related policies that
supplement these documents, such as guidance for Joint Field Office
operations. We also identified policies that define planning processes
for developing emergency plans, such as the draft Integrated Planning
System (IPS) and FEMA-issued interim and final Comprehensive
Preparedness Guides for nonfederal planning efforts. We identified
plans developed using planning processes that further define and
operationalize roles and responsibilities identified in existing
policies. These plans include the incident annexes and the incident
annex supplements for the NRF, FEMA's Pre-Scripted Mission Assignment
Catalog, plans being developed as part of FEMA's Catastrophic Disaster
Planning Initiative, as well as plans called for by HSPD 8 Annex 1 that
are to be developed using IPS. To identify lessons learned and
corrective actions related to roles and responsibilities from federal
emergency response exercises, we summarized lessons learned from after-
action reports for Tier I and II (or equivalent) exercises from 2005
through 2008. The exercises that comprised this data set were
identified by FEMA officials as well as counsel to the White House
Homeland Security Council. This analysis was conducted to determine
whether the exercises revealed unclear or conflicting roles and
responsibilities between federal departments and agencies and if
additional policies and plans were needed. We also interviewed
officials from DHS's Office of Operations Coordination and FEMA's
National Preparedness Directorate and Disaster Operations Directorate
to obtain information on the status of efforts to develop and issue
required preparedness policies and plans, including any existing
program or project management plans and related issuance schedules. We
compared policies and plans that have been published in a final form,
versus released in interim or draft formats or that have not yet been
developed, to determine the issuance status (completed, partially
completed, or incomplete) of these policies and plans. To identify best
practices for program management, such as steps for how a program is to
be executed, monitored, and controlled, we reviewed the Project
Management Institute's The Standard on Program Management. Finally, we
reviewed our prior reports on FEMA's preparedness programs and planning
efforts, as well as prior DHS, White House, and congressional reports
on the lessons learned from the response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
To assess the extent to which FEMA has taken actions since 2007 to
implement a National Exercise Program and track corrective actions, we
observed portions of two National Exercise Program exercises (TOPOFF 4
and the May 2008 Tier II exercise). Specifically, during TOPOFF 4, we
discussed exercise implementation with federal, state, and local
officials and observed FEMA's exercise management efforts at the TOPOFF
4 Master Control Cell in Springfield, Virginia; the TOPOFF 4 Long-Term
Recovery Tabletop Exercise in Washington, D.C.; and exercise
implementation in Portland, Oregon. During the May 2008 Tier II
exercise, we observed exercise implementation in Mount Weather and
Suffolk, Virginia and in Blaine, Washington and discussed the exercise
with participating federal, state, and local officials. We evaluated
key program documents, such as the implementation plan for the National
Exercise Program and the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation
Program (HSEEP)--FEMA's guidance for carrying out exercises in
accordance with the Post-Katrina Act and the 9/11 Act and data on the
program's performance measures. We reviewed actions taken by FEMA since
2007 because the National Exercise Program Charter was established in
January 2007 and the implementation plan was issued in April 2007. We
examined after-action reports for Principal Level Exercises--exercises
which involve senior federal officials, such as Deputy Secretaries of
departments or agencies--that were issued from April 2007 through
August 2008 to determine whether the Homeland Security Council
developed after-action reports.[Footnote 133] We also interviewed
Homeland Security Council staff and the Associate Counsel to the
President on the role and responsibility of the council for
systematically tracking and implementing corrective actions resulting
from Principal Level Exercises because these staff were responsible for
summarizing corrective actions for Principal Level Exercises. We also
reviewed after-action reports that were provided to us by the six
states we visited for exercises conducted from June 2007 through
September 2008 that used Homeland Security Grant Program funds, in
order to determine how well these states were complying with HSEEP and
grant guidance. To determine if FEMA is conducting monitoring and
oversight of Homeland Security Grant Program recipients, we reviewed
grant monitoring reports for the six states we visited. For information
that would provide a broader perspective on FEMA's efforts, we examined
several FEMA databases, including the FEMA Secure Portal--the FEMA
repository of after-action reports; the National Exercise Schedule
(NEXS) system--a scheduling system for all exercises; and the
Corrective Action Program (CAP) system--which is designed for tracking
capability-based improvement plans entered by federal, state, and local
exercise participants. We assessed the reliability of the FEMA Secure
Portal and NEXS databases by checking the systems to determine if known
exercises identified through after-action reports produced by states
were included in these systems, and by interviewing FEMA and state
officials responsible for the data. In addition, we assessed the
reliability of the CAP system by interviewing FEMA and Homeland
Security Council officials responsible for the data. We concluded the
data in the FEMA Secure Portal, the NEXS system, and the CAP system
were not reliable for use in this report because these databases lacked
complete information related to after-action reports, scheduled
exercises, and corrective actions and FEMA does not have procedures in
place to ensure that required data are collected consistently to
populate these databases.
To determine the extent to which FEMA has made progress and issues FEMA
has encountered in conducting a nationwide capabilities-based
assessment and developing required preparedness reports and any issues
it faces in completing the system, we (1) analyzed FEMA's plans and
schedules for developing the comprehensive assessment system and
performance objectives for measuring capabilities, including assessment
efforts initiated by FEMA's National Preparedness, Disaster Operations,
and Grant Programs Directorates, and (2) interviewed FEMA staff
responsible for these efforts. We also reviewed assessments previously
conducted by DHS and FEMA to evaluate historical efforts to assess
capabilities. To assess FEMA's efforts to establish quantifiable
metrics for target capabilities, we analyzed preliminary performance
objectives for two target capabilities that FEMA had completed, and
interviewed headquarters staff responsible for these efforts. We also
reviewed information pertinent to FEMA's assessment approach, including
the Federal Preparedness Report (issued by FEMA in January 2009) and
State Preparedness Reports for the 2007 reporting year for the six
states we visited (reports for 2008 were due to FEMA after this report
was finalized for publication). To assess the comparability of
information contained in the six State Preparedness Reports, we
selected one target capability--mass prophylaxis--outlined in the
Target Capabilities List, and reviewed a performance measure associated
with this capability for providing initial prophylaxis (an action taken
to prevent a disease or a health problem) within 48 hours of a state/
local decision to provide prophylaxis. To identify best practices for
project management, such as steps for how a project is to be executed,
monitored, and controlled, we reviewed the Project Management
Institute's A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK)
and compared FEMA's efforts for developing and implementing the
comprehensive assessment system to the best practices developed by the
institute. Finally, we reviewed our prior GAO reports on FEMA's
preparedness programs and exercise efforts.
To determine the extent to which FEMA's National Preparedness
Directorate has developed a strategic plan that implements the national
preparedness system, we interviewed FEMA National Preparedness
Directorate officials on strategic planning and policy and procedures
for the National Preparedness System. We analyzed the Post-Katrina Act
and key FEMA documents--including the agencywide Strategic Plan for
Fiscal Years 2008 through 2013, the Grants Program Directorate
Strategic Plan, and the draft annual National Preparedness Directorate
Operating Plan--to determine strategy-related requirements.
Additionally we reviewed DHS and DHS Office of Inspector General
reports on national preparedness. To determine the elements that
comprise a strategic plan, we examined our prior reports on the
desirable characteristics of effective national strategies and compared
them with FEMA's current approach for developing a National
Preparedness System.[Footnote 134] Finally, we compared the desirable
characteristics to the work of the National Preparedness Directorate as
described in the Homeland Security Council's National Strategy for
Homeland Security, DHS's National Preparedness Guidelines, and the Post-
Katrina Act.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 through April
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Overview of Policies and Plans to Define Roles and
Responsibilities and Planning Processes for Developing Emergency Plans:
[End of section]
In September 2006, we reported that in preparing for, responding to,
and recovering from any disaster, the legal authorities, roles and
responsibilities, and lines of authority for the preparation and
response at all levels for government and nongovernmental entities must
be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood in
order to facilitate rapid and effective decision making.[Footnote 135]
National preparedness policies and plans identify these legal
authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority for
response activities and serve to communicate this information to
emergency response stakeholders, and, in conjunction with training, are
the basis for ensuring that the information is well understood.
Effective and efficient disaster management relies on the thorough
integration of these emergency response policies and plans. Because
emergency response activities entail large numbers of stakeholders who
need to be able to respond to an incident in a coordinated and
integrated manner, it is essential that roles and responsibilities are
defined, communicated, and understood prior to a real-world incident
response. An example of the range of stakeholders involved in such
response activities is illustrated by figure 6.
Figure 6: Selected Stakeholders That Have Roles and Responsibilities
for Emergency Response Activities:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Selected Members of the Emergency Response Community:
This figure depicts a triangle with stakeholders appearing as
interlocking pieces forming that triangle. From the base of the
triangle to the top, the stakeholders represented are:
Base level:
Tribal governments;
U.S. National Guard Units;
Local governments and agencies.
First level up:
State governments;
State and territorial agencies.
Second level up:
Private sector;
FEMA regions;
Third level up:
Other federal agencies;
NGOs.
Fourth level up:
FEMA;
DHS.
Top level:
U.S. President.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: NGO = Non-Governmental Organization.
Figure 6 presents a range of emergency response stakeholders, but does
not attempt to depict the operational or information-sharing
relationships or relative authorities of such stakeholders.
[End of figure]
The wide range of emergency response stakeholders depicted in figure 6,
among others, are to be organized by the roles and responsibilities
defined in policies and plans that are designed to facilitate an
effective response to an incident, be it man-made (e.g., terrorism) or
a natural disaster. Policies that broadly define roles and
responsibilities are operationalized by the development of plans that
provide greater levels of detail.[Footnote 136] These detailed plans
are to be developed using the planning processes that are discussed and
established in federal policies. The range and relative relationships
of the policies that define roles and responsibilities and planning
processes for developing emergency plans are illustrated in figure 7.
Table 4, which follows figure 7, describes each of the policies
presented in the graphic.
Figure 7: Range and Relative Relationship of Policies That Define Roles
and Responsibilities and Planning Processes for Developing Emergency
Plans:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Legislation:
Stafford Act;
Homeland Security Act;
Post-Katrina Act;
9/11 Act.
Presidential Directives, DHS/FEMA Policy & Plans:
HSPD 5: Management of Domestic Incidents[A];
HSPD 8: National Preparedness[A];
HSPD 8 Annex 1: National Planning[A].
HSPD 5 and HSPD 8, together relate to:
National Strategy for Homeland Security[A]; which relates to:
National Homeland Security Plan (also related to HSPD 8, Annex 1).
National Homeland Security Plan[A]: is related to:
National Incident Management System[A];
National Preparedness Guidelines[A]:
* Universal Task List;
* Target Capabilities List;
* National Planning Scenarios;
National Response Framework base document[A]:
* 15 NRF Emergency Support Function Annexes[A];
* 8 NRF Support Annexes[A];
* 7 NRF Incident Annexes;
* 2 NRF Incident Annex Supplements;
* 4 NRF Partner Guides[A].
HSPD 8 Annex 1: National Planning[A] is directly related to the
following:
Integrated Planning System[A]:
* 8 NPS Strategic Guidance Statements;
* 8 NPS Strategic Plans;
* 8 NPS Concept Plans;
* 16 NPS Operational &Tactical Plans.
Related to the Integrated Planning System[A]:
10 FEMA Regional All-Hazards Response Plans.
Related to those plans:
* Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101[A];
* Interim Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 301[A].
State and Local Emergency Operations Plans are related to the guides
listed above.
Joint Field Office (JFO)[A]: Interagency Integrated Standard Operating
Procedure:
* JFO Appendixes & Annexes;
* JFO Field Operation Guide;
* JFO Organization & Functions Manual.
Related to the Joint Field Office (JFO)[A]:
FEMA Pre-Scripted Mission Assignment Catalog.
Operational Planning Guidance for FEMA Operational Planners[A]:
6 FEMA Regional Hurricane Contingency Plans;
Florida Catastrophic Comprehensive Response Plan;
Draft Hawaii Hurricane Contingency Plan;
Interim Federal Contingency Plan: New Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic
Earthquake;
2 California Earthquake Contingency Plans;
Draft Northwest Nevada Earthquake Contingency Plan.
[A] Policies that define roles and responsibilities and planning
processes.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
Among the 50 policies that define roles and responsibilities or
planning processes, 46 define roles and responsibilities and 4 define
planning processes for developing emergency plans. Table 4 provides
brief descriptions and the status of the policies depicted in figure 7
that define roles and responsibilities. Of the 46 policies presented in
table 4, 40 have been completed and 6 are incomplete.
Table 4: Description and Status of the 46 Policies That Define Roles
and Responsibilities:
Type[A]: Policy & doctrine (Legislation):
Title: Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act;
(Stafford Act); Pub. L. No. 93-288;
Summary: The Stafford Act, as amended, primarily establishes the
programs and processes for the federal government to provide major
disaster and emergency assistance to states, local governments, tribal
nations, individuals, and qualified nonprofit organizations. Among
other things, the act defines the role of the Federal Coordinating
Officer (FCO), who is to coordinate major disaster and emergency
assistance upon appointment by the President, as well as the role of
the FEMA Administrator, who is responsible for emergency preparedness
and is vested with the authority to prepare federal response plans;
Status[B,C]: Completed; (enacted May 1974).
Type[A]: Policy & doctrine (Legislation):
Title: Homeland Security Act of 2002; Pub. L. No. 107-296;
Summary: The Homeland Security Act established the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), with the Secretary of Homeland Security as the
head of the department, through the merger of disparate agencies and
organizations, including FEMA. It generally charged DHS with securing
the homeland against terrorist attacks and carrying out the functions
of all transferred entities, including acting as a focal point
regarding natural and man-made crises and emergency planning;
Status[B,C]: Completed; (enacted November 2002).
Type[A]: Policy & doctrine (Legislation):
Title: Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006; (Post-
Katrina Act); Pub. L. No. 109-295; Title VI;
Summary: The Post-Katrina Act, among other things, enhanced FEMA's
responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. Under the act, FEMA's
primary mission is to lead and support the nation in a risk-based,
comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection,
response, recovery, and mitigation. It directs the transfer to FEMA of
many functions of DHS' former Preparedness Directorate, and contains a
provision establishing in FEMA a National Integration Center, which is
responsible for the ongoing management and maintenance of the National
Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP),
which is now known as the National Response Framework (NRF);
Status[B,C]: Completed; (enacted October 2006).
Type[A]: Policy & doctrine (Legislation):
Title: Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007;
(9/11 Act); Pub. L. No. 110-53;
Summary: The 9/11 Act was enacted to implement recommendations in a
variety of areas that were made by the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States. Among other things, the act amends
certain provisions of the Homeland Security Act and the Post-Katrina
Act in order to strengthen the use of the incident command system. For
example, the act requires FEMA Regional Administrators to assist state,
local, and tribal governments to pre-identify and evaluate suitable
sites where a multijurisdictional incident command system may be
quickly established and operated, if the need arises;
Status[B,C]: Completed; (enacted August 2007).
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine (Presidential Directives):
Title: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5; (HSPD 5); Management
of Domestic Incidents;
Summary: Titled "Management of Domestic Incidents," the purpose of this
HSPD is to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic
incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident
management system (NIMS) and national response plan (NRP), both of
which are required by the Homeland Security Act. HSPD-5 also defines
the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal federal official
for domestic incident management and as responsible for coordinating
federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to,
and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act;
Status[B,C]: Completed; (February 2003).
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine (Presidential Directives):
Title: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8; (HSPD 8); National
Preparedness;
Summary: Titled "National Preparedness," this HSPD establishes policies
to strengthen the preparedness of the United States by requiring a
national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing
mechanisms for improved delivery of federal preparedness assistance to
state and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen
preparedness capabilities of federal, state, and local entities. It
requires the head of each federal department or agency to undertake
actions to support the national preparedness goal, including adoption
of quantifiable performance measurements in the areas of training,
planning, equipment, and exercises for federal incident management and
asset preparedness;
Status[B,C]: Completed; (December 2003).
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine (Presidential Directives):
Title: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 Annex 1; (HSPD 8
Annex 1) National Planning;
Summary: Titled "National Planning," this HSPD is intended to further
enhance the preparedness of the United States by formally establishing,
developing, and maintaining a standard and comprehensive approach to
national planning. It calls for: a standardized federal planning
process (the Integrated Planning System); national planning doctrine;
resourced operational and tactical planning capabilities at each
federal department and agency with a role in homeland security;
strategic guidance statements, strategic plans, concepts of operations,
operations plans, and, as appropriate, tactical plans for each National
Planning Scenario; and; a system for integrating plans among all levels
of government; It also calls for the development of the National
Homeland Security Plan;
Status[B,C]: Completed; (December 2007).
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine (Issued by DHS or FEMA):
Title: National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS);
Summary: The NSHS is to guide, organize, and unify homeland security
efforts by providing a common framework for the prevention of terrorist
attacks; protection of people, critical infrastructure, and key
resources; and response to and recovery from man-made and natural
disasters. It calls for homeland security management through a
continuous, mutually reinforcing cycle of four activity phases:
1. overarching homeland security guidance grounded in clearly
articulated and up-to-date homeland and relevant national security
policies, with coordinated supporting strategies, doctrine, and
planning guidance flowing from and fully synchronizing with these
policies;
2. a deliberate and dynamic system that translates policies,
strategies, doctrine, and planning guidance into a family of strategic,
operational, and tactical plans;
3. the execution of operational and tactical-level plans; and;
4. continual assessment and evaluation of both operations and
exercises;
Status[B,C]: Completed; (July 2002; revised October 2007).
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine (Issued by DHS or FEMA):
Title: National Homeland Security Plan (NHSP);
Summary: NHSP, as called for under HSPD 8 Annex 1, is to be an
overarching strategic plan to guide national efforts to execute the
National Strategy for Homeland Security. It is intended to:
* facilitate federal homeland security coordination;
* establish priorities, and;
* define roles and responsibilities for preventing, protecting against,
responding to, and recovering from man-made and natural disasters;
It was to be submitted to the President for approval within 120 days of
the approval of HSPD 8 Annex I (December 2007); however, as of April
2009, the NHSP has yet to be published;
Status[B,C]: Incomplete: not yet published; (release schedule
undetermined).
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine (Issued by DHS or FEMA):
Title: National Incident Management System (NIMS);
Summary: NIMS presents a core set of doctrine, concepts, principles,
procedures, organizational processes, terminology, and standard
requirements designed to enable effective, efficient, and collaborative
incident management. It forms the basis for interoperability and
compatibility to enable a diverse set of public and private
organizations to conduct integrated emergency management and incident
response operations;
Status[B,C]: Completed; (March 2004; revised December 2008).
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine (Issued by DHS or FEMA):
Title: National Preparedness Guidelines (NPG); and 3 capabilities-based
preparedness tools;
* Universal Task List;
* Target Capabilities List, and;
* National Planning Scenarios;
Summary: The NPG consists of a vision, capabilities, and priorities for
national preparedness. It establishes three capabilities-based
preparedness tools (Universal Task List, Target Capabilities List, and
National Planning Scenarios) and the National Preparedness System cycle
(plan; organize and staff; equip; train; and exercise, evaluate, and
improve) to collate existing homeland security plans, strategies, and
systems into an overarching framework. The revised and finalized NPG
replaces the interim National Preparedness Goal released in March 2005;
Status[B,C]: Completed; (interim NPG, March 2005; final NPG and 3
capabilities-based preparedness tools, September 2007).
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine (Issued by DHS or FEMA):
Title: National Response Framework (NRF); base document;
Summary: The NRF is a guide to how the nation conducts all-hazards
response, generally describing national response doctrine and the roles
and responsibilities of officials involved in response efforts,
including, among others, the Secretary of Homeland Security, FEMA
Administrator, Principal Federal Official, and Federal Coordinating
Officer. It is designed to align key roles and responsibilities,
linking all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and
the private sector, as well as capture specific authorities and best
practices for managing incidents that range from the serious but purely
local, to large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural
disasters;
Status[B,C]: Completed; (January 2008).
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine (Issued by DHS or FEMA):
Title: 15 NRF Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes;
Summary: NRF ESF Annexes align categories of federal government
response resources and capabilities and provide strategic objectives
for their use under the NRF. They provide the structure for
coordinating federal interagency support for a federal response to an
incident and are mechanisms for grouping functions most frequently used
to provide federal support to states, and federal-to-federal support.
Each ESF Annex, such as Search and Rescue, identifies the federal
agency coordinator and the primary and support agencies pertinent for
the ESF, and when activated, the initial actions delineated in the ESF
Annexes guide response activities;
Status[B,C]: Completed; (January 2008).
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine (Issued by DHS or FEMA):
Title: 8 NRF Support Annexes;
Summary: NRF Support Annexes describe the roles and responsibilities of
federal departments and agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and
the private sector in coordinating and executing the functional
processes and administrative requirements necessary for incident
management that are common to all incidents. They identify the federal
agency coordinator and the primary and support agencies pertinent for
the support activity, such as financial management or private-sector
coordination, and when activated, the initial actions delineated in the
Support Annexes guide response activities;
Status[B,C]: Completed; (January 2008).
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine (Issued by DHS or FEMA):
Title: 4 NRF Partner Guides;
Summary: NRF Partner Guides are to provide stakeholder-specific
references describing key roles and actions for local, tribal, state,
federal, private-sector, and nongovernmental response partners. They
are to summarize core NRF concepts and be tailored specifically to
leaders at different levels of government and from different types of
organizations. As of April 2009, none of the four NRF Partner Guides
have been published;
Status[B,C]: Incomplete: none published; (release schedule
undetermined).
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine (Issued by DHS or FEMA):
Title: Joint Field Office Interagency Integrated Standard Operating
Procedure (JFO IISOP); JFO Appendixes & Annexes (JFO A&A); JFO Field
Operations Guide (JFO FOG);
Summary: The various Joint Field Office (JFO) guides were written to
support the December 2004 National Response Plan for the establishment
of JFOs. The JFO is a temporary federal multi-agency coordination
center established locally to facilitate coordinated field-level
domestic incident management activities, with the JFO IISOP, JFO A&A,
and JFO FOG designed to assist personnel assigned to response
operations. In particular, the JFO IISOP and JFO A&A provide detailed
guidance on JFO activations and operations, including defining the
roles and responsibilities and concept of operations for the Principal
Federal Official cell within the JFO. The JFO FOG is intended to be
used as a quick reference job aid for JFO personnel;
Status[B,C]: JFO IISOP: Completed (April 2006);
Status[B,C]: JFO A&A: Completed (April 2006);
Status[B,C]: JFO FOG: Completed (June 2006).
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine (Issued by DHS or FEMA):
Title: JFO Organization and Functions Manual;
Summary: Policy & doctrine (Legislation): Type[A]Policy & doctrine
(Legislation): According to FEMA officials, FEMA's Disaster Operations
Directorate is developing a JFO Organization & Functions Manual,
reflecting the NRF, as an addition to existing JFO guidance. This new
manual is to provide guidance for the establishment, operation, and
demobilization, as well as the general organization and staffing, of
JFOs;
Status[B,C]: Incomplete: not yet published; (release schedule
undetermined).
Source: GAO analysis of legislation, presidential directives, and
policy issued by DHS and FEMA.
[A] The type column identifies the categorization of policy and plans.
Policies are categorized under the term "policy & doctrine" (including
legislation, presidential directives, and other policies that define
roles and responsibilities, as well as policies that define planning
processes), per the national preparedness cycle presented in the
National Preparedness Guidelines. Plans that define roles and
responsibilities and that are to operationalize policies are
categorized under the term "planning & resource allocation," also per
the national preparedness cycle presented in the National Preparedness
Guidelines.
[B] The status column identifies the categorization of policy and plans
as "completed," "partially completed," or "incomplete." Completed
policies and plans are those that have been publicly issued in a final
form. Partially completed policies and plans are those that have been
issued in interim formats or fully drafted and revised but not yet
published. Incomplete policies and plans are those that have not been
issued in an interim or draft format, or issued in a final form.
[C] When the status of a policy or plan identifies that the release
schedule is undetermined, this means that DHS, FEMA, or other
responsible parties for the development of a particular policy or plan
have not determined the final release date for the publication.
[End of table]
Table 5 provides brief descriptions and the status of the policies that
define planning processes for developing the emergency plans depicted
in figure 7. Of the four policies presented in the table, two have been
completed and two are partially completed.
Table 5: Description and Status of the Four Policies That Define the
Planning Processes to Be Used for Developing Emergency Plans:
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine;
Title: Policy and doctrine: Operational Planning Guidance for FEMA
Operational Planners;
Summary: According to FEMA officials, this document provides FEMA
operational planners with guidance and priorities for their operational
planning efforts. This guidance applies to operational planners in both
FEMA headquarters and FEMA regional offices (including the Operational
Planning Branch of FEMA's Disaster Operations Directorate and for
FEMA's Catastrophic Disaster Planning Initiative). According to FEMA
officials, this guidance was issued in March 2009 and will be updated
at the beginning of each fiscal year;
Status[B,C]: Completed: (March 2009).
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine;
Title: Integrated Planning System (IPS);
Summary: IPS, as called for in HSPD 8 Annex I, is to provide common
processes for developing emergency plans and is to include:
* national planning doctrine and planning guidance, instruction, and
processes to ensure consistent planning across the federal government;
* a mechanism that provides for concept development to identify and
analyze missions and potential courses of action;
* a description of the process that allows for plan refinement and
proper execution to reflect developments in risk, capabilities, or
policies, as well as to incorporate lessons learned from exercises and
actual events;
* a description of the process that links regional, state, local, and
tribal plans, planning cycles, and processes and allows these plans to
inform the development of federal plans;
* a process for fostering integration of federal, state, local, and
tribal plans that allows for state, local, and tribal capability
assessments to feed into federal plans; and; a guide for all-hazards
planning, with comprehensive, practical guidance and instruction on
fundamental planning principles that can be used at federal, state,
local, and tribal levels to assist the planning process;
It was to be submitted to the President for approval within 2 months of
the approval of HSPD 8 Annex I, which was signed by the President in
December 2007. According to FEMA officials, IPS received presidential
approval in January 2009 under President Bush; however, IPS has not
been publicly released as of April 2009. The Obama administration is
currently conducting a review of the document;
Status[B,C]: Partially completed: draft approved by President Bush in
January 2009; (currently being reviewed by President Obama's
administration, release schedule undetermined).
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine;
Title: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 (CPG 101); Developing and
Maintaining Emergency Plans;
Summary: The CPG 101 provides state and local communities with guidance
for emergency operations planning and describes how the state and local
planning process is to vertically integrate with the federal Integrated
Planning System. It is designed to promote a common understanding of
the fundamentals of emergency planning to help emergency planners
examine a hazard and produce integrated, coordinated, and synchronized
plans. The CPG includes planning processes for all mission areas--
prevention, protection, response, and recovery;
Status[B,C]: Completed: (interim CPG 101 July 2008; final CPG 101 April
2009).
Type[A]: Policy and doctrine;
Title: Interim Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 301 (CPG 301); Planning
Guide for Special Needs Populations;
Summary: The interim CPG 301 is the second guide being released by FEMA
to provide comprehensive guidance on developing emergency plans
(interim CPG 101 being the first). It is intended as a tool for state,
territorial, tribal, and local emergency managers in the development of
emergency operations plans that address planning for special needs
populations. The guide outlines how involving special needs populations
in planning considerations enables emergency managers to address the
function-based needs of individuals and offers scalable recommendations
to meet the needs of different jurisdictions. This document supplements
the prior FEMA guidance document "Accommodating Individuals with
Disabilities within Disaster Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services";
Status[B,C]: Partially completed: interim version released August 2008;
(final release schedule undetermined).
Source: GAO analysis of legislation, presidential directives, and
policy issued by DHS and FEMA.
[A] The type column identifies the categorization of policy and plans.
Policies are categorized under the term "policy & doctrine" (including
legislation, presidential directives, and other policies that define
roles and responsibilities, as well as policies that define planning
processes), per the national preparedness cycle presented in the
National Preparedness Guidelines. Plans that define roles and
responsibilities and that are to operationalize policies are
categorized under the term "planning & resource allocation," also per
the national preparedness cycle presented in the National Preparedness
Guidelines.
[B] The status column identifies the categorization of policy and plans
as "completed," "partially completed," or "incomplete." Completed
policies and plans are those that have been publicly issued in a final
form. Partially completed policies and plans are those that have been
issued in interim formats or fully drafted and approved but not yet
published (e.g., the Integrated Planning System). Incomplete policies
and plans are those that have not been issued in an interim or draft
format, or issued in a final form.
[C] When the status of a policy or plan identifies that the release
schedule is undetermined, this means that DHS, FEMA, or other
responsible parties for the development of a particular policy or plan
have not determined the final release date for the publication.
[End of table]
The range and relative relationships of the plans that define roles and
responsibilities are illustrated in figure 8. Table 6, which follows
figure 8, describes each of the plans presented in the graphic.
Figure 8: Range and Relative Relationship of Plans That Define Roles
and Responsibilities:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Legislation:
Stafford Act;
Homeland Security Act;
Post-Katrina Act;
9/11 Act.
Presidential Directives, DHS/FEMA Policy & Plans:
HSPD 5: Management of Domestic Incidents;
HSPD 8: National Preparedness;
HSPD 8 Annex 1: National Planning.
HSPD 5 and HSPD 8, together relate to:
National Strategy for Homeland Security; which relates to:
National Homeland Security Plan (also related to HSPD 8, Annex 1).
National Homeland Security Plan: is related to:
National Incident Management System;
National Preparedness Guidelines:
* Universal Task List;
* Target Capabilities List;
* National Planning Scenarios;
National Response Framework base document:
* 15 NRF Emergency Support Function Annexes;
* 8 NRF Support Annexes;
* 7 NRF Incident Annexes;
* 2 NRF Incident Annex Supplements;
* 4 NRF Partner Guides.
HSPD 8 Annex 1: National Planning is directly related to the following:
Integrated Planning System:
* 8 NPS Strategic Guidance Statements[A];
* 8 NPS Strategic Plans[A];
* 8 NPS Concept Plans[A];
* 16 NPS Operational &Tactical Plans[A].
Related to the Integrated Planning System:
10 FEMA Regional All-Hazards Response Plans[A].
Related to those plans:
* Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101;
* Interim Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 301.
State and Local Emergency Operations Plans are related to the guides
listed above.
Joint Field Office (JFO): Interagency Integrated Standard Operating
Procedure:
* JFO Appendixes & Annexes;
* JFO Field Operation Guide;
* JFO Organization & Functions Manual.
Related to the Joint Field Office (JFO):
FEMA Pre-Scripted Mission Assignment Catalog[A].
Operational Planning Guidance for FEMA Operational Planners:
6 FEMA Regional Hurricane Contingency Plans[A];
Florida Catastrophic Comprehensive Response Plan[A];
Draft Hawaii Hurricane Contingency Plan[A];
Interim Federal Contingency Plan: New Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic
Earthquake[A];
2 California Earthquake Contingency Plans[A];
Draft Northwest Nevada Earthquake Contingency Plan[A].
[A] Plans that define roles and responsibilities.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
Table 6 provides brief descriptions and the status of the plans that
define roles and responsibilities that are depicted in figure 8. Of the
72 plans presented in the table, 20 have been completed, 3 have been
partially completed, and 49 are incomplete.
Table 6: Description and Status of the 72 Plans That Define Roles and
Responsibilities:
Type[A]: Planning and resource allocation:
Title: 7 NRF Incident Annexes;
Summary: Seven NRF Incident Annexes describe the policies, concept of
operations, and responsibilities of emergency response stakeholders to
address specific contingency or hazard situations or an element of an
incident requiring specialized application of the NRF. As of April
2009, two of seven incident annexes have not been published--the
Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex and the
Cyber Incident Annex. Until revised, the December 2004 National
Response Plan versions of these documents remain in effect;
Status [B,C]: Completed: 5 of 7 incident annexes; Incomplete: 2 of 7
incident annexes; (release schedule undetermined).
Type[A]: Planning and resource allocation:
Title: 2 NRF Incident Annex Supplements;
* Catastrophic Incident Supplement (CIS);
* Mass Evacuation Incident Annex Operational Supplement (MEIAOS);
Summary: The supplement (CIS) to the NRF Catastrophic Incident Annex
has yet to be fully revised and published under the NRF. The CIS was
originally published under the NRP in September 2006 and describes the
coordinated strategy for accelerating the delivery and application of
federal and federally accessible resources and capabilities in response
to a catastrophic event. According to FEMA officials, the operational
annexes to the CIS (Execution Schedule and Transportation Support
Schedule) are currently being updated to reflect the present response
capabilities of the federal government. In addition, the future
revision of the base CIS document under the NRF will reflect FEMA's
current broadening of the scope and application of existing response
mechanisms to be utilized for catastrophic disaster response. The
MEIAOS has yet to be published under the NRF. According to FEMA
officials, this supplement to the NRF Mass Evacuation Incident Annex
has been drafted and is currently undergoing internal review at FEMA.
The MEISAOS is intended to provide additional guidance for mass
evacuations of large numbers of people in incidents requiring a
coordinated federal response;
Status [B,C]: Incomplete: CIS not yet fully revised and published under
the NRF; (release schedule undetermined); Incomplete: MEIAOS not yet
published; (release schedule undetermined).
Type[A]: Planning and resource allocation:
Title: FEMA Pre-Scripted Mission Assignment (PSMA) Catalog;
Summary: When the President declares a major disaster or emergency
under the Stafford Act, FEMA has the authority to direct other federal
entities to provide assistance to affected jurisdictions through the
issuance of mission assignments (MA). In order to expedite the delivery
of federal assistance, and as required by the Post-Katrina Act, FEMA
developed the PSMA Catalog. PSMAs provide standard statements of work
and cost estimates that can be used to develop MAs for other federal
entities, and the use of PSMA language streamlines the MA process to
enable quicker federal response times. PSMAs also provide a planning
base for federal agencies. FEMA published the PSMA Catalog in December
2008, with a total of 236 pre-scripted mission assignments across 29
federal departments and agencies;
Status [B,C]: Completed; (December 2008).
Type[A]: Planning and resource allocation:
Title: 6 FEMA Regional Hurricane Contingency Plans (RHCPS);
Summary: According to FEMA officials, six FEMA Regions (I, II, III, IV,
VI, and IX) have developed RHCPS in coordination with their regional
nonfederal response partners. These plans are designed to establish a
coordinated approach for the delivery and application of federal
resources and capabilities to support response to tropical storms and
hurricanes affecting the FEMA Regions. RHCPS identify critical actions
to be coordinated at the regional level. The actions, priorities, and
timelines identified in the RHCPS are designed to provide guidance to
all stakeholders on readiness, response, and initial recovery actions;
Status [B,C]: Completed: 6 of 6 RHCPS finalized and published.
Type[A]: Planning and resource allocation:
Title: Florida Catastrophic Comprehensive Response Plan - FEMA
Catastrophic Disaster Planning Initiative;
Summary: This plan is being developed through the use of scenario-based
and required-resource planning processes applied to the state of
Florida to enhance its capability to respond to catastrophic events.
The planning initiative will result in a set of plans, including
county, regional, state, and supporting federal response plans for a
catastrophic event impacting South Florida, including a category five
hurricane. The final version of the plan is scheduled to be released in
July 2009;
Status [B,C]: Incomplete: not yet published; (final plan scheduled for
release in July 2009).
Type[A]: Planning and resource allocation:
Title: Draft Hawaii Hurricane Contingency Plan - FEMA Catastrophic
Disaster Planning Initiative;
Summary: According to FEMA officials, a draft plan has been developed
for a category four/five hurricane strike on the southern part of the
Hawaiian island of Oahu. A major focus of the planning effort involves
the challenge of providing rapid large-scale disaster relief to the
geographically isolated island. The schedule for release of the final
version of the plan is undetermined;
Status [B,C]: Partially completed: draft plan published; (final plan
release schedule undetermined).
Type[A]: Planning and resource allocation:
Title: Interim Federal Contingency Plan (FCP) - New Madrid Seismic Zone
Catastrophic Earthquake;
Summary: The interim FCP addresses major issues the federal government
expects to encounter for a no-notice catastrophic earthquake in the New
Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ), including direction and control for
response operations for the eight states and four FEMA regions in the
NMSZ. Major components of the plan include action checklists,
timelines, senior leadership issues, and operational tools and
information for senior management. The final FCP, which is currently
under development, is intended to allow emergency managers to develop
detailed response plans and for FEMA and other federal entities to
develop supporting response plans to meet state capability shortfalls.
The IFCP will be replaced by the integrated concept of operations and
operational final FCP, scheduled for release by May 2010--one year
prior to the national level exercise scheduled for 2011 that will test
the plan;
Status [B,C]: Partially completed: interim FCP published June 2008;
(final FCP scheduled for release by May 2010).
Type[A]: Planning and resource allocation:
Title: 2 California (CA) Earthquake Contingency Plans - FEMA
Catastrophic Disaster Planning Initiative;
Summary: A California Catastrophic Disaster Planning Initiative is
currently underway. This two-phase initiative involves scoping
activities to determine catastrophic seismic incident readiness for
response planning in both Northern and Southern California. Phase one
of the initiative resulted in the creation of a San Francisco Bay Area
Earthquake Contingency Plan. Phase two of the initiative is currently
underway, focusing on the development of a contingency plan for
responding to a magnitude 7.0 earthquake along the San Andreas Fault in
southern CA. The schedule for the release of this plan is September
2010;
Status [B,C]: Completed: Northern CA plan published 2008; Incomplete:
Southern CA plan not published; (scheduled for release by September
2010).
Type[A]: Planning and resource allocation:
Title: Draft Northwest Nevada Earthquake Contingency Plan - FEMA
Catastrophic Disaster Planning Initiative;
Summary: Prompted by a series of magnitude 2.5 to 4.1 earthquakes in
northwest Nevada, this planning initiative resulted in the creation of
a Draft Northwest Nevada Earthquake Contingency Plan. This plan was
tested during the 2008 Vigilant Guard exercise, which was designed to
test the capabilities and interoperability of first responders at the
local, regional, and state levels in Nevada in conjunction with the
Nevada National Guard;
Status [B,C]: Partially completed: draft published 2008; (final release
schedule undetermined).
Type[A]: Planning and resource allocation:
Title: 8 National Planning Scenario (NPS) Strategic Guidance Statements
(SGS);
Summary: According to HSPD 8 Annex I, after the approval of the
Integrated Planning System, the Secretary of Homeland Security is to
develop a strategic guidance statement (SGS) for each of the National
Planning Scenarios (NPS). The eight consolidated NPS are intended to
focus national planning efforts on the most likely or most dangerous
threats to the homeland. The SGS are to be documents that outline
strategic priorities, broad national strategic objectives, and basic
assumptions; describe the envisioned end state; and establish the
general means necessary to accomplish that end for each NPS. HSPD 8
Annex I does not establish a completion date expectation for the
development of the SGS for each NPS. According to DHS officials, as of
April 2009, four SGS have been approved and one is under development
(drafted and undergoing interagency review and adjudication);
Status [B,C]: Completed: 4 SGS; Incomplete: 4 of 8 SGS not yet
published; (see figure 9 below for release schedule).
Type[A]: Planning and resource allocation:
Title: 8 NPS Strategic Plans (STRATPLANS);
Summary: According to HSPD 8 Annex I, no later than 90 days after the
approval of each strategic guidance statement (SGS) for each National
Planning Scenario (NPS), the Secretary of Homeland Security is to
develop corresponding strategic plans (STRATPLANS) for each SGS. The
STRATPLANS are to be plans that define the mission, identify
authorities, delineate roles and responsibilities, establish mission-
essential tasks, determine required and priority capabilities, and
develop performance and effectiveness measures for each NPS. The
STRATPLANS are effective as of their approval by the Secretary for
Homeland Security. According to DHS officials, as of April 2009 two
STRATPLANS have been approved and two are under development (drafted
and undergoing interagency review and adjudication);
Status [B,C]: Completed: 2 STRATPLANS; Incomplete: 6 of 8 STRATPLANS
not yet published; (see figure 9 below for release schedule).
Type[A]: Planning and resource allocation:
Title: 8 NPS Concept Plans (CONPLANS);
Summary: According to HSPD 8 Annex I, no later than 180 days after the
approval of each strategic plan (STRATPLAN) for each National Planning
Scenario (NPS), the Secretary of Homeland Security is to develop
corresponding concept plans (CONPLANS) for each STRATPLAN. The CONPLANS
are to be plans that briefly describe the concept of operations for
integrating and synchronizing existing federal capabilities to
accomplish the mission-essential tasks, and describe how federal
capabilities will be integrated into and support regional, state,
local, and tribal plans for each NPS. The CONPLANS are effective as of
their approval by the Secretary for Homeland Security. According to DHS
and FEMA officials, as of April 2009 one CONPLAN has been approved and
two are under development (drafted and are undergoing interagency
review and adjudication);
Status [B,C]: Completed: 1 CONPLAN; Incomplete: 7 of 8 CONPLANS not yet
published; (see figure 9 below for release schedule).
Type[A]: Planning and resource allocation:
Title: 16 NPS Operational Plans (OPLANS) & Tactical Plans[D];
Summary: According to HSPD 8 Annex I, no later than 120 days after the
approval of each concept plan (CONPLAN) for each National Planning
Scenario (NPS), the head of each federal agency with a role in homeland
security is to develop corresponding operations plans (OPLANS) and, at
his or her discretion, a tactical plan to execute the roles and
responsibilities assigned to that agency in each CONPLAN for each NPS.
The OPLANS are to be plans that identify detailed resource, personnel,
and asset allocations in order to execute the objectives of the
strategic plan and turn strategic priorities into operational
execution, and contain the full description of the concept of
operations, to include specific roles and responsibilities, tasks,
integration, and actions required, with supplemental support function
annexes as appropriate. The tactical plans contain the detailed
development and identification of individual tasks, actions, and
objectives tailored to specific situations and fact patterns at an
operational level, and are to support and achieve the objectives of the
OPLANS. According to DHS officials, as of April 2009, no OPLANS or
tactical plans have been approved under HSPD 8 Annex I;
Status [B,C]: Incomplete: none of the 16 OPLANS published; (see figure
9 below for release schedule).
Type[A]: Planning and resource allocation:
Title: 10 FEMA Regional All-Hazards Response Plans;
Summary: According to FEMA officials, each FEMA Region is responsible
for developing a regional all-hazards response plan that details the
specific regional-level actions and activities taken by federal
entities to support state and territorial requirements for emergency
response. These plans are to include organizational coordination
mechanisms and implementing instructions for accomplishing the actions
agreed upon for joint federal and state operations during disasters,
and are to provide the necessary link between state emergency
operations plans and federal plans, in accordance with the NRF; Status
[B,C]: Incomplete: none of the 10 FEMA Regional All-Hazards Response
Plans have been published; (release scheduled for June 2009).
Source: GAO analysis of legislation, presidential directives, and
policy issued by DHS and FEMA.
[A] The type column identifies the categorization of policy and plans.
Policies are categorized under the term "policy & doctrine" (including
legislation, presidential directives, and other policies that define
roles and responsibilities, as well as policies that define planning
processes), per the national preparedness cycle presented in the
National Preparedness Guidelines. Plans that define roles and
responsibilities and that are to operationalize policies are
categorized under the term "planning & resource allocation," also per
the national preparedness cycle presented in the National Preparedness
Guidelines.
[B] The status column identifies the categorization of policy and plans
as "completed," "partially completed," or "incomplete." Completed
policies and plans are those that have been publicly issued in a final
form. Partially completed policies and plans are those that have been
issued in interim formats or fully drafted and revised but not yet
published (e.g., Draft Northwest Nevada Earthquake Contingency Plan).
Incomplete policies and plans are those that have not been issued in an
interim or draft format, or issued in a final form.
[C] When the status of a policy or plan identifies that the release
schedule is undetermined, this means that DHS, FEMA, or other
responsible parties for the development of a particular policy or plan
have not determined the final release date for the publication.
[D] As of April 2009, the total number of operational plans to be
developed per HSPD 8 Annex 1 is uncertain. We determined that 16
operational plans need to be developed as required by Annex 1. We
calculated this number by counting DHS and FEMA as entities that both
need to develop operational plans to carry out their roles and
responsibilities for each of the eight consolidated national planning
scenarios (NPS) under the planning process established by Annex 1. In
addition to DHS and FEMA, it is likely that other federal departments
and agencies will also have to develop operational plans to address
their roles and responsibilities for response to each of the eight
consolidated NPS, as appropriate. For example, other federal entities,
such as DOD, EPA, and the Coast Guard responded to Hurricane Katrina
and would likely need to develop an operational plan per Annex 1 for
response to a major hurricane. However, while the exact number of
operational plans that federal departments and agencies will need to
develop as required by Annex 1 is unknown, it is likely to be higher
than the 16 we used in our calculation.
[End of table]
As noted in table 6, a schedule exists for the release of the myriad
plans called for under HSPD 8 Annex 1 using the not yet published
Integrated Planning System (IPS). Figure 9 presents the schedule for
the release of specific plans under IPS.
Figure 9: Schedule for the Development and Finalization of Plans Called
for Under HSPD 8 Annex 1, Utilizing the Integrated Planning System:
[Refer to PDF for image: table]
HSPD 8 Annex 1 Plan: Entity Responsible for Plan Development:
Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS) Status: DHS Operations Coordination
and Planning based Interagency Incident Management Planning Team;
Strategic Plan (STRATPLAN) Status: DHS Operations Coordination and
Planning based Interagency Incident Management Planning Team;
Concept Plan (CONPLAN) Status: FEMA Disaster Operations Directorate;
Operational Plan (OPLAN) Status: Federal departments and agencies;
HSPD 8 Annex 1 Plan: National Planning Scenario: Terrorist Use of
Explosives Attack;
Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS) Status: Approved by Secretary of
Homeland Security ” August 2008;
Strategic Plan (STRATPLAN) Status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland
Security ” November 2008;
Concept Plan (CONPLAN) Status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland
Security ” April 2009;
Operational Plan (OPLAN) Status: Under development ” started January
2009.
HSPD 8 Annex 1 Plan: National Planning Scenario: Improvised Nuclear
Device Attack;
Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS) Status: Approved by Secretary of
Homeland Security ”September 2008;
Strategic Plan (STRATPLAN) Status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland
Security ” January 2009;
Concept Plan (CONPLAN) Status: Under development: undergoing
interagency review/adjudication ” as of March 2009;
Operational Plan (OPLAN) Status: Awaiting development ” projected start
date undetermined.
HSPD 8 Annex 1 Plan: National Planning Scenario: Biological Attack;
Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS) Status: Approved by Secretary of
Homeland Security ” January 2009;
Strategic Plan (STRATPLAN) Status: Under development: undergoing
interagency review/adjudication ” as of March 2009;
Concept Plan (CONPLAN) Status: Under development: undergoing
interagency review/adjudication ” as of March 2009;
Operational Plan (OPLAN) Status: Awaiting development ” projected start
by April 2009.
HSPD 8 Annex 1 Plan: National Planning Scenario: Radiological
Dispersion Device Attack;
Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS) Status: Approved by Secretary of
Homeland Security ”January 2009;
Strategic Plan (STRATPLAN) Status: Under development: undergoing
interagency review/adjudication ” as of March 2009;
Concept Plan (CONPLAN) Status: Awaiting development ” projected start
by April 2009;
Operational Plan (OPLAN) Status: Awaiting development ” projected start
by July 2009.
HSPD 8 Annex 1 Plan: National Planning Scenario: Natural Disasters –
hurricanes and earthquakes;
Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS) Status: Awaiting development ”
projected start by April 2009;
Strategic Plan (STRATPLAN) Status: Awaiting development ” projected
start by May 2009;
Concept Plan (CONPLAN) Status: Awaiting development ” projected start
by November 2009;
Operational Plan (OPLAN) Status: Awaiting development ” projected start
by February 2010.
HSPD 8 Annex 1 Plan: National Planning Scenario: Chemical Attack;
Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS) Status:
Strategic Plan (STRATPLAN) Status:
Concept Plan (CONPLAN) Status:
Operational Plan (OPLAN) Status:
HSPD 8 Annex 1 Plan: National Planning Scenario: Cyber Attack;
Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS) Status: Awaiting development ”
projected start by July 2009;
Strategic Plan (STRATPLAN) Status: Awaiting development ” projected
start by September 2009;
Concept Plan (CONPLAN) Status: Awaiting development ” projected start
by February 2010;
Operational Plan (OPLAN) Status: Awaiting development ” projected start
by May 2010.
HSPD 8 Annex 1 Plan: National Planning Scenario: Pandemic Influenza;
Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS) Status: Awaiting development ”
projected start by August 2009;
Strategic Plan (STRATPLAN) Status: Awaiting development ” projected
start by January 2010;
Concept Plan (CONPLAN) Status: Awaiting development ” projected start
by May 2010;
Operational Plan (OPLAN) Status: Awaiting development ” projected start
by August 2010.
Source: DHS and FEMA.
[End of figure]
Finally, figure 10 shows the combined universe of all the policies and
plans in figures 7 and 8 in relation to each other. Figure 11, which
follows, shows the status of development of each of the policies and
plans.
Figure 10: Range and Relative Relationship of Policies and Plans That
Define Roles and Responsibilities and Planning Processes for Developing
Emergency Plans:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Legislation:
Stafford Act;
Homeland Security Act;
Post-Katrina Act;
9/11 Act.
Presidential Directives, DHS/FEMA Policy & Plans:
HSPD 5: Management of Domestic Incidents[A];
HSPD 8: National Preparedness[A];
HSPD 8 Annex 1: National Planning[A].
HSPD 5 and HSPD 8, together relate to:
National Strategy for Homeland Security[A]; which relates to:
National Homeland Security Plan (also related to HSPD 8, Annex 1).
National Homeland Security Plan[A]: is related to:
National Incident Management System[A];
National Preparedness Guidelines[A]:
* Universal Task List;
* Target Capabilities List;
* National Planning Scenarios;
National Response Framework base document[A]:
* 15 NRF Emergency Support Function Annexes[A];
* 8 NRF Support Annexes[A];
* 7 NRF Incident Annexes[B];
* 2 NRF Incident Annex Supplements[B];
* 4 NRF Partner Guides[A].
HSPD 8 Annex 1: National Planning[A] is directly related to the
following:
Integrated Planning System[A]:
* 8 NPS Strategic Guidance Statements[B];
* 8 NPS Strategic Plans[B];
* 8 NPS Concept Plans[B];
* 16 NPS Operational &Tactical Plans[B].
Related to the Integrated Planning System[A]:
10 FEMA Regional All-Hazards Response Plans[B].
Related to those plans:
* Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101[A];
* Interim Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 301[A].
State and Local Emergency Operations Plans are related to the guides
listed above.
Joint Field Office (JFO)[A]: Interagency Integrated Standard Operating
Procedure:
* JFO Appendixes & Annexes;
* JFO Field Operation Guide;
* JFO Organization & Functions Manual.
Related to the Joint Field Office (JFO)[A]:
FEMA Pre-Scripted Mission Assignment Catalog[B].
Operational Planning Guidance for FEMA Operational Planners[A]:
6 FEMA Regional Hurricane Contingency Plans[B];
Florida Catastrophic Comprehensive Response Plan[B];
Draft Hawaii Hurricane Contingency Plan[B];
Interim Federal Contingency Plan: New Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic
Earthquake[B];
2 California Earthquake Contingency Plans[B];
Draft Northwest Nevada Earthquake Contingency Plan[B].
[A] Policies that define roles and responsibilities and planning
processes.
[B] Plans.
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of figure]
Figure 11: Status of Development of Policies and Plans That Define
Roles and Responsibilities and Planning Processes for Developing
Emergency Plans:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Legislation:
Stafford Act;
Homeland Security Act;
Post-Katrina Act;
9/11 Act.
Presidential Directives, DHS/FEMA Policy & Plans:
HSPD 5: Management of Domestic Incidents[A];
HSPD 8: National Preparedness[A];
HSPD 8 Annex 1: National Planning[A].
HSPD 5 and HSPD 8, together relate to:
National Strategy for Homeland Security[A]; which relates to:
National Homeland Security Plan (also related to HSPD 8, Annex 1).
National Homeland Security Plan[C]: is related to:
National Incident Management System[A];
National Preparedness Guidelines[A]:
* Universal Task List;
* Target Capabilities List;
* National Planning Scenarios;
National Response Framework base document[A]:
* 15 NRF Emergency Support Function Annexes[A];
* 8 NRF Support Annexes[A];
* 7 NRF Incident Annexes[B];
* 2 NRF Incident Annex Supplements[C];
* 4 NRF Partner Guides[C].
HSPD 8 Annex 1: National Planning[A] is directly related to the
following:
Integrated Planning System[B]:
* 8 NPS Strategic Guidance Statements[B];
* 8 NPS Strategic Plans[B];
* 8 NPS Concept Plans[B];
* 16 NPS Operational &Tactical Plans[C].
Related to the Integrated Planning System[B]:
10 FEMA Regional All-Hazards Response Plans[C].
Related to those plans:
* Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101[A];
* Interim Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 301[B].
State and Local Emergency Operations Plans[A] are related to the guides
listed above.
Joint Field Office (JFO)[A]: Interagency Integrated Standard Operating
Procedure:
* JFO Appendixes & Annexes[A];
* JFO Field Operation Guide[A];
* JFO Organization & Functions Manual[C].
Related to the Joint Field Office (JFO)[A]:
FEMA Pre-Scripted Mission Assignment Catalog[A].
Operational Planning Guidance for FEMA Operational Planners[A]:
6 FEMA Regional Hurricane Contingency Plans[A];
Florida Catastrophic Comprehensive Response Plan[C];
Draft Hawaii Hurricane Contingency Plan[B];
Interim Federal Contingency Plan: New Madrid Seismic Zone Catastrophic
Earthquake[B];
2 California Earthquake Contingency Plans[B];
Draft Northwest Nevada Earthquake Contingency Plan[B].
Status of Policies and Plan:
[A] Published documents.
[B] Draft or interim version completed, or partially completes for
multiple deliverables.
[C] Draft or interim version not completed, not yet published.
Source: GAO analysis.
Note: Figure 11 provides a graphic depiction of the status of policies
and plans that define roles and responsibilities and planning processes
for developing emergency plans.
* The policies and plans in figure 11 that are identified as
[published] (white boxes with black text) align with the policies and
plans that are identified as [completed] in tables 4, 5, and 6 of this
appendix.
* The policies and plans in figure 11 that are identified as [not yet
completely drafted] or [not yet published] (green boxes with white
text) align with the policies and plans that are identified as
[incomplete] in tables 4, 5 and 6.
* However, the policies and plans in figure 11 that are identified as
[draft or interim version completed] or [partially completed for
multiple deliverables] (purple boxes with white text) do not
numerically align with the number of policies and plans that are
identified as [partially completed] in tables 4, 5, and 6. Tables 4, 5,
and 6 refer to policies and plans as [partially completed] if the
individual policy or plan has been issued in an interim format or fully
drafted and revised but not yet published (e.g., draft Northwest Nevada
Earthquake Contingency Plan). For figure 11, the policies and plans
identified as "partially completed" are grouped together with plans
that have been completed for some but not all deliverables. For
example, in figure 11 the 7 NRF Incident Annexes are coded as partially
completed for multiple deliverables (purple boxes with white text)
because not all 7 NRF Incident Annexes are completed. Each box that is
coded purple that contains multiple plans that are "partially completed
for multiple deliverables" are detailed as follows in table 6:
- Of the 7 NRF Incident Annexes, 5 are completed and 2 are incomplete.
- Of the 2 California Earthquake Contingency Plans, 1 is completed and
1 is incomplete.
- Of the range of plans called for under HSPD 8 Annex 1:
-- 8 NPS Strategic Guidance Statements: 4 are completed and 4 are
incomplete.
-- 8 NPS Strategic Plans: 2 are completed and 6 are incomplete.
-- 8 NPS Concept Plans: 1 is completed and 7 are incomplete.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Information Regarding Assessments Used to Develop the
Comprehensive Assessment System:
This appendix presents additional information regarding the Federal
Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) progress and any remaining issues
it faces in conducting a nationwide comprehensive assessment system.
FEMA has identified various ongoing and historical assessment efforts
that it plans to use to inform the development of the comprehensive
assessment system. Additional information regarding these efforts is
outlined below.
* State Preparedness Reports. While state preparedness reports assess
capabilities within states, FEMA could not use information in the 2007
reports to compare capability gaps between states, because states did
not report information using common metrics to assess capabilities and
data were not always available to consistently complete the report.
FEMA's state preparedness guidance explains that states are to "use
relevant metrics...from the Target Capabilities List when describing
current capabilities." However, FEMA has not developed a framework for
states to use in reporting their current capabilities against the
target capabilities because FEMA is in the process of (1) developing
quantifiable metrics for the target capabilities and (2) revising the
reporting format for state preparedness reports in order to base them
on the target capabilities. As a result, the 2007 reports do not report
state capabilities in a measurable way, or with the level of detail
necessary for a comparison across states and territories. [Footnote
137] In addition, the six states we visited used different techniques
to summarize their capabilities. In one location, a state homeland
security task force held discussion groups to determine what the
capability needs are and what resources are needed. In another
location, the state held a workshop attended by stakeholders from
across the state to collect and obtain input on capability needs to
complete the state preparedness report. Two states relied on
information collected for their respective state homeland security
strategies. A fifth state primarily used information it had gathered to
prepare a grant funding reporting requirement, while officials at a
sixth state collected information through site visits. FEMA
headquarters officials explained that they intend to use the target
capabilities as the framework for future state preparedness reports.
* National Incident Management System Compliance Assessment Support
Tool (NIMSCAST). NIMSCAST is a Web-based tool to assess states' and
territories' compliance with the NIMS, which is a standardized process
by which emergency responders are to conduct integrated incident
response operations, rather than a method for assessing capabilities.
Assessing compliance with National Incident Management System
requirements is one of the requirements for the comprehensive
assessment system.[Footnote 138] In February 2009, FEMA indicated that
it will use NIMSCAST to continue collecting data on NIMS compliance in
addition to collecting capability and state preparedness report data
through a survey it will distribute in 2009. FEMA noted that this
effort will consolidate reporting requirements and fulfill Post-Katrina
Act requirements for the comprehensive assessment system. In addition,
FEMA noted that it will use data collected through NIMSCAST related to
compliance with incident management processes and procedures to
directly inform the analysis of two target capabilities: On-Site
Incident Management and Emergency Operations Center Management.
However, it is unclear how FEMA will integrate this tool with other
features of the comprehensive assessment system to assess the remaining
35 capabilities that will not be directly informed by NIMSCAST data
related to compliance with incident management processes and
procedures.
* Gap Analysis Program (GAP). The methodology for the GAP analysis
focuses on seven activities needed to respond to a hurricane or other
disaster, such as sheltering and debris removal, but does not include
all activities needed to address all 37 target capabilities. GAP was
originally designed to provide a snapshot of gaps in disaster-response
resources in hurricane-prone regions. In the first phase of the
program, FEMA's Disaster Operations Directorate assessed the readiness
of five hurricane-prone regions composed of 17 states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands in 2007. The
Disaster Operations Directorate expanded the effort nationwide in 2009
to address all hazards so that it can better assess readiness.
* Cost-to-Capability Initiative (C2C). In 2008, FEMA's Grant Programs
Directorate launched its C2C, the purpose of which is to help FEMA and
localities better target and measure the results of using federal grant
funds. As its organizing structure, the C2C uses the 15 National
Planning Scenarios, such as a hurricane, earthquake, improvised
explosive device, or anthrax attack. Data for the C2C are to be based
on self assessments of capabilities from state preparedness plans,
estimates of baseline capability, and the estimated relative capability
improvement expected from a requested level of grant investment. To be
used effectively and enable comparisons across jurisdictions in
evaluating grant proposals, the state and local data for assessing
state and local capabilities must be in the common language of target
capabilities and have metrics that are compatible with C2C. These
metrics are being developed by FEMA's National Preparedness
Directorate. However, grantee use of C2C will not be mandatory, and
thus its ultimate value is yet to be determined. In developing the
initiative, grant officials are considering ways to collect data from
stakeholders with a minimal burden and integrate analyses resulting
from the C2C into existing programs, plans, and procedures.
* National Preparedness System (NPS). The NPS was discontinued because
it was time consuming and did not produce meaningful data. This Web-
based management information system was designed to serve as an
inventory tool to measure a jurisdiction's ability to deliver elements
of planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises.[Footnote
139] Although it was developed in response to Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 8's preparedness requirements, in conjunction
with the Target Capabilities List, and pilot tested in 10 states,
[Footnote 140] the system was discontinued by the Department of
Homeland Security because officials said it was too time consuming to
use, according to FEMA officials. Because it was only piloted, FEMA
officials explained that it did not generate meaningful preparedness
information from the data collected. According to FEMA budget
documentation required by the Office of Management and Budget for major
information technology investments, FEMA spent nearly $15 million in
total on the system for 2006, 2007, and 2008 before it was
discontinued.
* Pilot Capability Assessment (PCA). The PCA was labor intensive and
did not generate meaningful data. This assessment, based on the 37
target capabilities, was also intended to measure jurisdictions'
progress in achieving needed target capabilities. While it was
developed in response to HSPD 8 preparedness requirements and in
conjunction with the Target Capabilities List and pilot tested in six
states,[Footnote 141] FEMA officials said it was too labor intensive.
Because it was only piloted, FEMA did not generate meaningful
preparedness information from the data collected, according to FEMA
officials.
* Capability Assessment for Readiness (CAR). The CAR lacked controls
for validating the accuracy of self-reported assessment data. This
assessment was proposed as a one-time nationwide assessment of
performance in areas such as planning and hazard management to assess a
national set of emergency management performance criteria for FEMA
grant recipients. FEMA committed to preparing this assessment in
hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations. The assessment
was conducted in 1997 but concerns reported by the DHS Inspector
General in March 2006 regarding self-reporting and the lack of controls
for validating information reported by states limited the reliability
and, therefore, the value of the data. The assessment was conducted
once in 1997.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO's Description of the Six Characteristics of an
Effective National Strategy:
In February 2004, we identified six desirable characteristics of an
effective national strategy that would enable its implementers to
effectively shape policies, programs, priorities, resource allocations,
and standards and that would enable federal departments and other
stakeholders to achieve the identified results. We further determined
in that report that national strategies with the six characteristics
can provide policy makers and implementing agencies with a planning
tool that can help ensure accountability and more effective results. To
develop these six desirable characteristics of an effective national
strategy, we reviewed several sources of information. First, we
gathered statutory requirements pertaining to national strategies, as
well as legislative and executive branch guidance. We also consulted
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, general literature
on strategic planning and performance, and guidance from the Office of
Management and Budget on the President's Management Agenda. In
addition, among other things, we studied past reports and testimonies
for findings and recommendations pertaining to the desirable elements
of a national strategy. Furthermore, we consulted widely within GAO to
obtain updated information on strategic planning, integration across
and between the government and its partners, implementation, and other
related subjects.
We developed these six desirable characteristics based on their
underlying support in legislative or executive guidance and the
frequency with which they were cited in other sources. We then grouped
similar items together in a logical sequence, from conception to
implementation. The following sections provide more detail on the six
desirable characteristics.
Purpose, scope, and methodology: This characteristic addresses why the
strategy was produced, the scope of its coverage, and the process by
which it was developed. For example, a strategy should discuss the
specific impetus that led to its being written (or updated), such as
statutory requirements, executive mandates, or other events like the
global war on terrorism. Furthermore, a strategy would enhance clarity
by including definitions of key, relevant terms. In addition to
describing what it is meant to do and the major functions, mission
areas, or activities it covers, a national strategy would ideally
address its methodology. For example, a strategy should discuss the
principles or theories that guided its development, the organizations
or offices that drafted the document, or working groups that were
consulted in its development.
Problem definition and risk assessment: This characteristic addresses
the particular national problems and threats at which the strategy is
directed. Specifically, this means a detailed discussion or definition
of the problems the strategy intends to address, their causes, and
operating environment. In addition, this characteristic entails a risk
assessment, including an analysis of the threats to and vulnerabilities
of critical assets and operations. If the details of these analyses are
classified or preliminary, an unclassified version of the strategy
should at least include a broad description of the analyses and stress
the importance of risk assessment to implementing parties. A discussion
of the quality of data available regarding this characteristic, such as
known constraints or deficiencies, would also be useful.
Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures:
This characteristic addresses what the national strategy strives to
achieve and the steps needed to garner those results, as well as the
priorities, milestones, and performance measures to gauge results. At
the highest level, this could be a description of an ideal end state,
followed by a logical hierarchy of major goals, subordinate objectives,
and specific activities to achieve results. In addition, it would be
helpful if the strategy discussed the importance of implementing
parties' efforts to establish priorities, milestones, and performance
measures that help ensure accountability. Ideally, a national strategy
would set clear desired results and priorities, specific milestones,
and outcome-related performance measures while giving implementing
parties flexibility to pursue and achieve those results within a
reasonable time frame. If significant limitations on performance
measures exist, other parts of the strategy should address plans to
obtain better data or measurements, such as national standards or
indicators of preparedness.
Resources, investments, and risk management: This characteristic
addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and types of
resources and investments needed, and where those resources and
investments should be targeted. Ideally, a strategy would also identify
appropriate mechanisms to allocate resources. Furthermore, a national
strategy should elaborate on the risk assessment mentioned earlier and
give guidance to implementing parties to manage their resources and
investments accordingly. It should also address the difficult, but
critical, issues about who pays and how such efforts will be funded and
sustained in the future. Furthermore, a strategy should include a
discussion of the type of resources required, such as budgetary, human
capital, information, information technology (IT), research and
development (R&D), procurement of equipment, or contract services. A
national strategy should also discuss linkages to other resource
documents, such as federal agency budgets or human capital, IT, R&D,
and acquisition strategies. Finally, a national strategy should also
discuss in greater detail how risk management will aid implementing
parties in prioritizing and allocating resources, including how this
approach will create society-wide benefits and balance these with the
cost to society. Related to this, a national strategy should discuss
the economic principle of risk-adjusted return on resources.
Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination: This
characteristic addresses what organizations will implement the
strategy, their roles and responsibilities, and mechanisms for
coordinating their efforts. It helps to answer the question about who
is in charge during times of crisis and during all phases of national
preparedness: prevention, vulnerability reduction, and response and
recovery. This characteristic entails identifying the specific federal
departments, agencies, or offices involved, as well as the roles and
responsibilities of private sectors. A strategy would ideally clarify
implementing organizations' relationships in terms of leading,
supporting, and partnering. In addition, a strategy should describe the
organizations that will provide the overall framework for
accountability and oversight. Furthermore, a strategy should also
identify specific processes for coordination and collaboration between
sectors and organizations--and address how any conflicts would be
resolved.
Integration and implementation: This characteristic addresses both how
a national strategy relates to other strategies' goals, objectives, and
activities (horizontal integration)--and to subordinate levels of
government and other organizations and their plans to implement the
strategy (vertical integration). Similarly, related strategies should
highlight their common or shared goals, subordinate objectives, and
activities. In addition, a national strategy should address its
relationship with relevant documents from implementing organizations,
such as the strategic plans, annual performance plans, or the annual
performance reports the Government Performance and Results Act requires
of federal agencies. A strategy should also discuss, as appropriate,
various strategies and plans produced by the state, local, or private
sectors. A strategy also should provide guidance such as the
development of national standards to link together more effectively the
roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of the implementing parties.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
April 21, 2009:
Mr. William O. Jenkins:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Jenkins:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity
to review and respond to the Government Accountability Office's (GAO)
draft report entitled, "National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress,
but Needs to Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment
Efforts," (GAO-09-369).
The Department appreciates the work done in this engagement to identify
any issues that hinder the effectiveness of the National Exercise
Program. While we may not agree with all of the reports assertions, we
generally concur with the GAO recommendations, and FEMA has already
made significant inroads in each aspect of the GAO recommended
characteristics for sound strategic planning. We believe GAO's
recommendations provide a useful methodology and sound counsel for
revision of our current portfolio of national preparedness policy,
plans, protocols and procedures. We also observe, however, that much of
the report's information in areas such as recommending a clear purpose
statement, scope, problem definition and resources span multiple
documents and require a coordinated response.
There is also a concern that in a number of areas the report suggests
that DHS/FEMA should hold other federal agencies and departments or
state, local or tribal governments, accountable for compliance with
program requirements. At the same time, the report recognizes in a
number of places the absence of explicit FEMA authority to compel
compliance on the part of other federal agencies and departments or
state and local governments that are part of the highly decentralized,
divided and federated homeland security and emergency management
enterprise that constitutes the National Preparedness System. The
report should recognize that while improved program management and
strategic planning are well-advised and FEMA is actively pursuing them,
the outcomes still rest on collaboration and cooperation rather than
mandated compliance.
Thank you again for the opportunity to provide comments on this draft
report and we look forward to working with you again on future homeland
security and justice issues. Technical comments were previously
provided.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director, Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
[End of section]
William O. Jenkins Jr., (202) 512-8757 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
Staff Acknowledgements:
In addition to the contact named above, Chris Keisling (Assistant
Director), Neil Asaba (Analyst-in Charge), Joel Aldape, Avrum Ashery,
Tina Cheng, Brian Chung, Christine Davis, Lara Kaskie, Ron La Due Lake,
Brian Lipman, David Lysy, Jan Montgomery, and Robert Robinson made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Actions Taken to Implement the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform
Act of 2006. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-59R].
Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2008.
Voluntary Organizations: FEMA Should More Fully Assess Organization's
Mass Care Capabilities and Update the Red Cross Role in Catastrophic
Events. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-823].
Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2008.
Emergency Preparedness: States Are Planning for Medical Surge, but
Could Benefit from Shared Guidance for Allocating Scarce Medical
Resources. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-668].
Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2008.
Emergency Management: Observations on DHS's Preparedness for
Catastrophic Disasters. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-868T]. Washington, D.C.: June 11,
2008.
National Response Framework: FEMA Needs Policies and Procedures to
Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in the Revision Process.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-768]. Washington, D.C.:
June 11, 2008.
Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs'
Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs' Impact on
National Capabilities Remains a Challenge. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-488T]. Washington, D.C.: March 11,
2008.
National Disaster Response: FEMA Should Take Action to Improve Capacity
and Coordination between Government and Voluntary Sectors. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-369]. Washington, D.C.: February 27,
2008.
Continuity of Operations: Selected Agencies Tested Various Capabilities
during 2006 Governmentwide Exercise. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-185]. Washington, D.C.: November 19,
2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related
Recommendations and Legislation. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1142T]. Washington, D.C.: July, 31,
2007.
Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-395T]. Washington, D.C.:
March 9, 2007.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618]. Washington, D.C.: September 6,
2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-467T]. Washington, D.C.: February
23, 2006.
GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-365R]. Washington, D.C.: February 1,
2006.
Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All-
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-652]. Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2005.
Results-Oriented Government: Improvements to DHS's Planning Process
Would Enhance Usefulness and Accountability. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-300]. Washington, D.C.: March 31,
2005.
Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges
Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-33]. Washington, D.C.: January 14,
2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport
Exercises Needs Further Attention. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-170]. Washington, D.C.: January 14,
2005.
Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental Cooperation
Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable Communications.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-740]. Washington, D.C.:
July 20, 2004.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8--National Preparedness
(Dec. 17, 2003).
[2] The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120
Stat. 1355 (2006). The Post-Katrina Act is codified in numerous
sections of the U.S. Code, which we will cite in this report.
[3] See GAO, Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First
Responders' All-Hazard Capabilities Continue to Evolve, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-652] (Washington D.C.: Jul. 11,
2005); Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618] (Washington D.C.: Sept. 6,
2006); Disaster Preparedness: Better Planning Would Improve OSHA's
Efforts to Protect Workers' Safety and Health in Disasters, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-193] (Washington D.C.: Mar. 28,
2007); Continuity of Operations: Selected Agencies Tested Various
Capabilities during 2006 Governmentwide Exercises, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-185] (Washington D.C.: Nov. 19,
2007).
[4] Because FEMA may have collaborated with other DHS components in
carrying out its responsibilities, our report may refer to both DHS and
FEMA where appropriate.
[5] Since FEMA uses the terms "policy" and "doctrine" interchangeably,
we will refer to "policy" or "policies" when discussing the "Policy and
Doctrine" element of the National Preparedness System. For the purposes
of this report, plans developed using planning processes include
strategic, conceptual, operational, and scenario-specific plans.
[6] We did not examine resource allocation and training.
[7] Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007).
[8] Issued by DHS in January 2008, the NRF is the doctrine that guides
how federal, state, local, and tribal governments, along with
nongovernmental and private sector entities, will collectively respond
to and recover from all hazards, including catastrophic disasters such
as Hurricane Katrina. The NRF consists of a core base document that
broadly describes the roles and responsibilities of key officials. In
addition, roles and responsibilities for response activities are
further defined by 15 NRF Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes,
while 8 additional NRF Support Annexes describe the execution of common
incident management functional processes and administrative
requirements. The NRF also includes 4 Partner Guides, which are to
provide ready references describing key roles and actions for local,
tribal, state, federal, private-sector, and nongovernmental response
partners. Finally, the NRF contains 7 NRF Incident Annexes and 2 NRF
Incident Annex Supplements, which are to address aspects of how the
United States responds to broad incident types.
[9] Titled "National Planning," Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 8 Annex 1 is intended to enhance the preparedness of the
United States by formally establishing, developing, and maintaining a
standard and comprehensive approach to national planning. It calls for,
among other things, a standardized federal planning process (the
Integrated Planning System); a family of strategic guidance statements,
strategic plans, concepts of operations, operations plans, and, as
appropriate, tactical plans for responding to each National Planning
Scenario; and a system for integrating plans among all levels of
government.
[10] Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program Management,
2ND ed. (Newton Square, Pa.: 2006).
[11] The National Exercise Program involves, among other things, tier I
exercises that include one national level exercise and up to four
Principal Level Exercises annually. One of the four annual Principal
Level Exercises serves as a preparatory event for the annual national
level exercise.
[12] GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). These standards, issued pursuant to
the requirements of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of
1982 (FMFIA), provide the overall framework for establishing and
maintaining internal control in the federal government. Also pursuant
to FMFIA, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Circular A-
123, revised December 21, 2004, to provide the specific requirements
for assessing the reporting on internal controls. Internal control
standards and the definition of internal control in OMB Circular A-123
are based on GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government.
[13] Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, The Federal Preparedness Report (Washington, D.C.: January
2009).
[14] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004).
[15] Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program Management,
2ND ed. (Newton Square, Pa.: 2006).
[16] The Post-Katrina Act also calls on FEMA to develop and coordinate
the implementation of a strategy for preparedness. 6 U.S.C. §
313(b)(2)(H).
[17] Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8--National
Preparedness (Dec. 17, 2003).
[18] 6 U.S.C. § 313(b)(1).
[19] 6 U.S.C. § 313(b)(2)(G)-(H).
[20] 6 U.S.C. §§ 744, 749(b). In November 2008, we reported on FEMA's
and DHS's actions to implement the many provisions of the Post-Katrina
Act. See GAO, Actions Taken to Implement the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-59R] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21,
2008).
[21] Department of Homeland Security: National Preparedness Guidelines
(Washington, D.C.: September 2007), p. 22.
[22] Disaster response is handled at the local level, and escalates to
state or federal response as needed when conditions overtake local
emergency responder abilities.
[23] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities,
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6,
2006).
[24] 6 U.S.C. § 748.
[25] A 2006 Senate report on the federal response to Hurricane Katrina
noted that a 2004 exercise--called Hurricane Pam--illustrates the value
and importance of exercises and tracking corrective actions in building
national preparedness. The exercise resulted in functional plans that
were considered for and actually put to use before, during, and after
Hurricane Katrina. According to the Senate report, many of the
Hurricane Pam lessons learned were not applied because too little was
done to implement corrective actions in the plans resulting from the
exercise.
[26] 6 U.S.C. § 749.
[27] 6 U.S.C. § 752(a), (c).
[28] FEMA created the National Preparedness Directorate as a result of
the national preparedness system requirements established in the Post-
Katrina Act.
[29] The Disaster Operations Directorate is a FEMA component separate
from the National Preparedness Directorate. It is responsible for the
coordination of all federal emergency management response operations;
response planning; logistics programs; and integration of federal,
state, tribal, and local disaster programs.
[30] For example, see GAO, National Response Framework: FEMA Needs
Policies and Procedures to Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in
the Revision Process, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-768] (Washington, D.C.: June 11,
2008) and Voluntary Organizations: FEMA Should More Fully Assess
Organization's Mass Care Capabilities and Update the Red Cross Role in
Catastrophic Events, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-823] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18,
2008).
[31] See Homeland Security Advisory Council, Top Ten Challenges Facing
The Next Secretary of Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 11,
2008). Among other things, this report determined that the work of
strengthening disaster response capabilities is incomplete, in part,
because DHS will need to ensure involvement of homeland security
partners in building a bottom-up approach of organization and response
as it establishes national planning efforts.
[32] The Post-Katrina Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security
to establish a National Advisory Council to ensure effective and
ongoing coordination of federal preparedness, protection, response,
recovery, and mitigation for natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and
other man-made disasters. 6 U.S.C. § 318(a). The National Advisory
Council advises the FEMA Administrator on all aspects of emergency
management, incorporating state, local, and tribal government and
private-sector input in the development and revision of national
preparedness policies and plans. 6 U.S.C. § 318(b).
[33] The National Council on Disability is an independent federal
agency and is composed of 15 members appointed by the President. It
provides advice to the President, Congress, and executive branch
agencies to promote policies, programs, practices, and procedures that
guarantee equal opportunity for all individuals with disabilities,
regardless of the nature or severity of the disability and to empower
individuals with disabilities to achieve economic self-sufficiency,
independent living, and inclusion and integration into all aspects of
society.
[34] 6 U.S.C. § 315.
[35] The Exercise Program has undergone five organizational changes
since 2003. The program was in the Department of Justice before it was
transferred to DHS in 2003, at which time it was initially placed in
another DHS component called the Office of Domestic Preparedness.
[36] DHS's Office of Policy and Analysis developed a Web-based
assessment that was piloted in 10 states (known as the National
Preparedness System). DHS's Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness developed an in-person assessment that
was piloted in 6 states (known as a Pilot Capability Assessment).
[37] In addition to hiring a new director, FEMA had filled 80 percent
(20 of 25) of the budgeted positions for the program by October 2008,
according to FEMA officials.
[38] 6 U.S.C. § 314(a)(6). DHS issued the National Response Plan (NRP)
in December 2004 and made some revisions to the plan in May 2006 to
address lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, such as a lack of
clarity in federal leadership roles and responsibilities which resulted
in disjointed and delayed efforts by emergency responders. The January
2008 National Response Framework (NRF) replaced the NRP. For the
purposes of this report, the base NRF document, Emergency Support
Function (ESF) Annexes, Support Annexes, and Partner Guides are
identified as policies that define roles and responsibilities. The NRF
also contains seven Incident Annexes and two Incident Annex
Supplements, which for the purposes of this report are identified as
plans because these incident annexes and supplements are scenario-
specific plans.
[39] 6 U.S.C. § 313(b)(2)(F).
[40] 6 U.S.C. § 319(b)(1); see also 6 U.S.C. § 745.
[41] High-risk incidents include those that are defined in the National
Planning Scenarios, which represent examples of the gravest dangers
facing the United States, including terrorist attacks and natural
disasters, and have been accorded the highest priority for federal
planning efforts. A catastrophic incident is any natural or man-made
incident, including terrorism, which results in extraordinary levels of
mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the
population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale,
and/or government functions.
[42] 6 U.S.C. § 753(a)(4).
[43] 6 U.S.C. § 753(b)(1), (d).
[44] For details on all the policies and plans identified in this
section of the report, see appendix II.
[45] We considered policies to be completed if they have been published
in final form.
[46] NIMS presents, among other things, doctrine that standardizes the
process for emergency response stakeholders to conduct integrated
emergency management and incident response operations by establishing
organizational incident management structures. NIMS structures enable
incident action planning during an event response.
[47] The NRF Emergency Support Function Annexes align categories of
federal government response resources and capabilities and provide
strategic objectives for their use under the NRF. The NRF Support
Annexes describe the roles and responsibilities of federal departments
and agencies and nonfederal entities in coordinating and executing the
common functional processes and administrative requirements necessary
for incident management that are common to all incidents.
[48] The four NRF Partner Guides are to summarize core NRF concepts and
be tailored specifically to leaders at different levels of government
and from different types of organizations. The NRF Partner Guides
comprise four of the six policies that define roles and
responsibilities that have not been completed. According to FEMA
officials, the four Partner Guides have been drafted and are awaiting
revision pending guidance from FEMA leadership.
[49] The JFO is a temporary federal multiagency coordination center
established locally to facilitate field-level domestic incident
management activities. Three existing JFO policy guides, developed
prior to the issuance of the NRF and not yet revised, are designed to
assist personnel assigned to response operations.
[50] Our September 2006 report on Hurricane Katrina recommended that
DHS provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local
planning efforts to ensure such activities fully support preparedness,
as well as take a lead in monitoring federal agencies' efforts to meet
their responsibilities. See [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618].
[51] The Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 provides state and local
communities with guidance for emergency operations planning and
describes how the state and local planning process is to vertically
integrate with the federal Integrated Planning System. The
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 301 is intended to be a tool for
state, territorial, tribal, and local emergency managers in the
development of emergency operations plans that address planning for
special needs populations. The Integrated Planning System, among other
things, is to provide common processes for developing emergency plans.
[52] We determined that 16 of the 72 plans that need to be developed
are operational plans required by HSPD 8 Annex 1. We calculated this
number by counting DHS and FEMA as entities that both need to develop
operational plans to carry out their roles and responsibilities for
each of the eight consolidated national planning scenarios under the
planning process established by Annex 1. In addition to DHS and FEMA,
it is likely that other federal departments and agencies will also have
to develop operational plans to address their roles and
responsibilities in response to each of the eight consolidated national
planning scenarios, as appropriate. For example, other federal
entities, such as DOD, EPA, and the Coast Guard responded to Hurricane
Katrina and would likely need to develop an operational plan per Annex
1 for response to a major hurricane. As of April 2009, the exact number
of operational plans that federal departments and agencies will need to
develop as required by Annex 1 is unknown. It is, however, likely to be
higher than the 16 we used in our calculation.
[53] A mission assignment is a work order issued by FEMA to another
federal agency which directs completion by that agency of a specified
task and sets forth funding, other managerial controls and guidance. 6
U.S.C. § 741(4). To expedite the provision of federal assistance, the
Post-Katrina Act required FEMA to develop prescripted mission
assignments in coordination with other relevant federal agencies. 6
U.S.C. § 753(c).
[54] For the purposes of this report, we identified plans as "partially
completed" if they have been issued in interim or draft formats, but
not finalized. In addition to the interim Federal Contingency Plan--New
Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ) Catastrophic Earthquake, we identified two
other plans as partially completed: the draft Hawaii Hurricane
Contingency Plan and the draft Northwest Nevada Earthquake Contingency
Plan.
[55] For example, the New Madrid Seismic Zone planning efforts under
the FEMA Catastrophic Disaster Planning Initiative have included, among
others: earthquake response capability assessments for each of the
eight NMSZ states; facilitated earthquake response operations planning
sessions in 30 FEMA-supported workshops, conducted with the 747
counties and the eight states in the NMSZ; and participation by more
than 3,800 representatives of federal, state, tribal, local, and county
emergency management and responder organizations, as well as the
private sector.
[56] NRF incident annexes were released, from June through November
2008, for five of seven incident scenarios (Biological; Catastrophic;
Food and Agriculture; Mass Evacuation; and Nuclear/Radiological). The
Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement & Investigation Annex, Cyber
Incident Annex, Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRF-CIS) to the
Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRF-CIA), and Mass Evacuation Incident
Annex Operational Supplement have not been released as of April 2009.
[57] Two additional deficiencies cited by the White House report were
the failure of the federal government to properly execute the processes
designed to provide unified management of the national response for all
federal and nonfederal stakeholders, as well as the failure of command
and control structures for federal government operations.
[58] The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:
Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006).
[59] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618].
[60] 6 U.S.C. § 753(a)(4), (c).
[61] The HSAC operates in accordance with the provisions of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA), Title 5 United States Code, Appendix, to
provide advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland
Security on matters pertaining to DHS strategy, policy, leadership,
coordination, management, implementation, evaluation, and feedback.
[62] Among other issues, the HSAC has identified the need for the new
Secretary of Homeland Security to focus additional attention on certain
response issues, including the national planning system, implementing
the NRF and NIMS, as well as developing a framework for catastrophic
disaster recovery in addition to ongoing preparedness and response
planning efforts.
[63] The Post-Katrina Act was signed into law by the President in
October 2006.
[64] 6 U.S.C. § 753(b)(1).
[65] Project Management Institute. The Standard for Program Management,
2ND ed. (Newton Square, Pa.: 2006.)
[66] In 2008, FEMA staff conducted training and exercises plan
workshops for federal and state government officials involved in
exercises in all 10 FEMA regions. Among other things, stakeholders
participated in break-out sessions to discuss exercises that they
planned to conduct in 2009 and 2010. Staff used this information to
help participants plan their exercises in coordination with other
entities and to update participants on current events for the National
Exercise Program.
[67] 6 U.S.C. § 748(b)(2)(A)(vi).
[68] 6 U.S.C. § 750. Our report will generally refer to "corrective
action tracking" rather than "remedial action tracking," as used in the
statute because the database FEMA uses to implement the tracking
requirement is called the CAP system.
[69] TOPOFF 4 cost approximately $22 million to carry out. In addition
to TOPOFF 4, two Tier II level exercises have been conducted through
December 2008. "National Level Exercise 2-08" took place in May 2008
and Diablo Bravo took place in July and August 2008. As of February
2009, after-action reports and improvement plans had not been completed
for these two exercises.
[70] FEMA officials noted that while corrective actions have been
identified from TOPOFF 4, their tool to track corrective actions could
not be used until the agencies responsible for ensuring corrective
actions are taken were identified.
[71] According to FEMA officials, DHS could issue the after-action
report for TOPOFF 4 later this year.
[72] According to the implementation plan for the Exercise Program,
HSEEP serves as doctrine for the design, development, and conduct of
all exercises under the Exercise Program, including Tier I Principal
Level Exercises.
[73] We are not reporting on one after-action report because it was
classified.
[74] While two of the three after-action reports identified corrective
actions, they did not always identify the department or agency official
who was charged with taking the corrective action or identify the
milestone date by which corrective actions were to be completed.
[75] In March 2009, FEMA officials provided us corrective action
program worksheets for TOPOFF 4 and a Tier II exercise conducted in May
2008 that have been reviewed by the Domestic Readiness Group, the
senior policy entity for HSC on these matters.
[76] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00.21.3.1].
[77] The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:
Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2006).
[78] We interviewed officials from each of the six states we visited
and reviewed 44 after-action reports/improvement plans that state
officials identified to us as using HSGP funds.
[79] FEMA's HSGP guidance for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 states that
exercises conducted with FEMA support must be managed and executed in
accordance with the HSEEP guidance. In addition, according to FEMA
officials, FEMA's Regional Exercise Support Program should ensure that
state exercises comply with HSEEP.
[80] In February 2009, officials from one state informed us that they
had initiated a corrective action program based, in part, on our visit.
[81] The FEMA Secure Portal was originally procured in 2002 and fully
implemented by June 2004 to support the mission of the DHS Office for
Domestic Preparedness to engage federal, state, and local emergency
response and preparedness stakeholders in training and exercising
weapons-of-mass-destruction prevention, protection, response, and
recovery. Over the years, the mission-support role of this information
system has broadened to handle the transmission, sharing, and storage
of sensitive but unclassified information.
[82] FEMA, National Exercise Division Homeland Security Exercise and
Evaluation Program, Quarterly Newsletter (Summer 2008).
[83] The after-action report is to include a list of capabilities from
the Target Capabilities List that were tested and an analysis of
participants' effectiveness in executing the capabilities.
[84] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00.21.3.1].
[85] Among its Post-Katrina Act responsibilities, at least once every 2
years FEMA is required to conduct national exercises for the following
purposes: (1) to test and evaluate federal, state, local, and tribal
capability to detect, disrupt, and prevent catastrophic acts of
terrorism, and (2) to test and evaluate federal, state, local, and
tribal readiness to respond to and recover from catastrophic incidents.
6 U.S.C. § 748(b) (3). The Post-Katrina Act defines a catastrophic
incident as any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or man-made
disaster that results in extraordinary levels of casualties or damage
or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure,
environment, economy, national morale, or government functions in an
area. 6 U.S.C. § 701(4).
[86] Catastrophic events are different in the severity of the damage,
number of persons affected, and the scale of preparation and response
required. They quickly overwhelm or incapacitate local and/or state
response capabilities, thus requiring coordinated assistance from
outside the affected area. Thus, the response and recovery capabilities
needed during a catastrophic event differ from those required to
respond to and recover from a "normal disaster."
[87] The Post-Katrina Act appears to require catastrophic testing
before this date. Under the statute, the exercise program was to be
established by April 2007, which would make April 2009 the deadline for
the first 2-year catastrophic testing cycle. See 6 U.S.C. § 748(b)(1),
(b)(3).
[88] The supplement to the catastrophic incident annex is required by
the Post-Katrina Act. 6 U.S.C. § 319(b)(2)(C). While a version of the
supplement was written before the act, an updated supplement has yet to
be published.
[89] Regional plans have been drafted; however, according to FEMA
officials, the plans are not consistent from one region to another
because regions developed plans without any guidance from FEMA
headquarters.
[90] 6 U.S.C. § 748(b)(2)(A)(i).
[91] 6 U.S.C. § 748(b)(1), (b)(2)(A)(v).
[92] The White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:
Lessons Learned (Washington D.C.: Feb. 26, 2006).
[93] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide
the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-643] (Washington, D.C.: May 15,
2006).
[94] The National Exercise Program Five-Year Exercise Schedule
indicates that a National Level Exercise is planned for May 2011 that
will focus on a major earthquake.
[95] According to FEMA, exercise planners should post national,
federal, state, and local-level exercises to the NEXS system.
[96] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
[97] This performance measure addresses one element of HSEEP guidance,
i.e., that exercises must be capability based. FEMA reviews after-
action reports to determine whether they follow HSEEP guidance on
exercise design, and evaluation and considers after-action reports that
include an analysis of target capability performance to be in
compliance with minimum HSEEP guidance standards. However other aspects
of HSEEP guidance--such as whether the after-action report included an
improvement plan that identified specific corrective actions that must
be taken to remedy issues observed during exercise evaluation--are not
addressed as part of this performance measure.
[98] The NEP Implementation Plan provides for the use of the CAP system
for NEP Tier I exercises with respect to corrective actions for
unclassified issues.
[99] Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies: News
Release (January 22, 2009).
[100] The Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA, in coordination with the
National Council on Disability and the National Advisory Council, to
establish a "comprehensive system to assess, on an ongoing basis, the
Nation's prevention capabilities and overall preparedness, including
operational readiness." The assessment system must assess (i)
compliance with the national preparedness system, National Incident
Management System, National Response Plan (now known as the National
Response Framework), and other related plans and strategies; (ii)
current capability levels as compared to target capability levels;
(iii) resource needs to meet target capability levels; and (iv) the
performance of training, exercises, and operations. 6 U.S.C. § 749.
[101] The Post-Katrina Act requires that FEMA submit a federal
preparedness report to Congress in October 2007 and annually
thereafter. The act also requires the submission of annual state
preparedness reports to FEMA, beginning January 2008, by recipients of
DHS preparedness assistance, including states, territories, or the
District of Columbia. 6 U.S.C. § 752(a), (c); see also 6 U.S.C. §§
101(15), 701(11) for the applicable definition of a "state."
[102] In January 2008, FEMA established the Office of Preparedness
Policy, Planning and Analysis within the National Preparedness
Directorate to conduct, among other things, capability assessments and
analysis of policy and program results assessment efforts to develop
the comprehensive assessment system.
[103] 6 U.S.C. § 752(a).
[104] The National Preparedness System was piloted in Alabama,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, and Virginia. The system is a stand-alone Web-based
system, and is different from the National Preparedness System that is
required by the Post-Katrina Act to ensure that the nation has the
ability to deal with all-hazards incidents.
[105] The Pilot Capability Assessment was pilot tested in Colorado,
Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Utah.
[106] Awardees of the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) are
required to provide FEMA with semiannual updates on obligation and
expenditure information through Biannual Strategy Implementation
Reports. Applicants to the HSGP are required to provide an HSPG
Investment Justification that addresses each initiative being proposed
for funding. Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan Scorecards
assess the maturity of interoperable communications capabilities in
urban and metropolitan areas.
[107] The Post-Katrina Act requires FEMA, in developing guidelines to
define target capabilities, to ensure that such guidelines are
specific, flexible, and measurable. In addition, FEMA must ensure that
each component of the national preparedness system, which includes the
target capabilities, is developed, revised, and updated with clear and
quantifiable performance metrics, measures, and outcomes. 6 U.S.C. §§
744(b)(1), 746(c), 749(b).
[108] GAO, National Response Framework: FEMA Needs Policies and
Procedures to Better Integrate Non-Federal Stakeholders in the Revision
Process, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-768]
(Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008).
[109] GAO, Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders'
All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-652] (Washington, D.C.: July 11,
2005).
[110] The Emergency Support Function (ESF) structure of the National
Response Framework provides the mechanism for coordinating federal
interagency support for a federal response to an incident, and groups
functions most frequently used to provide federal support to states and
federal-to-federal support during a disaster. The National Response
Framework includes 15 ESFs ranging from transportation to external
affairs issues, with federal agencies designated as a coordinator,
primary agency, or supporting agency (e.g., Department of
Transportation is the coordinator and primary agency for ESF #1
Transportation). Each of the 37 target capabilities outlined in the
Target Capabilities List is assigned one or more ESF.
[111] FEMA does not plan to develop quantifiable metrics needed to
assess capabilities at the FEMA regional level, despite agency efforts
to focus on and enhance regional preparedness in response to Post-
Katrina Act requirements. While the act does not specifically require
the development of quantifiable metrics to assess capabilities at the
regional level, it does require capability building at the regional
level. For example, the act requires each FEMA region to assist in the
development of regional capabilities needed for a national catastrophic
response system, and to identify critical gaps in regional capabilities
to respond to populations with special needs. 6 U.S.C. § 317(c)(2)(B),
(G).
[112] Published by the Office of the Federal Register, National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA), the Federal Register is the
official daily publication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of
federal agencies and organizations, as well as executive orders and
other presidential documents.
[113] Each of the 37 target capabilities is assigned to one or more
federal agencies that serve as coordinating, primary, or support
agencies for conducting ESF activities.
[114] GAO, Voluntary Organizations: FEMA Should More Fully Assess
Organization's Mass Care Capabilities and Update the Red Cross in
Catastrophic Events, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-823] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18,
2008). In March 2008, the DHS Inspector General also reported on the
difficulties FEMA faces in coordinating with stakeholders to assess
capabilities. The Inspector General reported that FEMA had made modest
progress in assessing capabilities at all levels of government and
reported that conducting nationwide assessments will require
coordination among all government levels and the private sector. See
Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, FEMA's
Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster, OIG-08-34 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 28, 2008).
[115] 6 U.S.C. § 752(a).
[116] 6 U.S.C. § 752(a)-(b).
[117] Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project Management
Body of Knowledge (PMBOK Guide), 4th ed. (Newton Square, Pa.: 2008).
[118] FEMA, FEMA Secure Portal Transition Plan (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
15, 2008).
[119] 6 U.S.C. § 752(a)-(b).
[120] FEMA components include disaster operations, grant programs,
continuity programs, and national preparedness.
[121] FEMA, FEMA Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2008-2013 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2008).
[122] For example, in October 2008 FEMA's grants directorate issued its
component strategic plan. The plan states that the cornerstone of the
grant directorate's future lies in its strategic planning effort. Among
other things, the plan recognizes the importance of improving grants
management by developing a highly trained workforce to carry out the
grants program, establishing metrics for timeliness and responsiveness
to stakeholders, and increasing efficiencies across various grants
programs by integrating processes across programs.
[123] In 2004, DHS drafted a strategy for a national preparedness
system. The strategy, called Unified National Preparedness Strategy,
aimed to unify and integrate planning, exercises, and assessments.
However, the plan was not completed. Other programs in DHS that involve
interagency coordination and cooperation at the federal level have
developed strategic plans, for example, The National Strategy for
Maritime Security and The National Strategy for the Physical Protection
of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets.
[124] 6 U.S.C. § 313(b)(2)(H).
[125] The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General
identified the need for a strategic plan in reviewing FEMA preparedness
for catastrophic events in March 2008. See DHS OIG, FEMA's Preparedness
for the Next Catastrophic Disaster (Washington, D.C.: March 2008).
[126] Appendix IV provides more information on these six
characteristics.
[127] Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland
Security (Washington D.C.: October 2007).
[128] DHS, National Preparedness Guidelines (Washington, D.C.:
September 2007).
[129] 6 U.S.C. § 749(b).
[130] GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant
Programs' Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs'
Impact on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-488T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11,
2008).
[131] Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland
Security (Washington, D.C.: October 2007).
[132] Pub. L. No. 110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007).
[133] GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). These standards, issued pursuant to
the requirements of the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of
1982 (FMFIA), provide the overall framework for establishing and
maintaining internal control in the federal government. Also pursuant
to FMFIA, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Circular A-
123, revised December 21, 2004, to provide the specific requirements
for assessing the reporting on internal controls. Internal control
standards and the definition of internal control in OMB Circular A-123
are based on GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government.
[134] For the purposes of this report, we reviewed exercises conducted
after the approval of the April 2007 National Exercise Program
Implementation Plan and conducted before September 2008 because the
implementation plan requires after action-reports for Tier I level
exercises, including Principle Level Exercises, be issued within 180
days, or 6 months, after the completion of an exercise. After-action
reports for exercises occurring after August 2008 were not required to
be completed until after the end of our audit work.
[135] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004).
[136] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities,
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6,
2006).
[137] We use the term "policy" in this report to include certain laws,
executive orders, and derivative policy documents that are relevant to
national preparedness, including emergency response.
[138] We reviewed the 2007 state preparedness reports for the six
states we visited and selected one activity associated with the mass
prophylaxis capability--percentage of at-risk population that was
successfully provided with initial prophylaxis (an action taken to
prevent a disease or a health problem) within 48 hours of state/local
decision to provide prophylaxis. The Target Capabilities List indicates
that 100 percent (referred to as a metric) of at-risk population is to
be provided with initial prophylaxis within 48 hours of states and
local governments' decision to do so (referred to as a performance
measure). We found that capabilities information was not comparable
across the six state reports. Three of the six state preparedness
reports we reviewed described efforts to provide mass prophylaxis
within 48 hours, while the other three state preparedness reports did
not reference or describe their capability to carry out this activity.
[139] 6 U.S.C. § 749(c)(1).
[140] The system is a stand-alone Web-based system, and is different
from the National Preparedness System that is required by the Post-
Katrina Act to ensure that the nation has the ability to deal with all-
hazards incidents.
[141] The National Preparedness System was piloted in Alabama,
California, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, and Virginia.
[142] The Pilot Capability Assessment was pilot tested in Colorado,
Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Utah.
[143] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004).
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
