Influenza Pandemic
Increased Agency Accountability Could Help Protect Federal Employees Serving the Public in the Event of a Pandemic Gao ID: GAO-09-404 June 12, 2009Protecting federal workers essential to ensuring the continuity of the country's critical operations will involve new challenges in the event of a pandemic influenza outbreak. This requested report discusses (1) the extent to which agencies have made pandemic plans to protect workers who cannot work remotely and are not first responders, (2) the pandemic plans selected agencies have for certain occupations performing essential functions other than first response, and (3) the opportunities to improve agencies' workforce pandemic plans. GAO surveyed pandemic coordinators from 24 agencies and selected three case study occupations for review: federal correctional workers, staff disbursing Treasury checks, and air traffic controllers.
The Homeland Security Council's (HSC) 2006 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan required federal agencies to develop operational pandemic plans, and responses from the pandemic coordinators of the 24 agencies GAO surveyed indicate that a wide range of pandemic planning activities are under way. However, the responses also showed that several agencies had yet to identify essential functions during a pandemic that cannot be performed remotely. In addition, although many of the agencies' pandemic plans rely on telework to carry out their functions, several agencies reported testing their information technology capability to little or no extent. GAO's three case study agencies also showed differences in the degree to which their individual facilities had operational pandemic plans. The Bureau of Prisons' correctional workers had only recently been required to develop pandemic plans for their correctional facilities. Nevertheless, the Bureau of Prisons has considerable experience limiting the spread of infectious disease within its correctional facilities and had also made arrangements for antiviral medications for a portion of its workers and inmates. The Department of the Treasury's Financial Management Service, which has production staff involved in disbursing federal payments such as Social Security checks, had pandemic plans for its four regional centers and had stockpiled personal protective equipment such as respirators, gloves, and hand sanitizers at the centers. Air traffic control management facilities, where air traffic controllers work, had not yet developed facility pandemic plans or incorporated pandemic plans into their all-hazards contingency plans. The Federal Aviation Administration had recently completed a study to determine the feasibility of the use of respirators by air traffic controllers and concluded that their long-term use during a pandemic appears to be impractical. There is no mechanism in place to monitor and report on agencies' workforce pandemic plans. Under the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was required to monitor and report on the readiness of agencies to continue operations while protecting their employees during an influenza pandemic. The HSC, however, informed DHS in late 2006 or early 2007 that no specific reports on this were required to be submitted. Rather, the HSC requested that agencies certify to the council that they were addressing in their plans the applicable elements of a pandemic checklist in 2006 and again in 2008. This process did not include any assessment or reporting on the status of agency plans. Given agencies' uneven progress in developing their pandemic plans, monitoring and reporting would enhance agencies' accountability to protect their employees in the event of a pandemic. GAO has previously reported on the importance of internal control monitoring to assess the quality of performance over time. Without appropriately designed monitoring and reporting, the President and the Congress cannot fully assess the ability of the agencies to continue their operations while protecting their federal employees in the event of a pandemic.
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entitled 'Influenza Pandemic: Increased Agency Accountability Could
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Pandemic' which was released on June 16, 2009.
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2009:
Influenza Pandemic:
Increased Agency Accountability Could Help Protect Federal Employees
Serving the Public in the Event of a Pandemic:
Influenza Pandemic:
GAO-09-404:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-404, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Protecting federal workers essential to ensuring the continuity of the
country‘s critical operations will involve new challenges in the event
of a pandemic influenza outbreak. This requested report discusses (1)
the extent to which agencies have made pandemic plans to protect
workers who cannot work remotely and are not first responders, (2) the
pandemic plans selected agencies have for certain occupations
performing essential functions other than first response, and (3) the
opportunities to improve agencies‘ workforce pandemic plans. GAO
surveyed pandemic coordinators from 24 agencies and selected three case
study occupations for review: federal correctional workers, staff
disbursing Treasury checks, and air traffic controllers.
What GAO Found:
The HSC‘s 2006 National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation
Plan required federal agencies to develop operational pandemic plans,
and responses from the pandemic coordinators of the 24 agencies GAO
surveyed indicate that a wide range of pandemic planning activities are
under way. However, the responses also showed that several agencies had
yet to identify essential functions during a pandemic that cannot be
performed remotely. In addition, although many of the agencies‘
pandemic plans rely on telework to carry out their functions, several
agencies reported testing their information technology capability to
little or no extent.
GAO‘s three case study agencies also showed differences in the degree
to which their individual facilities had operational pandemic plans.
The Bureau of Prisons‘ correctional workers had only recently been
required to develop pandemic plans for their correctional facilities.
Nevertheless, the Bureau of Prisons has considerable experience
limiting the spread of infectious disease within its correctional
facilities and had also made arrangements for antiviral medications for
a portion of its workers and inmates. The Department of the Treasury‘s
Financial Management Service, which has production staff involved in
disbursing federal payments such as Social Security checks, had
pandemic plans for its four regional centers and had stockpiled
personal protective equipment such as respirators, gloves, and hand
sanitizers at the centers. Air traffic control management facilities,
where air traffic controllers work, had not yet developed facility
pandemic plans or incorporated pandemic plans into their all-hazards
contingency plans. The Federal Aviation Administration had recently
completed a study to determine the feasibility of the use of
respirators by air traffic controllers and concluded that their long-
term use during a pandemic appears to be impractical.
There is no mechanism in place to monitor and report on agencies‘
workforce pandemic plans. Under the National Strategy for Pandemic
Influenza Implementation Plan, DHS was required to monitor and report
on the readiness of agencies to continue operations while protecting
their employees during an influenza pandemic. The HSC, however,
informed DHS in late 2006 or early 2007 that no specific reports on
this were required to be submitted. Rather, the HSC requested that
agencies certify to the council that they were addressing in their
plans the applicable elements of a pandemic checklist in 2006 and again
in 2008. This process did not include any assessment or reporting on
the status of agency plans. Given agencies‘ uneven progress in
developing their pandemic plans, monitoring and reporting would enhance
agencies‘ accountability to protect their employees in the event of a
pandemic. GAO has previously reported on the importance of internal
control monitoring to assess the quality of performance over time.
Without appropriately designed monitoring and reporting, the President
and the Congress cannot fully assess the ability of the agencies to
continue their operations while protecting their federal employees in
the event of a pandemic.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Homeland Security Council (HSC) request that
the Secretary of Homeland Security monitor and report to the Executive
Office of the President on the readiness of agencies to continue their
operations while protecting their employees in the event of a pandemic.
The Congress may want to consider requiring similar Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) reporting. The HSC noted that it will give
serious consideration to the report findings and recommendations, and
DHS said the report findings and recommendations will contribute to its
efforts to ensure that government entities are well prepared for what
may come next.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-404]. For more
information, contact Bernice Steinhardt at (202) 512-6543 or
steinhardtb@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Agencies Report Being in Various Stages of Planning for the Protection
of Their Employees in the Event of a Pandemic:
Pandemic Preparations for Correctional Workers, Production Staff
Responsible for Disbursing Federal Payments, and Air Traffic
Controllers Are in Various Stages of Development:
Monitoring and Reporting on Agencies' Pandemic Workforce Protection
Plans Could Improve Efforts to Protect Employees in the Event of a
Pandemic:
Conclusions:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Chief Financial Officers Act Agencies:
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix III: Comments from the Homeland Security Council:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Agencies' Examples of Non-First Response Essential Functions
That Cannot Be Performed Remotely:
Table 2: Agencies' Responses on the Extent to Which They Have Tested IT
Infrastructure to Ensure That It Is Capable of Handling Telework or
Work-at-Home Arrangements during a Pandemic Influenza Outbreak:
Figures:
Figure 1: Number of Agencies Reporting Taking Various Measures to
Protect Their Employees in the Event of a Pandemic:
Figure 2: Number of Agencies Reporting Plans to Use Various Social
Distancing Strategies:
Figure 3: Federal Employees at Work in an Air Traffic Control Tower:
Abbreviations:
ATO: Air Traffic Organization:
BOP: Bureau of Prisons:
CFO: chief financial officer:
COOP: continuity of operations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOC: Department of Commerce:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOE: Department of Energy:
DOI: Department of the Interior:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
DOL: Department of Labor:
DOS: Department of State:
DOT: Department of Transportation:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration:
FEB: federal executive board:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
FMS: Financial Management Service:
GSA: General Services Administration:
HHS: Department of Health and Human Services:
HSC: Homeland Security Council:
HUD: Department of Housing and Urban Development:
IT: information technology:
KFC: Kansas City Financial Center:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
NSF: National Science Foundation:
OPM: Office of Personnel Management:
OSHA: Occupational Safety and Health Administration:
PAPR: powered air purifying respirator:
PFC: Philadelphia Financial Center:
SBA: Small Business Administration:
SEGS: sustain essential government services:
SNS: Strategic National Stockpile:
SSA: Social Security Administration:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
USDA: Department of Agriculture:
USP: United States Penitentiary:
VA: Department of Veterans Affairs:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548:
June 12, 2009:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
The Honorable George V. Voinovich:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
Protecting federal workers essential to ensuring the continuity of the
country's critical operations will involve new challenges in the event
of an influenza pandemic. While a pandemic will not directly damage
physical infrastructure, such as power lines or computer systems, it
threatens the operation of vital systems by endangering and potentially
removing the essential personnel needed to operate them from the
workforce for weeks or months. Many federal employees will be able to
perform their agencies' essential functions remotely through
arrangements such as telework. Other federal employees, however, such
as federal correctional workers, production staff involved in
disbursing federal payments such as Social Security checks,[Footnote 1]
and air traffic controllers, will have to work at assigned locations
where there will be an increased chance of infection due to proximity
to others. While the roles and responsibilities of first responders
[Footnote 2] in emergencies and the risks these employees face are well
recognized, the risks to other federal employees unable to perform
their essential functions remotely are not as apparent.
Contingency planning for an event sometime in the future is often
difficult to justify, particularly in the face of limited resources and
more urgent problems and priorities. However, as we were recently
reminded by the outbreak of an H1N1 virus, an influenza pandemic
remains a real threat to our nation and to the world. Although the
virus seems to have been relatively mild, it could return in a second
wave this fall or winter in a more virulent form. Of the three
pandemics of the 20th century, the most deadly was the influenza
pandemic of 1918-1919 during which scientists estimate there were 50
million to 100 million deaths worldwide, including at least 675,00 in
the United States, making it among the most deadly events in human
history. A pandemic is likely to come in waves, each lasting months,
and pass through communities of all sizes across the nation and the
world simultaneously. As a pandemic influenza outbreak spreads, federal
employees may be infected and their ability to work may be limited.
Many aspects of a pandemic and its consequences can be anticipated and
mitigated through planning. The Homeland Security Council's (HSC)
[Footnote 3] National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation
Plan (Implementation Plan) requires federal agencies to develop
operational plans[Footnote 4] addressing issues such as the protection
of federal employees. This report responds to your request that we
examine (1) the extent to which federal agencies have reported plans
under way to protect their workforce should an influenza pandemic occur
and have reported identifying essential functions, other than first
response, that cannot be accomplished remotely in the event of a
pandemic; (2) the plans selected agencies have established for certain
occupations performing essential functions other than first response;
and (3) opportunities to improve federal agencies' planning, enabling
them to protect their workforce while maintaining their essential
functions in the event of a pandemic.
To address our objectives, we surveyed the pandemic coordinators
[Footnote 5] from the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial
Officers (CFO) Act of 1990,[Footnote 6] which we supplemented with a
case study approach. We used the survey to get an overview of
governmentwide pandemic influenza preparedness efforts regarding
protection of the federal workforce. The survey questions asked about
pandemic plans; essential functions that employees cannot perform
remotely; protective measures, such as procuring pharmaceutical
interventions;[Footnote 7] social distancing strategies;[Footnote 8]
information technology (IT) testing; and communication of human capital
pandemic policies. We received responses from all of the agencies. We
also selected three federal occupations as case studies to provide a
more in-depth examination of agencies' pandemic planning and because
these occupations represent non-first response occupations involved in
an essential function that federal employees need to provide on-site.
The case study occupations were correctional workers employed by the
Department of Justice's (DOJ) Bureau of Prisons (BOP); production staff
responsible for disbursing federal payments, such as Social Security
checks, in the Department of the Treasury's (Treasury) Financial
Management Service (FMS); and air traffic controllers employed by the
Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA).
We reviewed agency pandemic influenza plans, national pandemic plans,
prior GAO work related to pandemic influenza planning, and additional
relevant documents that assess pandemic influenza, public health, and
other emergency preparedness and response issues. We interviewed agency
officials and managers from the case study agencies and made site
visits to case study facilities in the Kansas City metropolitan area,
including the United States Penitentiary (USP) in Leavenworth, Kansas.
In addition, we made a site visit to the Allenwood Federal Correctional
Complex in Allenwood, Pennsylvania, and received written responses to
interview questions from the FMS Philadelphia Financial Center. We also
met with FAA representatives at Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport in Arlington, Virginia; the Potomac Terminal Radar Approach
Control Facility in Warrenton, Virginia; the Washington Air Route
Traffic Control Center in Leesburg, Virginia; and Air Traffic Control
Systems Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. Our work included
interviews with officials at the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the
Department of Labor (DOL), and the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM). In addition, we met with White House counsel representing the
HSC from the past and current administrations to determine the role the
HSC played in ensuring uniform pandemic preparedness across the U.S.
government. We also interviewed representatives from the Kansas City
Federal Executive Board (FEB), the Minnesota FEB, and the Oklahoma FEB
[Footnote 9] and federal union representatives to gather their
perspectives on the protection of federal workers during a pandemic.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 to April 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Detailed information on our
scope and methodology appears in appendix II.
Background:
Approximately 2.6 million federal employees throughout the United
States and abroad execute the responsibilities of the federal
government. Federal employees work in every state, with about 90
percent outside the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. Federal
workers perform functions across a multitude of sectors, from those
vital to the long-term well-being of the country--such as environmental
protection, intelligence, social work, and financial services--to those
directly charged with aspects of public safety--including corrections,
airport and aviation safety, medical services, border protection, and
agricultural safety.
Worker protection strategies are crucial to sustain an adequate
workforce during a pandemic. During the peak of an outbreak of a severe
influenza pandemic in the United States, an estimated 40 percent of the
workforce could be unable to work because of illness, the need to care
for ill family members, or fear of infection. While the commitment of
federal workers to carry out the missions of their agencies during
natural and man-made disasters and emergencies is evident from past
disasters, critical federal workers have sometimes been left to fend
for themselves during such situations. For example, in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, many essential federal personnel in New
Orleans did not have housing and, therefore, were not able to return to
work. Unlike oil and gas workers in New Orleans, whose companies sought
to secure housing for them, local federal workers did not have an
advocate that would ensure the speedy reconstitution of essential
services. In many cases, essential federal employees queued up for
temporary housing in long lines.[Footnote 10]
The federal government has issued guidance to assist organizations of
all types in developing plans for pandemic events, including a national
strategy that discusses the threat and potential impact of a pandemic
influenza event and an implementation plan for the national strategy
that identifies roles and responsibilities for the federal government,
the private sector, and others. HHS has also published a series of
checklists intended to aid preparation for a pandemic across all
segments of society. These include checklists for organizations such as
state and local governments, U.S. businesses, individuals and families,
schools, health care organizations, and community organizations. As
pandemic influenza presents unique challenges to the coordination of
the federal effort, joint and integrated planning across all levels of
government and the private sector is essential to ensure that available
national capabilities and authorities produce detailed plans and
response actions that are complementary, compatible, and coordinated.
All federal agencies are expected to develop their own pandemic plans
that along with other requirements, describe how each agency will
provide for the safety and health of its employees and support the
federal government's efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover
from a pandemic. Because the dynamic nature of pandemic influenza
requires that the scope of federal government continuity of operations
(COOP) planning[Footnote 11] includes preparing for a catastrophic
event that is not geographically or temporally bounded, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) concluded that planning for a
pandemic requires a state of preparedness that is beyond traditional
federal government COOP planning. For example, for pandemic planning
purposes, essential functions may be broader than 30-day traditional
COOP-essential functions. Federal agency pandemic planning guidance can
be found at [hyperlink,
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/federal/index.html.[Footnote 12]
Agencies Report Being in Various Stages of Planning for the Protection
of Their Employees in the Event of a Pandemic:
The Implementation Plan issued in May 2006 directs federal agencies to
have operational pandemic plans. Agencies' responses to our survey
questions indicate that the agencies' preparedness efforts are less
than uniform. Although all of the 24 CFO Act agencies reported being
engaged in planning for pandemic influenza to some degree, several
agencies reported that they were still developing their pandemic plans.
According to the survey responses, the development of practices for
federal workforce protection in the event of a pandemic is also at the
beginning stages for several agencies.
The HSC Requested That Agencies Certify Their Pandemic Plans with the
Council:
In November of 2006, the HSC issued the Key Elements of Departmental
Pandemic Influenza Operational Plan (Key Elements), which had a
checklist for federal agencies to use in their pandemic preparedness.
The Key Elements checklist covered subjects dealing with the safety and
health of department employees, essential functions and services and
how agencies will maintain them in the event of significant and
sustained absenteeism, support of the federal response, and
communication with stakeholders during a pandemic. The Key Elements
stated that to ensure uniform preparedness across the U.S. government,
the HSC was including a request that by December 2006 the agencies
certify in writing to the HSC that they were addressing applicable
elements of the checklist. A letter to the council stating that an
agency was addressing the elements in the checklist in its planning was
sufficient for certification. According to White House counsel from the
prior administration, all of the 24 CFO Act agencies required to
certify with the HSC did so, although not all of the agencies met the
December 2006 deadline.
Subsequently, in August 2008, the HSC revised the Key Elements to
reflect current federal government guidance on pandemic planning. The
HSC requested that all department and agency heads recertify that their
pandemic plans were addressing all the applicable elements of pandemic
planning stipulated in the updated checklist by October 15, 2008. The
updated checklist provided revisions of some key elements and added new
elements. Additionally, the revised checklist required that agencies
plan for a severe pandemic, which requires planning for prolonged
implementation of community mitigation measures that could affect
workforce absenteeism, such as school closures, for up to 12 weeks. A
new planning element also asked if the agency planned to purchase and
stockpile antiviral medications and personal protective equipment for
employees identified through risk assessments.
Our survey questions for the pandemic coordinators of the 24 CFO Act
agencies focused on areas similar to the elements from the HSC
checklist dealing with the safety and health of agency employees and
essential functions. In addition to asking agencies about their
pandemic plans, we asked them whether they have identified essential
functions other than first response that cannot be performed remotely
in the event of a pandemic, planned measures to protect workers who
will not be able to work remotely, established social distancing
strategies, tested their IT capabilities, and communicated their human
capital pandemic policies. Survey responses represent the main
department or agency only unless components are specifically mentioned.
Several Agencies Were Still Developing Their Pandemic Plans:
In the introduction to the Key Elements, the HSC recognized that
pandemic planning is not a static process and encouraged departments
and agencies to revise their plans and procedures as new federal
guidance is developed. However, several of the agencies we surveyed
reported that they were still formulating their pandemic plans in May
2008. For example, the Small Business Administration (SBA) stated that
the agency had begun drafting its pandemic plan but had not completed
or cleared it. In February 2009, SBA reported that it had begun to
draft a more complete pandemic influenza annex to its COOP plan with an
estimated completion date of spring 2009. The Department of Defense
(DOD) had completed its overarching departmentwide plan, which tasked
its components to develop COOP pandemic plans. The department was
coordinating the plans among the combatant commands and military
services. DOD officials commented that some DOD components have had
pandemic influenza plans in place for several years. In addition, DOD
installations have been required to have Force Health Protection Plans
for years, and DOD reported that the installations are tailoring these
plans to include pandemic influenza considerations.
All of the 24 CFO Act agencies surveyed, with the exception of OPM, the
National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), required their components[Footnote 13] to
develop pandemic plans. OPM indicated that all of its essential
functions are performed at the department level. NSF reported not
having any essential functions as defined by Federal Continuity
Directive 2[Footnote 14] but that it does have important government
functions that the agency intends to continue during a pandemic.
According to an NSF continuity manager, all of NSF's government
functions are performed at the department level. HUD did not explain
why it did not require its components to develop pandemic plans. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), SBA, the General Services
Administration (GSA), the Department of State (DOS), the Department of
Energy (DOE), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) required
regional and program offices, in addition to components and bureaus,
where applicable, to develop pandemic plans, and as mentioned
previously, the DOD combatant commands and services were required to
prepare and validate plans. Six of the agencies surveyed--the
Department of Commerce (DOC), the Department of Education (Education),
EPA, Treasury, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), and SBA--reported requiring their components to incorporate
pandemic planning into or develop pandemic annexes or addenda to their
COOP plans. DOC, for example, reported providing templates to each of
its components to assist them in developing their own annexes or
addenda to their COOP plans.
Most, but Not All, of the Agencies Reported Identifying What Their On-
site Essential Functions Would Be in the Event of Pandemic Influenza:
The Implementation Plan instructs agencies that institutional planning
efforts should address the question of the agency's essential functions
and how they will be maintained in the event of significant and
sustained absenteeism. Furthermore, the Key Elements asks for plans to
include definitions and identification of essential functions needed to
sustain agency mission and operation. This includes the determination
of which, if any, essential functions, or nonessential operational
support functions can be suspended and for what duration before
adversely affecting agency mission. The Key Elements also calls on
agencies to identify positions, skills, and personnel needed to
continue essential functions and develop a plan to ensure and consider
appropriate level of staffing to continue these functions. Identifying
essential functions and enumerating the employees who would perform
them is the first step in training those employees, communicating the
risks and expectations of working during a pandemic, and budgeting and
planning for measures that would mitigate those risks.
Of the 24 agencies surveyed, 19 reported that they have identified
essential functions at both the department and component levels that
cannot be continued through telework in the event of pandemic influenza
or, in the case of OPM and the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), determined that all of their essential functions
could be performed remotely. NSF reported that all of its important
government functions could be performed remotely. Of the 5 agencies
reporting that they had not identified such functions, DOJ reported
identifying essential functions at the component level but not at the
departmental level, noting that the department's plan is being revised.
DOJ stated that upon completion the plan will address department-
essential functions that cannot be continued via telework. At the time
of our survey, GSA reported not identifying its essential functions in
the event of a pandemic while 3 agencies--DOD, SBA, and HUD--were still
identifying essential functions or determining which essential
functions could not be continued through telework. DOD reported that
its classified work prohibits telework for approximately 26,200
essential civilian personnel and its mission requirements preclude
telework for approximately 89,500 positions. DOD has approximately
700,000 civilian employees on its payroll. DOD stated that it is
finalizing a list of essential functions at the department and
component levels. SBA reported that it was expanding on its basic COOP
planning to account for the circumstances of a pandemic, stating that
the agency has identified its primary essential functions for COOP
purposes, functions that could be performed for the most part remotely
and through telework. HUD reported that it has identified its COOP-
essential functions but has not confirmed that they could be continued
through telework. Table 1 lists some examples agencies provided of
their essential functions that cannot be performed remotely in the
event of a pandemic.
Table 1: Agencies' Examples of Non-First Response Essential Functions
That Cannot Be Performed Remotely:
Agency: DHS;
Functions:
* Transportation Security Administration functions;
* Customs and Border Protection functions;
* Immigration and Customs Enforcement functions;
* U.S. Secret Service protection operations;
* U.S. Coast Guard daily safety operations.
Agency: DOC;
Functions: The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration weather
forecasts, watches, warnings, and advisories; acquisition and
distribution of hydrometeorological data; and interpretation of
satellite data.
Agency: DOJ;
Functions: Correctional workers' functions.
Agency: DOL;
Functions: Mine inspections.
Agency: DOS;
Functions: Protection and assistance to overseas American citizens.
Agency: DOT;
Functions:
* Air traffic control;
* Aviation safety inspections;
* Maintenance of National Aerospace System components;
* Airport inspections;
* Hazardous materials packaging and pipeline accident investigations;
* Oversight of damaged pipeline service restoration;
* Rail safety and truck safety inspections;
* Intelligence analysis and staffing the 24-Hour Operations Center;
* IT system maintenance.
Agency: EPA;
Functions: Lab sampling and analysis that supports emergency response
personnel.
Agency: HHS;
Functions: Critical regulatory functions and systems Maintenance of
unique biological stock.
Agency: NASA;
Functions: Command, control, and communications with spacecraft Imaging
products provided by satellite systems.
Agency: NRC;
Functions: Regional reactor inspections.
Agency: SSA;
Functions: Assigning Social Security numbers.
Agency: USDA;
Functions: Food safety Animal and plant disease management.
Legend:
SSA = Social Security Administration,
USDA = Department of Agriculture.
Source: GAO analysis of agency survey responses.
[End of table]
DOL reported identifying essential functions in accordance with federal
pandemic guidance. DOL stated that in recognition that an influenza
pandemic will last much longer than a traditional 30-day or less COOP
event, the DOL pandemic plan and component agency pandemic plans
include functions beyond the essential functions in the DOL and agency
COOP plans. The department expects that performance of its essential
functions will ebb and flow based on the availability of personnel and
telecommunications. DOL agencies identified which work would be
accomplished through telework and which could be done safely in the
office using social distancing methods. As part of its ongoing
planning, DOL requires its agencies to continuously identify who would
accomplish the essential functions and if the work could be done
through telework, cross-train at least three employees for each
function, and ensure that employees have the equipment needed to work
at home and test their ability to do so. Some, but not all, DOL
component agencies have identified which essential functions can only
be performed within a DOL facility with notice to the affected
employees.
Identifying essential functions and the employees who perform them is
the first step before informing these employees that they may be
expected to continue operations in the event of a pandemic, as well as
preparing them for the risks of performing such functions on-site.
Eighteen agencies reported that they have notified some or all
employees in department-level essential functions that they may be
expected to continue operations during a pandemic and 16 reported doing
so for employees in component-level essential functions. Three pandemic
coordinators did not know whether their employees had been notified. A
number of agencies reported having informed some employees who perform
essential functions that they may be expected to continue operations,
despite not having determined the number of such employees.
Agencies Reported Taking Measures Such as Procuring Gloves and Masks to
Protect Employees during a Pandemic:
We asked the pandemic coordinators from the 24 CFO Act agencies whether
they had planned or budgeted for any of seven potential measures to
protect workers whose duties require their on-site presence during a
pandemic. The measures included in our survey were among the
recommendations for worker protection issued through the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), HHS, or FEMA guidance. They
included procurement of personal protective equipment such as masks and
gloves; supplemental cleaning programs for common areas; distribution
of hygiene supplies (hand sanitizers, trash receptacles with hands-free
lids, etc.); obtaining antiviral medications; arrangements to obtain
pandemic vaccines to the extent available; prioritization of employees
for vaccinations; and prioritization of employees for antiviral
medications. The guidance recommends the measures according to risk
assessments for employees, and therefore, based on the agencies'
mission and activities, not all measures are equally appropriate for
all agencies.
Figure 1 details the agency responses to the measures they plan to
protect their employees during a pandemic. As the figure shows,
procurement of personal protective equipment and distribution of
hygiene supplies had the highest number of positive responses. Sixteen
agencies reported arranging for obtaining antiviral medication and
supplemental office cleaning programs for common areas. Agencies
reported arrangements to obtain vaccines, should they become available,
less frequently. Eight agencies said that they had planned for all
seven measures to some degree.
Figure 1: Number of Agencies Reporting Taking Various Measures to
Protect Their Employees in the Event of a Pandemic:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Procurement of personal protective equipment:
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 19.
Distribution of hygiene supplies:
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 18.
Obtaining antiviral medications:
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 16.
Supplemental office cleaning programs for common areas:
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 16.
Prioritization of employees for antiviral medication:
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 14.
Arrangements to obtain pandemic vaccines to the extent available:
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 13.
Prioritization of employees for vaccinations:
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 11.
Source: GAO analysis of agency survey responses.
[End of figure]
Agency responses to this set of questions emphasized different
approaches to planning for employee protective measures in the event of
a pandemic. For example, DOD reported investing approximately $24
million in antibiotics to treat bacterial infections secondary to
pandemic influenza. DOD also noted that a pandemic influenza
vaccination strategy for key civilian personnel within DOD is currently
in development. DOJ said its planning and budgeting for the measures
are limited to departmental first responders from its law enforcement
components and leadership. However, DOJ also reported that it plans to
advise all components to budget for emergency equipment and supplies in
their future budget submissions, in accordance with Federal Continuity
Directive 1 requirements. DHS reported that it had done fit testing of
employees for N95 respirators[Footnote 15] and training on the proper
use of other personal protective equipment and had pre-positioned
stockpiles of the equipment for employees in 52 locations. DOS noted
that it had provided pandemic influenza-specific training to janitorial
staffing, with a focus on maintaining proper disinfection of restrooms,
offices, and common areas as well as on their own protection.
Agencies Reported That Social Distancing Strategies Were Part of Their
Pandemic Plans:
The Key Elements asks agencies if they have considered implementation
of social distancing policies to prevent influenza pandemic spread at
work. Influenza is thought to be primarily spread through large
respiratory droplets that directly contact the nose, mouth, or eyes.
These droplets are produced when infected people cough, sneeze, or
talk, sending the infectious droplets into the air and into contact
with other people. Large droplets can only travel a limited distance;
therefore, people should limit close contact with others when possible.
Examples of social distancing strategies include requiring six feet of
separation between people or canceling events and closing or
restricting access to certain buildings. Employees may decrease their
risk of infection by practicing social distancing and minimizing their
nonessential contacts and exposure to highly populated environments. In
many instances, low-cost and sustainable social distancing practices
can be adopted by employees at the workplace for the duration of a
pandemic outbreak.
The agencies reported considering a variety of social distancing
strategies in the context of pandemic preparedness. For example, the
survey revealed that the most frequently cited social distancing
strategies involved using telework and flexible schedules for their
workforce. Eighteen agencies were considering low-cost social
distancing strategies, such as planning for restrictions on meetings
and gatherings and canceling unnecessary travel. Only 8 agencies
reported considering alternatives to public transportation for their
employees. Figure 2 shows the number of agencies responding positively
about their plans to use various social distancing strategies in the
context of pandemic preparedness.
Figure 2: Number of Agencies Reporting Plans to Use Various Social
Distancing Strategies:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Flexible schedules:
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 24.
Telework:
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 24.
Restrictions on meetings and gatherings:
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 18.
Avoiding all unnecessary travel:
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 18.
Pandemic influenza-specific office protocols:
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 16.
Closing office fitness centers or child care centers:
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 13.
Strategic work space configuration:
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 11.
Alternatives to public transportation:
Number of federal agencies that answered yes: 8.
Source: GAO analysis of agency survey responses.
[End of figure]
The agencies reported some other examples of social distancing
strategies. For instance, DOD's pandemic plan provides authority to
installation commanders to implement Emergency Health Powers[Footnote
16] to impose movement restriction and use of containment strategies,
such as isolation and quarantine. As a result of pandemic exercises,
DOD also plans to restructure cubicles and other work space during a
pandemic. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) intends to break up
workdays into shifts to minimize the number of people on-site
performing essential functions, whereas the Social Security
Administration (SSA) reported planning to stagger breaks and strategic
reassignments. Although the planning process has not been completed,
DOL noted that it plans to implement parking restrictions for essential
employees who would need to be physically in the office and post
signage for elevators and restrooms to limit use to one person at a
time. In addition, NRC reported that it enhanced telephone conferencing
capability so that it can locate and virtually assemble teams,
managers, and staff as needed.
Only One Agency Reported Testing Its Information Technology
Capabilities to a Great Extent:
Many of the agencies' pandemic influenza plans rely on social
distancing strategies, primarily telework, to carry out the functions
of the federal government in the event of a pandemic outbreak.
Accordingly, the Key Elements asks if agencies have ensured that their
telecommunications infrastructures are capable of handling telework
arrangements. As part of their pandemic planning, agencies need to
review their telework infrastructures and look for ways to expand their
capacities, if necessary.
In our survey, agencies reported testing their IT capabilities to
varying degrees. Only one agency, NSF, stated that it tested its IT
infrastructure to a great extent. NSF reported assessing its telework
system formally several times each year and each day through various
means. The agency noted that it has an annual COOP exercise that tests
the IT infrastructure it would use in a pandemic situation. Twice a
year, tests are done to ensure that the NSF computer service recovery
site can provide a connection to the agency's IT infrastructure. NSF
also stated that it has a majority of staff with telework agreements in
place and who telework at least on an episodic basis. In contrast, five
of the surveyed agencies acknowledged that they had tested their IT
network capacity to little or no extent. Table 2 shows the agency
responses to this question.
Table 2: Agencies' Responses on the Extent to Which They Have Tested IT
Infrastructure to Ensure That It Is Capable of Handling Telework or
Work-at-Home Arrangements during a Pandemic Influenza Outbreak:
Extent: To a great extent;
Agencies: NSF.
Extent: To a moderate extent;
Agencies: DOC, DOE, DOI, DOL, DOS, DOT, Education, EPA, OPM, NRC, SSA.
Extent: To some extent;
Agencies: DOJ, HHS, HUD, DOD, Treasury, USAID, VA.
Extent: To little or no extent;
Agencies: DHS, GSA, NASA, SBA, USDA.
Legend:
DOI = Department of the Interior,
VA = Department of Veterans Affairs.
Source: GAO analysis of agency responses.
[End of table]
Several agencies provided more detail on their IT network testing
efforts. For example, DOT stated that over the past 2 years, the
department had a number of IT and telework exercises. One of these
occurred on April 17, 2008, when the department tested its telework
capacity for all headquarters operations during the visit of Pope
Benedict XVI, who conducted a Mass at the Washington Nationals Stadium,
1 block from DOT headquarters. Other examples of IT capacity testing
included the Office of the Secretary of Defense's live 2-day pandemic
influenza-based exercise, that included employees who teleworked from
home or other alternative worksites. An HHS component, the Division of
Payment Management, reported executing a business continuity exercise,
which incorporated a scenario of responding to an outbreak of influenza
in the Washington, D.C., area. The division directed 40 percent of its
employees, 31 employees plus 3 contractors, to work from home. The goal
of the exercise was to test employees' access to critical systems and
determine IT gaps, the ability to continue transactions, and the
ability to communicate during an emergency. DOL stated that it has
established a committee to focus on increasing its telework testing and
providing guidance for agency program managers to do more direct tests.
On the other hand, SSA noted that while it has telework arrangements
that can be used during a pandemic outbreak, the agency has elected not
to develop a specific telework contingency because telework does not
lend itself to the agency's primary mission.
Three Agencies Reported Not Providing Employees with Information on
Human Capital Policy Changes in the Event of a Pandemic:
Federal Continuity Directive 1 requires that each agency implement a
process to communicate its human capital guidance for emergencies--pay,
leave, staffing, and other human resources flexibilities--to managers
and make staff aware of that guidance to ensure that the agency
continues essential functions during an emergency. Given the potential
severity of pandemic influenza, it is important that employees
understand the policies and requirements of their agencies and the
alternatives, such as telework, that may be available to them. Many
employees and their supervisors will have questions about their rights,
entitlements, alternative work arrangements, benefits, leave and pay
flexibilities, and hiring flexibilities available during the turmoil
created by a pandemic.
Twenty-one of the 24 pandemic coordinators surveyed reported making
information available to their employees on how human capital policies
and flexibilities will change in the event of a pandemic outbreak.
Three agencies--DOC, GSA, and SSA--reported that they have not. Of the
agencies that reported making information available, 2 had done so
indirectly. HUD stated that it shared information with unions, and
Treasury reported that it briefed its human capital officers on the
human capital policies and flexibilities available to address pandemic
issues. NRC reported that in September 2008 its pandemic plan was
completed and made available to staff through the agencywide document
management system. The plan reflected human capital policies and
flexibilities. Many of the agencies that made information available did
so through their internal Web sites, both by posting their own plans
and guidance and by linking to OPM guidance on human capital policies.
Of those agencies, several also held town hall meetings or all-staff
briefings to share guidance with employees. A number of agencies
reported distributing pamphlets or brochures that contained human
capital information.
Pandemic Preparations for Correctional Workers, Production Staff
Responsible for Disbursing Federal Payments, and Air Traffic
Controllers Are in Various Stages of Development:
BOP Has Taken Steps to Protect Correctional Workers in the Event of a
Pandemic:
BOP, a component of DOJ, has the mission of protecting society by
confining offenders in the controlled environments of prisons and
community-based facilities that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and
appropriately secure and that provide work and other self-improvement
opportunities to assist offenders in becoming law-abiding citizens. BOP
has 114 correctional facilities with a central office located in
Washington, D.C., and 6 regional offices. The central office provides
administrative oversight of its facilities, and the 6 regional offices
directly support operations of the facilities in their respective
geographic areas of the country. As of January 8, 2009, the agency was
responsible for the custody and care of 201,113 federal inmates.
Approximately 35,000 federal employees ensure the security of federal
prisons and provide inmates with programs and services. According to
BOP officials, the warden is permitted to use all facility staff,
including noncorrectional services staff, such as secretaries, nurses,
or dentists, for correctional service assignments during emergencies
and at other designated times. One of BOP's published core values is
that all employees are "correctional workers first," regardless of the
specific position to which an individual is hired, and both
correctional services staff and noncorrectional services staff are
responsible for the safety and security of the facility.
BOP operates facilities at different security levels, and each facility
is designated as either minimum, low, medium, or high security--with
increasing security features, inmate to staff ratios, and control of
inmate movement with each increasing security level--and administrative
facilities that have special missions, such as the detention of
pretrial offenders and the treatment of inmates with serious or chronic
medical problems. Some BOP facilities are part of BOP's 13 federal
correctional complexes, which consist of two or more colocated
facilities. BOP facilities are given a security designation based on
the level of security and staff supervision the facility is able to
provide.
Pandemic Planning for Correctional Workers:
DOJ's pandemic influenza plan focuses on minimizing the effects of a
pandemic on its workforce and operations via techniques such as social
distancing, infection control, personal hygiene, personnel training,
and telework. The department's plan is designed to supplement the
traditional, all-hazards COOP plan. According to DOJ's plan, each DOJ
component is required to identify its specific responsibilities for
maintaining essential functions during a pandemic influenza outbreak,
comply with Federal Continuity Directives 1 and 2 and FEMA guidelines,
and certify compliance with DOJ's Security and Emergency Planning
Department. DOJ's primary function with its components in pandemic
planning is its periodic random assessments of component continuity
programs.
BOP's pandemic influenza plan was developed through its Office of
Emergency Preparedness and was disseminated to its central office and
six regional offices in May 2008. In conjunction with BOP's pandemic
plan, BOP's Health Services Division developed four supplemental
pandemic flu modules for facility-level planning--Surveillance and
Infection Control, Antiviral Medications and Vaccines, Health Care
Delivery, and Care of the Deceased--which provide detailed instructions
for health-related aspects of pandemic flu emergency response.
Specifically, the modules contain guidelines, standard operating
procedures, checklists, and screening forms. The final modules became
available to individual BOP facilities in August 2008, and the deadline
to submit facility-specific pandemic plans was extended from September
to November 2008. Prior to the plan's release, BOP held conferences
with the Health Services Division and infection control officers to
solicit feedback on the draft plan's feasibility and to encourage the
facilities to start implementing elements of the plan, such as early
coordination with local communities, surveillance of seasonal
influenza, and promotion of good health habits among the correctional
workers and the inmates.
BOP's Antiviral Medications and Vaccines outlines guidance on
stockpiling, distribution, and dispensation of antiviral medications.
The module also requires the facilities to review HHS priority groups
for receiving antiviral medication and pandemic vaccine; develop local
procedures for dispensing antiviral medication and vaccine to employees
and inmates according to the central regional office guidance issued by
the medical director; and coordinate with local health departments to
ensure the facility's inclusion in the Strategic National Stockpile
(SNS),which is a national repository of medical supplies that is
designed to supplement and resupply local public health agencies in the
event of a national emergency.
BOP headquarters provided funding to the central regional offices to
stockpile Tamiflu, an antiviral medication, and a list of GSA-approved
sources to procure additional supplies. Based on a historical review of
the 1918 pandemic influenza and HHS planning assumptions, BOP intends
to supply antiviral medication to 15 percent of the correctional
workers and inmates in each facility if the influenza outbreak is
geographically spread throughout the United States. BOP's pandemic plan
anticipates that its supply of Tamiflu will come from two sources--
BOP's established stockpile and each BOP facility's coordinated effort
with its local health department to ensure inclusion in the SNS for
antiviral medication for treatment. According to a regional BOP
official, antiviral medication is already stockpiled at designated
storage sites in each region, and each storage site is responsible for
plans to distribute the antiviral medication throughout its respective
region. For example, the North Central Regional Office in Kansas City,
Missouri, reported managing its stockpile through a GSA contract with
McKesson Pharmaceuticals. Under the terms of the contract, the regional
office can exchange the antiviral medication after 5 years if a
pandemic does not occur. Upon expiration of the antiviral medication,
the contract requires either recertification of the existing
medications or a new shipment.
At the time of our review, no BOP-wide pandemic or health care
management exercise had been conducted; however, the Office of
Emergency Preparedness was planning such exercises. At the same time,
individual institutions and regional health services offices have
conducted exercises on specific aspects of pandemic preparedness. For
example, the North Central Regional Office in Kansas City reported
participating in pandemic tabletop exercises and interagency tests
coordinated by the Kansas City FEB. Regional directors have had basic
pandemic training, but there have not been exercises on how to manage a
pandemic or manage a local facility in the event of a pandemic. The
regional managers have ongoing conferences and have been trained on
overarching BOP pandemic plans and strategies, such as social
distancing, hand hygiene, and stockpiling.
BOP's pandemic plan addresses the need for infection control measures
to mitigate influenza transmission and calls for education of
correctional workers and the inmate population. Accordingly, all
facilities are instructed that they should have readily available and
ample supplies of bar soap and liquid soap in the restrooms, alcohol-
based wipes throughout the facility, and hand sanitizers if approved by
the warden. A BOP official noted that alcohol-based antibacterial hand
sanitizers would not be available to the inmates because of the
sanitizer's high alcohol content, which can be misused by the inmates.
The Surveillance and Infection Control details recommendations for use
of personal protective equipment such as surgical or procedure masks;
N95 respirators, which BOP stipulates should only be used in the
context of an OSHA-defined respiratory protection program; and gloves,
when directly involved in caring for ill correctional workers and
inmates. BOP's pandemic influenza plans also require training and
education of correctional workers and inmates on pandemic influenza and
aspects of facility management in case of an outbreak at the component
and facility levels.
Challenges in Protecting Correctional Workers:
The use of social distancing measures to protect correctional workers
in the event of a pandemic presents a challenge. Although BOP's
Surveillance and Infection Control advocates social distancing during a
pandemic outbreak, according to several BOP officials, social
distancing measures are difficult to implement at the facility level.
In older facilities, such as USP Leavenworth, there may be a greater
need for correctional workers to be physically present and work in
proximity to one another and the inmates to maintain facility security,
address emergencies, and deal with the inmate population. On the other
hand, recently constructed facilities such as the Allenwood Federal
Correctional Complex have closed-circuit video monitoring systems
throughout the facilities, which enable the correctional workers to
better monitor the inmate population and minimize contact. However, BOP
officials said that there are many situations in which close contact is
inevitable between correctional workers and inmates and where personal
protective equipment, such as gloves and masks, would not be feasible.
In the event of a fight between inmates, for example, correctional
workers would not have time to put on gloves or masks and any in-place
masks would be likely to fall off. In addition, according to a medical
officer at USP Leavenworth, gloves cannot be worn for a long period of
time without compromising the health of the skin. Another BOP official
said that various facilities have unique requirements that they need to
factor into planning for the use of social distancing measures.
Examples include prisons with different layouts; facilities where
inmates have increased needs, for example, inmates with diabetes or
those who need wheelchairs; and facilities where there are inmates who
cannot be colocated for security reasons.
A unique pandemic planning challenge facing federal correctional
workers is the maintenance of an effective custodial relationship
between them and the inmates in federal prisons. According to BOP
officials, this relationship depends on communication and mutual trust,
as correctional workers in federal prisons do not carry weapons or
batons inside the cellblocks. Rather, they use verbal methods of
communication to keep order. The BOP officials at USP Leavenworth said
that they would not allow a situation where correctional workers wear
N95 respirators or surgical masks but the inmates do not. Seeing a
correctional worker wearing a mask may cause fear among inmates and
could potentially contribute to an unstable situation. The BOP
officials at the Allenwood Federal Correctional Complex said that they
would provide personal protective equipment to both correctional
workers and inmates and use antiviral medication combined with social
distancing strategies to mitigate the spread of influenza. An Allenwood
Federal Correctional Complex official noted that education of staff and
the inmate population about pandemic influenza would be an important
part of the facility's pandemic effort.
The guidance provided by BOP's central office and regional offices does
not clearly determine prioritization and allocation of pandemic
pharmaceutical interventions to the facilities. For example, an
official at USP Leavenworth said that the facilities do not know how
much antiviral medication they can rely on from the SNS in addition to
the 15 percent BOP allocation. The distribution of antiviral
medications to Leavenworth correctional workers and inmates would take
into account a variety of factors, such as age; health factors,
including preexisting conditions; and severity of the pandemic event.
Based on these factors, the numbers of antivirals needed would be
difficult to calculate in advance. In addition, priority would always
depend on the situation, and the warden working with the facility's
medical director would make the final determinations.
Despite the challenges BOP faces with pandemic influenza planning, the
bureau has advantages, which are unique to its facilities. Every
correctional facility is a closed and self-contained system, and each
facility is somewhat self-sufficient, maintaining a 30-day supply of
food, water, and other necessities for any type of contingency.
Correctional facilities also have well-tested experience in emergency
and health hazard planning and management and infection control, which
provide them with a solid foundation to build on for pandemic influenza
preparedness. Additionally, correctional facilities generally have
strong ties with their local communities, important because pandemic
influenza will be largely addressed by the resources available to each
community it affects. For example, in addition to their own medical
staff, BOP facilities rely on local hospitals and work with community
first responders in emergencies. Having medical staff on board, an
advantage some of the other agencies lack, also makes pandemic planning
and decision making easier.
FMS Has Operational Pandemic Plans for Production Staff Responsible for
Disbursing Federal Payments:
FMS, a component of Treasury, provides central payment services to
federal agencies, operates the federal government's collections and
deposit systems, provides governmentwide accounting and reporting
services, and manages the collection of delinquent debt owed to the
government. FMS is the primary disburser of payments to individuals and
businesses on behalf of federal agencies, disbursing more than $1.6
trillion in federal payments annually, including Social Security
payments, veterans' benefits, and income tax refunds, to more than 100
million people. FMS has about 2,100 employees, one-third of whom are
located in four regional financial centers--Austin, Texas; Kansas City,
Missouri; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and San Francisco, California.
The regional financial centers issue the majority of their payments by
electronic fund transfers and the rest by wire transfers and paper
checks. The centers are production facilities that rely heavily on
integrated computer and telecommunications systems to perform their
mission. However, they also rely on light manufacturing operations to
print and enclose checks for releasing at specific times of the month.
For the most part, the regional financial centers are planning that in
the event of a pandemic, the nature of their business will be
unchanged, but there will be issues with sickness, absenteeism,
communication, and hygiene that they must address. Employees whose
positions require, on a daily basis, direct handling of materials or on-
site activity that cannot be handled remotely or at an alternative
worksite are not eligible for telework. According to an FMS official,
even with a minimum crew on-site to produce paper checks, there will
still be instances when employees will need to be within 3 feet of
other employees. For example, a certification process for the checks
includes internal controls, which necessitates having more than one
employee present in a confined space. The Kansas City Financial Center
(KFC) estimated that it would need 13 essential employees to continue
on-site operations in the event of a pandemic, including employees such
as payment control technicians, mail processing clerks, and production
machinery repairers. The Philadelphia Financial Center (PFC) explained
that its peak production workload is toward the end of the month when
it is preparing the monthly Social Security benefit payments. At this
point in the month, the PFC will need the majority of the payment and
mail operations branch employees present, approximately 25 employees.
Pandemic Planning for FMS Production Workers:
Treasury's pandemic plan is an annex to its COOP plan and describes how
departmental offices and its bureaus will discharge their
responsibilities in the event of a pandemic. The Treasury pandemic plan
describes the department's operational approach to employee safety and
COOP and the manner in which Treasury will communicate with its
stakeholders. To facilitate consistent planning across Treasury, its
Office of Emergency Preparedness provided all department offices and
bureaus with guidance for departmental planning from the Implementation
Plan. According to an FMS official, Treasury also directed its
components to [hyperlink, http://www.pandemicflu.gov] for additional
guidance.
FMS officials said that they have a biweekly teleconference to discuss
business continuity planning, including the pandemic plans for the
regional financial centers. An FMS official commented that the primary
guidance from FMS to the regional centers came from the Key Elements
provided by the HSC. The KFC reported that the Kansas City FEB's
Continuity Working Group held several workshops to discuss pandemic
planning. At these workshops, and in conjunction with online guidance
from the Office of Management and Budget, OPM, and FEMA, the KFC
developed its own plan, striving for consistency in assimilating the
guidance from all sources. FMS officials reported that the labor union
representing FMS's bargaining unit employees, the National Treasury
Employees Union, was involved in the pandemic planning process for FMS.
The FMS Security Division is responsible for ensuring uniformity in
pandemic planning across the regional financial centers. The four
regional financial centers' pandemic plans follow the same basic
template with an overview and center objectives followed by sections on
succession planning, human resource issues, telework issues,
communication, and hygiene. All of the regional financial centers'
pandemic plans contain detailed guidance for employees on human capital
policies in the event of a pandemic. All of the regional plans also
have guidance to maintain links with their respective FEBs in order to
be involved in local planning and communications. At the KFC, for
example, through monthly meetings and special workshops sponsored by
the Kansas City FEB, the regional financial center has had interactions
with state and local entities, including representatives from the
Missouri state emergency network and two local county health offices.
PFC officials also reported participating in two tabletop exercises
focused on emergency planning that were hosted by the Philadelphia FEB.
As part of the center pandemic plans, officials researched the types of
supplies they would need based on the risks faced in their facilities.
For example, the janitorial staff now routinely wipes off door handles,
tabletops, and other high-traffic areas. As part of the KFC's plan, the
center stocks such items as N95 respirators, gloves, hand sanitizers,
disinfectants, and fanny packs that include items such as ready to eat
meals, hand-cranked flashlights, small first-aid kits, and emergency
blankets. The KFC Deputy Director commented that in the event of a
pandemic, the KFC would encourage the use of N95 respirators and gloves
and that the facility had made a decision to pre-position these
supplies. The KFC plans to stock enough for 15 to 20 employees per day
for the first pandemic wave. Preceding the first wave, the KFC plans to
order additional supplies from GSA at the onset of the first pandemic
trigger. KFC officials believe that this will allow the center to have
enough supplies to last during subsequent pandemic waves. The KFC has
also discussed housing some employees on-site during a pandemic, but
this will be a greater possibility once the exercise facility,
including showers and lockers, is finished. The KFC Deputy Director
said that the organization is aware that the basis of part of the U.S.
economy rests on the regional financial centers and that they will need
to issue payments even during a pandemic. PFC officials reporting
having in stock approximately 1,200 N95 respirators, hand sanitizers,
and gloves, and the PFC has pre-positioned masks and gloves in each
branch. PFC officials noted that additional supplies are being
procured.
Although FMS said that continuing communication with employees is
needed, training, education, and materials have been provided to
managers concerning essential functions and employee safety and health
in the event of a pandemic. Essential employees have been told in broad
terms that operations will continue during a pandemic. For example, the
KFC Director has asked that designated critical employees be approached
to determine in the event of a pandemic crisis whether they would be
receptive to sheltering in place. An FMS official reported that the
agency presented a pandemic preparedness briefing in 2006, which shared
with the regional facilities' employees pandemic-related subjects, such
as cough etiquette. FMS also reported communicating the elements needed
for a home pandemic preparedness kit as well as personal pandemic
planning to all employees. The PFC stated that it plans to obtain
informational materials on safety and health during a pandemic from
local health care facilities for distribution to employees. The center
incorporated training on pandemic awareness into its annual safety and
health training.
Challenges in Protecting FMS Production Staff:
The FMS regional financial centers face some unique pandemic planning
challenges. Since the regional financial centers are production
facilities with large open spaces as well as enclosed office areas,
pandemic planning requires different responses for different areas. For
example, in the office and common areas, cleaning and disinfecting will
be a key component. An FMS official said that the employees' response
and diligence in following disease containment measures would be what
determines the success of those measures. Scheduling of production
personnel is also a challenge. Since the production of the checks must
be done according to a deadline and internal controls must be
maintained, schedules are not flexible. The KFC explained that its peak
production workload is toward the end of the month when it is preparing
the monthly Social Security benefit payments. PFC officials noted that
although they could identify certain positions that could be performed
remotely, there are issues surrounding personally identifiable
information, which must be protected and which requires that special
equipment needs be addressed. The PFC is exploring its telework options
as part of its pandemic planning, but officials acknowledged that
protecting sensitive data would be a significant consideration of any
formal telework program.
FMS officials had not made any arrangements for pandemic pharmaceutical
interventions for the regional financial centers. According to an FMS
official, Treasury asked its components to determine the number and
courses of antiviral medications needed for very high-risk, high-risk,
and medium-risk staff with critical professional responsibilities,
consistent with HSC guidance documents. Aside from that action, FMS had
not determined priorities for medical countermeasures in part because
the relatively small number of essential employees required to be on-
site, as well as the large open spaces in the regional facilities,
makes social distancing measures more feasible.
FAA Pandemic Plans to Protect Air Traffic Controllers Are Not Ready for
Implementation:
FAA, a component of DOT, expects the National Airspace System to
function throughout an influenza pandemic, in accordance with the
preparedness and response goal of sustaining infrastructure and
mitigating impact to the economy and the functioning of society. FAA's
Interim Plan for Sustaining Essential Government Services (SEGS) During
a Pandemic states that since an influenza pandemic would not damage
physical infrastructure, FAA facilities would remain operational and
day-to-day operations would continue based on the number of available
personnel. Maintaining the functioning of the National Airspace System
will require that FAA's air traffic controllers, who ensure that
aircraft remain safely separated from other aircraft, vehicles, and
terrain, continue to work on-site. Under nonpandemic circumstances,
FAA's over 15,000 air traffic controllers guide more than 7,000
aircraft in the United States each hour during peak hours and about
50,000 aircraft each day through the National Airspace System. While
FAA expects the demand for air traffic control, which manages cargo as
well as passenger travel, to be reduced in the event of a severe
pandemic outbreak, its contingency plans assume full air traffic levels
as a starting baseline. According to an FAA official, although
passenger travel may be diminished, the shipping of cargo may increase.
Pandemic Planning for Air Traffic Controllers:
DOT and FAA pandemic plans and guidance provide the basis for the air
traffic management facility pandemic plans. DOT's Guidance to the
Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) and Operating
Administrations (OA) addresses the protection of employees and
explicitly distinguishes pandemic plans from COOP plans, emphasizing a
pandemic's duration and expected absenteeism rate and stating that
plans must address workforce protective policies, equipment, and
measures. The guidance requires that each component use an accompanying
template to develop a plan to sustain essential government services
(SEGS) during a pandemic. The guidance set deadlines of March 24, 2006,
for the plans and July 31, 2006, for each operating administration
office to conduct an exercise to validate its individual SEGS plan.
FAA's SEGS plan defines essential services in the event of a pandemic
outbreak more broadly than those of COOP, because of the longer
duration of a pandemic. The essential services comprise all the
services that FAA deems necessary to provide to the aviation sector and
employees to keep the National Airspace System operational. The plan
addresses sustaining such services amid high employee absenteeism at
the peak of a pandemic wave. In broadening its categorization of
essential services, FAA considered whether and for how long the
functions can be deferred; whether the functions can be performed off-
site; the interchangeability of the occupation, such as those with
limited interchangeability because of certification requirements; as
well as operational contingency measures such as devolution, functional
backups, and system redundancies. FAA's SEGS plan also acknowledges
employee protection measures, stating that FAA will ensure the ready
availability of soap and water, tissues and waste receptacles, and
environmental cleaning supplies throughout work facilities.
The Air Traffic Organization (ATO), FAA's line of business responsible
for the air traffic management services that air traffic controllers
provide, had not yet directed facilities, such as its air route traffic
control centers, to develop pandemic-specific plans or incorporate
these pandemic plans into their all-hazards contingency plans. FAA
officials said that all-hazards contingency and continuity plans are
adapted to the facility level and are regularly implemented during
natural disasters such as hurricanes. Although these plans are not
specific to a pandemic, FAA officials reported that the all-hazards
plans allow ATO to mitigate the impact of adverse events, including
reduced staffing levels, on National Airspace Systems operations. FAA
reported that ATO completed a national-level pandemic plan in 2006 as
part of FAA's SEGS plan that addressed essential missions and services,
as well as general direction on social distancing and workforce
protection. FAA is incorporating detailed HHS antiviral stockpiling
guidance, issued in December 2008, into an FAA workforce protection
policy that it estimates will be completed by mid-2009. ATO will then
update its national-level pandemic plan with detailed protective
measures for its workforce, including air traffic controllers. ATO will
also use the national-level updates to direct its facilities to develop
pandemic-specific plans or enhance their preexisting all-hazards
contingency plans to incorporate and implement workforce protection
measures at the local field facility level.
FAA was also expecting the results of a powered air purifying
respirator (PAPR)[Footnote 17] feasibility study, completed in November
2008, to help inform pandemic planning at the facility level. The
objective of the study was to determine whether PAPRs are suitable for
long-term use and whether air traffic controllers can communicate with
aircraft and other controllers while wearing the PAPRs, as controllers
cannot communicate adequately while wearing N95 respirators or surgical
facemasks. At this time, FAA has provided PAPRs for short-term use by
air traffic controllers so that they can transfer control of air
traffic to other air traffic facilities, per existing contingency
plans. This use was intended primarily for situations involving
asbestos in air route traffic control centers. PAPRs cost approximately
$1,000 each plus filter and battery expenses, and FAA estimates the
total cost for PAPRs for its air traffic controller workforce would
reach $15 million. In addition to the cost, the study findings
suggested there are many potential problems, including noise,
visibility, and comfort, with the PAPR approach that FAA would have to
address. The study concluded that FAA would need to evaluate many
concerns in a more operationally realistic environment before
recommending PAPRs for use by air traffic controllers. Because of the
nature of these concerns, FAA agency officials said that the long-term
use of PAPRs in a pandemic appears to be impractical.
FAA also plans to augment its agencywide pandemic plan with a workplace
protection policy. Among the issues this policy would cover are the
classification of employees' workplace exposure risk and the
identification of categories of critical employees that should be given
upgraded personal protective equipment beyond what would be indicated
by their workplace exposure risk. Once the FAA-wide workforce
protection policy is determined, ATO and other lines of business will
be expected to incorporate it into their line of business-specific
pandemic plans or revise and elaborate those policies where they exist
and implement the policy.
Both DOT and FAA's pandemic plans emphasize employee awareness training
and both agencies already offer information and training to employees
through their intranet sites; however, the air traffic controllers we
interviewed did not generally access the intranet. DOT and FAA intranet
sites provide checklists for personal and family preparedness; simple
cleaning and decontamination guidance; hygiene reminders; social
distancing practices, such as no handshake policies and the use of
teleconferences in place of in-person meetings; and links to sites for
pandemic influenza-related information from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, World Health Organization, and OPM. FAA's
intranet also has pandemic influenza frequently asked questions and
links to the latest Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidance
on public health measures to reduce the spread of influenza and other
communicable diseases. FAA plans to publish its pandemic influenza plan
on its intranet. However, FAA officials responsible for pandemic
planning have acknowledged that disseminating information through
agency e-mail or its intranet site is not effective for communicating
with air traffic controllers, as they do not have ready access to
either during their shifts.
FAA has additional media through which to communicate pandemic
awareness to its employees. For example, FAA has developed a "Pandemic
Flu 101" training program, which is undergoing testing, and it has
arrangements in place for managers to alert air traffic controllers of
critical information and announcements when they are on duty. FAA also
plans to provide copies of its pandemic plan to employees who do not
have ready access to the intranet during duty hours. Managers will
ensure that new hires review the FAA pandemic plan as well as other
applicable documents and that employees undergo annual refresher
training.
Challenges in Protecting Air Traffic Controllers:
Protecting air traffic controllers in the event of a pandemic outbreak
is particularly challenging for several reasons. Air traffic
controllers work in proximity to one another; the 6 feet of separation
recommended for social distancing during a pandemic by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention and OSHA is not possible for them.
Figure 3 shows federal employees working in an air traffic control
tower. In addition, air traffic controllers cannot use personal
protective equipment such as N95 respirators or surgical masks, as
these impede the clear verbal communication necessary to maintain
aviation safety. FAA officials and air traffic controllers we
interviewed also reported that the common workstations that air traffic
controllers share are not regularly sanitized between users. FAA must
certify that any sanitizer, many of which are caustic chemicals, does
not corrode sensitive equipment necessary to ensure flight safety. FAA
is exploring this issue to determine if any sanitizer can be used
safely. Moreover, cross-certification of air traffic controllers is
problematic. Attaining full performance levels for the controllers
takes up to 3 years, and air traffic controllers proficient in one area
of airspace cannot replace controllers proficient in another airspace
without training and certification. This could result in reduced air
traffic management services. Finally, FAA regulations on medication for
air traffic controllers are strict because certain medications may
impair an air traffic controller's performance, and the Office of
Aviation Medicine's policy on the use of Tamiflu for prophylactic use
by on-duty controllers was still in draft as of March 2009. An FAA
official said that FAA would make final the policy for this use when
the workforce protection policy is approved.
Figure 3: Federal Employees at Work in an Air Traffic Control Tower:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: FAA.
Note: The employees shown are tower controllers at Fort Lauderdale-
Hollywood International Airport in Florida.
[End of figure]
Monitoring and Reporting on Agencies' Pandemic Workforce Protection
Plans Could Improve Efforts to Protect Employees in the Event of a
Pandemic:
Although the Implementation Plan includes action items aimed at
developing and tracking progress relative to the national response for
pandemic preparedness, there is no mechanism in place to track the
progress of federal agencies' workforce preparedness efforts. Action
items in the Implementation Plan specify roles and responsibilities as
well as deadlines and performance measures, and the HSC has issued
public progress reports on the status of the action items.
The survey results from the 24 CFO Act agency pandemic coordinators, as
well as information from the case study agencies, indicate that a wide
range of pandemic planning activities are under way and that all of the
agencies are taking steps to some degree to protect their workers in
the event of a pandemic. However, agencies' progress is uneven, and
while we recognize that the pandemic planning process is evolving and
is characterized by uncertainty and constrained resources, some
agencies are clearly in the earlier stages of developing their pandemic
plans and being able to provide the health protection related to the
risk of exposure their essential employees may experience. For example,
our previous work showed that agencies' plans lack important elements,
such as identifying which essential veterinarian functions must be
performed on-site and how they will be carried out if absenteeism
reaches 40 percent--the rate predicted at the height of the pandemic
and used for planning purposes.[Footnote 18] An example of an essential
veterinarian function is helping to ensure the safety of meat and
poultry products.
Under the HSC's Implementation Plan, DHS was charged with, among other
things, monitoring and reporting to the Executive Office of the
President on the readiness of departments and agencies to continue
their operations while protecting their workers during an influenza
pandemic. While directed by the plan, however, the report was not
included as a specific action item. DHS officials reported that in late
2006 or early 2007 they asked HSC representatives with direct
responsibility for the Implementation Plan for clarification on the
issue of reporting agencies' ability to continue their operations while
protecting their workers during a pandemic. DHS officials said they
were informed that they did not have to prepare a report. Instead,
according to White House counsel representatives, the HSC planned to
take on the monitoring role through its agency pandemic plan
certification process. The HSC, as noted earlier, had requested that
agencies certify that they were addressing the applicable elements of a
pandemic checklist in their plans in late 2006 and again in late 2008.
As originally envisioned in the Implementation Plan, the report was to
be directed to the Executive Office of the President. There was no
provision in the plan, however, for the report to be made available to
the Congress. We have previously reported on the importance of internal
control monitoring to assess the quality of performance over time.
[Footnote 19] Without appropriately designed monitoring and reporting,
the President and the Congress cannot fully assess the ability of the
agencies to continue their operations while protecting federal
employees in the event of a pandemic.
The HSC's certification process, as implemented, did not provide for
monitoring and reporting as envisioned in the Implementation Plan
regarding agencies' abilities to continue operations in the event of a
pandemic while protecting their employees. Although the council had
asked agencies to certify that they were addressing the applicable
elements of a pandemic planning checklist, the process did not include
any assessment of, or reporting on, agencies' progress as was the case
for the action items in the plan. Moreover, according to agency
officials we interviewed, this certification process was the only
effort to check on individual agencies' pandemic plans.
Conclusions:
Given the threat of pandemic influenza, heightened by recent events, it
is imperative that agencies have pandemic plans that ensure their
ability to continue operations while protecting their workers who serve
the American public. The survey of the 24 CFO Act agencies showed that
while some have progressed in their planning to address how their
employees' safety and health will be protected and have identified the
essential functions they will maintain in the face of significant and
sustained absenteeism, several agencies have yet to complete such
necessary initial steps. It is important to recognize that agency
pandemic plans will continue to be revised and improved with additional
time and information regarding pandemic preparedness and that some
agencies face greater complexities in their planning than others.
However, some agencies are not close to having operational pandemic
plans, particularly at the facility level. Federal agencies must
progress to establish operational plans to ensure the maintenance of
essential services during times in which widespread disease will affect
the health care system, the broader economy, and society as a whole.
The three case study agencies illustrate that filtering pandemic plans
down to individual facilities and making them operational present
challenges for the agencies. Because the primary threat to continuity
of operations during a pandemic is the threat to employee health,
agencies' plans to protect their workforce need to progress to be
operational at the facility level. However, unlike other action items
in the Implementation Plan that address the federal response to
pandemic influenza, there is no real monitoring mechanism in place to
ensure that agencies' workforce pandemic plans are complete and ensure
that the agencies can protect their workers in the event of a pandemic.
The process of monitoring should ensure that federal agencies are
making progress in developing their plans to protect their workforce in
the event of a pandemic and have the information and guidance they need
to develop operational pandemic plans.
The HSC has been serving as the hub of federal preparedness activities
for pandemic flu, coordinating activities across HHS, DHS, and other
federal agencies. However, the council's certification process has not
included any assessment or reporting on the status of agency plans.
Having DHS monitor and report on the status of agencies' pandemic plans
to protect the safety and health of their employees while maintaining
essential operations could enhance agencies' accountability for this
responsibility and serve as an effective way of tracking agencies'
progress in making their pandemic plans operational by planning for the
protection of their workforce. Although the directive in the
Implementation Plan required DHS to report to the Executive Office of
the President, the Congress may want DHS to report to it on agencies'
progress on their pandemic plans to allow it to carry out its oversight
role. Given the important role that the federal government will play in
responding to a pandemic, planning to ensure the safety and well-being
of federal employees is vital to the success of government operations.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
To help support its oversight responsibilities, the Congress may want
to consider requiring DHS to report to it on agencies' progress in
developing and implementing their pandemic plans, including any key
challenges and gaps in the plans.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To ensure agencies' greater accountability in developing operational
plans that will protect their workforce in the event of a pandemic, we
recommend that the HSC request that the Secretary of Homeland Security
monitor and report to the Executive Office of the President on the
readiness of agencies to continue their operations while protecting
their workers during an influenza pandemic. The reporting should
include an assessment of the agencies' progress in developing their
plans, including any key challenges and gaps in the plans. The request
should also establish a specific time frame for reporting on these
efforts.
Agency Comments:
We provided the Acting Executive Secretary of the HSC and the Secretary
of Homeland Security with a draft of this report for review and
comment. The Acting Executive Secretary of the HSC commented that the
report makes useful points regarding opportunities for enhanced
monitoring and reporting within the executive branch concerning
agencies' progress in developing plans to protect their workforce. She
noted that the council will give serious and careful consideration to
the report findings and recommendations in this regard. The Under
Secretary for Management at DHS said that in the coming weeks and
months, the department would be involved in efforts to ensure that
government entities are well prepared for what may come next. She
expressed her appreciation for the report's findings and
recommendations, which she said would contribute to the department's
efforts. The HSC's written comments are reprinted in appendix III, and
DHS's comments are reprinted in appendix IV.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. We are sending copies of this report to the
Homeland Security Council, the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, the Department
of Transportation, relevant congressional committees, and other
interested parties. The report also is available at no charge on the
GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff members have any questions about this report,
please contact me at (202) 512-6543 or steinhardtb@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may
be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Bernice Steinhardt:
Director, Strategic Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Chief Financial Officers Act Agencies:
Department of Agriculture:
Department of Commerce:
Department of Defense:
Department of Education:
Department of Energy:
Department of Health and Human Services:
Department of Homeland Security:
Department of Housing and Urban Development:
Department of the Interior:
Department of Justice:
Department of Labor:
Department of State:
Department of Transportation:
Department of the Treasury:
Department of Veterans Affairs:
U.S. Agency for International Development:
Environmental Protection Agency:
General Services Administration:
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
National Science Foundation:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
Office of Personnel Management:
Small Business Administration:
Social Security Administration:
[End of section]
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to determine (1) the extent to which federal
agencies have reported plans under way to protect their workforce
should an influenza pandemic occur and have reported identifying
essential functions, other than first response, that cannot be
accomplished remotely in the event of pandemic influenza; (2) the plans
selected agencies have established for certain occupations performing
essential functions other than first response; and (3) the
opportunities to improve federal agencies' planning enabling them to
protect their workforce while maintaining their essential functions in
the event of a pandemic.
To address the first objective, we developed and administered a Web-
based survey. Our intent was to survey the pandemic coordinators from
the 24 agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990. We
developed the survey questions based on guidelines for worker
protection from the Homeland Security Council (HSC), Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), and Federal Emergency Management Agency. We asked the
pandemic coordinators questions about (1) their pandemic plans, (2) the
department-and component-level functions the agencies consider
essential in the event of a pandemic that are not first response and
cannot be continued remotely, (3) measures planned to protect workers
who will not be able to work remotely, (4) social distancing
strategies, (5) information technology testing, and (6) communication
of human capital pandemic policies. Furthermore, in addressing the
first objective, we reviewed national pandemic plans, prior GAO work
assessing influenza, and additional relevant documents that assess
influenza, public health, and other emergency preparedness and response
issues. We defined essential functions based on Federal Continuity
Directive 1 as those functions that enable an organization to provide
vital services, exercise civil authority, maintain the safety of the
public, and sustain the industrial and economic base during disruption
of normal operations. We defined first responders as emergency
personnel called to the scene of a crisis or responding to emergency
calls for assistance and medical personnel. The scope of our work did
not include an independent evaluation of the effectiveness of the
workforce protection measures recommended by federal lead pandemic
planning agencies.
From April 8 through April 17, 2008, we conducted a series of pretests
with current and former federal pandemic coordinators and emergency
managers to further refine our questions, clarify any ambiguous
portions of the survey, and identify potentially biased questions. Upon
completion of the pretests and the development of the final survey
questions and format, we sent an announcement of the upcoming survey to
the 24 pandemic coordinators on May 13, 2008. These pandemic
coordinators were notified that the survey was available online on May
15, 2008. We sent a reminder e-mail message to nonrespondents on May
28, 2008, and conducted follow-up calls over the next few weeks. The
survey was available online until July 25, 2008, and the results were
confirmed or updated in early 2009. All 24 pandemic coordinators
completed the survey for a response rate of 100 percent.
To address the second and third objectives and to provide a more in-
depth examination of agencies' pandemic planning, we reviewed agency-
level pandemic planning for protection of employees for three case
study occupations. Our case studies included correctional workers from
the Department of Justice's Bureau of Prisons (BOP); production staff
responsible for disbursing federal payments from the Department of the
Treasury's Financial Management Service (FMS); and air traffic
controllers from the Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). The primary criteria for selecting the case
studies were that they represent non-first response occupations
involved in an essential function that federal employees need to
provide on-site. In addition, we excluded from our case study
selections occupations in agencies that have a primary role in the
federal response to pandemic influenza.
To assess the extent to which the case study agencies, BOP, FMS, and
FAA have operational plans to protect their workforce, we reviewed
agency and component pandemic plans and conducted interviews with
agency officials, employees in the case study occupations, and facility
managers and emergency planners for the sites at which the employees
work. We also met with union representatives from the American
Federation of Government Employees, the National Treasury Employees
Union, and the National Air Traffic Controllers Association to get
their perspective on plans to protect the federal workforce in the
event of a pandemic. In addition, we conducted interviews with the
executive directors of the Kansas City, Minnesota, and Oklahoma Federal
Executive Boards (FEB) to better understand federal planning for
workforce protection in the event of a pandemic at the regional level.
Minnesota and Oklahoma were selected because we had identified them in
a previous report[Footnote 20] as leaders in pandemic planning; Kansas
City was selected because of the large population of federal workers in
its jurisdiction, including many in our case study occupations.
To better understand the challenges and assess the progress made in
planning to protect employees, we visited several facilities where the
employees in our case study occupations worked. Kansas City, Kansas;
Kansas City, Missouri; and Leavenworth, Kansas, were selected as site
visit locations because all of the case study agencies had facilities
in the metropolitan statistical area that were also in the jurisdiction
of an FEB, namely the Kansas City FEB. We selected as site visit
facilities the United States Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas, and
BOP's North Central Regional Office in Kansas City, Kansas, as the
supporting regional office for that facility; the Kansas City Financial
Center in Kansas City, Missouri; and FAA's Central Regional Office in
Kansas City, Missouri. We also visited the Allenwood Federal
Correctional Complex in Allenwood, Pennsylvania. We selected FAA air
traffic facilities to cover the array of types of facilities in which
air traffic controllers work. We visited the Ronald Reagan Washington
National Airport in Arlington, Virginia; the Potomac Terminal Radar
Approach Control Facility in Warrenton, Virginia; the Washington Air
Route Traffic Control Center in Leesburg, Virginia; and the Air Traffic
Control Systems Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. Although we did
not conduct a site visit, the Philadelphia Financial Center provided us
with written answers to our questions.
We conducted interviews with officials from HHS, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and
the Department of Labor (DOL). We met with HHS officials to get a
better understanding of how access to antiviral medications and
vaccines by federal agencies is envisioned in the event of a pandemic.
HHS is responsible for the overall coordination of the public health
and medical emergency response during a pandemic. DHS has
responsibility for coordinating the overall domestic federal response
during an influenza pandemic, including implementing policies that
facilitate compliance with recommended social distancing measures,
developing a common operating picture for all federal agencies, and
ensuring the integrity of the nation's infrastructure. OPM has
responsibility for providing direction to the FEBs and the Chief Human
Capital Officers Council as well as responsibility for developing human
capital policy guidance for federal employees in the event of a
pandemic. DOL's Occupational Safety and Health Administration has
responsibility for promoting the safety and health of workers. We also
met with White House counsel from the past and current administrations
representing the HSC to determine what role the council played in
ensuring uniform pandemic preparedness across the U.S. government.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 to April 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Homeland Security Council:
The White House:
Washington:
June 1, 2009:
Ms. Bernice Steinhardt:
Director, Strategic Issues:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Steinhardt:
Thank you for providing the Homeland Security Council staff the
opportunity to review and comment on the Government Accountability
Office's draft report entitled, "Influenza Pandemic: Increased Agency
Accountability Could Help Protect Federal Employees Serving the Public
in the Event of a Pandemic" (GAO-09-404). We appreciate GAO's work in
this engagement and in the area of pandemic influenza preparedness more
generally. Recent events have underscored the importance of this issue.
The report makes useful points regarding opportunities for enhanced
monitoring and reporting within the executive branch concerning
agencies' progress in developing plans to protect their workforce. We
will give serious and careful consideration to GAO's findings and
recommendations in this regard.
Thank you again for your focus on this important issue.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Valerie S. Boyd:
Acting Executive Secretary:
Homeland Security Council:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
June 5, 2009:
Ms. Bernice Steinhardt:
Director:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-001:
Dear Ms. Steinhardt:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the Government Accountability
Office's (GAO) draft report; Influenza Pandemic. Increased Agency
Accountability Could Help Protect Federal Employees Serving the Public
in the Event of a Pandemic (GAO-09-404). This is, as you have noted, a
serious situation that we are aggressively addressing.
Our recent experience with the outbreak of the 2009 H1N1 flu reminds us
that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) employees have a
critical role to play during public health emergencies - in this case
the threat of a worldwide pandemic. In the coming weeks and months
ahead, the Department will be involved in an ongoing series of actions
to ensure government entities are well-prepared for what may come next.
We appreciate the report's findings and recommendations, which will
contribute to our efforts. We will continue to focus on our most valued
assets, our people, and remind the DHS and federal workforce of the
important roles they play in preventing the spread of influenza
viruses, not only for their own health, but also for the health of the
community-at-large.
Thank you for your contributions to strengthen workforce pandemic
plans. If there are any questions, please contact Michael Wetklow in
the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, at (202) 447-5196.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Elaine C. Duke:
Under Secretary for Management:
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Bernice Steinhardt (202) 512-6543 or steinhardtb@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, William J. Doherty, Assistant
Director, and Judith C. Kordahl, Analyst-in-Charge, supervised the
development of this report.
Alisa Beyninson, Ryan Little, Ulyana Panchishin, and Nicholas Petrovski
made significant contributions to all aspects of this report. David
Dornisch and Andrew Stavisky assisted with the design and methodology.
Karin Fangman provided legal counsel. Mallory Barg Bulman verified the
information in the report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The Department of the Treasury's Financial Management Service (FMS)
issues the majority of its payments by electronic fund transfers and
the rest by wire transfers and paper checks. Nearly 206 million of
FMS's payments were disbursed by check in fiscal year 2008.
[2] For the purposes of this report, we are defining first responders
as those called to the scene of a crisis or responding to emergency
calls for assistance and medical personnel.
[3] The HSC was established pursuant to Executive Order 13228, on
October 8, 2001, for purposes of advising and assisting the President
with respect to all aspects of homeland security and to serve as a
mechanism for ensuring (1) coordination of homeland security-related
activities of executive departments and agencies and (2) effective
development and implementation of homeland security policies. The
Congress subsequently established the HSC for the purpose of more
effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the federal
government relating to homeland security. See Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 (Nov. 25, 2002), 6 U.S.C. § 491 and § 494. On
May 26, 2009, President Obama issued a statement outlining his decision
to integrate White House staff supporting national security and
homeland security. The HSC will be maintained as the principal venue
for interagency deliberations on issues that affect the security of the
homeland, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, natural
disasters, and pandemic influenza.
[4] An operational pandemic influenza plan should articulate the manner
in which the department, including its components, plans to discharge
its responsibilities to support the federal efforts in fighting
pandemic influenza; address the operational approach to employee safety
and continuity of operations; and describe how the department plans to
communicate with its stakeholders.
[5] The pandemic coordinators are the individuals charged with
coordinating and executing the department or agency pandemic plan.
[6] 31 U.S.C. § 901. A list of the 24 CFO Act agencies appears in app.
I. The CFO Act agencies employ nearly all federal employees.
[7] The single most important pharmaceutical intervention during a
pandemic--a pandemic vaccine that is well matched to the pandemic-
causing strain--will not be available in large quantities in the
initial stages of a pandemic. Other pharmaceutical interventions, such
as antiviral medications and pre-pandemic vaccines are also expected to
be in limited supply. Antiviral medications are drugs designed to
prevent or reduce the severity of a viral infection, such as influenza,
and vaccines are drugs used to stimulate the response of the human
immune system to protect the body from disease.
[8] Social distancing is a technique used to minimize close contact
among persons in public places, such as work sites and public areas.
[9] FEBs, located outside Washington, D.C., in 28 cities with a large
federal presence, are interagency coordinating groups composed of the
federal field office agency heads and military commanders in their
cities. They are designed to strengthen federal management practices,
improve intergovernmental relations, and participate as a unified
federal force in local civic affairs.
[10] GAO, The Federal Workforce: Additional Steps Needed to Take
Advantage of Federal Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to
Emergency Operations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-515] (Washington, D.C.: May 4,
2007).
[11] COOP planning is an effort conducted by agencies to ensure that
the capability exists to continue essential agency functions across a
wide range of potential emergencies.
[12] The Web site, [hyperlink, http://www.pandemicflu.gov], provides
access to U.S. government avian and pandemic influenza information and
guidance.
[13] Components refer to subordinate entities of departments, such as
component agencies, field or regional offices, or other operating
divisions.
[14] In February 2008, the Secretary of Homeland Security released two
federal continuity directives. Federal Continuity Directive 1 provides
direction for the development of continuity plans and programs for the
federal executive branch. Federal Continuity Directive 2 provides
additional guidance for agencies in identifying their mission-essential
functions.
[15] An N95 respirator is designed to protect an individual from
breathing in very small particles, which might contain viruses. This
type of respirator fits tightly to the face so that most air is inhaled
through the filter material. To work most effectively, N95 respirators
must be specially fitted for each person who wears one.
[16] Emergency Health Powers establish DOD policy under applicable law
to protect installations, facilities, and personnel in the event of a
public health emergency because of biological warfare, terrorism, or
any other public health emergency communicable disease epidemic.
[17] PAPRs use a powered blower to force air through a filter. They
typically have a hood connected by a flexible hose to a blower unit
that is equipped with a filter and powered by a battery.
[18] GAO, Veterinarian Workforce: Actions Are Needed to Ensure
Sufficient Capacity for Protecting Public and Animal Health,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-178] (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 4, 2009).
[19] GAO, Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1008G] (Washington, D.C.: August
2001).
[20] GAO, The Federal Workforce: Additional Steps Needed to Take
Advantage of Federal Executive Boards' Ability to Contribute to
Emergency Operations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-515] (Washington, D.C.: May 4,
2007).
[End of section]
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