Federal Air Marshal Service
Actions Taken to Fulfill Core Mission and Address Workforce Issues Gao ID: GAO-09-903T July 23, 2009By deploying armed air marshals onboard selected flights, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), a component of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), plays a key role in helping to protect approximately 29,000 domestic and international flights operated daily by U.S. air carriers. This testimony discusses (1) FAMS's operational approach or "concept of operations" for covering flights, (2) an independent evaluation of the operational approach, and (3) FAMS's processes and initiatives for addressing workforce-related issues. Also, this testimony provides a list of possible oversight issues related to FAMS. This testimony is based on GAO's January 2009 report (GAO-09-273), with selected updates in July 2009. For its 2009 report, GAO analyzed policies and procedures regarding FAMS's operational approach and a July 2006 classified assessment of that approach. Also, GAO analyzed employee working group reports and related FAMS's initiatives for addressing workforce-related issues, and interviewed FAMS headquarters officials and 67 air marshals (selected to reflect a range in levels of experience).
Because the number of air marshals is less than the number of daily flights, FAMS's operational approach is to assign air marshals to selected flights it deems high risk--such as the nonstop, long-distance flights targeted on September 11, 2001. In assigning air marshals, FAMS seeks to maximize coverage of flights in 10 targeted high-risk categories, which are based on consideration of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. In July 2006, the Homeland Security Institute, a federally funded research and development center, independently assessed FAMS's operational approach and found it to be reasonable. However, the institute noted that certain types of flights were covered less often than others. The institute recommended that FAMS increase randomness or unpredictability in selecting flights and otherwise diversify the coverage of flights within the various risk categories. In its January 2009 report, GAO noted that the Homeland Security Institute's evaluation methodology was reasonable and that FAMS had taken actions (or had ongoing efforts) to implement the institute's recommendations. To address workforce-related issues, FAMS's previous Director, who served until June 2008, established a number of processes and initiatives, such as working groups, listening sessions, and an internal Web site for agency personnel to provide anonymous feedback to management. These efforts have produced some positive results. For example, FAMS revised its policy for airport check-in and aircraft boarding procedures to help protect the anonymity of air marshals in mission status, and FAMS modified its mission scheduling processes and implemented a voluntary lateral transfer program to address certain quality-of-life issues. The air marshals GAO interviewed expressed satisfaction with FAMS's efforts to address workforce-related issues. The current FAMS Director has expressed a commitment to continue applicable processes and initiatives. Also, FAMS has plans to conduct a workforce satisfaction survey of all employees every 2 years, building upon an initial survey conducted in fiscal year 2007. GAO's review found that the potential usefulness of future surveys could be enhanced by ensuring that the survey questions and the answer options are clearly structured and unambiguous and that additional efforts are considered for obtaining the highest possible response rates. To its credit, FAMS has made progress in addressing various operational and quality-of-life issues that affect the ability of air marshals to perform their aviation security mission. However, sustaining progress will require ongoing consideration by FAMS management--and continued oversight by congressional stakeholders--of key questions, such as how to foster career sustainability for air marshals given that maintaining an effective operational tempo can at times be incompatible with supporting a work-life balance.
GAO-09-903T, Federal Air Marshal Service: Actions Taken to Fulfill Core Mission and Address Workforce Issues
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight,
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 11:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, July 23, 2009:
Federal Air Marshal Service:
Actions Taken to Fulfill Core Mission and Address Workforce Issues:
Statement of Steve Lord, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-09-903T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-903T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Management, Investigations, and Oversight, Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
By deploying armed air marshals onboard selected flights, the Federal
Air Marshal Service (FAMS), a component of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), plays a key role in helping to protect
approximately 29,000 domestic and international flights operated daily
by U.S. air carriers. This testimony discusses (1) FAMS‘s operational
approach or ’concept of operations“ for covering flights, (2) an
independent evaluation of the operational approach, and (3) FAMS‘s
processes and initiatives for addressing workforce-related issues.
Also, this testimony provides a list of possible oversight issues
related to FAMS.
This testimony is based on GAO‘s January 2009 report (GAO-09-273), with
selected updates in July 2009. For its 2009 report, GAO analyzed
policies and procedures regarding FAMS‘s operational approach and a
July 2006 classified assessment of that approach. Also, GAO analyzed
employee working group reports and related FAMS‘s initiatives for
addressing workforce-related issues, and interviewed FAMS headquarters
officials and 67 air marshals (selected to reflect a range in levels of
experience).
What GAO Found:
Because the number of air marshals is less than the number of daily
flights, FAMS‘s operational approach is to assign air marshals to
selected flights it deems high risk”such as the nonstop, long-distance
flights targeted on September 11, 2001. In assigning air marshals, FAMS
seeks to maximize coverage of flights in 10 targeted high-risk
categories, which are based on consideration of threats,
vulnerabilities, and consequences.
In July 2006, the Homeland Security Institute, a federally funded
research and development center, independently assessed FAMS‘s
operational approach and found it to be reasonable. However, the
institute noted that certain types of flights were covered less often
than others. The institute recommended that FAMS increase randomness or
unpredictability in selecting flights and otherwise diversify the
coverage of flights within the various risk categories. In its January
2009 report, GAO noted that the Homeland Security Institute‘s
evaluation methodology was reasonable and that FAMS had taken actions
(or had ongoing efforts) to implement the institute‘s recommendations.
To address workforce-related issues, FAMS‘s previous Director, who
served until June 2008, established a number of processes and
initiatives, such as working groups, listening sessions, and an
internal Web site for agency personnel to provide anonymous feedback to
management. These efforts have produced some positive results. For
example, FAMS revised its policy for airport check-in and aircraft
boarding procedures to help protect the anonymity of air marshals in
mission status, and FAMS modified its mission scheduling processes and
implemented a voluntary lateral transfer program to address certain
quality-of-life issues. The air marshals GAO interviewed expressed
satisfaction with FAMS‘s efforts to address workforce-related issues.
The current FAMS Director has expressed a commitment to continue
applicable processes and initiatives. Also, FAMS has plans to conduct a
workforce satisfaction survey of all employees every 2 years, building
upon an initial survey conducted in fiscal year 2007. GAO‘s review
found that the potential usefulness of future surveys could be enhanced
by ensuring that the survey questions and the answer options are
clearly structured and unambiguous and that additional efforts are
considered for obtaining the highest possible response rates.
To its credit, FAMS has made progress in addressing various operational
and quality-of-life issues that affect the ability of air marshals to
perform their aviation security mission. However, sustaining progress
will require ongoing consideration by FAMS management”and continued
oversight by congressional stakeholders”of key questions, such as how
to foster career sustainability for air marshals given that maintaining
an effective operational tempo can at times be incompatible with
supporting a work-life balance.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO‘s January 2009 report (GAO-09-273) recommended actions for
improving the design and response rates of FAMS‘s workforce
satisfaction surveys. TSA agreed, and FAMS has begun steps to implement
these actions.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-903T] or key
components. For more information, contact Steve Lord at (202) 512-4379
or lords@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Federal Air Marshal
Service (FAMS), which has a core mission of deploying trained and armed
federal air marshals to provide an onboard security presence on
selected flights operated by U.S. commercial passenger air carriers.
The agency's cadre of air marshals grew significantly in response to
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), and pursuant to the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act.[Footnote 1] Nonetheless, as
noted in our January 2009 report,[Footnote 2] because the total number
of air marshals is less than the approximately 29,000 domestic and
international flights operated daily by U.S. commercial passenger air
carriers,[Footnote 3] FAMS routinely must determine which flights are
to be provided an onboard security presence. To facilitate making these
decisions, FAMS developed an operational approach--commonly referred to
as the agency's concept of operations--for deploying air marshals on
selected flights. As further noted in our January 2009 report, FAMS
also faces challenges in addressing various operational and quality-of-
life issues that affect the ability of air marshals to carry out the
agency's mission. Such issues range, for example, from maintaining
anonymity during aircraft boarding procedures to mitigating the various
health concerns associated with frequent flying.
With selected updates as of July 2009, this statement summarizes
information presented in our January 2009 report, which addressed the
following questions:
* What is FAMS's operational approach for achieving its core mission of
providing an onboard security presence for flights operated by U.S.
commercial passenger air carriers?
* To what extent has FAMS's operational approach for achieving its core
mission been independently assessed?
* To what extent does FAMS have processes and initiatives in place to
address issues that affect the ability of its workforce to carry out
its mission?
Also, as you further requested, this statement presents information on
possible oversight issues related to FAMS.
To address the questions, we reviewed (1) relevant legislation
regarding FAMS's mission, (2) the agency's policies and other
documentation regarding the strategy and concept of operations for
carrying out that mission, (3) a July 2006 classified report prepared
by the Homeland Security Institute based on its independent evaluation
of FAMS's concept of operations,[Footnote 4] and (4) documentation
regarding various working groups and other initiatives that FAMS had
established to address issues that affect the ability of air marshals
to carry out the agency's mission. Also, we interviewed FAMS
headquarters officials and visited 11 of the agency's 21 field offices,
where we interviewed managers and a total of 67 air marshals. We
selected the 11 field offices and the 67 air marshals based on
nonprobability sampling, which is a method of sampling where
observations are selected in a manner that is not completely random,
generally using specific characteristics of the population as criteria.
Results from a nonprobability sample cannot be used to make inferences
about an entire population because some elements of the population
being studied had no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as
part of the sample. However, the interviews provided a broad overview
of issues important to air marshals. More details about the scope and
methodology of our work to address the questions are presented in
appendix I of our January 2009 report.[Footnote 5] In conducting work
in July 2009 for this statement, we requested updated information from
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), contacted the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General to
discuss its FAMS-related audits or inspections, and (3) reviewed FAMS
budget data for fiscal years 2009 and 2010.
We conducted the work for this statement in July 2009 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
Background:
FAMS was originally established as the Sky Marshal program in the 1970s
to counter hijackers. In response to 9/11, the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act expanded FAMS's mission and workforce and
mandated the deployment of federal air marshals on high-security risk
flights. Within the 10-month period immediately following 9/11, the
number of air marshals grew significantly. Also, during subsequent
years, FAMS underwent various organizational transfers. Initially, FAMS
was transferred within the Department of Transportation from the
Federal Aviation Administration to the newly created TSA. In March
2003, FAMS moved, along with TSA, to the newly established DHS. In
November 2003, FAMS was transferred to U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). Then, about 2 years later, FAMS was transferred back
to TSA in the fall of 2005.[Footnote 6]
FAMS deploys thousands of federal air marshals to a significant number
of daily domestic and international flights. In carrying out this core
mission of FAMS, air marshals are deployed in teams to various
passenger flights.[Footnote 7] Such deployments are based on FAMS's
concept of operations, which guides the agency in its selection of
flights to cover. Once flights are selected for coverage, FAMS
officials stated that they must schedule air marshals based on their
availability,[Footnote 8] the logistics of getting individual air
marshals in position to make a flight, and applicable workday rules.
[Footnote 9]
At times, air marshals may have ground-based assignments. On a short-
term basis, for example, air marshals participate in Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams, which provide security nationwide
for all modes of transportation. After the March 2004 train bombings in
Madrid, TSA created and deployed VIPR teams to enhance security on U.S.
rail and mass transit systems nationwide. Comprised of TSA personnel
that include federal air marshals--as well as transportation security
inspectors, transportation security officers, behavioral detection
officers, and explosives detection canines--the VIPR teams are intended
to work with local security and law enforcement officials to supplement
existing security resources, provide a deterrent presence and detection
capabilities, and introduce an element of unpredictability to disrupt
potential terrorist activities.
FAMS's budget request for fiscal year 2010 is $860.1 million, which is
an increase of $40.6 million (or about 5 percent) over the $819.5
million appropriated in fiscal year 2009. The majority of the agency's
budget provides for the salaries of federal air marshals and supports
maintenance of infrastructure that includes 21 field offices.
FAMS's Operational Approach to Achieving Its Core Mission Is Based on
Risk-Related Factors:
FAMS's operational approach (concept of operations) for achieving its
core mission is based on assessments of risk-related factors, since it
is not feasible for federal air marshals to cover all of the
approximately 29,000 domestic and international flights operated daily
by U.S. commercial passenger air carriers. Specifically, FAMS considers
the following risk-related factors to help ensure that high-risk
flights operated by U.S. commercial carriers--such as the nonstop, long-
distance flights targeted on 9/11--are given priority coverage by
federal air marshals[Footnote 10]:
* Threat (intelligence): Available strategic or tactical information
affecting aviation security is considered.[Footnote 11]
* Vulnerabilities: Although FAMS's specific definition is designated
sensitive security information, DHS defines vulnerability as a physical
feature or operational attribute that renders an entity open to
exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard.
* Consequences: FAMS recognizes that flight routes over certain
geographic locations involve more potential consequences than other
routes.
FAMS attempts to assign air marshals to provide an onboard security
presence on as many of the flights in the high-risk category as
possible.[Footnote 12] FAMS seeks to maximize coverage of high-risk
flights by establishing coverage goals for 10 targeted critical flight
categories. In order to reach these coverage goals, FAMS uses a
scheduling process to determine the most efficient flight combinations
that will allow air marshals to cover the desired flights. FAMS
management officials stressed that the overall coverage goals and the
corresponding flight schedules of air marshals are subject to
modification at any time based on changing threat information and
intelligence. For example, in August 2006, FAMS increased its coverage
of international flights in response to the discovery, by authorities
in the United Kingdom, of specific terrorist threats directed at
flights from Europe to the United States. FAMS officials noted that a
shift in resources of this type can have consequences because of the
limited number of air marshals. The officials explained that
international missions require more resources than domestic missions
partly because the trips are of longer duration.
In addition to the core mission of providing an onboard security
presence on selected flights, FAMS also assigns air marshals to VIPR
teams on an as-needed basis to provide a ground-based security
presence. For the first quarter of fiscal year 2009, TSA reported
conducting 483 VIPR operations, with about 60 percent of these
dedicated to ground-based facilities of the aviation domain (including
air cargo, commercial aviation, and general aviation) and the remaining
VIPR operations dedicated to the surface domain (including highways,
freight rail, pipelines, mass transit, and maritime). TSA's budget for
fiscal year 2009 reflects support for 225 VIPR positions at a cost of
$30 million. TSA plans to significantly expand the VIPR program in
fiscal year 2010 by adding 15 teams consisting of 338 positions at a
cost of $50 million. However, questions have been raised about the
effectiveness of the VIPR program. In June 2008, for example, the DHS
Office of Inspector General reported that although TSA has made
progress in addressing problems with early VIPR deployments, it needs
to develop a more collaborative relationship with local transit
officials if VIPR exercises are to enhance mass transit security.
[Footnote 13]
An Independent Assessment Concluded That FAMS's Approach for Achieving
Its Core Mission Was Reasonable; Recommendations for Enhancing the
Approach Are Being Implemented:
After evaluating FAMS's operational approach for providing an onboard
security presence on high-risk flights, the Homeland Security
Institute, a federally funded research and development center, reported
in July 2006 that the approach was reasonable.[Footnote 14] In its
report, the Homeland Security Institute noted the following regarding
FAMS's overall approach to flight coverage:
* FAMS applies a structured, rigorous approach to analyzing risk and
allocating resources.
* The approach is reasonable and valid.
* No other organizations facing comparable risk-management challenges
apply notably better methodologies or tools.
As part of its evaluation methodology, the Homeland Security Institute
examined the conceptual basis for FAMS's approach to risk analysis.
Also, the institute examined FAMS's scheduling processes and analyzed
outputs in the form of "coverage" data reflecting when and where air
marshals were deployed on flights. Further, the Homeland Security
Institute developed and used a model to study the implications of
alternative strategies for assigning resources. We reviewed the
institute's evaluation methodology and generally found it to be
reasonable.
Although the institute's July 2006 report concluded that FAMS's
operational approach was reasonable and valid, the report also noted
that certain types of flights were covered less often than others.
Accordingly, the institute made recommendations for enhancing the
operational approach. For example, the institute recommended that FAMS
increase randomness or unpredictability in selecting flights and
otherwise diversify the coverage of flights.
To address the Homeland Security Institute's recommendations, FAMS
officials stated that a broader approach for determining which flights
to cover has been implemented--an approach that opens up more flights
for potential coverage, provides more diversity and randomness in
flight coverage, and extends flight coverage to a variety of airports.
Our January 2009 report noted that FAMS had implemented or had ongoing
efforts to implement the institute's recommendations. We reported, for
example, that FAMS is developing an automated decision-support tool for
selecting flights and that this effort is expected to be completed by
December 2009.
FAMS Has Taken Positive Actions to Address Issues Affecting Its
Workforce and to Help Ensure Continued Progress:
To better understand and address operational and quality-of-life issues
affecting the FAMS workforce, the agency's previous Director--who
served in that capacity from March 2006 to June 2008--established
various processes and initiatives. Chief among these were 36 issue-
specific working groups to address a variety of topics, such as
tactical policies and procedures, medical or health concerns,
recruitment and retention practices, and organizational culture. Each
working group typically included a special agent-in-charge, a subject
matter expert, air marshals, and mission support personnel from the
field and headquarters. According to FAMS management, the working
groups typically disband after submitting a final report, but
applicable groups could be reconvened or new groups established as
needed to address relevant issues. The previous Director also
established listening sessions that provided a forum for employees to
communicate directly with senior management and an internal Web site
for agency personnel to provide anonymous feedback to management.
Another initiative implemented was assigning an air marshal to the
position of Ombudsman in October 2006 to provide confidential,
informal, and neutral assistance to employees to address workplace-
related problems, issues, and concerns.
These efforts have produced some positive results. For example, as
noted in our January 2009 report, FAMS amended its policy for airport
check-in and flight boarding procedures (effective May 15, 2008) to
better ensure the anonymity of air marshals in mission status.[Footnote
15] In addition, FAMS modified its mission scheduling processes and
implemented a voluntary lateral transfer program to address certain
issues regarding air marshals' quality of life--and has plans to
further address health issues associated with varying work schedules
and frequent flying. Also, our January 2009 report noted that FAMS was
taking steps to procure new personal digital assistant communication
devices--to replace the current, unreliable devices--and distribute
them to air marshals to improve their ability to communicate
effectively with management while in mission status.[Footnote 16]
All of the 67 air marshals we interviewed in 11 field offices commented
favorably about the various processes and initiatives for addressing
operational and quality-of-life issues, and the air marshals credited
the leadership of the previous FAMS Director. The current FAMS
Director, as noted in our January 2009 report, has expressed a
commitment to sustain progress and reinforce a shared vision for
workforce improvements by continuing applicable processes and
initiatives.
In our January 2009 report, we also noted that FAMS plans to conduct a
workforce satisfaction survey of all employees every 2 years, building
upon an initial survey conducted in fiscal year 2007, to help identify
issues affecting the ability of its workforce to carry out its mission.
We reported that a majority (79 percent) of the respondents to the 2007
survey indicated that there had been positive changes from the prior
year, although the overall response rate (46 percent) constituted less
than half of the workforce. The 46 percent response rate was
substantially less than the 80 percent rate encouraged by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) in its guidance for federal surveys that
require its approval.[Footnote 17] According to the OMB guidance, a
high response rate increases the likelihood that the views of the
target population are reflected in the survey results. We also reported
that the 2007 survey's results may not provide a complete assessment of
employees' satisfaction because:
* 7 of the 60 questions in the 2007 survey questionnaire combined two
or more issues, which could cause respondents to be unclear on what
issue to address and result in potentially misleading responses, and:
* none of the 60 questions in the 2007 survey questionnaire provided
for response options such as "not applicable" or "no basis to judge"--
responses that would be appropriate when respondents had little or no
familiarity with the topic in question.
In summary, our January 2009 report noted that obtaining a higher
response rate to FAMS's future surveys and modifying the structure of
some questions could enhance the surveys' potential usefulness by, for
instance, providing a more comprehensive basis for assessing employees'
attitudes and perspectives. Thus, to increase the usefulness of the
agency's biennial workforce satisfaction surveys, we recommended that
the FAMS Director take steps to ensure that the surveys are well
designed and that additional efforts are considered for obtaining the
highest possible response rates. Our January 2009 report recognized
that DHS and TSA agreed with our recommendation and noted that FAMS was
in the initial stages of formulating the next workforce satisfaction
survey. More recently, by letter dated July 2, 2009, DHS informed
applicable congressional committees and OMB of actions taken in
response to our recommendation.[Footnote 18] The response letter noted
that agency plans include (1) ensuring that questions in the 2009
survey are clearly structured and unambiguous, (2) conducting a pretest
of the 2009 survey questions, and (3) developing and executing a
detailed communication plan.
Congressional Oversight Issues:
Federal air marshals are an important layer of aviation security. FAMS,
to its credit, has established a number of processes and initiatives to
address various operational and quality-of-life issues that affect the
ability of air marshals and other FAMS personnel to perform their
aviation security mission. The current FAMS Director has expressed a
commitment to continue relevant processes and initiatives for
identifying and addressing workforce concerns, maintaining open lines
of communications, and sustaining progress.
Similarly, this hearing provides an opportunity for congressional
stakeholders to focus a dialogue on how to sustain progress at FAMS.
For example, relevant questions that could be raised include the
following:
* In implementing the agency's concept of operations, how effectively
does FAMS use new threat information and intelligence to modify flight
coverage goals and the corresponding flight schedules of air marshals?
* In managing limited resources to mitigate a potentially unlimited
range of security threats, how does FAMS ensure that federal air
marshals are allocated appropriately for meeting in-flight security
responsibilities as well as supporting new ground-based security
responsibilities, such as VIPR team assignments? What cost-benefit
analyses, if any, are being used to guide FAMS decision makers?
* To what extent have appropriate performance measures been developed
for gauging the effectiveness and results of resource allocations and
utilization?
* How does FAMS foster career sustainability for federal air marshals
given that maintaining an effective operational tempo is not
necessarily compatible with supporting a better work-life balance?
These types of questions warrant ongoing consideration by FAMS
management and continued oversight by congressional stakeholders.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I look forward to
answering any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee
may have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For information about this statement, please contact Steve Lord,
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-4379, or
lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
statement. Other individuals making key contributions to this testimony
include David Alexander, Danny Burton, Katherine Davis, Mike Harmond,
and Tom Lombardi.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 105, 115 Stat. 597, 606-08 (2001)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44917).
[2] GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Has Taken
Actions to Fulfill Its Core Mission and Address Workforce Issues, but
Additional Actions Are Needed to Improve Workforce Survey, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-273] (Washington, DC.: Jan. 14,
2009).
[3] The specific number of federal air marshals is classified.
[4] The Homeland Security Institute is a federally funded research and
development center established pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of
2002. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 312, 116 Stat. 2135, 2176, as amended.
The institute's mission is to assist the Department of Homeland
Security in addressing relevant issues requiring scientific, technical,
and analytical expertise. In March 2009, the institute's name was
changed to Homeland Security studies and analysis Institute (with a
logo expressed as HSsaI). In this testimony, we use the former name,
which was applicable at the time of our review of FAMS.
[5] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-273].
[6] The transfer of FAMS to ICE was based partly on the assumptions
that (1) air marshals would be afforded a broader career path by cross-
training with ICE's investigative division and (2) ICE's special agents
could provide a surge capability by serving as supplemental air
marshals, if needed. See GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal
Service Is Addressing Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce,
but Additional Actions Needed, GAO-04-242 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19,
2003).
[7] The specific number of air marshals assigned to an onboard team,
whether for a domestic flight or an international flight, may vary
depending on such factors as duration of the flight, the type of
aircraft, the departure and destination cities, and awareness of
specific threat information.
[8] In determining air marshals' availability, FAMS officials stated
that they must consider such factors as training requirements, other
ground-based duties, and annual leave plans.
[9] "Workday rules" refer to the parameters that FAMS uses for
assigning air marshals to flights. As applicable to nonovernight
missions, for example, FAMS tries to assign air marshals to flights (or
combinations of flights) that will return the air marshals home during
a scheduled 10-hour workday.
[10] Under this approach, FAMS categorizes each of the approximately
29,000 daily flights into risk categories--high risk or lower risk.
[11] FAMS considers "threat" and "intelligence" as separate risk-
related factors.
[12] FAMS's criteria for determining high-risk flights are classified.
In part, FAMS's determinations are guided by the provisions of the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act that specify the deployment of
federal air marshals on flights presenting high security risks, such as
the nonstop, long-distance flights targeted on 9/11.
[13] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General,
TSA's Administration and Coordination of Mass Transit Security
Programs, OIG-08-66 (Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2008).
[14] Much of the specific information in the report is classified.
[15] FAMS's changes to check-in and boarding procedures concern air
marshals' interactions with airline personnel. FAMS's policy continues
to require air marshals to adhere to established TSA regulations and
locally established airport procedures.
[16] In July 2009, the DHS Office of Inspector General informed us that
it was initiating a review with objectives that include determining
whether TSA is pursuing communication capabilities to ensure that
federal air marshals in mission status can receive and send time-
sensitive, mission-related information through secure communication
while in flight.
[17] The OMB guidance governs federal agency surveys of the public at
large or outside individuals, groups, or organizations, such as local
government entities. The FAMS workforce survey was administered
internally to gather information from the agency's employees. Although
internal workforce surveys such as the one conducted by FAMS do not
require OMB approval, we believe the OMB standards and guidance provide
relevant direction on planning, designing, and implementing high-
quality surveys--including the need to obtain a high response rate to
increase the potential that survey responses will accurately represent
the views of the survey population.
[18] Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 720, the head of a federal agency must
submit a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations
to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
and to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform not later
than 60 days from the date of the report and to the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for
appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.
[End of section]
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