Homeland Defense
Preliminary Observations on Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Plans and Preparedness Gao ID: GAO-09-927T July 28, 2009DOD plays a support role in managing Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents, including providing capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate hardship or suffering, and minimize property damage. This testimony addresses GAO's preliminary observations on DOD's role in CBRNE consequence management efforts and addresses the extent to which (1) DOD's plans and capabilities are integrated with other federal government plans, (2) DOD has planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE consequence management assistance, (3) DOD's CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) are prepared to perform their mission; and (4) DOD has funding plans for the CCMRF that are linked to requirements for specialized CBRNE capabilities. GAO reviewed DOD's plans for CBRNE consequence management and documents from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. GAO also met with officials from the Undersecretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S Northern Command, U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army North, the National Guard Bureau, and some CCMRF units.
DOD has its own CBRNE consequence management plans but has not integrated them with other federal government plans because all elements of the Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in December 2007 have not been completed. The system is to develop and link planning documents at the federal, state, and local levels. While the system's framework is established, the CBRNE concept and strategic plans that provide further guidance are incomplete. DOD has had operational plans in place and revises these plans regularly. However, until the Integrated Planning System and its associated plans are complete, DOD's plans and those of other federal and state entities will not be integrated, and it will remain unclear whether DOD's CCMRF will address potential gaps in capabilities. With a goal to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous, catastrophic CBRNE incidents, DOD has plans to provide the needed capabilities, but its planned response times may not meet incident requirements, it may lack sufficient capacity in some capabilities, and it faces challenges to its strategy for sourcing all three CCMRFs with available units. Without assigned units and plans that integrate the active and reserve portions of the CCMRF, and agreements between DOD and the states on the availability of National Guard units and the duty status in which they would respond to an incident requiring federal forces, DOD's ability to train and deploy forces in a timely manner to assist civil authorities to respond to multiple CBRNE incidents is at risk. DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the readiness of units assigned to the CCMRF, increasing both individual and collective training focused on the mission and identifying the mission as high priority. However, the CCMRF has not conducted realistic full force field training to confirm units' readiness to assume the mission or to deploy rapidly. Competing demands of overseas missions may distract from a unit's focus on the domestic mission, and some CCMRF units rotate more frequently than stated goals. These training and force rotation problems have prevented DOD from providing the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build cohesiveness. DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to identify total program requirements have not been completed, and funding responsibilities have been assigned across the department and are not subject to central oversight. When the CCMRF mission priority increased in the spring of 2008, more funding was provided. However, units did not have dedicated funding and thus purchased equipment with existing funding which is also used for other missions. DOD lacks visibility over the mission's total funding requirements. Without an overarching approach to developing requirements and providing funding and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been identified and funded, DOD's ability to ensure that its forces are prepared to carry out this high priority mission remains challenged.
GAO-09-927T, Homeland Defense: Preliminary Observations on Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Plans and Preparedness
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and
Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Tuesday, July 28, 2009:
Homeland Defense:
Preliminary Observations on Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management Plans and
Preparedness:
Statement of Davi M. D'Agostino, Director:
Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-09-927T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-927T, testimony before the Subcommittee on
Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
DOD plays a support role in managing Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents,
including providing capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate
hardship or suffering, and minimize property damage. This testimony
addresses GAO‘s preliminary observations on DOD‘s role in CBRNE
consequence management efforts and addresses the extent to which (1)
DOD‘s plans and capabilities are integrated with other federal
government plans, (2) DOD has planned for and structured its force to
provide CBRNE consequence management assistance, (3) DOD‘s CBRNE
Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF) are prepared to perform
their mission; and (4) DOD has funding plans for the CCMRF that are
linked to requirements for specialized CBRNE capabilities.
GAO reviewed DOD‘s plans for CBRNE consequence management and documents
from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. GAO also met with officials from the
Undersecretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S Northern Command,
U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army North, the National Guard Bureau,
and some CCMRF units.
What GAO Found:
DOD has its own CBRNE consequence management plans but has not
integrated them with other federal government plans because all
elements of the Integrated Planning System mandated by Presidential
directive in December 2007 have not been completed. The system is to
develop and link planning documents at the federal, state, and local
levels. While the system‘s framework is established, the CBRNE concept
and strategic plans that provide further guidance are incomplete. DOD
has had operational plans in place and revises these plans regularly.
However, until the Integrated Planning System and its associated plans
are complete, DOD‘s plans and those of other federal and state entities
will not be integrated, and it will remain unclear whether DOD‘s CCMRF
will address potential gaps in capabilities.
With a goal to respond to multiple, near-simultaneous, catastrophic
CBRNE incidents, DOD has plans to provide the needed capabilities, but
its planned response times may not meet incident requirements, it may
lack sufficient capacity in some capabilities, and it faces challenges
to its strategy for sourcing all three CCMRFs with available units.
Without assigned units and plans that integrate the active and reserve
portions of the CCMRF, and agreements between DOD and the states on the
availability of National Guard units and the duty status in which they
would respond to an incident requiring federal forces, DOD‘s ability to
train and deploy forces in a timely manner to assist civil authorities
to respond to multiple CBRNE incidents is at risk.
DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the
readiness of units assigned to the CCMRF, increasing both individual
and collective training focused on the mission and identifying the
mission as high priority. However, the CCMRF has not conducted
realistic full force field training to confirm units‘ readiness to
assume the mission or to deploy rapidly. Competing demands of overseas
missions may distract from a unit‘s focus on the domestic mission, and
some CCMRF units rotate more frequently than stated goals. These
training and force rotation problems have prevented DOD from providing
the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build
cohesiveness.
DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and
equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to
identify total program requirements have not been completed, and
funding responsibilities have been assigned across the department and
are not subject to central oversight. When the CCMRF mission priority
increased in the spring of 2008, more funding was provided. However,
units did not have dedicated funding and thus purchased equipment with
existing funding which is also used for other missions. DOD lacks
visibility over the mission‘s total funding requirements. Without an
overarching approach to developing requirements and providing funding
and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been
identified and funded, DOD‘s ability to ensure that its forces are
prepared to carry out this high priority mission remains challenged.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO has ongoing work on this issue and will report its complete
evaluation along with any recommendations at a later date.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-927T] or key
components. For more information, contact Davi D'Agostino at (202) 512-
5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee,
I am pleased to be here today to discuss preliminary results of our
work on the Department of Defense's efforts to provide consequence
management support to civilian authorities in the event of a
catastrophic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-
yield explosives (CBRNE) incident. The 2007 National Strategy for
Homeland Security highlighted the continuing threat posed to the United
States by the potential use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist
organizations.[Footnote 1] In addition to efforts focused on preventing
such attacks, the strategy highlights the need for a comprehensive
capability to mitigate the consequences of an attack involving weapons
of mass destruction. Such a capability is also a key pillar of the
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.[Footnote 2]
The Department of Defense (DOD) characterizes weapons of mass
destruction in terms of CBRNE materials. Incidents involving CBRNE
could range in magnitude, from such things as accidents like chemical
spills that likely could be addressed by local responders to
catastrophic incidents such as terrorist attacks involving nuclear
material that could result in extraordinary levels of casualties and
property damage.
A catastrophic CBRNE-related incident occurring within the United
States would require a unified, national response, including action by
DOD. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for
coordinating federal disaster response planning, with the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) serving as the primary federal
agency under DHS for coordinating federal assistance in response to an
incident. DOD would act in support of the primary federal agency. In
addition to establishing CBRNE response units in the National Guard,
including the Civil Support Teams and CBRNE Enhanced Response Force
Packages, DOD is establishing CBRNE Consequence Management Response
Forces (CCMRF). The CCMRF is intended to be roughly a brigade-sized
force (approximately 4,500 troops) that provides the federal military
assistance when a CBRNE incident exceeds local and state capabilities.
In May 2006, we reported that the National Guard Civil Support Teams
were generally organized and prepared for their mission, and we
highlighted management challenges that needed to be addressed.[Footnote
3] In response to the request of this subcommittee and other Senate
requesters that we assess DOD's federal role in CBRNE consequence
management efforts, we initiated a review focusing on federal military
planning and preparedness efforts and the CCMRF. This testimony is
based on preliminary findings from this work and addresses the extent
to which (1) DOD's plans and capabilities are integrated with other
federal government plans to address capability requirements, (2) DOD
has planned for and structured its force to provide CBRNE consequence
management assistance, (3) DOD's CCMRF are prepared to perform their
mission; and (4) DOD has funding plans for the CCMRF that are linked to
requirements for specialized CBRNE capabilities.
To determine the extent to which DOD has planned for CBRNE consequence
management operations and integrated plans with other federal
government plans, we reviewed and compared current DOD operational and
tactical level plans for civil support and CBRNE consequence management
with existing FEMA and DHS planning efforts. We also met with officials
of the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and U.S Northern
Command. We reviewed prior GAO reports and worked with other GAO staff
currently examining the overall domestic homeland security planning
integration process. To determine how prepared the CCMRF is to perform
the mission we compared existing DOD policy and practices on readiness
with the current process used to prepare CCMRF units and report mission
readiness. We also met with U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Army
Forces command--which are responsible for providing ready forces to the
combatant commands--to discuss the manpower sourcing process followed
for the CCMRF. We obtained readiness reports for CCMRF units from U.S.
Northern Command and from judgmentally selected units that were part of
task force operations--which contains most of the specialized
capabilities. To determine CCMRF funding planning and the linkage of
funding to mission requirements, we met with Army and U.S. Northern
Command officials to obtain guidance on the topic and to discuss
mission requirements, funding needs, and sources. We compared funding
sources to known CBRNE consequence management requirements and
highlighted areas where funding was not identified for key activities
or areas relevant to unit preparedness. We also met with the National
Guard Bureau and some key units that were assigned to or soon to be
assigned to the CCMRF to discuss their current capabilities, identified
shortfalls, and their approach to mitigating any identified shortfalls.
These units were selected because they belonged to the task force that
would provide most of the specialized CBRNE capabilities that reside in
the CCMRF.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 through July
2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We plan to
report on our complete findings and any recommendations at a future
date.
Background:
DOD plays a support role in CBRNE consequence management, including
providing those capabilities needed to save lives, alleviate hardship
or suffering, and minimize property damage caused by the incident. DOD
generally provides defense support of civil authorities only when (1)
state, local, and other federal resources are overwhelmed or unique
military capabilities are required; (2) assistance is requested by the
primary federal agency; or (3) NORTHCOM is directed to do so by the
President or the Secretary of Defense.[Footnote 4] DOD has designated
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)[Footnote 5] to lead the federal
military[Footnote 6] portion of such a support operation in direct
support of another federal agency--most often the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). DOD would be the lead federal agency for
CBRNE consequence management or any other civil support mission only if
so designated by the President.[Footnote 7] To be effective, DOD's
efforts must be coordinated with a wide range of federal departments
and agencies--including FEMA and the Departments of Health and Human
Services and Justice--in order to support 50 states, the District of
Columbia, six territories, and hundreds of city and county governments.
The National Response Framework establishes the principles that guide
all response partners in preparing for and providing a unified national
response to disasters. [Footnote 8] Under the Framework, disaster
response is tiered; local government and agencies typically respond
immediately after an incident. When additional resources are required,
states may provide assistance with their own resources or may request
assistance from other states through interstate mutual agreements or
the Emergency Management Assistance Compact.[Footnote 9] Localities and
states usually respond within the first several hours of a major
incident. The federal government provides assistance to states if they
require additional capabilities and request assistance. In the event of
a catastrophic incident, such as one involving CBRNE, the framework
also calls for federal response partners to anticipate the need for
their capabilities before their assistance is requested. The framework
lists 15 emergency support functions and designates federal lead
agencies in areas such as search and rescue, public health and medical
services, and transportation. DOD is a supporting agency for all 15
emergency support functions but is the primary agency only for search
and rescue and public works and engineering.[Footnote 10] Additional
tools to guide response efforts are provided by The National
Preparedness Guidelines, including National Planning Scenarios, Target
Capability and Universal Target Lists, and national priorities.
DOD has created significant capabilities that could be used to augment
a federal CBRNE response. It also contributes to the organization,
training, and equipping of several other state military units focused
on consequence management. These include the 22-person National Guard
Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams that are located in
each state and territory); the larger National Guard CBRNE Enhanced
Response Force Packages of about 200 soldiers each that are located in
17 states for more expansive response; and the DOD's CBRNE Consequence
Management Response Forces (CCMRF).
The Civil Support Teams and CBRNE Emergency Response Force Packages are
intended to be part of the state response to an incident and therefore
remain under the control of the respective governors, unless they are
mobilized into federal service. The CCMRF is intended to be a roughly
brigade-sized force (approximately 4,500 troops) that provides the
federal military assistance when a CBRNE incident exceeds local and
state capabilities--including the Civil Support Teams and CBRNE
Enhanced Response Force Packages. The CCMRFs are not whole units by
themselves. They are a collection of geographically separated DOD
capabilities and units across the military services and consist of such
existing specialized capabilities as the U.S. Marine Corps' Chemical
Biological Incident Response Force as well as general capabilities,
such as transportation units. Although the CCMRF is intended to be
about 4,500 personnel in size, the size of the force that would deploy
in support of an actual incident could be modified based on the size of
the incident. DOD ultimately plans to have three fully functional
CCMRFs. DOD would, if necessary, draw on additional general military
forces over and above the CCMRF to provide assistance in the event of
one or more major CBRNE incidents.
DOD CBRNE Consequence Management Plans and Integration with Other
Federal Plans:
DOD has operational plans for CBRNE consequence management. However,
DOD has not integrated its plans with other federal government plans,
because the concept and strategic plans associated with the Integrated
Planning System mandated by Presidential directive in December 2007
have not been completed.
DOD Has Developed Plans for CBRNE Consequence Management:
Unlike most federal agencies, DOD has had CBRNE consequence management
operational plans for over 10 years. DOD, NORTHCOM, and its components
have prepared individual plans that address CBRNE consequence
management following DOD's well-established joint operation planning
process.[Footnote 11] This process establishes objectives, assesses
threats, identifies capabilities needed to achieve the objectives in a
given environment, and ensures that capabilities (and the military
forces to deliver those capabilities) are distributed to ensure mission
success. Joint operation planning also includes assessing and
monitoring the readiness of those units providing the capabilities for
the missions they are assigned. DOD and NORTHCOM routinely review and
update their plans as part of DOD's joint planning system. For example,
the most recent NORTHCOM CBRNE consequence management plan was
completed in October 2008. DOD and NORTHCOM have also developed such
planning documents as execute orders that are key to linking immediate
action to those plans, as well as scenario-based playbooks to guide the
planning, operations, and command and control of military forces for
CBRNE efforts.
Governmentwide Integrated Planning System Is under Development but Not
Yet Complete:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is leading a governmentwide
effort to develop an Integrated Planning System that would link the
plans of all federal agencies involved in incident response, including
DOD's; however, this effort is not yet complete.[Footnote 12] While
much in the way of federal guidance has been developed, to be most
effective, policy documents must be operationalized by further
detailing roles and responsibilities for each entity that may be
involved in responding to high-risk or catastrophic incidents.
In December 2007, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1,
mandated that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with
the heads of other federal agencies with roles in homeland security,
develop an Integrated Planning System to provide common processes for
all of the entities developing response plans.[Footnote 13] The
directive also called for the development of strategic plans, concepts
of operations plans, and operations plans that would be integrated at
the federal, regional, state, and local levels. DHS has grouped the 15
national planning scenarios on which preparedness plans are to be based
into 8 scenario sets, of which 5 are CBRNE-related. Each of the
scenarios, listed in table 1, includes a description, assumptions, and
likely impacts, so that entities at all levels can use them to guide
planning.[Footnote 14]
Table 1: Fifteen National Planning Scenarios Grouped into Eight
Scenario Sets:
Scenario Set: Explosives Attack - Bombing Using Improvised Explosive
Device;
National Planning Scenarios:
Scenario 12: Explosives Attack - Bombing Using Improvised; Explosive
Device.
Scenario Set: Nuclear Attack;
National Planning Scenarios:
Scenario 1: Nuclear Detonation - Improvised Nuclear Device.
Scenario Set: Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Device;
National Planning Scenarios:
Scenario 11: Radiological Attack - Radiological Dispersal Device.
Scenario Set: Biological Attack - With annexes for different pathogens;
National Planning Scenarios:
Scenario 2: Biological Attack - Aerosol Anthrax;
Scenario 4: Biological Attack - Plague;
Scenario 13: Biological Attack - Food Contamination;
Scenario 14: Biological Attack - Foreign Animal Disease.
Scenario Set: Chemical Attack - With annexes for different agents;
National Planning Scenarios:
Scenario 5: Chemical Attack - Blister Agent;
Scenario 6: Chemical Attack - Toxic Industrial Chemicals;
Scenario 7: Chemical Attack - Nerve Agent;
Scenario 8: Chemical Attack - Chlorine Tank Explosion.
Scenario Set: Natural Disaster - With annexes for different disasters;
National Planning Scenarios:
Scenario 9: Natural Disaster - Major Earthquake;
Scenario 10: Natural Disaster - Major Hurricane.
Scenario Set: Cyber Attack;
National Planning Scenarios:
Scenario 15: Cyber Attack.
Scenario Set: Pandemic Influenza;
National Planning Scenarios:
Scenario 3: Biological Disease Outbreak - Pandemic Influenza.
Source: Department of Homeland Security.
[End of table]
The directive required that the Integrated Planning System be submitted
to the President for approval within 2 months of the directive's
issuance in December 2007. As we have reported, the Integrated Planning
System was approved in January 2009 by former President Bush, but is
currently under review by the new administration, and no time frame for
its publication has been announced.[Footnote 15] The approval of the
CBRNE plans required under the directive (see table 2 below) would be a
step toward unifying and integrating the nation's planning efforts. For
example, for each National Planning Scenario, a strategic guidance
statement is intended to establish the nation's strategic priorities
and national objectives and to describe an envisioned end-state.
Strategic guidance statements will have corresponding strategic plans,
which are intended to define roles, authorities, responsibilities, and
mission-essential tasks. Under each strategic plan, a concept of
operations plan will be developed, and federal agencies are further
required to develop operations plans to execute their roles and
responsibilities under the concept of operations plan.
As of today, strategic guidance statements have been approved for all 5
CBRNE-related scenario sets. Four of the 5 required strategic plans
have also been completed. The remaining strategic plan (chemical
attack) was begun in June 2009 upon the approval of the strategic
guidance statement for that scenario. One of the 5 required overall
federal concept plans--that for terrorist use of explosives attack--has
been completed. As we have previously reported, apart from the
sequential timelines required in HSPD Annex 1, FEMA and DHS have no
schedule or project plan for completing the guidance and
plans.[Footnote 16] Table 2 shows the status of federal CBRNE strategy
and plans called for under HSPD 8 Annex 1.
Table 2: Status of Development for CBRNE Related Plans Called for under
HSPD 8 Annex 1, Utilizing the Integrated Planning System (As of July
2009):
Planning Scenario: Terrorist Use of Explosives Attack;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team, Strategic
Guidance Statement Status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security,
August 2008;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team, Strategic Plan
Status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, November 2008;
FEMA: Overall Federal Concept Plan Status: Approved by Secretary of
Homeland Security, May 2009;
Federal Departments and Agencies, Agency Operational Plans Status: DOD
has approved plans. Other agencies started January 2009.
Planning Scenario: Improvised Nuclear Device Attack;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team, Strategic
Guidance Statement Status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security,
September 2008;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team, Strategic Plan
Status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, January 2009;
FEMA: Overall Federal Concept Plan Status: Under development:
interagency review/adjudication;
Federal Departments and Agencies, Agency Operational Plans Status: DOD
has approved plans. Other agencies awaiting development; due 120 days
after Concept Plan.
Planning Scenario: Biological Attack;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team, Strategic
Guidance Statement Status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security,
January 2009;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team, Strategic Plan
Status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, July 2009;
FEMA: Overall Federal Concept Plan Status: Under development:
interagency review/adjudication; due 180 days after Strategic Plan;
Federal Departments and Agencies: Agency Operational Plans Status: DOD
has approved plans. Other agencies awaiting development; due 120 days
after Concept Plan.
Planning Scenario: Radiological Dispersion Device Attack;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team, Strategic
Guidance Statement Status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security,
January 2009;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team, Strategic Plan
Status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security, July 2009;
FEMA: Overall Federal Concept Plan Status: Awaiting development; due
180 days after Strategic Plan;
Federal Departments and Agencies: Agency Operational Plans Status: DOD
has approved plans. Other agencies awaiting development; due 120 days
after Concept Plan.
Planning Scenario: Chemical Attack;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team, Strategic
Guidance Statement Status: Approved by Secretary of Homeland Security,
June 2009;
DHS and Interagency Incident Management Planning Team, Strategic Plan
Status: Under development; started in June 2009;
FEMA: Overall Federal Concept Plan Status: Awaiting development; due
180 days after Strategic Plan;
Federal Departments and Agencies: Agency Operational Plans Status: DOD
has approved plans. Other agencies awaiting development ; due 120 days
after Concept Plan.
Source: GAO analysis of Department of Homeland Security data.
[End of table]
DOD's plans and those of other federal and state entities cannot be
fully integrated until the supporting strategic and concept plans are
completed.
Current Capability Assessments at Local, State, and Federal Levels May
Provide Insufficient Data for DOD to Shape Its Response to CBRNE
Incidents:
A number of efforts to develop capability assessments are under way at
local, state, and federal levels, but these efforts may not yet be
sufficiently mature to provide DOD with complete data that it can use
to shape its response plans for CBRNE-related incidents. For example,
FEMA has begun to catalog state capabilities in its preparedness
reports and is working on a capability gap analysis. However, DHS faces
challenges in developing its approach to assessing capabilities and
preparedness. As noted in DHS's January 2009 Federal Preparedness
Report, several key components of the national preparedness system are
still works in progress, and not all data required for the federal
government to assess its preparedness are available. We have previously
reported[Footnote 17] that state capability data developed by
individual states cannot be used to determine capability gaps across
states, because the states do not use common metrics to assess
capabilities and do not always have the data available that they need
to complete their reports. In addition, according to DOD and FEMA, even
to the extent that these data are available, states may limit their
sharing of sensitive information on capability gaps with DOD entities
responsible for developing DOD's plans and related capabilities.
DOD's Planned Response to CBRNE Incidents:
DOD has had plans to provide CBRNE consequence management support to
civil authorities since before 9/11 and in the last few years has set
higher goals in the expectation of being able to provide expanded
capabilities through its 3 CCMRFs. However, its ability to respond
effectively may be compromised because (1) its planned response times
may not meet the requirements of a particular incident, (2) it may lack
sufficient capacity in some key capabilities, and (3) it faces
challenges in adhering to its strategy for sourcing the CCMRFs with
available units.
DOD's Planned Response Times May Be Too Long:
In 2005, DOD established a standard for itself that called for the
ability to respond to multiple, simultaneous catastrophic incidents,
[Footnote 18] and it initiated efforts to create 3 CCMRFs. For the
first 3 years, DOD did not regularly assign units to the CCMRF mission,
and this decreased DOD's ability to actually field any of the CCMRFs
within the timelines it had established. In October 2008 DOD sourced
the first CCMRF, primarily with active force units. A second CCMRF,
comprised primarily of reserve units, will assume the mission in
October 2009 and a third in October 2010. In the absence of national
guidance suggesting what level of response capability DOD should have
available within a specified time frame, DOD's plans use a phased
deployment to allow the CCMRF to be able to provide consequence
management support to civilian authorities within 48-96 hours of being
notified of an CBRNE incident. The earlier phases of the deployment
will provide the lifesaving capabilities. However, multiple DOD
estimates for some of the more catastrophic scenarios, such as a
nuclear detonation, have identified significant gaps between the time
certain life saving and other capabilities would be needed and DOD's
planned response times. For example, victims of a nuclear attack would
require decontamination, which medical experts have established must be
provided within as soon as possible after exposure. If DOD adheres to
its planned response times in such a scenario, the capabilities of
early responders such as local police and fire departments would likely
be overwhelmed before DOD arrived at the incident site. NORTHCOM's
assessment [Footnote 19] and other DOD estimates demonstrated that, for
a number of capabilities, DOD's response would not be timely. Table 3
shows one estimate of the potential shortfall in decontamination
capabilities that could result.
Table 3: Estimate of Potential Lifesaving Decontamination Requirements
Compared With Likely Capabilities for a 10 Kiloton Nuclear Detonation
in Major Metropolitan City in the First 72 Hours After Incident:
Source of Decontamination Capability: Local;
Estimated Capability by Timeframe (persons):
1st 24 hours: 14,640;
24-48 hours: 14,640;
48-72 hours: 14,640.
Source of Decontamination Capability: State;
Estimated Capability by Timeframe (persons):
1st 24 hours: 1,350;
24-48 hours: 5,400;
48-72 hours: 10,800.
Source of Decontamination Capability: CCMRF Package 1;
Estimated Capability by Timeframe (persons):
1st 24 hours: 1,350;
24-48 hours: 5,400;
48-72 hours: 5,400.
Source of Decontamination Capability: CCMRF Package 2;
Estimated Capability by Timeframe (persons):
1st 24 hours: 0;
24-48 hours: 0;
48-72 hours: 2,880.
Source of Decontamination Capability: Self Decontamination;
Estimated Capability by Timeframe (persons):
1st 24 hours: 8,000;
24-48 hours: 8,000;
48-72 hours: 8,000.
Source of Decontamination Capability: Other Federal Decontamination
Capabilities;
Estimated Capability by Timeframe (persons):
1st 24 hours: 270;
24-48 hours: 1,080;
48-72 hours: 1,080.
Source of Decontamination Capability: Total Decontamination
Capabilities by Timeframe;
Estimated Capability by Timeframe (persons):
1st 24 hours: 25,610;
24-48 hours: 34,520;
48-72 hours: 42,800.
Source of Decontamination Capability: Total Decontamination
Requirement;
Estimated Capability by Timeframe (persons):
1st 24 hours: 138,000;
24-48 hours: 112,390;
48-72 hours: 77,870.
Source of Decontamination Capability: Unmet Decontamination
Requirement;
Estimated Capability by Timeframe (persons):
1st 24 hours: 112,390;
24-48 hours: 77,870;
48-72 hours: 35,070.
Source: GAO analysis of DOD information.
[End of table]
The NORTHCOM capability-based assessment similarly suggests that
without a national, risk-based determination of DOD's share of the
federal capability requirements, DOD will be unable to determine
whether its planned response times should be adjusted.
DOD's Planned Force May Lack Sufficient Capacity in Some Key
Capabilities Needed for Catastrophic Incidents:
In addition to timeliness issues, DOD's planned force has limited
quantities of some of the needed life saving capabilities, such as
medical and decontamination services. For example, some nuclear
detonation scenarios project that hundreds of thousands could be
killed, injured, displaced, contaminated, or in need of medical care.
The CCMRF would be able to provide only a small portion of the
necessary capability. Although a CCMRF is estimated, under optimal
circumstances, to be capable of decontaminating several thousand people
per day, some estimates project that the gap between needed
decontamination capabilities and what local, state, and other entities
could provide would be tens of thousands. DOD recognizes that it may
need additional units to augment the CCMRF, and it has made some
tentative estimates. However, DOD has not developed contingency plans
designating specific units to augment the CCMRF. Unless these units are
identified in advance and trained for the mission, they may be unable
to deploy rapidly. Without clear plans aligning CCMRF objectives with
the projected need for response capabilities and clearly delineating
national expectations for timely response, neither DOD nor other
entities involved in incident response can be certain that the CCMRFs
will be able to respond adequately to mitigate the consequences of a
catastrophic CBRNE incident.
DOD Faces Challenges in Adhering to Its Strategy for Sourcing the
CCMRFS with Available Units:
In sourcing its 3 CCMRFs, DOD has encountered challenges in
implementing an approach that could enhance unit availability and
training and readiness oversight for forces that are not assigned to
NORTHCOM. DOD originally intended the CCMRF to be comprised entirely of
federal active military forces, but the two follow-on CCMRFs will be
sourced with large numbers of National Guard and Army Reserve units.
The demands of ongoing overseas operations have led DOD to draw more
and more heavily on Guard and Reserve forces to fulfill civil support
functions. Because National Guard units have responsibilities in their
respective states, a competition for resources issue may arise between
DOD and the states. For example, while governors may need the same
capabilities within the state or to support mutual assistance
agreements with other states as would be needed to support a CCMRF,
there is no clear understanding between the governors and DOD to ensure
that these units will be available if they are needed for a federal
mission. Moreover, elements from a single unit can be spread over many
states, further complicating the task of coordinating between DOD and
each of the states. For example, one Army National Guard aviation
company belonging to the CCMRF has elements in Arkansas, Florida, and
Alabama. Three different states would be required to make these
elements available to form the company. The potential rapid deployment
mission of the CCMRF makes it imperative that specific agreements be
reached. However, the agreements that have been reached to date are
general in nature and do not specify how states are to ensure that
Guard units will be available for a CCMRF deployment.
Similar issues arise with the Army Reserve. The training demands of the
CCMRF mission have caused DOD to authorize additional training days,
but according to Army Reserve officials, reservists cannot be compelled
to attend training events beyond their annual training requirement.
They stated that, as a result, units must rely on the voluntary
participation of their personnel for training beyond the requirement,
which reduces their assurance that these personnel will be available
for other necessary CCMRF training. For example, one reserve company
was unable to fulfill all aspects of its mission requirements because
of low participation at a training event. Unit officials stated that
some of the unit's members had school or work obligations that
conflicted with this training. Moreover, reserve unit officials stated
that, unlike active unit officials, they cannot restrict the personal
travel of unit members to ensure that they will be available if they
are needed to support an unexpected federal CBRNE incident response.
These challenges to sourcing the CCMRF increase the risk that DOD's
ability to effectively respond to one or more major domestic CBRNE
incidents will be compromised. That risk can be mitigated by plans that
integrate the active and reserve component portions of the CCMRF and
agreements between DOD and the states on the availability of National
Guard units and the duty status under which they would respond to a
major incident requiring federal forces.
DOD's decision to change its approach to how NORTHCOM will routinely
interact with units designated for the CCMRF will present additional
challenges. In 2008, DOD's sourcing approach was to assign the first
CCMRF (primarily active forces) to NORTHCOM and allocate the remaining
two CCMRFs (mix of Guard and Army Reserve) to NORTHCOM.[Footnote 20]
Beginning in October 2009, DOD will allocate the units from all three
CCMRFs to NORTHCOM, rather than assigning them to the NORTHCOM
commander outright. As a result, despite the fact that NORTHCOM's
commander is responsible for commanding the federal military domestic
CBRNE response in the continental United States, NORTHCOM will have no
CBRNE forces under its direct control. There are advantages to
assigning forces directly to NORTHCOM. For example, the command would
have direct authority over the units' day-to-day activities, including
training and exercise schedules, and would be better able to monitor
readiness. Additionally, there would be fewer administrative steps
required for the NORTHCOM commander to activate and deploy the CCMRF in
the event of an incident. This would be crucial for deploying the
critical initial response elements of the overall force. Under
allocation, while DOD's current approach would provide NORTHCOM with
authority over units while they are participating in scheduled NORTHCOM
training events, NORTHCOM would have to coordinate with multiple
commands to obtain participation from these units. Current guidance
states that other commands should make their units available for
scheduled NORTHCOM exercises "to the greatest extent possible."
However, NORTHCOM cannot always be assured that units will be available
for these exercises. In addition, NORTHCOM remains uncertain about the
extent to which it will have oversight of CCMRF units' day-to-day
training activities and be able to confirm that these units are ready
to perform their mission even when they are under the authority of
another command.
DOD Actions on CCMRF Readiness and Training and the Impact of Current
Deployments:
DOD has taken a number of actions in the past year to improve the
readiness of its CCMRF units. However, our ongoing work shows that the
CCMRF may be limited in its ability to successfully conduct consequence
management operations because (1) it does not conduct realistic full
force field training to confirm units' readiness to assume the mission
or to deploy rapidly, and (2) conflicting priorities between the CCMRF
mission and overseas deployments impact some units' mission preparation
and unit cohesion.
DOD Has Taken Actions to Improve CCMRF Readiness:
The initial assignment of the CCMRF to NORTHCOM in October 2008 and the
increased priority DOD has placed on the CBRNE mission have resulted in
a number of improvements in unit preparation for the first fielded
CCMRF. The Army, in coordination with NORTHCOM and its subordinate
commands, has established guidance for both individual and collective
training--including joint mission essential task lists--for units
designated for the CCMRF. Therefore, for the first time, identified
units are conducting individual and collective training focused on the
CCMRF mission. For example, key leaders such as brigade task force
headquarters personnel and battalion commanders are required to
participate in a number of command and control training events to
provide them with an understanding of how to organize and conduct
operations in a complex interagency environment under catastrophic
disaster conditions. Moreover, the increased priority given to the
mission in the spring of 2008 has led to units receiving personnel and
equipment before they assume the mission and ahead of many other units
that do not participate in the CBRNE mission.
Extent of Realistic Field Training Impacts CCMRF's Ability to Perform
Effectively:
Despite units being certified as ready prior to assuming the mission in
October 2008, it is unclear whether the CCMRF can effectively perform
CBRNE consequence management operations throughout the 1-year mission
period to which it is assigned, because the readiness of the entire
CCMRF is not confirmed through a realistic field training exercise
before the force assumes the mission, nor have its rapid deployment
capabilities been fully assessed. Before designated units assume the
CBRNE mission, they must be certified by the military services to be
trained to perform that mission. However, there is no requirement to
provide these units with a full force tactical field training exercise.
While units conduct this type of training prior to an overseas
deployment, and NORTHCOM and Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC)
training officials have discussed the desirability of such an exercise,
the first CCMRF units have not received this kind of training. Although
some CCMRF units have participated in joint field exercises, critical
units often did not participate. In addition, the exercises were
conducted several months after units had been certified as trained to
perform the mission.
Units also must demonstrate that they will be able to meet the required
response times once they assume the mission. A key aspect of the CCMRF
mission is to be able to rapidly deploy each of the three force
packages that comprise each CCMRF within a specified response time. One
of the primary challenges to a timely response is that CCMRF packages
may have to deploy rapidly from their home stations. Deployment
readiness exercises are important, because they test units' abilities
to ascertain how quickly staff can be notified and assembled, equipment
prepared and loaded, and both staff and equipment moved to the
designated point of departure. DOD has provided general guidance that
supported commands, such as NORTHCOM, should verify the ability of
CCMRF units to activate and deploy. However, DOD has not yet conducted
deployment exercises for the entire CCMRF, and it is not clear if its
plans for future CCMRFs will include such exercises. In the absence of
such exercises, NORTHCOM and DOD will continue to be unable to verify
the ability of CCMRF units to deploy.
Units' Preparation for the CCMRF Mission and Efforts to Achieve Unit
Cohesion Are Impacted by Other Missions:
The demands that overseas missions are placing on the Army also may put
the effectiveness of the CCMRF mission at risk. While DOD has
identified CCMRF as a high priority mission, competing demands
associated with follow-on missions may distract from a unit's focus on
the domestic mission. For example, Army units are frequently given the
CCMRF mission when they return from an overseas deployment. Because
these units are at the beginning of the "reset" phase of the Army Force
Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle, they often lack personnel and equipment.
Although the Army attempts to accelerate the fill of personnel and
equipment to these units, some units may not have received their
personnel and equipment in sufficient time to allow them to meet all of
the requirements of the CBRNE mission before they assume it. These
training and force rotation issues have prevented DOD from providing
the kind of stability to the force that would allow units to build
cohesiveness. While DOD's goal has been to assign units for at least 12
months and to set standard start and end dates for each rotation,
several critical units have been unable to complete their 1-year CCMRF
rotations for fiscal year 2009. As a result, the replacement units who
have finished out these rotations have missed important training. For
example, the headquarters units for the aviation and medical task
forces rotated out of the mission after only 4 and 6 months,
respectively, because of competing priorities. Because key leaders from
units of the entire force attend a mission rehearsal exercise prior to
mission assumption, the replacement of these units after only a few
months negated much of the value that was gained from these three task
forces working together and precluded the replacement task force
leaders from having the same opportunity.
CCMRF Requirements Development, Funding, and Oversight:
DOD is making progress in identifying and providing funding and
equipment to meet CCMRF mission requirements; however, its efforts to
identify total program requirements have not been completed, and its
approach to providing program funding has been fragmented, because
funding responsibilities for CCMRF-related costs are dispersed
throughout DOD and are not subject to central oversight.
CCMRF Mission Requirements Have Not Been Fully Developed:
The units initially designated for the CCMRF mission did not have fully
developed funding and equipment requirements. In addition, the recent
NORTHCOM Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities-Based
Assessment highlighted a number of systemic capability gaps that need
to be addressed and may generate additional funding requirements.
[Footnote 21] Moreover, other important requirements for this mission
have not been identified and funded. The Joint Forces Land Component
Commander (U.S. Army North--ARNORTH) and the Joint Task Force Civil
Support[Footnote 22] are responsible for developing and approving
service-specific equipment unique to the CCMRF's Joint Mission
Essential Tasks. However, to date, mission essential equipment
requirements have not been fully developed. While some equipment
requirement lists have been developed and are being reviewed by
NORTHCOM, equipping officials said that lists have not been developed
for non-standard equipment that units may need in order to support
civil authorities in a CBRNE environment. As a result, some fiscal year
2008 units have determined requirements based on their own independent
mission analyses. Unit officials stated that filling some of the needs
they identified--such as the need for non-standard communications
equipment that is compatible with civilian equipment--was difficult
because the units lacked a documented requirement for their planned
acquisition. In addition, the review process did not always include the
command organizations that are responsible for the mission. Thus,
decisions on what to buy and in what quantity were not consistently
vetted to ensure standardization in equipping various units. ARNORTH
officials stated that they were in the process of developing mission
essential equipment lists and hope to have them completed in time for
the next rotation, which begins in October 2009.
Extent of Dedicated Funds for Some CCMRF Training Impacts Mission:
In the spring of 2008, sourcing priority for the CCMRF mission
increased substantially within the department, and funding was provided
for specific aspects of the mission. For example, funding was provided
for NORTHCOM's training program--which totals more than $21 million
annually--for three major exercises associated with the CCMRFs for
fiscal year 2010 and beyond, and the Army Reserve has planned funds of
more than $37 million for fiscal years 2009 and 2010 to support
additional full-time personnel and training days that have been
authorized to support the CCMRF mission. In addition, while the
military services have not planned funds for equipment specifically for
the CCMRF mission, equipment has been purchased with funds left over
from past Global War on Terrorism deployments. In other cases, purchase
requests for certain equipment were denied by administrative parent
commands because, unit officials believed, the equipment was considered
non-critical by reviewing officials. Moreover, units must fund their
CCMRF training activities from their operations and maintenance
accounts, which were developed and approved months before units knew
they would be assigned to the CCMRF. According to unit officials,
because they do not have dedicated funds for CCMRF in their budgets,
they sometimes must take money from other sources to meet what they
believe are their highest priorities for the CCMRF mission. Also
according to these officials, while the lack of planned funds for the
CCMRF has been mitigated to some extent by the mission's high priority
level, they have found it necessary to curtail or cancel some desirable
training because funding was unavailable. Army officials told us that
if funding shortfalls develop because units lack sufficient funds to
conduct both CCMRF and follow-on mission training, units can request
additional funds from the Army. However, unless units assess their
total funding requirement for the CCMRF and their other designated
mission and receive funding based on both missions, CCMRF units may be
at risk of not having enough funding to conduct all of their CCMRF
training. This, in turn, puts units at risk of not being fully prepared
if they are needed to respond to an incident.
CCMRF units may face more acute funding issues as the United States
begins drawing down in Iraq and as military supplemental funding, such
as funding for Global War on Terrorism, is reduced. Because DOD has
assigned funding responsibilities across the department and because
much of the funding for the CCMRF is coming from existing operations
and maintenance accounts, DOD lacks visibility across the department
over the total funding requirements for this mission. Without an
overarching approach to developing requirements and providing funding,
and a centralized focal point to ensure that all requirements have been
identified and fully funded, DOD's ability to carry out this high-
priority homeland security mission in an efficient and effective manner
is at risk.
Agency Comments:
We provided the Departments of Defense and of Homeland Security an
extensive briefing on our preliminary findings. We also provided them a
draft of this statement. Neither DOD nor DHS had formal comments, but
both provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the
statement, as appropriate.
We plan to provide this subcommittee and our other congressional
requesters with our final report on DOD's CBRNE consequence management
efforts in September 2009. We expect to make a number of
recommendations for DOD action at that time. Mr. Chairman, this
concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any
questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee might have.
Contacts and Acknowledgements:
For questions about this statement, please contact me at (202) 512-5431
or daogostinod@gao.gov. Individuals who made key contributions to this
testimony include Joseph Kirschbaum, Assistant Director; Rodell
Anderson; Joanne Landesman; Robert Poetta; and Jason Porter.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security
(Washington, D.C: Oct. 2007), pp. 15-31.
[2] White House, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2002).
[3] GAO, Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil
Support Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-498] (Washington, D.C.: May 31,
2006).
[4] Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2008), and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-
28, Civil Support (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2007)
[5] United States Northern Command, established in 2002, has the dual
mission of homeland defense and support of civil authorities.
[6] This does not include U.S. Coast Guard forces, which is under DHS,
or the National Guard, which, unless federalized by the President,
would remain under the authority of the respective state and territory
governors.
[7] Under DOD's immediate response provision, local commanders are
authorized to take the necessary actions to respond to local civil
authorities without higher headquarter approval when a civil emergency
may require immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering or
mitigate property damage.
[8] Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2008). The National Response Framework--
previously known as the National Response Plan--is the plan that guides
how federal, state, local, and tribal governments, along with
nongovernmental and private sector entities, will collectively respond
to and recover from all hazards, including catastrophic disasters, such
as Hurricane Katrina.
[9] Emergency Management Assistance Compact is a mutual aid agreement
among member states and is administered by the National Emergency
Management Association. States affected by disasters have increasingly
relied on the compact as a means to access resources from other states,
including emergency managers, National Guard assets, and first
responders. GAO, Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing
EMAC's Collaborative and Administrative Capacity Should Improve
National Disaster Response, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-854] (Washington, D.C.: June 29,
2007).
[10] The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is the DOD agent responsible for
public works and engineering.
[11] One of the primary joint doctrine documents that lays out DOD
guidance for joint operation planning is Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint
Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Dec. 26, 2006).
[12] The full National Response Framework is also not yet completed.
Partner guides, incident annexes for terrorism and cyber incidents, and
the incident annex supplement for catastrophic disasters remain
incomplete.
[13] White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, Annex 1,
National Planning (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2007).
[14] The 15 National Planning Scenarios have been grouped in 8 scenario
sets of similar characteristics. For example, the 4 National Planning
Scenarios related to chemical incidents have been grouped together.
Concept and operation plans are being developed for the 8 scenario
sets.
[15] GAO, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Needs to
Complete and Integrate Planning, Exercise, and Assessment Efforts,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369] (Washington, D.C.:
April 30, 2009).
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369].
[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-369].
[18] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil
Support (Washington, D.C.: June 2005), p. 3. DOD has since refined that
standard to "prepare for and mitigate the effects of multiple, near-
simultaneous CBRNE events." U.S. Northern Command, Department of
Defense Homeland Defense and Civil Support Joint Operating Concept,
Version 2.0 (October 2007), p. 43.
[19] U.S. Northern Command, Homeland Defense and Civil Support
Capabilities Based Assessment (Colorado Springs, CO: Mar. 2009).
[20] Assigned forces are under the direct command of their unified
command, such as NORTHCOM. Allocated forces are transferred from their
assigned unified command to another command for employment for a period
of time.
[21] Homeland Defense and Civil Support Capabilities Based Assessment.
[22] U.S. Army North and Joint Task Force Civil Support are subordinate
commands of NORTHCOM.
[End of section]
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