Disaster Housing
FEMA Needs More Detailed Guidance and Performance Measures to Help Ensure Effective Assistance after Major Disasters Gao ID: GAO-09-796 August 28, 2009Concerns over the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) provision of temporary housing assistance, including travel trailers at group sites, after the 2005 hurricanes led to the development of the National Disaster Housing Strategy. GAO was asked to assess (1) the challenges households faced in transitioning to permanent housing, (2) the extent to which FEMA measured its performance in closing and transitioning households in group sites, (3) the strategy's effectiveness in defining FEMA's roles and responsibilities for closing and transitioning households in group sites, and (4) the alternatives to travel trailers in group sites and how well the strategy assessed them. GAO reviewed the strategy and interviewed officials from FEMA, state agencies, and selected nonprofit and housing research groups.
Households living in FEMA group sites encountered various challenges in transitioning to permanent housing. A significant challenge cited by several reports and officials GAO contacted was the availability of affordable rental housing. Other challenges that were cited included insufficient financing to fund repairs of homes, significantly higher insurance premiums, and the availability of full-time employment to support disaster victims' return to permanent housing. FEMA's overall effectiveness in measuring its performance in closing and transitioning households in group sites was limited because the agency's measures do not provide information on program results that would be helpful in gauging whether the program is achieving its goal. Previously, GAO reported that performance measures should be aligned with program goals and cover the activities that an entity is expected to perform to support the purpose of the program. However, FEMA's performance measures for Katrina and Rita group sites primarily describe program outputs and do not provide information on results, such as the timeliness or efficiency of closing group sites and transitioning households into permanent housing. Having such information could help identify potential problems in meeting goals and could be used to make decisions about resources needed and steps to be taken. The National Disaster Housing Strategy broadly defines FEMA's roles and responsibilities for closing group sites and assisting households with the transition into permanent housing. Although the strategy states that FEMA is responsible for closing group sites and assisting households find permanent housing, the strategy does not reflect the key characteristics of effective national strategies and plans that GAO identified in prior work. For example, the strategy does not explain how FEMA will work with other agencies in closing these sites and transitioning households into permanent housing. A lack of a detailed plan that includes information on the steps FEMA needs to take to assist households with transitioning into permanent housing could lead to delays in the future in helping disaster victims return to more stable and conventional living arrangements. Officials contacted and reports reviewed by GAO identified a number of housing options that could serve as alternatives to travel trailers in group sites--for example, providing rental assistance for existing housing and repairing damaged rental housing. However, FEMA's strategy does not assess alternatives, in part, because evaluations are ongoing. Also, it does not provide clear guidance on the specific temporary housing options that states can use instead of travel trailers while FEMA completes these evaluations. Without more specific information on what these temporary housing options are, including alternatives to travel trailers, state officials will not have the information needed to expedite the selection of temporary housing options. As a result, FEMA and the states may not be fully prepared to quickly respond to the temporary housing needs of those displaced by major disasters.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-796, Disaster Housing: FEMA Needs More Detailed Guidance and Performance Measures to Help Ensure Effective Assistance after Major Disasters
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Performance Measures to Help Ensure Effective Assistance after Major
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2009:
Disaster Housing:
FEMA Needs More Detailed Guidance and Performance Measures to Help
Ensure Effective Assistance after Major Disasters:
GAO-09-796:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-796, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Concerns over the Department of Homeland Security‘s (DHS) Federal
Emergency Management Agency‘s (FEMA) provision of temporary housing
assistance, including travel trailers at group sites, after the 2005
hurricanes led to the development of the National Disaster Housing
Strategy. GAO was asked to assess (1) the challenges households faced
in transitioning to permanent housing, (2) the extent to which FEMA
measured its performance in closing and transitioning households in
group sites, (3) the strategy‘s effectiveness in defining FEMA‘s roles
and responsibilities for closing and transitioning households in group
sites, and (4) the alternatives to travel trailers in group sites and
how well the strategy assessed them. GAO reviewed the strategy and
interviewed officials from FEMA, state agencies, and selected nonprofit
and housing research groups.
What GAO Found:
Households living in FEMA group sites encountered various challenges in
transitioning to permanent housing. A significant challenge cited by
several reports and officials GAO contacted was the availability of
affordable rental housing. Other challenges that were cited included
insufficient financing to fund repairs of homes, significantly higher
insurance premiums, and the availability of full-time employment to
support disaster victims‘ return to permanent housing.
FEMA‘s overall effectiveness in measuring its performance in closing
and transitioning households in group sites was limited because the
agency‘s measures do not provide information on program results that
would be helpful in gauging whether the program is achieving its goal.
Previously, GAO reported that performance measures should be aligned
with program goals and cover the activities that an entity is expected
to perform to support the purpose of the program. However, FEMA‘s
performance measures for Katrina and Rita group sites primarily
describe program outputs and do not provide information on results,
such as the timeliness or efficiency of closing group sites and
transitioning households into permanent housing. Having such
information could help identify potential problems in meeting goals and
could be used to make decisions about resources needed and steps to be
taken.
The National Disaster Housing Strategy broadly defines FEMA‘s roles and
responsibilities for closing group sites and assisting households with
the transition into permanent housing. Although the strategy states
that FEMA is responsible for closing group sites and assisting
households find permanent housing, the strategy does not reflect the
key characteristics of effective national strategies and plans that GAO
identified in prior work. For example, the strategy does not explain
how FEMA will work with other agencies in closing these sites and
transitioning households into permanent housing. A lack of a detailed
plan that includes information on the steps FEMA needs to take to
assist households with transitioning into permanent housing could lead
to delays in the future in helping disaster victims return to more
stable and conventional living arrangements.
Officials contacted and reports reviewed by GAO identified a number of
housing options that could serve as alternatives to travel trailers in
group sites”for example, providing rental assistance for existing
housing and repairing damaged rental housing. However, FEMA‘s strategy
does not assess alternatives, in part, because evaluations are ongoing.
Also, it does not provide clear guidance on the specific temporary
housing options that states can use instead of travel trailers while
FEMA completes these evaluations. Without more specific information on
what these temporary housing options are, including alternatives to
travel trailers, state officials will not have the information needed
to expedite the selection of temporary housing options. As a result,
FEMA and the states may not be fully prepared to quickly respond to the
temporary housing needs of those displaced by major disasters.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security direct FEMA to (1) develop results-oriented performance
measures for assistance in group sites, (2) update its planning
documents to reflect key characteristics of effective national
strategies and plans, and (3) clearly describe in FEMA‘s guidance how
travel trailers or other options identified by the states can be
deployed when other preferred options are not available. FEMA generally
agreed with GAO‘s recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-796] or key
components. For more information, contact Mathew J. Scirč at (202) 512-
8678 or sciremj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Households in FEMA Group Sites Have Faced Various Challenges in
Returning to Permanent Housing:
FEMA Reports Basic Activities in Closing Group Sites, but Efforts to
Measure Results Are Limited:
The Housing Strategy Defines FEMA's Roles and Responsibilities for
Closing Group Sites, but Does Not Have Key Characteristics of an
Effective Strategy:
FEMA's Strategy Does Not Identify Alternatives or Provide Clear
Guidance on Using Currently Available Options:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Examples of Manufactured Housing and Recreational Vehicles:
Figure 2: Temporary Housing Unit Placed on a Private Site in New
Orleans, Louisiana:
Figure 3: Temporary Housing Units Placed at a FEMA Group Site in
D'Iberville, Mississippi:
Figure 4: Geographic Dispersion of FEMA Group Sites Following
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
Figure 5: Predisaster Tenure Status of Households Living in FEMA Group
Sites:
Figure 6: Comparison of Group Site Household Reported Average Income
with Statewide Average Income in Calendar Year 2005:
Figure 7: HUD Fair Market Rents for a Two-Bedroom Unit in Selected Gulf
Coast Metropolitan Areas, Fiscal Years 2005-2009:
Figure 8: Unemployment Rates in Selected Gulf Coast Metropolitan Areas:
Figure 9: Performance Measurement Model:
Abbreviations:
AHPP: Alternative Housing Pilot Program:
CDBG: Community Development Block Grant:
DHAP: Disaster Housing Assistance Program:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
FRRATS: FEMA Response and Recovery Applicant Tracking System:
GCRO: Gulf Coast Recovery Office:
GO Zone: Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005:
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act of 1993:
HFA: Housing Finance Agency:
HUD: Department of Housing and Urban Development:
JHSG: Joint Housing Solutions Group:
LIHTC: Low-Income Housing Tax Credit:
MSA: metropolitan statistical area:
NEMIS: National Emergency Management Information System:
NIMBY: not in my backyard:
OIG: Office of Inspector General:
VA: Department of Veterans Affairs:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 28, 2009:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Mary L. Landrieu:
Chair:
Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina destroyed or made uninhabitable an
estimated 300,000 homes, leaving thousands of people in need of
temporary housing across the Gulf Coast region of the United States.
Hurricane Rita added to the devastation in September 2005. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), whose mission includes leading the
federal response to natural disasters, provided direct housing
assistance to about 143,500 households affected by these storms--
primarily in the form of temporary housing units, such as travel
trailers or manufactured homes. In most cases, FEMA placed households
in units on private property near their homes so that they had a place
to live close by while making repairs. However, FEMA also placed about
25,000 households in units at more than 700 group sites, including
temporary sites that the agency constructed on stadium grounds and
school fields and preexisting trailer parks.[Footnote 1] More than 3
years after the storms, FEMA has moved most households from nearly all
of these sites, but 348 households continued to live in 101 group sites
located in Louisiana and Mississippi as of June 18, 2009.
In 2006, Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform
Act (Post-Katrina Act), which included several provisions related to
FEMA's efforts to provide housing assistance to individuals affected by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and future disasters.[Footnote 2] The act
also directed FEMA to develop a national disaster housing strategy to
outline the most efficient and cost-effective federal programs for
meeting the short-and long-term housing needs of individuals and
households affected by a major disaster.
You asked GAO to review several issues related to the federal
government's efforts to assist households with recovering and
rebuilding their lives following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
particularly its efforts for those households living in travel trailers
in group sites. This report focuses on FEMA's efforts to help these
households move to permanent housing.[Footnote 3] Specifically, this
report examines (1) challenges that households living in group sites
faced in transitioning to permanent housing[Footnote 4]; (2) the extent
to which FEMA effectively measured its performance in closing group
sites and assisting households with transitioning into permanent
housing; (3) the National Disaster Housing Strategy's effectiveness in
defining FEMA's roles and responsibilities for closing group sites and
assisting households with transitioning to permanent housing; and (4)
the alternatives to travel trailers in group sites when providing
temporary housing after major disasters, how they compare with respect
to identified policy factors, and how well FEMA's National Disaster
Housing Strategy assessed these alternatives.
To identify challenges that households living in group sites faced in
transitioning to permanent housing, we examined reports related to the
federal government's response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and its
efforts to provide housing assistance in group sites. We also
interviewed officials from federal, state, and local governments and
nonprofit organizations to obtain their perspectives on the challenges
that these households faced. To assess the extent to which FEMA
effectively measured its performance in closing group sites and
assisting households that lived in these sites with transitioning into
permanent housing, we examined annual performance plans, weekly
performance reports, and other documents related to the measures that
FEMA developed to assess its performance and compared these measures
with the key characteristics of successful performance measures
identified in prior GAO work. To determine the National Disaster
Housing Strategy's effectiveness in defining FEMA's roles and
responsibilities for closing group sites and assisting households that
lived in these sites with transitioning to permanent housing, we
reviewed FEMA's strategies, policies and procedures, and relevant
legislation that describe FEMA's authority to provide direct housing
assistance. Additionally, we drew upon our prior work to compare the
relevant sections of the strategy with the characteristics of an
effective national strategy. To determine the alternatives to travel
trailers in group sites and examine how they aligned with identified
policy factors, such as cost-effectiveness and efficiency, we reviewed
prior government and academic reports and interviewed officials from
FEMA, state housing agencies in the Gulf Coast region, and selected
nonprofit and housing research groups. We also reviewed the strategy to
determine how well it assessed alternatives to group sites in terms of
the identified policy factors. We tested the reliability of certain
FEMA data we discuss in this report as part of a previous study and
found the data to be reliable. We determined that the other data we
discuss in this report were sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 through August
2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I
discusses our scope and methodology in more detail.
Background:
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(the Stafford Act) grants the principle authority for the President to
provide assistance in mitigating, responding to, and preparing for
disasters and emergencies, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods,
tornadoes, and terrorist acts.[Footnote 5] FEMA administers the
Stafford Act and provides direct housing assistance (e.g., travel
trailers and manufactured homes) under its Individuals and Households
Program. FEMA provides these units at no charge to disaster victims who
cannot use financial assistance to rent alternate housing because such
housing is not available. The Stafford Act limits direct housing
assistance to an 18-month period, after which FEMA may charge rents at
the fair market rent levels established by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD), but the President can also extend the
initial 18-month period because of extraordinary circumstances.
[Footnote 6]
According to FEMA guidance, manufactured housing and recreational
vehicles are the two most common forms of temporary housing units (see
figure 1). Manufactured housing is factory-built housing designed for
long-term residential use. The term "mobile home" is sometimes used to
refer to manufactured homes. In addition, this type of housing must be
located on sites that are not in a designated floodplain area.
Recreational vehicles, which include park model and travel trailers,
are designed for short-term use when no other options are available.
Following a disaster, the units may be a short-term housing option for
households wanting to remain on an existing property or nearby while
permanent housing is being restored, but the terrain or lot size
prevents deployment of manufactured housing. A park model, which is
generally larger than a travel trailer, is built on a single chassis,
mounted on wheels, and has 400-square feet or less of living space.
Figure 1: Examples of Manufactured Housing and Recreational Vehicles:
[Refer to PDF for image: three photographs]
Two-bedroom manufactured (mobile) home;
Park model;
Travel trailer.
Source: FEMA (top: Patsy Lynch; middle: Susie Shapira; bottom: Mark
Wolfe).
[End of figure]
FEMA can place temporary housing units on a private site or in a group
site configuration.
* Private site: Temporary housing unit is placed on an individual's
private property if the site is feasible and the local authorities
approve. The unit can also be placed on individual private property
that is not owned by the applicant, if the owner allows FEMA to place
the unit at no cost to the agency (see figure 2).
Figure 2: Temporary Housing Unit Placed on a Private Site in New
Orleans, Louisiana:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
* Group site: Temporary housing unit is placed at a site that FEMA has
built to house multiple households. FEMA built these sites in open
space locations, including parks, playgrounds, ball fields, and parking
lots following Hurricane Katrina (see figure 3). FEMA can also place
units at a commercial manufactured housing or recreational vehicle park
that already has utilities (water, electric, and sewer/septic) for
existing lots. The park management must be willing to lease the lots to
FEMA at a fair and reasonable cost for the area. According to FEMA, the
agency's policy is to use existing commercial parks whenever possible,
rather than to build sites.
Figure 3: Temporary Housing Units Placed at a FEMA Group Site in
D'Iberville, Mississippi:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: FEMA (Mark Wolfe).
[End of figure]
FEMA placed temporary housing units on private sites for about 115,400
(80 percent) of the households that received direct housing assistance
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. FEMA placed about 25,000
households that received such assistance in temporary housing units at
group sites located across Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
Figure 4 illustrates the geographic dispersion of these sites.
Figure 4: Geographic Dispersion of FEMA Group Sites Following
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
[Refer to PDF for image: map]
Map of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Eastern Texas, depicting
the geographic dispersion of FEMA group sites, in the following four
categories:
0;
1 to 10;
11 to 20;
21 or more.
Sources: FEMA (data); MapInfo (map).
[End of figure]
Most of the households that FEMA placed in group sites following
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita reported being predisaster renters. Figure
5 shows that about 72 percent of group site households in Louisiana and
an even higher percentage of group site households in Mississippi
(about 84 percent) reported being predisaster renters. In comparison,
renters made up less than one-third of all households in both states
prior to the hurricanes.
Figure 5: Predisaster Tenure Status of Households Living in FEMA Group
Sites:
[Refer to PDF for image: four pie-charts]
Louisiana: Group sites;
Predisaster renters: 71.9%;
Predisaster homeowners: 28.0%.
Louisiana: Statewide;
Predisaster renters: 32.2%;
Predisaster homeowners: 67.8%.
Mississippi: Group sites;
Predisaster renters: 83.5%;
Predisaster homeowners: 16.3%.
Mississippi: Statewide;
Predisaster renters: 30.1%;
Predisaster homeowners: 69.9%.
Source: FEMA (group site data); Census Bureau (statewide data).
[End of figure]
Households in FEMA Group Sites Have Faced Various Challenges in
Returning to Permanent Housing:
Households living in FEMA group sites encountered a variety of
challenges in transitioning to permanent housing. According to
officials we contacted and reports we reviewed, many of the households
that lived in group sites following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita had low
incomes, were elderly, or had a disability.[Footnote 7] As a result,
these households were likely to experience difficulties in finding and
transitioning to permanent housing. FEMA expects disaster victims who
receive housing assistance to take an active role in finding housing
and rebuilding their lives. Specifically, FEMA requires households
receiving this type of assistance to develop within a reasonable amount
of time a plan for moving into permanent housing that is similar to
their predisaster housing.[Footnote 8] However, according to some
officials we contacted, households living in group sites were not able
to plan their recovery and were likely to face difficulties in
accessing aid from federal programs--a problem that was exacerbated by
the disaster--because these households were the hardest to serve.
According to these officials, these households generally required
additional services or assistance to support their transition into
permanent housing.
Specifically, our prior work found that although the majority of heads
of households reported being employed when they applied for FEMA
assistance, approximately 65 percent reported earning less than
$20,000.[Footnote 9] About one-fifth reported no income and some of
these individuals were retired or had disabilities. As shown in figure
6, the reported average income of households on group sites in
Louisiana and Mississippi was about $24,000 and $30,000, respectively,
or less than one-half of the Louisiana state average and less than two-
thirds of the Mississippi state average. According to FEMA, these
limited means led to concerns among some households about moving out of
the sites and finding housing that they could afford. Furthermore, some
of these households could not afford either security deposits for a
rental unit or furniture.
Figure 6: Comparison of Group Site Household Reported Average Income
with Statewide Average Income in Calendar Year 2005:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Group site location: Mississippi;
Average reported income: $45,000;
Group site mean income: $28,000.
Group site location: Louisiana;
Average reported income: $50,700;
Group site mean income: $24,000.
Source: FEMA (group site income); Census Bureau (statewide income).
[End of figure]
FEMA also said that households facing these challenges may be more
reluctant to find and pay for permanent housing. While FEMA does not
update demographic data on households on group sites to reflect current
employment status or income levels, agency officials stated that those
who remained in the sites the longest were the hardest-to-serve people,
including the unemployed, elderly, or persons with disabilities.
In the following sections, we describe other challenges that households
living in group sites may have likely faced in transitioning to
permanent housing. Although these other challenges are not unique to
group site households and affected disaster victims in the Gulf Coast
region, many of these challenges would likely have a more acute impact
on households living in group sites.
Availability of Affordable Rental Housing Was a Key Challenge in
Transitioning to Permanent Housing:
According to several federal and state officials we contacted and
reports we reviewed, one commonly cited challenge displaced households
faced was finding affordable rental housing, since rents increased
significantly following the storms in certain Gulf Coast metropolitan
areas. For example, HUD's fair market rent for a two-bedroom unit in
the New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner metropolitan area increased from $676
to $1,030, or about 52 percent, between fiscal years 2005 and 2009 (see
figure 7). In addition, HUD's fair market rent for a two-bedroom unit
in the Gulfport-Biloxi metropolitan area increased from $592 to $844,
or about 43 percent, over the same time period. Figure 7 also shows
that the Beaumont-Port Arthur and Mobile metropolitan areas experienced
relatively smaller increases in fair market rent between fiscal years
2005 and 2009 (about 22 and 20 percent, respectively). Rents did not
increase as much as in Beaumont-Port Arthur as they did in New Orleans-
Metairie-Kenner or Gulfport-Biloxi, because relatively high vacancy
rates prior to fiscal year 2005 likely softened the effect of the
permanent loss of rental units and temporary removal of rental units
from the market following Hurricane Rita.[Footnote 10] In comparison,
average rents in cities nationwide increased by about 12 percent from
fiscal years 2005 through 2008 (the last year for which data are
available), according to the Consumer Price Index.
Figure 7: HUD Fair Market Rents for a Two-Bedroom Unit in Selected Gulf
Coast Metropolitan Areas, Fiscal Years 2005-2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2005;
Metropolitan area: Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: $554;
Metropolitan area: Mobile, Alabama: $561;
Metropolitan area: Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: $592;
Metropolitan area: New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: $676.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Metropolitan area: Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: $570;
Metropolitan area: Mobile, Alabama: $567;
Metropolitan area: Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: $615;
Metropolitan area: New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: $696.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Metropolitan area: Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: $593;
Metropolitan area: Mobile, Alabama: $590;
Metropolitan area: Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: $640;
Metropolitan area: New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: $978.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Metropolitan area: Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: $645;
Metropolitan area: Mobile, Alabama: $628;
Metropolitan area: Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: $811;
Metropolitan area: New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: $990.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Metropolitan area: Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: $676;
Metropolitan area: Mobile, Alabama: $671;
Metropolitan area: Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: $844;
Metropolitan area: New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: $1,030.
Source: HUD.
[End of figure]
Two key factors that contributed to these higher rents were a decreased
supply of affordable rental units and an increased demand for undamaged
rental units. Specifically, according to estimates by FEMA, Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita caused major or severe damage to 112,000 rental units
across the Gulf Coast region. According to HUD, 75 percent of the
damaged rental units were occupied by low-income households. An
increased demand for rental units also contributed to rent increases.
According to The Urban Institute, this demand was driven by
construction workers who moved to the area to accelerate recovery and
by displaced renters and homeowners who needed temporary rental units
in the area while their homes were being repaired.[Footnote 11]
FEMA staff working to assist households living in group sites cited
additional difficulties that group site households faced in finding
permanent housing following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For example,
some households reported to FEMA that there was a lack of available
affordable rental housing in areas where they wanted to remain,
particularly in some small towns. Other households reported to FEMA
that while they were able to find rental housing, the units were either
not habitable or located in unstable or abandoned neighborhoods.
Limitations in Developing Affordable Rental Housing with Federal
Subsidies:
Also affecting the limited supply of rental housing were the following
two factors: the slow pace of rental housing construction under key
federal programs and the decision by states to focus the majority of
federal funds on repairing homeowner units, rather than rental units.
The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program provides an incentive
for the development of rental housing that is affordable to low-income
households and has been a major source of such housing. State housing
finance agencies (HFA) must award credits to developers of qualified
projects, and developers either use the credits or sell them to
investors to raise capital (i.e., equity).[Footnote 12] The equity
raised by the tax credits reduces the need for debt financing, and, as
a result, these properties can offer lower, more affordable rents.
After the 2005 hurricanes, Congress passed the Gulf Opportunity Zone
Act of 2005 (GO Zone), which temporarily increased the amount of
allocated tax credits for the five states along the Gulf Coast by a
total of about $330 million.[Footnote 13]
We reported in July 2008 that although the Gulf Coast states had
awarded nearly all of their GO Zone LIHTCs, few of the units funded by
these credits were in service as of April 2008.[Footnote 14] Since that
time, Louisiana and Mississippi, which received the largest amounts of
GO Zone authority, have each placed additional units in service.
However, neither state had placed more than 35 percent of planned units
in service as of December 2008. While LIHTC-funded units are generally
required to be placed in service within 2 years of credit allocation,
Congress extended this requirement for units funded with GO Zone
LIHTCs, which must be placed in service before January 1, 2011.
According to HFA officials, the declining market value of tax credits
has reduced the amount of equity developers receive from investors for
each dollar in tax credit awarded.[Footnote 15] As a result, developers
must seek additional funding sources to make up for the equity
shortfall, contributing to significant delays in closings, according to
state officials. Other issues that have impeded the timely development
of LIHTC units include the need to address environmental issues and
increases in the total costs to develop projects because of the high
costs of labor, materials, insurance, and land.
Much of the disaster assistance provided through HUD's Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, which provides flexible relief
and recovery grants to devastated communities, was targeted to
homeowners, with a small percentage of program funds set aside for
owners of rental properties.[Footnote 16] Between December 2005 and
November 2007, Congress appropriated a total of $19.7 billion in
disaster CDBG funds to states affected by the 2005 hurricanes, of which
not less than $1 billion was designated to repair or replace the
affordable rental housing stock, including public and HUD-assisted
housing.[Footnote 17] Local and state officials exercise a great deal
of discretion in determining the use of the funds under this program.
Three states (Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) used most of the CDBG
funds to implement homeowner assistance grant programs to help
homeowners cover the gap between their available financial resources
and the cost to repair and replace their damaged dwellings. For
example, as of January 2009, Louisiana had targeted $10.5 billion in
CDBG funds (out of the total $13.4 billion) to housing assistance
programs, and, of this amount, the state targeted about $8.6 billion,
or 86 percent, to the Road Home Program (the state's Homeowner
Assistance Program). In contrast, the state set aside about $1.3
billion, or 13 percent, of its housing allocation for programs that
targeted rental housing. Furthermore, while about 7 percent of the
Homeowner Assistance Program funds remained unexpended as of the
beginning of 2009, 80 percent of the funds set aside for rental housing
had not been spent.
Public housing agencies have faced considerable challenges in obtaining
funding for the recovery of public housing units. Public housing is an
important source of affordable housing for low-income households in the
Gulf Coast region. The Gulf Coast states experienced a decline in the
number of available units as a result of the storms, especially in the
New Orleans area. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the Housing Authority of
New Orleans managed over 7,000 units of public housing in 10 different
developments. Hurricane Katrina damaged about 80 percent of these units
(approximately 5,600 units). In the aftermath, HUD officials stated
that the department did not have sufficient program funds to repair and
rebuild these units, and that the public housing agencies did not have
sufficient insurance to cover the costs.[Footnote 18]
A large portion of households that were displaced by the Gulf Coast
hurricanes were renters, and given the challenges faced in developing
affordable rental housing with federal subsidies, concerns have been
raised about differences in the treatment of homeowners and rental
property owners. GAO is conducting a separate review to (1) identify
the federal assistance for permanent housing that was provided to
rental property owners and to homeowners affected by the Gulf Coast
hurricanes, (2) examine the extent to which federally funded programs
responded to the needs of rental property owners and homeowners, and
(3) describe the differences in the challenges faced in utilizing
federal assistance for permanent housing and the options to mitigate
these challenges.
Community Resistance to the Development of Affordable Housing:
According to many officials we contacted, another significant obstacle
to building affordable rental housing was opposition to the development
of such housing by local communities--a problem typically referred to
as "not in my backyard" or "NIMBY." Opposition by local residents and
public officials to specific types of housing in their neighborhood or
communities is a long-standing issue in the development of affordable
housing. Communities typically resist the development of affordable
rental housing because of concerns about potential adverse impact on
property values and community characteristics. Such opposition can
manifest itself in restrictive land-use and development regulations
that add to the cost of housing or discourage the development of
affordable housing altogether. During the period after the Gulf Coast
hurricanes, some officials we contacted and reports we reviewed
explained that local opposition had slowed and, in some instances,
stopped the development of affordable rental housing. For example, a
nonprofit organization had planned to use LIHTCs to build an apartment
complex for low-income elderly households in New Orleans to replace a
complex destroyed by the hurricanes. However, according to an official
from a New Orleans nonprofit organization, the local government passed
a resolution that prohibited LIHTC developments and also engaged in a
land-use study at the site of the proposed development that appeared to
be timed to terminate the project. A report on the status of
Mississippi's housing recovery efforts since the Gulf Coast hurricanes
cited NIMBY as one of the key barriers to addressing the state's
projected shortfall in the number of affordable rental housing units
that it had planned to restore under the LIHTC program.[Footnote 19]
Rebuilding Costs, Escalating Insurance Premiums, and Unemployment Also
Affected Disaster Victims' Efforts to Return to Permanent Housing:
On the basis of our discussions with officials and review of reports,
we found that disaster victims encountered other challenges in
returning to permanent housing, including households living in group
sites. First, several sources indicated that disaster victims who owned
homes faced significant challenges in financing repairs. For example,
according to a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of
Inspector General (OIG) report, a December 2007 survey of FEMA field
staff in Louisiana indicated that homeowners faced financial obstacles,
including insufficient insurance coverage and limited Road Home Program
funding, in repairing their homes.[Footnote 20] Similarly, a 2008 study
of the post-Katrina housing recovery in Louisiana found that nearly
three-fourths of Road Home applicants would still face a gap between
their rebuilding resources and the cost to rebuild, leaving them short
of the resources needed to repair their dwellings.[Footnote 21] The DHS
OIG report also found that high construction costs, competition for
available contractors, and new disaster mitigation requirements
compounded these financial problems.[Footnote 22] According to some
sources, the longer time frames and increased construction costs to
repair damaged dwellings also impacted landlords, which in turn
increased housing costs for renters.
A second commonly cited challenge that disaster victims faced in
returning to permanent housing was significantly higher insurance
premiums. According to a report from the Louisiana Housing Finance
Agency, premiums for homeowners insurance escalated to as much as four
times their pre-Katrina level for certain areas in Louisiana that were
severely impacted by the storm, putting insurance out of reach for most
low-and moderate-income households.[Footnote 23] According to some
officials we contacted, some landlords passed the escalating costs of
insurance to rental households through increased rents. In addition,
some insurance companies suspended sales of new homeowner policies in
all or parts of the Gulf Coast region following Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, making it increasingly difficult for households to obtain
insurance coverage in these areas.
Finally, many households faced challenges in finding full-time
employment to support a return to permanent housing. Following
Hurricane Katrina in late August 2005 and Hurricane Rita in September
2005, unemployment rates increased significantly across the Gulf Coast
region. For example, the unemployment rate in the New Orleans-Metairie-
Kenner metropolitan area increased from 4.9 percent in August 2005 to
more than 15.2 percent in September 2005, and the unemployment rate
remained above pre-Katrina levels until March 2006 (see figure 8). In
the Gulfport-Biloxi metropolitan area, the unemployment rate increase
following the storm was more significant, since the rate increased from
5.8 percent in August 2005 to more than 23.2 percent in September 2005.
Moreover, the unemployment rate remained above pre-Katrina levels for 1
year following the storm.
Figure 8: Unemployment Rates in Selected Gulf Coast Metropolitan Areas:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Date: August, 2005;
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: 7.1%;
Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: 5.8%;
Mobile, Alabama: 4.5%;
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: 4.9%;
United States: 4.9%.
Date: September, 2005;
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: 7.1%;
Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: 23.2%;
Mobile, Alabama: 4.9%;
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: 15.2%;
United States: 5%.
Date: October, 2005;
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: 11.5%;
Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: 21.9%;
Mobile, Alabama: 4.1%;
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: 15.5%;
United States: 5%.
Date: November, 2005;
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: 8.3%;
Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: 19.4%;
Mobile, Alabama: 3.7%;
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: 15.9%;
United States: 5%.
Date: December, 2005;
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: 7.2%;
Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: 16.9%;
Mobile, Alabama: 3.5%;
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: 8.1%;
United States: 4.8%.
Date: January, 2006;
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: 6.9%;
Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: 16.5%;
Mobile, Alabama: 4%;
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: 6.5%;
United States: 4.7%.
Date: February, 2006;
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: 6.4%;
Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: 14.2%;
Mobile, Alabama: 3.9%;
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: 5.1%;
United States: 4.8%.
Date: March, 2006;
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: 6.1%;
Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: 12.1%;
Mobile, Alabama: 3.4%;
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: 4.7%;
United States: 4.7%.
Date: April, 2006;
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: 5.8%;
Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: 12%;
Mobile, Alabama: 3%;
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: 4%;
United States: 4.7%.
Date: May, 2006;
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: 5.8%;
Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: 11.3%;
Mobile, Alabama: 3.1%;
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: 4.1%;
United States: 4.7%.
Date: June, 2006;
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: 5.8%;
Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: 10.2%;
Mobile, Alabama: 4.2%;
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: 4.9%;
United States: 4.6%.
Date: July, 2006;
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: 6.5%;
Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: 10%;
Mobile, Alabama: 4.3%;
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: 3.9%;
United States: 4.7%.
Date: August, 2006;
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: 6%;
Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: 8.3%;
Mobile, Alabama: 4.3%;
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: 4%;
United States: 4.7%.
Date: August, 2007;
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: 5.5%;
Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: 4.9%;
Mobile, Alabama: 4.1%;
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: 3.6%;
United States: 4.7%.
Date: August, 2008;
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas: 6.7%;
Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi: 6.3%;
Mobile, Alabama: 5.5%;
New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana: 4.7%;
United States: 6.2%.
Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
[End of figure]
In 2008, we reported that approximately 21 percent of those households
living in group sites reported no source of employment, and that some
of those households reported having a disability or being retired.
[Footnote 24] While FEMA did not update data on group site residents to
reflect current employment status, some state and FEMA officials we
contacted said that those who remained in the sites the longest were
those with limited income and limited choices to find stable
employment, including the elderly and persons with disabilities.
Similarly, according to an April 2007 survey of FEMA group sites in
Louisiana, more than two-thirds of the respondents were unemployed, and
most of these respondents were not looking for employment.[Footnote 25]
Most of those respondents not looking for employment said they were
disabled or had major health limitations.
FEMA Reports Basic Activities in Closing Group Sites, but Efforts to
Measure Results Are Limited:
FEMA's overall effectiveness in measuring its performance in closing
group sites and transitioning households into permanent housing was
limited. While FEMA made some efforts to measure its progress, its
measures did not provide the information on program results that was
needed to assess the agency's performance in achieving its goal of
"helping individuals and communities affected by federally declared
disasters return to normal functioning quickly and efficiently." Under
the provisions of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
(GPRA), federal agencies are required to measure and report the
performance of their programs.[Footnote 26] GPRA was designed to inform
congressional and executive decision making by providing objective
information on the relative efficiency and effectiveness of federal
programs and spending. Previously, we have reported that for
performance measures to be useful, they should be linked or aligned
with program goals, cover the activities that an entity is expected to
perform to support the program's purpose, and have a measurable target.
[Footnote 27] These measures can capture several aspects of
performance, including activities, outputs, outcomes, and impact (see
figure 9). Based on our past work, federal agencies have faced
challenges in identifying program goals and performance measures that
go beyond summarizing program activities (e.g., the number of clients
served) to distinguishing desired outcomes or results (e.g., improving
economic self-sufficiency among clients served).[Footnote 28] As figure
9 shows, having measures that describe outcomes and impact helps
describe the extent to which the program is effective in achieving its
policy objectives. In the past, we have found that performance measures
are an important results-oriented management tool that can enable
managers to determine the extent to which desired outcomes are being
achieved. Results-oriented measures further ensure that it is not the
task itself being evaluated, but progress in achieving the intended
outcome.[Footnote 29]
Figure 9: Performance Measurement Model:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Policy and program content:
* Government policies and priorities;
* Department/Agency mission, goals;
* Program mandate and objectives.
Five measurable aspects of performance:
Inputs:
* Dollars;
* Staff;
* Technology;
* Capital.
Activities:
* Work tasks;
* Functions;
* Program support.
Outputs:
* Goods and services
* Other products directed at external clients.
Outcomes:
* Client benefits
* Program consequences.
Impact:
* Direct or indirect effects or consequences.
Underlying dimensions of performance measurement:
Measures of economy:
* Budget variance;
* Resource utilization.
Measures of productivity/efficiency:
* Quantity (input/output ratios);
* Quality (according to standards);
* Cost (unit cost of output).
Measures of effectiveness:
* Client reach;
* Client satisfaction;
* Social/Economic impacts;
* Contribution to objectives.
Source: Adapted from the Office of Management and Budget.
[End of figure]
FEMA's Performance Measures Focus on Program Activities at Group Sites,
but Do Not Convey Information on Results:
FEMA's performance measures for group sites are output measures that
focus on the core program activity of closing group sites. But the
measures do not provide the information on program results that is
needed to assess the agency's performance in achieving its goal of
"helping individuals and communities affected by federally declared
disasters return to normal functioning quickly and efficiently."
[Footnote 30] The Post-Katrina Act required that FEMA develop
performance measures to help ensure that it provided timely and
efficient housing assistance to individuals and households displaced by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.[Footnote 31] In September 2007, FEMA began
publicly reporting data on a weekly basis to provide information on the
housing assistance that the agency provided, including at group sites.
Specifically, FEMA reported general data on the aggregate number of
households that moved out of travel trailers, park models, or mobile
homes and into other types of FEMA housing assistance or that were no
longer in FEMA's program. However, these data do not provide
information on whether households moved to permanent housing and are
not reported by the specific type of site (e.g., group site). FEMA also
reported data specific to group sites showing, for example, that FEMA
provided temporary housing to 24,960 households, at one point, at these
sites. These measures indicated that as of April 9, 2009, 577
households continued to live in group sites located in Louisiana and
Mississippi.[Footnote 32]
These measures describe program outputs--that is, information on the
number of sites established, current number of sites, number of
households that lived in group sites, and current number of households--
but do not provide information on results, such as successfully moving
households to permanent housing, or on qualitative factors, such as the
timeliness or efficiency of the assistance FEMA provided at group
sites. The difficulties experienced in closing group sites and
transitioning households to permanent housing--as we have previously
discussed--underscore the need to develop measures that describe how
efficiently and effectively the program is addressing its goal of
"helping individuals and communities affected by federally declared
disasters return to normal functioning quickly and efficiently."
[Footnote 33] For example, one potential measure could capture
information on the amount of time households live in group sites before
returning to permanent housing, and FEMA could establish a numerical
target that facilitates the future assessment of whether its overall
goal and objective were achieved. Having such information can help
identify potential problems in meeting program goals and could be used
to make management decisions about resources needed and steps to be
taken.
In its annual performance plans, FEMA also reports the percentage of
customers that are satisfied with its disaster assistance programs.
Although this measure may be a useful overall metric for assessing
agency efforts on the quality of assistance provided to program
beneficiaries, it is of limited use in assessing the agency performance
in operating group sites because it is not reported separately for
assistance provided through group sites. In the absence of other
performance indicators to measure the efficiency or effectiveness and
numeric targets, it is not possible to determine whether the disaster
assistance programs are achieving the program goal of "helping
individuals and communities affected by federally declared disasters
return to normal functioning quickly and efficiently."
According to FEMA officials, the agency has not developed results-
oriented performance measures, in part, because of the uniqueness and
unpredictable circumstances of each disaster. We recognize that the
circumstances can vary significantly from one disaster to another, and
that FEMA generally provides housing assistance in group sites as a
last resort and following catastrophic disasters, such as Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. Nevertheless, FEMA could leverage its experiences and
lessons learned from its responses to past major disasters to identify
potential measures of the agency's performance in closing group sites.
Such measures could be modified as needed to reflect actual conditions
and types of assistance deployed. In fact, FEMA has designed
performance measures for other types of assistance that may vary from
one disaster to another. Specifically, according to FEMA officials, the
agency has developed some potential outcome measures for other
activities (such as case management services). For example, FEMA
reports on the number of households that have achieved their recovery
plans and, therefore, no longer need case management.
FEMA officials also told us that they recognized the importance of
results-based measures and would like to develop them for measuring
housing assistance provided at group sites. Furthermore, the National
Disaster Housing Strategy recognizes that it is important to develop
performance measures to achieve the agency's national goals, and that
feedback on performance will enable those involved in the national
effort to assess progress, adopt best practices, and make course
corrections.[Footnote 34] Nonetheless, FEMA has yet to specify whether
and when it will develop outcome measures for group site assistance.
Without performance measures that reflect program results and that are
clearly linked to the agency's goals, FEMA cannot demonstrate program
results and progress in achieving intended policy objectives. Although
not all disasters may require the use of group sites, future major
disasters that involve protracted recovery efforts may have to rely on
such sites to provide temporary housing. As the experience from the
2005 hurricanes show, there will be a strong demand for results-
oriented measures on the part of Congress in fulfilling its oversight
responsibilities and holding FEMA accountable for its performance.
The Housing Strategy Defines FEMA's Roles and Responsibilities for
Closing Group Sites, but Does Not Have Key Characteristics of an
Effective Strategy:
The Post-Katrina Act was enacted to address various shortcomings
identified in the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.
[Footnote 35] Among other things, the Post-Katrina Act required the
FEMA Administrator, in coordination with specified federal and
nonfederal government agencies--including the American Red Cross, HUD,
the National Advisory Council, and the National Council on Disability-
-to develop, coordinate, and maintain a national disaster housing
strategy to help plan and protect the nation against future
catastrophes. Among other things, FEMA was to outline the most
efficient and cost-effective federal programs that will best meet the
short-and long-term housing needs of individuals and households
affected by a major disaster and describe plans for the operation of
group sites provided to individuals and households. FEMA was to provide
the strategy to Congress by July 1, 2007. On July 21, 2008, FEMA
released a draft strategy, with a 60-day comment period. However, the
draft strategy did not include seven annexes that were to describe,
among other things, the agency's plans for operating group sites.
Instead, the draft included seven blank pages of annexes marked "Under
Development."[Footnote 36]
On January 16, 2009, FEMA released the final version of the National
Disaster Housing Strategy, with annexes attached containing the
information that had been omitted from the draft strategy. The strategy
states that it serves two purposes--to describe how the nation
currently provides housing to those affected by disasters and, more
importantly, to chart a new direction that disaster housing efforts
must take to better meet the emerging needs of disaster victims and
communities. The strategy includes a discussion of key principles,
roles and responsibilities, current practices, and future directions
for the three phases of disaster housing (sheltering, interim housing,
and permanent housing).[Footnote 37]
As we have previously mentioned, the Post-Katrina Act mandated that
FEMA develop a disaster housing strategy, including plans for operating
group sites. In earlier work, we identified certain key characteristics
of effective national strategies and plans. For example, in 2007, we
assessed the federal government's preparedness to lead a response to an
influenza pandemic and reported that effective national strategies and
plans should contain certain key characteristics. Among these are:
[Footnote 38]
* the agencies responsible for implementing the strategy or plan, the
roles of the lead and supporting agencies, and mechanisms for
coordination among the agencies;
* the types of resources required--funding, staffing, and training--to
effectively implement the strategy or plan and the means of acquiring
these resources; and:
* the constraints and challenges involved in implementing the strategy
or plan.
* The Disaster Housing Community Site Operations Annex, which is one of
seven attachments of the National Disaster Housing Strategy, states
that FEMA is responsible for closing group sites and assisting
households in transitioning to permanent housing, but it did not fully
address these key characteristics of an effective national strategy.
The Strategy and Community Site Operations Annex Partially Address
Roles and Responsibilities:
We previously reported that a national strategy should address which
organizations would implement the strategy, their roles and
responsibilities, and mechanisms for coordinating their efforts. The
strategy should answer the fundamental questions about who is in
charge, not only during times of crisis, but also during all phases of
emergency management, as well as the organizations that will provide
the overall framework for accountability and oversight. This
characteristic entails identifying the specific federal agencies and
offices involved and, where appropriate, the different sectors, such as
state, local, and private.
The National Disaster Housing Strategy's Disaster Housing Community
Site Operations Annex, which discusses the issue of closing group
sites, partially addresses this characteristic. The annex contains
information on FEMA's roles and responsibilities for closing group
sites and assisting households in transitioning to permanent housing.
[Footnote 39] Specifically, it states that FEMA will assist with
finding and matching rental resources to households living at these
sites that were renting homes or apartments before the event and track
the progress of repairs to damaged or destroyed homes owned by affected
households. The annex also states that FEMA will provide access to
local, state, and federal agencies that could help affected households
with their unmet needs.
However, the annex does not explain how other federal or state agencies
will be involved in completing the tasks associated with transitioning
a group site household to permanent housing and what mechanisms will be
used to coordinate with these agencies in ensuring that victims can
find a permanent housing unit. Furthermore, the annex does not reflect
some of the experience that FEMA gained in responding to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita regarding coordinating with other agencies. For
example, in response to widespread concerns about both the long periods
that displaced households were living in group sites and the health
issues associated with the trailers on those sites, FEMA developed the
2007 FEMA Gulf Coast Recovery Office Housing Action Plan, which states
that the agency would work with HUD to identify households that were
receiving HUD assistance prior to the 2005 hurricanes. The plan also
states that FEMA would transition the remaining households living in
group sites into HUD's Disaster Housing Assistance Program (DHAP),
which is a pilot federal housing assistance grant program that provides
temporary rental assistance through local public housing agencies that
are experienced in administering other federal housing assistance.
[Footnote 40] According to the National Disaster Housing Strategy,
HUD's and FEMA's experience with DHAP demonstrates that rental
assistance administered through HUD's existing network of public
housing agencies is an effective way to meet the long-term housing
needs of displaced families following a disaster. Nonetheless, the
National Disaster Housing Strategy does not specify HUD's role in
transitioning households out of group sites and into permanent housing.
The Strategy and Annex Do Not Address Resources Required:
An effective national strategy should identify and describe the sources
and types of resources required, such as funding, staff, and training,
to effectively implement the strategy. Guidance on the costs and
resources needed helps implementing parties allocate resources
according to priorities, track cost, and shift resources, as
appropriate, among other competing demands. Furthermore, the National
Disaster Housing Strategy itself states that effective strategies
identify the means or resources to achieve the strategies' goals.
However, we found that neither the strategy itself nor the Disaster
Housing Community Site Operations Annex contained these elements.
Specifically, the documents do not address the cost of helping
households transition to permanent housing, the staffing resources that
would be needed to complete this task, the type of training that should
be provided to staff assigned to this task, and the sources (e.g., HUD;
FEMA; or other federal, state, local, or private agencies) of the
resources necessary to achieving FEMA's goal of closing group sites and
transitioning households into permanent housing.
Again, the annex does not reflect some of the experience that FEMA
gained in responding to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For example, in
response to these hurricanes, FEMA's Mississippi and Louisiana
Transitional Recovery Offices developed housing plans that discussed
some of the resources needed to assist households with transitioning
out of group sites and into permanent housing.[Footnote 41] The
Louisiana Transitional Recovery Office's housing plan's staffing
strategy was designed to create a more effective labor force and labor
mix to meet specific needs of the disasters, including mobilizing more
experienced individuals with targeted functional skills sets.
Similarly, the Mississippi Transitional Recovery Office's housing plan
provides information on the number of staff available to help
households transition to permanent housing and states that no
additional staff will be needed to complete this task. Furthermore,
both of these plans emphasize the importance of providing training to
their staffs to successfully assist affected households transition to
permanent housing. In contrast, the National Disaster Housing Strategy
does not identify and describe the resources needed, including staffing
and training, to effectively transition group site households into
permanent housing.
The Strategy and Annex Do Not Address Constraints and Challenges:
Finally, an effective strategy should reflect a clear description and
understanding of the problems to be addressed, their causes, and
operating environment. A disaster housing strategy should discuss the
constraints and challenges involved in closing group sites in the
aftermath of a catastrophic incident, such as potential shortages in
available permanent housing, and anticipate solutions to these
challenges. However, the National Disaster Housing Strategy does not
describe or anticipate challenges associated with helping people find
permanent housing after a catastrophic event. In the past, FEMA has
recognized the need to do so in order to help households move out of
group sites. For example, FEMA's November 2007 Gulf Coast Recovery
Office Housing Action Plan described the specific challenges involved
in closing the sites that were established after Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita and the mechanisms available to address these challenges. For
example, the plan states that households that have been living in group
sites would be reluctant to move to unfurnished rental units, and that
FEMA was to work with voluntary or other governmental agencies to
provide furniture to the households.
According to FEMA officials, the annex and strategy did not include the
characteristics that we have previously discussed because these
documents were meant to provide an overarching framework of FEMA's
process. Furthermore, officials said that it was difficult to outline
the specific resources needed and the particular challenges FEMA could
face in closing group sites and assisting households with the
transition into permanent housing, mainly because each disaster
presents unique needs and challenges. We previously identified the need
for documents supporting a key strategy or plan, such as an annex, to
contain detailed and robust information on how these plans are going to
be implemented. For example, in February 2006, we reported that
although the National Response Plan--which was revised in March 2008
and is now known as the National Response Framework--envisions a
proactive national response in the event of a catastrophe, the nation
did not yet have the types of detailed plans needed to better delineate
capabilities that might be required and how such assistance will be
provided and coordinated.[Footnote 42] We agree that no national
strategy can anticipate and specify the precise resources and
responsibilities appropriate for every circumstance. Nonetheless, this
does not preclude FEMA from identifying the range of resources and
responses appropriate for most circumstances. FEMA could leverage its
experiences and lessons learned from responses to past major disasters
in order to anticipate the types of challenges that could arise and the
resources needed to address them.
In 2007, we reported that the resources of certain federal agencies
were not fully addressed in the National Response Plan, and that this
hampered the ability of FEMA to provide leadership in coordinating and
integrating overall federal efforts associated with housing assistance.
[Footnote 43] The absence of detailed information in the housing
strategy and its Disaster Housing Community Site Operations Annex on
the partnerships that FEMA needs to form, the resources it needs, and
the mechanisms that FEMA is to use to address the challenges specific
to a catastrophic disaster when closing group sites and transitioning
households to permanent housing can lead to delays in helping disaster
victims return to more stable and conventional living arrangements.
Lack of such plans may have contributed to the fact that more than 3
years after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 348 households continued to
live in group sites as of June 18, 2009.[Footnote 44]
FEMA's Strategy Does Not Identify Alternatives or Provide Clear
Guidance on Using Currently Available Options:
Although several temporary housing options could offer alternatives to
travel trailers, FEMA's National Disaster Housing Strategy does not
identify alternatives to travel trailers or provide clear guidance on
what other temporary housing options are available to states. In our
discussions with officials and reports we reviewed, we identified
various alternatives to travel trailers in group sites, many of which
are already authorized under the emergency and temporary housing
provisions of the Stafford Act that FEMA has used in recent disasters,
including Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. FEMA's National Disaster Housing
Strategy does not assess alternatives to travel trailers because
evaluations are ongoing, nor does it provide clear guidance on what
other temporary housing options states should use instead of travel
trailers while FEMA completes these assessments. Such assessments could
be useful to states that are responsible for identifying and selecting
temporary housing options after a major disaster.
Several Temporary Housing Options Could Offer Alternatives to Travel
Trailers:
Alternatives to the use of travel trailers can be grouped into three
broad categories of options, including (1) utilizing existing available
housing, (2) repairing damaged rental housing, and (3) providing direct
housing.
Utilizing Existing Available Housing:
Current FEMA programs utilize existing available housing through
emergency and financial assistance under sections 403 and 408 of the
Stafford Act. Under section 403, FEMA provides direct grants to state
and local governments, which use the grants to provide emergency
shelter to households displaced from their residences following major
disasters. Emergency shelters can include hotels and apartment rentals.
The Stafford Act does not impose specific time limits on section 403
assistance, and FEMA's regulations generally restrict the amount of
time to a maximum of 6 months. Although the purposes of emergency
sheltering and temporary housing are different,[Footnote 45] according
to several sources, when the availability of temporary housing options
is limited, allowing households to remain in emergency shelters until
they can move to more suitable temporary or permanent housing options
may be preferable.[Footnote 46] Under section 408, FEMA has the
authority to provide assistance for households to rent an apartment or
other housing accommodations.
Such assistance is also being provided through a pilot program modeled
after HUD's Housing Choice Voucher program, a rental subsidy program
that serves more than 2 million low-income, elderly, and disabled
households nationwide and is administered by local public housing
agencies. In the summer of 2007, FEMA and HUD entered into an
interagency agreement to pilot a federal housing assistance grant
program, DHAP, to temporarily extend rental assistance for victims
displaced by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The program is funded by
FEMA, but is administered by selected public housing agencies that are
currently administering a HUD-funded housing choice voucher program. In
the fall of 2008, FEMA deployed a modified DHAP following Hurricanes
Ike and Gustav. While DHAP is a pilot program, in the National Disaster
Housing Strategy, FEMA recommended that Congress give HUD legislative
authority to create a permanent DHAP-like program. According to the
strategy, HUD's and FEMA's experience with the DHAP pilot demonstrated
that rental assistance administered through HUD's existing network of
local public housing agencies is an effective way to meet the long-term
housing needs of displaced families following a disaster.
Citing HUD's experience with rental assistance programs, some of the
officials we contacted and reports we reviewed have found that
temporary rental housing assistance should be modeled after HUD's
Housing Choice Voucher program. In particular, several of these sources
noted HUD's experience with its voucher program in responding to
disaster victims displaced by the 1996 Northridge Earthquake in Los
Angeles, California. Vouchers allowed households displaced by this
disaster to live in existing rental apartments of their choice. One
report cited that if this specific temporary housing option had been
deployed after the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, FEMA could have deployed
fewer travel trailers.[Footnote 47] The choice and mobility that the
housing voucher program has to offer to disaster victims and the help
that the victims receive in locating rental housing were the reasons
generally cited by the sources for using this type of program for
providing temporary housing after a major disaster. However, this
option is not currently authorized under the Stafford Act provisions.
[Footnote 48]
Repairing Damaged Rental Housing:
Because of the limited number of rental units available following a
major disaster and the amount of time required to construct new rental
housing, a vital component of quickly bringing disaster victims back to
the area is to repair damaged rental properties. Helping rental
property owners quickly make repairs to existing properties could
increase the number of available rental units.[Footnote 49] In past
disasters, FEMA has been reluctant to be directly involved in the rapid
repair of damaged rental housing, partly because the agency does not
view housing construction as part of its core mission. However, the
extent of destruction to the housing stock following the Katrina and
Rita disasters highlighted the need to increase the availability of
rental housing. As a result, the Post-Katrina Act established a pilot
program authorizing FEMA to repair rental housing located in areas
covered by a major disaster.[Footnote 50] The rental pilot, known as
the Individuals and Households Pilot Program, permits FEMA to enter
into lease agreements with owners of multifamily rental properties and
to repair damaged properties to meet federal housing quality standards.
The repaired apartments are to be rented to displaced households for at
least 18 months (or longer, if necessary).
In response to the midwest floods and Hurricane Ike, in September and
December 2008, FEMA implemented pilots in Iowa and Texas, respectively.
Specifically, FEMA selected apartments in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and
within this property funded the repair of seven two-bedroom units and
in Galveston, Texas, funded the repair of 32 units. FEMA's authority
for the pilot program expired at the end of 2008. In accordance with
the act, FEMA was to evaluate the effectiveness of the program and to
report its findings to Congress at the end of March 2009, including any
recommendations to continue the pilot program or to make the program a
permanent housing option. In May 2009, FEMA issued a report on the
pilot program, which stated that additional analysis and
recommendations on whether to make the program permanent would be
provided at a later date. Some officials we contacted and reports we
reviewed mentioned that the federal government needs to do more to
rapidly repair existing rental housing damaged during a major disaster
to increase the rental stock available to disaster victims in the
immediate area. An official from a nonprofit organization we contacted
viewed the rapid repair of damaged rental units as an effective way to
help households transition back to permanent housing more quickly,
potentially reducing the need for longer stays in temporary housing
options, such as travel trailers in group sites, which are not meant to
be a long-term option.
Providing Direct Housing:
When rental housing is unavailable, FEMA has traditionally provided
direct housing assistance to households displaced by major disasters,
as it did after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Such assistance has
included trailers and manufactured housing units that can be placed on
homeowners' property or on group sites. Travel trailers had been an
important means of providing temporary housing after major disasters
because the magnitude of these events limits the effectiveness of other
options. FEMA can provide such assistance under section 408 of the
Stafford Act and may also provide housing units owned or subsidized by
other federal agencies, such as HUD and the Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA), through agreements with these agencies.
Travel trailers as direct housing assistance have been a standard part
of FEMA's recovery operations in disasters prior to the 2005 hurricanes
and were intended for short-term use, but safety concerns involving the
travel trailers used after the 2005 disasters led FEMA to change its
policy.[Footnote 51] The agency's 2008 disaster housing plan and the
National Disaster Housing Strategy indicate that FEMA will no longer
use group sites for the placement of travel trailers.[Footnote 52]
Under current policies, FEMA will authorize the use of travel trailers
only upon the request of the affected state when no other form of
temporary housing is available. FEMA will also impose other
restrictions on travel trailers, including that they be used only on
private sites for no longer than 6 months and only after the state has
determined that the trailers meet acceptable formaldehyde levels. In
2008, FEMA developed new performance specification requirements for all
future temporary housing units purchased, including travel trailers, to
eliminate the use of materials that emit formaldehyde.[Footnote 53]
Finally, FEMA will continue to authorize group sites as a last resort
for the placement of manufactured housing units. Although FEMA's policy
restricts trailers on group sites, several sources agreed that FEMA
should use travel trailers or trailers on group sites as a last resort
and only for a short period of time. Lots where these sites are located
should be small and close to the displaced victims' communities, with
access to needed services.
Utilizing government-owned or subsidized housing following a major
disaster is another possible alternative, but this form of assistance
tends to play a supportive role to other temporary housing options,
since the number of units that could be utilized in a disaster tends to
be relatively small. Under the Stafford Act, FEMA will enter into an
agreement with other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, HUD, and VA, that own or subsidize property that could be
used to provide temporary housing to disaster victims. For example, in
response to Hurricane Katrina, about 10,000 federally owned or
subsidized units were used to house disaster victims, including 5,600
HUD-owned single-family properties. According to FEMA, it encountered
difficulties verifying that housing units offered by support agencies
after Hurricane Katrina were indeed available for disaster victims. The
National Disaster Housing Strategy indicates that since Katrina, the
federal government has made some progress in cataloging available
housing inventory through a number of online databases, potentially
making it easier for FEMA to identify available units following a
disaster.
With Each Temporary Housing Option Involving Trade-offs, a Mix of
Options Will Likely Be Needed to Respond to a Major Disaster:
Temporary housing options involve trade-offs that policymakers should
consider in providing temporary housing assistance. The limitations
involved in these trade-offs are magnified during a major disaster--for
example, when much of the existing housing stock is severely damaged or
destroyed and recovery efforts take years to complete. FEMA's National
Disaster Housing Strategy points to several key factors that should be
considered when assessing the relative efficiency and effectiveness of
temporary housing options, such as total cost and deployment time. We
identified three key factors that we used to assess how trailers in
group sites compared with possible alternative temporary housing
options: cost, availability, and suitability.
Cost:
Cost involves the total cost to the government for purchasing,
installing, maintaining, and (if applicable) deactivating the housing
unit over the period of use. Based on information presented in a 2008
DHS OIG report, the average unit cost for trailers in group sites
ranged from about $75,000 to $84,000, depending on whether FEMA
purchases units that have to be manufactured or units that already
exist.[Footnote 54] Based on reports we reviewed, utilizing existing
rental housing is generally considered to be a cost-effective approach
for providing housing assistance, and, according to FEMA, it is less
costly when compared with trailers in group sites. The principal cost
to the government of existing housing is the monthly rents, which,
under the section 408 program, are based on the fair market rent-level
established by HUD. According to several sources, when compared with
trailers, repairing damaged housing could cost less, and furthermore
the benefits of repairs would be realized over a longer period of time.
In a May 2009 report, FEMA estimated that completing rapid repairs and
making monthly operating payments to two sites in Iowa and Texas were
substantially less expensive than deploying and operating manufactured
units over a similar period of time.[Footnote 55]
Availability:
Determining whether temporary housing options are available after a
disaster occurs is a key consideration in assessing the viability of
the options. Although utilizing existing housing is generally FEMA's
preferred way of providing temporary housing after a major disaster,
there may not be sufficient housing available in the affected area to
house displaced victims. At the same time, although disaster victims
could be relocated to areas outside of the disaster area, FEMA
officials said that victims generally prefer to remain near the
affected area. Another obstacle that affects the availability of
utilizing existing housing is the willingness of landlords to
participate in the program. No information is available on the time
required to repair damaged housing, and the current pilot program is
not permanently authorized and may not be available in future
disasters. If authorized, rental repair programs could potentially be
deployed quickly, provided that funding was available and property
owners were willing to participate. As we have previously stated, FEMA
will no longer place travel trailers on group sites following a major
disaster. However, the extent to which FEMA will still use travel
trailers in other sites and the availability of trailers is unclear.
Specifically, while the strategy and FEMA policy state that trailers
will be used as a last resort when other temporary housing options are
unavailable, a recent report by the Senate Ad Hoc Subcommittee on
Disaster Recovery included an acknowledgment by FEMA officials that the
agency will continue to use trailers in large numbers in responding to
temporary housing needs following a catastrophic disaster.[Footnote 56]
One FEMA official also acknowledged that the agency did not currently
have sufficient housing resources to meet the demands of a large-scale
event. Although FEMA awarded four contracts in April 2009 for the
manufacture of low-emission travel trailers, the number of units
contracted may not be sufficient to address housing needs after a major
disaster, based on the number of units that were required in the Gulf
Coast after the 2005 hurricanes.[Footnote 57]
Suitability:
Temporary housing options must also meet the needs of affected
households, including proximity to work and access to health and social
services. Existing housing generally provides the households with a
choice of housing units that meet their needs and generally allows for
longer stays. Furthermore, as it does with the DHAP program, FEMA could
use existing administrative networks (such as public housing agencies)
to help find suitable housing. When sufficient existing housing is not
available, rapid repair of damaged rental housing offers some of the
same advantages of using existing housing, including the possibility of
longer stays. In terms of suitability, trailers in group sites are the
least-preferred option. Concerns about trailers in group sites after
the 2005 hurricanes often focused on the long-term use of this option
in sites that were isolated and lacked access to needed services.
[Footnote 58] Although FEMA plans not to use trailers in group sites,
several sources stated that these trailers are most suitable when they
are used for a short period of time in proximity to the victims'
communities, allow for access to needed services, and do not pose
health and safety risks to the occupants.
While the temporary housing options discussed in this report can serve
as possible alternatives to travel trailers in group sites, several of
the officials we contacted and reports we reviewed agreed that no
single alternative was best suited to providing temporary housing after
a major disaster. According to some of these sources, officials should
consider a mix of housing options that are determined to be most
efficient, effective, and specific to the circumstances of the
disaster.
FEMA's Disaster Housing Strategy Neither Assesses Alternatives to
Trailers Nor Provides Clear Guidance on What Options States Can Use
Instead of Trailers:
FEMA's National Disaster Housing Strategy does not assess alternatives
to trailers because evaluations are ongoing, nor does it provide clear
guidance on what other temporary housing options states should use
instead of trailers while FEMA completes these assessments. Such
assessments could be useful to states that are responsible for
identifying and selecting temporary housing options after a major
disaster. In accordance with the Post-Katrina Act and as part of the
strategy, FEMA was to identify the most efficient and cost-effective
federal programs for meeting the short-and long-term housing needs of
households affected by a major disaster. In describing these programs
in the strategy, FEMA:
* identified currently available options for providing temporary
housing after a major disaster under the housing assistance provision
of FEMA's section 408 program, such as rental assistance to disaster
victims in existing privately owned rental properties and temporary
housing units, such as mobile homes;
* described a number of factors that were relevant in selecting and
deploying temporary housing options, including relative costs,
implementation time, and program funding levels; and:
* provided a broad framework of how states were to consider these
factors in selecting specific temporary housing options--for example,
FEMA characterized the section 408 rental assistance provision as more
efficient as long as rental housing was available and the direct
assistance provision as less efficient due to the time needed to
activate units, such as mobile homes.
The strategy describes ongoing initiatives that FEMA has undertaken
since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to identify alternative forms of
temporary housing. These initiatives include the Alternative Housing
Pilot Program (AHPP), which was created in 2006 to identify, implement,
and evaluate disaster housing alternatives to travel trailers.[Footnote
59] According to FEMA officials, the evaluation process will continue
through 2011, at which time FEMA will issue a final report to Congress.
FEMA also established in 2006 the Joint Housing Solutions Group (JHSG)
to identify, among other things, viable alternatives to travel trailers
and manufactured homes by working with manufacturers of these units.
[Footnote 60] FEMA has not established an estimated completion date for
this effort.
The strategy is unclear regarding when travel trailers could be used
following a major disaster or what other temporary housing options
states should use instead of trailers while FEMA completes its
assessments. Specifically, the strategy indicates that travel trailers
will continue to be used as a last resort; however, it does not
describe the specific conditions where trailers would be a viable
option or those situations where trailers should not be used. In
addition, the strategy does not recommend an option (or options) that
would replace trailers and would be deployable on the scale needed to
respond to a major disaster while it considers alternatives to
trailers. In its March 2008 report, DHS OIG also raised concerns about
how FEMA plans to temporarily house disaster victims for future
catastrophic events.[Footnote 61] According to the OIG, FEMA needs to
develop and test new and innovative catastrophic disaster housing plans
to deal with the large-scale displacement of households for extended
periods of time. In addition, in its February 2009 report on the
federal government's disaster housing response after Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, the Senate Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery concluded
that FEMA has not planned sufficiently to replace travel trailers.
[Footnote 62] According to the report, FEMA does not offer a substitute
for mass trailers when other forms of temporary housing are
unavailable, as can happen after major disasters.
Not only did the January 2009 strategy not specify what other temporary
housing options states should use instead of trailers, prior FEMA
guidance also did not communicate clearly to states and others on the
use of trailers in future disasters. Since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
FEMA's policies have been inconsistent regarding the use of travel
trailers. For example, FEMA issued interim guidance in July 2007 that
temporarily suspended the use of travel trailers while the agency
worked with health and environmental experts to assess air quality and
health-related concerns. On the basis of the preliminary results of
this assessment, FEMA's revised guidance in March 2008 stated "it will
not deploy travel trailers" as a temporary housing option. A month
later, FEMA's Administrator told Congress that the agency was never
going to use travel trailers again, yet 2 months later FEMA changed its
policy to allow limited use of travel trailers. According to that
guidance issued in June 2008, trailers would remain an option upon a
state's request in extraordinary disaster conditions when no other form
of temporary housing is available. The guidance also indicated that
FEMA would no longer enter into contracts for the manufacture of travel
trailers. However, FEMA awarded four contracts in April 2009 for the
manufacture of low-emission travel trailers.
Given all of the changes in guidance on the use of trailers since the
Gulf Coast hurricanes, FEMA did not ensure the strategy clarified its
policies and provided sufficient details so that states understand the
extent to which trailers (as well as other options) are available and
practicable for future disasters. Officials from Texas and Louisiana
with whom we spoke also agreed that the strategy did not clearly
describe the circumstances under which temporary housing options could
be used in responding to the needs of disaster victims and did not
identify alternatives for options that could not be used. Louisiana
officials, for example, told us that the strategy provided a good
overview on the categories of assistance available to states following
a major disaster. However, these descriptions lacked information on the
specific situation or circumstance that would "trigger" when a
particular option could be used, according to the officials.
Furthermore, the officials noted that reference in the strategy
regarding the options being currently available to meet the needs of
disaster victims was misleading for some of the options described. In
particular, the officials did not believe that the use of innovative
forms of temporary housing should have been included as a current
practice for housing disaster victims following major disasters because
new options, including alternatives to travel trailers, were not yet
available to the states for future disasters.
Without more specific information on interim alternatives to travel
trailers while FEMA continues to conduct its assessments, state
officials will not have the information needed to choose those that
would be most effective and expedite decision making. As a result, FEMA
and the states may not be fully prepared to respond to the temporary
housing needs of those displaced by major or even catastrophic events.
The absence of clear guidance for state officials on the most
appropriate housing options and the lack of specific options to replace
travel trailers can lead to delays in deciding on what forms of
temporary housing assistance to deploy.
Conclusions:
FEMA began reporting basic performance measures about closing group
sites in the Gulf Coast region after the 2005 hurricanes, but these
measures did not provide information on the effectiveness of the
program in meeting its goals. As we have previously reported, it is
important for federal agencies to identify performance measures that go
beyond summarizing program activities. We have found that performance
measures focused on results are most effective in assessing the
achievement of policy objectives. FEMA officials agree that developing
measures that focus on results is critical, and, with the establishment
of the National Disaster Housing Strategy, FEMA will have an
opportunity to develop such measures consistent with the strategy in
future disasters. We recognize that each disaster presents its own
unique set of challenges, but FEMA can leverage its experiences and
lessons learned from its responses to past major disasters to identify
a range of potential measures of the agency's performance in closing
group sites and assisting households with transitioning to permanent
housing. Furthermore, the agency can modify such measures as needed to
reflect the realities of future disasters. Having results-oriented
measures, such as the amount of time that households live in group
sites before returning to permanent housing, and developing numerical
targets can help identify potential problems in meeting program goals
and could be used to make decisions about resources needed and actions
to be taken. Without measures that reflect program results and clearly
link to the agency's goals, FEMA will not be able to demonstrate
program results and progress in achieving its intended objectives.
The completion of the National Disaster Housing Strategy and the
Disaster Housing Community Site Operations Annex is an important step
in the agency's efforts to more clearly describe its roles and
responsibilities for closing group sites and assisting households with
the transition into permanent housing. However, these documents lack
several key characteristics for an effective strategy and plan. As a
result, their usefulness as a management tool for ensuring that FEMA
meets its goal of helping households find safe and suitable permanent
housing after a disaster is limited. For example, because the strategy
and the annex do not address the roles and responsibilities of other
federal and state agencies in closing group sites and transitioning
households into permanent housing, stakeholders and the public may not
have a full understanding of their role and responsibilities.
Furthermore, because these documents did not address the resources to
assist households living in group sites transition into permanent
housing, it is unclear what resources are needed to build capacity and
whether they would be available. Finally, because these documents did
not describe or anticipate challenges associated with helping people
find permanent housing after a catastrophic event, delays could occur
in helping disaster victims return to more stable and conventional
living arrangements. Opportunities exist to improve the usefulness of
these documents, especially the annex, because FEMA views them as
evolving documents that are to be updated on a regular basis to reflect
ongoing policy decisions.
Historically, FEMA has relied on travel trailers to provide temporary
housing to displaced households, especially after a major disaster when
other temporary housing options (such as existing rental housing) are
not sufficient. The use of these trailers has received significant
criticism after the 2005 hurricanes due to safety and health issues as
well as suitability for long-term use. While FEMA has changed its
policy, it has made little progress in issuing or providing clear and
consistent guidance on when travel trailers should be deployed
following major disasters. Furthermore, while FEMA has initiated
various assessments to identify potential temporary housing options
that retain many of the conveniences of trailers but are safer and more
suitable to the occupants, the lack of specific information on the
interim alternatives to travel trailers will impede decision making by
the states and places disaster victims at risk of not receiving
temporary housing assistance as quickly as possible following a major
disaster.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To ensure that Congress and others have accurate information about the
performance of Federal Emergency Management Agency's direct housing
assistance in group sites, we are making three recommendations to the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to direct FEMA to
develop performance measures and targets that the agency will use for
reporting on the results of closing group sites and assisting
households with transitioning to permanent housing, and ensure that
these measures are clearly linked with FEMA's goals for disaster
assistance.
In addition, because of the multiple agencies with which FEMA must
coordinate in delivering temporary housing assistance, we recommend
that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct FEMA to take the
following actions:
* Update its planning documents (e.g., the Disaster Housing Community
Site Operations Annex of the National Disaster Housing Strategy) to
describe how it will work with other agencies in closing group sites
and transitioning households into permanent housing, what resources it
needs to perform these activities, and how it will deal with specific
challenges of a major disaster, such as potential shortages in
available permanent housing.
* Describe clearly in its guidance to states how trailers or other
options identified by the states can be deployed when other preferred
housing options, such as existing rental housing, are not sufficient
after a major disaster.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland
Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency for its review and
comment. We received written comments from the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, which are reprinted in appendix II.
The agency also provided a technical comment, which we incorporated
into the report.
FEMA generally agreed with our recommendations and is planning to take
steps to address them. Specifically, FEMA intends to work through the
National Disaster Housing Task Force to establish standard performance
measures and reporting methods for all aspects of its direct assistance
program, including group sites. FEMA also intends to work through the
task force to address interagency operational issues. Although FEMA
indicated that the strategy, including its annexes, will be updated as
needed, it did not specifically discuss (1) whether these particular or
other planning documents will describe how FEMA will work with other
agencies in closing group sites and transitioning households into
permanent housing; (2) what resources it needs to perform these
activities; and (3) how it will deal with specific challenges of a
major disaster, such as potential shortages in available permanent
housing. We continue to believe that FEMA should update its planning
documents to include these key characteristics of effective strategies
and plans. Finally, FEMA said that the agency has been working to
develop guidance for Joint Field Offices and the states on formally
requesting and approving the use of temporary housing assistance
programs following a disaster, including direct assistance. According
to FEMA, the agency intends to clearly describe this process in the
National Disaster Housing Concept of Operations.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, and other interested parties. The
report will also be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8678 or sciremj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Mathew J. Scirč:
Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
The objectives of this report were to examine (1) challenges that
households living in group sites faced in transitioning to permanent
housing; (2) the extent to which the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) effectively measured its performance in closing group
sites and assisting households with transitioning into permanent
housing; (3) the National Disaster Housing Strategy's effectiveness in
defining FEMA's roles and responsibilities for closing group sites and
assisting households with transitioning to permanent housing; and (4)
the alternatives to travel trailers in group sites when providing
temporary housing after major disasters, how they compare with respect
to identified policy factors, and how well FEMA's National Disaster
Housing Strategy assessed these alternatives. Our review focused on
FEMA's programs for temporary housing in Alabama, Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas, including the use of group sites in the
aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For the purposes of this
report, the term "group sites" refers to both sites established by FEMA
and commercial sites that already existed and were used to house
hurricane victims.
For all four objectives, we interviewed officials from FEMA's Disaster
Assistance Directorate, Individual Assistance Branch, Office of Policy
and Program Analysis, Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast
Rebuilding, Gulf Coast Recovery Office (GCRO), and Recovery Division.
We also interviewed state officials from the Louisiana Recovery
Authority, the Mississippi Governor's Office of Recovery and Renewal,
and the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs.
To identify challenges that households living in group sites faced
transitioning to permanent housing, we examined reports related to the
federal government's response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and its
efforts to provide housing assistance in group sites. Specifically, we
reviewed relevant reports, including reports from the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG), Louisiana
Family Recovery Corps, The Brookings Institution, RAND Gulf States
Policy Institution, PolicyLink, Congressional Research Service, and
GAO. In addition to interviewing FEMA officials and officials from the
state agencies that we have previously mentioned, we conducted site
visits to Baton Rouge and New Orleans, Louisiana, where we met with
officials from the following selected local housing agencies and not-
for-profit organizations to obtain their perspectives on the challenges
that households living in group sites faced:
* Local agencies:
Jefferson Parish Housing Authority;
Housing Authority of East Baton Rouge;
Housing Authority of New Orleans;
Louisiana Housing Finance Agency;
New Orleans Office of Recovery and Development Administration.
* Not-for-profit organizations:
Louisiana Family Recovery Corp.
Catholic Charities;
Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center;
Louisiana Justice Institute.
We also visited three group sites, including Renaissance Village--the
largest group site established. To corroborate some of the challenges
mentioned during our interviews, we analyzed several data sources.
Specifically, to determine the extent to which Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita had an impact on rents in these areas, we analyzed data from the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) on the fair market
rents for two-bedroom units in the Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas,
metropolitan statistical area (MSA); Gulfport-Biloxi, Mississippi, MSA;
Mobile, Alabama, MSA, and New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, Louisiana, MSA,
from fiscal years 2005 to 2009. Furthermore, to determine the change in
unemployment rates in the selected MSAs following Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita, we analyzed annual unemployment rates data from the
Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics from fiscal years 2004
to 2007. In addition, we collected and analyzed data from FEMA to
determine the average reported income for households living in group
sites in Louisiana and Mississippi. We focused on group sites in
Louisiana and Mississippi for this analysis because FEMA established
most sites in these states. Specifically, we obtained information from
two of FEMA's databases--the FEMA Response and Recovery Applicant
Tracking System (FRRATS) and the National Emergency Management
Information System (NEMIS).
* FRRATS data are collected through FEMA field offices. Information
obtained from FRRATS included receipts for the purchase of travel
trailers and data on the type of site and the state where the trailer
or mobile home was located.
* NEMIS data are collected through the national FEMA office.
Information obtained from NEMIS included date of birth, age, income of
those receiving housing assistance, owner or renter status, and former
and current addresses.
* Both FRRATS and NEMIS contain a unique registration ID that we used
to match the data we collected from these databases.
We have tested the reliability of these data as part of a previous
study and found the data to be reliable.[Footnote 63] We determined
that the data provided were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this report. However, it is important to note that the demographic data
in NEMIS are largely self-reported by applicants, and FEMA does not
independently verify all of the data it collects. As an example, while
some of FEMA's assistance programs are based on income, the incomes
reported in NEMIS are not verified. Our analysis was based on the
highest income reported by an individual. Also, our analysis was
limited to individuals who provided the information, and we did not
determine whether nonrespondents were likely to differ from those who
responded.
To assess the extent to which FEMA effectively measured its performance
in providing housing assistance in group sites, we reviewed FEMA's
strategic plan and DHS's annual performance report and other documents
related to the measures that FEMA developed to assess its performance.
To identify the measures that FEMA developed to track the number of
group sites it used after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the number of
households that lived in those sites, we examined FEMA's GCRO
Individual Assistance Global Report Executive Summary weekly reports.
We determined that these reports were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of our report. Finally, we assessed FEMA's measures against
criteria for effective performance measures described in our prior
work.[Footnote 64]
To determine the National Disaster Housing Strategy's effectiveness in
defining FEMA's roles and responsibilities for closing group sites and
assisting households with transitioning to permanent housing, we
reviewed the strategy and supporting annexes as well as federal
emergency plans, including the National Response Framework and
supporting annexes and the 2008 Disaster Housing Plan. Furthermore, we
reviewed relevant sections of major statutes, regulations, and plans to
better understand FEMA's roles and responsibilities for closing group
sites and assisting households with transitioning into permanent
housing. Specifically, our review included the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974 (Stafford Act)--as
amended--and the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (Post-
Katrina Act). Additionally, we drew upon our extensive body of work on
the federal government's response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as
well as our prior work on pandemic influenza, to compare the relevant
sections of the National Disaster Housing Strategy with the
characteristics of an effective national strategy.[Footnote 65]
Specifically, we assessed the extent to which the strategy and the
Disaster Housing Community Site Operations Annex addressed certain
desirable characteristics and the related elements of these
characteristics developed in previous GAO work.[Footnote 66] Because we
were not assessing the effectiveness of the entire National Disaster
Housing Strategy and supporting annexes, we focused on three
characteristics identified in previous work: organizational roles,
responsibilities, and coordination; problem definition and risk
assessment (i.e., challenges and constraints); and resources,
investments, and risk management. Finally, we reviewed reports issued
by Congress, DHS's OIG, and the Congressional Research Service.
To determine the alternatives to travel trailers in group sites and
examine how they aligned with identified policy factors, we reviewed
the Stafford Act, the Post-Katrina Act, and other related legislation.
We also reviewed our previous reports and relevant literature,
including reports from Congress, DHS's OIG, and the Congressional
Research Service and academic reports. In addition, we interviewed
officials from FEMA, state housing agencies in the Gulf Coast region,
and selected nonprofit and housing research groups. We reviewed the
National Disaster Housing Strategy to determine how well it assessed
the capacity of available temporary housing options to respond to the
housing needs of individuals displaced by a major disaster on the basis
of certain factors, such as cost-effectiveness and efficiency. We also
interviewed officials from the previously mentioned state agencies to
obtain their perspective on the extent to which FEMA provided
sufficient information on the factors that should be considered when
selecting an interim housing approach in response to a disaster.
We conducted this performance audit from January 2008 through August
2009 in Atlanta, Chicago, Louisiana, and Washington, D.C., in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
August 14, 2009:
Mr. Matthew J. Scire:
Director:
Financial Markets and Community Investment:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Scire:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report GAO-09-
796, "FEMA Needs More Detailed Guidance and Performance Measures to
Help Ensure Effective Assistance after Major Disasters." The Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates GAO's in planning and conducting
and issuing this report.
The following is our response to the recommendations.
Recommendation #1:
To ensure that Congress and others have accurate information about the
performance of FEMA's direct housing assistance in group sites we
recommend that the Secretary of DHS direct FEMA to develop performance
measures and targets that the agency will use for reporting on the
results of closing group sites and assisting households with
transitioning to permanent housing and ensure that these measures are
clearly linked with FEMA's goals for disaster assistance.
Response: FEMA generally concurs with this recommendation. FEMA intends
to work through the National Disaster Housing Task Force to establish
standard performance measures and reporting methods for all aspects of
its direct assistance program, including group sites.
In addition, FEMA is returning to the fundamentals of housing
assistance; that is, applicants receiving direct temporary housing
assistance are temporarily housed until rental resources become
available in a community or until habitable repairs have been made to
their pre-disaster dwellings. FEMA is currently working on improving
the methods and strategies that it will use to document FEMA's support
of the applicant's efforts to locate and secure permanent or alternate
housing. FEMA is finalizing the documentation process that will be used
to measure whether the applicant is making progress in repairing their
dwelling. This process will allow FEMA to assess and monitor any
systematic or individual impediments to recovery. During the recovery
period, FEMA will also continue to monitor the availability of rental
resources. The various actions mentioned above will be solidified in a
new policy for continued direct assistance. As is the goal of disaster
recovery, once the applicant returns to permanent housing and moves
towards self-sufficiency, FEMA will disengage from the process.
Recommendation #2:
In addition, because of the multiple agencies with which FEMA must
coordinate in delivering temporary housing assistance, FEMA should
update its planning documents (e.g., the Disaster Housing Community
Site Operations Annex of the disaster housing strategy) to describe how
it will work with other agencies in closing group sites and
transitioning households into permanent housing, what resources it
needs to perform these activities, and how it will deal with specific
challenges of a major disaster, such as potential shortages in
available permanent housing.
Response: FEMA generally concurs with this recommendation. FEMA intends
to work through the National Disaster Housing Task Force (NDHTF) to
address inter-agency operational issues. The NDHTF will continually
focus on improving the delivery of the assistance for the entire
continuum of disaster housing, from sheltering to transitioning
disaster survivors into permanent housing.
Through the development of a Concept of Operations, the NDHTF will
revisit lessons learned and the Strategy, including its Annexes, to
improve the process of identifying housing needs following a disaster
and the sequence of delivery for delivering assistance. The Strategy
and its Annexes are living documents, and will be updated, as needed,
to eliminate identified shortfalls and incorporate best practices.
Recommendation #3:
Describe clearly in its guidance to states how trailers or other
options identified by the states can be deployed when other preferred
housing options such as existing rental housing, are not sufficient
after a major disaster.
Response: FEMA generally concurs with this recommendation. FEMA has
been working to develop guidance for Joint Field Offices and States to
formally request and approve the use of temporary housing assistance
programs following a disaster, including direct assistance. FEMA
intends to clearly describe this process in the National Disaster
Housing Concept of Operations. FEMA is working on policy and guidance
to develop standard and criteria to determine the need for a temporary
housing unit mission.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Mathew J. Scirč, (202) 512-8678 or sciremj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Daniel Garcia-Diaz, Assistant
Director; Emily Chalmers; Marshall Hamlett; John McGrail; Marc Molino;
Josephine Perez; and Rose Schuville made key contributions to this
report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] FEMA refers to preexisting trailer parks used to house disaster
victims as "commercial sites." For the purposes of this report, our use
of the term "group sites" includes both FEMA-constructed and
preexisting commercial sites, unless otherwise indicated.
[2] The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as title VI of the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120
Stat. 1355 (2006).
[3] GAO has also conducted related work on the federal government's
efforts to assist households living in group sites with employment,
services for families with children, and transportation. See GAO,
Disaster Assistance: Federal Efforts to Assist Group Site Residents
with Employment, Services for Families with Children, and
Transportation, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-81]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2008).
[4] FEMA defines "permanent housing" as safe, sanitary, and secure
housing that can be sustained without continued disaster-related
assistance.
[5] The Stafford Act is codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.
[6] HUD annually estimates the fair market rents for all metropolitan
and nonmetropolitan areas nationwide for the Housing Choice Voucher
program. Fair market rents represent the cost of modest housing (equal
to the 40th percentile in the distribution of rents) in specific
markets.
[7] See appendix I of this report for a list of all the entities we
interviewed to identify challenges that households living in group
sites faced in transitioning to permanent housing.
[8] 44 C.F.R. § 206.114(b)(1).
[9] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-81]. The
demographic data represent information that individuals self-reported
as part of their application for FEMA assistance.
[10] U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Comprehensive
Market Analysis: Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX (Washington, D.C.: June 1,
2008).
[11] The Urban Institute, Affordable Rental Housing in Healthy
Communities: Rebuilding After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (May 2007).
[12] In general, investors can claim credits on the qualified basis of
the property--that is, total development cost (excluding land and other
certain costs) of the low-income units. The investors receive
approximately 9 percent of the qualified basis in tax credits annually
for 10 years.
[13] GO Zone LIHTCs were provided to the five eligible states in
addition to their regular annual allocations. The 2006 through 2008 GO
Zone LIHTC authority was about 75 percent, 567 percent, and 523 percent
greater than the regular LIHTC authority that Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi received in the same period, respectively. Also, Florida
and Texas each received $3.5 million in GO Zone tax credit authority.
[14] GAO, Gulf Opportunity Zone: States Are Allocating Federal Tax
Incentives to Finance Low-Income Housing and a Wide Range of Private
Facilities, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-913]
(Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2008).
[15] Alex Frangos, "Credit Losses Stall Affordable-Housing Projects,"
The Wall Street Journal (Mar. 12, 2008) Eastern edition, B.1; and
Rebecca Mowbray, "Market Crunch Hinders New Housing," The Times
Picayune (Mar. 28, 2008).
[16] The CDBG program, administered by HUD, is the federal government's
largest and most widely available source of financial assistance to
support state and local government-directed neighborhood
revitalization, housing rehabilitation, and economic development
activities. The CDBG program has been used frequently by the federal
government to respond to natural and man-made catastrophes.
[17] Congress appropriated $11.5 billion in CDBG assistance in the
Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148,
and $5.2 billion in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of
Defense, the Global War on Terror, and the Hurricane Recovery Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-234. In addition, Congress provided $3 billion in
CDBG funding for the Louisiana homeowner assistance grant program,
through the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for fiscal year
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-116.
[18] A 2003 FEMA policy states that it cannot fund the repair and
rebuilding of public housing units through its Stafford Act authorities
(see FEMA Policy 9523.7 and FEMA/HUD memorandum of understanding
entitled Coordination of HUD and FEMA Disaster Assistance to Public
Housing Authorities (PHAs) at [hyperlink,
http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/pa/9523_7b.shtm]). Although recent
changes in law now appear to allow FEMA funding of public housing units
after a presidentially declared disaster, these changes do not apply
retroactively to units affected by the 2005 hurricanes.
[19] Mississippi Center for Justice, prepared for the Steps Coalition,
Is Mississippi Building Back Better Than Before: Problems and Solutions
Regarding Mississippi's Use of CDBG Disaster Recovery Fund (Biloxi,
Miss.: Aug. 29, 2008).
[20] See Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General,
Federal Emergency Management Agency's Exit Strategy for Temporary
Housing in the Gulf Coast Region, OIG-09-02 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2,
2008). The Louisiana Road Home Program, which is mainly funded with
CDBG funds, provided eligible homeowners affected by Hurricanes Katrina
or Rita with compensation grants up to $150,000 for their losses and to
help them get back into their homes. Similarly, Mississippi's
Homeowner's Grant Program provided eligible homeowners with
compensation grants of up to $150,000 for losses not covered by their
homeowners insurance or FEMA assistance.
[21] PolicyLink, A Long Way Home: The State of Housing Recovery in
Louisiana 2008 (online publication).
[22] OIG-09-02.
[23] GCR & Associates, Inc., Louisiana and New Orleans Metro Housing
Needs Assessment--Louisiana Housing Finance Agency (New Orleans, La.:
Feb. 15, 2008).
[24] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-81]. These data
represent information that individuals self-reported as part of their
application for FEMA assistance.
[25] Louisiana State University Agricultural Center, Louisiana FEMA
Park Survey, Interim Report (April 2007).
[26] Pub. L. No. 103-62, 31 U.S.C. 1115 et seq. and 5 U.S.C. 306.
[27] GAO, HUD and Treasury Programs: More Information on Leverage
Measures' Accuracy and Linkage to Program Goals Is Needed to Assessing
Performance, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-136]
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2008); Tax Administration: IRS Needs to
Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance Measures, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22,
2002); and Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[28] GAO, Managing for Results: Analytic Challenges in Measuring
Performance, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-
138] (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 1997).
[29] GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's
Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-549] (Washington, D.C.:
May 31, 2007).
[30] According to the Office of Management and Budget, output measures
describe the level of a program's activity, whereas outcome measures
describe the intended result from carrying out a program or activity.
[31] Pub. L. No. 109-295, section 638(e), 120 Stat. 1422 (2006).
[32] On February 28, 2009, FEMA changed the format of its individual
assistance weekly reports, which no longer include the total number of
group sites established following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the
current number of group sites still open. Prior to this date, FEMA also
included data on industrial sites, private sites, and rental
assistance. The last publicly available report on FEMA's Web site was
published on April 9, 2009. According to FEMA, 348 households continued
to live in 101 group sites located in Louisiana and Mississippi, as of
June 18, 2009.
[33] Department of Homeland Security, Annual Performance Report for
Fiscal Years 2008-2010 (Washington, D.C.: May 7, 2009).
[34] Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Disaster Housing
Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 16, 2009).
[35] The provisions of the Post-Katrina Act became effective upon
enactment, October 4, 2006, with the exception of certain
organizational changes related to FEMA, most of which took effect on
March 31, 2007.
[36] According to a 2008 report by the Senate Subcommittee on Disaster
Recovery, the draft strategy violated two-thirds of its legal
requirements and in doing so failed in the planning needed to protect
the nation. For example, the draft strategy did not describe the
disaster housing group site operations. See Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Disaster
Recovery, FEMA's Disaster Housing "Strategy:" Still Passing the Buck,
Nearly Three Years After Katrina & Rita (Washington, D.C.: July 21,
2008).
[37] The disaster housing strategy defines "sheltering" as housing that
provides short-term refuge and life-sustaining services for disaster
victims who have been displaced from their homes and are unable to meet
their own immediate postdisaster housing needs; "interim housing" as
the intermediate period of housing assistance that covers the gap
between sheltering and the return of disaster victims to permanent
housing; and "permanent housing" as safe, sanitary, and secure housing
that can be sustained without continued disaster-related assistance.
[38] GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are Needed to Ensure
Clearer Federal Leadership Roles and an Effective National Strategy,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-781] (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 14, 2007).
[39] A community site is a site provided by the federal, state, or
local government that accommodates two or more units and is connected
to utilities. Before developing the current strategy, FEMA referred to
these sites as group sites. In addition, the Disaster Housing Community
Site Operations Annex of the National Disaster Housing Strategy
includes information about all of the phases of establishing group
sites, including (1) assessment of needs; (2) site selection; (3) site
development; (4) placement of individuals and households; (5) site
management; and (6) depopulation, conversion, and deactivation. We
focused on the last phase of the process because our scope was on the
closing of group sites and assisting households with transitioning to
permanent housing. Furthermore, according to FEMA officials, the
process of closing group sites and transitioning households into
permanent housing that is described in the Disaster Housing Community
Site Operations Annex is the same for commercial sites.
[40] In July 2007, FEMA and HUD entered into an interagency agreement
to pilot DHAP, to temporarily extend rental assistance and case
management services for victims displaced by Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita. The program is funded by FEMA from the Disaster Relief Fund,
which is the major source of federal disaster recovery assistance.
[41] FEMA, Louisiana Transitional Recovery Office, Louisiana
Depopulation Implementation Plan (Nov. 6, 2007), and Mississippi
Transitional Recovery Office, Mississippi Transitional Recovery Office
Housing Action Plan (Nov. 28, 2007).
[42] GAO, Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO's
Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-365R] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1,
2006).
[43] GAO, Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing
Victims of Catastrophic Disasters, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-88] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28,
2007).
[44] As we have previously discussed, for the purposes of this report,
our use of the term "group sites" includes both FEMA-constructed and
preexisting commercial sites.
[45] Emergency sheltering provides immediate, short-term housing
assistance for disaster victims who have been displaced from their
homes, while temporary housing provides intermediate, longer-term
housing assistance to cover the gap between emergency sheltering and
the return to permanent housing.
[46] A February 2009 report on deficiencies in federal disaster housing
assistance after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, recommended amending
section 403 of the Stafford Act to permit extending the duration of
section 403 emergency assistance in the event of a catastrophic
disaster if FEMA determines that transition into section 408 assistance
is not practicable or that such an extension is necessary to meet
postcatastrophic housing needs. See Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster
Recovery, Far From Home: Deficiencies in Federal Disaster Housing
Assistance After Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and Recommendations for
Improvement, S. Prt. No. 111-7, at 279 (2009).
[47] The Brookings Institution, Housing Families Displaced by Katrina:
A Review of the Federal Response to Date (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 11,
2005).
[48] The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1994 was signed
into law on February 12, 1994 (Pub. L. No. 103-211), and provided
nearly $900 million in appropriations to HUD programs for communities
impacted by disasters. Of this, $200 million was directed to provide
Section 8 rental assistance to households displaced by the Northridge
earthquake.
[49] Under section 408 of the Stafford Act, FEMA also has the authority
to provide financial assistance for the repair or replacement of owner
occupied primary residences that sustained damage or were destroyed by
a major disaster and FEMA can also provide assistance to construct
permanent or semipermanent housing. We consider these forms of
assistance as permanent housing options and do not include them in our
discussion of available temporary housing options that can serve as
alternatives to trailers in group sites.
[50] Pub. L. No. 109-295, 689i, 120 Stat. 1454 (2006).
[51] In 2008, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention identified
the presence of significant levels of formaldehyde in the travel
trailers in group sites that FEMA used following the 2005 hurricanes.
Formaldehyde can pose serious health and safety concerns to those
exposed to the chemical.
[52] The strategy adopted an approach that was previously described in
FEMA's June 2008 Disaster Housing Plan, which was in effect during the
2008 hurricane season when Hurricanes Gustav and Ike hit the Gulf Coast
in September 2008.
[53] FEMA Notice HQ-08-056, April 11, 2008: New FEMA Procurement
Specifications Require Significantly Reduced Formaldehyde Levels In
Mobile Homes And Park Models.
[54] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General,
FEMA's Sheltering and Transitional Housing Activities After Hurricane
Katrina, OIG-08-93 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2008).
[55] Federal Emergency Management Agency, Individuals and Households
Pilot Program: Fiscal Year 2009 Report to Congress (Washington, D.C.:
May 19, 2009). FEMA estimated that rapid repair was about 83 percent
less expensive than manufactured units in the Iowa pilot program and 66
percent less expensive than in the Texas pilot.
[56] Far From Home: Deficiencies in Federal Disaster Housing
Assistance.
[57] The agency intends to order a minimum of 100 units from each
contract award, with the ability to order 6,000 units each year for 5
years.
[58] In a related December 2008 GAO report on disaster assistance
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we reported that FEMA officials
stated that given the level of destruction caused by these hurricanes
and, in some cases, opposition from communities, FEMA was not always
able to locate temporary housing in places with easy access to existing
infrastructure, even though in instances where FEMA creates group
sites, its guidance suggests that such sites should be located near
existing supermarkets, public transportation, schools, and health care
facilities. See GAO-09-81.
[59] FEMA designed the AHPP as a competitive grant to the Gulf Coast
States and awarded projects to the following four states: Alabama,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.
[60] In 2008, FEMA conducted a solicitation and awarded provisional
contracts to seven alternative housing manufacturers. The JHSG has
recently begun to assess and evaluate the viability of the units
identified by these manufacturers on the basis of criteria such as
cost, livability, and deployment time. According to FEMA, once the
testing of pilot units is complete and the JHSG determines that the
units meet safety, security, and affordability requirements, FEMA will
begin purchasing units.
[61] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General,
FEMA's Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster, OIG-08-34
(Washington, D.C.: March 2008).
[62] See Far From Home: Deficiencies in Federal Disaster Housing
Assistance. Furthermore, the report indicated that FEMA's assessment on
the efficiency and effectiveness of the options was "general" in
nature, and suggested that FEMA should build on the information
presented in the strategy and provide more specific cost-effectiveness
studies of the available housing options so that policymakers and state
and local governments can make informed decisions about which programs
to use.
[63] GAO, Disaster Assistance: Federal Efforts to Assist Group Site
Residents with Employment, Services for Families with Children, and
Transportation, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-81]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2008).
[64] GAO, HUD and Treasury Programs: More Information on Leverage
Measures' Accuracy and Linkage to Program Goals Is Needed to Assessing
Performance, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-136]
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2008); Tax Administration: IRS Needs to
Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance Measures, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22,
2002); and Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[65] For examples, see GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are
Needed to Ensure Clearer Federal Leadership Roles and an Effective
National Strategy, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-781]
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 14, 2007); and Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced
Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the
Effectiveness of the National Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
System, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
[66] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-781].
[End of section]
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