Emergency Communications
National Communications System Provides Programs for Priority Calling, but Planning for New Initiatives and Performance Measurement Could be Strengthened Gao ID: GAO-09-822 August 28, 2009Government functions and effective disaster response and management rely on the ability of national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) personnel to communicate. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National Communications System (NCS), is responsible for ensuring continuity of NS/EP communications when network congestion or damage occurs. As requested, GAO assessed the (1) priority communication programs NCS provides, how it enlists subscribers, and to what extent NCS controls access to these programs; (2) challenges that can affect delivery of these programs; and (3) extent to which NCS plans for and evaluates its services. GAO reviewed NCS program documents, such as annual reports and access control procedures and data on program subscribers. GAO also interviewed officials from NCS and select state and local government entities. GAO compared NCS performance measures to federal best practices.
NCS has two programs to provide NS/EP personnel with priority calling service when telephone networks are congested or damaged--the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and the Wireless Priority Service (WPS). NCS has undertaken several efforts, such as outreach at industry conferences, to increase participation in and control access to these programs. According to NCS, though outreach efforts have helped to increase overall enrollment, it is working to further address possible cost barriers to participation in WPS, such as discussing options with wireless carriers to help defray costs. In addition, NCS has implemented policies and procedures to ensure that access to its priority programs are limited to authorized users. GAO's review of select GETS and WPS subscriber data revealed that, of the 85 records we examined, NCS generally followed its policies and procedures to limit GETS and WPS access to authorized subscribers. NCS is taking steps to address inherent challenges in the communications environment--such as network congestion. For example, NCS initiated a satellite pilot program to allow NS/EP officials to circumvent severely damaged or congested traditional telephone networks. However, methods for implementation and evaluation of the pilot were unclear and NCS subsequently terminated the pilot. NCS is also working to provide priority voice and data NS/EP communications as part of the evolving telecommunications networks, but it has not finalized an acquisition approach based on available technologies, costs, or plans to mitigate technological and other challenges to deliver such capabilities. The lack of this information has led to congressional restrictions on NCS's funding. As NCS attempts to ensure that GETS and WPS services can operate in these evolving networks, an acquisition approach that includes this information will provide NCS officials and Congress with essential information to most effectively allocate resources and guide decision making. Although DHS agreed with GAO's June 2008 recommendation to complete the NCS strategic plan, NCS has not finalized its strategic plan which has been under development since 2007. Furthermore, existing performance measures do not cover all of its core responsibilities, as suggested by best practices, and certain performance measures could be strengthened. For example, NCS does not have a measure to gauge its performance in two of its key federal roles--critical infrastructure protection for communications under DHS's National Infrastructure Protection Plan as well as coordinating communications issues under the National Response Framework. Furthermore, NCS does not use prior years' enrollment levels to help determine increases, if any, to be made to future year's goals for user enrollment. Fully and accurately measuring performance is critical to ensuring the agency and key stakeholders--such as Congress--base program and resource decisions on actual performance.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-822, Emergency Communications: National Communications System Provides Programs for Priority Calling, but Planning for New Initiatives and Performance Measurement Could be Strengthened
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2009:
Emergency Communications:
National Communications System Provides Programs for Priority Calling,
but Planning for New Initiatives and Performance Measurement Could Be
Strengthened:
GAO-09-822:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-822, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Government functions and effective disaster response and management
rely on the ability of national security and emergency preparedness
(NS/EP) personnel to communicate. The Department of Homeland Security‘s
(DHS) National Communications System (NCS), is responsible for ensuring
continuity of NS/EP communications when network congestion or damage
occurs. As requested, GAO assessed the (1) priority communication
programs NCS provides, how it enlists subscribers, and to what extent
NCS controls access to these programs; (2) challenges that can affect
delivery of these programs; and (3) extent to which NCS plans for and
evaluates its services. GAO reviewed NCS program documents, such as
annual reports and access control procedures and data on program
subscribers. GAO also interviewed officials from NCS and select state
and local government entities. GAO compared NCS performance measures to
federal best practices.
What GAO Found:
NCS has two programs to provide NS/EP personnel with priority calling
service when telephone networks are congested or damaged”the Government
Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and the Wireless Priority
Service (WPS). NCS has undertaken several efforts, such as outreach at
industry conferences, to increase participation in and control access
to these programs. According to NCS, though outreach efforts have
helped to increase overall enrollment, it is working to further address
possible cost barriers to participation in WPS, such as discussing
options with wireless carriers to help defray costs. In addition, NCS
has implemented policies and procedures to ensure that access to its
priority programs are limited to authorized users. GAO‘s review of
select GETS and WPS subscriber data revealed that, of the 85 records we
examined, NCS generally followed its policies and procedures to limit
GETS and WPS access to authorized subscribers.
NCS is taking steps to address inherent challenges in the
communications environment”such as network congestion. For example, NCS
initiated a satellite pilot program to allow NS/EP officials to
circumvent severely damaged or congested traditional telephone
networks. However, methods for implementation and evaluation of the
pilot were unclear and NCS subsequently terminated the pilot. NCS is
also working to provide priority voice and data NS/EP communications as
part of the evolving telecommunications networks, but it has not
finalized an acquisition approach based on available technologies,
costs, or plans to mitigate technological and other challenges to
deliver such capabilities. The lack of this information has led to
congressional restrictions on NCS‘s funding. As NCS attempts to ensure
that GETS and WPS services can operate in these evolving networks, an
acquisition approach that includes this information will provide NCS
officials and Congress with essential information to most effectively
allocate resources and guide decision making.
Although DHS agreed with GAO‘s June 2008 recommendation to complete the
NCS strategic plan, NCS has not finalized its strategic plan which has
been under development since 2007. Furthermore, existing performance
measures do not cover all of its core responsibilities, as suggested by
best practices, and certain performance measures could be strengthened.
For example, NCS does not have a measure to gauge its performance in
two of its key federal roles”critical infrastructure protection for
communications under DHS‘s National Infrastructure Protection Plan as
well as coordinating communications issues under the National Response
Framework. Furthermore, NCS does not use prior years‘ enrollment levels
to help determine increases, if any, to be made to future year‘s goals
for user enrollment. Fully and accurately measuring performance is
critical to ensuring the agency and key stakeholders”such as Congress”
base program and resource decisions on actual performance.
What GAO Recommends:
Among other things, GAO recommends the Manager of NCS (1) define
program capabilities, costs, and mitigation plans as part of NCS‘s
acquisition planning for enhanced NS/EP communications services; (2)
incorporate strategic planning best practices as NCS finalizes its
strategic plan; and (3) strengthen NCS‘s performance measurement. DHS
agreed with our recommendations. DHS‘s detailed comments and GAO‘s
response are included in the report.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-822] or key
components. For more information, contact William O. Jenkins at (202)
512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
NCS Provides Priority Calling Services for NS/EP Personnel and Has
Designed Mechanisms to Manage Access to These Services:
Initiatives Exist to Address Challenges in NCS's Operating Environment,
but Planning Efforts to Leverage Evolving Technology Could Be
Strengthened:
NCS Has Implemented Strategic Planning Efforts, but These Could Be
Strengthened by Incorporating Key Planning and Performance Measurement
Practices:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: The NCS Organization Structure:
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope and Methodology:
Appendix III: Telecommunications Service Priority Program:
Appendix IV: GETS and WPS Performance during Select Emergency Events:
Appendix V: NS/EP Categories That Qualify for NCS's Priority
Telecommunications Services:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Participation Levels in the GETS and WPS Programs as of April
2009:
Table 2: GETS and WPS Subscriber Rates and Program Fees:
Table 3: NCS's Strategic Goals and Select Objectives:
Table 4: NCS's Performance Measures, Targets, and Results for Fiscal
Years 2006 to 2009:
Table 5: GETS and WPS Performance during Select Emergency Events:
Table 6: NS/EP Categories That Qualify for NCS's Priority
Telecommunications Services:
Figures:
Figure 1: Packet-Switching Versus Circuit-Switching:
Figure 2: GETS Calling Card:
Figure 3: Linkages between NCS Performance Measures and NCS and DHS
Strategic Goals and Objectives:
Figure 4: NCS Management Structure:
Abbreviations:
EOP: Executive Office of the President:
ESF-2: emergency support function no. 2:
FCC: Federal Communications Commission:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
GETS: Government Emergency Telecommunications Service:
HSC: Homeland Security Council:
IP: Internet Protocol:
IPv4vInternet Protocol version 4:
IPv6: Internet Protocol version 6:
IXC: interexchange carrier:
NCC: National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications:
NCS: National Communications System:
NEMA: National Emergency Management Association:
NGN: next generation network:
NIPP: National Infrastructure Protection Plan:
NS/EP: national security and emergency preparedness:
NS/EP NGN: national security and emergency preparedness next generation
network:
NSC: National Security Council:
NSTAC: National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
OMNCS: Office of the Manager, National Communications System:
OSTP: Office of Science and Technology Policy:
POC: point-of-contact:
PSTN: public switch telephone network:
VoIP: Voice over Internet Protocol:
WPS: Wireless Priority Service:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 28, 2009:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce, and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The global community relies on telecommunications services and
infrastructure to conduct business, government, and daily life.
[Footnote 1] Emergency events such as the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, during which communications
capabilities were substantially disrupted, remind us of the fragility
of the complex telecommunications infrastructure and the need to ensure
availability of communications capabilities for leaders responsible for
functions critical to the management of and response to national
security and emergency situations. Telecommunications infrastructure is
susceptible not only to flooding, fire, and power outages, but also to
increased demand--all of which can limit the availability of
telecommunications services or render services inoperable. In the
United States, more than 2 billion calls are made every day via
wireline and wireless networks, and, in 2008, more than 1 trillion text
messages were transmitted. Additionally, since the mid-1990s, U.S.
wireless telephone subscriptions have grown from about 28 million to
more than 270 million as of December 2008, resulting in a significant
surge in the number of daily voice and data transmissions. This surge
can create increased competition for critical telecommunications
resources that may be limited during disasters and emergencies.
[Footnote 2] Heightened network use, in combination with the effects of
disasters and emergencies, can produce cascading effects far beyond the
physical location of the disaster area.
In 1963, President Kennedy established the National Communications
System (NCS),[Footnote 3] which now falls under the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), to facilitate continuity of government by
maintaining communications between the President and officials with
national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) functions.
[Footnote 4] Given the critical nature of their roles, it is essential
that these individuals have access to vital communications capabilities
needed to carry out their NS/EP functions--particularly during
disasters or emergencies. To that end, the NCS provides a number of
programs and services designed to enable communications and facilitate
continuity of government during emergencies.
You requested that we review the communications capabilities and access
to the priority communications programs that NCS provides. In response
to your request, we prepared this report to answer the following
questions:
(1) What priority communications programs does NCS provide, how does
NCS enlist subscribers, and to what extent does NCS control access to
these programs?
(2) What challenges, if any, can affect NCS's delivery of priority
communications programs?
(3) To what extent does NCS plan and evaluate its services?
To analyze what priority communications programs NCS provides, we
reviewed relevant legislation, available NCS program plans, as well as
budget requests and annual reports. We also interviewed relevant NCS
and Federal Communications Commission (FCC) officials who have varying
responsibilities for priority communications. In addition, we
interviewed cognizant representatives from AT&T, Qwest Communications,
and Verizon. We selected these carriers because they provide NS/EP
communications services and were amenable to meeting with us.[Footnote
5] Although their views cannot be generalized to all telecommunications
companies that provide NS/EP communications, the information we
obtained helped to enhance our understanding of their role in providing
emergency communications. We also interviewed NS/EP officials from a
nonprobability sample of 15 states and 13 localities, which we selected
based on a variety of factors including geographical location, terrain
and climate conditions, and types and frequency of natural
disasters.[Footnote 6] While the results of these interviews cannot be
generalized to reflect the views of NS/EP emergency management
officials in all states and localities, the information obtained
provided us with useful information on the perspectives of various NS/
EP personnel about NCS and its priority communications programs. To
determine how NCS enlists subscribers and controls access to its
priority programs, we collected and reviewed subscriber eligibility
criteria, and interviewed NCS officials on these criteria, NCS's
outreach efforts to enlist new subscribers, and its internal controls
for controlling access to these programs. We also obtained NCS standard
operating procedures and compared them with criteria in Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government.[Footnote 7]
To determine whether NCS adhered to its procedures for terminating
access for subscribers who no longer meet the programs' eligibility
criteria, we reviewed subscriber records for select former federal and
state government officials. Specifically, we reviewed a nonprobability
sample of records for former members of the U.S. Senate as well as
members and delegates of the U.S. House of Representatives; immediate
past heads of federal departments and agencies as of August 2008; and
immediate past governors of U.S. states and territories as of August
2008, which is when we obtained the subscriber data. We selected these
groups because they served in public positions that would allow NCS to
easily determine that their positions ended, and in turn, work with the
subscriber organization's to update account status, as appropriate.
Although the results of our work cannot be generalized to evaluate the
effectiveness of controls used for all NCS program subscribers, the
information obtained provided us with useful information about the
extent to which subscriber records were terminated for groups we
reviewed following a change in the subscriber's eligibility status.
Because the subscriber database, in its entirety, is classified, we
have limited our reporting of the results of our analysis to only
nonclassified information; however, this does not affect our findings.
To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed the data for
obvious problems with completeness or accuracy, interviewed
knowledgeable agency officials and contract support staff about the
data quality control processes, and reviewed relevant documentation
such as the database dictionary that describes various data fields in
the subscriber database. We performed electronic testing on the data
and found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report.
To determine what challenges can affect NCS's delivery of its priority
communication programs, we interviewed relevant NCS officials who have
responsibilities for the implementation of these programs. We also
obtained information and reviewed documentation such as briefing slides
from the agency regarding its efforts to implement a pilot program to
explore utilizing satellite technology, the Satellite Priority Service
pilot program, as well as its efforts to leverage next generation
network (NGN) technology in its priority communication programs. We
compared this information with our previous work on pilot program
planning and technology acquisition to determine the extent to which it
was consistent with these criteria.[Footnote 8]
To assess NCS's overall planning and evaluation efforts, we reviewed
related program and planning documentation including Program Assessment
Rating Tool (PART) reports submitted to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB).[Footnote 9] We also interviewed NCS officials about their
strategic planning efforts and the mechanisms NCS uses to evaluate its
services. We compared these efforts with criteria in guidance from the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), related legislation such as the
Government Performance and Results Acts of 1993, as well as federal
best practices contained in our past reports.[Footnote 10] Our work
primarily focused on the office that is charged with executing the day-
to-day functions necessary to meet federal national security and
emergency preparedness telecommunications needs, which is the Office of
the Manager, NCS (OMNCS). Throughout this report, unless otherwise
noted, we refer to the OMNCS as the NCS, though organizationally, the
NCS includes the OMNCS, as well as a 24-member interagency body, among
other entities. For more details on the overall NCS organization
structure, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through August 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix II contains more
details on our scope and methodology.
Background:
Telecommunications Infrastructure:
The telephone remains an essential communication tool for business,
government, and the general public. The public switched telephone
network (PSTN), an interconnected network of telephone exchanges over
which telephone calls travel from person to person, is the backbone of
the communications architecture that enables the transmission of voice
and data communications. In general terms, the PSTN is the public
communications system that includes the networks of local and long
distance telephone carriers, as well as cellular networks and satellite
systems. To connect one wireline (also known as landline) telephone to
another, the telephone call is routed through various switches at
telephone exchanges that are operated by local and long-distance
telephone carriers.[Footnote 11] As a caller dials another party's
number, the transmission from one caller to the other is made through a
telephone company's facility, known as the central office, over copper
wires or fiber-optic cables to the called party's telephone. Over time,
the PSTN has evolved from an analog system to one that is almost
entirely digital and able to support voice and data transmissions made
from wireline and wireless devices.
Wireless networks, which include cellular and satellite-based systems,
among other systems, are an important and growing element of the
communications infrastructure. Cellular and satellite-based systems and
networks provide an alternative to wireline networks because they are
potentially accessible from any point on the globe without the cost of
installing a wire or cable. Rather than relying on wired connections,
wireless devices (such as cellular telephones) are essentially
sophisticated radio devices that send and receive radio signals. These
devices connect to a wireless network--which may also interact with the
PSTN, depending on the type of connection--that enables the wireless
telephone to connect to another wireless or wireline telephone.
Wireless networks operate on a grid that divides large geographical
areas (such as cities) into smaller cells that can range from a few
city blocks to several miles. Each cell contains or is adjacent to a
base station equipped with one or more antennas to receive and send
radio signals to wireless devices within its coverage area, which can
range from less than a mile to 20 miles from the base station. When a
caller turns on a wireless device, the device searches for a signal on
an available channel from a nearby base station to confirm that service
is available. At that time, the base station assigns a radio frequency
(also known as radio channels) to the wireless device from among the
group of frequencies that the base station controls. Each base station
is wirelessly linked to a mobile switching office, as well as a local
wireline telephone network. The mobile phone switching office directs
calls to the desired locations, whether to another wireless device or a
traditional wireline telephone.
If a wireless caller is connecting with another wireless telephone, the
call may go through the wireline network to the recipient's wireless
carrier, or it may be routed wholly within the wireless network to the
base station that is nearest the called party. On the other hand, when
the wireless caller is connecting to a wireline phone, the call travels
to the nearest base station and is switched by the caller's wireless
carriers to a wireline telephone network. The call then becomes like
any other phone call and is directed over the PSTN to the destination
number.
NS/EP Communications in the Next-Generation Networks:
Because both voice and data transmissions have become common functions
in daily life, an effective communications infrastructure that includes
voice and data networks is essential to the nation's ability to
maintain communications to enable public health and safety during a
natural disaster, such as a hurricane, or a man-made disaster, such as
a terrorist attack. Over the years, voice and data networks have
evolved separately, with voice networks relying on circuit-switching
methods while data networks largely use packet-switching techniques.
[Footnote 12] Thus, a user requiring voice, data, and videoconferencing
services may have to use three separate networks--a voice network, a
data network, and a videoconferencing network. The telecommunications
industry has begun to address the limitations of legacy communications
infrastructure (such as the PSTN) to provide integrated voice, data,
and video services. Technological advances in these networks have led
to a convergence of the previously separate networks used to transmit
voice and data communications. These new converged networks--commonly
referred to as next-generation networks--are capable of transmitting
both voice and data on a single network and eventually are to be the
primary means for voice and data transmissions. Converged voice and
data networks use technology that is based on packet switching which
involves breaking a message (such as an ongoing videoconference,
images, or voice conversation) into packets, or small chunks of data.
Using the packet's destination address, computer systems called routers
determine the optimal path for the packets to reach their destination
where they are recombined to form the original message. In doing so,
packets can be transmitted over multiple routes rather than via a
predetermined circuit, which, in turn, can help to avoid areas that may
be congested or damaged, among other things. For example, information
sent over the Internet is packet-switched, the transmission of which is
defined by Internet protocol (IP).[Footnote 13] Wireline and wireless
carriers have begun transforming their networks to route voice data
this way, called Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) rather than
circuit-switched methods. The adoption of VoIP and other technological
advances is changing the way in which people communicate and, as a
result, are likely to become central to the future of NS/EP
communications. Figure 1 shows a comparison between how information is
transmitted via packet switching versus circuit switching. Industry
analysts have said that although the transition to converged networks
is well underway, they expect the process to take many years.
Furthermore, NCS projects that half of the existing circuit-switched
network will be transitioned to packet-based network by 2015 with the
remainder reaching full transition by 2025.
Figure 1: Packet-Switching Versus Circuit-Switching:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Packet-switched network:
Original message:
Broken into packets;
Routed across a network path that can be modified as needed;
Reassembled to form original message.
Circuit-switched network:
Original message:
Routed across a fixed network path;
Original message.
Source: GAO analysis; Art Explosion (images).
Note: The example above demonstrates how an e-mail or similar message
is transmitted between computers and/or enabled wireless devices using
packet-based versus circuit-based methods. In the top example, the
three packets that comprise the original message can travel various,
different paths, and can be rerouted as necessary to successfully
complete transmission.
[End of figure]
Network Congestion Can Affect Communications Capabilities:
Despite the evolution in telecommunications technology, congestion in
the wireline and wireless telephone networks occurs. Damage or
destruction of infrastructure, or extreme demand for service, can
result in outages or congestion on the wireline and wireless networks
which can impede or obstruct successful communications. During periods
of congestion, the caller may encounter signs that the network is
congested such as (1) a fast busy signal and (2) a prerecorded message
alerting the caller that all circuits are busy. Given the importance of
telecommunications to coordinating response and recovery efforts, it is
essential that NS/EP officials successfully complete their calls even
when there is damaged infrastructure or network congestion. For
example, nationwide telecommunications congestion and failures during
the September 11, 2001, attacks and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 were due,
in part, to both damaged infrastructure and high call volume.
Additionally, high call volume that has the potential to create network
congestion can occur independent of emergencies. For example, Mother's
Day has historically generated the highest volume of telephone calls of
any day of the year. This increased call volume can create network
congestion and cause call delay or disruption during normal operations;
this congestion would also reduce the likelihood NS/EP personnel would
be able to successfully place calls in the event of an emergency during
this period. A similar issue exists for text messaging, wherein high
volumes of text transmissions can create network congestion. For
instance, on New Year's Eve, a spike in the number of text messages
transmitted in the minutes immediately preceding and following midnight
could overload cellular networks. The effects of this congestion could
be severe for emergency responders in the event they needed to
coordinate planning for or response to an emergency at that time.
Organization and Responsibilities of the National Communications
System:
As part of the creation of DHS under the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
NCS was transferred to DHS from the Department of Defense.[Footnote 14]
Within DHS, NCS is organized as part of the Office of Cyber Security
and Communications and has a fiscal year 2009 budget of $141 million.
While the Secretary of Homeland Security has overall responsibility for
the broader NCS organization,[Footnote 15] the duties are delegated to
the NCS Manager who has primary responsibility for day-to-day
activities of the NCS, including coordinating the planning and
provisioning of communications services that support NS/EP needs.
Central to its functions are the partnerships that NCS has established
with federal, state, and local government entities, and with the
service providers and equipment vendors that provide wireline and
wireless communications services to support NS/EP communications. For
example, NCS has long-standing relationships with industry groups such
as the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC)--
a presidentially appointed committee of industry leaders--that help
keep it abreast of changes in the commercial telecommunications
marketplace.[Footnote 16] The committee provides industry-based
analyses and recommendations to the President and executive branch
regarding telecommunications policy and proposals for enhancing
national security and emergency preparedness.
Since joining DHS when DHS became operational in March 2003, federal
policies provided that NCS's responsibilities include, among other
things, serving as the lead coordinating agency for communications
issues (defined as emergency support function no. 2, or ESF-2), under
the National Response Framework.[Footnote 17] As part of this
responsibility, when significant impact to the communications
infrastructure occurs or is expected, NCS is to serve as one of the
primary agencies to (1) support the restoration of the communications
infrastructure and (2) coordinate the deployment of federal
communications support to response efforts.[Footnote 18] As part of its
ESF-2 role, NCS conducts and/or supports training and exercises
intended to test and improve response and recovery capabilities needed
in the event of an emergency or disaster. For example, NCS has
supported exercises that model emergency scenarios that include
potential and actual impacts to the communications infrastructure. In
addition to its ESF-2 responsibilities, NCS serves as the Sector-
Specific Agency to lead the federal government's efforts to protect
critical communications infrastructure.[Footnote 19] In this regard,
NCS works with industry that owns and operates the vast majority of
communications infrastructure to develop strategies to protect against
and mitigate the effects of natural disasters or manmade attacks
against critical communications infrastructure. As part of this
function, NCS is working with industry to develop a risk assessment
methodology for use in assessing the communications sector's overall
exposure including the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences of an
incident such as a natural disaster or man-made attack.
Within NCS, the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications
(NCC), which serves as the operational component, is an industry-
government collaborative body that coordinates the restoration and
provisioning of NS/EP communications services during crises or
emergencies.[Footnote 20] The NCC consists of officials from 24
government agencies and 49 companies including eight industry members
that are co-located at the center (such as AT&T, Sprint, and Verizon)
as well as nonresident members that comprise the telecommunications
sector--wireless companies, cable companies, internet service
providers, satellite providers, and communications equipment
manufacturers and suppliers, among others. Since January 2000, the
center also functions as the Telecommunications Information Sharing and
Analysis Center to allow information sharing between representatives of
the telecommunications companies. During a disruption to
telecommunications services, the NCS, through the NCC, coordinates with
both resident and nonresident members with the goal of restoring
service as soon as possible. According to NCS, this partnership allows
both industry and government to work in close proximity, helping to
ensure that NCS successfully executes its mission. For example, during
the 2008 hurricane season, the NCC worked with its government and
industry partners to identify communications assets and infrastructure
in the impacted areas and develop pre-and post-landfall strategies and
response activities to help ensure availability of communications.
NCS Provides Priority Calling Services for NS/EP Personnel and Has
Designed Mechanisms to Manage Access to These Services:
In order to overcome network congestion, NCS has implemented priority
calling programs to provide NS/EP personnel within all levels of
government, as well as the private and non-profit sectors, with
communications services during incidents of national security or
emergency that can overwhelm the telecommunications network. [Footnote
21] The two primary programs NCS provides to deliver priority calling
are the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and the
Wireless Priority Service (WPS). NCS has undertaken a number of
outreach efforts to help increase participation in these priority
calling programs and has designed controls to help ensure the use of
these programs is only for authorized personnel and purposes.
NCS's Two Main Programs Provide Priority Calling for NS/EP Personnel in
the Event of Network Congestion During Emergencies:
NCS has implemented two main programs intended to overcome busy
networks during periods of congestion or network failure due to
abnormally high usage or infrastructure damage; the GETS program
provides wireline priority calling, and WPS provides wireless priority
calling for authorized NS/EP officials.
According to NCS, it established GETS in conjunction with the nation's
telecommunications industry to meet White House requirements for a
nationwide voice and limited data service intended for authorized
personnel engaged in NS/EP missions.[Footnote 22] GETS is designed to
provide priority treatment in the wireline portions of the PSTN during
an emergency or crisis situation when the PSTN is congested and the
probability of completing a call by normal means has been significantly
decreased. For example, during the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing--one of
the earliest uses of GETS in an emergency event--a high call volume of
three times more than the usual volume resulted in an overload of the
telephone network in the Oklahoma City area, according to NCS. During
this emergency event, officials from the federal government and the
private sector were able to successfully complete about 300 calls using
the GETS service. According to a senior official from the Florida
Division of Emergency Management, GETS was also used in Florida during
Hurricane Katrina. Prior to hitting the Gulf Coast, the hurricane made
landfall in South Florida, damaging the communications infrastructure
and resulting in network congestion that prevented Florida emergency
management officials from completing calls. According to this official,
GETS allowed Florida emergency management officials to circumvent the
congested lines and successfully complete calls.
To activate a GETS call, subscribers follow a three-step process
similar to that of using a traditional calling card. First, subscribers
must dial the universal access number by using equipment such as a
standard desk phone, payphone, secure telephone, cellular phone, VoIP
telephone, or facsimile. Next, a tone prompts the subscriber to enter
their GETS personal identification number (PIN) found on the calling
card distributed to the subscriber. (Figure 2 shows the GETS calling
card that is provided to each authorized NS/EP subscriber.) Lastly, the
subscriber is prompted to enter a destination telephone number. Once
the calling party's identity is authenticated (via the PIN), the call
receives priority treatment that increases the probability of call
completion in damaged or congested networks. GETS is designed to
achieve a probability that 90 percent of calls made via the PSTN will
be successfully completed--that is, establish a connection with the
intended called party--during periods of network congestion or outage.
[Footnote 23] The service achieves a high probability of call
completion through a combination of features such as re-routing GETS
calls around network blockage areas, routing calls to a second or third
carrier if the first carrier's network is congested, and queuing
pending GETS calls for up to 30 seconds, among other things.[Footnote
24] Subscribers can place local, long distance, and international
calls; however, it is not possible to use GETS to dial a toll-free
destination number.[Footnote 25] When using GETS, subscribers are
billed by the wireline carrier at a rate of $0.07 to $0.10 per minute
for calls within the United States and its territories.[Footnote 26] As
of April 2009, the program had grown to more than 227,000 subscribers,
according to NCS.
[Side bar: Illustration: The September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks:
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York City and the
Washington, D.C., area inflicted extensive damage to telecommunications
infrastructure and, combined with increased call volume, resulted in
network congestion. While much of the infrastructure damage occurred in
New York City, resulting in immediate service disruption in the
disaster area, the attacks also disrupted voice communications
nationally. When the collapse of the twin towers indirectly caused
damage to a telecommunications center owned by Verizon, about 182,000
voice circuits and 1.6 million data circuits, among other things, were
lost. In New York City, over 20 base stations in the immediate disaster
area were damaged or destroyed, resulting in widespread cellular
outages. Throughout the course of the day, heavy call volume across the
United States at times reached up to 250 percent of normal levels and
greatly overloaded the telecommunications networks, according to NCS.
These events had a devastating effect on people‘s ability to make calls
into, within, and out of the immediate disaster areas. The network
damage combined with increased call volume made it difficult for NS/EP
officials in the New York and the Washington, D.C., areas to
communicate using traditional calling methods in order to coordinate
emergency response and recovery efforts.
NCS describes the 2001 terrorist attacks as the first large-scale
emergency event in which the performance of GETS service was tested.
Despite the network congestion and damage, according to NCS, the GETS
service remained available and helped ensure that authorized NS/EP
personnel had alternative means to communicate. For the period from
September 11 to September 18, 2001, NCS reports that more than 19,000
calls were attempted of which 18,117 were successfully completed
resulting in a call completion rate of 95 percent. NCS also reported
that it distributed about 1,900 new GETS cards during the event.
End of Side bar]
Figure 2: GETS Calling Card:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration of the front and back of a
GETS card]
Sources: GAO, NCS.
[End of figure]
As significant increases in wireless telephone subscribers occurred in
the mid-1990s, the concept for a wireless priority capability first
emerged, according to NCS; however, it was in the wake of the events of
Tuesday, September 11, 2001, that the Executive Office of the
President, through the National Security Council, directed NCS to
implement a wireless priority capability. According to NCS, in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks, wireless carriers experienced
significant difficulties trying to cope with the unprecedented call
volume. The reported increase in the number of phone calls in the
Washington, D.C., New Jersey, and New York City areas made between 9:00
a.m. and 12:00 p.m. was 2 to 10 times the number on an average Tuesday.
The resulting effort became WPS, which is a subscription-based service
designed to help increase the probability of call completion for NS/EP
personnel that rely on wireless devices--typically, a cell phone
[Footnote 27]--while performing duties related to emergency response
and recovery. To that end, WPS provides nationwide wireless priority
calling capabilities, from call initiation through to when a connection
is established with the called party, to NS/EP personnel during natural
or man-made disasters or emergencies that result in network congestion
or outages in the nation's wireless networks.
Like the average U.S. consumer, NS/EP personnel have great flexibility
in choosing a wireless carrier for wireless communications services. In
order to assure that WPS capabilities are accessible by the majority of
wireless services that could be used by NS/EP personnel, NCS has taken
steps to ensure that the nationwide and regional wireless carriers that
provide services to the greatest number of wireless customers upgrade
their networks to support WPS functionalities. As a result, authorized
WPS subscribers are able to access WPS in nearly all the major wireless
markets in the continental United States and its territories.
Currently, WPS is supported by all the nationwide wireless carriers
(AT&T, Sprint Nextel, T-Mobile, and Verizon Wireless). Additionally,
regional carriers (such as Cellcom and Cellular South) that can help to
provide WPS coverage in geographically remote or sparsely populated
areas are at varying stages of updating their networks to support WPS.
[Side bar: Illustration: 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes:
In August 2005 and September 2005, the Gulf Coast was struck by two
hurricanes (Katrina and Rita). On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina
made landfall in Louisiana and significantly damaged or destroyed the
communications infrastructure in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.
According to the FCC, the storm caused outages for over 3 million
telephone customers. A substantial number of central offices were
flooded and consequently forced out of operation, according to NCS.
Additionally, about 1,500 cellular sites were damaged and subsequently
unable to provide wireless service. NCS reported that the
infrastructure damage caused by the hurricane was among the worst of
any disaster in the nation‘s history. Moreover, Hurricane Katrina was
the first large scale test of WPS in an emergency event, according to
NCS. Despite the destruction and damage, from August 29 to September 5,
2005, more than 27,000 GETS and about 3,400 WPS calls were successfully
completed achieving a call completion rate of 95 and 89 percent
respectively, according to NCS.
On September 24, 2005, Hurricane Rita made landfall between Sabine
Pass, Texas, and Johnson‘s Bayou, Louisiana. Although the storm
disabled thousands of phone lines, Hurricane Rita did not cause the
extensive damage that occurred during Hurricane Katrina. In contrast,
the number of GETS calls attempted was about 50 percent less than the
totals for Hurricane Katrina. From September 24 to September 29, 2005,
11,145 GETS calls were attempted, of which approximately 10,740 were
successfully completed resulting in a call completion rate of about 96
percent. During the same period, of the 1,109 WPS calls attempted, 983
were successfully completed resulting in a call completion rate of
about 89 percent. According to NCS, the majority of GETS and WPS calls
that failed during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were largely a function
of damaged infrastructure rather than network congestion. End of Side
bar]
To initiate a WPS call, authorized subscribers must dial *272 plus the
destination number from their WPS-enabled cell phone.[Footnote 28] If
all radio channels in the caller's area are busy, the call will be
placed in queue for up to 28 seconds for access to the next available
local radio channel. WPS subscribers receive additional priority based
on their office or position to ensure that communications are first
available for senior leadership (see appendix V for a description of
how this priority is determined). While WPS provides priority access to
the next available radio channel, it does not guarantee call completion
as a WPS call may encounter further congestion while being routed
through the wireline or wireless portions of the PSTN. Therefore,
according to NCS, WPS is most effective when used in conjunction with
GETS because GETS is also designed to help activate priority calling
features in the wireless network in addition to the wireline network.
Thus, using a GETS calling card after activating WPS can help to ensure
a higher probability of call completion for calls placed from a
cellular telephone to another cellular or wireline telephone number.
As with GETS, WPS subscribers incur expenses as part of their
subscription; however, the WPS fee structure is more expensive. In
addition to wireless calling plan fees, WPS subscribers must pay (1) a
one-time activation fee of up to $10.00, (2) a monthly service fee of
up to $4.50, and (3) a $0.75 per minute fee when WPS is invoked by
dialing the WPS code, *272. These fees help wireless carriers to recoup
the costs associated with providing NS/EP calling features in their
respective wireless networks, according to NCS. As of April 2009, there
are approximately 93,000 WPS subscribers, according to NCS.
[Side bar: Illustration: 2009 Presidential Inauguration:
On January 20, 2009, about 2 million people attended the Presidential
Inauguration held in Washington, D.C., to observe the swearing in of
the 44th President of the United States. Because of the anticipated
large crowds on the National Mall and immediate surrounding areas, as
well as the presence of numerous senior government officials in the
D.C. area, the federal government worked with its private sector
partners to ensure the availability of communications during the
inauguration activities. For example, in anticipation that observers
would use cell phones and other wireless devices to communicate
information and images of their experiences to family, friends, and
television stations, NCS issued an advisory to GETS and WPS subscribers
informing them of potential delays in using wireless communications and
reminding them to use GETS and WPS if they have difficulty completing a
call. NCS officials stated that from January 16 to January 20, 2009,
they activated about 1,200 new GETS accounts and 3,700 WPS accounts”the
majority of which were for law enforcement personnel and staff for the
incoming administration.
During the 24-hour period covering inauguration day there was a
combined total of 1,429 GETS and WPS calls attempted. NCS officials
stated that there was unprecedented stress on cellular networks
resulting in extreme congestion and numerous incidents of blocked calls
even though wireless carriers had deployed mobile cellular equipment in
the event area to augment the capacity of their networks. Of the 771
GETS calls attempted, about 99 percent were successfully completed, but
of the 658 WPS calls attempted, 60 percent were successfully completed.
End of Side bar]
NCS Uses Outreach to Enlist Subscribers and Has Designed Controls to
Help Ensure Priority Calling Services Are Used as Intended by Eligible
Subscribers:
Priority Calling Programs Available to Diverse Groups with NS/EP
Responsibilities:
NCS priority calling programs are primarily intended for officials with
responsibilities for coordinating the functions critical to the
planning, management, and response to national security and emergency
situations--particularly during the first 24 to 72 hours following an
emergency.[Footnote 29] According to NCS, participants in its priority
programs come from federal, state, local, or tribal government, and
private industry or nonprofit organizations.[Footnote 30] In order to
subscribe to GETS and WPS, applicants must prove that their
organization is engaged in activities essential to NS/EP functions
including (1) national security leadership; (2) national security
posture and U.S. population attack warning;[Footnote 31] (3) public
health, safety, and maintenance of law and order; (4) public welfare
and maintenance of national economic posture; and (5) disaster
recovery. Furthermore, these individuals must demonstrate that they
perform a function that is critical to the planning, management, and
response to national security and emergency situations. At the federal
government level, personnel that qualify to subscribe to the GETS and
WPS service range from staff in the Executive Office of the President
to members of Congress and officials in federal departments and
agencies. Nonfederal representatives such as state governors, mayors,
police and fire chiefs, as well as personnel engaged in restoration of
services such as telecommunications and electricity, are among those
who can qualify to use the priority calling programs. Appendix V
provides further details about the types of positions and functions
that generally qualify for access to the GETS and WPS programs.
According to NCS, the number of personnel in the public and private
sectors that perform functions critical to national security and
emergency preparedness range from about 2 to 10 million people. In
planning for future growth in its programs, NCS estimates that the
communications network can successfully support up to 2 million
priority subscribers. To that end, NCS has plans underway to achieve up
to 2 million GETS subscribers. NCS officials have not yet finalized
this goal or a goal for WPS subscribers but indicated that the WPS goal
may be about 225,000 subscribers.[Footnote 32] As of April 2009, NCS
has 227,614 active subscribers in the GETS program. For WPS, there were
92,820 active subscribers. As table 1 shows, the federal government
accounts for about 46 percent of active GETS subscribers and 72 percent
of active WPS subscribers.
Table 1: Participation Levels in the GETS and WPS Programs as of April
2009:
Category: Federal government;
GETS subscribers: 104,391;
WPS subscribers: 67,222.
Category: State government;
GETS subscribers: 25,969;
WPS subscribers: 4,464.
Category: Local government;
GETS subscribers: 48,348;
WPS subscribers: 9,054.
Category: Tribal government;
GETS subscribers: 82;
WPS subscribers: 4.
Category: Industry;
GETS subscribers: 47,509;
WPS subscribers: 12,010.
Category: Other NS/EP organizations;
GETS subscribers: 1,315;
WPS subscribers: 66.
Category: Total;
GETS subscribers: 227,614;
WPS subscribers: 92,820.
Source: NCS.
[End of table]
NCS Conducts Outreach to Enlist Subscribers, Although WPS Cost Can Be a
Barrier to Participation:
NCS has undertaken several outreach efforts to help increase awareness
of and participation in its priority calling programs across essential
NS/EP personnel. These efforts include, for example, attending
emergency management conferences, writing articles for emergency
management and telecommunications publications, as well as deploying
outreach coordinators to promote NCS's priority calling programs. For
example, since 1995, NCS has participated in various conferences hosted
by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) and the
International Association of Emergency Managers to facilitate its
outreach and marketing efforts. At these conferences, NCS operates
display booths and distributes marketing materials and may conduct
presentations to help increase awareness about the benefits of its
priority calling programs. NCS officials and/or contract personnel
attend approximately 30 conferences annually that target federal,
state, local, and industry NS/EP members. NCS officials told us that it
has enlisted all but 1 of the 50 state emergency operations centers to
participate in GETS and/or WPS because of initial contacts made at
events hosted by NEMA. Similarly, to expand its outreach to other
essential emergency personnel who also rely on wireline and wireless
communications services during emergencies such as those from water,
gas, and electric companies, NCS has attended conferences and other
events that attract this target audience.
In addition to attending conferences to reach general NS/EP personnel,
NCS has implemented targeted outreach efforts to groups such as
governors and state homeland security advisors; critical infrastructure
facilities, such as nuclear power plant operations centers, national
and regional airport traffic control centers; and federal officials who
serve as the designated continuity coordinator within their respective
agency. NCS officials report that they have generally made progress in
enlisting these groups in its priority calling programs. For example,
in 2008 NCS enlisted 56 of 71 federal continuity coordinators in the
GETS program. NCS also worked with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
and the Federal Aviation Administration to ensure that GETS cards are
available at all nuclear facilities and at all national and regional
airports respectively. In 2005, NCS began deploying regional outreach
coordinators to promote NCS's priority calling programs to emergency
management officials and other key decision makers (such as governors)
that coordinate emergency response and recovery and continuity of
government in state and local government.[Footnote 33] NCS credits the
addition of the regional outreach coordinators as a key reason for
significant growth in enrollment rates across all NS/EP categories
since 2005.
Despite the outreach efforts NCS has undertaken to increase
participation in its priority calling programs, WPS fees are a barrier
to participation in the program, according to NCS. For example, as of
October 2008, while the majority of federal continuity coordinators
enrolled in the GETS program, only 44 percent or 31 of 71 federal
continuity coordinators are WPS subscribers. Additionally, while 24 of
56 state homeland security advisors subscribe to GETS, only 10
subscribe to WPS, and only 8 governors subscribe to WPS while 43
subscribe to GETS. The subscriber levels for the GETS program are more
than twice that of the WPS program as shown in table 2. For each WPS-
activated device, subscribers pay an initial activation fee of $10, a
monthly fee of $4.50 as well as a usage fee of $0.75 per minute. In
2006, NCS commissioned a study to examine barriers to WPS
participation, among other things. According to NCS, the survey results
found that program cost was the single largest impediment to
participating in WPS. Similarly, our work showed that WPS fees can be a
burden particularly for NS/EP members at the state and local government
level due to limited financial resources. At least one-third of 37
state and local government entities that we spoke with--including some
who subscribe to WPS--stated that WPS fees affected the extent to which
they participate in the program. For example, an official from the
Oregon Emergency Management Division stated his organization's
participation in the WPS is relatively low because the overall WPS
costs can become very expensive when calculated across all subscribers
in a particular agency. Another official from Ohio Emergency Management
Division stated that his organization does not participate in the
program due to budget constraints even though they consider WPS to be
more beneficial than GETS because the wireless component is more widely
used among staff performing emergency management functions.
Table 2: GETS and WPS Subscriber Rates and Program Fees:
Program: GETS;
Number of subscribers (as of April 2009): 227,614;
One-time activation fee: $0;
Monthly fee: $0;
Usage fee: $0.07 to $0.10 per minute.
Program: WPS;
Number of subscribers (as of April 2009): 92,820;
One-time activation fee: $10 per device;
Monthly fee: $4.50 per device;
Usage fee: $0.75 per minute.
Source: NCS.
[End of table]
In light of concerns about WPS subscription costs, NCS has been
exploring ways to minimize the burden of program fees for its intended
subscribers. For example, NCS examined the feasibility of the federal
government subsidizing all or part of the WPS fees; however, DHS and
OMB determined that this may not be feasible because of questions about
the federal government's ability to sustain these costs in the future.
Further, NCS has had discussions with the wireless carriers to explore
ways to eliminate or defray the costs; however, the wireless carriers
maintain that the fees are necessary to operate and maintain WPS
capabilities in their networks in order to comply with the NCS
requirements. Nevertheless, some carriers have made arrangements with
WPS subscribers to provide WPS as part of a bundled telecommunications
service package, which, according to NCS, can defray the costs. NCS
officials have stated that they plan to continue to explore ways to
address the WPS cost issue as it believes doing so can help increase
participation in the WPS program.
NCS Has Designed Procedures and Controls to Limit Access to Authorized
Subscribers:
Federal internal control standards[Footnote 34] state that documented
policies and procedures to control access to agency resources and
records to authorized individuals are essential to accountability and
safeguarding assets, and NCS has developed and implemented policies and
procedures to help ensure that access to its programs is limited to
authorized subscribers. NCS has standard operating procedures that
document how potential subscribers can gain access to its priority
calling programs. To be approved for a GETS card and/or WPS service
request, the NCS contractor must be able to confirm that the request is
from an organization that performs any of five NS/EP functions
mentioned earlier in this report. If the organization's NS/EP status is
unclear (such as chemical suppliers, radio and TV stations, or housing
shelters), the organization must obtain sponsorship from NCS, 1 of the
24 NCS member agencies, or through the emergency management agency in
the state or locality in which they operate. Once approved,[Footnote
35] the organization must identify a primary point-of-contact (POC) and
an alternate POC, if available. Within each organization, the POC is
the primary liaison between NCS and individual GETS and WPS
subscribers. The POC is responsible for (1) determining who should have
access to the GETS and WPS service within their organization;[Footnote
36] (2) processing all GETS and WPS service requests; (3) notifying NCS
of changes to subscriber account data such as changes in name,
telephone number, or eligibility status; (4) reviewing and certifying
monthly subscriber calling data; (5) familiarizing subscribers with
GETS and WPS functionalities,[Footnote 37] and (6) annual verification
of subscriber eligibility.
As evidenced by their responsibilities, NCS relies on the POCs to
manage almost all aspects of subscriber accounts. However, through an
annual verification process, NCS seeks to ensure that POCs provide a
current account of subscribers who meet the eligibility requirements.
NCS will make multiple attempts over a 90-day period to ensure the POC
responds to its request to validate subscriber information, according
to NCS officials and failure to do so can result in cancellation of the
subscribers' account. NCS officials told us that they designed these
verification procedures to help ensure that only eligible subscribers
have access to NCS's priority programs. From our review of selected
GETS and WPS records as a limited check on whether current positions
meet eligibility criteria, we found that the GETS and/or WPS accounts
for former members and delegates of the U.S. House of Representatives
and the U.S. Senate in the 109th Congress were terminated in accordance
with NCS's procedures. However, when we reviewed accounts for 15
immediate past heads of federal departments and agencies as of August
2008, we found 4 of 15 instances where these officials' GETS and/or WPS
accounts were not terminated. We brought this to NCS's attention and
officials told us that these accounts were terminated effective July
2009. Further, NCS plans to institute new processes that are to include
more frequent monitoring of GETS and WPS accounts that coincide with
administration changes to ensure that the subscriber's account status
is appropriately updated.
In addition to verifying whether a subscriber is authorized to enroll
in NCS's programs, telephone carriers as well as NCS and its
contractors have applied fraud detection mechanisms intended to protect
against fraudulent calls in their networks as well as others that are
unique to the GETS and WPS services. For example, carriers have fraud
detection for general telephone use that also detects fraud for GETS
and WPS services. These detection mechanisms include detection of a
single PIN being used simultaneously from multiple originating phone
numbers and calls of long duration, among other things. NCS and its
contractor said that they have also instituted procedures to determine
the legitimacy of calls and to take corrective action, which may
include disabling the GETS and WPS account in question. According to
NCS, it has rarely found actual cases of fraud and abuse. For example,
although there were 45 reported cases of potential fraudulent calls in
2008, through further investigation NCS determined that the calls were
legitimate and the reports typically resulted from calls placed by
authorized subscribers conducting test calls or participating in
preparedness exercises. Even if fraudulent calls were made using GETS
and WPS services, the implications would likely be minimal due to two
factors. First, the subscriber levels for GETS and WPS, which currently
stand at more than 227,000 and about 93,000 respectively, are well
below the capacity of the system. For example, according to NCS, the
GETS system was designed to support up to 2 million subscribers,
however, the current subscriber level--227,000 GETS subscribers--is
well below the intended capacity. Second, the potential financial
implications for the federal government would be nominal as NCS does
not bear the costs for GETS and WPS charges for nonfederal subscribers.
State and local governments as well as private and nonprofit
organizations bear all of the costs related to the usage of the GETS
and WPS programs. In general, NCS may cover GETS charges for federal
departments and agencies up to an annual budget threshold; however,
federal agencies may be responsible for these costs in the event of
fraudulent or abusive calling activity. Federal and nonfederal WPS
subscribers are responsible for all associated costs.
Initiatives Exist to Address Challenges in NCS's Operating Environment,
but Planning Efforts to Leverage Evolving Technology Could Be
Strengthened:
The delivery of NCS's priority calling services faces challenges
related to the inherent vulnerabilities of the communication
infrastructure such as downed phone lines, damaged cell towers, and
broken circuits and switches. Therefore, NCS seeks to build redundancy
into the communication capabilities and services it provides and has
explored satellite technology to overcome such challenges. However,
methods for implementation and evaluation of its related satellite
pilot were unclear and NCS subsequently terminated the pilot. In
addition, NCS faces the challenge of keeping pace with the rapid
evolution in telecommunications technology and it is working with the
telecommunications industry to ensure that NS/EP communications
requirements are integrated into the next-generation communications
networks. However, NCS's planning efforts to update its programs as
technology evolves could be strengthened.
NCS Launched the Satellite Pilot Program without Clear Methods for
Implementation and Evaluation and Has Since Terminated the Pilot:
In December 2007, NCS launched a satellite pilot program to provide an
alternative means to support NS/EP communications to help circumvent
network congestion or outages in the PSTN. According to NCS, because
GETS and WPS leverage PSTN-based infrastructure to enable
communications for NS/EP personnel, these programs can be limited in
their ability to provide services when damage renders the PSTN
infrastructure inoperable, such as it did in certain regions affected
by Hurricane Katrina. In February 2004, the National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Council (NSTAC) issued a report to the
Executive Office of the President recommending that NCS develop a
satellite capability to facilitate NS/EP communications. The
communications challenges that arose during the 2005 Gulf Coast
hurricanes due to flooding and loss of power, among other things,
underscored the need for a communications capability that could
transcend these infrastructure issues, and NCS observed that satellite
networks appeared to be the least disrupted communications service
during this event. To that end, 3 years following the 2005 Gulf Coast
Hurricanes, NCS launched the first of two phases of the satellite pilot
program intended to enable unclassified voice connectivity during
emergencies that leverages satellite infrastructure independent of the
PSTN. As part of the pilot, according to NCS officials, NCS is to
provide participants with a wall-mounted unit that consists of battery
backup and surge protection and a satellite phone. According to NCS
officials, one objective of the pilot is to evaluate two voice
communications capabilities via satellite technologies: push-to-talk
communication functions and GETS priority calling using a satellite
phone. Push-to-talk is a radio-like function, similar to that of a
walkie-talkie or three-way radio, with which a group of users would
connect back-and-forth with each other from their individual satellite
phones at the push of a button without having to make individual calls.
[Footnote 38] NCS also plans to use the pilot to test the ability to
make GETS priority functions to call a wireline or cellular telephone
number using a satellite phone. According to NCS, calls made from a
satellite phone to a cellular or wireline telephone can bypass
congested or damaged areas of the PSTN, as such calls can be routed via
satellite networks to a less congested area of the PSTN, thus
increasing the likelihood of call completion. However, because these
calls are still expected to travel through the wireline and wireless
portions of the PSTN to reach their destination, they could face
congestion while trying to connect to the PSTN. To bypass such
congestion, NCS officials stated that the GETS priority calling
features must be supported on the satellite networks, which currently
they are not. By inserting priority calling functionality in satellite
networks, GETS calls that originate from a satellite phone will have a
greater likelihood of being successfully routed through the PSTN in
times of network congestion. NCS officials also told us that other
objectives for the pilot include determining the extent to which
satellite communications meet NS/EP needs and educating NS/EP personnel
about the availability of satellite communications for use in emergency
situations.
Although the pilot began in December 2007 and is estimated to last 3
years and cost $1.9 million, as of May 2009 NCS could provide little
documentation to explain its objectives for the pilot, and how it
planned to meet those objectives. For example, while NCS officials
provided briefing slides to elaborate on the pilot program and describe
some high-level program objectives, these slides lacked key program
information such as a methodology for evaluating pilot results to
determine whether the intended pilot objectives were met, and
milestones for pilot implementation. Specifically, although the
briefing slides noted the planned number of sites to be included in the
pilot, it did not specify when the site selection would be completed,
when sites would begin participating in the pilot, or the data that
would be collected and analyzed to evaluate pilot performance.
According to NCS, the pilot was to include up to 65 participating sites
comprising emergency operations centers supporting federal and state
government, and NCS officials stated they had initially identified six
sites and conducted an evaluation of additional candidate sites.
However, NCS officials could not provide any detailed information about
what criteria or rationale was used to determine which sites to include
in the pilot.[Footnote 39] For instance, while NCS officials told us
they evaluated sites based on two factors (effects of disaster
scenarios and population served by the respective location), they did
not provide any documentation that outlined these details or
demonstrated how these two factors would help it determine if the pilot
objectives were met. In addition, as part of phase two of the satellite
pilot, NCS officials said they intended to use lessons learned from the
experience of phase one of the pilot to migrate the satellite
capability to another NCS technology initiative already underway;
however, NCS launched the pilot program without the benefit of
completing a methodology to evaluate the pilot. In addition, NCS could
not provide documentation as to how the results of the pilot would be
evaluated and used to inform future program decisions such as future
rollout. Exacerbating the absence of program planning documents, is
that key staff originally involved in the pilot have since left NCS
resulting in the loss of institutional knowledge about the original
decisions and planning for the pilot.
In April 2009, officials told us that the pilot had been placed on hold
as they were reassessing various aspects of the pilot such as
conducting a cost-benefit analysis to determine which satellite
provider and equipment to use. After reassessing the pilot, NCS
subsequently terminated the pilot in May 2009, according to NCS
officials. NCS officials acknowledged that the pilot program needed
improved planning and metric documentation and noted that NCS took a
number of issues into consideration including the current availability
of push-to-talk capability among existing satellite service providers
in making the decision to end the pilot.
NCS Is Restructuring Efforts to Keep Pace with Emerging
Telecommunications Technology, but Further Development of Plans and
Program Details Would Better Inform Program and Budget Decisions:
NCS is mandated by presidential directive to support the use of
technological advances and evolutionary communications networks for NS/
EP communications functions assigned to NCS, including programs it
provides to maintain continuity of communications.[Footnote 40] GETS
and WPS are designed to operate on the circuit-based PSTN platform,
while packet-based IP networks are increasingly used and expected to
eclipse the use of circuits in telecommunications, according to
representatives from the telecommunications industry. As a result, NCS
and its GETS and WPS subscribers face the risk that these services will
not work within these next-generation networks. To avoid disruption or
degradation of service, NCS plans to migrate existing GETS and WPS
priority calling features from circuit-based networks to public
telephone packet-based networks to assure that the programs will be
operable on new technologies available from wireline and wireless
carriers.[Footnote 41] NCS's efforts to integrate new and existing NS/
EP services into next-generation networks (NS/EP NGN) [Footnote 42]
consist of two primary components: (1) priority voice communications
and (2) priority data communications that includes priority treatment
for the transmission of e-mail, streaming video, text messaging, and
Internet access, among other things.
NCS has taken steps to assess how the evolution of technology will
affect the provision of its priority calling services and to plan for
these changes. In addition, because NCS's programs are largely
dependent on the telecommunications industry, which owns and operates
most of the communications infrastructure on which GETS and WPS
operate, NCS has partnered with industry to inform and implement these
changes. According to NCS, adding the priority voice communications
component of NS/EP NGN is less challenging than adding data services
because while priority calling programs exist (GETS and WPS), priority
data programs do not. NCS officials estimate that at least one of the
three major carriers (AT&T) will begin supporting priority
communications via VoIP by 2010 and the remaining carriers (Sprint and
Verizon) by 2014. However, less is known about supporting priority data
communications and, consequently, this effort is more challenging,
according to NCS officials.
The challenge to develop priority data services is not a new issue; in
2006 we reported that the obstacles to offering the service include
both technical and financial challenges.[Footnote 43] For example, the
commonly used version of Internet protocol (known as IPv4) does not
guarantee priority delivery and has certain security limitations that
may not adequately protect information from being monitored or modified
while in transit via the Internet. Though the next version (IPv6) has
features that may help prioritize the delivery of data in the future
and provide enhanced security, it is not yet widely adopted. Also, in
March 2006, the NSTAC reported that while the NS/EP NGN initiative is
expected to offer improvements for NS/EP communications, the security
challenges are likely to have an operational impact on the transmission
of NS/EP communications if not adequately addressed.[Footnote 44]
Specifically, they noted that robust user authentication methods are
needed in order to enable NS/EP personnel to share information in a
secure manner. While these authentication methods are to be available
through IPv6, they are not available through IPv4, which is the more
widely used version. In April 2009, NCS officials told us they have not
yet finalized what types of authentication methods or which IP version
would support the NS/EP NGN, though they plan to request additional
information from industry experts about how to address authentication
issues. In our 2006 report, we noted that NCS had previously requested
information from private companies on the potential for prioritizing
services, and found that there was no offering for a priority service,
nor was there any consensus on a standard approach to prioritization.
Although, NCS, in conjunction with international standards bodies,
completed the first set of engineering standards for priority VoIP in
December 2007, as of May 2009, standards had not yet been established
to support prioritized NS/EP NGN data communications.[Footnote 45]
Moreover, NCS could not provide further detail as to how its planning
efforts account for the different capabilities of the available
technology, and the associated challenges.
In addition to NCS not fully detailing how it plans to mitigate
existing challenges, it also could not provide details about key
program elements such as, the estimated total costs, and a timeline for
implementation of the NS/EP NGN initiative. Officials said the
information was not yet finalized. Our previous work on acquisition and
technology investment management has shown that undertaking such
efforts is strengthened by first ensuring that (1) an acquisition
approach, such as the one for NS/EP NGN, is based on available
technologies that support the intended capability; (2) cost estimates
are realistic; and (3) risks have been identified and analyzed, and
corresponding mitigation plans have been developed.[Footnote 46] NCS
officials told us they planned to develop program plans that included
this information, but as of May 2009 these documents were in the early
stages of development, and officials stated they were finalizing cost
and schedule estimates for the initiative, which may be greater than
previously projected. In addition, for the last 2 years, Congress has
raised questions about the absence of detailed program information such
as costs of planned investments for some of NCS's programs, and NCS has
faced difficulties in justifying its budget requests. For example,
during the appropriations process for fiscal years 2008 and 2009, the
House and Senate Committees on Appropriations raised questions about
the intended investments in NS/EP NGN. Because of the lack of
explanation about the significant increase in funds requested for
fiscal year 2008 compared to the previous year, the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations stated that NCS had not adequately
justified funding for the NS/EP NGN effort.[Footnote 47] Consequently,
Congress appropriated $21 million--about 60 percent less than
requested--to DHS for NS/EP NGN.[Footnote 48] In addition, the House of
Representatives Committee on Appropriations directed DHS to brief them
on the planned expenditures for NS/EP NGN in fiscal year 2008.[Footnote
49] Again, for the fiscal year 2009 budget request for NS/EP NGN, the
House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations raised questions
about the lack of a thorough explanation of (1) information about
planned investments, (2) clarity about how the initiative aligns with
DHS's homeland security goals, and (3) information about the total
costs to complete the initiatives.[Footnote 50] As a result, Congress
withheld half of the fiscal year 2009 funding for NS/EP NGN until NCS
completes an expenditure plan to be approved by the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations that identifies the strategic context,
specific goals and milestones, and planned investments.[Footnote 51]
Although NCS had planned to submit the expenditure plan to the
Committees on Appropriations in January 2009, they have not done so,
and as of May 2009, the plan was still being reviewed internally.
[Footnote 52]
Based on technological and planning challenges, NCS officials told us
that in 2008 it began taking steps to restructure its acquisition
approach to focus first on voice with data to follow much later.
However, as noted by Congress in its response to NCS's fiscal year 2009
budget request, little is known about this restructuring, including key
program information such as what capabilities will be delivered, total
costs, and milestones. Moreover, despite requirements from Congress to
articulate its strategy for the NS/EP NGN initiative, as of May 2009
NCS had not yet clearly defined program objectives and total costs,
among other things. While NCS officials told us that they expect
increased costs and schedule delays, they have not provided any further
details or plans to mitigate these challenges, and it is unclear when
important technological and program details of the restructuring will
be finalized. In February 2009, NCS hired a new manager whose
responsibilities include NS/EP NGN, who stated the need to plan for
these issues and develop corresponding program plans that outline the
NS/EP NGN acquisition approach including costs, milestones, and risk
mitigation plans.
GAO and commercial best practices show that incorporating cost
information and strategies to mitigate program and technical challenges
are essential to successfully meeting program objectives and minimizing
the risk of cost overruns, schedule delays, and less than expected
performance.[Footnote 53] As NCS moves forward with the NS/EP NGN
effort, clearly defining and documenting its technical approach to
achieve program objectives within the constraints imposed by known
challenges--such as the limitations of available technologies and NCS's
dependence on the telecommunications industry--could help provide
reasonable assurance that an executable approach is in place to meet
current and future NS/EP communications needs. Furthermore, such
planning could provide a sound basis for determining realistic cost and
schedule estimates and provide key stakeholders such as Congress with
information they need to make funding decisions over time.
NCS Has Implemented Strategic Planning Efforts, but These Could Be
Strengthened by Incorporating Key Planning and Performance Measurement
Practices:
NCS has been developing its strategic plan since 2007, and although
officials have stated that a strategic plan could help inform their
efforts, it has not been finalized. In addition, while NCS has
generally linked the performance of its programs to broader agency and
department goals, the performance of two of NCS's core responsibilities
is not measured. Finally, focusing program evaluation efforts on
outcomes, gauging progress, incorporating past performance, and clarity
can improve the usefulness of NCS's performance measures.
NCS Has Been Developing a Strategic Plan since 2007, but It Has Not
Been Finalized and Could Be Strengthened with Key Planning Practices:
NCS has undertaken strategic planning for its programs and documented
some key elements of strategic planning--such as a statement of the
agency's mission, strategic goals, and objectives--across a range of
documents and sources. For example, the mission statement is documented
in program documents such as NCS's Annual Reports, and NCS officials
told us they have identified 21 strategic objectives that align with
its three strategic goals (information on the three strategic goals and
some of the related objectives is shown in table 3). However, this
information has not been incorporated into a strategic plan.
Furthermore, NCS officials stated that these goals and objectives are
being revised, but they did not provide a date when this would be
finalized. Additionally, NCS's congressional budget justification
documents for fiscal years 2007 through 2009 contain planned milestones
and spending for various program initiatives.
Table 3: NCS's Strategic Goals and Select Objectives:
NCS Strategic Goals: Ensure availability of the communications
infrastructure to support NS/EP requirements;
Select NCS Objective: Ensure performance of priority communications
services during normal and stressed emergency situations;
Select NCS Objective: Enhance existing NS/EP communication
capabilities.
NCS Strategic Goals: Enhance and maintain NCS operational preparedness
for effective and timely response and recovery to national emergencies;
Select NCS Objective: Serve as the lead agency for Emergency Support
Function 2 (ESF-2) in support of the National Response Plan;
Select NCS Objective: Build on the strategic outreach and communication
program to continue to raise awareness about NCS and NSTAC programs and
activities.
NCS Strategic Goals: Provide leadership in Critical Infrastructure
Protection (CIP) as the telecommunications Sector-Specific Agency;
Select NCS Objective: Serve as the sector-specific agency for the
telecommunications sector;
Select NCS Objective: Work with industry and other sector-specific
agencies to improve communications assurance and preparedness.
Source: NCS.
[End of table]
In June 2008, we reported that efforts were under way to draft a
strategic plan for the NCS, and recommended that DHS establish
milestones for completing the development and implementation of the
strategic plan.[Footnote 54] DHS agreed with our recommendation and
stated that it was taking steps toward finalizing the strategic plan.
However, as of April 2009, the plan, which has been in draft since mid-
2007, had not yet been finalized and NCS officials could not provide a
date for when this would occur. A draft strategic plan for fiscal years
2007 to 2013 did not include some of the key elements associated with
effective strategic plans. For example, while the plan included NCS's
mission, strategic goals and high-level objectives, it did not include
a discussion of the resources needed to achieve these goals and
objectives. Although NCS intends to enhance its priority communications
offerings to keep pace with emerging technology (such as priority data
in an IP environment), it has not yet finalized the total costs to do
so. In addition, the draft plan did not identify external factors that
could affect achievement of strategic goals (such as management or
technological challenges). Moreover, the plan did not articulate how
current and planned initiatives such as the NS/EP NGN and the satellite
pilot program fit into the broader agency goals.
Our past work has discussed the importance of strategic planning as the
starting point for results-oriented management.[Footnote 55] Strategic
plans are to articulate the mission of an organization or program, and
lay out its long-term goals and objectives for implementing that
mission, including the resources needed to reach these goals. Leading
management practices state that federal strategic plans include six key
elements: (1) a comprehensive mission statement, (2) strategic goals
and objectives, (3) strategies and the various resources needed to
achieve the goals and objectives, (4) a description of the relationship
between the strategic goals and objectives and performance goals, (5)
an identification of key external factors that could significantly
affect the achievement of strategic goals, and (6) a description of how
program evaluations were used to develop or revise the goals and a
schedule for future evaluations.[Footnote 56] As we have previously
reported, strategic plans are strengthened when they include a
discussion of management challenges facing the program that may
threaten its ability to meet long-term, strategic goals.[Footnote 57]
While NCS has completed some key aspects of strategic planning,
critical elements such as the key external factors that could affect
achievement of its mission--for example, challenges affecting the NS/EP
NGN initiative--have not yet been documented and NCS has not committed
to incorporating these elements in its strategic plan. A strategic plan
that captures these key elements in a centralized way would help inform
stakeholders, such as departmental leadership, Congress, and the
administration about NCS's priorities and plans and assist stakeholders
in making efficient and effective program, resource, and policy
decisions. In addition, because NCS has experienced frequent turnover
in leadership, such a plan would be beneficial for new agency
management during transition periods. For example, since January 2007,
there have been two directors and one acting director as well as three
different staff serving in the capacity of Chief for the Technology and
Programs Branch--a position that oversees the day-to-day operations
regarding NS/EP NGN, among other initiatives.
NCS's Performance Measures Are Generally Linked to Broader Agency and
Department Goals and Objectives, but Measures Do Not Cover All Core
Program Activities:
NCS has five performance measures which relate to three aspects of GETS
and WPS--the number of subscribers, priority call completion rates in
emergencies, and cost to support GETS and WPS subscribers. While NCS
has not documented how its performance measures link to NCS's and DHS's
strategic goals and objectives, we used various documents, such as
DHS's fiscal year 2008 to 2013 strategic plan, to determine that NCS's
five performance measures link to agency and department strategic goals
and objectives (see figure 3, which illustrates the connection between
DHS's mission to NCS's performance measures). For example, NCS's
performance measure to track the call completion rate of priority calls
is linked to its strategic goal of ensuring availability of
communications as well as to DHS's strategic objective to ensure
continuity of government communications. Consistent with our past work
on performance management, linking performance measures with strategic
goals and objectives in this way provides managers and staff with a
roadmap that shows how their day-to-day activities contribute to
achieving broader DHS and NCS goals.[Footnote 58]
Figure 3: Linkages between NCS Performance Measures and NCS and DHS
Strategic Goals and Objectives:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
DHS Mission:
Lead the unified national effort to secure America; prevent and deter
terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and
hazards to the Nation; secure the national borders while welcoming
lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade.
DHS Strategic Goals:
* Protect nation from dangerous people;
* Protect nation from dangerous goods;
* Protect critical infrastructure;
* Strengthen nation‘s preparedness and emergency response capabilities;
* Strengthen and unify DHS operations and management.
Select DHS Strategic Objective:
Ensure Continuity of Government Communications and Operations:
Implement continuity of operations planning at key levels of
government. Improve our ability to continue performance of essential
functions/business and government operations, including the protection
of government personnel, facilities, national leaders, and the Nation‘s
communications infrastructure across a wide range of potential
emergencies.
NCS Mission:
Assist the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland
Security Council, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget in: (1)
the exercise of the telecommunications functions and responsibilities;
and (2) the coordination of the planning for and provision of national
security and emergency preparedness communications for the Federal
government under all circumstances, including crisis or emergency,
attack, recovery and reconstitution.
NCS Strategic Goals:
* Ensure availability of the communications infrastructure to support
NS/EP requirements;
* Enhance and maintain NCS operational preparedness for effective and
timely response and recovery to national emergencies;
* Provide leadership in critical infrastructure protection as the
telecommunications Sector Specific Agency.
NCS Performance Measures:
* Call completion rate for priority calling services;
* Number of WPS subscribers;
* Number of GETS subscribers;
* Percent of federal continuity coordinators with access to priority
calling services;
* Average cost to maintain a subscriber to priority calling services.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS and NCS data.
[End of figure]
While NCS's performance measures generally link to overall goals and
objectives, NCS's performance measures focus exclusively on its
priority calling programs, and NCS does not have measures to assess the
performance of its other two primary responsibilities--serving as the
ESF-2 coordinator and the lead federal agency for critical
infrastructure protection for the communications sector. Although NCS
officials acknowledged that they do not have such measures and noted
that they could be helpful, these officials did not commit to
developing such measures. While we have previously reported that
agencies do not need to develop performance measures that cover all of
their activities, OMB requires that performance measures reflect a
program's mission and priorities.[Footnote 59] Furthermore, we have
also reported that an agency's performance measurement efforts are
strengthened when they sufficiently cover its core activities.[Footnote
60] NCS's critical infrastructure protection and ESF-2 responsibilities
are key components of the agency's mission to help ensure that NS/EP
communications are available during disasters or emergencies, and are
articulated in NCS's strategic goals (see table 3). For example, NCS,
in conjunction with the telecommunication industry is responsible for
conducting risk assessments of the nation's critical communication
infrastructure; according to Executive Order 13,231, as amended,
communications infrastructure is critical not only to emergency
preparedness, but all aspects of U.S. national security and economy.
Without the benefit of performance measures that cover these functions,
NCS may be limited in its ability to assess its overall effectiveness
in meeting all three of its strategic goals. Moreover, developing
performance measures for these mission-critical functions would help
strengthen and inform future program and budget decisions, improve
critical program activities, and as we have previously reported, help
verify that NCS's resources are being used responsibly.[Footnote 61]
Focusing on Outcomes, Progress, and Past Performance to Set Performance
Targets and Clarity Can Improve the Usefulness and Reliability of
Performance Measures:
Of its five performance measures, NCS has identified two as outcome
measures, two as output measures, and one as an efficiency measure (see
table 4 for more information on each of these measures).[Footnote 62]
While OMB guidance defines output measures (such as the number of
products or services delivered) as a description of the level of
activity provided over a period of time, it asserts program performance
is most effectively measured by focusing on how those outputs support
the achievement of desired outcomes--the intended results of carrying
out a program or activity.[Footnote 63] NCS's two output measures--the
number of GETS subscribers and the number of WPS subscribers--could be
strengthened to focus on outcomes, more effectively gauge progress
toward achieving results, and set more reliable targets. In addition,
one of NCS's outcome measures, the call completion rate, does not
clearly illustrate the measures' intended purpose. OMB guidance
emphasizes the use of outcome measures as a more meaningful indicator
of performance and encourages agencies to translate existing measures
that focus on outputs into outcome measures, or at least demonstrate
that measured outputs would logically lead to intended outcomes.
Currently, neither of NCS's output measures fully demonstrates how it
supports NCS in the achievement of the intended outcomes of the GETS
and WPS programs, which, as articulated in one of NCS's strategic goal,
is to ensure the availability of communications capabilities for all
NS/EP officials. For example, NCS told us that the long-term goal for
the GETS program may be to reach 2 million subscribers; however, NCS
has not demonstrated how reaching 2 million subscribers achieves the
result of ensuring the availability of communications capabilities for
NS/EP officials that could benefit from the use of the GETS service.
According to NCS officials, NCS based this number on an internal study
that identified 2 million subscribers as the capacity level that the
PSTN can support. However, NCS could not provide a rationale as to how
2 million subscribers appropriately quantifies the population of NS/EP
personnel critical to NCS achieving its desired results. Therefore, it
is unclear whether achieving 2 million GETS subscribers means that all
the NS/EP personnel who have the greatest need for access to priority
calling capabilities are enlisted in the program thereby enabling them
to make calls that can help to coordinate planning for national
security incidents and emergencies and facilitate continuity of
government under these conditions--a key function of the GETS program.
In addition, NCS officials have told us that the agency has an
unofficial long-term goal of 225,000 subscribers for the WPS program.
Although NCS officials noted that this number has not been finalized,
the measure also does not portray how well or if WPS is achieving its
desired program outcome. Furthermore, NCS has not been able to provide
information regarding how it developed this WPS subscriber goal or
describe how it will do so in the future.
Table 4: NCS's Performance Measures, Targets, and Results for Fiscal
Years 2006 to 2009:
Performance measure: Priority service call completion rate during
emergency communication periods;
Description: Measures the call completion rate for GETS, WPS, and a
classified priority calling program during emergency communication
periods. The call completion rate is defined as the number of
successful calls made divided by the total number of calls originated.
A successful call is one in which the user (1) gets an answer, (2) a
ring but no answer, or (3) a traditional busy signal;
FY 2006 target: [A];
FY 2006 results: [A];
FY 2007 target: 90%;
FY 2007 results: 94%;
FY 2008 target: 90%;
FY 2008 results: 97%;
FY 2009 target: 90%.
Performance measure: Number of WPS subscribers;
Description: Measures the total number of subscribers who are
authorized to use the Wireless Priority Service;
FY 2006 target: 30,000;
FY 2006 results: 38,594;
FY 2007 target: 39,000;
FY 2007 results: 47,214;
FY 2008 target: 57,000;
FY 2008 results: 85,076;
FY 2009 target: 68,500.
Performance measure: Number of GETS subscribers;
Description: Measures the total number of subscribers registered to use
the GETS program;
FY 2006 target: 118,000;
FY 2006 results: 158,669;
FY 2007 target: 155,000;
FY 2007 results: 168,428;
FY 2008 target: 185,000;
FY 2008 results: 208,600;
FY 2009 target: 204,000.
Performance measure: Percent of Federal Continuity Coordinators with
access to priority telecommunications services;
Description: Measures the percentage of federal continuity coordinators
that are registered to use the GETS program;
FY 2006 target: [B];
FY 2006 results: [B];
FY 2007 target: [B];
FY 2007 results: [B];
FY 2008 target: 80%;
FY 2008 results: 81%;
FY 2009 target: 90%.
Performance measure: Average cost to maintain priority
telecommunications service subscribers;
Description: Measures the average cost to NCS to maintain subscribers
in the GETS and WPS programs, as well as a classified priority calling
program;
FY 2006 target: [C];
FY 2006 results: [C];
FY 2007 target: $21.00;
FY 2007 results: $17.00;
FY 2008 target: $15.63;
FY 2008 results: $13.70;
FY 2009 target: $14.22.
Source: NCS.
[A] Data not available as NCS implemented this performance measure in
fiscal year 2007.
[B] Data not available as NCS implemented this performance measure in
fiscal year 2008.
[C] Data not available as NCS implemented this performance measure in
fiscal year 2007.
[End of table]
Our past work, along with federal guidance, has discussed the
importance of using a series of output and outcome goals and measures
to depict the complexity of the results that agencies seek to achieve.
[Footnote 64] We recognize that it can be difficult to develop outcome
goals and corresponding measures. Nonetheless, by further articulating
how NCS's measures support the intended outcome articulated in its
strategic goal--ensuring availability of communications for NS/EP
functions--, NCS and its stakeholders could more effectively gauge the
extent to which subscriber levels in GETS and WPS reflect if
communications capabilities are available to all critical NS/EP
personnel as intended.
NCS's progress can be better measured through annual performance
targets that track subscriber levels to demonstrate how overall
subscriber goals for GETS and WPS lead to program outcomes. This would
help to better illustrate NCS's annual progress toward achieving its
desired results. Furthermore, although both of NCS's output measures
reflect the number of subscribers in each program for a given year, the
measures do not reflect whether NCS's annual achievement demonstrate
significant or marginal progress toward reaching 2 million subscribers,
and NCS has not defined a time by which it hopes to achieve this goal.
In its GETS and WPS performance measures, NCS states annual results as
an output of the number of subscribers in a particular year--for
example, 208,600 GETS subscribers in fiscal year 2008. These output
measures do not capture percentage increases in the number of
subscribers from year to year to help measure performance changes in
achieving any long-term goal for subscribers. According to OMB
guidance, performance over time is to be expressed as a tangible,
measurable objective, against which actual achievement can be compared,
such as a quantitative standard, value, or rate.[Footnote 65] For
example, for NCS's performance measure related to the percent of
federal continuity coordinators with access to priority calling
programs--NCS tracks change over time by showing a rate of annual
progress toward enlisting these particular officials in the GETS and
WPS programs. In doing so, NCS can provide insight as to the extent to
which this group can successfully place calls to help facilitate
continuity of government at the federal level--particularly in the
event of network congestion during emergencies.[Footnote 66] Although
NCS has reported ongoing or planned targeted outreach efforts to
similar groups that play a leadership role in coordinating emergency
response and continuity of government such as governors or mayors, they
have not developed similar performance measures to track their annual
progress in enlisting and maintaining these subscribers. NCS has not
finalized its overall goal for the number of GETS and WPS subscribers
or set a timeline for when it plans to achieve its unofficial goals for
the number of GETS and WPS subscribers. Based on GETS enrollment levels
over the last 3 fiscal years, at current rates NCS may not achieve its
unofficial subscriber goals until somewhere between 2015 and 2047. OMB
guidance states that performance goals are to be comprised not only of
performance measures and targets, but also include time frames for
achieving these goals.[Footnote 67]
In addition, OMB guidance states that targets are to consider past
performance, adjusted annually as conditions change, such as funding
levels and legislative constraints. However, NCS did not consider past
performance when setting annual performance targets for several of its
performance measures. As a result, the targets are not ambitious or
based on reliable baselines. For example, NCS did not modify its
targets for the number of GETS subscribers for fiscal years 2007 and
2009 based on actual results achieved in the previous fiscal year.
According to OMB performance guidance, baselines are the starting point
from which gains are measured and targets set; and performance targets
are to be ambitious. Our past work has also emphasized the importance
of baselines and multiyear goals particularly when results are expected
to take several years to achieve.[Footnote 68] As detailed in table 4,
for fiscal year 2006, NCS reported a target of 118,000 GETS subscribers
and achieved 158,669, which also surpassed its 2007 goal. However, NCS
did not update its fiscal year 2007 goal of 155,000 when it was
achieved in 2006. Similarly, in fiscal year 2008, NCS set a target of
185,000 subscribers and achieved 208,600 subscribers, which surpassed
the fiscal year 2009 goal. However, as of April 2009, the goal remained
at 204,000 subscribers even though NCS exceeded this level in the
previous fiscal year. Similarly, the target level for another measure--
the average cost to maintain a priority telecommunications service
subscriber--has not been modified to reflect the actual results of the
prior year. NCS began using this measure in fiscal year 2007 and has
exceeded its target reductions in cost for the 2 years that the measure
has been in place. For fiscal years 2008 and 2009, the average cost
targets were $15.63 and $14.22, respectively; however, NCS reported
that the average cost to maintain a priority service subscriber in 2008
was $13.70, surpassing targeted reductions for both 2008 and 2009. As
with the target for the subscriber measures, the average cost target
was not modified to build upon actual results of the prior fiscal year.
Furthermore, the baseline upon which each annual average cost goal is
determined is the number of GETS and WPS subscribers. While officials
cite reductions in operating costs as one reason for exceeding the
target, they also stated that the achievement was more a function of
the fact that they exceeded the projected number of GETS subscribers.
As a result, because the annual GETS subscriber performance measure is
not composed of ambitious targets from year to year, the baseline it
provides for determining the average cost target is unreliable. Without
considering changes in this baseline information--in this case, number
of subscribers--valid comparisons to measure improvement over time
cannot be made. Considering past performance in setting targets could
help NCS develop a true sense of continued improvement in enlisting
priority service subscribers and reducing costs to service the
subscribers.
Finally, while NCS has implemented an outcome-oriented measure to
assess the effectiveness of its priority calling programs during
periods of congestion, the information the measure intends to convey--
priority service call completion rate--is not consistent with the
methodology used to calculate the results. Specifically, the measure is
intended to capture and measure combined call completion rates for GETS
and WPS. However, wireless carriers collect the relevant information
that NCS reports via this measure, and under current processes for
capturing attempted WPS calls, wireless carriers are unable to identify
all attempted WPS calls that are not completed.[Footnote 69] Our
previous work holds that performance measures should be clearly stated
in order to ensure that the name and definition of the measure are
consistent with the methodology used to calculate it.[Footnote 70]
Furthermore, OMB guidance states that agencies are required to discuss
the completeness and reliability of their performance data, and any
limitations on the reliability of the data. As the call completion
measure does not provide clear information about program performance
and limitations, NCS risks overstating the completion rate for WPS and
the use of this measure may affect the validity of managers' and
stakeholders' assessment of WPS performance in comparison to the
intended result. NCS officials agreed that opportunities exist to
strengthen this measure to ensure that it accurately reflects the
activity being measured, and stated they are taking steps to work with
carriers that support WPS services to develop a solution that would
allow them to track the full range of WPS calls. However, in the
meantime, NCS has not committed to revising the measure to accurately
reflect the activity being monitored.
Conclusions:
The events of September 11, 2001, and the 2005 hurricane season
dramatically demonstrated how catastrophic man-made and natural
disasters can disrupt communication capabilities and highlight the need
for essential NS/EP officials to be able to communicate during and in
the aftermath of such events. NCS continues to recognize the need to
keep pace with technological changes and look for ways to better meet
NS/EP personnel's current and future communications needs as evidenced
by the development of its NGN initiative. Information such as costs,
available technology, and future capabilities for these types of
initiatives are unknown, and as such require thoughtful planning to
most effectively allocate current and future resources. These efforts
to ensure that the communication capabilities it provides to NS/EP
personnel will be operable on and leverage next-generation networks
could benefit from better planning. By clearly defining its acquisition
approach for the initiative and developing mitigation plans to address
known risks and technical challenges, NCS can help minimize cost
overruns and schedule delays, and more importantly help ensure that it
is developing services that meet the emerging communication needs of
the NS/EP community.
Strategic plans are an essential element in results-oriented program
management, and provide agencies and stakeholders a common set of
operational principles with which to guide actions and decisions.
Although DHS stated that it was taking steps to finalize its strategic
plan in response to our June 2008 recommendation, it has not yet
finalized the plan which has been in draft since mid-2007 or committed
to incorporating key elements of a strategic plan. We continue to
believe that our prior recommendation has merit and that NCS could
benefit from completing a strategic plan. A strategic plan that
includes identifying strategic goals and objectives, the resources
needed to achieve those goals and objectives, and a description of the
relationship between planned initiatives and strategic goals could
serve as the foundation to help NCS align its daily activities,
operations, program development, and resource allocation to support its
mission and achieve its goals. As NCS undertakes a variety of new
initiatives and attempts to strengthen existing programs, finalizing
its strategic plan will also help strengthen NCS's ability to
efficiently and effectively allocate resources, inform key
stakeholders, and provide agency and congressional decision makers the
ability to assess NCS's programs and initiatives.
As part of strategic planning, it is important that related performance
measures are linked and support NCS strategic goals, as well as DHS's
strategic goal of ensuring continuity of communications. In the absence
of performance measures for the key functions NCS performs as the lead
for the federal government's efforts to protect critical communications
and as the coordinator for ESF-2, NCS cannot reasonably measure or
demonstrate how these core program activities are contributing to
achieving all three of its strategic goals and DHS's overall mission of
providing continuity of communications. For a performance measure to be
used effectively, it is essential that a measure's definitions, and its
intended use, are consistent with the methodology used to calculate it.
While NCS acknowledges that its primary performance measure for its
priority calling programs--call completion rate--does not capture all
WPS calls completed and is exploring ways to capture the full spectrum
of uncompleted, by not revising the measure in the meantime to
accurately portray what is being measured, NCS continues to
inaccurately measure performance and provide potentially misleading
information to decision makers. Similarly, by not adjusting the
performance targets that intend to measure number of subscribers and
average costs to build upon and reflect previous years' results, NCS
cannot make valid comparisons to measure improvement over time, and
cannot ensure whether performance goals are reasonable and appropriate.
Beyond adjusting targets for the number of subscribers, opportunities
exist to make these measures more outcome oriented to reflect the
progress in reaching NCS's ultimate goals for the number of subscribers
to its GETS and WPS programs. However, without clearly defining or
demonstrating how its ultimate subscriber goals achieve the result of
ensuring the availability of communications capabilities for NS/EP
personnel who need these services, it will remain difficult to measure
progress. To its credit, NCS has identified federal continuity
coordinators as critical NS/EP personnel needing access to its programs
and has developed an outcome measure to track progress in enlisting and
maintaining this group of subscribers. However, without similar
measures for other groups that play a significant role in coordinating
emergency response and continuity of government, NCS will not be in a
position to evaluate its efforts to reach out, target, and ultimately
provide priority calling programs to these groups.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To help ensure that NCS management has sufficient information needed to
assess and improve NCS's programs and new initiatives and to
effectively support budget decisions, we recommend that the Secretary
of DHS direct the Manager of the NCS to take the following three
actions:
* Develop program plans for the NS/EP NGN initiative that outline an
acquisition approach based on available technologies, realistic cost
estimates, and that include mitigation plans to address identified
challenges and risks.
* Follow best practices for strategic planning in finalizing the NCS
strategic plan including identifying the resources needed to achieve
its strategic goals and objectives and providing a description of the
relationship between planned initiatives such as the NS/EP NGN and
strategic goals.
* Strengthen NCS's performance measurement efforts by (1) developing
measures to cover all core program activities, (2) exploring
opportunities to develop more outcome-oriented measures, (3) ensuring
performance measure baselines are reliable and based upon past
performance, (4) and improving the clarity of its call completion
measure.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided DHS a draft of this report for review and comment. DHS
provided written comments on August 7, 2009, which are summarized below
and presented in their entirety in appendix VI. DHS also provided
technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.
DHS disagreed with the recommendation in our draft report that it
develop an evaluation plan for its satellite program that includes
milestones for continued implementation and a methodology for assessing
the results of the pilot before moving forward with the program.
Specifically, DHS noted that the pilot program, which was on hold at
the time of our review, was now complete. However, at the conclusion of
our field work, our understanding from the NCS Director was that the
pilot was on hold and that NCS was reassessing various aspects of the
pilot such as conducting a cost-benefit analysis to determine which
satellite provider and equipment to use. In light of this discrepancy,
we subsequently obtained clarification on the status of the pilot. Our
discussion with DHS revealed that the pilot program was terminated
rather than completed. In providing clarification, DHS stated that it
agreed with our assessment that the pilot program needed improved
planning and metrics documentation and that NCS took a number of issues
into consideration including the current availability of push-to-talk
capability among existing satellite service providers to determine
whether the pilot should be continued. Given these considerations, as
well as the issues that we identified such as lack of program
objectives, documentation and metrics, NCS terminated the pilot.
According to NCS, about $900,000 had already been spent or obligated to
support various activities for the pilot program. According to NCS
officials, the remaining $1 million for the pilot will be reprogrammed
and any funds that had already been obligated but not yet spent will be
deobligated and also reprogrammed for other priority communications
services. Thus, based on the termination of the pilot, we withdrew our
recommendation and have modified our report to reflect the current
status of the pilot.
DHS concurred with our recommendation that it develop program plans for
the NS/EP NGN initiative that outline an acquisition approach based on
available technologies, realistic cost estimates, and that include
mitigation plans to address identified challenges and risks. Although
it concurred with our recommendation, DHS also reported that NCS
currently follows a structured approach in the design and
implementation of program plans and that it assesses industry trends to
help determine program enhancements and mitigation plans. Developing
program plans for the NS/EP NGN initiative as we recommended can help
NCS minimize cost overruns and schedule delays and help ensure that it
is developing services that meet the needs of the NS/EP community.
DHS concurred with our recommendation that NCS follow best practices
for strategic planning in finalizing the NCS strategic plan including
identifying the resources needed to achieve its strategic goals and
objectives and providing a description of the relationship between
planned initiatives, such as the NS/EP NGN, and strategic goals. DHS
stated that all NCS activities are directly linked to its mission and
associated performance measures. Finalizing its strategic plan as we
have recommended will help provide decision makers with information to
help them assess NCS's programs and initiatives.
With regard to our recommendation that NCS strengthen its performance
measurement efforts by (1) developing measures to cover all core
program activities, (2) exploring opportunities to develop more outcome-
oriented measures, (3) ensuring performance measure baselines are
reliable and based upon past performance, and (4) improving the clarity
of its call completion measure, DHS concurred. Specifically, DHS
reported that NCS will continue to develop performance measures. Taking
action to strengthen its performance measures as we recommended should
help NCS improve its ability to evaluate its efforts to reach out,
target, and provide priority calling programs.
DHS also commented on the report's discussion of subscriber database
accuracy, stating that it disagreed with what it viewed as our
assertion that NCS should be able to easily determine whether certain
individuals serving in public positions were still entitled to be GETS
subscribers, as well as our expectation that NCS terminate access for
individuals regardless of whether the subscriber's organization has
notified NCS to do so. DHS also highlighted the steps that NCS takes to
help ensure agency points of contact keep NCS's subscriber database
updated. We modified the report to better recognize the role agency
Points of Contacts play in updating NCS's database.
DHS also noted that the report suggested that NCS's outreach efforts
are limited to a select number of activities and noted that NCS also
meets with other governmental bodies. We have modified our report to
clarify the discussion that these are examples of outreach efforts that
are not intended to be inclusive of all of NCS's efforts.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and any other interested
parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777, or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in Appendix VII.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
William O. Jenkins, Jr.
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: The NCS Organization Structure:
The National Communications System (NCS) was established by a
memorandum signed by President Kennedy in 1963, in the wake of the
communications challenges that arose during the Cuban Missile Crisis
when, according to NCS, delays in sending and receiving communications
between the United States and foreign governments involved in the
crisis threatened to further complicate the crisis. The original
memorandum which has been amended and superseded over time, called for
establishing a national communications system by linking together, and
improving the communications assets of various federal agencies.
[Footnote 71] Such a system is to provide the necessary communications
for the federal government under all conditions ranging from normal
conditions to domestic emergencies and international crises. Today,
Executive Order 12,472 is the primary federal guidance in force that
dictates the composition and functions of the NCS. Executive Order
12,472 defined the NCS as those telecommunications assets owned or
leased by the federal departments, agencies, or entities that comprise
the NCS that can meet the national security and emergency preparedness
(NS/EP) needs of the federal government together with a management
structure that could ensure that a national telecommunications
infrastructure is developed that is responsive to NS/EP needs, among
other things. Executive Order 12,472 which was amended by Executive
Order 13,286 on February 28, 2003, provided that NCS's mission is to
assist the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland
Security Council,[Footnote 72] the Directors of the Office of Science
and Technology and Office of Management and Budget in, among other
responsibilities, "the coordination of the planning for and provision
of NS/EP communications for the Federal government under all
circumstances, including crisis or emergency, attack, recovery, and
reconstitution."
The NCS organization structure largely consists of federal entities.
However, the telecommunications industry serves in an advisory capacity
to the federal government on matters regarding NS/EP communications. A
description of the roles and responsibilities of the entities that
comprise the NCS organization follows. See figure 4 for an illustration
of the current NCS management structure.
* Executive Office of the President (EOP). Within the EOP, the National
Security Council (NSC), the Homeland Security Council (HSC), the Office
of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), and the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) have varying responsibilities for setting the policy
direction for NS/EP communications and providing oversight of the
NCS.[Footnote 73] For example, in consultation with the Executive Agent
and a group of federal telecommunications officers (known as the NCS
Committee of Principals), the EOP helps to determine NS/EP
telecommunications requirements.
* NCS Executive Agent. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002,
the functions and responsibilities of the NCS Executive Agent were
transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security.[Footnote 74] Among
other things, the Executive Agent is responsible for ensuring that the
NCS conducts unified planning and operations, in order to coordinate
the development and maintenance of an effective and responsive
capability for meeting the domestic and international NS/EP
telecommunications needs for the federal government as well as ensuring
coordination with emergency management activities of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). Additionally, the Executive Agent designates
the NCS Manager and oversees related activities including the delivery
of priority communications programs (such as Government Emergency
Telecommunications Service (GETS) and the Wireless Priority Service
(WPS)).
* Office of the Manager, NCS. The Office of the Manager, NCS (OMNCS)
falls under the Office of Cyber Security and Communications which is
part of the National Protection and Programs Directorate within DHS.
The responsibilities of the NCS Manager include, among other
responsibilities, preparing for consideration by the NCS Committee of
Principals and the Executive Agent:
- recommendations on an evolutionary telecommunications architecture to
meet current and future NS/EP needs; and:
- plans and procedures for the management, allocation and use,
including the establishment of priorities or preferences, of federally
owned or leased telecommunications assets under all conditions of
crisis or emergency.
Additionally, the NCS Manager is responsible for implementing and
administering any approved plans or programs as assigned, including any
system of priorities and preferences for the provision of
communications service, in consultation with the NCS Committee of
Principals and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to the
extent practicable or otherwise required by law or regulation. Further,
the NCS Manager is to conduct technical studies or analyses for the
purpose of identifying improved approaches which may assist in
fulfilling NS/EP telecommunications objectives, among other things.
Additionally, in consultation with the NCS Committee of Principals and
other appropriate entities of the federal government, the NCS Manager
is to ensure that, where feasible, existing and evolutionary industry,
national, and international standards are used as the basis for federal
telecommunications standards. The OMNCS also includes the National
Coordinating Center--a joint industry-government entity--which assists
in coordinating the initiation and restoration of NS/EP communications
services and is involved in critical infrastructure protection of
telecommunications assets.
* NCS Committee of Principals. According to NCS, this collaborative
body, chaired by the NCS Manager comprises of the key
telecommunications officers of those agencies designated by the
President that own or lease telecommunications assets of significance
to national security or emergency preparedness, and other executive
entities which bear policy, regulatory, or enforcement responsibilities
of importance to NS/EP telecommunications capabilities. Currently, the
NCS Committee of Principals includes representatives from 24 federal
departments and agencies--known as the NCS Member Agencies.[Footnote
75] In accordance with Executive Order 12,472, the NCS Committee of
Principals, among other things, provides comments and recommendations
to the National Security Council, the Director of OSTP, the OMB
Director, the NCS Executive Agent, or NCS Manager regarding ongoing or
prospective activities of the NCS. According to NCS, the NCS Committee
of Principals, in accordance with its bylaws, has established subgroups
such as the NCS Council of Representatives to help support the work
activities of the NCS. Further, the NCS Committee of Principals
established other groups such as the Priority Services Working Group to
analyze the potential impact of future technologies on priority
services programs and examine the outreach efforts for the GETS and WPS
programs, among other things.
* The National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC).
The NSTAC was established in 1982 by Executive Order 12,382 to serve as
an advisory committee to the President on matters related to NS/EP
communications and may comprise of no more than 30 industry leaders
appointed by the President. The NSTAC members are usually chief
executive officers, from the telecommunications companies, network
service providers, information technology firms, finance, and aerospace
companies.[Footnote 76] As we previously reported, over the course of
its longstanding relationship with the NSTAC, the NCS has worked
closely with NSTAC member companies during emergency response and
recovery activities following a terrorist attack or natural disaster.
[Footnote 77] For example, after the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, NSTAC member companies immediately coordinated with NCS to
assist with communication restoration efforts despite the fact that
some of their network infrastructure had been among the most severely
damaged. As we have previously reported, the NCS and NSTAC share
information on a variety of issues including federal policies related
to NS/EP communications and changes in the telecommunications
marketplace. The NSTAC has also issued multiple reports addressing a
wide range of policy and technical issues regarding communications,
information systems, information assurance, critical infrastructure
protection, and other NS/EP communications concerns. For example, in
2006, NSTAC issued a report that identified challenges related to NS/EP
communications and provided recommendations to the President intended
to help ensure that next generation network initiatives meet NS/EP
user's need, among other things.[Footnote 78] As provided under
Executive Order 12,382, the NSTAC has established subgroups such as the
Industry Executive Committee to help it carry out its functions.
[Footnote 79]
Figure 4: NCS Management Structure:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Top level:
Executive Office of the President: HSC; NSC; OMB; OSTP;
* Advise to NCS Committee of Principals (Government Arm) at second
level;
* Advise to National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
(Industry Arm) at second level.
Second level, reporting to Executive Office of the President:
Secretary of Homeland Security; NCS Executive Agent;
* Coordination with NCS Committee of Principals (Government Arm);
* Coordination with National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee (Industry Arm).
Third level, reporting to Secretary of Homeland Security:
Office of the Manager, NCS (OMNCS):
* Manager, NCS;
* Deputy Manager, NCS;
* Deputy Manager, NCS and Director;
* OMNCS Staff.
Direction given to NCS Committee of Principals (Government Arm);
Coordination with National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee (Industry Arm).
Third level, Government Arm:
NCS Committee of Principals; direction to:
* NCS Council of Representatives;
* Working Groups.
Third level, Industry Arm:
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee; direction to:
* Industry Executive Committee;
* Task Force and Ad Hoc Groups.
Fourth level, reporting to Office of the Manager, NCS (OMNCS):
NCS Member Agencies: DOS; DOC; CIA; NTIA; TREAS; DHHS; FEMA; NSA; DOD;
DOT; JS; USPS; DOJ; DOE; GSA; FRB; DOI; VA; NASA; FCC; USDA; DHS; NRC;
ODNI.
Source: NCS.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix II: Objectives, Scope and Methodology:
To analyze the extent to which the National Communications System (NCS)
provides priority communications programs, we reviewed relevant
legislation, regulations and other documentation that outline NCS
responsibilities in ensuring the continuity of communication including
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Executive Orders 12,472 and 13,231,
and NCS Directive 3-10. We also reviewed budget requests, annual
reports, the Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) reports
submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),[Footnote 80]
and other documentation related to NCS activities. We also obtained and
reviewed relevant agency documents such as internal briefings, program
planning documents, and standard operating procedures that describe how
Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and the Wireless
Priority Service (WPS) operate and the capabilities that each program
delivers. We obtained information on the mechanisms NCS utilizes to
collect, track and analyze the performance of GETS and WPS. In
addition, we obtained and analyzed data on the performance of GETS and
WPS during select emergency or national special security events such as
the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, the September 11, 2001, attacks,
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the 2009 Presidential Inauguration,
among others. We also interviewed NCS officials to obtain information
on the agency's role in ensuring continuity of communications, the
types of priority communications capabilities it provides to the
national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) community--
specifically through the GETS, WPS, and Telecommunications Service
Priority (TSP) programs--as well as the types of challenges, if any,
the agency may face in providing these services. We interviewed
officials from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to obtain
information on the agency's role in providing emergency communications,
including how it works with NCS in providing priority communications
capabilities. Furthermore, we interviewed telecommunications industry
representatives from AT&T, Qwest Communications, and Verizon that are
among the U.S. telephone carriers that provide NS/EP communications
services. Although their views cannot be generalized to all
telecommunications companies that provide NS/EP communications, the
information we obtained helped to enhance our understanding of their
role in providing emergency communications and their views on the
impact the next generation network (NGN) technology transition may have
on NCS's priority communication programs.
We also interviewed NS/EP officials from a non-probability sample of 15
states and 13 localities[Footnote 81] to obtain their perspectives and
views on the NCS and its priority communication programs. Specifically,
we obtained information from these officials regarding (1) their
awareness of the NCS and the GETS, WPS, and TSP programs; (2) the
extent they had utilized these programs in responding to an emergency
situation and/or in their training and exercise activities; and (3)
their perspectives on the benefits of these priority calling programs
and potential barriers to participation. In selecting these states and
localities, we considered a variety of factors including (1) the
frequency and types of declared disasters by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), (2) geographic dispersion, and (3)
topographical factors that could affect the functionality of
communications. The selected states and localities represent a range of
natural disasters, terrains, climates, and population densities and
also include areas that have recently experienced high-profile natural
disasters or man-made attacks. While the perspectives of the officials
we interviewed cannot be generalized to reflect the views of NS/EP
emergency management officials in all states and localities, we believe
the perspectives of the officials in these locations provided us with
an overview and useful information on the NCS and the priority
communications programs it provides.
To determine how NCS enlists subscribers and controls access to its
priority programs, we collected and analyzed documentation, and
interviewed NCS officials (1) on subscriber eligibility criteria, (2)
to determine NCS's outreach efforts to enlist new subscribers for its
priority calling programs, and (3) to identify its internal controls
for controlling access to these programs. With regards to NCS's
outreach efforts, we obtained and reviewed documentation such as
brochures, newsletters, and conference schedules on NCS outreach
efforts including its use of regional outreach coordinators and its
awareness booth deployments at various emergency management
conferences. We also attended several NCS user-focused meetings and
obtained documentation which detailed NCS efforts to attract new
subscribers and provide support to current subscribers. To determine
what internal controls NCS utilizes to grant and control access to its
priority calling programs, we obtained the NCS standard operating
procedures for GETS and WPS programs which outlined the procedures and
processes to participate in the programs including the eligibility
criteria, the approval process, and the re-validation process. We also
obtained NCS standard operating procedures and compared them with
criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.
[Footnote 82] To determine whether NCS adhered to its procedures for
terminating access for subscribers who no longer meet the programs'
eligibility criteria, we reviewed a nonprobability sample of records
for 76 former federal and 9 former state government officials including
former members of the U.S. Senate as well as members and delegates of
the U.S. House of Representatives for the 109th Congress; immediate
past heads of federal departments and agencies as of August 2008; and
immediate past governors of U.S. states and territories as of August
2008, which is when we obtained the subscriber data. We selected these
groups because they served in public positions that would allow NCS to
easily determine that their positions ended, and in turn, work with the
subscriber's organization to update account status, as appropriate.
Although the results of our work cannot be generalized to evaluate the
effectiveness of controls used for all NCS program subscribers, the
information obtained provided us with useful information about the
extent to which subscriber records for these groups were terminated
following a change in the subscriber's eligibility status. Because the
subscriber database, in its entirety, is classified, we have limited
our reporting of the results of our analysis to only nonclassified
information; however, this does not affect our findings.
To assess the reliability of these data, we reviewed the data for
obvious problems with completeness or accuracy and interviewed
knowledgeable agency officials and contract support staff about the
data quality control processes and reviewed relevant documentation such
as the database dictionary that describes the data fields in the
subscriber database. When we found discrepancies (such as duplicate
records), we brought them to the attention of NCS officials and its
contract support staff to better understand the nature of the
discrepancies and resulting impact on our work. We performed electronic
testing on the data and found the data to be sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of this report.
To determine what challenges can affect NCS's delivery of its priority
communications programs, we interviewed relevant NCS officials who have
responsibilities for these programs. We also obtained information and
reviewed documentation from the agency regarding its efforts to
implement the Satellite Priority Service pilot program, as well as its
efforts to leverage NGN technology in its priority communication
programs. We compared this information with our previous work on pilot
program planning and technology acquisition.[Footnote 83]
To assess NCS's overall planning and evaluation efforts, we interviewed
NCS officials and reviewed relevant documentation regarding their
strategic planning efforts and the mechanisms they use to evaluate
their services. Specifically, we reviewed and analyzed NCS's draft
strategic plan to determine the extent to which the plan outlined the
agency's short and long term strategic goals and objectives, the
associated time frames with their identified goals and objectives, the
current status of the goals and objectives and internal and external
factors that may affect their ability to achieve their goals and
objectives. We also obtained and reviewed the OMB Performance
Assessment Rating Tool, NCS's Congressional Budget Justifications, and
other documents that outlined the performance measures utilized to
assess the extent they are achieving their goals and objectives; and
planned milestones and spending for their priority calling programs. To
assess the effectiveness of NCS planning efforts, we compared their
efforts with federal best practices contained in our past reports which
discussed the importance of strategic planning.[Footnote 84] We also
utilized guidance from OMB Circular A-11, and related federal
legislation, such as the Government Performance and Results Acts of
1993, which identifies the six key element of a strategic plan.
[Footnote 85] In addition, we interviewed NCS officials about their
strategic planning efforts and the mechanisms they use to monitor and
evaluate their services. While NCS is not required to explicitly follow
these guidelines, the guidelines do provide a framework for effectively
developing a strategic plan and the basis for program accountability.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through August 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence provides a reasonable basis for our findings based on our
audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Telecommunications Service Priority Program:
The Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) program provides priority
provisioning and restoration of telecommunications services that
support emergency operations facilities for certain federal, state, and
local governments and other entities. Such services include equipment
used to transmit voice and data communication by wire, cable, and
satellite, among other things. During and following an emergency event,
wireless and wireline carriers may receive numerous requests for new
telecommunications service as well as for the restoration of existing
services. Under this program, telecommunications carriers and their
partners (collectively referred to as service vendors) are required to
restore national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP)
telecommunications services that suffer outage, or are reported as
unusable or otherwise in need of restoration, before non-NS/EP
services.[Footnote 86] As with Government Emergency Telecommunications
Service (GETS) and the Wireless Priority Service (WPS), certain
government agencies and other groups are identified as having specific
NS/EP responsibilities that qualify them for priority provisioning and
restoration of services. However, unlike GETS and WPS, for which new
subscriptions can be requested and approved during emergency response
and recovery activities, authorization to receive TSP priority services
must be in place before it is needed. Although the federal government
does not charge a fee, telecommunications service providers (such as
wireless carriers and cable and satellite providers) may charge an
initial startup fee of up to $100 per circuit and a monthly fee of up
to $10 per circuit.[Footnote 87] The National Communications System
(NCS) reported that as of fiscal year 2008, over 1,000 organizations
have registered more than 191,000 circuits under the TSP program.
Telecommunications personnel have traditionally faced difficulties in
accessing disaster areas in order to make TSP repairs to communications
assets. According to telecommunications representatives that are part
of the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC) within
NCS, access for repair crews to disasters areas has been an issue
dating back to Hurricane Hugo in 1989, and during the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina. For example, an independent panel formed to examine
the telecommunications challenges during Hurricane Katrina, reported
that inconsistent and unclear requirements for repair crews and their
subcontractors to gain access to the affected area impeded their
efforts to make necessary repairs including those that they are
required to complete under the TSP program.[Footnote 88] The panel
reported that there were no mechanisms in place to issue credentials to
those who needed them prior to Hurricane Katrina making landfall.
Consequently, personnel from telecommunications companies were unable
to gain access to repair some communications assets in the disaster
area because they lacked the necessary credentials to access these
areas. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana authorities,
among others, provided credentials to telecommunications repair crews
to permit them access to certain affected areas; however,
telecommunications personnel reported that within disaster areas,
credentials that permitted access through one checkpoint would not be
honored at another. In addition these personnel reported that in some
cases the checkpoints required different documentation and
credentialing before granting access to repair personnel. As a result,
repair personnel had to carry multiple credentials and letters from
various federal, state, and local officials authorizing their access to
the disaster area. Furthermore, telecommunications personnel were
unclear about which government agency had the authority to issue the
necessary credentials. Similarly, repair crews reported that other
factors delayed or interrupted the delivery of TSP services, such as
the enforcement of curfews and other security procedures intended to
maintain law and order.
Although the full scope of these credentialing issues is outside NCS's
jurisdiction, under the communications annex of the revised 2008
National Response Framework, NCS is to coordinate with other emergency
support function 2 (ESF-2) support agencies, among others, to ensure
that telecommunications repair personnel have access to restore
communications infrastructure in the incident area. To help facilitate
this, NCS has taken steps to work with federal, state, and local
government agencies as well as the private sector to identify
solutions. For instance, NCS has coordinated with emergency management
officials in Georgia and Louisiana to develop standard operating
procedures to ensure access for critical infrastructure workers during
emergencies or disasters. NCS officials also told us that they have
begun to catalog the access procedures for various states and
localities that could be provided to telecommunications personnel in
order to facilitate access to damaged infrastructure in the aftermath
of an emergency or disaster. In addition, other federal agencies, such
as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), have also taken
steps to address this issue. For example, in November 2008, FEMA
released for comment credentialing guidelines for essential personnel
who need access to disaster areas in order to facilitate response,
recovery and restoration efforts.[Footnote 89] The guidelines are
intended to provide a uniform approach at the state and local level to
provide telecommunications repair personnel, among others with access
and credentials needed to enter a disaster area in order to expedite
the restoration of communication capabilities.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GETS and WPS Performance during Select Emergency Events:
Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and the Wireless
Priority Service (WPS) are designed to achieve a probability that 90
percent of calls made using these services will successfully connect.
The ability to communicate is critical to coordinating emergency
response and recovery efforts during the first 72 hours following an
emergency; however, the availability of communications can be disrupted
by increased call volume or outages that occur in wireline and wireless
networks. According to NCS, telephone calls made without the use of
GETS or WPS during nonemergency periods generally result in a 99
percent likelihood of successful completion--that is the (1) called
party answers the call, (2) called number rings but is not answered, or
(3) called number responds with a busy signal. However, during a
disaster or emergency event, NCS officials stated that the public
switched telephone network (PSTN) can experience up to 10 times the
normal call volume. Conversely, without using GETS or WPS,
approximately 9 out of every 10 calls would not complete during a time
period when the PSTN is highly congested.
NCS's priority calling programs services have been used to facilitate
communications across the spectrum of emergencies and other major
events dating back to the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombings through the
recent 2009 Presidential Inauguration. GETS and WPS usage has varied
greatly during disasters or emergencies as the programs have evolved
and the programs have generally achieved call completion rates that
range from 68 percent to 99 percent. For example, during the 1995
Oklahoma City bombings, of 429 GETS calls attempted 291 calls that may
not have otherwise been completed due to network overload reached the
intended destination number and resulted in a call completion rate of
about 68 percent.[Footnote 90] In contrast, during Hurricane Katrina in
2005, the number of GETS calls attempted was 28,556, of which 27,058
(or 95 percent) were successfully completed (see table 5).
Additionally, GETS and WPS capabilities were also used during the 2003
power outage that affected New York City and other areas. During this
event, there were fewer GETS and WPS calls made in comparison to other
events; however, the call completion rates for the duration of the
event were 92 percent and 82 percent respectively.
Table 5: GETS and WPS Performance during Select Emergency Events:
Event: September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks;
Time frame following onset of event: 24 hours;
Date: 11-Sep-01;
GETS calls attempted: 2,283;
GETS calls completed: 2,025;
GETS call completion rate: 89%;
GETS cards distributed: 100;
WPS calls attempted (a): Data unavailable as WPS did not yet exist;
WPS calls completed (b): Data unavailable as WPS did not yet exist;
WPS Call completion rate: Data unavailable as WPS did not yet exist.
Time frame following onset of event: 48 hours;
Date: 12-Sep-01;
GETS calls attempted: 628;
GETS calls completed: 556;
GETS call completion rate: 89%;
GETS cards distributed: 100;
WPS calls attempted (a): Data unavailable as WPS did not yet exist;
WPS calls completed (b): Data unavailable as WPS did not yet exist;
WPS Call completion rate: Data unavailable as WPS did not yet exist.
Time frame following onset of event: 72 hours;
Date: 13-Sep-01;
GETS calls attempted: 675;
GETS calls completed: 617;
GETS call completion rate: 91%;
GETS cards distributed: 155;
WPS calls attempted (a): Data unavailable as WPS did not yet exist;
WPS calls completed (b): Data unavailable as WPS did not yet exist;
WPS Call completion rate: Data unavailable as WPS did not yet exist.
Time frame following onset of event: Total duration of event;
Date: 11-27 Sep-01;
GETS calls attempted: 19,071;
GETS calls completed: 18,117;
GETS call completion rate: 95%;
GETS cards distributed: 1,956;
WPS calls attempted (a): Data unavailable as WPS did not yet exist;
WPS calls completed (b): Data unavailable as WPS did not yet exist;
WPS Call completion rate: Data unavailable as WPS did not yet exist.
Event: 2003 Northeastern Blackout;
Time frame following onset of event: 24 hours;
Date: 14-Aug-03;
GETS calls attempted: 658;
GETS calls completed: 604;
GETS call completion rate: 92%;
GETS cards distributed: 21;
WPS calls attempted (a): 22;
WPS calls completed (b): 13;
WPS Call completion rate: 59%.
Time frame following onset of event: 48 hours;
Date: 15-Aug-03;
GETS calls attempted: 344;
GETS calls completed: 308;
GETS call completion rate: 90%;
GETS cards distributed: 20;
WPS calls attempted (a): 38;
WPS calls completed (b): 28;
WPS Call completion rate: 74%.
Time frame following onset of event: 72 hours;
Date: 16-Aug-03;
GETS calls attempted: 85;
GETS calls completed: 85;
GETS call completion rate: 100%;
GETS cards distributed: 0;
WPS calls attempted (a): 56;
WPS calls completed (b): 55;
WPS Call completion rate: 98%.
Time frame following onset of event: Total duration of event;
Date: 14-16 Aug-03;
GETS calls attempted: 1,087;
GETS calls completed: 997;
GETS call completion rate: 92%;
GETS cards distributed: 41;
WPS calls attempted (a): 116;
WPS calls completed (b): 95;
WPS Call completion rate: 82%.
Event: 2005 Hurricane Katrina;
Time frame following onset of event: 24 hours;
Date: 29-Aug-05;
GETS calls attempted: 1,075;
GETS calls completed: 1,030;
GETS call completion rate: 96%;
GETS cards distributed: 208;
WPS calls attempted (a): 656;
WPS calls completed (b): 611;
WPS Call completion rate: 93%.
Time frame following onset of event: 48 hours;
Date: 30-Aug-05;
GETS calls attempted: 2,071;
GETS calls completed: 1,989;
GETS call completion rate: 96%;
GETS cards distributed: 109;
WPS calls attempted (a): 1,400;
WPS calls completed (b): 1,217;
WPS Call completion rate: 87%.
Time frame following onset of event: 72 hours;
Date: 31-Aug-05;
GETS calls attempted: 2,345;
GETS calls completed: 2,236;
GETS call completion rate: 95%;
GETS cards distributed: 166;
WPS calls attempted (a): 1,728;
WPS calls completed (b): 1,528;
WPS Call completion rate: 88%.
Time frame following onset of event: Total duration of event;
Date: 29 Aug-09 Sep-05;
GETS calls attempted: 28,556;
GETS calls completed: 27,058;
GETS call completion rate: 95%;
GETS cards distributed: 1,027;
WPS calls attempted (a): 3,784;
WPS calls completed (b): 3,356;
WPS Call completion rate: 89%.
Event: 2005 Hurricane Rita;
Time frame following onset of event: 24 hours;
Date: 22-Sep-05;
GETS calls attempted: 1,783;
GETS calls completed: 1,628;
GETS call completion rate: 91%;
GETS cards distributed: 0;
WPS calls attempted (a): 471;
WPS calls completed (b): 428;
WPS Call completion rate: 91%.
Time frame following onset of event: 48 hours;
Date: 23-Sep-05;
GETS calls attempted: 1,211;
GETS calls completed: 1,107;
GETS call completion rate: 91%;
GETS cards distributed: 0;
WPS calls attempted (a): 728;
WPS calls completed (b): 617;
WPS Call completion rate: 85%.
Time frame following onset of event: 72 hours;
Date: 24-Sep-05;
GETS calls attempted: 817;
GETS calls completed: 756;
GETS call completion rate: 93%;
GETS cards distributed: 139;
WPS calls attempted (a): 621;
WPS calls completed (b): 540;
WPS Call completion rate: 87%.
Time frame following onset of event: Total duration of event;
Date: 22-29 Sep-05;
GETS calls attempted: 14,139;
GETS calls completed: 13,475;
GETS call completion rate: 95%;
GETS cards distributed: 1,356;
WPS calls attempted (a): 2,308;
WPS calls completed (b): 2,028;
WPS Call completion rate: 88%.
Event: 2007 San Diego Wildfires;
Time frame following onset of event: 24 hours;
Date: 24-Oct-05;
GETS calls attempted: 458;
GETS calls completed: 458;
GETS call completion rate: 100%;
GETS cards distributed: 0;
WPS calls attempted (a): 783;
WPS calls completed (b): 780;
WPS Call completion rate: 100%.
Time frame following onset of event: 48 hours;
Date: 25-Oct-05;
GETS calls attempted: 1,277;
GETS calls completed: 1,276;
GETS call completion rate: 100%;
GETS cards distributed: 317;
WPS calls attempted (a): 861;
WPS calls completed (b): 855;
WPS Call completion rate: 99%.
Time frame following onset of event: 72 hours;
Date: 26-Oct-05;
GETS calls attempted: 1,988;
GETS calls completed: 1,987;
GETS call completion rate: 100%;
GETS cards distributed: 141;
WPS calls attempted (a): 517;
WPS calls completed (b): 507;
WPS Call completion rate: 98%.
Time frame following onset of event: Total duration of event;
Date: 24-28 Oct-05;
GETS calls attempted: 5,152;
GETS calls completed: 5,147;
GETS call completion rate: 100%;
GETS cards distributed: 543;
WPS calls attempted (a): 2,617;
WPS calls completed (b): 2,582;
WPS Call completion rate: 99%.
Event: 2008 Hurricane Gustav;
Time frame following onset of event: 24 hours;
Date: 1-Sep-08;
GETS calls attempted: 1,200;
GETS calls completed: 1,199;
GETS call completion rate: 100%;
GETS cards distributed: 0;
WPS calls attempted (a): 395;
WPS calls completed (b): 369;
WPS Call completion rate: 93%.
Time frame following onset of event: 48 hours;
Date: 2-Sep-08;
GETS calls attempted: 1,404;
GETS calls completed: 1,401;
GETS call completion rate: 100%;
GETS cards distributed: 0;
WPS calls attempted (a): 611;
WPS calls completed (b): 588;
WPS Call completion rate: 96%.
Time frame following onset of event: 72 hours;
Date: 3-Sep-08;
GETS calls attempted: 517;
GETS calls completed: 503;
GETS call completion rate: 97%;
GETS cards distributed: 6;
WPS calls attempted (a): 785;
WPS calls completed (b): 765;
WPS Call completion rate: 97%.
Time frame following onset of event: Total duration of event;
Date: 1-3 Sep 2008;
GETS calls attempted: 7,026;
GETS calls completed: 6,923;
GETS call completion rate: 99%;
GETS cards distributed: 555;
WPS calls attempted (a): 3,311;
WPS calls completed (b): 3,028;
WPS Call completion rate: 91%.
Event: 2008 Hurricane Ike;
Time frame following onset of event: 24 hours;
Date: 11-Sep-08;
GETS calls attempted: 1,629;
GETS calls completed: 1,625;
GETS call completion rate: 100%;
GETS cards distributed: 53;
WPS calls attempted (a): 580;
WPS calls completed (b): 528;
WPS Call completion rate: 91%.
Time frame following onset of event: 48 hours;
Date: 12-Sep-08;
GETS calls attempted: 1,345;
GETS calls completed: 1,337;
GETS call completion rate: 99%;
GETS cards distributed: 52;
WPS calls attempted (a): 821;
WPS calls completed (b): 756;
WPS Call completion rate: 92%.
Time frame following onset of event: 72 hours;
Date: 13-Sep-08;
GETS calls attempted: 2,420;
GETS calls completed: 2,344;
GETS call completion rate: 97%;
GETS cards distributed: 0;
WPS calls attempted (a): 1,011;
WPS calls completed (b): 983;
WPS Call completion rate: 97%.
Time frame following onset of event: Total duration of event;
Date: 11-18 Sep-08;
GETS calls attempted: 17,525;
GETS calls completed: 17,301;
GETS call completion rate: 99%;
GETS cards distributed: 1,433;
WPS calls attempted (a): 7,231;
WPS calls completed (b): 6,884;
WPS Call completion rate: 95%.
Event: 2009 Presidential Inauguration;
Time frame following onset of event: 24 hours;
Date: 16-Jan-09;
GETS calls attempted: 1,260;
GETS calls completed: 1,235;
GETS call completion rate: 98%;
GETS cards distributed: 23;
WPS calls attempted (a): 536;
WPS calls completed (b): 372;
WPS Call completion rate: 69%.
Time frame following onset of event: 48 hours;
Date: 17-Jan-09;
GETS calls attempted: 228;
GETS calls completed: 228;
GETS call completion rate: 100%;
GETS cards distributed: 0;
WPS calls attempted (a): 86;
WPS calls completed (b): 58;
WPS Call completion rate: 67%.
Time frame following onset of event: 72 hours;
Date: 18-Jan-09;
GETS calls attempted: 222;
GETS calls completed: 220;
GETS call completion rate: 99%;
GETS cards distributed: 0;
WPS calls attempted (a): 156;
WPS calls completed (b): 96;
WPS Call completion rate: 62%.
Time frame following onset of event: Total duration of event;
Date: 16-20 Jan 2009;
GETS calls attempted: 4,032;
GETS calls completed: 4,005;
GETS call completion rate: 99%;
GETS cards distributed: 1,188;
WPS calls attempted (a): 1,615;
WPS calls completed (b): 1,050;
WPS Call completion rate: 65%.
Source: NCS.
Note: In some cases, call completion rate may not equal 100% due to
rounding.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: NS/EP Categories That Qualify for NCS's Priority
Telecommunications Services:
The National Communications System (NCS) uses five broad categories to
determine who may be eligible to participate in its priority calling
programs such as the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
(GETS) and the Wireless Priority Service (WPS). Eligible subscribers
may include personnel from federal, state, local, or tribal government;
as well as private industry and or non-profit organizations (see table
6 below for further detail on each of these categories). In addition,
these categories are used to prioritize WPS calls in order to further
ensure that communications are first available for senior executive
leaders and policy makers at the federal, state, and local government
level. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in response to
NCS's request, established these priority levels that are used to
determine which WPS calls are to receive the first available channel
with level five receiving the lowest priority (though all levels
receive priority over non-WPS callers).[Footnote 91] In the event of an
emergency and network congestion, the mobile switching center queues
the call according to the subscriber's priority level and call
initiation time. For example, authorized staff from the Executive
Office of the President would receive priority over national security
and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) officials who have responsibility
for public health and law enforcement if they placed calls at the same
time. NCS has not determined whether a similar approach is required for
the GETS program; however, if it is determined that a similar approach
is needed--NCS believes it can apply the WPS approach to the GETS
program. Table 6 also shows the priority level for each user category.
Table 6: NS/EP Categories That Qualify for NCS's Priority
Telecommunications Services:
NS/EP category: Executive Leadership and Policymakers;
Priority level: 1;
Description: Individuals in high-level government positions;
Examples of positions that could qualify for GETS and WPS:
* The President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense,
selected military leaders, and the minimum number of senior staff;
* Members of the United States Congress and senior staff;
* State governors, lieutenant governors, cabinet-level officials
responsible for public safety and health, and the minimum number of
senior staff;
* Mayors, county commissioners, and the minimum number of senior staff.
NS/EP category: Disaster Response/Military Command and Control;
Priority level: 2;
Description: Individuals eligible for this category include personnel
key to managing the initial response to an emergency at the local,
state, regional and federal levels. Personnel selected for this
priority level should be responsible for ensuring the viability or
reconstruction of the basic infrastructure in an emergency area. In
addition, personnel essential to continuity of government and national
security functions (such as the conduct of international affairs and
intelligence activities) are also included in this priority;
Examples of positions that could qualify for GETS and WPS:
* Federal emergency operations center coordinators, e.g., Manager,
National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications, National
Interagency Fire Center, Federal Coordinating Officer, Federal
Emergency Communications Coordinator, Director of Military Support;
* State emergency services director, National Guard Leadership, State
and Federal Damage Assessment Team Leaders;
* Federal, state and local personnel with continuity of government
responsibilities;
* Incident Command Center Managers, local emergency managers, other
state and local elected public safety officials;
* Federal personnel with intelligence and diplomatic responsibilities.
NS/EP category: Public Health, Safety, and Law Enforcement;
Priority level: 3;
Description: Individuals eligible for this category are individuals who
direct operations critical to life, property, and maintenance of law
and order immediately following an event;
Examples of positions that could qualify for GETS and WPS:
* Federal law enforcement command;
* State police leadership;
* Local fire and law enforcement command;
* Emergency medical service leaders;
* Search and rescue team leaders; * Emergency communications
coordinators.
NS/EP category: Public Services/Utilities and Public Welfare;
Priority level: 4;
Description: Individuals eligible for this category are those users
whose responsibilities include managing public works and utility
infrastructure damage assessment and restoration efforts and
transportation to accomplish emergency response activities;
Examples of positions that could qualify for GETS and WPS:
* Army Corps of Engineers leadership;
* Power, water and sewage and telecommunications utilities;
* Transportation Leadership.
NS/EP category: Disaster Recovery;
Priority level: 5;
Description: Individuals eligible for this category are those
individuals responsible for managing a variety of recovery operations
after the initial response has been accomplished. These functions may
include managing medical resources such as supplies, personnel, or
patients in medical facilities. Other activities such as coordination
to establish and stock shelters, to obtain detailed damage assessments,
or to support key disaster field office personnel may be included;
Examples of positions that could qualify for GETS and WPS:
* Medical recovery operations leadership;
* Detailed damage assessment leadership;
* Disaster shelter coordination and management;
* Critical Disaster Field Office support personnel.
Source: NCS.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Office of GAO/OIG Audit Liaison:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
August 7, 2009:
Mr. William O. Jenkins, Jr.
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Jenkins:
Subject: GAO 09-822, Emergency Communications: National Communications
System Provides Programs for Priority Calling, but Planning for New
Initiatives and Performance Measurement Could Be Strengthened:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity
to review and comment on the U.S. Government Accountability Office's
(GAO) draft report referenced above. The GAO came to several
conclusions with regard to the current state of the National
Communications System (NCS). The Department agrees with some of these
assertions and disagrees with others; we appreciate the opportunity to
clarify.
1. Recommendation: Develop an evaluation plan for its satellite pilot
program that includes milestones for continued implementation and a
methodology for assessing the results of the pilot before moving
forward with program.
DHS Response: Non-concur. The satellite pilot program is now complete.
At the time of the audit, it was on hold. Though the capability and
services offered by the pilot could be beneficial in catastrophic
events, NCS believes other, readily available technologies can fulfill
this requirement. During the course of the GAO discussion, the NCS
realized the objectives and goals of the pilot were met. Specifically,
it proved that Government Emergency Telecommunication Service (GETS) is
interoperable with satellite communications, there is no priority to
satellite mobiles, and that satellite phones have evolved to be similar
in operation to cellular phones. Lessons learned are being developed to
reflect NCS's analysis of the pilot.
2. Recommendation: Develop program plans for the NS/EP Next Generation
Network (NGN) initiative that outline an acquisition approach based on
available technologies, realistic cost estimates, and that include
mitigation plans to address identified challenges and risk.
DHS Response: Concur. The NCS follows a structured approach in its
design, development, and implementation of program plans. The NCS
assesses industry trends to identify technology insertion for both
program enhancements and mitigation plans.
3. Recommendation: Follow best practices for strategic planning in
finalizing the NCS strategic plan including identifying the resources
needed to achieve its strategic goals and objectives and providing a
description of the relationship between planned initiatives such as the
NS/EP NGN and strategic goals.
DHS Response: Concur. NCS has worked diligently to identify and acquire
resources, and to map program initiatives to its own mission and the
Department's broader strategic direction. All NCS activities are
directly linked to the mission and the associated performance measures.
4. Recommendation: Strengthen NCS's performance measurement efforts by
(1) developing measures to cover all core program activities, (2)
exploring opportunities to develop more outcome-oriented measures, (3)
ensuring performance measure baselines are reliable and based upon past
performance, and (4) improving the clarity of its call completion
measure.
DHS Response: Concur. NCS will continue to develop performance measures
at all levels to monitor strategic progress and program success, align
priorities, and link programs and operations to mission, resource
priorities, and strategic objectives.
In its review of subscriber database accuracy, DHS disagrees with the
GAO's statements that NCS should be able to easily determine whether
certain individuals serving in public positions were still entitled to
be GETS subscribers. GAO expects NCS to terminate access for such
individuals regardless of whether the subscriber's organization has
notified NCS to do so. The NCS does, in counsel with agency Point of
Contacts (POCs), perform updates to the subscriber database. NCS also
reminds POCs at user conferences to keep databases updated, and has
instituted quarterly reminders for subscribers' POCs.
Finally, the report suggests that NCS's outreach efforts are limited to
attendance at emergency management conferences, writing articles for
emergency management and telecommunications publications, as well as
deploying outreach coordinators to promote NCS's priority calling
programs. In addition to these efforts, the NCS also meets with other
governmental bodies, which should be reflected in this report.
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
William O. Jenkins, 202-512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Kirk Kiester, Assistant
Director, and Candice Wright, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this review.
Mark Abraham, Flavio Martinez, and Daniel Paepke made significant
contributions to the work. David Alexander and Arthur James assisted
with design, methodology, and data analysis. Sally Williamson provided
assistance in report preparation. Pille Anvelt provided assistance with
the report's graphics.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Telecommunications is defined as the electronic transmission of
information, including voice and data, over a long distance for the
purpose of communicating.
[2] Data obtained from the Cellular Telecommunications and Internet
Association, an industry trade association.
[3] The NCS is both a national communications system that brings
together the telecommunications assets owned or leased by the federal
government that can meet the federal government's communications needs
to support its national security and emergency preparedness activities
as well as a management structure intended to ensure that a national
telecommunications infrastructure is developed that is responsive to
these needs. The management structure includes (1) an office within DHS
that consists of the Office of the Manager, NCS, which includes the
National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications, and (2) an
interagency body of NCS member agencies, which is a consortium of 24
federal departments and agencies.
[4] NS/EP personnel include officials from across all levels of
government including members of Congress, personnel in federal
departments and agencies with continuity of government
responsibilities, state governors, mayors, fire and police chiefs, and
state and local government emergency managers.
[5] NS/EP communications are telecommunications services used to
maintain a constant state of readiness--24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
365 days a year--or to respond to and manage any event or crisis that
can (1) create injury or harm to the population and (2) threaten the
NS/EP posture of the nation, among other things.
[6] Nonprobability sampling is a method of sampling when nonstatistical
judgment is used to select members of the sample, usually specific
characteristics of the population as criteria. Results from
nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a
population, because in a nonprobability sample some elements of the
population being studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being
selected as part of the sample.
[7] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[8] GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Strengthen Its Approach for
Evaluating the SRFMI Data-Sharing Pilot Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-45] (Washington, D.C.: November 7,
2008); and Information Technology: DHS Needs to Fully Define and
Implement Policies and Procedures for Effectively Managing Investments,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-424] (Washington, D.C.:
April 27, 2007).
[9] PART consists of a standard series of questions intended to
determine the strengths and weaknesses of federal programs. The PART
questions cover four broad topics--(1) program purpose and design, (2)
strategic planning, (3) program management, and (4) program results/
accountability.
[10] Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993); and OMB, OMB Circular A-11, Part 6,
Preparation, Submission, of Strategic Plans, Annual Performance Plans,
and Annual Program Performance Reports (Washington, D.C.: Executive
Office of the President, June 2008). For our past work, see, for
example, GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax
Filing Season Performance Measures, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143] (Washington, D.C.: November 22,
2002); and Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[11] A switch is a piece of equipment in a telephone carrier's central
office facility that routes telephone signals between users and
terminates connections when there is no longer a session to support.
[12] Conventional voice services use traditional telephone networks
(such as the PSTN), which are based on circuit switching technology.
Instead of breaking a message into packets, circuit-switching uses a
dedicated channel to transmit the voice connection. Once all channels
are occupied, no further connections can be made until a channel
becomes available.
[13] IP is a set of standards that enable the transmission of
information such as text, video, and voice across a global network of
networks. These protocols are updated as the uses and processes for
transmitting voice and data communications evolve. For more information
on the ongoing transition to the next version of IP, see GAO, Internet
Protocol Version 6: Federal Government in Early Stages of Transition
and Key Challenges Remain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-675] (Washington, D.C.: June 30,
2006).
[14] Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 201, 116 Stat. 2135, 2145-49 (2002).
[15] The duties of the NCS and the NCS Manager are set forth in
Executive Order No. 12,472, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,471 (April 3, 1984).
[16] As of May 2009, the NSTAC is comprised of 22 industry leaders
appointed by the President, usually chief executive officers, from
telecommunications companies, network service providers, information
technology firms, finance, and aerospace companies.
[17] The National Response Framework, issued by DHS in 2008, is the
policy document that is to guide how federal, state, local, and tribal
governments, along with nongovernmental and private sector entities,
are to collectively respond to and recover from all hazards, including
catastrophic disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina.
[18] Additionally, NCS is charged with facilitating the recovery of
systems and applications in the event of a major Internet disruption
caused by a cyber attack, among other things.
[19] The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), first released
by DHS in 2006 and updated in 2009, is intended to integrate activities
and strategies for the protection and continuity of critical
infrastructure and key resources, such as communications infrastructure
and networks, and outlines partnerships and responsibilities across
federal, state, local, tribal, and private agencies. For example,
federal agencies identified as the Sector-Specific Agency--the lead
federal agency for a given sector's protection--are responsible for,
among other things, developing and implementing a Sector-Specific Plan
to apply the NIPP to the unique characteristics and conditions of their
sector.
[20] NCS, through the NCC, manages the Telecommunications Service
Priority program--a program that provides priority provisioning and
restoration of telecommunications services that support emergency
operations facilities for certain federal, state, and tribal
governments, and other entities. For more information about this
program, see appendix III.
[21] Priority calling is provided through special enhancements embedded
in the PSTN and wireless networks to identify calls made by authorized
users as a high priority. These enhancements automatically place the
call higher in the queue and increase the probability that the call
will be successfully completed over other calls made through
traditional means.
[22] GETS is designed to support low-speed data transmissions via
facsimile machines or secure telephone equipment. Such data
transmissions do not exceed 56 kilobytes which is equivalent to the
speed for dial-up modems.
[23] NCS describes a successful connection when using GETS as one in
which the calling party gets (1) an answer by the called party, (2) a
ring but no answer, or (3) a traditional busy signal.
[24] Early in the GETS program, the number of calls successfully
completed during the time immediately following emergency events
varied, but as the program has matured, GETS has increasingly achieved
or surpassed its intention to complete 90 percent of calls. See
appendix IV for the number of calls completed during past emergency
events since the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.
[25] Most toll-free numbers translate to a traditional 10-digit toll
number. As such, NCS encourages GETS subscribers to obtain the regular
10-digit toll number for organizations that they may need to coordinate
with during emergencies. NCS defines international calls as those that
occur outside the United States, Canada, and parts of the Caribbean.
For such calls, international calling privileges are applied to a GETS
card only upon request and priority treatment is limited to US
telephone networks. For example, for an outbound international call,
once the call leaves US telephone networks, it will no longer receive
priority treatment.
[26] For GETS calls made from, to, or between international locations,
prevailing international calling rates apply.
[27] WPS functionality can also work in wireless devices such as a
Blackberry provided the device has voice communications capability.
[28] WPS can be used to place calls from a cell phone to another cell
phone or a wireline telephone device.
[29] NCS programs are not for immediate, on-site emergency response,
and are therefore not geared toward first responders, such as police,
fire fighters, emergency medical personnel, and others who are among
the first on the scene of an emergency.
[30] Nonfederal subscribers must be sponsored by the NCS or one of the
24 NCS member agencies.
[31] Population attack warning includes threat assessments and warnings
of potential nuclear attacks, among other things, within the United
States.
[32] The process NCS used to establish these subscriber goals is
discussed later in the report.
[33] The regional outreach coordinators are not NCS staff but rather
part-time staff hired by NCS's contractor--Computer Sciences
Corporation. Currently, there are six regional outreach coordinators.
[34] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[35] According to NCS, approximately 4 percent of the GETS and WPS
service requests are denied because the requesting organization does
not have a function that is clearly related to NS/EP and most often are
industry organizations that provide services that are only tangentially
related to NS/EP functions.
[36] According to NCS guidance, access should be limited to staff who
have a clearly defined NS/EP duty.
[37] In addition to the POC's responsibilities to familiarize
subscribers, NCS has incorporated priority calling programs in several
training or preparedness exercises that it conducts or participates in
with the goal of keeping subscriber's knowledge of the services current
because of concerns that subscribers may not be readily prepared to
effectively use GETS and WPS during an emergency.
[38] This group of users is known as a talkgroup. The radio users are
structured into talkgroups so that they can share calls and messages as
a group. Satellite radio talkgroups allow authorized NS/EP users to
participate in a nationwide two-way satellite communications whereby
each group member can either listen to or join in the conversation
taking place over the talkgroup.
[39] The six participating sites include the operations centers
operated by (1) NCS, (2) the three major nationwide carriers (AT&T,
Sprint, and Verizon), and (3) NCS's contractors that support GETS and
WPS (Computer Sciences Corporation and Science Applications
International Corporation).
[40] Executive Order 12,472, which outlines the responsibilities of the
NCS as it relates to NS/EP communications, states that NCS shall
develop for consideration a recommended evolutionary telecommunications
architecture designed to meet the current and future NS/EP
telecommunications requirements and shall ensure that current and
future telecommunications standards are utilized as the basis for the
federal telecommunications standards.
[41] According to industry experts, current and next-generation
networks will operate in parallel until the circuit-based portion of
the PSTN is phased out.
[42] For the purposes of this report, we refer to NCS's efforts to plan
for and implement these NS/EP voice and data services on the next-
generation networks as the NS/EP NGN.
[43] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-672].
[44] National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, Next
Generation Networks Task Force Report, March 28, 2006.
[45] The international standards bodies involved in this effort include
the Alliance for Telecommunications Solutions, The European
Telecommunications Standards Institute's Telecoms and Internet
Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networks, International
Telecommunication Union-Telecommunication Standardization Sector, The
Internet Engineering Task Force, and The Third Generation Partnership
Project.
[46] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-424]; Department of
Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major Programs Lack Appropriate
Oversight, GAO-09-29 (Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2008); and Defense
Acquisitions: Restructured JTRS Program Reduces Risk, but Significant
Challenges Remain, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-955]
(Washington, D.C.: September 2006).
[47] In fiscal year 2008, DHS requested about $52 million for the NS/EP
NGN initiative--a 270 percent increase over the $14 million provided in
fiscal year 2007. See, H.R. Rep. No. 110-181, at 85 (2007) and S. Rep.
No. 110-84, at 85-86 (2007).
[48] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121
Stat. 1844 (Dec. 26, 2007). See also, House Appropriations Committee
Print for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008.
[49] H.R. Rep. No. 110-181, at 85 (2007).
[50] H.R. Rep. No. 110-862, at 97, 100 (2008).
[51] Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L.
No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3652, 3668 (2008) enacted as Division D of the
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574.
[52] Although Congress did not set a deadline for DHS to submit the
expenditure plan, DHS officials told us they planned to submit the plan
by January 2009 to avoid delays in moving forward with planned
activities.
[53] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-29] and [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-955].
[54] GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Further Efforts Needed to
Integrate Planning for and Response to Disruptions on Converged Voice
and Data Networks, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-607]
(Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2008). The NCS strategic plan is to be part
of an overarching strategy for all the entities that comprise the
Office of Cyber Security and Communications that also includes the
National Cyber Security Division and Office of Emergency
Communications.
[55] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[56] Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and OMB Circular A-
11provide guidance in this instance since NCS's strategic plan is not
an agency-wide strategic plan.
[57] GAO, Managing for Results: Critical Issues for Improving Federal
Agencies' Strategic Plans, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-97-180] (Washington, D.C.:
September 16, 1997).
[58] GAO, Homeland Security: Guidance and Standards are Needed for
Measuring the Effectiveness of Agencies' Facility Protection Efforts,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-612] (Washington, D.C.:
May 31, 2006).
[59] GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax
Filing Season Performance Measures, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143] (Washington, D.C.: November 22,
2002); and OMB, Guide to the Program Assessment Rating Tool
(Washington, D.C., January 2008).
[60] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143].
[61] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-612].
[62] OMB defines an efficiency measure as one that captures a program's
ability to carry out its activities and achieve results (an outcome or
output) relative to resources (an input such as cost).
[63] OMB, Guide to the Program Assessment Rating Tool.
[64] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118], and OMB,
Guide to the Program Assessment Rating Tool.
[65] OMB, Guide to the Program Assessment Rating Tool.
[66] Federal continuity coordinators as defined in the National
Continuity Policy are staff designated within federal departments and
agencies, at the Assistant Secretary level, to coordinate their
agency's continuity of operations requirements which includes the
availability of critical communications capabilities, among other
things. Because this performance measure was introduced in fiscal year
2008, we could not evaluate how useful this measure has been in gauging
progress over time.
[67] OMB, Guide to the Program Assessment Rating Tool.
[68] GAO, Agency Performance Plans, Examples of Practices That Can
Improve Usefulness to Decisionmakers, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-AIMD-99-69] (Washington, D.C.:
February 26, 1999); and [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-18].
[69] When a WPS user attempts to place a call, the call can be dropped--
or incomplete--at several stages. The manner in which wireless carriers
are currently able to identify incomplete calls occurs only for calls
that have reached the mobile switching center. However, those WPS calls
that have reached the base station, but failed to reach the mobile
switching center, would not be captured as an incomplete call.
[70] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143].
[71] Congressional Research Service, John Moteff, Computer Security: A
Summary of Selected Federal Laws, Executive Orders, and Presidential
Directives, RL32357 (Apr. 16, 2004).
[72] On May 26, 2009, the President announced the full integration of
White House staff supporting national security and homeland security.
[73] Executive Order No. 12,472, 49 Fed. Reg. 13,471 (April 3, 1984).
[74] Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 201, 116 Stat. 2135, 2145-49 (2002).
[75] These entities include the Department of State (DOS), the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury),
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of
Defense (DOD), the Joint Staff (JS), the Department of Justice (DOJ),
the General Services Administration (GSA), the Department of the
Interior (DOI), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA), the Department of Agriculture (DOA), the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), the Department of Commerce (DOC), the National
Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS), the National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA), Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the
Department of Transportation (DOT), the United States Postal Service
(USPS), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the FCC, and DHS.
[76] As of May 2009, the NSTAC is comprised of representatives from the
following companies: AT&T, Bank of America, Computer Sciences
Corporation, Boeing Company, Harris Corporation, Intelsat General,
Juniper Networks, Lockheed Martin, Microsoft, Motorola, National Cable
and Telecommunications Association, Nortel, Qwest, Raytheon Company,
Rockwell Collins, Science Applications International Corporation,
Telcordia Technologies, Teledesic, Tyco Electronics, United States
Telecom Association, Verisign, and Verizon.
[77] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-672].
[78] The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee, Next Generation Network Task Force Report, (March 28, 2006).
[79] These subgroups may be composed, in whole or in part, of
individuals who are not members of the NSTAC.
[80] PART consists of a standard series of questions intended to
determine the strengths and weaknesses of federal programs. The PART
questions cover four broad topics--(1) program purpose and design, (2)
strategic planning, (3) program management, and (4) program results/
accountability.
[81] In total, we interviewed NS/EP officials from 37 state and local
agencies. State interviews were held with emergency management agencies
and/or homeland security departments and covered the following states:
Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Virginia,
and Wyoming. Local interviews were held with local emergency management
agencies, police and fire departments, and other entities with NS/EP
responsibilities. Localities we covered included: City of Sacramento,
County of Sacramento, County of Santa Clara, County of San Diego, City
of San Diego Lee County, Broward County, Miami-Dade County, Palm Beach
County, City of Fort Lauderdale, City of Boynton Beach, City of New
York, and the City of New Orleans.
[82] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[83] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-45] and [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-424.
[84] See for example, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143] and [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118].
[85] Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993); and OMB, OMB Circular A-11, Part 6,
Preparation, Submission, of Strategic Plans, Annual Performance Plans,
and Annual Program Performance Reports (Washington, D.C.: Executive
Office of the President, June 2008).
[86] Miscellaneous Rules Relating to Common Carriers:
Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) System for National Security
Emergency Preparedness (NSEP), 47 C.F.R. pt. 64, App. A. Under the
appendix, service vendors are defined as any person, association,
partnership, corporation, organization, or other entity (including
common carriers and government organizations) that offer to supply any
telecommunications equipment, facilities, or services (including
customer premises equipment and wiring) or combination thereof and the
term includes resale carriers, prime contractors, subcontractors, and
interconnecting carriers.
[87] The fees charged may differ depending on the service provider and
are separate from any charges related to the installation or repair of
circuits following an emergency event.
[88] Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks, Report and Recommendations to the Federal
Communications Commission, (Washington D.C., June 12, 2006).
[89] DHS defines credentialing as the administrative process for
validating personnel qualifications and providing authorization to
perform specific functions in response to an emergency or disaster.
[90] At that time, GETS was in the early stages of deployment and had
not yet achieved initial or full operating capability.
[91] 47 C. F. R. pt. 64, App. B.
[End of section]
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