Emergency Preparedness
Improved Planning and Coordination Necessary for Modernization and Integration of Public Alert and Warning System Gao ID: GAO-09-834 September 9, 2009A comprehensive system to alert the American people in times of hazard allows people to take action to save lives. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for the current Emergency Alert System (EAS) and the development of the new Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS). In this requested report, GAO examined (1) the current status of EAS, (2) the progress made by FEMA in implementing an integrated alert and warning system, and (3) the challenges involved in implementing an integrated alert and warning system. GAO conducted a survey of states, reviewed FEMA and other documentation, and interviewed industry stakeholders and officials from federal agencies responsible for public alerting.
As the primary national-level public warning system, EAS is an important alert tool, but it exhibits longstanding weaknesses that limit its effectiveness. EAS allows state and local officials limited ability to produce public alerts via television and radio. Weaknesses with EAS include lack of reliability of the message distribution system; gaps in coverage; insufficient testing; and inadequate training of personnel. Further, EAS provides little capability to alert specific geographic areas. EAS does not ensure message delivery for individuals with hearing and vision disabilities, and non-English speakers. FEMA has projects under way to address some of these weaknesses with EAS. However, to date, little progress has been made and EAS remains largely unchanged since GAO's previous review, completed in March 2007. As a result, EAS does not fulfill the need for a reliable, comprehensive alert system. Initiated in 2004, FEMA's IPAWS program is intended to integrate new and existing alert capabilities, including EAS, into a comprehensive "system of systems." However, national-level alert capabilities have remained unchanged and new technologies have not been adopted. IPAWS efforts have been affected by shifting program goals, lack of continuity in planning, staff turnover, and poorly organized program information from which to make management decisions. The vision of IPAWS has changed twice over the course of the program and strategic goals and milestones are not clearly defined, as IPAWS operated without an implementation plan from early 2007 through June 2009. Consequently, as state and local governments are forging ahead with their own alert systems, IPAWS program implementation has stalled and many of the functional goals of IPAWS, such as geo-targeting of messages and dissemination through redundant pathways to multiple devices, have yet to reach operational capacity. FEMA conducted a series of pilot projects without systematically assessing outcomes or lessons learned and without substantially advancing alert and warning systems. FEMA does not periodically report on IPAWS progress, therefore, program transparency and accountability are lacking. FEMA faces coordination issues and technical challenges in developing and implementing IPAWS. Effective public warning depends on the cooperation of stakeholders, such as emergency managers and the telecommunications industry, yet many stakeholders GAO contacted knew little about IPAWS and expressed the need for better coordination with FEMA. FEMA has taken steps to improve its coordination efforts, but the scope of stakeholder involvement is limited. FEMA also faces technical challenges related to systems integration, standards development, the development of geo-targeted and multilingual alerts, and alerts for individuals with disabilities. For example, the standard intended to facilitate integration of systems is still under development and is not widely used. As a result of these coordination and technical hurdles, integration with state and local systems will likely be a significant challenge due to potential incompatibility, and FEMA does not yet have logistical plans to integrate these systems.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-834, Emergency Preparedness: Improved Planning and Coordination Necessary for Modernization and Integration of Public Alert and Warning System
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Report to the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings,
and Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2009:
Emergency Preparedness:
Improved Planning and Coordination Necessary for Modernization and
Integration of Public Alert and Warning System:
GAO-09-834:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-834, a report to the Subcommittee on Economic
Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
A comprehensive system to alert the American people in times of hazard
allows people to take action to save lives. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) is responsible for the current Emergency Alert
System (EAS) and the development of the new Integrated Public Alert and
Warning System (IPAWS). In this requested report, GAO examined (1) the
current status of EAS, (2) the progress made by FEMA in implementing an
integrated alert and warning system, and (3) the challenges involved in
implementing an integrated alert and warning system. GAO conducted a
survey of states, reviewed FEMA and other documentation, and
interviewed industry stakeholders and officials from federal agencies
responsible for public alerting.
What GAO Found:
As the primary national-level public warning system, EAS is an
important alert tool, but it exhibits longstanding weaknesses that
limit its effectiveness. EAS allows state and local officials limited
ability to produce public alerts via television and radio. Weaknesses
with EAS include lack of reliability of the message distribution
system; gaps in coverage; insufficient testing; and inadequate training
of personnel. Further, EAS provides little capability to alert specific
geographic areas. EAS does not ensure message delivery for individuals
with hearing and vision disabilities, and non-English speakers. FEMA
has projects under way to address some of these weaknesses with EAS.
However, to date, little progress has been made and EAS remains largely
unchanged since GAO‘s previous review, completed in March 2007. As a
result, EAS does not fulfill the need for a reliable, comprehensive
alert system.
Initiated in 2004, FEMA‘s IPAWS program is intended to integrate new
and existing alert capabilities, including EAS, into a comprehensive ’
system of systems.“ However, national-level alert capabilities have
remained unchanged and new technologies have not been adopted. IPAWS
efforts have been affected by shifting program goals, lack of
continuity in planning, staff turnover, and poorly organized program
information from which to make management decisions. The vision of
IPAWS has changed twice over the course of the program and strategic
goals and milestones are not clearly defined, as IPAWS operated without
an implementation plan from early 2007 through June 2009. Consequently,
as state and local governments are forging ahead with their own alert
systems, IPAWS program implementation has stalled and many of the
functional goals of IPAWS, such as geo-targeting of messages and
dissemination through redundant pathways to multiple devices, have yet
to reach operational capacity. FEMA conducted a series of pilot
projects without systematically assessing outcomes or lessons learned
and without substantially advancing alert and warning systems. FEMA
does not periodically report on IPAWS progress, therefore, program
transparency and accountability are lacking.
FEMA faces coordination issues and technical challenges in developing
and implementing IPAWS. Effective public warning depends on the
cooperation of stakeholders, such as emergency managers and the
telecommunications industry, yet many stakeholders GAO contacted knew
little about IPAWS and expressed the need for better coordination with
FEMA. FEMA has taken steps to improve its coordination efforts, but the
scope of stakeholder involvement is limited. FEMA also faces technical
challenges related to systems integration, standards development, the
development of geo-targeted and multilingual alerts, and alerts for
individuals with disabilities. For example, the standard intended to
facilitate integration of systems is still under development and is not
widely used. As a result of these coordination and technical hurdles,
integration with state and local systems will likely be a significant
challenge due to potential incompatibility, and FEMA does not yet have
logistical plans to integrate these systems.
What GAO Recommends:
To ensure a consistent direction for the public alert and warning
system, GAO recommends, among other things, that FEMA develop strategic
goals and processes for deployment of IPAWS and report periodically on
program progress. In response, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) agreed with all of the recommendations and provided examples of
actions aimed at addressing the recommendations. However, FEMA‘s
planned actions to address some of the recommendations might be
insufficient. DHS and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
provided technical comments which have been incorporated in the report.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-834] or key
components. For GAO survey results, view GAO-09-880SP. For more
information, contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or
goldsteinm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
EAS Remains the Nation's Primary Public Alert and Warning System, But
Unaddressed Weaknesses Limit its Effectiveness:
While FEMA Has IPAWS Initiatives Under Way, Progress in Implementing an
Integrated Alert System Has Been Limited:
FEMA Faces Coordination Issues and Technical Challenges in Implementing
IPAWS:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Executive Order 13407 (2006) Functions of the Secretary of
Homeland Security and Projects Carried Out by FEMA:
Figures:
Figure 1: IPAWS Conceptual Architecture:
Figure 2: PEP Station Daytime EAS Coverage Areas:
Figure 3: Examples of Incomplete IPAWS Projects with Missed Timelines:
Figure 4: FEMA's Shifting Vision for IPAWS:
Figure 5: Survey Responses on IPAWS Pilots Projects from State
Emergency Management Directors:
Figure 6: Survey Responses of State Emergency Management Directors on
FEMA IPAWS Information, Training, Communication, and Coordination:
Abbreviations:
AMBER Alerts: America's Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response:
CAP: Common Alerting Protocol:
CAP Profile: IPAWS CAP v1.1-EAS Profile:
CMAS: Commercial Mobile Alert System:
CMSAAC: Commercial Mobile Service Alert Advisory Committee:
DEAS: Digital Emergency Alert System:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
EAS: Emergency Alert System:
FACA: Federal Advisory Committee Act:
FCC: Federal Communications Commission:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
GTAS: Geo-Targeted Alerting System:
IPAWS: Integrated Public Alert and Warning System:
NEMA: National Emergency Management Association:
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:
NWR: National Weather Radio:
NWS: National Weather Service:
PEP: Primary Entry Point:
PEPAC: Primary Entry Point Administrative Council:
WARN: Web Alert and Relay Network:
WARN Act: Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act of 2006:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 9, 2009:
The Honorable Eleanor Holmes Norton:
Chair:
The Honorable Mario Diaz-Balart:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency
Management:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
A comprehensive system to warn Americans about public safety
emergencies allows people to take actions designed to save lives and
reduce damage. The current Emergency Alert System (EAS) provides the
President and authorized officials with limited capability to transmit
emergency messages to the public via television and radio. The
antiquated methods employed by EAS date back to 1963, exposing the
system to weaknesses, including questionable reliability and
versatility. In 2006, an executive order gave the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) the responsibility of modernizing the public
alert and warning systems to ensure the capability of distributing
alerts through varied telecommunications modes and based on factors
such as geography. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the
entity within DHS responsible for the program, is working on the
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS), which is intended
to eventually integrate EAS into a larger warning network. When
completed, EAS is expected to be superseded by the IPAWS "system of
systems," which will form the country's comprehensive public alert
system. In March 2007, we reported on identified limitations of EAS and
the challenges of developing the new integrated system.[Footnote 1]
Building on our previous work, you asked us to provide information on
the status of the nation's emergency alert and public warning systems
and FEMA's IPAWS program. For this report, we examined (1) the current
status of EAS, (2) the progress made in FEMA's efforts to modernize and
integrate alert and warning systems, and (3) the issues and challenges
involved in implementing an integrated public alert and warning system.
To meet these objectives, we conducted a Web-based survey of emergency
management directors in all 50 states and the District of Columbia in
March and April 2009, with 46 states and the District of Columbia
responding for an overall response rate of 92 percent. The survey asked
questions regarding public alert capabilities at the state and local
level, the FEMA IPAWS program, and stakeholder coordination. This
report contains selected results from the survey. To view the survey
and a more complete tabulation of the results, access the following
link: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-880SP]. We
met with officials from FEMA, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), DHS, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA). We also interviewed representatives of state and local
emergency management offices; industry stakeholder organizations;
public and private sector alert and warning experts; and private sector
stakeholders, including broadcasters, the wireless industry, emergency
alert technology companies, emergency management associations, and
consumer advocacy groups. In addition, we conducted interviews with
state participants in FEMA's IPAWS pilot programs. We examined federal
agency documentation including planning, program status, and financial
information; agency orders and rules; testimony statements; and
briefings from FEMA, FCC, and NOAA. We also reviewed relevant
literature on public alert and warning from public and private
stakeholders.
We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 through
September 2009, in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. A
more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology appears in
appendix I.
Background:
EAS, the nation's primary alerting system, provides capacity for the
United States to issue alerts and warnings to the public in response to
emergencies. FEMA is responsible for administering EAS at the national
level, while FCC manages EAS participation by media-related
communications service providers.[Footnote 2] FCC provides technical
standards and support for EAS, rules for its operation, and enforcement
within the over-the-air broadcast, cable, and satellite broadcasting
industries. Presidential, or national-level, EAS alerts use a
hierarchical distribution system to relay important emergency messages.
As the entry point for national level EAS messages, FEMA is responsible
for distributing presidential EAS alerts to National Primary stations,
often referred to as Primary Entry Point (PEP) stations. Broadcasts of
these national-level alerts are relayed by the PEP stations across the
country to radio and television stations that rebroadcast the message
to other broadcast stations and cable systems until all EAS
participants have been alerted. This retransmission of alerts from EAS
participant to EAS participant is commonly referred to as a "daisy
chain" distribution system. FCC rules require EAS participants to
install FCC-certified EAS equipment. Radio and television broadcast
stations, cable companies, wireless cable companies, direct broadcast
satellite, and satellite radio generally must participate in the system
and transmit alerts initiated by the President. State and local
governments determine the content and transmission procedures of their
alerts, in conjunction with local broadcast radio and television
stations. These procedures are specified in state EAS plans filed with
FCC. In 2007, FCC adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to
explore EAS-related issues, such as how non-English speakers may best
be served by national, state, and local EAS; and to reexamine the best
way to make EAS accessible to persons with disabilities.[Footnote 3]
Organizations that participate in EAS planning and administration
include the Primary Entry Point Administrative Council (PEPAC), the
Society of Broadcast Engineers, and associations such as the National
Association of Broadcasters and individual state broadcasting
associations. States and localities organize emergency communications
committees whose members often include representatives from
broadcasters or local television and radio stations. These committees
agree on the chain of command and other procedures for activating EAS
alerts.
In June 2006, the President issued Executive Order 13407, entitled
Public Alert and Warning System, effecting a policy that the U.S. have
a comprehensive integrated alert and warning system, and detailing the
responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland Security in meeting this
requirement.[Footnote 4] The order also specified the level of support
expected from other departments and agencies in meeting the
requirements for a more robust federal warning system. The Secretary of
Homeland Security was ordered to "ensure an orderly and effective
transition" from current capabilities to the system described by the
executive order, and to report on the implementation of the system
within 90 days of the order, and on at least a yearly basis,
thereafter. The FEMA IPAWS program was initiated in 2004 and the
development and implementation of IPAWS has become the programmatic
mechanism to carry out the executive order. IPAWS is defined by FEMA as
a "system of systems," which is intended to eventually integrate
existing and new alert systems, including EAS. That is, EAS is expected
to be superseded as the nation's primary alert function by IPAWS, with
EAS acting as one of its component parts and as one of IPAWS's
mechanisms to disseminate alerts. Another intended partner system is
NOAA's National Weather Radio (NWR). NWR broadcasts National Weather
Service forecasts and all-hazard warnings. Non-weather emergency
messages are broadcast over NWR at the request of federal, state, and
local officials in time-critical situations when public safety is
involved.
The Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act of 2006 (WARN Act)
[Footnote 5] required FCC to adopt relevant technical standards,
protocols, procedures, and other technical requirements to enable
commercial mobile service providers (wireless providers) to issue
emergency alerts. The act established an advisory panel called the
Commercial Mobile Service Alert Advisory Committee (CMSAAC),[Footnote
6] to recommend the technical specifications and protocols that will
govern wireless providers that participate in emergency alerting. The
CMSAAC was chaired by then-FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin and included 42
other members, representing stakeholders in all levels of government
and the private sector. FCC adopted most of the recommendations made by
the committee regarding the required capabilities of wireless providers
to transmit alerts, as well as the proposal to develop a Commercial
Mobile Alert System (CMAS).
Figure 1 displays the conceptual architecture of IPAWS, with EAS, NWR,
and CMAS as mechanisms for disseminating alerts.
Figure 1: IPAWS Conceptual Architecture:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Federal; State; Local:
feed into IPAWS.
IPAWS then supports:
* Emergency Alert System:
- National Primary;
- State Primary;
- Local Primary;
* NOAA National Weather Radio;
* CMAS;
* Other Commercial Alert and Warning Services.
Source: FEMA.
[End of figure]
The Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) is an open, non-proprietary digital
message format being used as a standard for new, digitized alert
networks using multiple technologies. CAP is compatible with multiple
applications and telecommunication methods, and has been developed for
use by emergency management officials in sending all types of alert
messages. CAP can be used as a single input to activate multiple
warning systems, and is capable of geographic targeting and
multilingual messaging. FEMA--required by the executive order to adopt
alert standards and protocols--intends to adopt CAP and to publish its
IPAWS CAP v1.1-EAS Profile (CAP Profile) standard. In an FCC report and
order released in July 2007, FCC promulgated new rules, including a
requirement for all mandatory EAS participants to accept messages using
CAP, no later than 180 days after FEMA adopts the CAP standard.
[Footnote 7]
EAS Remains the Nation's Primary Public Alert and Warning System, But
Unaddressed Weaknesses Limit its Effectiveness:
EAS remains the primary national-level public alert system and serves
as a valuable public alert and warning tool. It remains available as a
mechanism for the President to issue national warnings, and it allows
state and local governments to generate weather warnings, America's
Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response (AMBER) Alerts,[Footnote 8] and
other public emergency communications. Nonetheless, as we previously
reported, EAS exhibits longstanding weaknesses that continue to limit
its effectiveness.[Footnote 9] In particular, the reliability of the
national-level relay system--which would be critical if the President
were to issue a national-level alert--remains questionable due to a
lack of redundancy among key broadcasters, gaps in coverage,
insufficient testing of the relay system, and inadequate training of
personnel. Further, EAS alerts have limited coverage, dissemination
means, and geographical specificity. FEMA has several projects under
way to address some of these weaknesses, but little progress has been
made and EAS remains effectively unchanged since our last report,
issued in March 2007.
EAS Remains Available as a Means to Broadcast National-Level Alerts,
but Is Primarily Used by State and Local Governments:
Although EAS was established to allow the President to communicate with
the public, it primarily serves as a means of disseminating emergency
alert and warning information at the state and local level. EAS has
never been used to transmit a national-level alert, but instead has
evolved into an important public alert and warning tool for state and
local governments. State and local emergency operations managers can
request activation of EAS for state and local public alert and warning
needs. EAS participants transmit state and local alerts via radio and
television or other media facilities, such as cable or satellite. These
alerts include weather warnings, AMBER Alerts, or other emergency
communications, such as evacuation notices. EAS participants may decide
individually whether to transmit alerts that originate at the state or
local level. Approximately 90 percent of all EAS messages are weather
alerts generated by NOAA's National Weather Service (NWS). NWS
broadcasts forecasts, warnings, watches, and other non-weather hazard
information, and supplies such information to broadcast and cable entry
points designated in approved EAS state and local plans.
Weaknesses in Alert Distribution and Dissemination Hinder EAS:
EAS has longstanding weaknesses that have not been resolved since we
reported on them in March 2007.[Footnote 10] These weaknesses continue
to limit the effectiveness of EAS and include (1) a lack of redundancy,
(2) gaps in coverage, (3) a lack of testing, and (4) inadequate
training for EAS participants. In addition to these weaknesses, EAS is
also hampered by how alerts are disseminated to the public.
Lack of redundancy. FEMA lacks alternative means of reaching EAS
participants should its primary connection fail. Specifically, FEMA can
distribute national-level alerts to 35 PEP stations (which serve as the
entry points for Presidential alerts) and to 860 public radio stations
across the country via EAS phone lines and satellite connectivity,
respectively. However, FEMA lacks an alternative means of reaching
these participants if those primary connections fail. Furthermore, if a
primary connection to a PEP station failed, all of the other EAS
participants that rely on that station via the daisy chain relay system
would fail to receive alerts. This lack of redundancy could have
serious consequences. For example, if a PEP station were disabled
during a disaster in a major metropolitan area, an EAS alert would
likely fail to reach a sizable portion of the population because FEMA,
potentially, would not have access to other stations in that area.
Gaps in coverage. Gaps in PEP station broadcast coverage could hinder
the successful dissemination of EAS alerts, as some broadcast stations
might have difficulty in monitoring their assigned PEP station because
the station is geographically distant. Some states, such as Maine, are
not covered at all by the PEP system and would have to pick up a
national-level message from an alternate source, such as Public Radio.
[Footnote 11] This might not be a fully reliable option, however.
Unlike PEP stations, public radio stations do not necessarily have
extra fuel and generators on-site to help ensure continuous operations
following a disaster. Some broadcasters we contacted expressed concern
that other factors might impede their ability to receive alerts from
PEP stations. For example, some PEP broadcast signals are too weak to
overcome geographical impediments, such as mountains; due to
interference, broadcast signals generally do not travel as well during
the day as at night and, therefore, have inconsistent EAS coverage; and
high definition radio signals can overpower or distort PEP broadcast
signals. Some states, such as Washington, have developed systems to
augment the PEP network to ensure that EAS messages are disseminated
throughout the state, but not every state has taken such action. As
shown in figure 2, PEP daytime broadcast coverage leaves large
geographic areas uncovered by EAS. FEMA officials noted that there is a
significant difference between daytime and nighttime coverage. FEMA
estimated that 82 percent and 75 percent of the population are covered
by nighttime and daytime PEP signals, respectively.
Figure 2: PEP Station Daytime EAS Coverage Areas:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Map of the continental United States depicting PEP Station Daytime EAS
Coverage Areas (shaded in gray).
Sources: FEMA and GAO; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Lack of testing. FEMA does not perform ongoing national-level tests of
the daisy chain relay system to ensure that it would work as intended
during a national-level alert. FCC requires stations to test their EAS
equipment[Footnote 12] and FEMA is required to perform weekly tests of
connections to the 35 PEP stations, but there is no requirement for a
national-level test of the relay system. In January 2007, in response
to our ongoing work at that time, FEMA conducted a national-level EAS
test. According to FEMA, the test demonstrated an effective satellite
connection to public radio stations. However, three PEP stations failed
to receive and effectively rebroadcast the national-level test message
due to hardware and software issues, which FEMA stated have since been
resolved. FEMA has not held another test since 2007, although DHS
agreed with the intent of our previous recommendation that FEMA develop
and implement a plan to verify the dependability and effectiveness of
the relay distribution system. DHS had also stated that FEMA would
begin to conduct new quarterly "over-the-air" tests, but these have not
taken place. In addition, FEMA has no plans for testing the relay
distribution system. Consequently, there is no assurance the national-
level relay would work should the President need to activate EAS to
communicate with the American people. The recent failure of an
accidental national-level alert suggests that problems remain in the
relay system. In this incident, a national-level (Presidential) alert,
intended as a test, was inadvertently initiated in Illinois. Despite
this false alarm, as intended for a national-level alert, the broadcast
airways were "seized." However, the alert failed to be properly
disseminated by all EAS participants. In particular, cable companies,
which should disseminate such an alert in an emergency situation,
failed to receive it. According to FEMA officials and industry
stakeholders, the failure was due to a malfunction of cable providers'
EAS equipment. While FEMA officials say this situation has since been
rectified, no testing has been done to confirm that the equipment used
by cable companies would work properly. Coupled with the results from
the January 2007 test, these events raise concerns about the national-
level relay system and further highlight the need for additional
testing.
Inadequate training for EAS participants. Another longstanding weakness
of EAS is inadequate training for EAS participants, both in using EAS
equipment and in drafting EAS messages. In 2007, we reported that
several EAS stakeholders, including state and local officials,
identified inadequate training as a limitation of EAS and cited a need
for additional instruction in equipment use and message creation. Our
current work indicates that such training is still lacking. For
example, a state official told us that users and message originators
need additional training to know how to properly craft and initiate a
message, especially since emergency managers vary in their level of
expertise. Similarly, a number of respondents to our state survey of
emergency managers cited a need for training. For example, one state
emergency management representative suggested that training courses be
established for emergency managers, broadcasters, and cable providers.
To address training inadequacies, we previously recommended that FEMA
develop a plan to verify that EAS participants have the training and
technical skills to issue effective EAS alerts. DHS agreed with the
intent of the recommendation and noted that FEMA would improve training
for EAS operators, as well as make the system more user-friendly.
According to FEMA, it is currently analyzing and assessing EAS operator
training needs, but it has not yet implemented any new training
initiatives.
In addition to the aforementioned weaknesses, EAS is also hampered by
how alerts are disseminated to the public. Much as gaps exist with PEP-
station coverage and through weaknesses in EAS participants'
distribution, large portions of the population remain uncovered because
EAS relies on certain media, such as radio and television broadcast, to
provide alerts. Specifically, EAS's reliance on broadcast and other
media currently exclude other communications devices, such as cell
phones. In addition, it remains difficult for EAS to reach distinct
segments of the population. For example, alerts are typically provided
only in English and alerting mechanisms provide unequal access for
persons with disabilities. In particular, individuals with hearing and
vision disabilities may be subject to inconsistent aural and visual
information in EAS alerts. Further, effective public alerting via EAS
is also hindered by its limited ability to target alert messages to
specific geographic locations. For example, a local emergency manager
told us that a message generated by his county would be automatically
sent to 10 neighboring counties, potentially causing unnecessary alarm
for alert recipients in surrounding areas.
FEMA Has Introduced Projects to Address Some of EAS's Operational
Weaknesses, but Little Progress Has Been Made:
FEMA officials stated that projects are under way to address some of
EAS's operational weaknesses. For example, to improve EAS coverage,
FEMA is planning to expand the number of PEP stations from 35 to 69 by
2011. However, since the PEP expansion effort was initiated in 2006, of
three PEP stations scheduled for addition in 2007, FEMA completed only
one in 2008, with the other two only partially completed.[Footnote 13]
At the time of our review, FEMA had selected six additional area
locations for new PEP stations and initiated negotiations with radio
stations in three of the areas. FEMA cited several challenges in
expanding the number of PEPs. Specifically, officials told us that the
process is often slowed by negotiations with broadcast stations, soil
sampling, and construction. In addition, PEPAC representatives said
regulatory procedures, such as those requiring stations to house fuel
on-site, lengthen the process.
To add redundancy and improve the reliability of the relay system, FEMA
is also developing the Digital Emergency Alert System (DEAS). DEAS is
expected to provide additional connections with EAS entry points--the
PEP stations--and provide for the direct transmission of a voice,
video, or text alert to stations using the public broadcast system
satellite network. According to FEMA, DEAS was successfully piloted
twice. However, despite concluding the pilots in 2007, FEMA had not
begun implementing DEAS at the time of our review. FEMA planned to
deploy DEAS in 2008 to 13 states and 1 territory, including those that
participated in the second pilot; followed in 2009 by a deployment to
16 additional states prone to weather hazards, and then to all states.
However, DEAS deployment did not occur and FEMA did not provide an
explanation for this delay. Currently, FEMA plans to implement DEAS
using a phased approach beginning in mid-2009.
Other FEMA initiatives related to EAS include the integration of XM
satellite transmission paths and the implementation of CAP.
Specifically, FEMA plans to deliver national-level EAS messages from
FEMA to PEP stations by establishing a satellite connection via XM
Satellite Radio to complement its existing phone connection. FEMA
targeted completion of XM satellite connectivity to key EAS sites by
2007; however, it is now scheduled for completion in 2009. While no
reason was provided for the apparent delay, FEMA noted that it is
currently working on certification and accreditation issues.
Separately, FEMA is working to develop and implement the CAP Profile;
however, FEMA has not defined how CAP will work within EAS, including
how EAS participants will rebroadcast a CAP message.[Footnote 14]
Further, CAP is not currently capable of carrying a live audio message.
Alternatively, to satisfy the requirement to carry a presidential
message, EAS participants will be required to link to a FEMA server to
stream audio messages. Finally, broadcasters expressed concern that CAP
is not ready to be used with EAS, thereby leading broadcasters to
question its utility, as well as the necessity of obtaining CAP-
compliant equipment.
While FEMA Has IPAWS Initiatives Under Way, Progress in Implementing an
Integrated Alert System Has Been Limited:
FEMA began initiatives related to IPAWS in 2004, yet national-level
alert capabilities have remained unchanged and new standards and
technologies have not been adopted. IPAWS has operated without a
consistent strategic vision and has been adversely affected by shifting
program vision, lack of continuity in planning and program direction,
and poorly organized program information from which to make management
decisions. Therefore, as state and local governments are forging ahead
with their own alert systems, IPAWS program implementation has stalled
and many of its functional goals have yet to reach operational
capacity. Additionally, FEMA's investment in the IPAWS pilot projects-
-seed initiatives intended to test alert technologies and form the
foundation of IPAWS--has resulted in few lessons learned and few
advances in alert and warning systems. Furthermore, FEMA does not
report on IPAWS spending or progress in achieving goals, which limits
transparency and accountability for program results.
FEMA Has Begun Some Projects, but Has Yet to Integrate Alert Systems or
Adopt New Technologies and Standards:
Although IPAWS has existed since 2004 with the original objective of
modernizing and integrating public alert and emergency warning systems
across federal, state, and local governments, national-level alert
system capabilities remain unchanged and have yet to be integrated. In
June 2006, Executive Order 13407 specified the responsibilities of DHS
and FEMA with respect to a public alert and warning system,
establishing 10 functions for the Secretary of Homeland Security. Since
the executive order, FEMA has launched or continued, under the IPAWS
program, several projects intended to address the 10 functions
specified in the order. Table 1 displays the functions of the executive
order, FEMA's ongoing projects aimed at satisfying those functions, and
the status and progress of the projects.
Table 1: Executive Order 13407 (2006) Functions of the Secretary of
Homeland Security and Projects Carried Out by FEMA:
Function: Inventory and assess existing alert infrastructure;
FEMA projects: IPAWS Inventory and Evaluation Survey, beginning 2009;
Status/progress/timeline: Information collection has yet to begin.
Completion of inventory scheduled for 2012.
Function: Develop alert standards and protocols;
FEMA projects: CAP Profile standard adoption proposed early 2009;
Status/progress/timeline: Limited use of CAP was intended for 2007. CAP
Profile under review, pending approval and adoption in fiscal year
2010.
Function: Geo-targeted, risk-based alerts;
FEMA projects: FEMA/NOAA Geo-Targeted Alerting System (GTAS)
Demonstration Project. CMAS under development;
Status/progress/timeline: GTAS project continued through June 2009.
CMAS scheduled for 2012 completion.
Function: Alerts for non-English speakers and the disabled;
FEMA projects: No projects currently under way;
Status/progress/timeline: In 2010, IPAWS intends to engineer, plan, and
begin implementation of these capabilities.
Function: Augment infrastructure;
FEMA projects: DEAS for redundant EAS distribution path. PEP station
expansion. Satellite distribution of EAS messages. Integration of NOAA
Weather Radio;
Status/progress/timeline: DEAS initiated in 2004, plans to be
implemented in 9 states in 2009. PEP expansion initiated in 2007 with 1
station added in 2008; expansion to 69 stations to be complete in 2012.
Initial NOAA alert integration, beginning in 2009, targeted to be
complete in 2013.
Function: Conduct training and testing;
FEMA projects: Partnership with FEMA Resource Center and NOAA to
provide alert and warning message origination training;
Status/progress/timeline: No training or national-level system testing
to date. NOAA conducting training independently.
Function: Provide public education on uses and access to the public
alert and warning system;
FEMA projects: Launched IPAWS Web site;
Status/progress/timeline: Limited changes to IPAWS Web site completed
March 2009. No additional public education projects planned.
Function: Consult, coordinate, and cooperate with private sector;
FEMA projects: Federal, Practitioner, and Industry Working Groups
formed to discuss CAP Profile;
Status/progress/timeline: Working groups' scope will be expanded to
gather input on development and implementation of IPAWS.
Function: Administer EAS as component of public alert and warning
system;
FEMA projects: FEMA acts as executive agent for EAS, maintaining the
PEP stations in cooperation with PEPAC;
Status/progress/timeline: Continue ongoing administration of EAS.
Function: Ensure Presidential alert and warning capability under all
conditions;
FEMA projects: Maintain EAS and PEP stations, integrate NOAA network
with IPAWS;
Status/progress/timeline: Status of presidential alert and warning
capability is undetermined: A Presidential alert has never been issued,
nor nationally tested.
Source: Executive Order 13407 and GAO analysis of FEMA documentation.
[End of table]
While there are IPAWS projects under way designed to meet the
requirements of the executive order, these projects have shown little
progress. Many IPAWS initiatives have been ongoing for several years
with little functional contribution to the improvement or modernization
of public alert and warning. In fact, some of the projects cited by
FEMA as initiatives satisfying the requirements of the executive order
have been under development since the inception of IPAWS and have yet
to be completed. For example, one intention of IPAWS is to integrate
various alert systems into a "system of systems." There are both
federally-and locally-operated alert systems, which are to be
integrated under IPAWS. On the federal level, NOAA directs the NWS
alerting network; and at the state level, 42 emergency management
directors who responded to our survey reported existing or planned
systems in their state. According to FEMA briefings and documents, it
is the intention that local, state, and tribal systems be interoperable
with IPAWS; however, states and localities operate their own distinct
systems. In fact, of the 42 state survey respondents with alert
systems, only 11 have systems that have been integrated with or are
automatically triggered by the existing EAS. At present, the extent of
efforts to integrate state and local systems is a nationwide inventory
of systems and there are not yet any architectural or logistical plans
to integrate these systems. In effect, as deployment of state and local
alert systems continues, integration into the IPAWS system could become
increasingly complicated and difficult.
As another example, FEMA's efforts to have IPAWS deliver warnings
through diverse media have been limited. As early as 2005, FEMA planned
efforts to provide warning messages to subscribers via email and to
telephones, text message devices, cell phones, pagers, and Internet
desktops. These capabilities were tested under various IPAWS pilot
projects, but the development and implementation of the methods were
discontinued when the pilots were completed. At present, IPAWS efforts
to expand alert dissemination through methods other than standard radio
and television broadcast are limited to participation in CMAS, a
cellular broadcast text alert initiative. FEMA has accepted the
responsibility for collecting and disseminating alerts, but it is
unclear, at this point, how CMAS will be integrated with IPAWS.
FEMA has missed numerous timelines that it set for IPAWS initiatives.
Various projects were originally intended to be completed to form the
foundation of IPAWS, but have experienced delays and are still not yet
functional. Figure 3 demonstrates some of the IPAWS programs whose
timelines were surpassed and have still yet to be realized.
Figure 3: Examples of Incomplete IPAWS Projects with Missed Timelines:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
EAS Satellite connectivity to PEPs and States:
4th quarter fiscal year 2005;
XM Satellite alert transmission and EAS link:
August 2007;
GTAS initial capability in National Capital region:
September 2007;
DEAS deployment to all states:
December 2007;
PEP expansion to 90 percent coverage:
Fiscal year 2008;
Digital Presidential video, voice, and text messaging capability:
January 2009;
Adoption of the CAP Profile:
First quarter 2009.
Source: GAO analysis of FEMA information.
[End of figure]
Aside from implementing an integrated public alert and warning system,
FEMA has responsibility for providing training on and testing of alert
and warning systems; public education on use and access to the system;
and consultation, coordination, and cooperation with public and private
sector stakeholders. According to emergency management and industry
stakeholders, FEMA has not sufficiently met this responsibility. About
half of the state survey respondents reported that FEMA had not
provided them with a clear understanding of the IPAWS vision or program
goals and 66 percent were somewhat or very dissatisfied with FEMA's
level of consultation and coordination. Ultimately, among states, there
is a general lack of satisfaction with FEMA's outreach and a clouded
understanding of what IPAWS actually is. Although survey respondents
generally evaluated FEMA as having done little to no outreach,
education, and coordination, FEMA has made recent progress in these
efforts. FEMA officials have convened federal, industry, and
practitioners' "working groups" to discuss the adoption of the CAP
Profile, which they plan to expand to include broader discussions about
public alert and warning. In interviews, public and private sector
stakeholders have expressed frustration with the lack of communication
and coordination with IPAWS in the past, but have also noted recent
improvements.
Shifting Program Vision and Lack of Continuity in Planning Have
Adversely Affected Efforts to Modernize and Integrate Alerts:
FEMA's efforts to create an integrated and modernized alert and warning
system have been affected by (1) shifting program vision, (2) a lack of
continuity in planning and program direction, (3) a lack of collection
or organization of program information from which to make management
decisions, and (4) staff turnover.
Shifting program vision. The IPAWS program vision has changed several
times, slowing progress toward an integrated system. FEMA originally
planned to build an infrastructure to deliver state and local alerts
through multiple pathways. However, according to FEMA officials, in the
second quarter of calendar year 2007, the vision changed to focus
exclusively on dissemination of presidential messages and setting alert
and warning technical standards. In early 2009, the vision of the
program shifted to again focus on a comprehensive system that included
infrastructure for state and local alerts. Figure 4 shows the evolution
of the IPAWS vision.
Figure 4: FEMA's Shifting Vision for IPAWS:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Late 2004 to early 2007:
Integrated public alert and warning system that provides federal,
state, and local officials with multiple means to provide timely public
alerts.
Goal: Alert all people on all communications devices.
Early 2007 to early 2009:
IPAWS architecture will ensure that the President will be able to send
an alert to the public during any hazardous event.
Goal: Deliver the presidential message to the nation.
Early 2009 onward:
Build and maintain an integrated and comprehensive system that enables
people to receive alerts and warnings through as many means as
possible.
Goal: IPAWS will provide local, state, and federal authorities
integrated services and capabilities to alert and warn their
communities, via multiple communications methods of any hazard
impacting public safety.
Sources: FEMA and GAO.
[End of figure]
Lack of continuity in planning and program direction. FEMA's efforts to
create an integrated and modernized alert and warning system have
encountered difficulties in program planning and management. As we have
reported, effective project planning involves establishing and
maintaining plans; defining the project mission, scope and activities;
and determining overall budget and schedule, key deliverables, and
milestones for key deliverables. It also involves ensuring that the
project team has the skills and knowledge needed to manage the project
and obtaining stakeholder commitment to the project plan. Furthermore,
agencies can use performance information to make various types of
management decisions to improve programs and results.[Footnote 15]
Although the executive order requires an implementation plan to be
updated yearly, from early 2007 through June 2009, the IPAWS effort
operated without a designated implementation plan and no specific
processes for systems development and deployment.[Footnote 16] The
current implementation plan, completed in June 2009, does not
adequately satisfy the project management and planning practices
essential for effective program execution. In contrast to the plan from
2006, this plan provides few program details. Additionally, the new
plan includes only a vague overview of IPAWS initiatives, few
definitive milestones toward reaching program goals, and a lack of
clarity in how IPAWS systems will be integrated. Other planning
documentation that exist--consisting mostly of briefing slides
outlining IPAWS initiatives or broad, conceptual program requirements--
indicate a lack of continuous overall strategic vision with disparate
projects not tied together by a cohesive plan.[Footnote 17]
Lack of collection or organization of program information from which to
make management decisions. We found organized IPAWS program information
that officials might use for decisionmaking and establishing project
plans is also lacking. Throughout the course of our work, FEMA
officials told us that many key IPAWS documents did not exist or were
irretrievable. Moreover, a consultant[Footnote 18] at FEMA who is
assessing IPAWS has found that there is no cogent organization system
to locate program information, that information exists in multiple
locations across FEMA office spaces, and that data searches on program
information take an inordinate amount of time and effort. The
consultant also found more robust and realistic documented internal
controls are necessary.
We requested documentation on FEMA and DHS reporting requirements or
performance measures for which the IPAWS program prepared documented
updates of its progress. However, neither FEMA nor DHS regularly report
on IPAWS.[Footnote 19] FEMA was able to provide a performance
information worksheet and spreadsheet, but this documentation provided
only vague program parameters, without progress updates on reaching
specific goals or milestones. FEMA has taken steps to assess the IPAWS
program and has contracted with a consultant to perform a full
assessment of the IPAWS program and to implement internal controls and
performance measures. However, the absence of accurate periodic
reporting on IPAWS leaves valuable program information unavailable.
Such information would help increase program transparency, establish
greater program accountability, and assure a reasonable assessment of
return on financial investments. Additionally, periodic reporting on
IPAWS would provide FEMA's private sector partners and those in
government at the federal, state, and local level with information
necessary to help establish an integrated alert and warning system.
Such reporting would also assist the Congress as it oversees issues
related to public alert and warning.
Staff turnover. Progress toward an integrated alert system has also
been slowed by frequent changes in organizational leadership of the
IPAWS program office and other staffing related issues. During our
review, IPAWS was operating under an acting director--its third
director since the program began--and at the time of our review was
searching for a permanent director. According to FEMA, a new director
took charge of the program on August 3, 2009. Additionally, according
to FEMA officials, high turnover of program staff has made it difficult
to consistently manage IPAWS programs. FEMA's heavy use of contract
employees has also resulted in concerns from stakeholders. In one
state, emergency management officials participated in an IPAWS project,
relying solely on contract staff without actually knowing that FEMA was
involved. Another state official said that IPAWS is dominated with
outside contractors who do not fully understand alert and warning
needs. At the program office itself, there is a preponderance of
contract staff. As of June 2009, 27 contractor staff and 5 FEMA IPAWS
staff positions were filled out of 11 noncontract full-time equivalent
positions that were available.
Limited Program Accountability for IPAWS Projects Has Contributed to
Inconclusive Results and Lessons Learned:
To demonstrate the integration and expansion of new alerting
technologies, and to work toward the functionality described in the
executive order, FEMA has implemented a series of IPAWS pilot projects,
but they have ended inconclusively, with few documented lessons
learned. The IPAWS pilots were first introduced in 2004, prior to
Executive Order 13407, and focused on testing various alerting systems
in different areas of the country with the intent that successfully
piloted technologies could eventually be used in a fully integrated
"system of systems." At various stages of our work, FEMA provided
different accounts of the number and breadth of the pilot projects, as
well as inconsistent documentation on the goals, costs, and results of
the full IPAWS pilot programs. Specifically, FEMA documents and
interviews revealed inconsistent information on the purpose of the
pilot programs and how they supported broader IPAWS goals. According to
FEMA officials, the pilot projects were intended to be discrete tests
of alert capability, with clear goals and specified durations. However,
there is a dearth of documentation describing the actual plans and
results of the pilots. Although we requested reports documenting the
plans, lessons learned, and technological or operational outcomes, for
most pilot projects, such formal documentation was never
produced.[Footnote 20] Rather, the extent of the documentation FEMA
provided on the pilots includes general briefing slides with broad
program descriptions. FEMA equipment deployed during the pilots was
left, for the most part, unused with pilot participants. According to
FEMA officials, there is an inventory accounting for the equipment and
the equipment is intended to be repurposed in the future. As a result
of the lack of project assessments, reporting, and documentation, it is
unclear which aspects of the IPAWS projects, if any, are currently
being utilized or are planned to be utilized in the future or whether
the projects informed actions or decisions with respect to IPAWS
programming. Initial findings from an IPAWS program assessment,
performed by a FEMA consultant, revealed that, in most cases, key
project deliverables, for which the government contracted, could not be
accounted for. FEMA's consultant was unable to locate or verify the
status of deliverables for 18 of the 28 projects it identified. The
consultant was able to verify only partial completion of 6 other
projects, while the status of deliverables for the 4 other projects was
incomplete, ongoing, not available, or unknown.
Responses from our survey of state emergency management directors
indicate that most of the 12 states that reported participating in the
pilot projects reacted unfavorably when asked about the outcomes and
lessons learned from the pilots. Lack of coordination, poor management,
incomplete execution, and short project duration were cited, among
other things, as lessons learned or outcomes from the pilots. Figure 5
identifies the states who reported participating in IPAWS pilot
projects, including select open-ended feedback provided by states.
Figure 5: Survey Responses on IPAWS Pilots Projects from State
Emergency Management Directors:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Included in the illustration is a map of the United States, with the
following states shaded to indicated that survey responses were
received from those states:
Alabama;
Alaska;
Florida;
Louisiana;
Maine;
Mississippi;
New Jersey;
Oklahoma;
North Carolina;
South Carolina;
Washington;
Wisconsin.
Responses:
* Lack of coordination over entire life of program...Too little
information, too late;
* State input would have been valuable to the program in its earlier
development stages...IPAWS appeared to be hastily conceived and poorly
executed.
* IPAWS was, in the state's opinion, not ready for operations during
that one-year pilot period— The system was slow, taking about 8 hours
to send out the prerecorded message.
* The one-year pilot period was not enough time to evaluate a system of
this scope.
* At least two counties were pleased with the ability to alert the
public.
* Length of program should have been longer. Many of our participant
counties were reluctant to promote or utilize the system because of the
short duration.
* The pilot was poorly managed...There were no results—the equipment
was never installed. Lessons learned: beware of federal contractors
bearing …gifts that will work.‘
* The pilot program emphasized the need for additional capabilities in
regards to alert and warning for our citizens during periods of
emergencies and/or activations.All of these systems have proven
effective and reliable as another tool in the warning and notification
toolbox.
* Non-conclusive testing. Equipment installed but never worked
correctly.
Source: GAO; Map Resources (map).
[End of figure]
Some states cited positive outcomes and were generally more optimistic
about their participation. For example, one state was encouraged by the
promise of new alerting technology being pilot tested and said that the
pilot technologies proved effective and reliable and should be
components of an overall strategy. Another emphasized the need for
additional capabilities to alert and warn citizens during emergencies.
FEMA Faces Coordination Issues and Technical Challenges in Implementing
IPAWS:
FEMA faces coordination issues in successfully implementing IPAWS.
While there is broad consensus regarding the need for coordination
among diverse stakeholders, many stakeholders we contacted generally
lack specific knowledge of IPAWS and would like more opportunities to
interact with FEMA on public alert and warning issues. FEMA also faces
technical challenges related to integrating state and local systems;
adopting standards; and the development of geo-targeted, risk-based,
multilingual, and disabled population alerting capabilities. These
elements are required aspects of the public alert and warning system
and are crucial to IPAWS implementation, yet remain largely unresolved.
Coordination Among Diverse Stakeholders is Necessary, but Has Been
Insufficient According to Many Stakeholders:
To effectively develop and implement IPAWS, FEMA depends on the efforts
and expertise of diverse stakeholders, yet coordination was cited as
the primary challenge facing the implementation of IPAWS. Specifically,
FEMA relies on partners such as the DHS Directorate for Science and
Technology, NOAA, the Organization for Advancement of Structured
Information Standards, and CTIA - The Wireless Association, an
association of wireless telecommunications providers, which is involved
in the development of CMAS. In addition, given that the IPAWS vision
relies heavily upon state and local investment in CAP-based warning
systems, organizations at these levels of government have a range of
interests in IPAWS planning efforts. In fact, many respondents to our
state survey seek opportunities to contribute to IPAWS planning and
consider collaboration among all levels of government to be imperative
to the delivery of public alerts and warnings.
Executive Order 13407, in laying out FEMA's IPAWS role, recognized the
need for stakeholder involvement for an effective alert system to work
and required FEMA to "consult, coordinate, and cooperate with the
private sector, including communications media organizations, and
federal, state, territorial, tribal and local governmental authorities,
including emergency response providers." Many stakeholders we contacted
from various levels of government and the private sector expressed
support for a collaborative, consensus-based forum that could increase
the flow of information and best represent stakeholder interests. In
March 2007, we recommended that FEMA establish a forum for stakeholders
involved with emergency communications to discuss issues related to
IPAWS, with representation from federal agencies, state and local
governments, private industry, and the affected consumer community.
[Footnote 21] DHS agreed with the intent of this recommendation, noting
that FEMA would continue to work with stakeholders through meetings,
conferences, and other forums. As recently as May 2008, FEMA said it
intended to create a stakeholder subcommittee under an appropriate DHS
departmental advisory committee in compliance with the Federal Advisory
Committee Act (FACA).[Footnote 22] Also, FEMA informed us of plans to
establish state advisory committees. However, FEMA subsequently told us
that neither the federal advisory subcommittee nor state advisory
committees have been implemented and there are no current plans to
establish such groups.
While there is broad consensus regarding the need for coordination,
FEMA's efforts to date have been insufficient, according to many
stakeholders we contacted. For example, broadcaster associations and
local government officials were unaware of IPAWS program goals and
milestones. Also, the majority of our state survey respondents received
little to no information from FEMA and communicated with FEMA to little
or no extent. Further, only one survey respondent indicated that FEMA's
communication and coordination efforts have provided him with a clear
understanding of the IPAWS vision and program goals, with the majority
of respondents having little or no understanding of the program. Local
officials we contacted had little to no communication with FEMA, were
generally unaware of the IPAWS program, and overall, lacked an
understanding of the CAP alert standard.
FEMA officials acknowledged that they have, thus far, insufficiently
engaged state-level stakeholders and have recently taken steps to
increase their communication and collaboration efforts. Many of FEMA's
recent initiatives are driven by its July 2008 - September 2009 IPAWS
Stakeholder Engagement Plan, which describes FEMA's strategy for
establishing, developing, and maintaining partnerships with alert and
warning stakeholders. Among other things, this plan details FEMA's
intent to continue its participation in alert and warning and emergency
management conferences; to engage relevant congressional committees; to
build relationships with FEMA Regions, which can pass information to
state and local government officials; and to build relationships with
other organizations and media outlets. In addition, FEMA launched an
updated Web site in March 2009, which allows users to submit questions
regarding the IPAWS program. The Web site lacks detailed program
information, however.
In figure 6, we display the survey responses of state emergency
management directors on the extent to which they believe FEMA officials
adequately communicated or coordinated with state and local governments
with respect to public alert and warning programs. States largely
reported inadequate levels of training, testing, and alert exercises,
as well as inadequate public education efforts. The survey results
indicate that a set of stakeholders crucial to establishing a public
alert and warning system do not believe FEMA is communicating and
collaborating adequately.
Figure 6: Survey Responses of State Emergency Management Directors on
FEMA IPAWS Information, Training, Communication, and Coordination:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Survey item: Receive information or updates from FEMA on adoption of
the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP):
Great extent: 0%;
Some extent: 34%;
Little extent: 36%;
No extent: 23%.
Survey item: Receive communiqués from FEMA regarding IPAWS program;
Great extent: 2%;
Some extent: 23%;
Little extent: 32%;
No extent: 32%.
Survey item: Exchange communications with FEMA representatives about
IPAWS;
Great extent: 4%;
Some extent: 256%;
Little extent: 26%;
No extent: 34%.
Survey item: Receive invitations to or participate in formal meetings
or working groups with FEMA or DHS;
Great extent: 6%;
Some extent: 32%;
Little extent: 21%;
No extent: 30%.
Survey item: Solicited for input to FEMA on issues related to emergency
alerts and warnings;
Great extent: 6%;
Some extent: 23%;
Little extent: 30%;
No extent: 32%.
Survey item: Participate in FEMA training, tests, and exercises for
IPAWS;
Great extent: 2%;
Some extent: 13%;
Little extent: 17%;
No extent: 60%;
Survey item: Participate in FEMA public education efforts on integrated
alerts and public warning;
Great extent: 0%;
Some extent: 9%;
Little extent: 19%;
No extent: 55%.
Source: GAO survey of state emergency management directors.
[End of figure]
According to our survey results, overall, 31 states were either
somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the level of
consultation, coordination, and communication shown by FEMA with
respect to its public alert and warning programs. Many stakeholders we
contacted and respondents to our state survey desire greater dialogue
with FEMA and want FEMA to better coordinate its efforts with public
and private partners. Some of these sentiments were echoed by federal
partners, such as NOAA, which noted that coordination could be
improved. The DHS Office of Science and Technology, which cited its
relationship with FEMA as a primary challenge to developing an
integrated alert system, told us that FEMA's frequent periods of
transition made planning difficult. To improve federal coordination and
assert its lead role in federal alert and warning programs, FEMA has
established memorandums of agreement and understanding with federal
partners and meets regularly with them. The IPAWS stakeholder
engagement plans call for FEMA to host annual alert and warning summits
with its federal partners, starting as soon as the first quarter of
fiscal year 2009, and FEMA also formed three working groups to review
and validate requirements for the CAP Profile.[Footnote 23] FEMA said
it plans to eventually expand the scope of these working groups beyond
CAP to solicit feedback on the continued development and implementation
of IPAWS.
Although some of FEMA's communication and coordination efforts appear
promising, their effectiveness is not yet clear. For example, one
survey respondent has been encouraged by his state's inclusion in
FEMA's Practitioner's Working Group, yet nonetheless reported a lack of
communication and coordination with FEMA. The scope and range of
stakeholder involvement in each new effort is limited and, as such,
FEMA remains without a mechanism to bring together all interested
stakeholders. This raises the possibility that many stakeholders will
remain uninformed of FEMA's efforts pertaining to IPAWS and leaves FEMA
without a means to thoroughly collaborate on a range of alert and
warning issues.
Technical and Other Challenges Have Not Been Fully Addressed:
FEMA faces an array of technical and other challenges in developing and
implementing IPAWS that have not been fully addressed. These challenges
include (1) integrating systems; (2) adopting CAP standards; and (3)
developing and implementing geo-targeted and risk-based alerting,
alerts for individuals with disabilities, and multilingual alerts.
Integrating IPAWS with state and local systems. As states and local
governments develop and deploy their own alert systems, a key
challenge, according to stakeholders, is the integration of IPAWS with
these disparate alert systems. In our survey, 42 states responded that
they have implemented or plan to implement alternate methods to
disseminate emergency alert information outside of EAS, such as email
or text alerts. Current and planned capabilities vary widely, however.
In addition, 20 state respondents indicated that their states have no
plans to wait for information or guidance from the federal government
before investing in emergency alert and warning systems. States that
are moving ahead without federal guidance and investing in alert
methods cited a responsibility to provide their citizens with emergency
communications. The prevalence of alternate alerting methods at the
state level that lack compatibility with federal investments could lead
to increased diversity among systems, making future integration more
difficult. To address challenges related to integrating IPAWS with
state and local alert systems, FEMA is planning to inventory and
evaluate federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal alert and
warning capabilities by surveying approximately 3,500 emergency
operations centers. This effort, initiated in late 2008, is required by
the 2006 executive order, and will be carried out over a 3-year period
ending in 2012, according to FEMA.
Adopting CAP standards. Integration of IPAWS and state and local
systems hinges largely on whether these systems use the same alert
standards. FEMA intends to adopt CAP as the standard by which
information will be transported among alerting systems. Currently, only
10 respondents to our state survey are using CAP, indicating that the
prospect for seamless integration of existing systems may be limited.
However, 42 states responding to our survey plan to use CAP in future
investments in emergency alert and warning equipment, suggesting that
the use of CAP will expand. Several survey respondents cited funding as
an obstacle to CAP usage and system integration, reporting that further
investment would be required to make necessary system upgrades.
Additional challenges to integration exist at the local level due to
the potential diversity among systems and similar financial
constraints. For example, one state survey respondent indicated that
cities are purchasing notification systems, yet the state has set no
standards for such systems. FEMA officials acknowledged that federal
grant programs would likely be necessary to support IPAWS deployment,
and are currently exploring the use of grant programs to make funding
available to states and local jurisdictions for the procurement of CAP-
compliant equipment.
Developing and implementing tailored alerting: geo-targeted and risk-
based alerting, alerts for individuals with disabilities, and
multilingual alerts. CAP messages can be disseminated with the multiple
streams of information necessary to facilitate tailored alerting, and
according to FEMA, adoption of the CAP Profile is the first step in
developing the flexibility to provide such alerts. However, the current
CAP Profile under consideration does not address multiple languages or
special needs.[Footnote 24] Risk-based alerting--that is, the
capability to tailor alerts based on a person's threat risk or level of
danger--is a requirement of the executive order, yet FEMA does not have
plans to address this functionality.[Footnote 25] FEMA noted that state
and local practitioners have developed innovative warning systems and
methods for alerting those with disabilities and non-English speakers.
To address these challenges, in 2009 and 2010, FEMA intends to plan,
engineer, and implement capabilities to extend alerts to these groups.
Conclusions:
Emergency communications are critical in crisis management and for
protecting the public in situations of war, terrorist attack, or
natural disaster; yet, FEMA has made limited progress in implementing a
comprehensive, integrated alert system as is the policy of the federal
government. Management turnover, inadequate planning, and a lack of
stakeholder coordination have delayed implementation of IPAWS and left
the nation dependent on an antiquated, unreliable national alert
system. FEMA's delays also appear to have made IPAWS implementation
more difficult in the absence of federal leadership as states have
forged ahead and invested in their own alert and warning systems.
The IPAWS program has been slowed and has suffered setbacks due to a
lack of consistent program goals, clear performance measures, and
program management information. In the absence of systematic
performance measures, project milestones and schedules have been left
undefined and little progress has been made in achieving the objectives
of Executive Order 13407, which called for a comprehensive solution in
the way public alert and warning is conducted in the United States. In
order that IPAWS achieve the federal government's public alert and
warning goals, it is essential that FEMA define the specific steps
necessary in realizing a modernized and integrated alert system. While
the executive order requires an implementation plan to be updated
yearly, separately, periodic reporting on progress toward achieving an
integrated public alert and warning system would improve program
transparency and accountability. Such reporting would match program
goals to their respective timelines and provide government and private
sector stakeholders with information necessary to help establish an
integrated alert and warning system.
EAS, one of the mainstays for public alerting, and the only operational
aspect of IPAWS, has remained largely unchanged since our previous
review in 2007. Although projects are under way to address longstanding
weaknesses, the lack of reliability of alert distribution and
dissemination functions to the public limits EAS's effectiveness.
Specifically, a lack of training and national-level testing raises
questions about whether the relay system would actually work during a
national-level emergency. Previously, we recommended that FEMA work in
conjunction with FCC to develop and implement a plan to verify (1) the
dependability and effectiveness of the EAS relay distribution system,
which is used to disseminate national-level alerts; and (2) that EAS
participants have the training and technical skills to issue effective
EAS alerts. As sufficient action on EAS testing and training has not
been taken and since IPAWS is years away from full implementation,
these recommendations remain applicable to help ensure EAS is capable
of operating as intended. Further, as IPAWS is developed and deployed,
it is important that the dependability of those systems be verified and
that IPAWS participants are adequately trained.
Effectively implementing an integrated alert system will require
collaboration among a broad spectrum of stakeholders, including those
at the federal, state, and local levels; private industry; and the
affected consumer community. Executive Order 13407 requires such
collaboration. As states and localities invest in their own alert
systems in advance of IPAWS deployment, it is critical that FEMA
coordinate with stakeholders to help facilitate the integration of
these alert systems. We previously recommended that FEMA establish a
forum for the diverse stakeholders involved with emergency
communications to discuss emerging and other issues related to the
implementation of an integrated public alert and warning system. While
FEMA has established stakeholder "working groups," a robust forum of
diverse public alert stakeholders does not exist and further action on
stakeholder engagement is necessary. As technology continues to evolve
and states implement their own systems, it is all the more relevant
that a permanent collaborative body be put in place to support the
development and implementation of IPAWS.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order that the public alert and warning system be conceived of,
designed, and implemented, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct the Administrator, FEMA to take the following actions:
* To improve program management and align IPAWS's vision with the
requirements established in the executive order, implement processes
for systems development and deployment, including (1) updating IPAWS
strategic goals and milestones, implementation plans, and performance
measures; (2) prioritizing projects in consultation with stakeholders;
and (3) creating the necessary documentation on system design and
specific release schedules for IPAWS.
* To improve program transparency and accountability, report
periodically to the Congress and the Secretary of Homeland Security on
progress toward achieving an integrated public alert and warning
system. The report should include information on ongoing IPAWS
projects, financial information on program expenditures, and status
updates in achieving performance measures and reaching milestones.
* To help ensure system dependability, as IPAWS is developed and
deployed, establish and implement a plan to verify (1) the
dependability and effectiveness of systems used to disseminate alerts,
and (2) that IPAWS participants have the training and technical skills
to make use of IPAWS infrastructure and to issue effective public
alerts.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS and FCC for their review and
comment. In its comments, DHS focused on the report's recommendations
and indicated that it agrees with all our recommendations to improve
public alert and warning. DHS provided examples of actions aimed at
addressing our recommendations. In particular, FEMA said it is
developing an IPAWS Strategic Plan and that existing plans have been
modified to align IPAWS with the requirements of Executive Order 13407.
FEMA believes IPAWS has documentation and processes for system design
and that detailed requirements for specific IPAWS components have been
coordinated extensively with federal, industry, and public
stakeholders. FEMA noted that it will continue to brief Congress on
IPAWS and provide project status updates to DHS on its progress in
achieving milestones. FEMA also said as IPAWS is developed, it plans to
include testing methods to ensure deployed systems are dependable and
effective, and to coordinate with FCC on enforcing new testing
procedures without placing an undue burden on industry. FEMA further
said that it is working with its Emergency Management Institute to
develop specific training for stakeholders.
Although FEMA noted preexisting IPAWS actions as addressing
documentation and processes on system design, our performance audit
concluded that such actions do not amount to a specific definition of
the steps necessary in realizing a modernized and integrated alert
system. Additionally, the actions detailed in DHS's response do not
fully address the need for documented plans and a schedule for IPAWS's
implementation. Regarding previous reporting on IPAWS projects,
expenditures, and status in achieving performance measures and reaching
milestones, while FEMA noted that they brief House and Senate
appropriation subcommittees, we found during our review that briefing
information about IPAWS's overall progress, project status, and program
expenditures was vague or non-existent. Given the important role that
state and local governments and private-sector stakeholders have in
IPAWS, the intent of our recommendation is that periodic reporting
information on IPAWS be more broadly available so that stakeholders are
fully aware of the IPAWS program's direction and progress. See appendix
II for written comments from DHS. In addition to the above comments,
DHS and FCC both provided technical comments that we incorporated into
the report as appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretary of DHS, the Chairman of the FCC, and interested
congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at
no charge on our Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix III.
Signed by:
Mark Goldstein:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The objectives of this report are to provide information on issues
relating to public alert and warning, the Emergency Alert System (EAS),
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Integrated Public
Alert and Warning program (IPAWS); specifically, (1) the operational
capability of the nation's current EAS, (2) the progress made in FEMA's
efforts to modernize and integrate alert and warning systems, and (3)
the issues and challenges involved in implementing an integrated public
alert and warning system.
To obtain information related to all three objectives of this report,
we conducted a Web-based survey of state emergency management
directors. We asked them questions related to public alert and warning
capabilities at the state or local level, the current status and
integration of EAS with other alert capabilities, the use of the Common
Alerting Protocol (CAP), the FEMA IPAWS program, and the level of
coordination between FEMA and state officials. The survey was deployed
by email to all 50 states and the District of Columbia and was
conducted in March and April 2009. Contact information for each state
was provided by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA).
We obtained contact information for state directors for whom NEMA did
not have correct contact information directly from state departments.
We obtained responses from 47 survey recipients (92 percent). Despite
repeated inquiries, the emergency management directors from California,
New Mexico, Tennessee, and Texas did not respond to the survey. The
survey was also deployed, in text form, to select local emergency
management agency officials whose contact information was provided to
us as a part of the state survey. The results of local surveys were not
included in the state survey results in this report. Additionally, this
report does not contain all of the results from the survey. The survey
and a more complete tabulation of the results can be viewed by
accessing the following link: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-09-880SP].
To obtain information on the operational capability of the current EAS
and the progress that has been made in FEMA's efforts to plan and
implement a modernized and integrated alert and warning system, we
reviewed and analyzed relevant documentation and literature,
interviewed public and private sector stakeholders, and collected
information from our survey of state emergency management agencies. We
examined federal agency documentation, including planning, program
status, and financial documents; agency orders and rules; testimony
statements; and briefings from FEMA and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). We also reviewed relevant literature
on public alert and warning from public and private sector
stakeholders, including the Congressional Research Service and various
industry consortia. We interviewed federal officials from FEMA, FCC,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and NOAA. We also spoke with
representatives of state and local emergency management offices,
industry stakeholder organizations, and public and private sector alert
and warning experts. Stakeholders we interviewed included the Society
of Broadcast Engineers, the Primary Entry Point Advisory Committee, the
National Center for Accessible Media, the Association of Public Safety
Communications Officers, the Emergency Interoperability Consortium, the
EAS-CAP Industry Group, the Association of Public Television Stations,
the Telecommunications Industry Association, and CTIA - The Wireless
Association.
To obtain information on the challenges of implementing FEMA's IPAWS,
we interviewed a broad set of government and industry stakeholders, as
indicated above, and obtained information through our survey of state
of emergency management directors. In addition to stakeholders
previously mentioned, we conducted interviews with state and local
officials and with organizations involved with the public alert and
warning, such as the International Association of Emergency Managers.
We also conducted interviews with officials from state participants in
FEMA's IPAWS pilot programs and state emergency managers. Additionally,
we interviewed private sector stakeholders and participants in public
alert and warning, including broadcasters, the wireless industry,
emergency alert technology companies, and consumer advocacy groups.
Information on IPAWS challenges from each state was collected as part
of our survey of state emergency management directors and select local
emergency management officials.
We conducted this review from September 2008 to September 2009, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our review objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
August 24, 2009:
Mr. Mark Goldstein:
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Goldstein:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity
to review and comment on the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) •
report, GAO-09-834, Emergency Preparedness: Improved Planning and
Coordination Necessary for Modernization and Integration of Public
Alert and Warning System. The GAO makes three recommendations to
improve the public alert and warning system. We agree with all three of
the recommendations and have provided recommendation specific
explanations.
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct the Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) to improve program management and to align Integration of Public
Alert and Warning System's (IPAWS) vision with the requirements
established in the executive order, implement processes for systems
development and deployment, including (1) updating IPAWS strategic
goals and milestones, implementation plans, performance measures, (2)
prioritizing projects in consultation with stakeholders, and (3)
creating the necessary documentation on system design, and specific
release schedules for IPAWS.
DHS Response: FEMA generally concurs with this recommendation. The new
TAWS Program Director, Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act
(DAWIA) Level III certified with over 20 years experience as a Program
Manager, took charge of the program on August 3, 2009, and will lead
the necessary actions to improve program management. An ]PAWS Strategic
Plan is currently under development and will be completed within 90
days, codifying the strategic focus of the program and aligning it with
Executive Order 13407. In addition, the IPAWS Mission Needs Statement
and Operational Requirements Documents have been modified to more
comprehensively align the IPAWS vision with requirements established in
Executive Order 13407.
The program has documentation and processes for system design --
including a Concept of Operations (CONOPS), Program Management Plan
(draft), and a System Engineering Management Plan and Architecture
Analysis Report -- many of which were in the process of internal
coordination as of the writing of the report. Our documents are
reviewed and approved by a Change Control Board internally first, and
then, if necessary, are shared with key stakeholders before being
submitted to the Program Manager and program sponsors for signature.
Additionally, we have briefed preliminary plans to industry conferences
(the EAS Summit in March and the Society of Broadcast Engineers meeting
at the National Association of Broadcasters Show in April), and plan
further briefings at major stakeholder conferences in the fall.
In addition, detailed requirements for specific IPAWS components have
been coordinated extensively with federal, industry, and public
stakeholders. For example, the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) [PAWS
Profile document was defined via several federal, practitioner and
industry working groups. The IPAWS profile is undergoing public comment
and validation through the Organization for the Advancement of
Structured Information Systems (OASIS) standards process. OASIS is an
internationally recognized standards body, which will ensure the
broadest spectrum of comments are received. FEMA, along with our
supporting partner DHS Science and Technology (S&T), closely
coordinated with the commercial cellular industry to develop
requirements for the Commercial Mobile Alert Service (CMAS) interface,
and are now beginning work with practitioners to refine the
capabilities that the [PAWS CMAS component will make available to
emergency managers. Additionally, we are prototyping a Geo-Targeted
Alerting origination capability with State emergency operation centers
to gather feedback on the capability, and refine the models and
interfaces to better suit emergency manager needs.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct the Administrator, FEMA to improve program transparency
and accountability, report periodically to the Congress and the
Secretary of Homeland Security on progress toward achieving an
integrated public alert and warning system. The report should include
information on ongoing [PAWS projects, financial information on program
expenditures, and status updates in achieving performance measures and
reaching milestones.
DHS Response: FEMA generally concurs with this recommendation. IPAWS
continues to be a program of interest with the House and Senate and
quarterly briefings and updates are provided to their respective
appropriation sub-committees. [PAWS has been identified as a program of
interest by FEMA and DHS and is part of the FEMA Acquisition Review
Board (ARB), which follows DHS Acquisition Directive 102-01 guidance.
IPAWS will continue to report through the ARB process to refine project
status updates to the Secretary of DHS or designee regularly on our
progress in achieving milestones
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct the Administrator, FEMA to help ensure dependability,
as IPAWS is developed and deployed, establish and implement a plan to
verify (1) the dependability and effectiveness of systems used to
disseminate alerts, and (2) that [PAWS participants have the training
and technical skills to make use of IPAWS infrastructure and to issue
effective public alerts.
DHS Response: FEMA concurs with this recommendation. As IPAWS continues
its integrated systems development, we plan to incorporate this
recommendation to ensure deployed systems are dependable and effective.
The target architecture will include testing methods and means to
verify coverage areas served. While this does not eliminate the need
for testing the responses of operators, it will provide [PAWS the
capability to conduct automated end-to-end testing of the system in a
way that is not presently supportable by the legacy Emergency Alert
System. We will work with the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) to
define ways to enforce new testing procedures without placing an undue
burden on industry. To address IPAWS participant training, IPAWS is
working with the Emergency Management Institute (EMI) to develop
specific training for stakeholders. The training, which is on target to
begin development by the end of fourth quarter FY2009, will be web-
based and available to emergency managers through standard internet
access. Once the training package has been developed and validated, the
long range plan is to incorporate PAWS training into the FEMA National
Incident Management Systems (NIMS) training pipeline.
Again, DHS appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on this
draft report and we look forward working with you on future homeland
security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Mark L. Goldstein, (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact above, other key contributors to this report
were Sally Moino, Assistant Director; Ryan D'Amore; Simon Galed; Andrew
Stavisky; and Mindi Weisenbloom.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System Has
Limitations, and Development of a New Integrated System Will Be
Challenging, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-411]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2007).
[2] FCC manages EAS participation by media-related communications
service providers, including radio and television broadcasters, cable
television, satellite radio, and television and IP-based video services
offered by wireline companies. See, 47 C.F.R. 11.2(c).
[3] Review of the Emergency Alert System; Independent Spanish
Broadcasters Association, the Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ, Inc., and the Minority Media and Telecommunications
Council, Petition for Immediate Relief, Second Report & Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 FCC Rcd 13275 (2007).
[4] Exec. Order 13407, 71 Fed. Reg. 36975 (June 26, 2006).
[5] The Warning, Alert, and Response Network Act was enacted on October
13, 2006, as title VI of the Security and Accountability for Every Port
Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (2006).
[6] Section 603(c) of the WARN Act required that FCC establish the
CMSAAC to develop and recommend technical standards and protocols for
the voluntary transmission of emergency alerts by Commercial Mobile
Service Providers within one year from the date of enactment of the
WARN Act (i.e., by October 12, 2007).
[7] 22 FCC Rcd 13275 (2007). In July 2008, FEMA announced its intention
to adopt CAP in the first quarter of calendar year 2009, but has since
revised its plans to adopt CAP in fiscal year 2010.
[8] The AMBER Alert Program is a voluntary partnership between law-
enforcement agencies, broadcasters, transportation agencies, and the
wireless industry to activate an urgent bulletin in the most serious
child-abduction cases.
[9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-411].
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-411].
[11] The State of Maine uses the Maine Public Broadcasting microwave
system as its primary EAS backbone. Each station in the Maine EAS
distribution system can receive national-level EAS alerts via National
Public Radio.
[12] 47 C.F.R. § 11.61.
[13] FEMA officials told us that one station was fully complete, but
two others still required circuits in order to be fully operational.
[14] According to FEMA officials, FEMA is developing a CAP Profile
Implementation Guide that will define how CAP will work within EAS. The
DHS Directorate for Science and Technology has been tasked with
developing CAP to EAS translation specifications.
[15] GAO, Managing For Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance
Information for Management Decision Making, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-927] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9,
2005)
[16] The executive order required the Secretary of Homeland Security to
submit to the President an implementation plan no later than 90 days
after the date of the order and, thereafter, to submit a report not
less than once each year.
[17] FEMA indicated that a strategic plan is under development, and
that it has other documentation and processes for system design that
were in the process of internal coordination when our review was being
completed.
[18] In October 2008, FEMA contracted with a professional services firm
providing management, assurance, and financial services.
[19] The DHS performance and accountability reports do not include
information on IPAWS.
[20] Sandia National Laboratories was contracted to implement the Web
Alert and Relay Network (WARN) pilot. Sandia produced a final report
for the second phase of the pilot, WARN2, whose results, according to
FEMA officials, were not accepted by the FEMA IPAWS program management
office.
[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-411].
[22] FACA sets requirements regarding how agencies establish federal
advisory committees and how the activities of the committees are
conducted. 5 U.S.C. App. 2.
[23] Through DHS, FEMA formed a Federal Working Group, Practitioner
Working Group, and Industry Working Group consisting of federal
partners, emergency managers and broadcast community members, and
broadcast vendors, respectively.
[24] According to FEMA officials, IPAWS intends to address multiple
languages and special needs in future revisions of the CAP Profile.
[25] FEMA signed an interagency agreement with NOAA to perform a Geo-
Targeting Alert System Demonstration Project, which, according to FEMA
officials, contains a risk-based alerting component. The GTAS
Demonstration Project continued through June 2009.
[End of section]
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