Coast Guard
Service Has Taken Steps to Address Historic Personnel Problems, but It Is too Soon to Assess the Impact of These Efforts Gao ID: GAO-10-268R January 29, 2010During this decade, the Coast Guard has been challenged with expanded mission responsibilities, and concerns have been raised about whether sufficient personnel exist within the Coast Guard to fulfill these mission responsibilities. The terrorist attacks of September 11th resulted in additional and expanded security-related mission areas, while major natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, provided lessons learned in allocating personnel and other resources across Coast Guard units. However, the impact of expanding Coast Guard missions and the increasing nationwide need for mission-ready Coast Guard units underscored shortcomings in the Coast Guard's ability to effectively allocate resources, such as personnel, ensure readiness levels, and maintain mission competency. GAO, the Offices of Inspector General at first the Department of Transportation and then the Department of Homeland Security, the National Transportation Safety Board, Congress, and the Coast Guard itself have reported on these types of personnel concerns both before and after the 2001 attacks. Commenting on the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2009 appropriations, congressional appropriators noted in a Senate Appropriations Committee Report that while the Coast Guard workforce is approximately the same size today as it was at the end of fiscal year 1975, its present mission responsibilities are greater. For example, the congressional appropriators reported that the number of foreign vessel arrivals in the United States increased by 61 percent over the last 10 years while the number of marine inspectors responsible for inspecting these vessels decreased by 1 percent. According to the Senate Appropriations Committee Report, however, the Coast Guard has not completed the necessary human resource requirements analysis to address the increases in its personnel needs. Further, a number of GAO's reports and others have noted problems the Coast Guard has had allocating its personnel and other resources to accomplish its missions. For example, in 2008, GAO commented on the Coast Guard's inability to clearly monitor resource allocations, particularly in mission areas like marine safety where work is heavily personnel-based and not as dependent on physical assets such as ships or airplanes. There are also concerns about the competency levels of some Coast Guard personnel. Specifically, maritime stakeholders have raised issues about the competency of some Coast Guard personnel to fulfill its marine safety mission, which Coast Guard leadership agreed needed to be addressed. Interested in these issues and others, Congress requested that GAO provide information on personnel efforts undertaken by the Coast Guard. This report discusses (1) documented personnel problems experienced by the Coast Guard in the last decade, (2) Coast Guard efforts to address these personnel problems, and the extent to which these efforts conform to congressional direction or identified best practices, as appropriate, and (3) possible challenges to their implementation.
The Coast Guard has made efforts to address its personnel problems, but it is too soon to assess these efforts' impact. The Coast Guard has a well-documented history of personnel problems, identified by Congress, GAO, and marine safety industry stakeholders, among others. For example, the Coast Guard faces continuing problems in balancing homeland security and more traditional missions, such as law enforcement and marine safety. The Coast Guard has made efforts to address these problems, such as the development of servicewide mission-support and mission-specific plans, as well as the creation or expansion of data-driven management tools. However, most of these efforts are in early stages of implementation or expansion, the data are not yet available to assess them, and of the four plans GAO reviewed, one plan did not fully conform to congressional direction. For example, one servicewide effort provides a description of the processes used by the Coast Guard to manage its personnel resources. Yet this effort did not include a gap analysis of the mission areas that continue to need resources and the type of personnel necessary to address those needs, in response to congressional direction. The remaining three plans generally conformed to best practices. Other efforts involve the development of electronic tools to allow for more data-driven management decisions on personnel requirements and preparedness. For example, the Officer Specialty Management System is designed to help workforce planners monitor the officer corps and identify potential shortfalls in specific knowledge, skills, education, and experience. The tool may help determine the rotation assignments of individual officers and assist program managers with calculating the time and cost of obtaining specific specialties, but officials do not expect the system to be fully online until 2011. Furthermore, as the Coast Guard continues to develop and implement these personnel related efforts, it faces challenges due to resource constraints, data reliability problems, coordination, and leadership concerns.
GAO-10-268R, Coast Guard: Service Has Taken Steps to Address Historic Personnel Problems, but It Is too Soon to Assess the Impact of These Efforts
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GAO-10-268R:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
January 29, 2010:
The Honorable James L. Oberstar:
Chairman:
The Honorable John Mica:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings:
Chairman:
The Honorable Frank LoBiondo:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation:
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Coast Guard: Service Has Taken Steps to Address Historic
Personnel Problems, but It Is too Soon to Assess the Impact of These
Efforts:
During this decade, the Coast Guard has been challenged with expanded
mission responsibilities, and concerns have been raised about whether
sufficient personnel exist within the Coast Guard to fulfill these
mission responsibilities. The terrorist attacks of September 11TH
resulted in additional and expanded security-related mission areas,
while major natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, provided
lessons learned in allocating personnel and other resources across
Coast Guard units. However, the impact of expanding Coast Guard
missions and the increasing nationwide need for mission-ready Coast
Guard units underscored shortcomings in the Coast Guard's ability to
effectively allocate resources, such as personnel, ensure readiness
levels, and maintain mission competency. GAO, the Offices of Inspector
General at first the Department of Transportation and then the
Department of Homeland Security, the National Transportation Safety
Board, Congress, and the Coast Guard itself have reported on these
types of personnel concerns both before and after the 2001 attacks.
Commenting on the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2009 appropriations,
congressional appropriators noted in a Senate Appropriations Committee
Report that while the Coast Guard workforce is approximately the same
size today as it was at the end of fiscal year:
1975, its present mission responsibilities are greater.[Footnote 1]
For example, the congressional appropriators reported that the number
of foreign vessel arrivals in the United States increased by 61
percent over the last 10 years while the number of marine inspectors
responsible for inspecting these vessels decreased by 1 percent.
According to the Senate Appropriations Committee Report, however, the
Coast Guard has not completed the necessary human resource
requirements analysis to address the increases in its personnel needs.
Further, a number of our reports and others have noted problems the
Coast Guard has had allocating its personnel and other resources to
accomplish its missions. For example, in 2008, we commented on the
Coast Guard's inability to clearly monitor resource allocations,
particularly in mission areas like marine safety where work is heavily
personnel-based and not as dependent on physical assets such as ships
or airplanes. There are also concerns about the competency levels of
some Coast Guard personnel. Specifically, maritime stakeholders have
raised issues about the competency of some Coast Guard personnel to
fulfill its marine safety mission, which Coast Guard leadership agreed
needed to be addressed.
Interested in these issues and others, you requested that we provide
information on personnel efforts undertaken by the Coast Guard. This
report discusses (1) documented personnel problems experienced by the
Coast Guard in the last decade, (2) Coast Guard efforts to address
these personnel problems, and the extent to which these efforts
conform to congressional direction or identified best practices, as
appropriate, and (3) possible challenges to their implementation.
To provide the historical perspective of personnel problems
experienced by the Coast Guard, we reviewed our prior work on the
Coast Guard's difficulties allocating its personnel and other
resources to accomplish all of its diverse missions while ensuring
that it addresses personnel readiness, qualifications, and training
requirements. We also reviewed the results of relevant Coast Guard
personnel qualifications and training investigations conducted by the
National Transportation Safety Board and the Coast Guard, as well as
reports of the Departments of Transportation and Homeland Security
Offices of Inspector General related to the Coast Guard's management
and readiness posture.
To assess the Coast Guard's efforts to address personnel problems, we
reviewed relevant laws and congressional guidance, instructions,
staffing manuals, training guidance, policies, and procedures related
to the Coast Guard's workforce planning and personnel development. We
analyzed the Coast Guard's Workforce Action Plan against guidance
provided by congressional appropriators, the Department of Homeland
Security's Workforce Planning Guide, and key principles for effective
strategic workforce planning we identified in previous work.[Footnote
2] In addition, we analyzed the Force Readiness Command's Business
Plan as it reflects the Coast Guard's effort to align and standardize
training to ensure force interoperability and readiness across all
units. We also compared the Business Plan to planning elements set out
in the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993.[Footnote
3] We analyzed the Marine Safety Performance Plan to assess how the
Coast Guard planned to address certain complaints raised by the
maritime community regarding a lack of competency in personnel
conducting this mission, among other things. We also compared the
Marine Safety Performance Plan to planning elements set out in the
GPRA. Further, we reviewed the Coast Guard's Acquisition Human Capital
Strategic Plan as well as a body of our work related to Coast Guard
acquisitions as the Coast Guard continues implementing the largest
acquisition program in the Coast Guard's history.[Footnote 4] We also
analyzed information that reflects how the Coast Guard assessed
personnel resources and allocated personnel to its various missions.
In addition, we spoke with relevant Coast Guard officials from various
offices, including the Office of the Vice Commandant; Human Resources;
Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security, and Stewardship;
Assistant Commandant for Capability; Deputy Commandant for Operations;
and Force Readiness Command, to discuss new personnel initiatives,
including plans and data-driven tools, which are designed to better
inform Coast Guard management of the personnel resources available,
the status of training and other necessary qualifications, and options
to allocate personnel for Coast Guard missions.
To identify and assess the challenges the Coast Guard may experience
implementing new personnel initiatives, we discussed with relevant
Coast Guard officials the purpose, status, and time frames for these
initiatives, as well as the challenges and obstacles to implementing
them. We also reviewed the National Academy of Public Administration's
(NAPA) 2009 study addressing the Coast Guard's modernization program,
and interviewed members of the project team.[Footnote 5]
We conducted this performance audit from December 2008 through January
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
The Coast Guard has made efforts to address its personnel problems,
but it is too soon to assess these efforts' impact. The Coast Guard
has a well-documented history of personnel problems, identified by
Congress, GAO, and marine safety industry stakeholders, among others.
For example, the Coast Guard faces continuing problems in balancing
homeland security and more traditional missions, such as law
enforcement and marine safety. The Coast Guard has made efforts to
address these problems, such as the development of servicewide mission-
support and mission-specific plans, as well as the creation or
expansion of data-driven management tools. However, most of these
efforts are in early stages of implementation or expansion, the data
are not yet available to assess them, and of the four plans we
reviewed, one plan did not fully conform to congressional direction.
For example, one servicewide effort provides a description of the
processes used by the Coast Guard to manage its personnel resources.
Yet this effort did not include a gap analysis of the mission areas
that continue to need resources and the type of personnel necessary to
address those needs, in response to congressional direction. The
remaining three plans generally conformed to best practices. Other
efforts involve the development of electronic tools to allow for more
data-driven management decisions on personnel requirements and
preparedness. For example, the Officer Specialty Management System is
designed to help workforce planners monitor the officer corps and
identify potential shortfalls in specific knowledge, skills,
education, and experience. The tool may help determine the rotation
assignments of individual officers and assist program managers with
calculating the time and cost of obtaining specific specialties, but
officials do not expect the system to be fully online until 2011.
Furthermore, as the Coast Guard continues to develop and implement
these personnel-related efforts, it faces challenges due to resource
constraints, data reliability problems, coordination, and leadership
concerns.
Background:
The Coast Guard is a multimission military service comprising
approximately 49,100 full-time personnel--including about 42,000
military personnel and 7,100 civilians. Active duty military
personnel, in turn, are comprised of almost 7,000 officers and 35,000
chief warrant officers and enlisted personnel. The Coast Guard's
statutory mission responsibilities include homeland-security-mission
programs such as the protection of ports, waterways, and coastal
security; defense readiness; undocumented migrant interdiction; and
nonhomeland-security-mission programs, such as drug interdiction; aids
to navigation and waterways management; search and rescue; living
marine resources; marine safety; marine environmental protection;
other law enforcement; and ice operations.[Footnote 6] For fiscal year
2010, the Coast Guard's budget request totals about $9.7 billion to
meet its personnel and mission responsibilities, which is about $360
million more than its total enacted appropriation in fiscal year 2009.
As the Coast Guard continues to tackle historical documented problems
related to personnel resource allocation, personnel readiness,
qualifications, and training, the service is undergoing a significant
organizational change, part of which involves modernizing its command
structure, support systems, and business processes. The Coast Guard
intends for this modernization program to better position the service
to fulfill not only traditional missions but also homeland security
responsibilities that expanded after September 11TH. The modernization
program is focused on the Coast Guard's command and control structure
and human resources systems, among other mission-support systems.
[Footnote 7] These new commands are as follows:
* The Deputy Commandant for Operations is responsible for aligning
policy and planning across the Coast Guard's 11 statutory mission
programs. The Deputy Commandant for Operations coordinates the
development of resource proposals, including personnel resources,
articulates gaps in workforce planning, and prioritizes the workforce
gaps to be filled.
* The Deputy Commandant for Mission Support is responsible for
processes and systems related to logistics, mission support, and human
resources, including the development of human resource strategies to
support mission execution (e.g., the Coast Guard's Workforce Action
Plan).
* Force Readiness Command (FORCECOM) has the overall role of providing
prepared forces throughout the Coast Guard by using enterprisewide
analysis and standardized doctrine, training and tactics, and
techniques and procedures to best allocate forces for sustainable
mission execution.
* Operations Command is comprised of and consolidating the Coast
Guard's field command and control structure, with ultimate
responsibility for Coast Guard mission execution. Operations Command,
as the end-user of operational personnel, is expected to collaborate
with other commands to help ensure that its personnel-related needs
are met.
The Coast Guard has requested certain additional statutory authorities
to fully implement the new command structure and associated senior
leadership positions. As of January 8, 2010 there were three pending
bills (H.R. 3619, H.R. 2650, and S. 1194) containing the Coast Guard's
requested provisions. For example, H.R. 3619, one of the pending Coast
Guard authorization bills, would amend federal statutes that govern
the operations of the Coast Guard and authorize four instead of the
current two vice admiral positions to take leadership positions for
each of the commands listed above.
The Coast Guard Has a History of Personnel Resource Allocation and
Preparedness Problems:
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard has
encountered difficulties allocating its personnel and other resources
to accomplish all of its diverse missions while ensuring that it
addresses personnel readiness, qualifications, and training
requirements. More specifically, the Coast Guard's security
responsibilities increased following the September 11TH attacks, while
it maintained responsibility for conducting its nonhomeland security
responsibilities, such as law enforcement and marine safety. Moreover,
although the Coast Guard received increases in funding following the
attacks, resources allocated to some nonhomeland-security activities
declined, and remained below historic levels for years.[Footnote 8] In
2002 and 2003, we reported that the Coast Guard did not have a long-
term strategy that outlined how it sees its resources--including
personnel--distributed across its various missions in this new
operating environment.[Footnote 9] Furthermore, we reported that
although the Coast Guard used a variety of mission performance
measures, it lacked a useful reporting mechanism to synthesize and
convey data to Congress about its nonsecurity-mission resource levels.
Thus, we recommended in 2004 that the Coast Guard implement a system
to accurately account for resources expended in each of its mission
areas.[Footnote 10] The Coast Guard acted upon this recommendation and
has reported improvements in the transparency and accuracy of its
financial systems and data. Similarly, in 2008, we noted that a lack
of reliable data hindered the Coast Guard's efforts to estimate the
number of facility inspectors needed to fulfill statutory
responsibilities for conducting regular security inspections of the
nation's ports and other maritime facilities to help prevent terrorist
attacks.[Footnote 11] Facility inspectors may be assigned other duties
apart from inspections, and the Coast Guard did not have data on how
inspectors' time was allocated. Further, in 2008, we reported that the
Coast Guard's execution of a security-related program was at risk
because it lacked a strategic workforce plan that defined appropriate
staffing levels, identified the critical skills needed to achieve the
mission, and eliminated workforce gaps to prepare for future needs.
[Footnote 12]
Formulating appropriate personnel levels for specific programs or
across mission areas also involves a consideration of military-to-
civilian staff ratios. A previous Coast Guard report to Congress on
workforce issues, submitted to Congress in 1997, noted that civilian
employees were better qualified to fill support positions that require
technical skills, extensive specialty training, and continuity of
service.[Footnote 13] In 2000, we reviewed close to 1,000
nonoperational commissioned officer positions and determined that
about 800 of the positions did not meet the Coast Guard's criteria for
military staffing and could be filled by civilians.[Footnote 14]
Although the Coast Guard identified several disadvantages to filling
the military positions with civilians, such as loss of flexibility and
impact on promotions and retention in the officer corps, we maintained
that the long-term cost savings of the conversion outweighed the Coast
Guard's concerns. Specifically, for the jobs examined in the study,
the cost of employing an officer was on average 21 percent more than
filling the same position with a comparable civilian. Despite the fact
that the Coast Guard did not agree with several aspects of the
analysis, it concurred that additional civilian conversions were
appropriate and acknowledged additional qualitative benefits of a
civilian workforce. More recently, the Coast Guard has sought to
strengthen continuity of expertise in mission-related areas, such as
marine safety, by adding civilian positions. These types of
considerations will continue to make the balance of military and
civilian personnel an important component of Coast Guard workforce
planning, especially given the service's uncertain long-term budget
outlook.
The Coast Guard has also faced other personnel problems related to
readiness, qualifications, and training in specific mission areas,
some of which predate the terrorist attacks. For example, some
personnel qualifications and training elements associated with the
Coast Guard's search and rescue mission were questioned in a National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation of the 1997 fatal
sinking of a recreational sailing vessel.[Footnote 15] The NTSB
concluded that substandard performance by the Coast Guard in
initiating a search and rescue response to the incident contributed to
loss of life, and recommended training improvements and changes in the
certification process for Coast Guard communications staff that
receive and act upon distress calls. In 2001, 2002, and 2003, the
Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General also reported
personnel concerns with the Coast Guard search and rescue mission
along with the network of boat stations typically responsible for
carrying out these operations.[Footnote 16] Among other things, the
Inspector General noted boat station staff shortages, a declining
trainer-to-trainee ratio that diminished the quality of on-the-job
training, and a lack of entry-level training for boatswain's mates,
who are key search and rescue mission staff that comprise a large
segment of Coast Guard enlisted personnel. We reported in 2005 that
stations were still unable to meet Coast Guard standards in the area
of staffing.[Footnote 17] As recently as 2009, the experience levels
of Coast Guard personnel were again called into question following a
search and rescue response to a fatal fishing vessel sinking. A Coast
Guard memorandum about the incident stated that the delayed response
"revealed several procedural, training, and judgment shortfalls" and
recommended further study.[Footnote 18]
The Coast Guard has also acknowledged significant personnel problems
in conducting its marine safety mission. The primary goal of this long-
standing core mission is to promote the safe operation and navigation
of U.S. and foreign flagged commercial vessels, passenger vessels, and
recreational boats. Towards this goal, the marine safety mission
encompasses several different activities, including vessel
inspections, mariner credentialing, developing and enforcing federal
marine safety regulations, industry and public outreach, and maritime
casualty investigations. According to Coast Guard documents, the
demand for marine safety mission services has increased significantly
over the past decade in conjunction with industry growth and increased
complexity. For example, citing Department of Transportation figures,
a Coast Guard budget publication affirms that from 2002 to 2005, the
number of U.S. port calls made by oceangoing vessels increased more
than 10 percent to 61,047 calls.[Footnote 19] At the same time,
however, many of the Coast Guard's industry stakeholders (e.g., ports;
shipyards; cargo, tank, and small passenger vessels; cruise ships)
perceived a widening performance gap in the marine safety mission as
the Coast Guard assumed additional homeland security responsibilities
after the September 11th attacks. In August 2007, the Coast Guard
Commandant acknowledged industry concerns in his written testimony for
a congressional hearing on marine safety challenges. The most
prominent concerns included reduced access to senior Coast Guard
leadership, delays in mariner license issuance, perceived reduction in
marine inspector experience, and confusion over the Coast Guard
rulemaking process. A more detailed Coast Guard report documenting
maritime stakeholder complaints was released later in 2007.[Footnote
20] It described specific stakeholder concerns related to marine
safety personnel issues: the number of personnel/resources,
capability, career path/professionalism, training and qualifications,
civilian/military mix, and tour length and rotations. In addition to
maritime stakeholders, the Department of Homeland Security Office of
Inspector General has raised personnel-related concerns about aspects
of the Coast Guard's marine safety mission. For example, a 2008 report
found that the marine casualty investigations program had been
hindered by less than fully qualified personnel conducting
investigations, among other things.[Footnote 21] The Office of
Inspector General made several recommendations with which the Coast
Guard concurred, including developing and implementing a plan to
increase the number of marine casualty investigators (including hiring
additional civilians), and improving the investigator career path.
In addition to issues in specific mission areas, such as search and
rescue and marine safety, the Coast Guard has faced significant
problems developing and managing its acquisition workforce, which we
have reported on previously.[Footnote 22] Although we noted in 2009
that the Coast Guard had made progress in identifying and mitigating
acquisition workforce challenges, the service had difficulty hiring
and retaining qualified acquisitions personnel and key positions
remained unfilled as of July 2009. However, the Coast Guard's Office
of Acquisition Workforce Management reported that the vacancy rate
across the civilian acquisition workforce had declined from 27.2
percent to 12.7 percent during the second half of the 2009 calendar
year.
The Coast Guard Has Developed Plans and Tools to Address Personnel
Problems, but It Is too Soon to Assess Their Impact:
The Coast Guard has responded to its historic problems related to
personnel by developing both plans and tools to better allocate
personnel resources, and prepare personnel for the positions they have
been assigned. Figure 1 provides an overall diagram of how selected
plans and data-driven tools collectively work to inform management
decisions about personnel, including allocation and training needed.
Following the figure is a more detailed description of each plan and
tool we reviewed. For additional information on the time frames and
status of each of these efforts, see enclosure.
Figure 1: Select Coast Guard Personnel-Related Plans and Tools:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Coast Guard strategic intent and mission requirements:
Select servicewide plans:
* Workforce Action Plan;
* Force Readiness Command Business Plan.
Select mission-support and mission-specific plans:
* Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan;
* Marine Safety Performance Plan.
Select data-driven tools:
Coast Guard Business Intelligence:
* Personnel preparedness/training:
- Competency Management System;
- Officer Specialty Management System.
* Personnel resource allocation:
- Sector Staffing Model;
- Manpower Requirements Determination.
Information exchange among overall Coast Guard strategic intent and
mission requirements, personnel-related plans, and data-driven tools.
Sources: GAO (analysis), Coast Guard (data).
[End of figure]
Servicewide, Mission-Support and Mission-Specific Plans:
To address problems related to personnel, the Coast Guard has
developed plans including, among others, two servicewide plans for
implementing broad workforce changes--the Workforce Action Plan and
the FORCECOM Business Plan--plus a mission-support plan focused on
increasing the number of acquisition personnel within its Acquisition
Directorate, and a mission-specific plan focused more narrowly on its
marine safety mission.[Footnote 23] According to the Coast Guard,
these plans represent its efforts to better identify its personnel
resource needs and manage its workforce.
* Workforce Action Plan: This plan considers Coast Guard mission areas
and was developed in response to appropriations committee report
direction, whose members had expressed concern that the size of the
Coast Guard's workforce had not kept pace with its increased mission
requirements.[Footnote 24] The creation of a workforce action plan can
help to ensure that the Coast Guard better align its human capital
program with current and emerging mission requirements, and facilitate
the development of long-term strategies for acquiring, training, and
retaining needed staff. In this case, the Coast Guard was directed to
provide a workforce plan that would include (1) a gap analysis of the
mission areas that continue to need resources and the type of
personnel necessary to address those needs; (2) a strategy, including
funding, milestones, and a timeline for addressing personnel gaps for
each category of employee; (3) specific strategies for recruiting
individuals for hard-to-fill positions; and (4) any additional
authorities and resources necessary to address staffing requirements.
The Workforce Action Plan did not provide a gap analysis of the
mission areas and personnel needed, and thus also did not provide a
strategy with proposed funding, milestones, and a timeline for
addressing these personnel gaps for each employee category consistent
with congressional direction. The Workforce Action Plan did provide a
general view of recruiting strategies for meeting the service's three
priority workforce needs related to the quantity, quality, and
diversity of its applicant pool, and referred generally to two mission
areas that the Coast Guard identified as needing personnel
adjustments--acquisitions and marine safety. Lastly, while the plan
discussed some of the agency's existing authorities, it did not
expound upon any additional authorities needed to address staffing
requirements. Instead, the Coast Guard's Workforce Action Plan
explained the Coast Guard's workforce planning process. For example,
the Workforce Action Plan provided an overview of how the Coast Guard
would use the resources requested in the fiscal year 2010 President's
Budget and provided a list of manpower determinations for some units
and platforms, an accession plan, civilian hiring targets, and a
workforce status report (as of the first quarter of 2009). Although
the workforce plan did not comport with the direction provided by the
congressional appropriators, it followed the Department of Homeland
Security's workforce planning guidance in that the Coast Guard
identified its human resource planning processes, highlighted recent
efforts undertaken to improve the Coast Guard's human resources
management program, and discussed areas for improvement in its human
resource planning and budgeting processes.[Footnote 25] The Workforce
Action Plan was completed in August 2009, but elements, such as the
accession and recruiting plans, are to be implemented once final
fiscal year funding is identified. The Coast Guard reported that it
intends to revise the plan periodically as needed.
* FORCECOM Business Plan: The Coast Guard has developed a business
plan for improving the readiness of its operational personnel and has
tasked one of its new commands, FORCECOM, with carrying out the plan.
The plan reflects FORCECOM's goals of ensuring servicewide force
interoperability and readiness and supports the command's overall
mission to provide ready forces to operational commanders.
Standardizing personnel requirements and training may help to ensure
that the Coast Guard can surge people and assets across the nation to
fulfill mission needs. GPRA provided agencies a framework for
effectively implementing and managing programs including setting
strategic goals, measuring performance, and reporting on the degree to
which goals are met. Although GPRA is generally applied to agencywide
strategic plans, its framework is useful to guide any type of
planning. The FORCECOM Business Plan contains characteristics of GPRA
planning including defining a mission and desired outcomes and
identifying performance measures to gauge progress.[Footnote 26] For
example, the plan defines a clear mission, specifically, to ensure the
allocated forces are trained to standards, armed with current tactics
and procedures, interoperable, and inspected in order to meet current
and future operational requirements. The plan also calls for
performance to be measured with specific actions. For example, the
Business Plan contains a goal to catalogue and review all general
mandated training requirements to ensure that each requirement is
carefully approved and targeted for efficiency by 2010. To fulfill
this plan, FORCECOM is assuming responsibilities in several personnel-
related areas, including training and standardization. For example,
under FORCECOM, Coast Guard officials we spoke with said they are
planning to work with Coast Guard units to develop more standardized
on-the-job training requirements across local units. We reported in
2006 that for the Hurricane Katrina response, standardization enabled
Coast Guard search and rescue personnel from anywhere in the country
to form unified crews to perform operations. For example, a helicopter
pilot from Florida, a copilot from Alabama, and a rescue swimmer from
Alaska formed a crew to perform numerous search and rescue operations.
FORCECOM intends to take the standardization lessons-learned from this
historic response and apply them across Coast Guard units and mission
areas. FORCECOM officials noted that the Coast Guard's consolidation
of force readiness responsibilities under FORCECOM represents an
effort to increase this standardization and integration of personnel
management. The FORCECOM Business Plan was completed in October 2008,
and is planned to be implemented through fiscal year 2010. The Coast
Guard reported that it intends to update the plan periodically to
reflect FORCECOM priorities.
* Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan: This document addresses
the challenges the Coast Guard is facing in filling the government
acquisition positions it has identified both now and in the future. By
developing its own acquisition workforce, the Coast Guard may improve
accountability for its acquisitions by increasing government control
and visibility over its assets and capabilities. The plan sets forth
three overall challenges to developing its own acquisition workforce,
including (1) recruitment, development, and retention of qualified
acquisition personnel; (2) human capital information management; and
(3) human capital management policy guidance, procedures, and
practices. Further, it outlines 10 strategies for building and
maintaining an acquisition workforce. The strategies include creating
a "reward environment" that recognizes factors beyond employee
compensation and benefits that attract, retain, and motivate
employees. They also include establishing and maintaining human
capital information systems that support the recruitment, development,
and retention of the acquisition workforce, and performance planning,
assessment, and measurement. According to the Acquisition Human
Capital Strategic Plan, it established the strategic foundation for
specific actions to be taken to achieve its human capital objectives,
and identified performance metrics to track progress towards these
goals. In addition, the plan adopted and applied the Office of
Personnel Management's Human Capital Assessment and Accountability
Framework, which includes guidance in the areas of Strategic
Alignment, Leadership and Knowledge Management, Results-Oriented
Performance Culture, Talent Management, and Accountability. The
Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan was first released in 2008,
with an updated version published in 2009, and officials indicated
that the outcomes and effectiveness of this plan are under constant
assessment and review to ensure that the Coast Guard acquisition
workforce is continually improving.
* Marine Safety Performance Plan: This mission-specific plan seeks to
address competency concerns by setting goals, objectives, and
performance targets for the marine safety mission for fiscal years
2009 through 2014. Having the appropriate numbers and fully trained
marine safety personnel may help to ensure that the Coast Guard
successfully meets the increasing needs of maritime stakeholders.
Similar to the FORCECOM Business Plan, the Marine Safety Plan also
contained characteristics of planning set out by GPRA, including
involving stakeholders in defining the mission and desired outcomes of
the plan, and identifying specific goals, objectives, and performance
measures that link to the stated mission.[Footnote 27] For example,
according to the Marine Safety Performance Plan, it incorporates input
from maritime stakeholders, and defines the mission of the plan as a
means to ensure the safety of maritime stakeholders by preventing
marine casualties, protecting marine environment, and strengthening
maritime commerce. In addition, the Marine Safety Performance Plan
outlines specific goals and objectives that can be measured. For
example, as of December 3, 2009, the Coast Guard had filled 88 of 108
civilian marine safety positions, including more civilian inspectors
for continuity, adjusted tour lengths, strengthened career paths, and
expanded marine safety training and education. The Marine Safety
Performance Plan was designed to reduce maritime casualties,
facilitate commerce, improve program processes and management, and
improve human resource capabilities. The Marine Safety Performance
Plan was completed in November 2008, and is planned to be implemented
through 2014.
Tools to Facilitate Data-Driven Management Decisions:
Coast Guard officials have expressed a need for reliable, verifiable,
and repeatable data to facilitate data-driven management decisions on
personnel requirements and preparedness. The five tools identified
below are all in development and intended to collectively provide
Coast Guard management with access to more reliable and comprehensive
data. The last of the five tools is expected to provide the Coast
Guard with data access capability to allow it to use the data captured
by the first four tools, among other things.
* Officer Specialty Management System (OSMS): OSMS is a new framework
for Coast Guard officer "specialties," specific areas of expertise
within the service associated with different occupations or positions.
In addition to replacing over 70 legacy specialties with 13 new
specialties and 38 subspecialties, for the first time the Coast Guard
plans to identify specific competency requirements for each specialty.
For example, the legacy specialties of Boating Safety, including
General, Boating Affairs, Boating Standards, and Boating
Investigations, have been consolidated into one subspecialty under
OSMS entitled Maritime Law Enforcement/Ports, Waterways & Coastal
Security Operations. According to officials and an agency overview
document, the overarching goal of these changes to legacy specialties
is to gain a clearer picture of (1) what is required by Coast Guard
officer positions, and (2) the capabilities of the officer corps.
[Footnote 28] OSMS is the product of internal studies initiated in
2001. The Coast Guard expects to assign specialties to officers
beginning in summer 2010 with full implementation of the system by
spring 2011.
* Competency Management System (CMS):[Footnote 29] CMS is the
mechanism by which Coast Guard officials establish and modify a
standard set of competencies, assign competencies to positions, record
competencies earned by members, collect and organize competency data
and information, and allow for the use of competency information in
personnel management decisions. For example, CMS contains the
engineering competency "Engineering Inspections" and describes the
individual with this competency as "able to inspect facilities or
construction projects from an engineering perspective to identify
required repairs, remaining life, and potential problems or
improvements." In another example, CMS lists the marine safety
competency "Boarding Officer (Marine Safety)" and describes an
individual with this competency as able to "perform detailed
examinations of foreign and U.S. vessels of all types to verify
compliance with U.S., class society, and international safety,
security, and pollution prevention regulations." According to the CMS
Manual, at a basic level CMS is designed to help decision makers
understand the demands of the service and specific positions along
with the supply of people available to meet those demands. As of
November 2009, CMS covered approximately 80 percent of active duty and
reserve positions, and the Coast Guard was in the early stages of
developing processes to identify and assign competencies to civilian
and auxiliary positions. It is unclear at this time when CMS will
fully reflect military, reserve, and auxiliary competencies.
* Manpower Requirements Determination (MRD): According to Coast Guard
documents and officials, the MRD system is designed to help calculate
the human capital needed to perform Coast Guard tasks or missions
using verifiable, repeatable, and defendable analyses. According to
the MRD Business Model, Coast Guard officials currently measure human
capital in ways that can vary based on factors such as programmatic or
local needs. The goal of the MRD system is to create a common set of
standards and analytical approaches so that officials responsible for
personnel allocation decisions can make more standardized human
capital comparisons across units or programs. For example, in December
2008 the MRD system was used to conduct a baseline analysis of the
optimal mix of manpower required to maintain safety and sustain the
mission of the Juniper Class cutter, which resulted in recommended
increases of certain enlisted positions, and decreases in other
enlisted positions.[Footnote 30] MRD was chartered in 2006, and the
Coast Guard expects the guiding doctrine, policy, and procedure
documents for the MRD program to be complete by September 2010; the
service expects the supporting automated information system that would
be accessed through the Coast Guard Business Intelligence system to be
completed by September 2012.
* Sector Staffing Model (SSM): Using SSM, the Coast Guard expects to
be able to create baseline staffing data that are comparable across
the Coast Guard's 35 diverse sectors.[Footnote 31] Specifically,
according to Coast Guard officials, SSM seeks to quantify staffing
shortfalls, which in turn could justify resource proposals for
additional staff; provide a transparent basis for mission requirement
resource allocation; enable senior leadership and program managers to
understand resource implications of proposed policy changes and
requirements; and help forecast future staffing needs based on
projected activity and mission growth. SSM uses two types of
worksheets to analyze baseline staffing at sectors: (1) an activity-
based worksheet and (2) a command cadre worksheet. For example, using
the activity-based worksheet for "container inspections," each sector
estimates annual mission hours and activity levels needed to complete
inspection-related activities. The results of this worksheet are
converted into time available for work. The second worksheet--the
command cadre tool--accounts for the number of subordinate officers,
and enlisted and civilian personnel, and considers unit-specific data
for roughly 12-15 criteria related to each unit's size, assets, and
missions. For example, the Prevention Department Head worksheet would
include criteria, such as number of vessels inspected in that
particular sector and the number of serious marine casualties
occurring in that sector. These SSM worksheets are converted into
Coast Guard positions, taking into account the mix of civilian and
military staff, as well as their rates, ranks, or pay grades,
providing Coast Guard management with a baseline of the personnel
needed at each sector. SSM was chartered in 2007, and the Coast Guard
expects that it will be accessible through the Coast Guard Business
Intelligence data system in December 2010.
* Coast Guard Business Intelligence (CGBI): According to Coast Guard
documents and officials, the CGBI data system is designed to support
decision making across all levels of the Coast Guard by leveraging
existing Coast Guard data, measures, and processes. This data system
can generate a variety of reports or displays by drawing and combining
data from multiple electronic sources. CGBI can access or is expected
to be able to access the Officer Specialty Management System,
Competency Management System, Manpower Requirements Determination, and
Sector Staffing Model and is to provide a foundation for more data-
driven decisions. For example, the Coast Guard expects to be able to
access Sector Staffing Model results through CGBI in June 2010. In
April 2009, the Coast Guard launched an updated version of CGBI, which
added features to the initial 2006 version. Although the CGBI system
is operational and utilized across the Coast Guard, its development
continues. Program staff will continue to focus on measuring data
quality in the future, according to one official. The next major
system upgrade, which involves increasing the Coast Guard's capability
to use existing data for predictive modeling or simulations, is
expected to be completed in 2011, according to the Coast Guard.
Efforts Still in Development:
It is too soon to tell whether the plans and data-driven tools that
the Coast Guard has begun to put in place will provide an analytical
foundation to support management decisions related to resource
allocation and personnel preparedness because the plans and tools are
still in development or support ongoing efforts. The Workforce Action
Plan and FORCECOM Business Plan both describe discrete goals related
to personnel improvements that extend beyond 2010. The Acquisition
Human Capital Strategic Plan also contains challenges and outlines
strategies for addressing these challenges, which have deadlines
provided by the Blueprint for Acquisition Reform, a companion document
to the human capital strategic plan. As we reported in July 2009, the
Coast Guard has completed a number of the initiatives, including the
adoption of a model to assess future acquisition workforce needs. The
Marine Safety Performance Plan contains initiatives that extend
through fiscal year 2014. In terms of the tools, OSMS and SSM have
undergone beta testing and have been deployed for limited use, but are
not expected to be fully implemented until 2011 and 2010,
respectively, according to estimates from the responsible program
offices. The Coast Guard reported in December 2009 that the Manpower
Requirements Determination analysis tool has been utilized in 23
completed or ongoing projects; however, the Coast Guard estimated that
the currently expanding Manpower Requirements Determination system
will not be completed until 2012. The Competency Management System
tool currently provides information relevant to most military
positions, but officials have only recently begun to populate civilian
and auxiliary competencies, and it is not clear when this update will
be completed. Lastly, although the CGBI system is operational and in
use across the Coast Guard, it too undergoes updates and revisions to
meet the needs of those who use the system, according to officials who
manage the system.
Figure 2 illustrates the timeline for implementation or development of
Coast Guard plans and data-driven tools that may address personnel
challenges.
Figure 2: Timeline of Select Coast Guard Personnel-Related Plans and
Tools:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Select servicewide plans:
Workforce Action Plan:
Effort initiation to present: Started August 2009;
Expected continuous development: Until September 2010 (in
implementation).
Force Readiness Command Business Plan:
Effort initiation to present: Started October 2008;
Expected continuous development: Until September 2010 (in
implementation).
Select mission-support and mission-specific plans:
Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan:
Effort initiation to present: Started April 2009;
Expected continuous development: Until March 2010 (in implementation).
Marine Safety Performance Plan:
Effort initiation to present: Started November 2008;
Expected continuous development: Until September 2014 (in
implementation).
Select data-driven tools:
Officer Specialty Management System:
Effort initiation to present: Started 2001;
Expected continuous development: Until 2011 (Development towards key
milestone).
Competency Management System[A]:
Effort initiation to present: Started 2004;
Expected continuous development: Until current time.
Manpower Requirements Determination:
Effort initiation to present: Started 2006;
Expected continuous development: Until 2012 (Development towards key
milestone).
Sector Staffing Model:
Effort initiation to present: Started 2007;
Expected continuous development: Until 2010. (Development towards key
milestone).
Coast Guard Business Intelligence:
Effort initiation to present: Started 2006;
Expected continuous development: Until 2011 (Development towards key
milestone).
[A] Milestone not identified, but the Coast Guard indicated that
system development is ongoing.
Sources: GAO (analysis), Coast Guard (data).
[End of figure]
The Coast Guard May Face Challenges in Implementing Personnel Efforts:
The Coast Guard may encounter four specific challenges as it
implements the personnel management actions discussed above.
Specifically, there may be challenges related to resources being
sufficient to implement personnel efforts, as well as sufficient to
support mission requirements, data reliability, coordination among the
Coast Guard offices responsible for developing and implementing each
of these actions, and leadership. It is too soon to tell how
successful the Coast Guard will be in overcoming these challenges.
Resource Challenges Are Twofold: Are Resources Sufficient to Implement
Personnel Efforts and Fill Mission Requirements:
The Coast Guard acknowledged that it faces two types of resource
challenges--first, dedicating the necessary resources to implement and
monitor its planning and data-tool personnel initiatives, and second,
having the resources to meet its personnel and mission requirements
once they are established.
First, it remains unclear whether the Coast Guard's existing resources
are sufficient or appropriately utilized to put these new plans and
tools into operation. For example, the Manpower Requirements
Determination office consists of five staff and one supervisor and has
three unfilled positions (two officers and one civilian)[Footnote 32]
and they plan to review human resource requirements for over 100 unit
types (including small-boat stations, sectors, National Security
Cutter, and headquarters), provide an analysis for each new unit, or
mission requirements, which is estimated to take about 6-12 months
(e.g., the new enlisted maritime enforcement specialist rating), and
provide support for all resource proposals that are considered for
funding by the Coast Guard.[Footnote 33] As a result of the size of
the workload relative to the size of the staff, the program office
that manages MRD is conducting an MRD analysis on its own manpower
requirements, which it expects to complete by July 2010. The results
will inform the MRD office's staffing decisions and may result in a
request for additional personnel. Further, the Coast Guard's reliance
upon congressional authorization for the new overall Coast Guard
command structure may also complicate steps to standardize training
and personnel requirements across all Coast Guard units. Under the
Coast Guard's current approach, until the Coast Guard's new command
structure, which includes FORCECOM, is fully authorized and funded
under the new structure, personnel assigned to FORCECOM are to
continue to conduct their legacy responsibilities under the old
command structure. Although senior Coast Guard officials from FORCECOM
responsible for training and other personnel-related initiatives
reported that they have continued to fulfill their legacy
responsibilities and complete their new responsibilities under
FORCECOM, it is unclear what impact these dual responsibilities will
have on the timely implementation of the goals set out in the FORCECOM
Business Plan that are focused on standardizing personnel training and
preparedness requirements.
Second, given the current resource-constrained federal budget
environment faced by all agencies, the use of more standardized and
analytical tools like the Manpower Requirements Determination or
Sector Staffing Model will not guarantee that identified personnel
needs are met in units and platforms across the Coast Guard. Admiral
Thad Allen, the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard,
recognized the economic challenges the nation faces when he testified
in May 2009 on the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2010 budget request. He
acknowledged that the Coast Guard could no longer do more with less,
and would need to prioritize resource allocations, while accepting
risk in areas where resources would be lacking. In July 2009, we noted
that while the Coast Guard's budget has increased significantly since
2003, the long-term budget outlook for the service is uncertain.
[Footnote 34] Specifically, administration budget projections indicate
that the Department of Homeland Security's annual budget is expected
to remain constant or decrease over the next 10 years. As a result of
this uncertainty, if the results of personnel analyses show a need to
increase resources, it will still be a challenge for the Coast Guard
to obtain them.
Data Reliability Challenges Are Ongoing Concern:
Coast Guard officials we spoke with acknowledge challenges with
obtaining reliable, verifiable, and repeatable data that may affect
the data-driven tools created by the Coast Guard. For example, CGBI
combines data from multiple databases to create its various
informational reports. Coast Guard officials acknowledge that some of
these databases, including Direct Access and Marine Information for
Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE), have data quality problems.
[Footnote 35] Although Coast Guard officials said that the more
widespread use and greater transparency of CGBI has promoted more
accurate data entry, these officials added that the increased use of
the system has also exposed unreliable data. As a result, the Coast
Guard has begun taking steps to proactively validate data, for
example, within the Direct Access system, which is the service's
authoritative human resources database. Specifically, all active duty
personnel were required to update or validate certain information,
such as marital status, birth date, and number of dependents.
According to Coast Guard officials, they intend to continue this
validation process for other data fields. In another effort to improve
data accuracy, after discovering that one data element--military
service entry date--had a relatively high error rate, the Coast Guard
reported addressing this issue by providing a clearer definition of
this data field to personnel. According to an official with direct
responsibility for CGBI, these types of incremental improvements at
the transactional database level will improve the overall efficacy of
CGBI products. However, in 2008 we reported our concerns about the
reliability of some MISLE data, and the Coast Guard concurred with our
recommendation to assess the data, including their completeness, along
with data entry, consistency, and data field problems.[Footnote 36] As
the Coast Guard plans to rely on MISLE data to help inform personnel
decisions, ensuring its reliability is important to strengthening the
reliability of the CGBI system and its subordinate tools, but
achieving this data reliability will likely be a challenge for the
Coast Guard given its past problems with ensuring data reliability.
[Footnote 37]
Challenges Coordinating Various Personnel-Related Plans and Tools:
Along with resource and data reliability challenges, the Coast Guard
faces potential challenges in coordinating its various personnel-
related plans and tools. Specifically, in the midst of the large
organizational transformation that is under way involving numerous
changes to the Coast Guard's command structure, enterprisewide support
systems, and business practices, it may prove difficult for the Coast
Guard to coordinate more narrowly defined personnel-related efforts,
such as the nine plans and tools highlighted in this report. These
plans and tools, although interrelated, span a range of specific
functions and encompass a variety of Coast Guard activities. Efforts
such as the Manpower Requirements Determination system and Sector
Staffing Model, for example, are designed to help the Coast Guard
better allocate overall personnel resources across the service, while
efforts such as the Officer Specialty Management System and Competency
Management System are more focused on the knowledge, skills, and
abilities of individuals. In addition to varying in purpose and scope,
the efforts are subject to different time frames and are overseen by
several different entities. Specifically, the nine plans and tools
have been managed by at least eight different program or mission
support offices and three separate commands, and some initiatives,
such as the Officer Specialty Management System and Sector Staffing
Model, have shifted or may shift to different program offices as they
move from development to implementation.
Although the Coast Guard has established an office to coordinate the
modernization effort and other broad organizational change
initiatives, it is not clear whether its span of control or influence
will extend to the specific personnel-related plans and tools
described above. In May 2009, the Coast Guard established the Office
of Enterprise Strategy, Management, and Doctrine Oversight Directorate
within the Office of the Vice Commandant, to enhance servicewide
change management and strategic analysis, among other things.
According to a draft charter document provided to us in September
2009, this newly established office will lead a team of senior
officials from across the Coast Guard charged with the overarching
design, planning, implementation, and sustainment of organizational
change initiatives such as modernization. However, as of December
2009, the draft charter had not been finalized and senior officials
from the Office of Enterprise Strategy had previously stated that
their office was not tasked with direct coordination of specific
personnel efforts. Furthermore, these officials emphasized that the
more narrowly defined personnel plans and tools are owned and managed
by their respective program offices. For instance, at the programmatic
level, the Office of Future Force provided examples of outreach and
coordination with offices responsible for implementing aspects of the
plans and tools we have discussed above. The Office of Future Force
coordinates with FORCECOM's Office of Assessment, Integration and Risk
Management on building competency-based curriculum, works with the
Acquisition Workforce Planning, Development & Certification office to
identify acquisition competencies, and with the Assistant Commandant
for Marine Safety and Stewardship has developed two new competencies.
However, management by different program offices may complicate
coordination. For example, in August 2009, the Personnel Service
Center assumed responsibility for the Officer Specialty Management
System; the Office of Future Forces maintains the Competency
Management System. The expertise of staff in the Office of Enterprise
Strategy, one official continued, does not typically extend to program
subject matter itself and the program offices are ultimately
accountable for developing and monitoring their own initiatives.
Officials did note, however, that the Office of Enterprise Strategy's
role in managing the Coast Guard Business Intelligence system involves
checking the performance metrics of the various initiatives for
duplication. In addition, they concurred that the visibility of the
Coast Guard Business Intelligence system data throughout the Coast
Guard would facilitate coordination among the relevant program offices
themselves. Still, because of the numerous Coast Guard entities
involved with the development of the various personnel-related plans
and tools, the Coast Guard faces the potential for duplication of
efforts and challenges in establishing accountability for its overall
workforce goals.
Upcoming Change in Leadership May Make Sustaining Personnel Efforts
Challenging:
A change in the Coast Guard's leadership in May 2010 may make it
challenging to sustain various personnel efforts associated with the
Coast's Guard's ongoing modernization. In our view, fostering
continued progress in addressing workforce issues is important to
achieving the agency's workforce goals embedded within the agency's
overall modernization plan. As we have previously reported, at the
center of any serious change management initiative--such as the
modernization plan--are the people.[Footnote 38] Thus, the key to a
successful merger and transformation is to recognize the "people"
element and implement strategies to help individuals maximize their
full potential in the new organization, while simultaneously managing
the risk of reduced productivity and effectiveness that often occurs
as a result of the changes. One key practice in this effort is
ensuring that the organization's top leadership drives the change
initiative and defines and articulates a succinct and compelling
reason for the change. For example, in 2003 we reported that because a
merger or transformation entails fundamental and often radical change,
strong and inspirational leadership is indispensable, and that top
leadership that is clearly and personally involved in the merger or
transformation represents stability and provides an identifiable
source for employees to rally around during tumultuous times. The
agency's leadership must set the direction, pace, and tone for the
transformation. According to a 2009 National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA) study, the current Coast Guard Commandant has
taken several positive steps in this regard by reaching out to an
unprecedented number of agency staff through a variety of innovative
mechanisms and by involving his senior leadership in the design,
communication, and implementation of the modernization vision since
announcing his intention to transform the organization.[Footnote 39]
However, with the transition to a new Commandant's leadership in the
summer of 2010, there is no guarantee that the events put into motion
to achieve this transformation will be supported by the new
Commandant's agenda. As NAPA reported, it is possible that the current
leadership's vision will not be sustained past the summer of 2010.
Moreover, our previous work also reported that experience shows that
successful major change management initiatives in large private and
public sector organizations can often take at least 5 to 7 years.
Thus, the combined factors of the Coast Guard's dependence on
receiving congressional authorization to fully implement the
modernization plan, and the current Commandant's limited time
remaining as the leader of this effort, may make it challenging to
retain the sustained and inspired attention needed to accomplish these
changes, unless the incoming Commandant shares a similar vision for
the organization. Certainly the progress made to date in implementing
the modernization plan helps to mitigate this challenge, but the final
results remain to be seen.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
On December 21, 2009, we provided a draft of this report for review
and comment to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Coast
Guard. On January 5, 2010, the department's audit liaison office
responded by e-mail that DHS concurred with the report. The department
and the Coast Guard provided no formal comments but offered one
technical clarification. We incorporated the technical clarification
into this report where appropriate.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Secretary of Homeland Security and interested congressional
committees and subcommittees. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff has any questions about this report or wish to
discuss the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-9610 or
caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Other key contributors to this report are listed in enclosure
II.
Signed by:
Stephen L. Caldwell:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
Enclosure - 2:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Key Personnel Plans and Data-Driven Tools:
This enclosure provides more detailed information about how the Coast
Guard seeks to address its personnel problems. The Coast Guard has
developed plans and tools including, among others, two servicewide
plans for implementing broad workforce changes--the Workforce Action
Plan and the FORCECOM Business Plan--plus a mission-support plan
focused on improving the number of acquisition personnel within its
Acquisition Directorate, and a mission-specific plan focused more
narrowly on its marine safety mission. Table 1 provides a detailed
description of the purpose of each personnel plan or tool, the
specific Coast Guard office responsible for its implementation, the
time frames for implementation, and the status of each initiative.
Summary of Key Personnel Plans and Data-Driven Tools:
Servicewide Plans:
Workforce Action Plan:
Issue:
This plan considers Coast Guard mission areas and was developed at the
direction of the Senate Appropriations Committee, whose members had
expressed concern that the size of the service's workforce had not
kept pace with its increased mission requirements. The plan was to
include (1) a gap analysis of the mission areas that continue to need
resources and the type of personnel necessary to address those needs;
(2) a strategy, including funding, milestones, and a timeline, for
addressing personnel gaps for each category of employee; (3) specific
strategies for recruiting individuals for hard-to-fill positions; and
(4) any additional authorities and resources necessary to address
staffing requirements. The creation of a workforce action plan may
help the Coast Guard better align its human capital program with
current and emerging mission requirements, and also facilitate the
development of long-term strategies for acquiring, training, and
retaining needed staff.
Purpose:
The Coast Guard's Workforce Action Plan, which emphasizes the Coast
Guard's mission staffing for fiscal years 2009-2010, was created in
response to congressional direction and examines current human
resource planning processes, highlights recent improvements to these
processes, and discusses areas for improvement.
Responsible Command:
The Assistant Commandant for Human Resources under the future Deputy
Commandant for Mission Support is responsible for development of the
Workforce Action Plan.
Time frames:
Start:
* September 2008--Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
2009 (Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574 (2008)) enacted. Senate
appropriations committee report 110-396 accompanying this
appropriations act directed the Coast Guard to create a workforce
action plan. The Explanatory Statement accompanying the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009 directed the Coast Guard to
comply with the Senate report direction regarding a workforce action
plan. H. Comm. on Appropriations, 110[TH] Cong., Committee Print on
H.R. 2638/Public Law 110-329 at 646 (2008).
End:
* August 24, 2009--Plan signed by Commandant;
* Fiscal year 2010--Plan listed selected requests for personnel
increases contained in the fiscal year 2010 President's Budget; the
Coast Guard reported that it intends to revise the plan periodically
as needed.
Status:
The Workforce Action Plan did not provide a gap analysis of the
mission areas and personnel needed, and thus also did not provide a
strategy with proposed funding, milestones, and a timeline for
addressing these personnel gaps for each employee category consistent
with congressional direction. The Workforce Action Plan did provide a
general view of recruiting strategies for meeting the service's three
priority workforce needs related to the quantity, quality, and
diversity of its applicant pool, and referred generally to two mission
areas that the Coast Guard identified as needing personnel
adjustments--acquisitions and marine safety. Lastly, while the plan
discussed some of the agency's existing authorities, it did not
expound upon any additional authorities needed to address staffing
requirements. Instead, the Coast Guard's Workforce Action Plan set out
an explanation of the Coast Guard's workforce planning process. For
example, the Workforce Action Plan provided an overview of how the
Coast Guard would use the resources requested in the fiscal year 2010
President's Budget and provided a list of manpower determinations for
some units and platforms, an accession plan and civilian hiring
targets, as well as a workforce status report (as of the first quarter
of 2009). Although the submitted workforce plan did not comport with
direction provided by the Senate appropriators, it did follow the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) workforce planning guidance in
that the Coast Guard identified its human resource planning processes,
highlighted recent efforts undertaken to improve the Coast Guard's
human resources management program, and discussed areas for
improvement in its human resource planning and budgeting processes.
Following the DHS Workforce Planning Model, the Coast Guard plan
frames its human resource planning and budget processes across five
stages:
* Strategic Planning: As described in the Workforce Action Plan, Coast
Guard strategic planning takes place under the "Evergreen process," a
4-year planning cycle aligned with the appointment of a new
Commandant. The incoming Commandant's Intent is developed into Coast
Guard Strategy and communicated to the organization. The central
linkage between overall strategy and human capital allocations is the
budget process. Program managers submit Resource Proposals (RP) to
request staffing for current shortfalls or anticipated needs using
guidance from the Commandant, which is reflected in the Coast Guard
Strategy. The RPs are reviewed and prioritized by different groups of
senior resource managers before inclusion in the DHS budget.
* Supply, Demand, Discrepancies: In its Workforce Action Plan, the
Coast Guard describes how program managers determine the nature of
their human resource needs by identifying the job tasks to be
performed, the skills needed to do them, and an assessment of the
training needed to deliver the job skills to an individual. The Coast
Guard has developed the Manpower Requirements Determination tool,
which according to Coast Guard documents and officials is designed to
use a scientific approach to measure workload, in order to help
determine the appropriate number and mix of personnel needed to
conduct Coast Guard work. The Manpower Requirements Determination
system, is under development and is planned to be linked to RP
requests--with the goal of providing senior Coast Guard managers the
information they need to make better informed resource management
decisions.
* Develop Action Plan: According to the Workforce Action Plan, the
Coast Guard develops an annual Integrated Accession Plan (IAP) to
provide guidance on personnel requirements and goals for the following
fiscal year. The IAPs provide target numbers of needed military and
civilian personnel, and are based on expected on-budget personnel
increases or decreases and forecasted losses. In addition, the Coast
Guard Recruiting Command annually develops a recruiting plan that
focuses on hiring individuals in sufficient quantity to meet mission
requirements.
* Implement Action Plan: To help attain hiring goals contained in
annual IAPs, the Workforce Action Plan describes various Coast Guard
recruiting strategies for its military and civilian workforce,
including incentive programs for difficult to fill positions.
Strategies used include bonuses and guaranteed skills training; direct-
hire authority for limited occupations such as contracting specialist;
a pilot referral bonus program; recruitment, relocation, and retention
incentives; rehire of annuitants without a salary offset;
moving/relocation assistance; student loan repayments; enhanced annual
leave accrual; and student internship/developmental programs. Also,
the Acquisition Directorate's Human Capital Strategic Plan outlines
the tools used to meet the human capital goals of the acquisition
workforce.
* Monitor, Evaluate, Revise: According to the Workforce Action Plan,
the Coast Guard creates and distributes to senior leadership a monthly
workforce status report to help monitor several aspects of the Coast
Guard's human capital. The status reports track indicators such as the
number of personnel in Coast Guard positions (by officer, chief
warrant officer, and enlisted), rates of attrition, and position
vacancy rates. The Workforce Action Plan states that anomalies
revealed through these reports and through other means are
investigated further, and can result in corrective actions, such as
offering incentives to attract personnel to a specific job. In
addition, mission performance data are used by program managers to
help identify potential links between declining performance and
workforce gaps.
In the section Coast Guard Staffing Level Requirements, the Workforce
Action Plan contains fiscal year 2010 requested personnel increases
and fiscal year 2009 enacted increases.
The concluding comments of the Workforce Action Plan indicate that the
Coast Guard will continue its development of tools, such as the
Manpower Requirements Determination system, and the Competency
Management System, in order to provide a clearer picture of the
service's general human resource requirements, and will also continue
to implement programs in specific mission areas where resource needs
have already been identified, such as marine safety, acquisitions, and
financial management.
The fiscal year 2009 Workforce Action Plan noted that important
elements of its five-stage planning process are incomplete and still
being developed, including the Manpower Requirements Determination
(MRD) System and competency definitions.
[End of Workforce Action Plan]
Force Readiness Command (FORCECOM) Business Plan:
Issue:
Prior to FORCECOM, which was established on June 1, 2009, many
personnel readiness roles were independently managed by the Atlantic
Area and Pacific Area commands.[Footnote 40] This bifurcation resulted
in geographic variation in how Coast Guard personnel were trained; how
their operational readiness was inspected, assessed, and reported; and
which doctrine or Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP)[Footnote
41] they followed when performing their missions. For example, at the
unit level, on-the-job training requirements for the same positions
could vary by location at the discretion of the commanding officers.
Standardizing personnel requirements and training will help to ensure
that the Coast Guard can surge people and assets across the nation to
fulfill mission needs.
Purpose:
FORCECOM's overarching mission is to provide ready forces to meet the
supported commander's current and future operational requirements.
FORCECOM is leading efforts to make aspects of personnel readiness
more standardized across the Coast Guard. As described in the Business
Plan and FORCECOM Commander's Intent for fiscal years 2009 through
2010, the intended roles of the new command are to;
* allocate mobile and deployable specialized forces;
* formulate operational doctrine that will align training and
standardization to ensure force interoperability and readiness;
* provide timely and high-quality operational training;
* consolidate and standardize operational inspections and establish a
standard measurement system to evaluate force readiness, and;
* validate field innovation best practices and incorporate them into
TTP.
While recognizing that Coast Guard personnel serve in diverse
operating environments that require a degree of local control and
flexibility, the consolidation of force readiness responsibilities
under a single service-wide command represents an effort to increase
standardization and integration of personnel management, according to
the Coast Guard.
Responsible Command:
FORCECOM, along with the Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, the
Deputy Commandant for Operations, and the Operations Command, is one
of the four new commands created under the Coast Guard's modernization
effort.
Time frames:
Start:
* October 2008--FORCECOM Fiscal Year 2009-2010 Business Plan issued; *
June 1, 2009--FORCECOM stood-up at initial operating capability, but
awaiting full congressional approval.
End:
* Fiscal year 2010--FORCECOM Business Plan end date; the Coast Guard
reported that it intends to update the plan periodically to reflect
FORCECOM priorities;
* 2012--FORCECOM expected to reach final operating capability.
Status:
Between its 2009 commission date and 2012, FORCECOM will incrementally
expand its operations to final operating capability. Although not
fully implemented, FORCECOM documents and officials provided examples
of specific initiatives under way that intend to further the overall
goal of more centralized and standardized force readiness management:
* Assume management of all major training commands--For the first time
in the Coast Guard's history, according to FORCECOM documents, all
training for individuals, boat, cutter, shore, and aviation units will
be managed under a single command.
* Review and revise operational policy, doctrine, and Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures--One FORCECOM division is currently leading
an effort to identify, catalog, and prioritize legacy operational
doctrine.
* Standardize unit inspection requirements and coordinate inspections--
According to the FORCECOM Commander's Intent, an average Coast Guard
unit spends 60 days completing inspection visits each year. In
addition, we spoke with the senior officer from the FORCECOM offices
responsible for standardizing unit inspection requirements and
coordinating inspections and he explained that in many cases they
request the same information. In 2009, FORCECOM began beta testing new
processes to consolidate and standardize assessment visits at three
types of field units: cutter, air station, and sector. The command is
also seeking ways to more efficiently integrate best practices from
the field into standard Coast Guard operating doctrine.
* Develop a Coast-Guard-wide system of readiness measures--This
"FORCECOM Readiness Dashboard" is expected to measure individual,
unit, and mission readiness across six broad indicators: People,
Equipment, Supply, Training, Infrastructure, and Information, and will
be accessed through the Coast Guard Business Intelligence system.
* Collaborate with operational command and program offices to build a
catalog of Coast Guard Mission Essential Tasks--Mission Essential Task
Lists for specific unit types or assets are intended to help the Coast
Guard better assess readiness gaps and will be used as part of a
system that reports readiness to the Department of Defense and others.
We used the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA),
which provides agencies a framework for effectively implementing and
managing programs including setting strategic goals, measuring
performance, and reporting on the degree to which goals were met, in
our analysis of the FORCECOM Business Plan. Although GPRA is generally
applied to agencywide strategic plans, its framework is useful to
guide any type of planning. The FORCECOM Business Plan contains
characteristics of GPRA planning including defining a mission and
desired outcomes and identifying performance measures to gauge
progress.[Footnote 42] For example, the plan defines a clear mission,
specifically to ensure the forces allocated are trained to standards,
armed with current tactics and procedures, interoperable, and
inspected, in order to meet current and future operational
requirements. The plan also calls for performance to be measured with
specific actions needed to create this new command. For example, the
FORCECOM Business Plan sets a goal to catalogue and review all general
mandated training requirements to ensure that each requirement is
carefully approved and targeted for efficiency by 2010. Some personnel-
related milestones contained in the FORCECOM Business Plan, such as
establishing processes for developing new operational doctrine and
assuming management of certain training teams, for example, are not
expected to be reached until 2010.
[End of Force Readiness Command (FORCECOM) Business Plan]
[End of Servicewide Plans]
Mission-Support Plan:
Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan:
Issue:
In the late 1990s the Coast Guard began the largest acquisition
program in its history to build or modernize ships and aircraft and to
procure other capabilities, and in 2007, after a series of
programmatic failures, the Coast Guard sought to change how its
acquisitions were managed. Recognizing that it did not have in place a
workforce with the experience and depth to manage all Coast Guard
acquisitions, and that it was relying too heavily on contractors, the
Coast Guard took steps to build its own acquisition workforce to
manage its multibillion dollar acquisition program. By developing its
own acquisition workforce, the Coast Guard may improve accountability
for its acquisitions by increasing government control and visibility
over its assets and capabilities.
Purpose:
The Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan 2009 is the second human
capital plan used by the Coast Guard since the Acquisition Directorate
was created in 2007. The first human capital plan described the
challenges related to building a new acquisition directorate, and the
updated Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan 2009 set out longer-
term planning and management of the acquisition workforce.
Responsible Command:
The Office of Acquisition Workforce Management within the future
Deputy Commandant for Mission Support authored the plan.
Time frames:
Start:
* Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan first released in April
2008, with a recently updated version published in 2009 and a third
iteration expected in the second quarter of fiscal year 2010,
according to the Coast Guard.
End:
* According to the July 2009 Blueprint for Continuous Improvement--a
companion document to the Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan--
the plan will be updated.
Status of the Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan:
The 2009 version of the Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan
identifies three overarching human capital challenges facing the Coast
Guard's Acquisition Directorate along with 10 specific strategic
objectives to address these challenges. In addition, the plan adopted
and applied the Office of Personnel Management's Human Capital
Assessment and Accountability Framework, which includes guidance in
the areas of: Strategic Alignment, Leadership and Knowledge
Management, Results-Oriented Performance Culture, Talent Management,
and Accountability. While the Acquisition Human Capital Strategic Plan
itself does not identify time frames for completion, the Blueprint for
Acquisition Reform, renamed the Blueprint for Continuous Improvement,
supports many of the initiatives and provides deadlines for their
completion.
[End of Mission-Support Plan]
Mission-Specific Plan:
Marine Safety Performance Plan:
Issue:
Some Coast Guard officials, congressional members, and industry
stakeholders perceived a widening performance gap in the service's
marine safety mission as the Coast Guard took on increased homeland
security mission responsibilities. Specific concerns were summarized
in a November 2007 report by retired Vice Admiral James C. Card, Coast
Guard Marine Safety Analysis: An Independent Assessment and
Suggestions for Improvement. Personnel-related issues described in the
report were: the number of marine safety personnel/resources;
capability; professionalism; training and qualifications;
civilian/military mix; and tour length and rotations. Having the
appropriate numbers and fully trained marine safety personnel will
help to ensure that the Coast Guard successfully meets the increasing
needs of maritime stakeholders.
Purpose:
The Marine Safety Performance Plan was developed in part as a response
to concerns expressed by stakeholders and others noted above. The plan
sets goals, objectives, and performance targets for the marine safety
mission for fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2014.
Responsible Command:
Assistant Commandant for Marine Safety, Security and Stewardship under
the Deputy Commandant for Operations authored the Marine Safety
Performance Plan and is responsible for managing its implementation.
Time frames:
Start:
* November 2008--Performance Plan issued.
End:
* Fiscal year 2014--Performance Plan end date.
Status of Marine Safety Performance Plan:
The Coast Guard set out a course of action to meet its human resource
capability goals and objectives identified in the Marine Safety
Performance Plan.
* Additional positions for fiscal year 2009--The Coast Guard's fiscal
year 2009 appropriation included 310 marine safety positions. About
two-thirds (202) of these positions are for military personnel and
about one-third (108) are for civilian personnel. The military
positions include 47 officers, 42 warrant officers, and 113 enlisted
personnel, and as of December 16, 2009, the Coast Guard reported that
it had placed a total of 178 military personnel in marine safety
positions, including 39 officers, 26 warrant officers, and 113
enlisted personnel. The Coast Guard also reported that it expects to
assign the remaining marine safety military positions during the
regular assignment cycle (which will conclude in June 2010). With
regard to the civilian positions, as of December 3, 2009, 88 of the
108 positions were filled, 17 positions were advertised, and three
position descriptions were under development, according to the Coast
Guard. Civilian positions have been funded within the National Centers
of Expertise for Marine Safety, and among apprentice marine
inspectors, and additional civilian training, planning, oversight,
policy, and investigating officer positions have also been funded.
* Additional positions for fiscal year 2010--The Coast Guard has
requested funding for an additional 74 positions for marine inspectors
and investigating officers at field units; marine inspector training
officers at feeder ports; staffing for the Steam and Vintage Vessels
Center of Expertise; engineers for standards development and review;
and expanded training curricula at the Marine Safety School in
Yorktown, Virginia.
* Strengthen marine safety career paths--The Coast Guard is developing
an apprentice, journeyman, and senior marine inspector career
progression as well additional career paths for junior civilian marine
safety positions.
* Feeder Ports and National Centers of Expertise--Feeder Ports are
ports that have sufficient volume and workload to train apprentice-
level personnel on marine safety competencies during a 2-year
rotation. Eighteen Feeder Ports have been established to enhance
training consistency and opportunities for new marine safety
personnel. In addition to the feeder ports, the Coast Guard has
created various National Centers of Expertise designed to enhance
professional development and interaction with industry. Seven centers
were developed in fiscal years 2008 and 2009, including the Vintage
Vessels National Center of Expertise (NCOE), Duluth, Minnesota; Towing
Vessel NCOE, Paducah, Kentucky; Liquefied Gas Vessel NCOE, Port
Arthur, Texas; Outer Continental Shelf NCOE, Morgan City, Louisiana;
and Investigating Officer NCOE, New Orleans, Louisiana.
* Industry training/Merchant Marine Industry Training Program--The
Coast Guard is developing Mutual Training Memorandums of Understanding
for industry and the Coast Guard, and has a goal of doubling annual
industry training billets to 24. In fiscal year 2009, six commissioned
Coast Guard Academy graduates were assigned to a newly developed
merchant marine ship-rider program. The purpose of the program is to
provide staff with exposure to the U.S. merchant marine and maritime
industry prior to beginning marine inspector assignments. The Coast
Guard and industry are developing long-term (12 months), mid-term (3-6
months), and short-term (less than 1 month) professional development
opportunities.
We found that this performance plan also contained characteristics of
planning set out in the Government Performance and Results Act,
including involving stakeholders in defining the mission and desired
outcomes of the plan, and identifying specific goals, objectives, and
performance measures that link to the stated mission. [Footnote 43]
For example, this 5-year plan was the result of actively solicited
input from maritime stakeholders, and defines the mission of the plan
as a means to ensure the safety of maritime stakeholders by preventing
marine casualties, protecting the marine environment, and
strengthening maritime commerce. In addition, the Marine Safety
Performance Plan outlines specific goals and objectives that can be
measured. For example, the plan envisions adding over 300 inspector
and investigator positions in fiscal year 2009, including more
civilian inspectors for continuity, adjusting tour lengths,
strengthening career paths, and expanding marine safety training and
education. The Marine Safety Performance Plan describes various
initiatives and set targets for marine safety outcomes through fiscal
year 2014. In addition, a senior Marine Safety official said and the
Marine Safety Performance Plan states that the plan is a living
document and will undergo continual review.
[End of Mission-Specific Plan]
Data-Driven Tools:
Officer Specialty Management System (OSMS):
Issue:
The legacy Officer Corps Management System and Officer Billet Code
framework, according to agency documents and officials, was too
complex and no longer accurately reflected Coast Guard mission
requirements. The OSMS, by providing a framework with more clearly
defined specialties and position requirements, may help officers
manage their careers and development, and assist Coast Guard
management to better understand the skills set within the officer
corps and those skills that need to be enhanced or expanded.
Purpose:
The OSMS consists of a new framework of officer specialties and
subspecialties--the set of over 70 legacy specialties under the
Officer Billet Code framework was reorganized into 13 specialties and
38 subspecialties. Also, unlike the previous system, the OSMS is to
detail specific competencies and qualifications required for the
specialties and subspecialties.
The OSMS is an evolving system for managing Coast Guard officer
"specialties"--specific areas of expertise within the service
associated with different occupations or positions. As described both
by officials who designed the new system and by key end-users
responsible for assigning officers to new positions, OSMS is intended
to more clearly articulate information than the legacy system it is to
replace, providing the technological link between competencies,
individual officers, and specialties. As a result, the system should
facilitate the Coast Guard's efforts to specifically identify, for the
first time, the specific competency requirements for each officer
specialty. As such, according to officials and an agency overview
document, the new streamlined system of specialties will provide a
clearer picture of what is required by Coast Guard officer positions
and the capabilities of the officer corps. In addition, the OSMS
allows for the addition or deletion of specialties and subspecialties
as service needs dictate. Officials responsible for OSMS development
outlined different ways that stakeholders may capitalize on these
clarifications and use the OSMS as a type of management tool:
* Individual officers may be able to better manage their professional
development and career choices given more clearly articulated
specialty requirements and standards.
* Supervisors and workforce planners may be able to better monitor the
competency profile of the officer corps, including potential
shortfalls of specific knowledge, skills, education, and experience.
In addition, standard specialty requirements may assist managers with
calculating the time and cost of obtaining specific specialties.
* Assignment Officers who determine the rotation assignments of
individual officers can use the tool to inform their placement
decisions, although officials involved with the assignment process
emphasized that the system data by itself would not determine
placements.
Responsible Command:
OSMS was developed by the Future Force Office within the Office of the
Assistant Commandant for Human Resources and the future Deputy
Commandant for Mission Support. In August 2009 the management of the
system was transferred to the Personnel Service Center, the Coast
Guard entity responsible for officer assignments.
Time frames:
Start:
* 2001--the Coast Guard sponsored studies focused on officer
specialties that led to a 2-year Future Force Office evaluation of the
legacy system;
* May 2004--Coast Guard Commandant approved new officer specialty
framework;
* Summer 2010--the Coast Guard expects to start assigning specialties
to all officers.
End:
* Summer 2010--the Coast Guard expects System to be mapped to CMS;
* Spring 2011--Expected full implementation, followed by continued
development.
Status:
The Future Force Office assigned the new specialties and
subspecialties to officer billets in 2008 and conducted beta testing
from December 2008 through June 2009. The Personnel Service Center,
having assumed management of OSMS in August 2009, planned to carry out
additional beta testing in four specific specialty areas (aviation,
medical, legal, and C4IT) from September 2009 through May 2010.
[Footnote 44]
As of summer 2009, program offices were still in the process of
identifying requirements for the new specialties, and full system
implementation is not expected until 2011.
[End of Officer Specialty Management System (OSMS)]
Competency Management System (CMS):
Issue:
There are ongoing general concerns in the Coast Guard about personnel
being subjected to different sets of human resource requirements. For
example, a 2006 Commandant Intent Action Order stated that the Coast
Guard's "staffing standards are obsolete and no process exists to
remedy this state.Leaders and resource managers do not have confidence
that any particular set of human capital requirements are based on
industrial engineering principles, or any objective science, and
cannot compare sets of requirements to optimize human resource
allocation."[Footnote 45] Having clearly defined, standardized human
resource requirements should help the Coast Guard ensure that the
appropriate personnel with appropriate skill sets are assigned to the
appropriate positions.
Purpose:
Through a standard set of defined competencies, according to Coast
Guard documents, CMS is designed to help decision makers understand
the demands of the service and specific positions along with the
supply of people available to meet those demands. Specifically, for
all Coast Guard personnel, including officers, enlisted, and civilian,
the system allows the Coast Guard to:
* establish and modify competencies;
* assign competencies to positions;
* record competencies earned by members;
* collect and organize competency data and information, and;
* allow for the use of competency information in personnel management
decisions.
Responsible Command:
The Future Force Office, which falls under the Assistant Commandant
for Human Resources and the future Deputy Commandant for Mission
Support, maintains CMS.
Time frames:
Start:
* 2004--CMS initial implementation.
End:
* Ongoing. Competencies are routinely reviewed and modified if needed
based on changing Coast Guard mission requirements, according to
officials.
Status:
As of November 2009, CMS covered approximately 80 percent of active
duty and reserve positions, and the Coast Guard was in the early
stages of developing processes to identify and assign competencies to
civilian and auxiliary positions. The system's Competency Dictionary
currently contains close to 900 competencies. It is unclear at this
time when CMS will fully reflect all military, reserve, and auxiliary
competencies.
[End of Competency Management System (CMS)]
Manpower Requirements Determination (MRD):
Issue:
In general, the MRD system was developed to help make the Coast Guard
staffing processes more objective. More specifically, according to the
MRD business model, Coast Guard officials currently measure human
capital in ways that can vary based on factors such as programmatic or
local needs. Having a common set of standards and analytical
approaches may enable officials responsible for personnel allocation
decisions to make more standardized human capital comparisons across
units or programs.
Purpose:
According to the MRD business model, the MRD system is designed to
help calculate the human capital needed to perform Coast Guard tasks
or missions using verifiable, repeatable, and defendable analyses.
The MRD analyses consider a range of variables including Coast Guard
strategy, mission requirements, standards shaped by program mangers,
and inputs from operational commanders. Analyses can be conducted on
current, new, or changing mission requirements, such as the recent
addition of the new Maritime Enforcement Specialist rating, or on more
specific unit-or asset-based activities, such as operating a
particular class of cutter.
In addition to the number of personnel needed, analysis outputs can
include data on personnel competencies, experience, training, and rank
required to conduct the mission, as well as broader Coast Guard
considerations like the appropriate mix of ranks needed for continuous
growth. When summed across all units, the MRD business model notes,
the total human capital requirements associated with a particular
mission can be advocated by the program manager or unit in the Coast
Guard's resource prioritization and allocation process.
The MRD system is highlighted in the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2009
Workforce Action Plan as an example of a tool being developed by the
service to help identify workforce supply and demand gaps.
Responsible Command:
The Future Force Office within the Office of the Assistant Commandant
for Human Resources and future Deputy Commandant for Mission Support
is developing the MRD system.
Time frames:
Start:
* August 2006--Commandant Intent Action Order #8 (Human Resource
Strategies to Support Coast Guard Maritime Strategy) noted the need
for a more standardized, objective set of human capital requirements;
* October 2006--MRD Enterprise Project Chartered.
End:
* September 2010--Expected completion of policy and program
development;
* September 2012--Expected completion of automated information system
to support the MRD (including access through CGBI), followed by
continued development.
Status:
According to an agency document, 16 MRD analyses were completed
throughout the Coast Guard as of December 2009, an additional 7 were
ongoing, and 2 were planned. These types of analyses can be conducted
at the request of a sponsoring program, operational commander, or
Coast Guard planning element to support specific resource requests in
the Coast Guard's annual budget process. The analyses are currently
not required and represent almost none of the total number of human
capital resource proposals evaluated, according to one official
involved with the development of the MRD system. This official stated,
however, the Future Force Office hopes to eventually conduct an MRD
analysis of every unit type, every 5 years.
[End of Manpower Requirements Determination (MRD)]
Sector Staffing Model (SSM):
Issue:
As noted in the 2007 charter that established SSM's guidance team and
working group, when sectors were created between 2004 and 2006, there
was no standard model to help determine staffing levels--personnel
allocations were developed using methodologies that differed by
program or unit. Having a transparent and repeatable methodology to
determine the minimum number of personnel needed to staff a sector
should assist Coast Guard management in allocating personnel resources
across all sectors and help project future personnel needs.
Purpose:
According to Coast Guard documents, SSM is designed to assist
officials with resource allocation decisions by creating baseline
staffing data that are comparable across the Coast Guard's 35 diverse
sectors.
Officials hope that SSM will address these inconsistencies by applying
a transparent, repeatable, and scalable methodology to the staffing
process. Specifically, officials intend to use the model to:
* quantify staffing shortfalls to justify human capital requests in
the Coast Guard's regular resource prioritization and allocation
process;
* provide a transparent basis to reallocate resources;
* enable senior leadership and program managers to understand resource
implications of proposed policy changes and requirements, and;
* help forecast future staffing needs based on projected activity and
mission growth.
SSM, according to an official involved with its development, will
quantify staffing needs for specific sector activities, such as
"container inspections," based upon a number of variables, including:
* Coast Guard mission requirements;
* individual sector activity levels;
* "average" time to complete activities, and;
* other sector-specific data (e.g., local travel factors).
In addition to defining the quantity of human capital needed to
complete an activity in a particular location, the model is planned to
break out a recommended mix of officer, enlisted, and civilian
personnel along with their rates, ranks, and grades. Another component
of the model, a "command cadre tool," is expected to recommend
appropriate ranks for sector leadership based on responsibility and
span of control measures.
A key official noted that base-level staffing data generated by the
model assume positions will be staffed with fully qualified personnel
and that data on the length of time needed to complete training
requirements have not been collected; specific training factors were,
however, under development as of spring 2009.
Responsible Command:
The Office of Shore Forces within the Assistant Commandant for
Capabilities and the Deputy Commandant for Operations is leading the
development of SSM. According to one official, Shore Forces intends to
maintain the model until at least 3-years of activity data are
incorporated and other refinements to the model are complete. The same
official further commented that the Manpower Requirements
Determination workgroup in the Future Force Office will recommend
which Coast Guard directorate should take ownership of all service
staffing issues, including SSM. Currently, the official said, the
Office of Budgets & Programs is responsible for the Coast Guard
staffing requirements and the official service staffing manual.
Time frames:
Start:
* 2007--Sector Staffing Senior Guidance Team and Working Group
chartered.
End:
* December 2010--Expected SSM access through CGBI.
Status:
SSM was accredited by senior Coast Guard leadership in July 2009 and
is now available for use by select units to support resource requests
and unit-level reprogramming.
According to one Shore Forces official, further refinement is required
before the SSM is implemented on a large scale in 2010. This
refinement includes additional testing to reduce data anomalies and
faulty assumptions, as well as the development and integration of a
Sector competency framework. A charter to begin development of the
refined model, Phase III, was issued July 2009.
[End of Sector Staffing Model (SSM)]
Coast Guard Business Intelligence (CGBI):
Issue:
The Coast Guard employs numerous data systems that exhibit varying
degrees of data quality, reliability, and integration. The Coast Guard
recognizes the need for accurate data from a variety of sources to use
in its analysis of personnel management decisions.
Purpose:
According to Coast Guard documents and officials, the CGBI system is
designed to support decision making across all levels of the Coast
Guard by leveraging existing Coast Guard data, measures, and
processes. Specifically, the tool accesses raw data from the Coast
Guard's numerous "transactional" systems, (i.e., individual databases
like Direct Access or Marine Information for Safety and Law
Enforcement that serve a range of functions). The general premise of
the tool, according to one official, is to collect data once through
the appropriate transactional systems in order to have the ability to
use the information multiple times in a variety of configurations.
Along with providing decision makers a means to view Coast Guard data,
officials told us that CGBI also promotes information transparency,
which has resulted in more self-correcting of inaccurate data, and
greater information sharing, which among other things, helps prevent
duplication of efforts.
Responsible Command:
The Office of Performance Management and Decision Support under the
Office of the Vice Commandant, maintains CGBI. This office is
currently transitioning to the new Office of Performance Management
within the Coast Guard Enterprise Strategy, Management and Doctrine
Oversight Directorate, also under the Office of the Vice Commandant.
Time frames:
Start:
* 2006--CGBI Phase I launched.
End:
* Officials indicated that the system will continue to evolve to meet
organizational needs. The next major system upgrade, which involves
predictive analytics capabilities, is expected to be implemented by
2011.
Status:
CGBI Phase II was launched in April 2009. This version, according to
agency documentation, is capable of more powerful searches and has
more features than the initial system launched in 2006.
Several other tools related to personnel issues, including the
Competency Management System, the Manpower Requirements Determination
system, the Officer Specialty Management System, and the Sector
Staffing Model, are currently or are planned to be accessed through
CGBI.
The CGBI system has been implemented, but its refinement continues.
For example, an official noted that the next major system enhancement
is focused on capabilities that will help the Coast Guard use existing
data in models or simulations to help predict future outcomes. In
addition, the Office of Performance Management staff that support the
CGBI system will continue to focus on measuring data quality for the
foreseeable future, according to one official.
[End of Coast Guard Business Intelligence (CGBI)]
[End of Data-driven Tools]
[End of Enclosure I]
Enclosure II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgements:
GAO Contact:
Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov:
Acknowledgements:
In addition to the contact name above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director,
and Lori Kmetz, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. David
Lutter contributed to all aspects of the work. Neetha Rao and Brian
Schwartz provided analytical support to several aspects of this
review. Greg Wilmoth assisted with design and methodology. Geoffrey
Hamilton provided legal support. Katherine Davis assisted in report
development.
GAO Related Products:
Coast Guard: As Deepwater Systems Integrator, Coast Guard Is
Reassessing Costs and Capabilities but Lags in Applying Its
Disciplined Acquisition Approach. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-682]. Washington, D.C.: July 14,
2009.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2010 Budget and Related
Performance and Management Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-810T]. Washington, D.C.: July 7,
2009.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Genesis and Progress of the Service's
Modernization Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-530R]. Washington, D.C.: June 24,
2009.
Coast Guard: Update on Deepwater Program Management, Cost and
Acquisition Workforce. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-620T]. Washington, D.C.: April 22,
2009.
Military Personnel: DOD's and the Coast Guard's Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Programs Face Implementation and Oversight
Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-924].
Washington, D.C.: August 29, 2008.
Coast Guard: Change in Course Improves Deepwater Management and
Oversight, but Outcome Still Uncertain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-745]. Washington, D.C.: June 24,
2008.
Coast Guard: Strategies for Mitigating the Loss of Patrol Boats Are
Achieving Results in the Near Term, but They Come at a Cost and Longer
Term Sustainability is Unknown. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-660]. Washington, D.C.: June 23,
2008.
Coast Guard: Status of Selected Aspects of the Coast Guard's Deepwater
Program. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-270R.
Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Recent
Performance, and Related Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-494T]. Washington, D.C.: March 6,
2008.
Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct
Facility Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program's Staffing,
Practices, and Data. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-12]. Washington, D.C.: February 14,
2008.
Military Personnel: The DOD and Coast Guard Academies Have Taken Steps
to Address Incidents of Sexual Harassment and Assault, but Greater
Federal Oversight Is Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-296]. Washington, D.C.: January 17,
2008.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One
Year Later. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-126T].
Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of
Mission and Management Functions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-454]. Washington, D.C.: August 17,
2007.
Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and
Management Efforts to Address Them. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-874]. Washington, D.C.: June 18,
2007.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, Performance,
Reorganization, and Related Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-489T]. Washington, D.C.: April 18,
2007.
Coast Guard: Status of Efforts to Improve Deepwater Program Management
and Address Operational Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-575T]. Washington, D.C.: March 8,
2007.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery
Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-903]. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and
Future Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-448T]. Washington, D.C.: June 15,
2006.
[End of Enclosure II]
Footnotes:
[1] The Senate report (S. Rep. No. 110-396 at 80 (2008)) accompanying
the Fiscal Year 2009 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Act (Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574, 3652 (2008)) required the
Commandant of the United States Coast Guard to develop a workforce
action plan. The Explanatory Statement accompanying the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009, directed the Coast Guard
to comply with the Senate report direction regarding a workforce
action plan. H. Comm. on Appropriations, 110TH Cong., Committee Print
on H.R. 2638/Public Law 110-329 at 646 (2008).
[2] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Workforce Planning Guide,
(July 31, 2007); and GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective
Strategic Workforce Planning, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14,
2003).
[3] Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), Pub. L. No.
103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993).
[4] We have a robust body of work related to the acquisition
challenges of the Coast Guard spanning several years. For example,
GAO, Coast Guard: As Deepwater Systems Integrator, Coast Guard Is
Reassessing Costs and Capabilities but Lags in Applying Its
Disciplined Acquisition Approach, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-682] (Washington, D.C.: July 14,
2009) and Coast Guard: Change in Course Improves Deepwater Management
and Oversight, but Outcome Still Uncertain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-745] (Washington, D.C.: June 24,
2008).
[5] NAPA, U.S. Coast Guard Modernization Study (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
2009). NAPA is an independent, nonprofit organization chartered by
Congress to assist federal, state, and local governments in improving
their effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability.
[6] The Coast Guard's homeland security and nonhomeland security-
missions are delineated in section 888 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2249 (2002)). Starting with
the fiscal year 2007 budget, however, the Office of Management and
Budget designated the Coast Guard's drug interdiction and other law
enforcement mission programs--which were originally homeland-security-
missions--as nonhomeland-security-missions for budgetary purposes.
[7] GAO, Coast Guard: Observations on the Genesis and Progress of the
Service's Modernization Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-530R] (Washington, D.C.: June 24,
2009). This report provides additional information about the status of
the Coast Guard's modernization effort.
[8] GAO, Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring
Levels of Effort for All Missions, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-155] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12,
2002) and Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and
Monitor Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions, GAO-03-
544T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 12, 2003).
[9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-155] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-544T].
[10] GAO, Coast Guard: Relationship between Resource Used and Results
Achieved Needs to be Clearer, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-432] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22,
2004).
[11] GAO, Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and
Correct Facility Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program's
Staffing, Practices, and Data, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-12] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14,
2008).
[12] GAO, Maritime Security: Coast Guard International Port Security
Program Has Made Progress, but Additional Workforce Planning Is
Needed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-335SU]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2008).
[13] U.S. Coast Guard, Report to Congress on Civilians in Personnel
Management Structure (Washington, D.C., June 26, 1997).
[14] GAO, Coast Guard Workforce Mix: Phased-In Conversion of Some
Support Officer Positions Would Produce Savings, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/RCED-00-60] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1,
2000).
[15] National Transportation Safety Board, Marine Accident Report:
Sinking of the Recreational Sailing Vessel Morning Dew at the Entrance
to the Harbor of Charlestown, South Carolina, December 29, 1997
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1999).
[16] U.S. Department of Transportation, Audit of the Small Boat
Station Search and Rescue Program, United States Coast Guard
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2001); U.S. Department of Transportation,
U.S. Coast Guard Budget and Management Issues: Statement of the
Honorable Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Transportation (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2002); and U.S. Department of
Transportation, Audit of the Use of Fiscal Year 2002 Funds to Improve
the Operational Readiness of Small Boat Stations and Command Centers,
United States Coast Guard (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2003).
[17] GAO, Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource
Challenges and Management Concerns Remain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-161] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31,
2005).
[18] U.S. Coast Guard, Final Action on Administrative Investigation of
the Coast Guard Response to the Sinking of the F/V Patriot that
Occurred on 3 January 2009 (Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2009).
[19] U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Coast Guard Posture Statement with 2009
Budget in Brief (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2008).
[20] U.S. Coast Guard, Coast Guard Marine Safety Analysis: An
Independent Assessment and Suggestions for Improvement, (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 16, 2007).
[21] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector
General, United States Coast Guard's Management of the Marine Casualty
Investigations Program (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2008).
[22] GAO has a robust body of work related to the acquisition
challenges of the Coast Guard spanning several years. For example,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-682] and [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-745].
[23] In this review, we focused on the marine safety mission and the
Coast Guard's November 2008 Marine Safety Performance Plan because of
the number of complaints lodged by maritime stakeholders nationwide,
and the Coast Guard's recognition of the extent and serious nature of
the problems within this mission area. In addition, enhancing aspects
of the marine safety mission was identified as a "strategic priority"
in both the 2008 and 2009 Coast Guard Posture Statements.
[24] In response to the congressional direction provided in Senate
Report 110-396, the Coast Guard produced a document, entitled U.S.
Coast Guard Workforce Action Plan: Fiscal Year 2009 Report to Congress.
[25] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Workforce Planning Guide
(July 31, 2007).
[26] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996). It is important to note that while GPRA focuses on the agency
level, performance goals and measures are important management tools
for all levels of an agency, such as the bureau, program, project, or
activity level, and these criteria are applicable at those levels as
well.
[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118].
[28] Unlike officer specialties, the Coast Guard's enlisted ratings
already provide specific requirements for each rating.
[29] "Competency" in the Coast Guard generally refers to attributes
such as knowledge, skills, abilities, and personal attributes that a
person exercises while performing the business of any given position.
[30] A Coast Guard cutter is a vessel 65 feet in length or greater,
having adequate accommodations for crew to live onboard. The Juniper
Class cutter is 225 feet in length and the first vessel of this class
was commissioned in 1996 as the lead ship in the Coast Guard's Buoy
Tender Replacement Project.
[31] Sectors are operational units that carry out the full range of
Coast Guard missions. There are currently 35 geographically-based
Coast Guard sectors in the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii,
Puerto Rico, and Guam.
[32] The MRD office anticipates filling these three positions by the
summer of 2010. There are an additional three analysts that conduct
manpower requirement determinations for acquisition-related reviews.
[33] In January of 2010, the new maritime enforcement specialist
rating will take effect; in the future the personnel in this position
will execute the duties of port security specialists. The maritime
enforcement "A" school will be located in the Coast Guard Maritime Law
Enforcement Academy at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in
Charleston, South Carolina, and the first class will graduate in
spring 2010.
[34] GAO, Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2010 Budget and
Related Performance and Management Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-810T] (Washington, D.C.: July 7,
2009).
[35] Direct Access is a computer-based human resource system. It
provides Coast Guard assignment processing; posts official positions;
schedules training; and processes retirements, promotions, and
disciplinary actions. Direct Access also maintains all personnel
attributes and military payroll. MISLE began operating in December
2001 as the Coast Guard's primary data system for documenting marine
safety and environmental protection activities. Storage of data on
facility oversight and other Coast Guard activities, such as vessel
boardings and incident response, have since been added. The purpose of
MISLE is to provide the capability to collect, maintain, and retrieve
information necessary for the administration, management, and
documentation of Coast Guard activities.
[36] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-12].
[37] GAO, Coast Guard: Update on Marine Safety Information for Safety
and Law Enforcement System, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-11] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17,
2001) and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-12].
[38] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).
[39] NAPA, U.S. Coast Guard Modernization Study (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 2009). NAPA is an independent, nonprofit organization chartered
by Congress to assist federal, state, and local governments in
improving their effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability.
[40] The Coast Guard is in the process of transitioning from a
bicoastal operational command structure, consisting of the Atlantic
Area Command and Pacific Area Command, to one where all operations are
centralized under one command (Operations Command). According to the
Coast Guard, when modernization is complete, both Atlantic and Pacific
Commands will cease to exist.
[41] Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures are codified, specific, and
measurable actions and methods that implement doctrine or policy. TTP
captures the content of the information, including the ’what,“ ’when,“
’how,“ ’where,“ ’who,“ and ’why.“
[42] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996). It is important to note that while GP agency level, performance
goals and measures are important management tools for all levels of an
agency, such as the bureau, program, project, or activity levels, and
these criteria are applicable at those levels as well.
[43] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118].
[44] C4IT refers to Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
Information Technology.
[45] Commandant Intent Action Order #8, Human Resource Strategies to
Support Coast Guard Maritime Strategy.
[End of section]
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