Aviation Security
DHS Has Taken Steps to Enhance International Aviation Security and Facilitate Compliance with International Standards, but Challenges Remain
Gao ID: GAO-11-238T December 2, 2010
The attempted December 25, 2009, terrorist attack and the October 2010 bomb attempt involving air cargo originating in Yemen highlight the ongoing threat to aviation and the need to coordinate security standards and practices to enhance security with foreign partners, a process known as harmonization. This testimony discusses the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and challenges in harmonizing international aviation security standards and practices and facilitating compliance with international standards. This testimony is based on reports GAO issued from April 2007 through June 2010, and ongoing work examining foreign airport assessments. For this work, GAO obtained information from DHS and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and interviewed TSA program officials, foreign aviation officials, representatives from international organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and industry associations, about ongoing harmonization and TSA airport assessment efforts and challenges.
In the wake of the December 2009 terrorist incident, DHS and TSA have strived to enhance ongoing efforts to harmonize international security standards and practices through increased global outreach, coordination of standards and practices, use of enhanced technology, and assessments of foreign airports. For example, in 2010 the Secretary of Homeland Security participated in five regional summits aimed at developing an international consensus to enhance aviation security. In addition, DHS and TSA have coordinated with foreign governments to harmonize air cargo security practices to address the statutory mandate to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on U.S.-bound passenger aircraft by August 2010, which TSA aims to meet by 2013. Further, in the wake of the December 2009 incident, the Secretary of Homeland Security has encouraged other nations to consider using advanced imaging technology (AIT), which produces an image of a passenger's body that screeners use to look for anomalies such as explosives. As a result, several nations have begun to test and deploy AIT or have committed to deploying AIT units at their airports. Moreover, following the October 2010 cargo bomb attempt, TSA also implemented additional security requirements to enhance air cargo security. To facilitate compliance with international security standards, TSA assesses the security efforts of foreign airports as defined by ICAO international aviation security standards. In 2007, GAO reported, among other things, that TSA did not always consistently track and document host government progress in addressing security deficiencies identified during foreign airport assessments and recommended that TSA track and document progress in this area. DHS and TSA have made progress in their efforts to enhance international aviation security through these harmonization efforts and related foreign airport assessments; however, a number of key challenges, many of which are beyond DHS's control, exist. For example, harmonization depends on the willingness of sovereign nations to voluntarily coordinate their aviation security standards and practices. In addition, foreign governments may view aviation security threats differently, and therefore may not consider international aviation security a high priority. Resource availability, which is a particular concern for developing countries, as well as legal and cultural factors may also affect nations' security enhancement and harmonization efforts. In addition to challenges facing DHS's harmonization efforts, in 2007 GAO reported that TSA experienced challenges in assessing foreign airport security against international standards and practices, such as a lack of available international inspectors and concerns host governments had about being assessed by TSA, both of which may affect the agency's ability to schedule and conduct assessments for some foreign airports. GAO is exploring these issues as part of an ongoing review of TSA's foreign airport assessment program, which GAO plans to issue in the fall of 2011. In response to prior GAO recommendations that TSA, among other things, track the status of foreign airport assessments, DHS concurred and is working to address the recommendations. TSA provided technical comments on a draft of the information contained in this statement, which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-11-238T, Aviation Security: DHS Has Taken Steps to Enhance International Aviation Security and Facilitate Compliance with International Standards, but Challenges Remain
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:15 p.m. EST:
Thursday, December 2, 2010:
Aviation Security:
DHS Has Taken Steps to Enhance International Aviation Security and
Facilitate Compliance with International Standards, but Challenges
Remain:
Statement of Steve Lord, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-11-238T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-238T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security, Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The attempted December 25, 2009, terrorist attack and the October 2010
bomb attempt involving air cargo originating in Yemen highlight the
ongoing threat to aviation and the need to coordinate security
standards and practices to enhance security with foreign partners, a
process known as harmonization. This testimony discusses the
Department of Homeland Security‘s (DHS) progress and challenges in
harmonizing international aviation security standards and practices
and facilitating compliance with international standards. This
testimony is based on reports GAO issued from April 2007 through June
2010, and ongoing work examining foreign airport assessments. For this
work, GAO obtained information from DHS and the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and interviewed TSA program officials,
foreign aviation officials, representatives from international
organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), and industry associations, about ongoing harmonization and TSA
airport assessment efforts and challenges.
What GAO Found:
In the wake of the December 2009 terrorist incident, DHS and TSA have
striven to enhance ongoing efforts to harmonize international security
standards and practices through increased global outreach,
coordination of standards and practices, use of enhanced technology,
and assessments of foreign airports. For example, in 2010 the
Secretary of Homeland Security participated in five regional summits
aimed at developing an international consensus to enhance aviation
security. In addition, DHS and TSA have coordinated with foreign
governments to harmonize air cargo security practices to address the
statutory mandate to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on
U.S.-bound passenger aircraft by August 2010, which TSA aims to meet
by 2013. Further, in the wake of the December 2009 incident, the
Secretary of Homeland Security has encouraged other nations to
consider using advanced imaging technology (AIT), which produces an
image of a passenger‘s body that screeners use to look for anomalies
such as explosives. As a result, several nations have begun to test
and deploy AIT or have committed to deploying AIT units at their
airports. Moreover, following the October 2010 cargo bomb attempt, TSA
also implemented additional security requirements to enhance air cargo
security. To facilitate compliance with international security
standards, TSA assesses the security efforts of foreign airports as
defined by ICAO international aviation security standards. In 2007,
GAO reported, among other things, that TSA did not always consistently
track and document host government progress in addressing security
deficiencies identified during foreign airport assessments and
recommended that TSA track and document progress in this area.
DHS and TSA have made progress in their efforts to enhance
international aviation security through these harmonization efforts
and related foreign airport assessments; however, a number of key
challenges, many of which are beyond DHS‘s control, exist. For
example, harmonization depends on the willingness of sovereign nations
to voluntarily coordinate their aviation security standards and
practices. In addition, foreign governments may view aviation security
threats differently, and therefore may not consider international
aviation security a high priority. Resource availability, which is a
particular concern for developing countries, as well as legal and
cultural factors may also affect nations‘ security enhancement and
harmonization efforts. In addition to challenges facing DHS‘s
harmonization efforts, in 2007 GAO reported that TSA experienced
challenges in assessing foreign airport security against international
standards and practices, such as a lack of available international
inspectors and concerns host governments had about being assessed by
TSA, both of which may affect the agency‘s ability to schedule and
conduct assessments for some foreign airports. GAO is exploring these
issues as part of an ongoing review of TSA‘s foreign airport
assessment program, which GAO plans to issue in the fall of 2011.
What GAO Recommends:
In response to prior GAO recommendations that TSA, among other things,
track the status of foreign airport assessments, DHS concurred and is
working to address the recommendations. TSA provided technical
comments on a draft of the information contained in this statement,
which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-238T] or key
components. For more information, contact Steve Lord at (202) 512-4379
or lords@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to work
with foreign partners to enhance international aviation security. The
December 25, 2009, attempt to detonate an explosive during an
international flight bound for Detroit, and the October 2010 discovery
of explosive devices in air cargo packages bound for the United States
from Yemen, provide vivid reminders that civil aviation remains a key
terrorist target and highlight the importance of working with foreign
partners to enhance international aviation security. In response to
the December 2009 incident, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) mandated enhanced security measures for air carriers at United
States airports and for all international flights--prior to departure--
bound for the United States.[Footnote 1] Additionally, the President
directed DHS to take a number of steps to enhance aviation security
including strengthening international coordination on aviation
security issues and pursuing enhanced screening technology, protocols,
and procedures. Following the October 2010 bomb attempt in cargo
originating in Yemen, TSA also implemented additional security
requirements to enhance air cargo security.[Footnote 2]
To this end, DHS has increased its ongoing efforts to work with
foreign partners to coordinate security standards and practices among
nations--a process known as harmonization. Harmonization, as defined
by DHS, refers to countries' efforts to coordinate their security
standards and practices to enhance security as well as the mutual
recognition and acceptance of existing security standards and
practices aimed at achieving the same security outcome.[Footnote 3]
TSA also facilitates compliance with existing international standards
and practices by coordinating assessments of foreign airports with
foreign nations. Through its foreign airport assessment program, and
using international standards and recommended practices, TSA
determines whether foreign airports that provide service to the United
States are maintaining and carrying out effective security measures.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted into law
shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, established
TSA and gave the agency responsibility for securing all modes of
transportation, including the nation's civil aviation system, which
includes air carrier operations (domestic and foreign) to, from, and
within the United States.[Footnote 4] For example, ATSA requires that
TSA provide for the screening of all passengers and property,
including air cargo, transported on passenger aircraft.[Footnote 5]
ATSA further requires that a system be in operation to screen,
inspect, or otherwise ensure the security of the cargo transported by
all-cargo aircraft--aircraft that carry only cargo and no passengers--
to, from, and within the United States.[Footnote 6] TSA also assesses
the effectiveness of security measures at foreign airports served by a
United States air carrier, or from which a foreign air carrier serves
the United States, at intervals deemed appropriate by the Secretary of
Homeland Security.[Footnote 7] TSA further requires that domestic and
foreign air carriers with operations to, from, or within the United
States establish and maintain TSA-approved security programs and
comply with any applicable security directives or emergency amendments
to air carrier security programs.[Footnote 8]
On a global basis, the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), a specialized agency of the United Nations representing 190
countries, has established security standards and recommended
practices to help ensure a minimum baseline level of international
aviation security among member nations.[Footnote 9] These
international aviation security standards and recommended practices
are detailed in Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil
Aviation, as adopted by ICAO. Although TSA security requirements
generally encompass (and in several instances exceed) the ICAO
standards and recommended practices, the ICAO standards and
recommended practices are broad and open to different interpretations.
As such, there are wide variations among the aviation security
practices adopted by ICAO member nations. For example, some nations
require passengers to remove their shoes for screening at airport
passenger checkpoints while others do not. TSA officials stated that
countries may utilize different approaches to achieve the same outcome
and that DHS and TSA work closely with their international partners
and with other U.S. agencies, such as the U.S. Department of State
(State), to enhance existing international standards and practices
through harmonization efforts.
My testimony today discusses DHS's progress and challenges in
enhancing international aviation security standards and practices
through harmonization efforts and facilitating compliance with ICAO
standards and recommended practices. My comments are based, in part,
on our prior reports and testimonies issued from April 2007 through
June 2010 addressing the security of the passenger and air cargo
transportation system.[Footnote 10] For these reports, we reviewed
relevant documents related to the programs reviewed and interviewed
cognizant DHS and TSA officials. In addition, we obtained updated
information in September 2010 on TSA's efforts to address
recommendations we made in 2007 to improve its foreign airport
assessments program. More detailed information on our scope and
methodology appears in our published reports.
This statement is also partly based on observations from our work--
conducted from April 2010 through November 2010--assessing the
progress that DHS and its component agencies have made in enhancing
international aviation, and ongoing work assessing TSA's foreign
airport assessment program, which will be issued next year. To conduct
this work we reviewed relevant documents related to TSA's passenger
screening, air cargo security, and foreign airport assessment programs
including TSA aviation security policies and procedures, as well as
ICAO aviation security standards and recommended practices, and
working group documents. We also interviewed cognizant DHS and TSA
program officials, foreign aviation officials from Australia, Canada,
the European Union (EU), France, the United Kingdom, and the
Netherlands, and representatives from international organizations such
as ICAO and international aviation industry associations. While
information obtained from our interviews with foreign aviation
officials and aviation industry representatives cannot be generalized
beyond those contacted because we did not use a probability sampling
method to select these officials for interviews, the officials we
interviewed provided important perspectives on efforts to enhance
international aviation security. All of our prior work, as well as the
results of our ongoing work, used for this statement was conducted in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
DHS Has Made Progress in Harmonizing International Aviation Security
and Facilitating Compliance through Foreign Airport Assessments, but
Can Further Strengthen Assessment Efforts:
DHS Has Made Progress in Its Efforts to Harmonize International
Aviation Security Standards and Practices:
DHS has increased its global outreach efforts. Historically, DHS and
its components, working with State, have coordinated with foreign
partners on an ongoing basis to promote aviation security enhancements
through ICAO and other multilateral and bilateral outreach efforts.
For example, DHS and TSA have coordinated through multilateral groups
such as the European Commission and the Quadrilateral Group--
comprising the United States, the EU, Canada, and Australia--to
establish agreements to develop commensurate air cargo security
systems. On a bilateral basis, the United States has participated in
various working groups to facilitate coordination on aviation security
issues with several nations, such as those that make up the EU,
Canada, and Japan. The United States has also established bilateral
cooperative agreements to share information on security technology
with the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Israel, among others.
[Footnote 11] In addition, TSA has finalized agreements with ICAO to
provide technical expertise and assistance to ICAO in the areas of
capacity building and security audits, and serves as the United
States' technical representative on ICAO's Aviation Security Panel and
the panel's various Working Groups.
In the wake of the December 2009 incident, DHS increased its outreach
efforts. For example, to address security gaps highlighted by the
December incident, DHS has coordinated with Nigeria to deploy Federal
Air Marshals on flights operated by U.S. carriers bound for the United
States from Nigeria. Further, in early 2010, the Secretary of Homeland
Security participated in five regional summits--Africa, the Asia/
Pacific region, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere--
with the Secretary General of ICAO, foreign ministers and aviation
officials, and international industry representatives to discuss
current aviation security threats and develop an international
consensus on the steps needed to address remaining gaps in the
international aviation security system.[Footnote 12] Each of these
summits resulted in a Joint Declaration on Aviation Security in which,
generally, the parties committed to work through ICAO and on an
individual basis to enhance aviation security. Subsequently, during
the September 2010 ICAO Assembly, the 190 member states adopted a
Declaration on Aviation Security, which encompassed the principles of
the Joint Declarations produced by the five regional summits.[Footnote
13] Through the declaration, member states recognized the need to
strengthen aviation security worldwide and agreed to take nine actions
to enhance international cooperation to counter threats to civil
aviation, which include, among other things:
* strengthening and promoting the effective application of ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices, with particular focus on Annex
17, and developing strategies to address current and emerging threats;
* strengthening security screening procedures, enhancing human
factors, and utilizing modern technologies to detect prohibited
articles and support research and development of technology for the
detection of explosives, weapons, and prohibited articles in order to
prevent acts of unlawful interference;
* developing and implementing strengthened and harmonized measures and
best practices for air cargo security, taking into account the need to
protect the entire air cargo supply chain; and:
* providing technical assistance to states in need, including funding,
capacity building, and technology transfer to effectively address
security threats to civil aviation, in cooperation with other states,
international organizations and industry partners.
TSA has increased coordination with foreign partners to enhance
security standards and practices. In response to the August 2006 plot
to detonate liquid explosives on board commercial air carriers bound
for the United States, TSA initially banned all liquids, gels, and
aerosols from being carried through the checkpoint and, in September
2006, began allowing passengers to carry on small, travel-size liquids
and gels (3 fluid ounces or less) using a single quart-size, clear
plastic, zip-top bag. In November 2006, in an effort to harmonize its
liquid-screening standards with those of other countries, TSA revised
its procedures to match those of other select nations. Specifically,
TSA began allowing 3.4 fluid ounces of liquids, gels, and aerosols
onboard aircraft, which is equivalent to 100 milliliters--the amount
permitted by the EU and other countries such as Canada and Australia.
This harmonization effort was perceived to be a success and ICAO later
adopted the liquid, gels, and aerosol screening standards and
procedures implemented by TSA and other nations as a recommended
practice.
TSA has also worked with foreign governments to draft international
air cargo security standards. According to TSA officials, the agency
has worked with foreign counterparts over the last 3 years to draft
Amendment 12 to ICAO's Annex 17, and to generate support for its
adoption by ICAO members. The amendment, which was adopted by the ICAO
Council in November 2010, will set forth new standards related to air
cargo such as requiring members to establish a system to secure the
air cargo supply chain (the flow of goods from manufacturers to
retailers).[Footnote 14] TSA has also supported the International Air
Transport Association's (IATA) efforts to establish a secure supply
chain approach to screening cargo for its member airlines and to have
these standards recognized internationally.[Footnote 15] Moreover,
following the October 2010 bomb attempt in cargo originating in Yemen,
DHS and TSA, among other things, reached out to international
partners, IATA, and the international shipping industry to emphasize
the global nature of transportation security threats and the need to
strengthen air cargo security through enhanced screening and
preventative measures. TSA also deployed a team of security inspectors
to Yemen to provide that country's government with assistance and
guidance on their air cargo screening procedures.
In addition, TSA has focused on harmonizing air cargo security
standards and practices in support of its statutory mandate to
establish a system to physically screen 100 percent of cargo on
passenger aircraft--including the domestic and inbound flights of
United States and foreign passenger operations--by August
2010.[Footnote 16] In June 2010 we reported that TSA has made progress
in meeting this mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, but faces
several challenges in meeting the screening mandate as it applies to
inbound cargo,[Footnote 17] related, in part, to TSA's limited ability
to regulate foreign entities.[Footnote 18] As a result, TSA officials
stated that the agency would not be able to meet the mandate as it
applies to inbound cargo by the August 2010 deadline. We recommended
that TSA develop a plan, with milestones, for how and when the agency
intends to meet the mandate as it applies to inbound cargo. TSA
concurred with this recommendation and, in June 2010, stated that
agency officials were drafting milestones as part of a plan that would
generally require air carriers to conduct 100 percent screening by a
specific date. At a November 2010 hearing before the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the TSA Administrator
testified that TSA aims to meet the 100 percent screening mandate as
it applies to inbound air cargo by 2013.
In November 2010 TSA officials stated that the agency is coordinating
with foreign countries to evaluate the comparability of their air
cargo security requirements with those of the United States, including
the mandated screening requirements for inbound air cargo on passenger
aircraft. According to TSA officials, the agency has begun to develop
a program that would recognize the air cargo security programs of
foreign countries if TSA deems those programs provide a level of
security commensurate with TSA's programs. In total, TSA plans to
coordinate with about 20 countries, which, according to TSA officials,
were selected in part because they export about 90 percent of the air
cargo transported to the United States on passenger aircraft.
According to officials, TSA has completed a 6-month review of France's
air cargo security program and is evaluating the comparability of
France's requirements with those of the United States. TSA officials
also said that, as of November 2010, the agency has begun to evaluate
the comparability of air cargo security programs for the United
Kingdom, Israel, Japan, Singapore, New Zealand, and Australia, and
plans to work with Canada and several EU countries in early 2011. TSA
expects to work with the remaining countries through 2013.
TSA is working with foreign governments to encourage the development
and deployment of enhanced screening technologies. TSA has also
coordinated with foreign governments to develop enhanced screening
technologies that will detect explosive materials on passengers.
According to TSA officials, the agency frequently exchanges
information with its international partners on progress in testing and
evaluating various screening technologies, such as bottled-liquid
scanner systems and advanced imaging technology (AIT).[Footnote 19] In
response to the December 2009 incident, the Secretary of Homeland
Security has emphasized through outreach efforts the need for nations
to develop and deploy enhanced security technologies.
Following TSA's decision to accelerate the deployment of AIT in the
United States, the Secretary has encouraged other nations to consider
using AIT units to enhance the effectiveness of passenger screening
globally. As a result, several nations, including Australia, Canada,
Finland, France, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Germany, Poland, Japan,
Ukraine, Russia, Republic of Korea, and the UK, have begun to test or
deploy AIT units or have committed to deploying AITs at their
airports. For example, the Australian Government has committed to
introducing AIT at international terminals in 2011. Other nations,
such as Argentina, Chile, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Kenya, New
Zealand, Singapore, and Spain are considering deploying AIT units at
their airports. In addition, TSA hosted an international summit in
November 2010 that brought together approximately 30 countries that
are deploying or considering deploying AITs at their airports to
discuss AIT policy, protocols, best practices, as well as safety and
privacy concerns.
However, as discussed in our March 2010 testimony, TSA's use of AIT
has highlighted several challenges relating to privacy, costs, and
effectiveness that remain to be addressed.[Footnote 20] For example,
because the AIT presents a full-body image of a person during the
screening process, concerns have been expressed that the image is an
invasion of privacy.[Footnote 21] Furthermore, as noted in our March
2010 testimony, it remains unclear whether the AIT would have been
able to detect the weapon used in the December 2009 incident based on
the preliminary TSA information we have received.[Footnote 22] We will
continue to explore these issues as part of our ongoing review of
TSA's AIT deployment, and expect the final report to be issued in the
summer of 2011.[Footnote 23]
DHS Has Made Progress in Its Efforts to Facilitate Compliance with
ICAO Standards through Foreign Airport Assessments but Can Further
Strengthen Its Efforts:
TSA conducts foreign airport assessments. TSA efforts to assess
security at foreign airports--airports served by U.S. aircraft
operators and those from which foreign air carriers operate service to
the United States--also serve to strengthen international aviation
security. Through TSA's foreign airport assessment program, TSA
utilizes select ICAO standards to assess the security measures used at
foreign airports to determine if they maintain and carry out effective
security practices.[Footnote 24] TSA also uses the foreign airport
assessment program to help identify the need for, and secure, aviation
security training and technical assistance for foreign countries. In
addition, during assessments, TSA provides on-site consultations and
makes recommendations to airport officials or the host government to
immediately address identified deficiencies. In our 2007 review of
TSA's foreign airport assessment program,[Footnote 25] we reported
that of the 128 foreign airports that TSA assessed during fiscal year
2005, TSA found that 46 (about 36 percent) complied with all ICAO
standards, whereas 82 (about 64 percent) did not meet at least one
ICAO standard.[Footnote 26]
In our 2007 review we also reported that TSA had not yet conducted its
own analysis of its foreign airport assessment results, and that
additional controls would help strengthen TSA's oversight of the
program. Moreover, we reported, among other things, that TSA did not
have controls in place to track the status of scheduled foreign
airport assessments, which could make it difficult for TSA to ensure
that scheduled assessments are completed. We also reported that TSA
did not consistently track and document host government progress in
addressing security deficiencies identified during TSA airport
assessments. As such, we made several recommendations to help TSA
strengthen oversight of its foreign airport assessment program,
including, among other things, that TSA develop controls to track the
status of foreign airport assessments from initiation through
completion; and develop a standard process for tracking and
documenting host governments' progress in addressing security
deficiencies identified during TSA assessments. TSA agreed with our
recommendations and provided plans to address them. Near the end of
our 2007 review, TSA had begun work on developing an automated
database to track airport assessment results.[Footnote 27] In
September 2010 TSA officials told us that they are now exploring ways
to streamline and standardize that automated database, but will
continue to use it until a more effective tracking mechanism can be
developed and deployed. We plan to further evaluate TSA's
implementation of our 2007 recommendations during our ongoing review
of TSA's foreign airport assessment program, which we plan to issue in
the fall of 2011.
Challenges Related to the Harmonization Process and TSA's Foreign
Airport Assessment Program May Affect DHS's Progress:
Challenges Related to Harmonization:
A number of key challenges, many of which are outside of DHS's
control, could impede its ability to enhance international aviation
security standards and practices. Agency officials, foreign country
representatives, and international association stakeholders we
interviewed said that these challenges include, among other things,
nations' voluntary participation in harmonization efforts, differing
views on aviation security threats, varying global resources, and
legal and cultural barriers. According to DHS and TSA officials, these
are long-standing global challenges that are inherent in diplomatic
processes such as harmonization, and will require substantial and
continuous dialogue with international partners. As a result,
according to these officials, the enhancements that are made will
likely occur incrementally, over time.
Harmonization depends on voluntary participation. The framework for
developing and adhering to international aviation standards is based
on voluntary efforts from individual states. While TSA may require
that foreign air carriers with operations to, from, or within the
United States comply with any applicable U.S. emergency amendments to
air carrier security programs, foreign countries, as sovereign
nations, generally cannot be compelled to implement specific aviation
security standards or mutually accept other countries' security
measures.[Footnote 28] International representatives have noted that
national sovereignty concerns limit the influence the United States
and its foreign partners can have in persuading any country to
participate in international harmonization efforts. As we reported in
2007 and 2010, participation in ICAO is voluntary.[Footnote 29] Each
nation must initiate its own involvement in harmonization, and the
United States may have limited influence over its international
partners.
Countries view aviation security threats differently. As we reported
in 2007 and 2010, some foreign governments do not share the United
States government's position that terrorism is an immediate threat to
the security of their aviation systems, and therefore may not view
international aviation security as a priority.[Footnote 30] For
example, TSA identified the primary threats to inbound air cargo as
the introduction of an explosive device in cargo loaded on a passenger
aircraft, and the hijacking of an all-cargo aircraft for its use as a
weapon to inflict mass destruction. However, not all foreign
governments agree that these are the primary threats to air cargo or
believe that there should be a distinction between the threats to
passenger air carriers and those to all-cargo carriers. According to a
prominent industry association as well as foreign government
representatives with whom we spoke, some countries view aviation
security enhancement efforts differently because they have not been a
target of previous aviation-based terrorist incidents, or for other
reasons, such as overseeing a different airport infrastructure with
fewer airports and less air traffic.
Resource availability affects security enhancement efforts. In
contrast to more developed countries, many less developed countries do
not have the infrastructure or financial or human resources necessary
to enhance their aviation security programs. For example, according to
DHS and TSA officials, such countries may find the cost of purchasing
and implementing new aviation security enhancements, such as
technology, to be prohibitive. Additionally, some countries
implementing new policies, practices, and technologies may lack the
human resources--for example, trained staff--to implement enhanced
security measures and oversee new aviation security practices. Some
foreign airports may also lack the infrastructure to support new
screening technologies, which can take up a large amount of space.
These limitations are more common in less developed countries, which
may lack the fiscal and human resources necessary to implement and
sustain enhanced aviation security measures. With regard to air cargo,
TSA officials also cautioned that if TSA were to impose strict cargo
screening standards on all inbound cargo, it is likely many nations
would be unable to meet the standards in the near term. Imposing such
screening standards in the near future could result in increased costs
for international passenger travel and for imported goods, and
possible reductions in passenger traffic and foreign imports.
According to TSA officials, strict standards could also undermine
TSA's ongoing cooperative efforts to develop commensurate security
systems with international partners.
To help address the resource deficit and build management capacity in
other nations, the United States provides aviation security
assistance--such as training and technical assistance--to other
countries. TSA, for example, works in various ways with State and
international organizations to provide aviation security assistance to
foreign partners. In one such effort, TSA uses information from the
agency's foreign airport assessments to identify a nation's aviation
security training needs and provide support. In addition, TSA's
Aviation Security Sustainable International Standards Team (ASSIST),
comprised of security experts, conducts an assessment of a country's
aviation security program at both the national and airport level and,
based on the results, suggests action items in collaboration with the
host nation. State also provides aviation security assistance to other
countries, in coordination with TSA and foreign partners through its
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program. Through this program, State
uses a needs assessment--a snapshot of a country's antiterrorism
capability--to evaluate prospective program participants and provide
needed training, equipment, and technology in support of aviation
security, among other areas.[Footnote 31] State and TSA officials have
acknowledged the need to develop joint coordination procedures and
criteria to facilitate identification of global priorities and program
recipients. We will further explore TSA and State efforts to develop
mechanisms to facilitate interagency coordination on capacity building
through our ongoing work.
Legal and cultural factors can also affect harmonization. Legal and
cultural differences among nations may hamper DHS's efforts to
harmonize aviation security standards. For example, some nations,
including the United States, limit, or even prohibit the sharing of
sensitive or classified information on aviation security procedures
with other countries. Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which
limits the data it can collect and share with other nations,
demonstrates one such impediment to harmonization. According to TSA
officials, the United States has established agreements to share
sensitive and classified information with some countries; however,
without such agreements, TSA is limited in its ability to share
information with its foreign partners. Additionally, the European
Commission reports that several European countries, by law, limit the
exposure of persons to radiation other than for medical purposes, a
potential barrier to acquiring some passenger screening technologies,
such as AIT.[Footnote 32]
Cultural differences also serve as a challenge in achieving
harmonization because aviation security standards and practices that
are acceptable in one country may not be in another. For example,
international aviation officials explained that the nature of aviation
security oversight varies by country--some countries rely more on
trust and established working relationships to facilitate security
standard compliance than direct government enforcement. Another
example of a cultural difference is the extent to which countries
accept the images AIT units produce. AIT units produce a full-body
image of a person during the screening process; to varying degrees,
governments and citizens of some countries, including the United
States, have expressed concern that these images raise privacy issues.
TSA is working to address this issue by evaluating possible display
options that would include a "stick figure" or "cartoon-like" form to
provide enhanced privacy protection to the individual being screened
while still allowing the unit operator or automated detection
algorithms to detect possible threats. Other nations, such as the
Netherlands, are also testing the effectiveness of this technology.
Although DHS has made progress in its efforts to harmonize
international aviation security standards and practices in key areas
such as passenger and air cargo screening, officials we interviewed
said that there remain areas in which security measures vary across
nations and would benefit from harmonization efforts. For example, as
we reported in 2007,[Footnote 33] the United States requires all
passengers on international flights who transfer to connecting flights
at United States airports to be rescreened prior to boarding their
connecting flight.[Footnote 34] In comparison, according to EU and
ICAO officials, the EU has implemented "one-stop security," allowing
passengers arriving from EU and select European airports to transfer
to connecting flights without being rescreened. Officials and
representatives told us that although there has been ongoing
international discussion on how to more closely align security
measures in these and other areas, additional dialogue is needed for
countries to better understand each others' perspectives. According to
the DHS officials and foreign representatives with whom we spoke,
these and other issues that could benefit from harmonization efforts
will continue to be explored through ongoing coordination with ICAO
and through other multilateral and bilateral outreach efforts.
Challenges Related to TSA's Foreign Airport Assessment Program:
Our 2007 review of TSA's foreign airport assessment program identified
challenges TSA experienced in assessing security at foreign airports
against ICAO standards and recommended practices, including a lack of
available inspector resources and host government concerns, both of
which may affect the agency's ability to schedule and conduct
assessments for some foreign airports.[Footnote 35] We reported that
TSA deferred 30 percent of its scheduled foreign airport visits in
2005 due to the lack of available inspectors, among other reasons.
[Footnote 36] TSA officials said that in such situations they
sometimes used domestic inspectors to conduct scheduled foreign
airport visits, but also stated that the use of domestic inspectors
was undesirable because these inspectors lacked experience conducting
assessments in the international environment.[Footnote 37] In
September 2010 TSA officials told us that they continue to use
domestic inspectors to assist in conducting foreign airport
assessments and air carrier inspections--approximately 50 domestic
inspectors have been trained to augment the efforts of international
inspectors. We also previously reported that representatives of some
foreign governments consider TSA's foreign airport assessment program
an infringement of their authority to regulate airports and air
carriers within their borders. Consequently, foreign countries have
withheld access to certain types of information or denied TSA access
to areas within an airport, limiting the scope of TSA's assessments.
We plan to further assess this issue, as well as other potential
challenges, as part of our ongoing review of TSA's foreign airport
assessment program, which we plan to issue in the fall of 2011.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I look forward to
responding to any questions you or other members of the committee may
have at this time.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For additional information about this statement, please contact
Stephen M. Lord at (202) 512-4379 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this statement.
In addition to the contact named above, staff who made key
contributions to this statement were Steve D. Morris, Assistant
Director; Carissa D. Bryant; Christopher E. Ferencik; Amy M. Frazier;
Barbara A. Guffy; Wendy C. Johnson; Stanley J. Kostyla; Thomas F.
Lombardi; Linda S. Miller; Matthew M. Pahl; Lisa A. Reijula; Rebecca
Kuhlmann Taylor; and Margaret A. Ullengren.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See, for example, TSA, SD 1544-09-06E (Apr. 2, 2010); EA 1546-09-
01D (Jan. 3, 2010).
[2] On November 8, 2010, DHS announced security measures in response
to the Yemen incident. Specifically, TSA banned cargo originating from
Yemen and Somalia from transport into the United States; banned the
transport of cargo deemed high-risk on passenger aircraft; prohibited
the transport of toner and ink cartridges weighing 16 ounces or more
on passenger aircraft in carry-on and checked luggage; and required
additional screening of high-risk cargo prior to transport on an all-
cargo aircraft.
[3] For the purposes of this statement, "standards and practices"
refers to statutory, regulatory and other requirements as well as any
measures or practices imposed or followed by a country to secure its
civil aviation system. This general term encompasses the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) "standards and recommended
practices" also referred to in this statement.
[4] See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[5] See Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 110(b), 115 Stat. at 614-15 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44901). The U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) also plays a role in securing inbound cargo--cargo transported
by U.S. and foreign air carriers from a foreign location to the United
States--by selectively screening cargo upon its arrival in the United
States. CBP has primary responsibility for preventing terrorists and
implements of terrorism from entering the United States. CBP is
currently coordinating with TSA to determine the feasibility of using
CBP's Automated Targeting System--a system used by DHS to match
travelers and goods against certain screening information and
intelligence--to support TSA's efforts toward screening 100 percent of
inbound air cargo. In discussing how a system to target certain
shipments for screening will fit into TSA's overall plans to screen
100 percent of inbound air cargo, officials stated that ATS would
provide an additional layer of scrutiny for all cargo entering the
United States.
[6] See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(f) (requiring the system to be in operation
as soon as practicable after the date of enactment--November 19, 2001--
but without establishing a firm deadline).
[7] See 49 U.S.C. § 44907. While § 44907 requires that TSA conduct
foreign airport assessments at intervals deemed necessary, in practice
TSA may not perform an assessment of security measures at a foreign
airport without permission from the host government.
[8] See 49 U.S.C §§ 44903, 44906; 49 C.F.R. pts. 1544-46. TSA also
conducts security inspections of foreign and United States-based air
carriers with service to the United States from foreign countries to
ensure compliance with applicable security requirements, including
those set forth in the air carriers' TSA-approved security programs.
[9] ICAO is responsible for the safe, orderly, and efficient
development of international civil aviation. ICAO was formed following
the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (the Chicago
Convention). Signatory nations to the ICAO convention agree to
cooperate with other member states to meet standardized international
aviation measures. An ICAO standard is a specification for the safety
or regularity of international air navigation, with which member
states agree to comply; whereas, a recommended practice is any
desirable specification for safety, regularity, or efficiency of
international air navigation, with which member states are strongly
encouraged to comply. Member states are expected to make a genuine
effort to comply with recommended practices.
[10] See GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made but Actions Needed to
Address Challenges in Meeting the Air Cargo Screening Mandate,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-880T] (Washington,
D.C.: Jun. 30, 2010); Aviation Security: TSA Has Made Progress but
Faces Challenges in Meeting the Statutory Mandate for Screening Air
Cargo on Passenger Aircraft, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-446] (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 28,
2010); Aviation Security: TSA Is Increasing Procurement and Deployment
of the Advanced Imaging Technology, but Challenges to This Effort and
Other Areas of Aviation Security Remain, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-484T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17,
2010); Homeland Security: Better Use of Terrorist Watchlist
Information and Improvements in Deployment of Passenger Screening
Checkpoint Technologies Could Further Strengthen Security, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-401T] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 27,
2010); Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and
Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but
Continue to Face Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-128] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7,
2009); Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress
and Challenges in Meeting the Statutory Mandate for Screening Air
Cargo on Passenger Aircraft, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-422T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 18,
2009); Aviation Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier
Inspections Help Enhance Security, but Oversight of These Efforts Can
Be Strengthened, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-729]
(Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2007); and Aviation Security: Federal
Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and
Could Be Strengthened, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-660] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,
2007).
[11] For example, in January 2010 the United States signed an
Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation with New Zealand to
establish a framework to encourage, develop, and facilitate bilateral
coordination in science and technology by means that include, but are
not limited to, facilitating a systematic exchange of technologies,
personnel, and information, as well as collaborating to develop
technologies and prototype systems that assist in countering present
and anticipated terrorist actions.
[12] Regional summits were held in Abuja, Nigeria; Tokyo, Japan;
Mexico City, Mexico; Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, and Toledo,
Spain. In addition, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the ICAO
Secretary General met with industry representatives from the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) in Geneva, Switzerland.
[13] ICAO's member states--the Assembly--meet at least once every 3
years, at which time members establish ICAO policy for the following 3
years.
[14] According to ICAO officials, ICAO member states have yet to vote
on final approval of Amendment 12. If approved by ICAO members,
Amendment 12 to Annex 17 will become effective in March 2011 and
applicable in July 2010.
[15] IATA is an international trade body that represents 230 airlines
comprising 93 percent of scheduled international air traffic. IATA's
approach, called Secure Freight, is an attempt to create an air cargo
industry comprising certified secure operators in secure supply chains
operating to international cargo security standards recognized by
relevant state authorities. A pilot test of the Secure Freight program
began in the first half of 2010.
[16] Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1602, 121 Stat. 266, 477-80 (2007)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)).
[17] For the purposes of this statement, domestic cargo refers to
cargo transported by air within the United States and from the United
States to a foreign location by both United States and foreign-based
air carriers.
[18] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-446]; [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-880T].
[19] AITs produce an image of a passenger's body that security
personnel use to look for anomalies, such as explosives. See GAO-10-
484T.
[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-484T].
[21] In October 2010 TSA adopted "enhanced pat down" procedures for
passengers who decline to be screened using the AIT, which have also
raised privacy concerns.
[22] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-484T].
[23] Our ongoing review of TSA's procurement and deployment of AIT
units is requested by Senator George V. Voinovich and Representative
John Mica, Ranking-Republican Member, House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure.
[24] For the purposes of this testimony we refer to both standards and
recommended practices as standards. TSA officials said that when
conducting airport assessments they focus on 17 ICAO standards the
agency deems most critical. TSA assessment teams coordinate with State
to arrange briefings for host government and airport officials at the
beginning of an assessment and to schedule exit briefings for the
officials at the end of the assessment, during which a synopsis of the
assessment results is presented. TSA also coordinates with State to
provide aviation security training to host nations. For example, State
uses TSA instructors to teach an airport security course that is
provided to officials from host nations through the department's Anti-
Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program.
[25] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-729].
[26] For the 82 foreign airports that did not meet at least 1 ICAO
standard, the average number of standards not met was about 5, and the
number of standards not met by an individual airport ranged from 1 to
22. The most common area of noncompliance for foreign airports was
related to quality control--mechanisms to assess and address security
vulnerabilities at airports. After the Secretary of Homeland Security
determined that 2 of the 128 foreign airports TSA assessed were not
maintaining and carrying out effective security measures, DHS notified
the general public of these determinations by the Secretary in
accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 44907(d). In 2007 TSA assessed security
against 86 of 106 ICAO aviation security standards and practices.
[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-729].
[28] See 49 U.S.C § 44906; 49 C.F.R. pt. 1546.
[29] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-660] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-446.
[30] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-660] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-446].
[31] The needs assessment, performed by State personnel along with a
team of interagency subject-matter experts, is conducted at several
levels, including tactical capabilities (people and resources),
operational management capabilities (overall management and ability),
and strategic capabilities.
[32] According to the European Commission, these countries are the
Czech Republic, France, Germany, and Italy. GAO has not independently
verified these potential legal impediments. Both TSA and the European
Commission report that use of the two types of AIT units deployed will
expose individuals to low doses of radiation. For example, the x-ray
dose received from the backscatter system is equivalent to the
radiation received in two minutes of airplane flight, while the energy
projected by the millimeter wave system is 100,000 times less than a
cell phone transmission.
[33] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-729].
[34] For example, a passenger traveling from Frankfurt, Germany, to
Chicago, Illinois, and changing planes in New York City, must be
rescreened, along with the passenger's checked baggage, prior to
boarding the connecting flight to Chicago. See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a),
which requires that TSA provide for the screening of such passengers.
[35] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-729].
[36] This included visits for both airport assessments and air carrier
inspections. See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-729].
[37] Domestic inspectors are inspectors who typically conduct security
inspections at U.S. airports.
[End of section]
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