Disaster Recovery
FEMA's Long-term Assistance Was Helpful to State and Local Governments but Had Some Limitations Gao ID: GAO-10-404 March 30, 2010The administration is developing the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) in order to enhance the nation's ability to deliver recovery assistance. The Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Long-Term Community Recovery Branch (LTCR) is responsible for leading a network of primarily federal agencies, known as ESF-14, that supports long-term recovery. LTCR's experiences offer potential insights for developing the NDRF. GAO was asked to report on (1) the roles that LTCR played in recent disasters, (2) broad criteria and timing challenges that affected this assistance, (3) the effectiveness of specific coordination practices, and (4) the effectiveness of specific planning assistance practices. GAO focused on three disasters with significant LTCR involvement: the Greensburg tornado (2007), the Iowa floods (2008), and Hurricane Ike (2008). GAO reviewed agency documents and policies and interviewed relevant federal, state, and local officials.
As the federal lead for long-term disaster recovery, FEMA's LTCR played two major roles in the three disasters that we reviewed--facilitating the coordination of federal, state, and nongovernmental assistance for recovery and helping communities to develop long-term recovery plans. GAO found two broad challenges related to this assistance. First, the criteria for when to involve LTCR and ESF-14 in a specific disaster are vague, which resulted in uncertainty among other federal agencies in the ESF-14 network and state recovery officials. Second, in some cases assistance began before state and local governments had the capacity to effectively work with LTCR and ended before critical long-term recovery coordination and planning needs were fully addressed. Federal, state, and local officials said that LTCR's facilitation of regular interagency meetings to coordinate federal and state partners helped to identify and effectively leverage recovery resources, as well as identify coordination problems and other concerns. For example, the town of Greensburg, Kansas, determined that replacing its destroyed water tower with one of the same capacity it had before the tornado would be insufficient for the community's expected future growth. As a result of interagency meetings conducted by LTCR, federal and state agencies, and others found a way to leverage resources from their programs in order to build a higher-capacity water tower that better addressed the city's long-term recovery needs. Federal, state, and local officials also identified two barriers to LTCR's coordination efforts. LTCR was not always able to obtain or sustain the participation of all of the agencies that it sought to coordinate with. Even when it did have full agency participation, LTCR was not always able to secure the involvement of agency officials with sufficient authority to resolve the program problems that arose. LTCR's planning assistance--including facilitating community meetings and identifying potential funding resources for recovery projects--helped affected communities to develop and implement long-term recovery plans. In Iowa City, LTCR identified possible federal funding sources for specific projects in the city's recovery plan and advised the city on how to prepare effective project proposals. Local officials credit this assistance with helping the city to be able to secure federal funding that it expects to receive for its top two recovery priorities. However, state and local officials also identified areas where LTCR assistance could be improved. State and local officials in Texas recovering from Hurricane Ike said that LTCR's process of ranking projects in Galveston's recovery plan had the effect of fostering unrealistic expectations among the public about what projects would be funded. In addition, in one of the three disasters that we reviewed, LTCR did not effectively transfer recovery planning tools, such as a guide on federal funding timelines, to the relevant officials prior to their withdrawal from the state. LTCR officials recognized that their transfer of information in Texas could have been more effective, citing time limitations as one reason for the challenge.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Stanley J. Czerwinski Team: Government Accountability Office: Strategic Issues Phone: (202) 512-6520GAO-10-404, Disaster Recovery: FEMA's Long-term Assistance Was Helpful to State and Local Governments but Had Some Limitations
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-10-404
entitled 'Disaster Recovery: FEMA's Long-term Assistance Was Helpful
to State and Local Governments but Had Some Limitations' which was
released on April 14, 2010.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility.
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features,
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters,
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2010:
Disaster Recovery:
FEMA's Long-term Assistance Was Helpful to State and Local Governments
but Had Some Limitations:
GAO-10-404:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-404, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The administration is developing the National Disaster Recovery
Framework (NDRF) in order to enhance the nation‘s ability to deliver
recovery assistance. The Federal Emergency Management Agency‘s (FEMA)
Long-Term Community Recovery Branch (LTCR) is responsible for leading
a network of primarily federal agencies, known as ESF-14, that
supports long-term recovery. LTCR‘s experiences offer potential
insights for developing the NDRF.
GAO was asked to report on (1) the roles that LTCR played in recent
disasters, (2) broad criteria and timing challenges that affected this
assistance, (3) the effectiveness of specific coordination practices,
and (4) the effectiveness of specific planning assistance practices.
GAO focused on three disasters with significant LTCR involvement: the
Greensburg tornado (2007), the Iowa floods (2008), and Hurricane Ike
(2008). GAO reviewed agency documents and policies and interviewed
relevant federal, state, and local officials.
What GAO Found:
As the federal lead for long-term disaster recovery, FEMA‘s LTCR
played two major roles in the three disasters that we reviewed”
facilitating the coordination of federal, state, and nongovernmental
assistance for recovery and helping communities to develop long-term
recovery plans. GAO found two broad challenges related to this
assistance. First, the criteria for when to involve LTCR and ESF-14 in
a specific disaster are vague, which resulted in uncertainty among
other federal agencies in the ESF-14 network and state recovery
officials. Second, in some cases assistance began before state and
local governments had the capacity to effectively work with LTCR and
ended before critical long-term recovery coordination and planning
needs were fully addressed.
Federal, state, and local officials said that LTCR‘s facilitation of
regular interagency meetings to coordinate federal and state partners
helped to identify and effectively leverage recovery resources, as
well as identify coordination problems and other concerns. For
example, the town of Greensburg, Kansas, determined that replacing its
destroyed water tower with one of the same capacity it had before the
tornado would be insufficient for the community‘s expected future
growth. As a result of interagency meetings conducted by LTCR, federal
and state agencies, and others found a way to leverage resources from
their programs in order to build a higher-capacity water tower that
better addressed the city‘s long-term recovery needs. Federal, state,
and local officials also identified two barriers to LTCR‘s
coordination efforts. LTCR was not always able to obtain or sustain
the participation of all of the agencies that it sought to coordinate
with. Even when it did have full agency participation, LTCR was not
always able to secure the involvement of agency officials with
sufficient authority to resolve the program problems that arose.
LTCR‘s planning assistance”including facilitating community meetings
and identifying potential funding resources for recovery projects”
helped affected communities to develop and implement long-term
recovery plans. In Iowa City, LTCR identified possible federal funding
sources for specific projects in the city‘s recovery plan and advised
the city on how to prepare effective project proposals. Local
officials credit this assistance with helping the city to be able to
secure federal funding that it expects to receive for its top two
recovery priorities. However, state and local officials also
identified areas where LTCR assistance could be improved. State and
local officials in Texas recovering from Hurricane Ike said that LTCR‘
s process of ranking projects in Galveston‘s recovery plan had the
effect of fostering unrealistic expectations among the public about
what projects would be funded. In addition, in one of the three
disasters that we reviewed, LTCR did not effectively transfer recovery
planning tools, such as a guide on federal funding timelines, to the
relevant officials prior to their withdrawal from the state. LTCR
officials recognized that their transfer of information in Texas could
have been more effective, citing time limitations as one reason for
the challenge.
What GAO Recommends:
Among GAO‘s recommendations are that FEMA (1) more effectively align
the timing and level of long-term recovery assistance to match the
capacity and needs of affected states and localities and (2) evaluate
the level of authority needed to effectively coordinate federal
agencies involved in disaster recovery. In commenting on a draft of
this report the Department of Homeland Security agreed with the
recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-404] or key
components. For more information, contact Stanley J. Czerwinski at
(202) 512-6806 or czerwinskis@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
LTCR Provided Coordination and Planning Assistance to States and
Localities:
The Lack of Clear Criteria and the Timing of LTCR Assistance Presented
Challenges to Recovery Partners:
LTCR's Assistance with Disaster Recovery Coordination Was Generally
Considered Valuable, but Some Challenges Limited Its Effectiveness:
LTCR's Recovery Planning Assistance Benefited States and Localities,
but Some Practices Limited More Effective Implementation of Recovery
Plans:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Figures:
Figure 1: Emergency Support Function 14 - Long-Term Community Recovery
Partners:
Figure 2: The ESF-14 Assistance Process:
Figure 3: Membership of the LTCR Interagency Coordination Group for
the 2008 Iowa Floods:
Figure 4: Comparison of the Timing of LTCR Involvement and the
Availability of Selected Federal Recovery Funds following Hurricane
Ike:
Abbreviations:
CDBG: Community Development Block Grant:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
ESF-14: Emergency Support Function #14:
FCO: Federal Coordinating Officer:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
HUD: Department of Housing and Urban Development:
JFO: Joint Field Office:
LTCR: Long-Term Community Recovery Branch:
NDRF: National Disaster Recovery Framework:
NRF: National Response Framework:
RIO: Rebuild Iowa Office:
SBA: Small Business Administration:
USDA: Department of Agriculture:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 30, 2010:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Mary L. Landrieu:
Chairman:
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery: Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs: United States Senate:
Long after temporary shelters have closed, debris has been cleared,
and critical communication and transportation systems have been
repaired, the process of long-term recovery for communities affected
by catastrophic disasters can continue on for years and sometimes
decades. Congress typically appropriates billions of federal dollars
to assist in the long-term recovery of communities affected by such
disasters. These funds support activities provided by a wide and
diverse range of federal departments and agencies, including the
Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), Agriculture (USDA), and Transportation; the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA); and the Small Business Administration (SBA),
among many others. The National Response Framework (NRF), the
principal document guiding national recovery efforts, established a
structure known as Emergency Support Function -14 (ESF-14) to
coordinate long-term recovery assistance from this diverse group of
agencies. Under the NRF, FEMA is responsible for coordinating ESF-14
and federal long-term recovery efforts, which the agency has assigned
to its Long-Term Community Recovery Branch (LTCR). Because of
challenges experienced during recovery from recent disasters, over the
last several months the administration has begun to reexamine the way
the nation approaches disaster recovery. As part of this effort, FEMA
and HUD are working with a broad range of federal agencies and other
organizations to develop the National Disaster Recovery Framework
(NDRF) to improve federal coordination in the future.
In light of these ongoing efforts to improve disaster recovery, and in
response to your request to examine recent FEMA experiences supporting
long-term recovery through LTCR and ESF-14, we evaluated the
effectiveness of the assistance provided by LTCR in three recent
disasters. Specifically, we report on (1) the roles that LTCR played
in recent disasters--coordination and planning assistance, (2) broad
criteria and timing challenges that affected this assistance, (3) the
effectiveness of specific coordination practices, and (4) the
effectiveness of specific planning assistance practices.
To identify the key roles and responsibilities of LTCR in disaster
recovery, we reviewed FEMA regulations and policies, as well as
national policy on disaster recovery, such as the NRF's ESF-14 long-
term community recovery annex, and relevant legislation. To determine
the effectiveness of LTCR's disaster assistance practices, we assessed
the experiences of federal, state, and local officials involved in
recovering from the 2007 tornado in Greensburg, Kansas; Hurricane Ike
that affected Texas in 2008; and the 2008 Midwest floods in Iowa. FEMA
identified all three of these disasters as having significant ESF-14
involvement led by LTCR.[Footnote 1] We interviewed, and obtained
documentation from, officials from FEMA and other relevant components
within DHS, as well as SBA, HUD, and USDA--the three other entities
identified by the NRF as "primary agencies" involved in long-term
disaster recovery. We also interviewed and obtained documentation from
state and local officials who had significant leadership roles in
disaster recovery and who worked directly with LTCR and other ESF-14
agencies. We compared the information obtained from these sources
against criteria identified in FEMA regulations and policies, the
NRF's ESF-14 long-term community recovery annex, relevant legislation,
as well as our previous work on effective coordination and planning
practices. These criteria include actions that LTCR should take to
expedite, leverage, and increase the effectiveness of federal and
other long-term recovery assistance. For more information on our scope
and methodology, see appendix I.
We conducted this performance audit from April 2009 through March 2010
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
During the immediate aftermath of a disaster, first responders--
assisted by federal agencies and others--focus on essential lifesaving
activities. However as the urgency for response to an incident is
being addressed, the need to begin recovery operations emerges. During
the recovery phase, actions are taken to help individuals,
communities, and the nation return to normal. This recovery typically
occurs in overlapping phases, with initial efforts dedicated to
helping those affected meet short-term needs for housing, food, and
water after a disaster. During this phase, basic services and
functions are restored, such as providing essential public health and
safety services, restoring interrupted utility and other essential
services, reestablishing transportation routes, and providing food and
temporary shelter for those displaced by the incident. Longer-term
recovery may also involve some of these same actions, but the focus
shifts to restoring both the individual and the community, including
the complete redevelopment of damaged areas. According to FEMA, long-
term community recovery addresses these ongoing restoration and
rebuilding needs by taking a holistic, long-term view of critical
recovery needs and coordinating the mobilization of resources at the
federal, state, and community levels. As seen from past catastrophic
disasters, the long-term recovery phase can begin shortly after a
disaster, last for many years--sometimes decades--and involve the
assistance and coordination of a wide range of governmental and
nongovernmental entities.
The NRF, which became effective in March 2008, presents the guiding
principles that enable all response partners to prepare for and
provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies. The
NRF was developed by FEMA and a wide range of federal, state, and
local governments and nongovernmental entities, in response to
challenges experienced in August 2005's Hurricane Katrina and
subsequent hurricanes, which revealed several limitations in the
former guidance document--the 2004 National Response Plan. The NRF
identifies the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, local,
and tribal governments; the private sector; and voluntary
organizations in responding to disasters.[Footnote 2] The framework
provides the structure and mechanisms to coordinate and integrate
incident management activities and emergency support functions across
all of these entities. This coordination typically occurs within a
Joint Field Office (JFO), which is led by a Federal Coordinating
Officer (FCO) provided by FEMA.[Footnote 3] As part of this framework,
the NRF identifies 15 Emergency Support Functions that are used to
help identify and coordinate the capabilities and resources of federal
departments and agencies, along with certain private-sector and
nongovernmental organizations. While most of the NRF focuses on the
immediate response to and short-term recovery from disasters, one of
the framework's Emergency Support Functions addresses long-term
community recovery--ESF-14.
According to the NRF, DHS functions as the principal coordinating
agency for ESF-14. As previously noted, FEMA's LTCR carries out this
responsibility for the department. The NRF also identifies three non-
DHS entities as "primary agencies" for supporting long-term community
recovery--USDA, HUD, and SBA. These agencies provide recovery support
in their areas of expertise and assist with identifying areas of
collaboration with other agencies, among other things. Under the NRF
structure, LTCR is also responsible for coordinating with over 13
other federal agencies and nongovernmental organizations that
participate in supporting long-term community recovery (see figure 1).
[Footnote 4]
Figure 1: Emergency Support Function 14 - Long-Term Community Recovery
Partners:
[Refer to PDF for image: list]
ESF coordinator:
* Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Primary agencies:
* Department of Agriculture;
* Department of Homeland Security;
* Department of Housing and Urban Development;
* Small Business Administration.
Support agencies:
* Department of Commerce;
* Department of Defense;
* Department of Energy;
* Department of Health and Human Services;
* Department of the Interior;
* Department of Labor;
* Department of Transportation;
* Department of the Treasury;
* Environmental Protection Agency;
* Corporation for National and Community Service;
* Delta Regional Authority;
* American Red Cross;
* National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters.
Source: The National Response Framework.
[End of figure]
When ESF-14 is activated, the National Response Coordination Center
initially provides national-level coordination and information sharing
among the agencies for ESF-14. Once the JFO is established within the
disaster area, the FCO may request the ESF-14 network to be deployed
to the field location to provide on-scene coordination.[Footnote 5]
The level of this assistance depends on each community's recovery
needs, including the size and scope of the disaster, the community's
ability to recover, and how much help state and local governments
request. Although no direct funding is provided to state and local
governments by ESF-14 or LTCR, the ESF-14 network can assist
communities affected by a disaster in a variety of ways, including by
providing long-term recovery experts to help identify recovery
resources in other federal and private funding programs and by helping
the community coordinate these resources to achieve a greater impact
than they might have by themselves. The overall goal of this
coordination is to expedite, leverage, and increase the effectiveness
of federal and other long-term recovery assistance.
While the NRF is the principal document that guides the nation's
response and recovery efforts, the administration is undertaking
several initiatives to develop new guidance that will focus
specifically on disaster recovery. As noted earlier, the vast majority
of the NRF is devoted to coordinating the nation's emergency response
to disasters. Currently, there is no comprehensive operational
coordinating structure to guide the many federal, state, and local
entities involved in disaster recovery. As a first step, in 2006
Congress required FEMA to develop a national disaster recovery
strategy for federal agencies involved in recovery.[Footnote 6] In
response to this mandate and because it was recognized that such a
strategy must be comprehensive and reflect the entire range of
recovery activities and actors, FEMA and HUD are leading a diverse
group of federal agencies and other organizations to develop the
National Disaster Recovery Framework. The goal of this framework is to
establish a comprehensive coordinating structure that will enhance the
nation's ability to work together and effectively deliver recovery
assistance. Four objectives identified for the NDRF are (1) to define
the federal, state, local, tribal, private nonprofit, and private-
sector roles and individual citizen's roles in disaster recovery; (2)
to design and establish an effective coordinating structure for
disaster recovery programs; (3) to identify gaps, as well as
duplications, in recovery programs and funding; and (4) to establish
performance standards for the federal support of state and local
recovery. The administration expects to issue a final version of the
NDRF in June 2010.
In addition, the President requested that the Secretaries of Homeland
Security and HUD lead a Long-Term Recovery Working Group responsible
for examining lessons learned from previous catastrophic disaster
recovery efforts, including areas for improved collaboration between
federal agencies and between the federal government and state and
local governments and stakeholders. It is also responsible for
reviewing federal disaster recovery programs for efficacy and
identifying methods to build capacity within state, local, and tribal
governments as well as within the nonprofit, faith-based, and private
sectors. Because of the relationship between these goals and the
development of the NDRF, the group tasked with developing the
framework has worked closely with the White House's Long-Term Disaster
Recovery Working Group. It will provide one of the two main outcomes
of the effort. The other outcome is a report to the President,
expected to be issued in May 2010, which will provide recommendations
on how to improve long-term disaster recovery.
LTCR Provided Coordination and Planning Assistance to States and
Localities:
LTCR played two key roles during recovery in the disasters that we
reviewed: (1) facilitating the coordination of federal, state, and
nongovernmental assistance and (2) assisting local communities with
developing long-term disaster recovery plans, strategies, or reports.
In addition to carrying out these two major functions, each support
operation began with a small ESF-14 advance team dispatched by the FCO
to conduct an initial on-the-ground assessment of likely long-term
recovery needs.[Footnote 7] This assessment helped to determine the
amount and type of assistance ESF-14 provided. See figure 2 for a
graphic representation of these roles and their approximate time
frames.
Figure 2: The ESF-14 Assistance Process:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Disaster:
FCO requests ESF-14assessment/support:
* LTCR advance team evaluates the impact of the event to determine
needs and state capability and roles.
Coordination track (interagency coordination team):
1 week:
Engage state:
* Identify coordination needs;
* Identify community support process.
2-3 weeks:
Convene:
* Federal, state and local interagency team.
1 month:
Gather/share:
* Identify issues and gaps;
* Communicate;
* Problem solve.
2-3 months:
Analyze and communicate:
* Prepare analysis, resource guides, assessment report, etc.
6-9 months:
Produce coordination tools and information.
6-12 months:
Implementation:
* State, federal, and NGO funding linking;
* Build ongoing state, local, and federal relationships;
* Limited ESF-14 transitional support.
Planning technical assistance track (LTCR):
1 week:
Identify target communities:
* Preliminary Community Needs Assessment Tool.
2-3 weeks:
Analyze and define assistance:
* Sector analysis tool;
* Consult local governments.
1-3 months:
Assist targeted local governments:
* Launch LTCR organizing, citizen engagement;
* Prepare strategies and recovery plans;
* Link potential federal, state, and NGO funding sources to local
recovery plans.
In conjunction with the Coordination track:
* Workshops;
* Federal/state participation in community technical assistance team;
* Distribute information;
* Problem solve.
6-9 months:
Produce recovery plan, strategy, or report and provide recovery tools
and aids.
6-12 months:
Implementation:
* State, federal, and NGO funding linking;
* Build ongoing state, local, and federal relationships;
* Limited ESF-14 transitional support.
Source: GAO presentation of LTCR process chart.
[End of figure]
In each of the disasters included in our review, LTCR facilitated
coordination among federal, state, and nongovernmental organizations
through frequent interagency meetings, and by working one-on-one with
relevant federal and state agencies to identify and resolve
challenges. Toward this end, LTCR held biweekly meetings with federal
and state agencies, such as USDA, HUD, SBA, the Departments of Labor,
Commerce, and Transportation, and the Environmental Protection Agency;
the state counterparts to these agencies; state finance offices; and
others. The number and type of federal and state agencies involved in
the interagency meetings varied among the states, depending on their
recovery needs, and sometimes changed during the course of the
recovery process. In all three states we reviewed, federal and state
officials used these meetings to identify and report on the status of
assistance provided by each agency, and to identify long-term recovery
challenges or concerns. See figure 3 for an example of the interagency
coordination structure utilized during Iowa's recovery from the 2008
Midwest floods.
In addition to facilitating coordination during meetings, LTCR also
worked one-on-one with various federal and state agencies to identify
and resolve challenges. These meetings often followed up on challenges
or opportunities that were identified during interagency coordination
meetings or issues raised to LTCR directly by state and local
officials. In addition, LTCR established coordination agreements with
agencies to perform long-term recovery assessments and provide
technical assistance related to their specific areas of expertise. For
example, in Texas, LTCR entered into an agreement with the Economic
Development Agency to conduct economic growth and recovery assessments
for recovery planning for communities affected by Hurricane Ike.
Figure 3: Membership of the LTCR Interagency Coordination Group for
the 2008 Iowa Floods:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration of LTCR Interagency Coordination
Group]
LTCR Integration and Coordination Group:
Federal agencies:
U.S. Small Business Administration;
U.S. Economic Development Administration;
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services;
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development;
U.S. Department of Transportation;
U.S. Department of the Treasury:
ESF-14/LTCH;
FEMA;
U.S. Department of Education:
U.S. Department of Labor;
USDA Rural Development;
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers;
USDA Natural Resource Conservation Service;
USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services;
USDA Farm Service Agency;
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency;
Inter-Agency Levee Workforce;
Corporation for National and Community Service.
State agencies:
Iowa Finance Authority;
Iowa Governor's Office;
Iowa State Coordinating Office;
Central Iowa Partnership;
Rebuild Iowa Office;
Iowa Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management;
Iowa Department of National Resources;
Iowa Department of Economic Development;
Iowa Department of Human Services;
Iowa Department of Agriculture;
Iowa Small Business Administration;
Iowa Lieutenant Governor's Office.
Nonprofit or other agencies:
American Red Cross;
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters;
DElta Regional Authority;
U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
Source: GAO presentation based on information provided by LTCR and
Iowa state officials.
Note: The LTCR Integration and Coordination graphic in the center of
the figure represents the collective interagency coordination effort,
which included regular meetings involving the federal, state, and
nonprofit organizations shown.
[End of figure]
The other major component of LTCR's assistance was the assistance that
it provided to local communities in developing long-term disaster
recovery plans, strategies, or reports. One way LTCR provided this
support was through its facilitation of frequent planning meetings. In
all three states, LTCR held weekly meetings with various stakeholders
in affected communities. For example, in Greensburg, Kansas, LTCR
conducted frequent recovery planning meetings that included the school
board, citizen groups, business owners, and community members at
large. In each of the states in our review, these planning meetings
were used to obtain and document the community's views on recovery
priorities and to develop ideas for recovery projects.
LTCR also provided technical assistance to the local communities by
conducting or facilitating long-term recovery assessments to identify
the long-term impacts of the disaster, providing staff to advise the
communities on steps to take as they developed recovery plans,
creating planning tools that the communities used to guide their
planning activities, and hosting workshops to discuss and share
recovery planning lessons, among other things. In addition to these
supports, LTCR helped communities to prioritize their potential long-
term recovery projects.
The Lack of Clear Criteria and the Timing of LTCR Assistance Presented
Challenges to Recovery Partners:
Unclear Criteria regarding LTCR's and ESF-14's Involvement in Disaster
Recovery Has Led to a Lack of Understanding and Agreement about ESF-14
Deployment:
One broad challenge reported by federal and state partners of LTCR
involved a lack of understanding and agreement about the criteria used
to determine whether ESF-14 becomes involved in a disaster. We have
previously reported on the importance of having clear criteria to
guide agency decisions about whether to provide disaster assistance.
[Footnote 8] This is especially important when the actions involve
multiple partners that must work together to accomplish a common goal.
However, we found that the NRF and FEMA guidance on the factors that
warrant ESF-14 involvement in a specific disaster are vague. For
example, the NRF states that ESF-14 will be deployed "when the
incident is likely to require significant federal long-term community
recovery assistance." Other FEMA guidance says that deployment should
be considered "when routine federal, state, local, and tribal disaster
assistance mechanisms are insufficient to meet the extraordinary
challenges of affected jurisdictions." Both criteria are broad enough
to be interpreted differently by state and federal recovery partners,
regarding whether these criteria were met.[Footnote 9] As a result,
they have been interpreted differently by various recovery partners.
Officials from the three non-DHS entities designated as "primary
agencies" responsible for implementing the ESF-14 function--SBA, HUD,
and USDA--told us that they were generally uncertain about why they
were involved in some disasters versus others. The agencies reported
that they did not understand what criteria were used to trigger ESF-14
involvement in various disasters, and sometimes disagreed with the
determination. For example, USDA officials told us that they thought
ESF-14 should have been deployed for the American Samoa Tsunami that
occurred on September 30, 2009, but such support was not
provided.[Footnote 10] Similarly, state and local officials from two
of the three states we visited also reported that they did not fully
understand the basis for decisions made about ESF-14 deployment to
some disasters versus others in their states. For example, Texas
officials believed that ESF-14 assistance was warranted for Hurricane
Dolly because, in their view, the hurricane resulted in a long-term
recovery impact that was significant and overwhelmed the abilities of
the community and state. However, FEMA determined that Hurricane Dolly
did not meet requirements for activating ESF-14 assistance. Similarly,
Kansas officials reported that they believed ESF-14 assistance was
warranted in the 2007 floods that occurred in the state after the
tornado, but was not made available by FEMA. Officials from the FCO
office stated that these decisions are often made with the input of
other FEMA and state officials, and are based on their collective
assessment of what support a disaster may warrant. However, when we
spoke with LTCR officials about criteria for activating ESF-14, they
said it would be helpful if FEMA provided additional guidance on the
criteria that determine whether ESF-14 should become involved in a
disaster recovery effort.
The Timing of LTCR's Assistance Presented Challenges to Some State and
Local Governments:
In two of the three states included in our review, LTCR's coordination
and planning efforts began before state and local governments had the
capacity to effectively work with them and ended before critical long-
term recovery coordination and planning needs were addressed. As a
result, state and local officials reported that they are left without
federal coordination and planning assistance during a critical period
in the recovery process. We have previously reported that actions
taken shortly after a major disaster and during the early stages of
the recovery process can have a significant impact on the success of a
community's long-term recovery. Therefore, early involvement in
disasters to assess the impact of response activities on longer-term
recovery is important to a successful recovery.[Footnote 11] As part
of this consideration, the level and focus of long-term recovery
assistance need to be appropriately aligned with the capacity of the
state and local governments to effectively become involved in the
activities and with the ripeness of recovery issues. We found that the
timing and focus of LTCR activities was appropriate and beneficial for
certain types of important recovery needs, but not for others. For
example, LTCR's deployment of a one-to two-person team to develop long-
term recovery impact assessments a few days after each disaster
provided valuable insight on which federal, state, and local partners
needed to be involved in recovery, and what long-term recovery
challenges these partners needed to consider during emergency response
and short-term recovery activities. Further, LTCR's efforts to
establish an interagency coordination structure during early phases of
disaster recovery and to begin coordination with other federal
agencies had several benefits that we discuss later in this report.
However, LTCR's efforts to engage state and local partners in more
substantive long-term recovery activities while they were still in the
midst of addressing immediate emergency response, and ending this
assistance 6 to 8 months later, did not effectively align with the
state and local governments' capacity or support some of their most
critical long-term recovery needs.
In Texas and Iowa, state and local officials reported that LTCR's
efforts to begin intensive long-term recovery coordination and
planning meetings just a few weeks after the disasters--while they had
limited staff dealing with multiple recovery efforts--created an
additional burden. For example, Texas State officials said that LTCR's
requests that their staff produce recovery information, attend weekly
or biweekly recovery meetings, and follow up on recovery actions
during the early response phase created a significant burden that
could not be met.[Footnote 12] As a result, these officials did not
fully participate in LTCR's assistance. For example, Texas housing
officials told us that key housing disaster recovery staff were still
involved in administering $300 million in HUD's Community Development
Block Grant (CDBG) housing funds for ongoing recovery efforts for
Hurricane Rita victims.[Footnote 13] Therefore, when LTCR requested
that they send staff to attend frequent recovery meetings a few weeks
after the disaster, they could not afford to provide the staff and
time to do so. Our review of LTCR's after-action report for Hurricane
Ike confirmed that this was a challenge. According to the report, when
working with the Governor's Disaster Recovery and Renewal Committee
"it was clear that the amount of work that state staff was engaged in
did not provide time for additional tasks, duties, or meeting
participation." Similarly, LTCR and local officials in Galveston,
Texas, reported that LTCR attempted to engage the local community in
long-term recovery planning about a month after Hurricane Ike.
However, because the city was still overwhelmed with emergency
response activities, it had to delay acceptance of this assistance for
about 6 weeks.
Federal, state, and local officials involved in the disasters in Texas
and Iowa also reported that LTCR's involvement ended before some
critical recovery funding became available and before local
governments were able to focus on developing long-term plans.
According to federal, state, and local officials, some critical long-
term recovery funding, such as HUD's CDBG housing funds, and many long-
term recovery projects do not become available or begin until 1 or 2
years after the disaster occurs, which is at least 6 months to a year
after LTCR concludes its assistance. In addition, state and local
officials reported that many local communities were not stable enough
to effectively focus on addressing long-term recovery needs until
about 6 months after the disaster, which was about the time that LTCR
left. As a result, state and local officials reported that they were
left without federal coordination assistance during a critical period
in the recovery process. Our review of the Texas Funding Timeline
developed by LTCR showed that some federal assistance, such as the
Federal Highway Administration's Emergency Relief funds, was released
within weeks of the disaster, which was during the height of LTCR
involvement. However, the majority of the larger federal funding
sources became available near the end of LTCR's and the ESF-14
network's assistance or after it concluded. (Figure 4 illustrates the
timing of the release of selected sources of federal recovery
assistance for Hurricane Ike compared with the time period of ESF-14's
involvement after the disaster.)
Figure 4: Comparison of the Timing of LTCR Involvement and the
Availability of Selected Federal Recovery Funds Following Hurricane
Ike:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated timeline]
Hurricane Ike: September 13, 2008:
LTCR Involvement: September 13, 2008 through mid-May, 2009.
HUD CDBG funds ($1.3 billion):
Release of funds: June, 2009 through October 2009 and beyond.
SBA loans ($637 million):
Release of funds: March 2009 through October 2009 and beyond.
HHS SSBG funds ($219 million):
Release of funds: Early February 2009 through October 2009 and beyond.
EDA disaster relief funds ($134.4 million):
Release of funds: May 2009 through October 2009 and beyond.
DOT emergency relief ($70 million):
Release of funds: Late October 2008 through October 2009 and beyond.
USDA rural economic development loans and grants ($45.8 million):
Release of funds: Late June 2009 through October 2009 and beyond.
NOAA fisheries fund ($7 million):
Release of funds: March 2009 through October 2009 and beyond.
Source: GAO analysis of FEMA and other federal agency documents.
Legend:
NOAA = National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association;
USDOT = Department of Transportation.
Note: All above data are as of February 24, 2009, except for the
figure for the SBA loans, which is current up to September 1, 2009.
All of the figures, except for SBA loans, are based on the expected
release of funds identified by LTCR during recovery from Hurricane Ike
in Texas.
[End of figure]
LTCR officials recognized that the timing of their assistance often
limited their ability to more effectively provide coordination and
planning, but attributed this to the closing of JFO operations.
According to these officials, there are several reasons why the JFO
may close before ESF-14's mission is complete, including the fact that
most JFO operations focus on response and short-term recovery
activities as well as varying interpretations among FCOs on when ESF-
14's mission is complete. FEMA interim guidance identifies three
conditions for concluding ESF-14 assistance: (1) long-term impact
analyses are performed, (2) necessary technical support to establish
local long-term recovery strategies or plans is provided, and (3)
coordination of long-term recovery resources needed by the affected
community to launch its recovery efforts is complete. However, LTCR
officials acknowledged that they sometimes conclude their assistance
before these conditions are met. According to the officials, one
reason this occurs is because the life span of ESF-14 involvement is
closely linked with the JFO operation, which typically ends at 6
months. LTCR officials told us that when making determinations about
when to end ESF-14 assistance, FEMA considers whether the three
conditions above are met. However, the achievement of these conditions
carries less weight than closing the JFO expeditiously, especially
because all other JFO operations involve response and short-term
recovery activities that largely draw to a close about 6 months after
a disaster.
Other reasons identified by LTCR for concluding their assistance
before achieving the above conditions include different
interpretations of FEMA's mission and authorities as well as varying
interpretations of LTCR's mission by the FCOs. The director of the FCO
office told us that based on his experience, FCOs generally believe
that LTCR's mission is primarily to work with the states immediately
after a disaster to develop a long-term recovery plan. Under this
view, assisting states and local communities with coordinating federal
assistance to implement their recovery plans is not the role of ESF-
14, but that of regional staff or other FEMA recovery officials who
remain in the disaster area. However, it is not clear that FEMA
regional staff have the capacity or interest in taking on this role.
For example, according to LTCR officials, FEMA region 2, which
includes New York and New Jersey, is the only region that has staff
specifically assigned to work with communities to address long-term
community recovery needs. In Galveston, Texas, LTCR officials
recognized that additional long-term recovery support would be needed
by the city after they left, and accordingly developed a
demobilization plan that transferred oversight of remaining recovery
duties to a regional FEMA staffer. However, the regional staff member
met with city officials only once and had little additional
interaction with them afterward.
According to LTCR officials, they would like to stay involved in
communities longer but are often unable to do so. Once the JFO closes
there is no protocol for ESF-14 to provide additional assistance to
the community.[Footnote 14] However, in the case of Kansas, LTCR
developed a creative way to link back to the community. After spending
about 6 months in the community, LTCR and state officials worked
together to obtain about a 6-month extension of LTCR assistance, which
included providing remote support for projects, meetings, and
developing resources from LTCR offices in Washington D.C. A senior
official responsible for coordinating recovery reported that this
extension was critical to the successful implementation of many of
Greensburg's major recovery initiatives.
LTCR's Assistance with Disaster Recovery Coordination Was Generally
Considered Valuable, but Some Challenges Limited Its Effectiveness:
LTCR's Interagency Coordination Meetings and Direct Coordination with
Partners Improved Recovery Progress:
Most federal, state, and local officials reported that LTCR's
assistance with coordinating federal resources helped states to
accomplish two goals: identifying and leveraging federal and state
resources that could be used to support disaster recovery projects,
and identifying potential coordination challenges, such as gaps in
funding or other long-term recovery concerns. Although the officials
identified limitations with the timing of LTCR's assistance, they
identified several important benefits when LTCR coordinated federal
and state recovery partners. According to federal and state partners,
as well as our review of some meeting minutes, the interagency
coordination meetings facilitated by LTCR in Iowa, Kansas, and Texas
were effective forums for identifying federal and state resources that
could be used to support disaster recovery projects. During these
meetings, federal and state agencies reported on the types of programs
and assistance that their agencies offered, and collectively discussed
which programs would best meet the unique needs of specific recovery
projects. This identification of potential funding sources occurred at
the beginning of the disaster recovery and typically continued for
about 6 months after recovery began. According to federal and state
officials, these interagency forums were especially useful because
they resulted in identifying funding resources that are not typically
provided as part of disaster recovery. For example, in Iowa, through
the interagency meetings, LTCR and the state identified federal
funding sources to support the state's desire to utilize smart growth
concepts in rebuilding efforts, including considerations for economic
growth, public health, and quality of life. As a result of the
interagency coordination that occurred during the meetings, FEMA,
Iowa's recovery office, the Iowa Department of Economic Development,
and USDA partnered with the Environmental Protection Agency's Smart
Growth program to offer smart growth support to assist five
communities in their rebuilding efforts.
As part of identifying resources, state and federal officials reported
that the meetings were also effective forums for identifying ways to
leverage federal and state with private or nonprofit funding to assist
local governments in rebuilding to address longer-term rather than
short-term recovery needs. For example, in Greensburg, Kansas, the
capacity of the city's water tower was determined to be insufficient
for the future growth of the community. However, under FEMA's Public
Assistance Grant program--which was the primary funding source
identified for the project--the community could only rebuild the tower
back to its preexisting capacity. As a result, the project would have
only addressed the city's immediate recovery needs.[Footnote 15]
However, as a result of discussions held during the interagency
coordination meetings, USDA's Rural Development Agency was identified
as an additional funding source that could be used with FEMA funding
to achieve longer-term recovery goals. Ultimately, USDA provided loans
that along with FEMA, State of Kansas, foundation, and nonprofit
funding, helped the community to build a new water tower with greater
capacity.
LTCR coordination efforts also assisted federal and state partners
with identifying potential coordination challenges, including gaps in
funding or other long-term recovery concerns. Our review of
interagency meeting minutes showed that the coordination meetings were
used to identify long-term recovery issues or concerns, such as
challenges associated with rebuilding wastewater facilities or gaps in
funding for levee systems. Federal and state officials discussed these
challenges and, at times, identified potential next steps for dealing
with concerns. For example, in Iowa, interagency meetings were used to
discuss challenges with the lack of contingency planning for
wastewater systems throughout the state, which were leading to raw
sewage leakages in several communities. Cedar Rapids was one of these
communities. The city had three wastewater facilities that were still
not working or not working correctly almost 5 months after the
disaster. During the meetings, the Environmental Protection Agency
agreed to work with state and local officials to develop a template
for contingency planning for wastewater treatment systems in order to
prevent the discharge of untreated sewage after disasters.
LTCR's coordination efforts were more effective in states that had an
established coordination officer or office that brought various state
agencies together to work with LTCR and to provide a strategic vision
for local planning and coordination efforts. For example, in Iowa, the
Governor established a system within the state for organizing the
recovery efforts by creating the Rebuild Iowa Office (RIO), which was
initially established through an executive order and later codified by
the state legislature.[Footnote 16] As the principal coordinator for
the state's short-and long-term recovery, RIO tracked and reported on
rebuilding progress under the various disaster assistance programs,
and provided a strategic vision for recovery planning efforts within
the state. Moreover, RIO served as a galvanizer of state agencies by
working with LTCR to bring the appropriate state agencies together to
coordinate with the federal agencies. In addition, RIO staff served as
liaisons with local communities to ensure that local recovery concerns
were identified and discussed during interagency meetings. Once LTCR
ended its assistance to the state, RIO continued the interagency
coordination role formerly conducted by LTCR. LTCR and state officials
reported having a similarly positive experience in Kansas, which had a
senior state official, who reported directly to the Governor, to
coordinate its long-term recovery effort. According to LTCR and state
officials in Texas, there was no coordinating entity for long-term
recovery in the state, which made coordination significantly more
difficult. According to LTCR officials, its staff spent more time
trying to identify and work with individual state agencies and was
less effective in coordinating the use of federal and state resources
in Texas than in the other states.
Challenges Bringing Together the Right Agencies and Staff Sometimes
Limited LTCR's Effectiveness:
LTCR's inability, at times, to obtain or sustain the participation of
all of the agencies needed limited the effectiveness of ESF-14's
coordination. Under the NRF, LTCR is responsible for coordinating
assistance by convening interagency recovery expertise to provide
strategic guidance to long-term recovery efforts, and coordinating
program application processes and planning requirements to streamline
assistance processes, among many other things. However, according to
documents that we reviewed, as well as LTCR and state officials whom
we spoke with, LTCR experienced challenges getting and keeping some
agencies engaged in coordination activities and other ESF-14
operations. LTCR officials reported that they had difficulties getting
some federal partners to join and remain involved in federal
coordination efforts and to provide ESF-14 support to local
communities. Among the reasons cited were the cost associated with
sending staff from partner agencies into the field and challenges that
these agencies faced in temporarily replacing deployed staff. LTCR and
state officials reported that, over time, it became more difficult to
keep agencies that were initially a part of the coordination efforts
involved. According to the officials, they do not have the authority
to compel agencies to participate in ESF-14 coordination and
activities, therefore, they tend to only coordinate with agencies that
are willing to expend their own resources. At times this has meant
that not all of the necessary federal partners were involved in
coordination. There is currently a debate about the level of authority
that FEMA has to coordinate disaster recovery.
One challenge that limited LTCR's ability to obtain and keep agencies
involved in coordination activities was its inability to obtain the
agreements that it needed to support ESF-14 coordination efforts. We
have previously reported on the importance of having clearly defined
and sufficient authority to resolve response and recovery challenges.
[Footnote 17] In order to obtain and maintain the involvement of some
agencies in ESF-14 activities, LTCR had to request agreement from the
FCO and State Coordinating Officer to issue Mission Assignments or
Interagency Agreements that would fund the costs associated with staff
and travel for the agencies. However, according to documentation from
disaster correspondences and after-action reports and LTCR officials,
LTCR was not always able to secure these agreements. For example,
according to LTCR's February 2009 after-action report for Hurricane
Ike, LTCR's need to obtain support from other federal agencies, as
agreed to under the NRF, was not fully successful in Texas's recovery
because the Mission Assignment process used to support these efforts
ended too soon to be useful for long-term recovery activities. Without
these agreements, some agencies declined to provide support for long-
term recovery activities in the state.
Even when LTCR did have the right agencies at the table, their efforts
were limited when they did not have the right staff to resolve policy
and program challenges. While the interagency meetings held were
effective in identifying challenges, they were less effective in
resolving them. One of the reasons for this was that interagency
coordination meetings did not always include agency officials with a
sufficient level of authority to resolve such problems.[Footnote 18]
For example, in Iowa, through interagency meetings, LTCR identified a
funding challenge involving SBA and USDA relating to how the agencies
interpreted program rules regarding flower farms. Specifically, from
an eligibility perspective, SBA considers a flower farm that grows its
own stock to be an agricultural enterprise. However, USDA may consider
this type of farm as not eligible if the business exceeds its family
farm size threshold. Officials involved in the interagency
coordination meetings did not have the authority to resolve this
issue. A senior SBA official told us that this particular issue has
come up in other disaster recoveries, and the two agencies have tried
to handle it on a case-by-case basis. However, he noted that
resolution of such conflicts is supposed to be one of the functions of
ESF-14. An LTCR official told us that, ideally, most policy problems
would be communicated to and resolved by senior officials involved in
the national ESF-14 network. However, in his experience, problems
identified by the interagency coordination group are not typically
resolved through this process.[Footnote 19]
LTCR's Recovery Planning Assistance Benefited States and Localities,
but Some Practices Limited More Effective Implementation of Recovery
Plans:
LTCR's Meetings and Tools Enhanced the Recovery Planning of the
Communities:
First, LTCR provided planning assistance that according to state and
local officials, was beneficial in helping them achieve their recovery
goals. Types of assistance included facilitating community planning
meetings to assist communities in identifying recovery goals and
related recovery projects; providing communities with planning tools
to organize and communicate their recovery goals to key stakeholders;
and assisting communities with identifying potential funding
resources, which led to the development of strategic recovery plans or
reports tailored specifically for the affected communities. For
example, according to officials in Iowa, LTCR was very effective in
helping several of the state's communities develop recovery plans.
LTCR held weekly meetings that involved the communities and focused on
specific recovery areas, such as housing, economic development, and
infrastructure. These officials specifically emphasized that LTCR was
most effective in assisting the hardest hit communities with little
capacity to provide their own resources, such as experienced staff.
Similarly, in Kansas, LTCR led an intensive 12-week process involving
many meetings and discussions among the citizens; civic groups;
business owners; and local, state, and other federal officials to
share ideas on how to rebuild the city of Greensburg and Kiowa County.
These planning efforts resulted in creating long-term recovery plans
that identified potential funding resources that were relevant to the
specific projects.
Second, LTCR provided communities with various planning tools, which
provided a mechanism for these localities to organize and communicate
their recovery vision, goals, and recovery projects to key
stakeholders. Both community leaders and members of the public used
these planning tools to help them carry out various steps in the
recovery planning process. For example, in Iowa, planning aids, such
as the ESF-14 LTCR Communication Mapping Tool, provided effective
communication techniques for gathering and sharing information
important to long-term recovery. Other documents, such as the ESF-14
Decision Making Tool, provided users with a process and template to
guide decision making during disaster recovery and can also be used to
provide a concise way to identify and prioritize potential projects
and programs for further development. LTCR also provided communities
with standardized forms to assist in the collection and analysis of
information needed to develop the goals, strategies, and expected
outcomes of proposed recovery projects and programs. The ESF-14 LTCR
Resource Guide provided community stakeholders with a directory of
technical assistance resources and funding opportunities to support
projects and programs developed through the long-term community
recovery process. State and local recovery officials from Iowa stated
that these planning tools were very effective in assisting them during
the recovery process, and added that these can also be beneficial to
communities outside of disaster recovery.
Lastly, LTCR identified potential funding resources within the
communities' recovery plans, which helped to provide the communities
with a road map for accomplishing recovery goals. State and local
officials in two of the three states we contacted stated that this
LTCR practice was helpful. State recovery officials from Iowa noted
that rather than giving localities a long list of federal grants to
decipher, LTCR targeted and tied relevant funding sources to specific
recovery projects, which was very effective in helping communities,
particularly those communities that did not have the capacity to sort
through and comprehend the extensive range of the federal funding
resources. In Iowa City, officials stated that LTCR's involvement in
developing the city's recovery plan and assistance in targeting
potential funding sources gave creditability to the projects. LTCR
presorted and identified potential federal funding sources that could
fund specific types of projects, and helped the city to ensure that
the projects included elements that the federal funding agencies would
be looking for, thereby improving the projects' chances of getting
approval. As a result, city officials are securing $25 million in
funding from the Department of Commerce's Economic Development Agency
for the top two projects in the plan that LTCR helped the city to
develop.
LTCR's Planning Assistance Sometimes Created Unrealistic Expectations
within Communities:
Local officials in two of the three states we contacted stated that
LTCR's planning assistance had the effect of creating unrealistic
expectations about what would be funded and built in the community.
ESF-14 guidance identifies the importance of setting and reinforcing
realistic expectations with the community throughout the LTCR
technical assistance process. However, one of the major concerns
reported by state and local officials was that the project
prioritization process used by LTCR sometimes led to unrealistic
expectations in the community. One of the types of planning assistance
LTCR offers is an independent assessment of the "recovery value" of
projects to be included in a community's long-term recovery plan.
Toward this end, LTCR has developed the Long-Term Community Recovery
Value Tool, which provides a standardized methodology for assigning
proposed projects a recovery value of high, moderate, or low.[Footnote
20] When assessing potential recovery projects in the city of
Galveston, Texas, LTCR assigned a lower recovery value to
infrastructure projects intended to restore the basic function and
services of the city than to projects whose goal was to enhance and
beautify it. Galveston City officials told us that many of the
projects in the recovery plan were not financially or structurally
feasible and presented an additional challenge for city leaders as
they tried to address the community's most important recovery needs.
[Footnote 21] Our review of the plan confirmed that all of the city's
infrastructure projects, such as rebuilding the city's water
distribution system, sewer lines, and major bridges, were ranked as a
lower priority than projects intended to augment the city's beauty,
such as enhancing the main beach area or redeveloping historic parts
of downtown.
LTCR officials told us that their categorization of projects is
intended to communicate to stakeholders the relative value of the
projects in relation to the recovery objectives, but not actually
prioritize them.[Footnote 22] However, Galveston community leaders as
well as state and local officials all understood LTCR's categorization
of projects in the city's recovery plan to be just such a
prioritization or ranking. State officials told us that they were
unwilling to fund some beautification projects that were ranked "high"
in the plan, and instead decided to use the limited funds available to
support critical infrastructure projects that LTCR ranked lower.
According to these officials, they believed that LTCR's prioritization
of projects in the City of Galveston's recovery plan set false
expectations for the public because residents were left with the
impression that projects that LTCR identified as high-value should
happen. These officials told us that this public perception put them
in the position of having to respond to a gap in expectations.
In addition to concerns about LTCR's communication about the purpose
of the recovery value tool that it applied to Galveston's recovery
plan, LTCR's implementation of the tool contributed to creating
unrealistic expectations about what projects were most important to
fund and build within the community. As previously noted, LTCR
officials told us that the categories assigned to recovery projects
were intended to communicate which projects have a direct value to
support recovery objectives, as opposed to broader community interests
that are important but do not support recovery challenges and needs to
the same degree as others. However, based on our review of LTCR
guidance on these assessments, it is not clear how the final ranking
in Galveston's recovery plan accomplishes this goal. For example,
according to the LTCR guidance, a project that is categorized as
having "moderate" value "provides benefits for some economic sectors,"
but "does not have communitywide or regional impacts, has limited
community support and benefits, is difficult to achieve and sustain,"
and/or "has less definable outcomes." Given these factors--similar to
the conclusion reached by Galveston city officials--we had difficulty
understanding the rationale for LTCR's categorization of all of the
city's infrastructure projects as "moderate" value. In particular, we
did not understand the assignment of a moderate value to
infrastructure projects that had long-term recovery impacts, including
projects that would allow more residents to return to the city. Such
projects included restoring the city's five wastewater treatment
plants that serve approximately 22,000 homes (approximately 88 percent
of Galveston's residents) and most commercial properties.
Challenges with LTCR setting unrealistic expectations were not unique
to Texas. Local officials from Iowa also stated that LTCR did not
adequately communicate realistic expectation to the community
regarding projects. LTCR recognized this in its after-action report
for the 2008 Midwest floods, which identified "setting unrealistic
expectations with communities" as an issue that needed to be
addressed. Moreover, HUD officials reported that as a federal partner,
they have experienced challenges resulting from LTCR practices that
set unrealistic public expectations in many other disasters, which
they had to resolve while administering their CDBG program.
In Hurricane Ike, LTCR Did Not Effectively Transmit Planning Tools to
State and Local Officials before Concluding Assistance to the State:
In one of the three disasters we reviewed--Hurricane Ike in 2008--LTCR
did not effectively transmit planning tools to state and local
governments before leaving the affected areas. Officials from both the
City and County of Galveston stated that they did not receive key
planning tools and other documents that LTCR created specifically to
assist with their recovery efforts. One of these planning tools, the
Texas Recovery Resource Guide, identified various funding resources
the community could have potentially utilized to fund several of its
recovery projects. Another, the Texas Strategic Recovery Timeline, was
developed to help local officials identify and understand the various
funding timelines of federal agencies. When we shared these documents
with local officials to obtain perspectives on their usefulness, the
official's remarked that they had never seen the documents before, but
that they believed such documents would have been beneficial to them
and requested copies for future use. According to LTCR officials, they
did provide state and local officials with copies of these documents.
However, they acknowledged that the transfer of the information,
including an explanation of the materials and follow-up, may not have
been effective. According to the officials, they were limited in
transferring these materials to state and local officials in Texas
because they were asked by FEMA leadership, including the FCO and
region 6 leadership, to end their assistance immediately after
developing the recovery plan. The officials said that for this same
reason, they were unable to more effectively communicate the purpose
of their recovery value tool as it related to the recovery plan or
assist the City of Galveston with the plan's implementation.
Our review of disaster closeout documents for Hurricane Ike supports
this view, showing that LTCR staff were requested by FEMA leadership
to leave Galveston as soon as they delivered the recovery plan despite
the fact that they raised concerns about demobilizing from Galveston
too soon.[Footnote 23] LTCR guidance on demobilizing its operation
emphasizes the importance of transferring information and resources to
local officials during demobilization. As previously noted, we found
that LTCR did develop a demobilization plan for Texas, which included
plans for transferring oversight of remaining duties to staff in FEMA
region 6, but it did not include a process for transferring developed
materials to the state and local officials. Further, as noted earlier,
regional staff did not complete the transition activities identified
in the demobilization plan. LTCR officials stated that the longer-term
recovery success of a community is influenced, in part, by the
activities that occur near the end of their assistance. Ideally, they
would prefer to stay long enough to help communities prepare for the
implementation of their recovery plans but this does not always occur,
as was the case in Texas, and they are aware that several recovery
issues remain unresolved in Galveston.
Conclusions:
Communities affected by catastrophic disasters often face years of
work rebuilding shattered infrastructure, revitalizing damaged local
and regional economies, and restoring or refashioning social and
cultural institutions. Although the process of long-term recovery from
such disasters presents a great many challenges, it can also offer an
opportunity to make use of the considerable resources provided by the
federal and state governments to rebuild in a way that addresses long-
standing needs and goals. We have previously reported that successful
communities are able to understand, and effectively work with, the
large and diverse collection of programs and agencies that provide
financial and technical support for recovery and put in place clear
and implementable long-term recovery plans. In the three disasters we
reviewed, LTCR provided critical assistance in both of these key areas-
-coordination and planning--and state and local officials generally
viewed this support as constructive and beneficial to their recovery.
Coordination meetings facilitated by LTCR brought together key
stakeholders, providing them with the opportunities to leverage
programs and resolve problems. LTCR also played a critical role in
helping affected communities to develop effective long-term recovery
plans, since they often lacked the resources and experience to
undertake such a project on their own. Training, advice, and the large
number of guides and other tools provided by LTCR helped communities
to create plans that both communicated a broad recovery vision and
included detailed information to assist the implementation of specific
projects.
We also identified several areas that are likely to present challenges
moving forward, whether the federal government continues to coordinate
and support long-term recovery through LTCR and ESF-14 under the
existing NRF structure, or adopts a new approach such as that
represented by the NDRF. First, in the absence of clear criteria,
misunderstandings will most likely continue to exist among recovery
partners about when the federal government will offer communities long-
term recovery assistance and how long this assistance will last.
Second, while it is important that federal and state officials be
mindful of recovery issues during the response phase, ESF-14's
approach of engaging state and local governments in significant long-
term recovery activities while they are still overwhelmed by response,
and ramping down recovery assistance about 6-9 months later, often
does not align well with the needs and capacity of affected
communities nor with many of the time frames involved in recovery
funding. Third, we have previously reported that effective
coordination requires sufficient authority and influence to bring the
necessary agencies to the table and facilitate the resolution of
challenges that may arise. But since LTCR's authority to carry out its
role as the primary coordinator of ESF-14 assistance is unclear, it
tends to work with agencies that are willing to expend their own
resources. At times, this has meant that not all of the necessary
federal partners have participated or remained engaged in long-term
recovery coordination efforts. Fourth, communities recovering from
Hurricane Ike in Texas provide an illustration of the barriers that
can be created when expectations about the recovery process are not
effectively communicated to the public, including expectations about
what types of projects can and will be funded based on their
feasibility, in terms of both cost and importance to state and local
leaders.
LTCR's experiences--both positive and negative--offer valuable
insights about what practices and approaches are likely to work, as
well as the challenges and limitations that may be encountered. Such
information is especially important now as the administration is
currently in the process of developing--for the first time--a formal
organizational framework to guide and coordinate the many federal,
state, local, and nongovernmental entities involved in disaster
recovery.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
As a result of insights based on the experiences of FEMA's LTCR and
recognizing the administration's current efforts to develop the NDRF
and improve recovery authorities and programs, we recommend that the
Secretary of Homeland Security, as a leader of these efforts, take the
following four actions:
* Develop clear and consistent criteria that identify factors that
determine whether and how the entity responsible for coordinating long-
term recovery will become involved in a specific disaster. Such
criteria should provide additional guidance about factors that
determine whether the entity responsible for coordinating and planning
becomes involved in recovery.
* Establish, as part of the new NDRF or related efforts, a long-term
recovery structure that more effectively aligns the timing and level
of involvement of the entity responsible for coordinating long-term
community recovery assistance with both the capacity of state and
local governments to work with them and the need for coordination
assistance, which may last beyond the operation of the JFO. One
approach could allow for the deployment of resources in phases to
provide long-term recovery assistance tailored to a community's
evolving needs, and could be provided remotely when necessary, similar
to LTCR's experience during recovery from the 2007 tornado in
Greensburg, Kansas.
* Evaluate and assess, as part of the new NDRF or related efforts,
what would be an appropriate level of authority for the entity
responsible for coordinating long-term recovery in order for it to
foster effective coordination among federal agencies involved in
disaster recovery and to resolve related policy and program conflicts
that may arise.
* Communicate more clearly the objectives and processes used when
assessing the value of specific recovery projects to help prevent
unrealistic expectations about the implementation of such projects
among members of the affected community. Toward this end, FEMA should
resolve any inconsistencies in relevant guidance or terminology and
take steps to ensure that these assessments appropriately reflect the
feasibility of projects, including their importance to state and local
leaders as well as the broader community.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
On February 23, 2010, we provided a draft of this report to the
Secretary of Homeland Security for comment. We received written
comments on March 24, 2010, in which DHS agreed with our
recommendations. These comments are reprinted in appendix II. In
addition, DHS provided technical clarifications, and we made those
changes where appropriate. In light of the work being done by the
White House Long-Term Disaster Recovery Working Group and the role
played by HUD in coleading the development of the NDRF, we provided a
draft of this report to the Director of the President's Domestic
Policy Council and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development for
their information.
Although DHS agreed with each of our four recommendations, the
department's written response included several substantive comments
related to our first two recommendations. These issues are summarized
below along with our response.
DHS agreed with our recommendation that it should develop clear and
consistent criteria that identify factors to determine whether the
entity responsible for coordinating long-term recovery will become
involved in a specific disaster; however, the department identified
several challenges with doing so. These include the lack of, until
recently, sufficient experience on which to develop such criteria, and
the fact that such decisions often are made with limited information
and therefore must rely on the judgment of FCOs. We agree that such
decisions can often be complex and do not lend themselves to an
automatic or arbitrary approach. However, during our review, FEMA
officials repeatedly told us that many challenges they have faced
resulted from the varying level of knowledge and understanding among
FCOs regarding the role and function of ESF-14. This reliance on the
judgment of FCOs operating under such challenging conditions is one
reason why it is so important to have additional guidance on the
factors to be considered when making this decision. Additional
guidance and criteria regarding the factors to consider when deciding
whether to deploy ESF-14 assistance will help to establish a common
understanding among FCOs. This should also improve the transparency of
such decisions to the federal, state, and local recovery partners and
help minimize doubts as to whether such requests are treated fairly
and equitably.
DHS also agreed with our recommendation that it establish, as part of
the new NDRF or related efforts, a long-term recovery structure that
more effectively aligns the timing and level of involvement of the
entity responsible for coordinating long-term community recovery
assistance with both the capacity of state and local governments to
work with them and the need for coordination assistance, which may
last beyond the operation of the JFO. In its response, the department
emphasized the importance of developing state and local recovery
capacity and expressed concern about statements in our report that the
federal interagency coordination efforts created additional or
inappropriate burdens on states, asserting that ESF-14 activities
never interfered with response or other critical activities. We agree
with DHS regarding the importance of developing the capacity of states
and localities to effectively recover after a disaster and that
preplanning for recovery can be one important way to do this. However,
it is also important for the federal government to be mindful of the
existing capacity of state and local governments affected by a
disaster and to adjust the focus and timing of its long-term recovery
assistance as appropriate to align with the availability of state and
local partners. For example, in Texas, several senior state officials
told us that LTCR's request for state resources to address long-term
recovery issues days after Hurricane Ike struck interfered with the
state's ability to address more immediate demands and presented an
additional burden on already constrained resources. Further, as we
noted in the report, some state and local officials in Texas told us
that they did not initially participate in long-term recovery
activities because they decided to devote their limited resources to
more immediate needs.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will provide copies of this
report to other interested congressional committees; the Secretary of
Homeland Security; the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; the
Director of the President's Domestic Policy Council; the Administrator
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency; and federal, state, and
local officials we contacted for this review. This report also is
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at
(202) 512-6806 or at czerwinskis@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Major contributors to this report were
Peter Del Toro, Assistant Director; Latesha Love; Mark Abraham; and
Susan Mak.
Signed by:
Stanley J. Czerwinski:
Director, Strategic Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Long-
Term Community Recovery Branch's (LTCR) disaster assistance focuses on
experiences following three recent major disasters--the tornado that
affected Greensburg, Kansas (2007); the Midwest floods in Iowa (2008);
and Hurricane Ike in Texas (2008). We selected these three events
because their catastrophic or nearly catastrophic impact on one or
more communities resulted in substantial long-term recovery needs, and
they were identified by FEMA as having significant involvement by LTCR
and other Emergency Support Function #14 (ESF-14) agencies. We then
selected specific localities within these states that (1) sustained
substantial long-term damage, (2) had direct involvement with LTCR,
and (3) were identified by LTCR or their state as experiencing
significant challenges or successes during the recovery process.
Accordingly, we included the following localities from Iowa in the
review: Cedar Rapids, Iowa City, and Oakville. In Texas, we included
the City of Galveston and Galveston County. In Kansas, we focused on
recovery in the City of Greensburg and Kiowa County. Although we
obtained preliminary information from Louisiana and Mississippi on ESF-
14's assistance in their states after hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we
decided not to focus on these disasters in our review because the ESF-
14 function was still largely undeveloped at the time of these
disasters and the President appointed a separate official, the Federal
Coordinator for Gulf Coast Recovery, to coordinate federal assistance.
Consequently, LTCR and the ESF-14 network did not perform a
coordination role following hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which was one
of its two primary roles in providing assistance in subsequent major
disasters.
To identify the responsibilities of LTCR in disaster recovery, we
obtained and reviewed FEMA regulations and policies, as well as
national policy on disaster recovery, such as the National Response
Framework's (NRF) ESF-14 long-term community recovery annex, and
relevant legislation. We assessed relevant authorities, regulations,
and legislation when necessary. In order to identify the role LTCR
played in the specific disasters included in our review, we conducted
interviews with, and obtained documentation from, LTCR officials,
officials in other relevant FEMA offices, as well as state and local
officials.
To evaluate the effectiveness of LTCR practices in coordinating
federal assistance and identify improvements, if any, that can be
made, we interviewed and obtained documents on LTCR's coordination
practices from federal officials within relevant offices and divisions
in FEMA, including LTCR, the Disaster Assistance Division, and the
Federal Coordinator's Office. We also interviewed officials from the
Small Business Administration and the Departments of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and Agriculture--the three other agencies identified
in the NRF as primary federal agencies responsible for coordinating
long-term recovery assistance. In addition, we interviewed and
obtained documentation about LTCR's coordination efforts during
recovery from the three disasters selected for our review from state
and local officials in Texas, Iowa, and Kansas, as identified above.
We conducted site visits to recovering locations in Texas and Iowa--
the two states that were most recently affected by catastrophic
disasters (2008). We examined the information obtained in order to
identify LTCR practices that worked well as well as those that were
less effective. We compared this information against criteria
identified in FEMA regulations and policies, as well as the NRF's ESF-
14 long-term community recovery annex, relevant legislation, and our
previous work on effective coordination and planning practices. These
criteria describe actions that LTCR should take to expedite, leverage,
and increase the effectiveness of federal and other long-term recovery
assistance, including agreeing on roles and responsibilities of the
parties involved; identifying and addressing needs by leveraging
resources; convening interagency recovery expertise to provide
strategic guidance to long-term recovery efforts; coordinating with
state and local governments to develop long-term recovery plans; and
identifying and coordinating resolution of policy and program issues,
among other things. We also identified coordination and planning
limitations or roadblocks that may have been outside of LTCR's
control, which affected its ability to more effectively provide
assistance. With input from federal, state, and local officials
involved in the review, we identified actions that can be taken by
FEMA to apply effective practices more broadly and to improve on
current coordination limitations.
For the disasters that we selected, we did not choose a representative
sample of state and local officials to interview. Instead, we chose
individuals based upon their knowledge, experience, or leadership role
in disaster recovery.
* For the tornado that affected Greensburg, Kansas (2007), at the
state level, we interviewed and obtained documentation from officials
in the Kansas Development Finance Authority (the official included in
our review was the Governor's Liaison for Community Recovery) and the
Kansas Division of Emergency Management (which was the official state
coordinating agency and grantee for many of the federal recovery
assistance programs). At the local level, we interviewed a senior
recovery official from Kiowa County.[Footnote 24]
* For the Midwest floods in Iowa (2008), at the state level, we
interviewed and obtained documentation from officials in the Rebuild
Iowa Office (which served as the policy and coordination office for
the recovery) and the Homeland Security and Emergency Management
Division (which was the state coordinating agency and grantee for many
of the federal recovery assistance programs). At the local level, we
interviewed and obtained documentation from officials in the City of
Cedar Rapids, the City of Oakville, and Iowa City.
* For Hurricane Ike in Texas (2008), at the state level, we spoke with
officials in the Texas Division of Emergency Management (which was the
state coordinating agency and grantee for many of the federal recovery
assistance programs), the Texas Department of Rural Affairs (which was
responsible for administering the nonhousing portion of HUD's
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program), and the Texas
Department of Housing and Community Affairs (which was responsible for
administering the housing portion of HUD's CDBG program). At the local
level, we interviewed and obtained documentation from officials in the
City of Galveston and Galveston County.
* We conducted this performance audit from April 2009 through March
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
March 24, 2010:
Mr. Stanley J. Czerwinski:
Director, Strategic Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Czerwinski:
RE: Draft Report GAO-10-404 (Reference # 450736) FEMA 's Long-Term
Community Recovery Assistance was Helpful to State and Local
Governments but had Some Limitations:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report concerning
the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Long-Term Community
Recovery Assistance. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
FEMA concur with GAO's proposed recommendations. There were four
recommendations for executive action. We would like to respectfully
offer the following comments:
GAO Recommendation # (1): Develop clear and consistent criteria that
identify factors that determine whether and how the entity responsible
for coordinating long-term recovery will become involved in a specific
disaster. Such criteria should provide additional guidance about
factors that determine whether the entity responsible for coordinating
and planning becomes involved in recovery.
DHS Response; DHS concurs with this recommendation. For improved
clarity, DHS believes that the report narrative and findings must
address several important points to properly place this recommendation
in context. Explicit, specific or required criteria have not been set
for Emergency Support Function (ESF) #14 deployment as there has not
been sufficient experience with deploying ESF #14, until very
recently, to warrant the use of specific criteria for decisions. The
decisions made early in an event must be made with limited
information. Rather than set arbitrary criteria that would rely on
limited information, FEMA has issued general guidelines to FCOs and
has relied on the expert judgment of the FCOs to guide their
preliminary analysis and request for ESF #14 (See ESF #14 FCO Quick
Reference Guide). These general guideline criteria should be cited in
the report. Decisions to deploy ESF #14 are not comparable to
decisions to authorize disaster assistance programs which, unlike ESF
#14, bring significant financial entitlements and substantial
expenditures, as cited in the report.
The National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), when published, as
well as follow-on operational guidance will clarify authority of the
new Recovery Coordinating Officer, the activation of ESF #14 or its
new successor, and the points GAO raised. As the report alludes, state
and local governments are generally unsure of when ESF #14 is
relevant. The NDRF will help to rectify this situation by providing
better guidance for state and local governments to be better prepared
for the challenges of long term disaster recovery.
DHS believes that smaller disasters have provided a substantial
learning opportunity for Federal Coordinating Officers, FEMA, other
federal partners, states and communities. ESF #14 deployments of all
sizes have also proven to be useful in testing the awareness and
ability of partner agencies to provide a minimal level of support.
GAO Recommendation # (2): Establish, as part of the new National
Disaster Recovery Framework or related efforts, a long term recovery
structure that more effectively aligns the timing and level of
involvement of the entity responsible for coordinating long-term
community recovery assistance with both the capacity of state and
local governments to work with them and the need for coordination
assistance which may last beyond the operation of the JFO. One
approach could allow for the deployment of resources in phases to
provide long-term recovery assistance tailored to a community's
evolving needs and could be provided remotely when necessary, similar
to Long Term Community Recovery Branch's experience during recovery
from the 2007 tornado in Greensburg, Kansas.
DHS Response: DHS concurs with this recommendation. For improved
clarity and to fully reflect findings in the main body of the report,
DHS suggests this recommendation should also include additional
language that emphasizes that the federal government should also be
devoting additional attention and resources to assisting state and
local governments to prepare for recovery and build their capacity, so
they can effectively engage in recovery coordination and planning
before and earlier after disasters.
DHS is concerned about statements that the federal interagency
coordination efforts created additional or inappropriate burdens on
states. The timeframes of recovery supported by ESF #14 align properly
with an early start to initiating coordination, building relationships
for coordination, organizing state and local efforts, and launching
the planning underpinnings that should guide recovery funding
decisions before the funding arrives; not after decisions have already
been made by state and local governments. In no case did any ESF #14
activities interfere with response or other critical activities. DHS
believes that the federal coordination activities were important for
the magnitude and very significant funding being provided to the
states for these disasters. We also believe that the key to addressing
this issue is to provide additional support to states and localities,
both pre and post disaster, to be better prepared to address recovery
challenges early.
The NDRF will also greatly improve the governmental framework for this
entire issue by providing states and local governments guidance and
tools for preparing for and managing disaster recovery, as well as
identifying the long term support role of the federal government.
Findings from the GAO 09-811 report (Disaster Recovery: Experiences
from Past Disasters Offer Insights for Effective Collaboration after
Catastrophic Events) should also be brought forward and summarized in
this report to clarify the importance of early recovery planning,
which is not adequately explained presently.
GAO Recommendation # (3): Evaluate and assess, as part of the new
National Disaster Recovery Framework or related efforts, what would be
an appropriate level of authority for the entity responsible for
coordinating long-term recovery in order for it to foster effective
coordination among federal agencies involved in disaster recovery and
to resolve related policy and program conflicts that may arise.
DHS Response: DHS concurs with this recommendation and has no further
comment.
GAO Recommendation # (4); Communicate more clearly the objectives and
processes used when assessing the value of specific recovery projects
to help prevent unrealistic expectations about the implementation of
such projects among members of the impacted community. Toward this
end, FEMA should resolve any inconsistencies in relevant guidance or
terminology and take steps to ensure that these assessments
appropriately reflect the feasibility of projects including their
importance to state and local leaders as well as the broader community.
DHS Response: DHS concurs with this recommendation. DHS agrees that
the processes used to aid communities can be improved through the
lessons and experiences of ESF #14. We will be further examining the
appropriate tools and how they are offered and communicated to
communities as part of the implementation of the NDRF.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this draft report and we
look forward to working with you on future homeland security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Peggy Mayfield, for:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental Audit Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] LTCR staff initially provided some coordination and planning
assistance in Louisiana and Mississippi after hurricanes Katrina and
Rita. However, for the majority of recovery, these responsibilities
were managed by the presidentially appointed Federal Coordinator for
Gulf Coast Recovery and the FEMA Gulf Coast Recovery Office. While we
do not focus on hurricanes Katrina and Rita in this report, we have
previously reported on a wide range of issues involving recovery from
these disasters. These reports include GAO, Disaster Recovery: FEMA's
Public Assistance Grant Program Experienced Challenges with Gulf Coast
Rebuilding, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-129]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2008); Gulf Coast Disaster Recovery:
Community Development Block Grant Program Guidance to States Needs to
Be Improved, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-541]
(Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2009); Office of the Federal Coordinator
for Gulf Coast Rebuilding: Perspectives and Observations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-411R] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10,
2009); Small Business Administration: Additional Steps Should Be Taken
to Address Reforms to the Disaster Loan Program and Improve the
Application Process for Future Disasters, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-755] (Washington, D.C.: July 29,
2009); and Disaster Assistance: Federal Assistance for Permanent
Housing Primarily Benefited Homeowners; Opportunities Exist to Better
Target Rental Housing Needs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-17] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14,
2010).
[2] In response to issues raised during recovery from hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, we have reported on the importance of having clearly
defined roles and responsibilities of all key participants in
preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic
disaster. See GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership,
Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the
Effectiveness of the Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
System, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). More recently, we reported on the
importance of including nonfederal stakeholders in the process of
revising the framework. See GAO, National Response Framework: FEMA
Needs Policies and Procedures to Better Integrate Non-Federal
Stakeholders in the Revision Process, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-768] (Washington, D.C.: June 11,
2008).
[3] The JFO is a temporary federal facility that provides a central
location for the coordination of federal, state, tribal, and local
governments and private-sector and nongovernmental organizations with
primary responsibilities for response and recovery. The FCO is the
official appointed by the President to commit the resources of FEMA
and to task other agencies with performing response and recovery
activities. The FCO is also the primary federal representative
responsible for coordinating with key state, tribal, and local
response officials to determine their needs and set objectives for an
effective response and recovery.
[4] ESF-14 involvement may sometimes be broader than the 13 agencies
in fig. 1 because there are several agencies within the listed
departments that coordinate with FEMA, and LTCR also coordinates with
entities that are not shown here. In addition to the structure
outlined in figure 1, ESF-14 has arranged its partners into six
functional groups to support disaster recovery operations in the areas
of economic development; housing; infrastructure systems; social and
human services; community planning and capacity building; and
environmental, cultural, and historic resources.
[5] ESF-14 may be activated in headquarters for federal coordination
and assessment support without deploying assistance to the field to
provide on-site coordination and planning assistance directly to the
states. In this report, we discuss the assistance provided directly to
the state when ESF-14 is deployed to the disaster site.
[6] See 6 U.S.C. § 771.
[7] In order to carry out these activities, LTCR operates with a small
staff of permanent employees, supplemented by contract staff who are
hired during disaster response and recovery. For example, LTCR
officials reported that LTCR has had one to two full-time staff from
its creation until April of 2008. Since 2008, the office has increased
to five staff.
[8] We reported that developing more explicit and transparent criteria
for decisions that trigger federal disaster assistance could provide a
number of potential benefits, including helping state and local
governments decide whether they had a valid request to make, enabling
them to provide more complete and uniform information, and minimizing
doubts as to whether their requests were treated fairly and equitably.
GAO, Disaster Assistance: Information on Federal Costs and Approaches
for Reducing Them, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/T-RCED-98-139] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
26, 1998).
[9] We also reviewed a third source of guidance, the ESF-14 FCO Quick
Reference Guide, which contained similarly broad language.
Specifically, the guide states that ESF-14 is deployed "in disasters
with potential significant long-term impacts, where enhanced federal
coordination and specialized long-term recovery technical assistance
is necessary. State and/or local capacity for recovery will be
limited."
[10] American Samoa officials requested long-term recovery assistance,
but this assistance was not provided for the disaster.
[11] GAO, Disaster Recovery: Past Experiences Offer Insights for
Recovering from Hurricanes Ike and Gustav and Other Recent Natural
Disasters, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1120]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008).
[12] This information was obtained from senior officials in the Texas
Emergency Management Division, the Texas Department of Rural Affairs,
and the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs. These state
agencies are responsible for administering funds received from the
largest federal response and recovery grant programs.
[13] For additional information on the length of time that it took for
state and local governments to receive CDBG funding after hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, see [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-17].
[14] Under the NRF, ESF-14 functions out of the JFO. Once the JFO
closes, ongoing long-term recovery activities transition to the
individual agencies responsible for specific recovery programs and
activities.
[15] According to Public Assistance Grant program rules, state and
local governments applying for Public Assistance Grants typically
receive less funding in their grant award amounts if they decide to
build infrastructure that varies from the original design. For more
information on the operation and limitations of the Public Assistance
Grant program, see [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-129].
[16] See Iowa Executive Order 7 (June 27, 2008), and Iowa House File
64 (Feb. 2, 2009).
[17] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-411R] and
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-618].
[18] Federal officials stated that this challenge often related to the
lack of funding in some federal assistance programs. Interagency
coordination meetings did not always include agency officials with the
authority to approve dedication of agency or departmental resources to
address the gaps.
[19] As previously mentioned, when ESF-14 is activated, the National
Response Coordination Center initially provides national-level
coordination and information sharing among the agencies for ESF-14.
[20] While other tools developed by LTCR are utilized and applied by
the community, LTCR independently applies the Long-Term Community
Recovery Value Tool to community plans to "produce a summary that
captures and prioritizes the projects based on their ability to
stimulate recovery."
[21] Although the recovery plan listed potential funding sources, city
officials stated that often the projects were not designed in way that
made them eligible for the funding identified.
[22] Although LTCR officials told us that they do not consider this
process to be a prioritization, guidance documents they provided to us
use the term prioritization when describing this process.
[23] LTCR officials reported that the FCO had accelerated the
reduction of ESF-14 staff deployed for Hurricane Ike. Concerns raised
by LTCR officials about the staff reduction include uncertainties
regarding the community's ability to lead, develop, and complete a
recovery plan without higher-level ESF-14 involvement; the community's
inability to complete the recovery planning process; and the
community's inability to access technical specialists to further
develop recovery projects and strategies and identify funding.
[24] The local official in the City of Greensburg who was involved
with ESF-14 during recovery was absent for an extended period of time
during the data gathering phase of our review. Therefore, we met with
the local emergency manger involved in the recovery effort.
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
