Coast Guard
Deployable Operations Group Achieving Organizational Benefits, but Challenges Remain Gao ID: GAO-10-433R April 7, 2010This letter in response to congressional direction accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 reports on the Coast Guard's Deployable Operations Group. Specifically, we are reporting on the extent to which the Deployable Operations Group achieved its intended benefits and the challenges it faces as it continues to mature. Based on the results of our review, we are not making any recommendations for congressional consideration or agency action.
GAO-10-433R, Coast Guard: Deployable Operations Group Achieving Organizational Benefits, but Challenges Remain
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GAO-10-443R:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 7, 2010:
The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
Chairman:
The Honorable George V. Voinovich:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable David E. Price:
Chairman:
The Honorable Harold Rogers:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
Subject: Coast Guard: Deployable Operations Group Achieving
Organizational Benefits, but Challenges Remain:
This letter formally transmits the enclosed briefing in response to
congressional direction accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2008 to report on the Coast Guard's Deployable Operations
Group.[Footnote 1] Specifically, we are reporting on the extent to
which the Deployable Operations Group achieved its intended benefits
and the challenges it faces as it continues to mature. For a summary
of the results of our work, see enclosure 1, slides 9-10. Based on the
results of our review, we are not making any recommendations for
congressional consideration or agency action.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees. We are also sending copies to the Department of Homeland
Security and the U.S. Coast Guard. This report will also be available
at no charge on our Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-9610, or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were
Christopher Conrad, Assistant Director; Danny Burton; Lara Kaskie;
Stanley Kostyla; Ryan Lambert; and Jeremy Rothgerber.
Signed by:
Stephen L. Caldwell:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
Enclosures (3):
cc: Mr. Scott Nance:
Ms. Rebecca Davies:
Mr. Will Painter:
Mr. Ben Nicholson:
[End of section]
Enclosure I: Briefing on the Coast Guard's Deployable Operations Group:
Coast Guard: Deployable Operations Group Achieving Organizational
Benefits, but Challenges Remain:
[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: photograph of helicopter and boat]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
Briefing for the Subcommittees on Homeland Security, Committees on
Appropriations, U.S. Senate and House of Representatives:
Briefing Overview:
* Introduction;
* Objectives, Scope, and Methodology;
* Summary;
* Background;
* Findings;
* Agency Comments.
Introduction:
The U.S. Coast Guard's Deployable Operations Group (DOG) was
established in July 2007 to align all of the service's deployable
specialized forces under a single unified command. Creation of the DOG
was an integral part of the Coast Guard's modernization program”-a
major, ongoing effort to update its command structure, support
systems, and business practices.[Footnote 2]
Figure 1: Deployable Operations Group Seal:
[Refer to PDF for image: Deployable Operations Group Seal]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
According to Coast Guard officials, the DOG is intended to enhance
operational effectiveness and interagency coordination in responding
to a wide range of national emergencies and events, such as terrorist
threats or natural disasters.
Introduction: Deployable Forces under Command of the DOG:
With a total of approximately 3,000 personnel, the Coast Guard's
deployable specialized forces (DSF) consist of five types of teams or
units, as follows:[Footnote 3]
* National Strike Force. The three teams”Atlantic Strike Team, Gulf
Strike Team, and Pacific Strike Team”have incident-management skills
and specialized equipment to respond to oil spills and other hazardous
substance pollution incidents.[Footnote 4]
* Tactical Law Enforcement Teams (TACLET). The Coast Guard's two
TACLETs deploy units known as Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET)
aboard U.S. Navy vessels to enforce U.S. and international laws.
Typically, the interdiction of illicit narcotics is a primary mission.
* Port Security Units (PSU). The Coast Guard's eight PSUs are
expeditionary forces responsible for maintaining security in overseas
ports during U.S. military operations.
* Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST). The Coast Guard's 12
MSSTs constitute a domestic force for mitigating or responding to
terrorist threats or incidents. Teams have deployed, for example, to
national special security events such as the presidential
inauguration, the Olympics, and the Super Bowl.
* Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT). The MSRT is a
counterterrorism unit trained to conduct advanced interdiction
operations in hostile environments”such as vertically inserting team
members from a helicopter to a ship's deck to neutralize potentially
hostile personnel.
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Objectives:
In accordance with congressional direction accompanying the Coast
Guard's fiscal year 2008 appropriations,[Footnote 5] and as agreed
with your offices, this report addresses the following questions:
* To what extent has the Deployable Operations Group achieved its
intended benefits?
* What challenges, if any, does the Deployable Operations Group face
as it continues to mature?
Scope and Methodology:
To answer the objectives, we analyzed:
* DOG charter documents, relevant Coast Guard reports and documents”
including briefing materials and journal articles”and congressional
testimony to identify the primary origin and intended benefits of the
DOG;
* DOG policy doctrine; workforce plans; recruiting and training
initiatives; scheduling and force apportionment procedures; strategic
plans; and documents regarding the development of tactics, techniques,
and procedures;
* After-action reports for key operations or exercises conducted since
the DOG's inception; and;
* Briefing materials and background documents for each of the five
types of deployable specialized forces.
We also conducted interviews with Coast Guard officials and
interagency partners, to include:
* DOG officials and senior program officials at Coast Guard
headquarters;
* commanding officers and key personnel from Maritime Safety and
Security Teams in San Francisco, San Diego, and Los Angeles/Long
Beach; Port Security Unit San Pedro; Pacific Tactical Law Enforcement
Team; Pacific Strike Team; the National Strike Force Coordination
Center; and the Maritime Security Response Team;[Footnote 6]
* representatives from all three of the Coast Guard's field command
levels (Area, District, Sector). Specifically, we visited Pacific Area
and Atlantic Area, two District offices, as well as Sector Hampton
Roads, Sector San Francisco, Sector Los Angeles/Long Beach, and Sector
San Diego; and;
* interagency liaisons to the DOG from the Department of Defense (DOD)
Special Operations Command, Customs and Border Protection, and a Navy
unit that routinely deploys with the Coast Guard's Port Security Units.
* To obtain additional information regarding the mission and skill
sets of individual deployable units, we also observed demonstrations
of specialized capabilities, such as the detection of explosives by
canines, the use of vertical insertion for boarding vessels at sea,
and an interagency exercise conducted in preparation of the 2010
Winter Olympic Games, in which Maritime Safety and Security Teams and
the Maritime Security Response Team were involved.
* We conducted this performance audit from July 2009 to April 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary: Key Benefits Achieved Since Establishment of the DOG:
The unified command structure established by the creation of the DOG
has achieved its intended benefits by facilitating the Coast Guard's
ability to standardize training and processes while using deployable
specialized forces as centrally managed global assets, rather than
local or regional assets. Specifically, the unified command structure
has achieved four key benefits:
(1) standardized tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP);
(2) standardized the process used to allocate deployable resources and
based those allocations on specific capabilities rather than entire
units;
(3) implemented an employment schedule that provides dedicated
training periods for DOG units to maintain operational readiness,
among other improvements; and;
(4) enhanced management and oversight functions, such as establishment
of dedicated program managers for each type of deployable unit, and
collaborative working groups to help improve standardization and
develop TTP.
Summary: Challenges Facing the DOG:
As the DOG continues to mature, the command faces various challenges
that may impact its ability to ensure that each deployable unit is
staffed and trained and that the DSF community is prepared to meet its
broad range of responsibilities.
* In particular, DSF units face human resource challenges associated
with assessing and selecting qualified candidates. Other challenges
involve achieving and maintaining qualifications for capabilities that
are critical for maritime interdiction missions, such as vertical
insertion from a helicopter onto the deck of a ship.
* The Coast Guard is generally taking, or has plans to take, actions
to address the issues that we identified. For example, it has
developed partnerships with other agencies to better leverage
potential training assets and has requested additional billets for
selected units, where applicable. Further, to address potential gaps
in its ability to prevent high consequence attacks, such as those
involving weapons of mass destruction, the Coast Guard is also
considering options for expanding select capabilities to other U.S.
regions. Although such actions should help mitigate identified
challenges, in many cases it is too soon to tell the potential impact.
In addition, these challenges will be affected, in part, by the Coast
Guard's fiscal year 2011 budget, which proposes a reduction in the
total number of deployable units available.
Background: Origin and Intended Benefits of the DOG:
As part of the Coast Guard's overall modernization effort, the DOG was
created on July 20, 2007, as an independent Coast Guard command
intended to integrate deployable specialized forces, provide a single
community of interest, improve organizational efficiencies, and
enhance mission effectiveness. The creation of the DOG was also
intended to improve the process by which operational and tactical
commanders request deployable forces and the Coast Guard can assess
its ability to support and allocate forces to best meet those requests.
Based partly on lessons learned following the response to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, the Coast Guard identified actions that it believed
were necessary to enhance its ability to surge forces and better
leverage the unique operational capabilities of deployable specialized
forces. Specifically, the Coast Guard intended to:
* establish a unified command structure under which all deployable
specialized forces would operate;
* group deployable capabilities into tailored force packages;
* enhance standardization across the deployable units to permit
national and global employment; and;
* optimize the employment of specialized force packages when
responding to maritime threats and disasters.
Background: Deployable Specialized Forces Command Structure:
Prior to the DOG, deployable specialized forces were aligned under a
geographically divergent command structure”Atlantic (LANT) Area and
Pacific (PAC) Area, respectively. The DOG now serves to integrate
these forces under a single command entity, as illustrated below.
Figure 2: Comparison of Deployable Specialized Forces Command
Structure, Pre- and Post-DOG:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 organization charts]
Pre-DOG:
Top level:
Coast Guard HQ;
Second level, reporting to Coast Guard HQ:
* Atlantic Area;
* National Strike Force Coordination Center;
* Pacific Area.
Third level, reporting to Atlantic Area:
* LANT MSSTs;
* LANT TACLET;
* LANT PSUs;
* MSRT.
Third level, reporting to National Strike Force Coordination Center:
* Strike Teams.
Third level, reporting to Pacific Area:
* PAC MSSTs;
* PAC TACLET;
* PAC PSUs.
Post-DOG:
Top level:
Coast Guard HQ;
Second level:
Pacific Area Command/Force Readiness Command[A].
Third level:
Deployable Operations Group.
Fourth level:
All DSF units (MSST, TACLETs, PSUs, MSRT, and Strike Teams).
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[A] The DOG is currently under the operational control of Pacific Area
Command. However, the DOG is to report to the Force Readiness Command,
or FORCECOM, pending enactment of a legislative change proposal
intended to enable the Coast Guard to establish additional three-star
vice admiral positions. While several current bills (e.g., H.R. 2650,
H.R. 3619, and S. 1194) contain the Coast Guard's legislative change
proposal provisions, as of April 1, 2010, such bills were pending.
[End of figure]
Background: Primary DOG Roles and Responsibilities:
The DOG was created through the internal transfer of existing Coast
Guard billets and is intended to function as:
* a force manager, with responsibility for standardizing, as
appropriate, the staffing, equipping, and training of the Coast
Guard's deployable specialized forces;
* a force provider, with responsibility for providing operational
commanders with adaptive force packages drawn from the services
deployable specialized forces, and coordinating and executing all
deployments of these forces; and;
* a force integrator, with responsibility for developing partnerships
and facilitating interoperability with Coast Guard, the Department of
Homeland Security, DOD, and other agencies.
As a collateral duty, two 21-person teams within the DOG are also
trained to help support on-scene operational commanders during major
events. These subject matter experts, collectively referred to as the
Deployable Element, are available to integrate into an incident
command post or may help coordinate tactics and logistics for deployed
force packages as needed.
Background: DOG Organizational Chart:
The DOG is composed of 113 personnel, who are organized among eight
distinct divisions, a command cadre, and related support staff (see
figure 3).
Figure 3: Organizational Chart of the Deployable Operations Group:
[Refer to PDF for image: organization chart]
Top level:
DOG commander:
* Executive assistant;
* Command master chief.
Second level, reporting to DOG commander:
DOG deputy commander:
* External affairs;
* Legal advisor.
Third level, reporting to DOG deputy commander:
* Personnel support;
* Intelligence;
* Operations;
* Engineering and logistics;
* Plans and exercises;
* Communications and security;
* Training and assessment;
* Resource and requirements.
Source U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
Background: Fiscal Year 2011 Coast Guard Budget Proposal:
The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2011 budget request of $9.87 billion is
approximately $35.8 million less than the fiscal year 2010 enacted
budget. The budget request also includes several initiatives which, if
implemented, will impact the structure and resources of the deployable
specialized forces. Specifically, the budget calls for:
(1) Decommissioning the National Strike Force Coordination Center;
* Intended to eliminate redundant functions already provided by the
DOG, this initiative is to eliminate 9 billets and relocate the
remaining 17 billets.
(2) Decommissioning five Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST);
[Footnote 7]
* The seven remaining MSSTs are to deploy regionally to mitigate the
highest prevailing port security risks in the nation's critical ports.
(3) Increasing the capacity of Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET);
* The Coast Guard is to reinvest some of the MSST billets to grow each
LEDET from 11 to 12 members and establish a new 12-person team (for a
total of 18). The proposed changes to MSST and LEDET programs are
expected to result in a net reduction of approximately $18.2 million.
(4) Permanently relocating two H-60 helicopters from the Maritime
Security Response Team (Elizabeth City, N.C.) to the Coast Guard Air
Station in Traverse City, Mich.
* The H-60 helicopters are intended to replace existing H-65 assets
which have a more limited range and reduced capability to operate in
extreme weather.
Objective 1: Key Benefits Achieved: Enhanced Standardization and
Development of Common TTP:
DOG Standardized Assets and Training for the Deployable Specialized
Forces:
* Prior to establishing the DOG, Pacific Area and Atlantic Area
commands did not have a standardized process to manage DSFs and, as a
result, independently allocated resources and prioritized operations.
* The DOG now functions as a single force manager to train and equip
all DSF units.
* Officials stated that assets such as boats, weapons, and personal
protection equipment are in the process of being standardized across
DOG forces where applicable (see figure 4).
* DOG also established a training division to provide oversight on
training activities and ensure adequate training time is apportioned
to all DSF units.
Figure 4: Member of a Deployable Unit Wearing Standard Protective
Equipment:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
Development of TTP Enhances DOG's Ability to Meet Operational and
Tactical Requirements:
* Establishment of the DOG helped eliminate procedural variations that
existed between deployable specialized forces regarding how to perform
specific duties.
* Coast Guard officials noted that prior to the DOG, utilizing
deployable specialized forces across geographical regions was
challenging because of procedural differences between the two Area
Commands. For example, MSST units on the West Coast operated with
three-person boat crews, while MSST units on the East Coast operated
four-person boat crews for the same vessel.
* Coast Guard officials further noted that no specific TTP existed for
deployable specialized forces prior to the DOG, which is now
responsible for developing all TTP related to advanced capabilities
for its deployable specialized forces.
- The DOG established a TTP working group, where DOG personnel and
unit representatives meet quarterly to continue to develop UP,
identify needs, review policies, and update or reprioritize TTP.
- In 2008, the DOG developed UP addressing various aspects of
waterborne insertion/extraction operations, vertical insertion, and
unannounced nighttime boardings.
Objective 1: Key Benefits Achieved: Adaptive Force Packaging:
Adaptive Force Packaging Allows DOG to Better Target Resources to
Operational Needs:
* Prior to the DOG, deployable specialized forces were usually
requested by sectors as an entire unit. However, the sectors generally
needed specific capabilities within that unit, which resulted in
excess capacity and unnecessary costs.
* The DOG now allocates resources based on specific capabilities
rather than by entire units. Officials stated that as a result, assets
are utilized more effectively and are targeted to operational needs.
For example, the DOG may send a single boat crew and a dive team
rather than an entire MSST.
* As a dedicated force provider, the DOG is able to pull from the
entire range of capabilities available among its units to create
adaptive, tailored packages of resources to respond rapidly to a range
of environmental, safety, and security threats.
Figure 5: Members of MSST Unit Conducting Boarding Tactics Training:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source, U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
Objective 1: Key Benefits Achieved: Employment Schedule and Request
for Forces Process:
Employment Schedule Provides Dedicated Training Periods for DOG Units
to Maintain Operational Readiness:
* Prior to the establishment of the DOG, the frequent deployment of
some units adversely impacted training and leave schedules. The DOG
developed and standardized an employment schedule that identifies when
units are either deployed, on standby, available, or are slated for
required training or leave periods.
* According to officials, the DOG training division actively manages
training by evaluating requirements and identifying gaps in training
schedules to ensure all training requirements for deployable
specialized forces are met.
* Further, the DOG training division coordinates recurring training
courses for advanced skills for deployable specialized forces, such as
close quarters combat, vertical insertion, and high-speed vessel
interception.
Figure 6: Members of Deployable Unit Undergoing Close Quarters Combat
Training:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source, U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
Objective 1: Key Benefits Achieved: Employment Schedule and Request
for Forces Process:
Request for Forces Process Allocates DOG Resources Based on
Capabilities:
Coast Guard officials noted that the Request for Forces (RFF) process
works more efficiently for both planned and unplanned events since the
DOG was established.
* For example, an annual planning process exists to identify planned
events that may require DSF support and resources. Specifically, the
Sectors/Districts/Areas identify resources they have available and
request any additional requirements through the DOG. These requests
are prioritized and the DOG allocates DSF assets based on availability
and other priorities.
* Under the DOG, there is also enhanced visibility of the scheduling
of units and greater recognition of these resources as centrally
managed assets. For example, officials stated that the response to
unplanned events is quicker and more organized because dedicated
personnel at the DOG are responsible for prioritizing requirements and
allocating resources.
* The DOG also provides a process by which officials from other
federal agencies, including DOD, Department of State, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, and the U.S. Secret Service, can request
deployable forces. Further, since DSF resources are placed under a
single command, the DOG can better provide the status and availability
of specified capabilities.
* The streamlined internal and external RFF process captures the
utilization of DOG capabilities and helps maintain awareness of
potential impacts on operational readiness (see figures 7 and 8).
Objective 1: Key Benefits Achieved: Schedule and Request for Forces
Process:
Request for Forces (RFF) Process Allocates DOG Resources Based on
Capabilities:
Figure 7: Internal Coast Guard Request for Forces (RFF) Process:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Sector initiates RFF and forwards to District[A];
District reviews RFF and forwards to Area Command;
Area Commander endorses RFF and submits to DOG;
DOG approves RFF and deploys force package.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data.
[A] The Request for Forces process applies to all DOG units except the
National Strike Force, which can also be requested directly by the
Sector to mitigate the effects of hazardous substance releases, oil
discharges, and other environmental emergencies.
[End of figure]
Figure 8: Other Federal Agency Request for Forces (RFF) Process:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Agency submits RFF to Coast Guard HQ[B];
USCG HO submits RFF request to DOG;
DOG prioritizes RFF and determines DSF availability;
DOG approves RFF and deploys force package.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard data.
[B] The Request for Forces is sent directly to the DOG or Area
Commander if forces are needed in less than 48 hours.
[End of figure]
Objective 1: Key Benefits Achieved: Management and Oversight Functions:
Unified Command Structure Enhances DOG Management and Oversight:
DOG officials cite streamlined management functions and enhanced
oversight as benefits to a unified command structure. Specifically,
DOG officials stated the following:
* Having a dedicated program manager at the DOG for each of the
deployable specialized forces provides increased attention to unit
needs, including training constraints and potential resource gaps.
* Input and feedback from DOG units has been enhanced through
increased collaboration and communication, specifically the TTP
working groups and annual meetings with commanding officers and
executive officers.
* The DOG headquarters Deployable Element provides command and
control/incident management support to government agencies during
incidents requiring a multi-agency coordinated response, such as the
coordinated interagency response to Hurricanes Ike and Gustay.
* Development of the Maritime Enforcement Specialist rating, which was
established in January 2010, should enhance opportunities for
personnel to transition through and remain within the DSF community
without jeopardizing promotion potential. Additionally, the new rating
may improve recruiting and retention of personnel and the training and
readiness of the DSF community.
Objective 1: Key Benefits Achieved: Coast Guard Haiti Response
Operations:
Haiti Response Operations Illustrated Ability of the DOG to Mobilize
and Deploy Adaptive Force Package in Support of U.S. Federal Response
Efforts:
According to DOG officials, several successes were identified during
the Haitian relief effort. For example,
* The DOG provided liaison officers from the Deployable Element to
applicable Coast Guard and DOD units to ensure unity of effort and
help support development of plans to apply targeted DSF assets.
The Coast Guard's response in Haiti also provided an example of
deployment of an adaptive force package comprised of several different
DSF units. Specifically, the DOG deployed:
* 33 TACLET members;
* 118 PSU members;
* 5 DOG staff and 11 MSST members;
* 4 Strike Team members.
Figure 9: PSU Members Deployed to Haiti to Support Response Efforts:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: U.S Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
Objective 2: Challenges Facing the DOG: Human Resources and Personnel
Issues:
DOG Headquarters Staffing Likely to Remain Static for the Foreseeable
Future:
* As of December 2009, the DOG was staffed with 113 billets, 12 more
than when it was initially established in 2007.
* Although the Coast Guard envisioned full operating capacity for the
DOG to be 147 billets, DOG officials do not anticipate additional
staffing growth given the budget climate and other Coast Guard
resource priorities.
- DOG officials noted that, at current staffing levels, they remain
capable of performing all designated responsibilities; however, some
functions may take longer than originally anticipated. That is, any
additional billets would be used to grow the capacity of existing
functions rather than assume any new roles.
- For example, a single five-person team is currently responsible for
conducting annual readiness audits at each of the DSF units. According
to DOG officials, with additional billets, a second team of five would
be created to mitigate travel demands and quicken the pace of these
ongoing audits.
* The Coast Guard's FY 2011 budget proposes decommissioning the
National Strike Force Coordination Center, which, if implemented, is
to relocate 13 existing billets to Washington, D.C. However, officials
noted that any personnel transferred to the DOG are expected to
continue performing their current duties, rather than assuming new
principal responsibilities at the DOG.
Development of Assessment and Selection Program for DSF Personnel Is
Ongoing:
According to DOG officials, there is no mandatory screening process
for application to DSF units, largely because there is not sufficient
demand to allow for a rigorous selection program.[Footnote 8] DSF
assignments are based on a combination of personnel preferences and
service needs identified during transfer season.[Footnote 9]
* It is possible that, due to organizational needs, personnel may be
assigned to DSFs that they did not list as a preference, or they may
have difficulty meeting physical or other requirements. Officials
noted that unit morale or readiness may be impacted whenever personnel
are unable to perform their assigned roles.[Footnote 10]
* To facilitate the assignment and selection process, the DOG sponsors
a voluntary week-long course to help assess basic physical fitness and
other requirements for DSF billets. According to officials, the course
has been attended by 30 to 60 individuals each year.
* DOG officials, however, are also planning to take advantage of
additional opportunities for DSF recruiting and assessment through
outreach to candidates of the new Maritime Enforcement Specialist
rating, over 40 percent of whom are expected to be assigned to DSF
billets.
Objective 2: Challenges Facing the DOG: Training Capacity Constraints:
Vertical Insertion Training Presents Substantial Demand for Helicopter
Assets:
* MSSTs, TACLETS, and MSRTs are each designated as capable of
performing vertical insertion from a helicopter onto a target vessel,
which requires considerable training to develop and maintain necessary
qualifications (see figure 10).
* San Diego and Cape Cod provide the primary training platforms;
however, the DOG does not own any required helicopter assets.
Therefore, the DOG requests aviation resources from Coast Guard Area
commands and interagency partners and must remain prepared to assemble
DSF teams quickly when limited training opportunities arise.
Figure 10: Members of a Deployable Unit Conducting Vertical Insertion
Training:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
* To address this issue, the DOG has taken steps to better leverage
training resources by bringing DSF units together for training
whenever possible, as air assets become available. In addition, DOG
officials noted that they are working with interagency partners to
conduct joint training. For example, MSST Honolulu has used DOD assets
and the DOG is currently looking to develop similar partnerships with
Customs and Border Protection, Los Angeles Police Department, and the
California National Guard.
- Given the existing limitations on Coast Guard helicopter assets,
these interagency partnerships appear to be a reasonable approach to
leveraging available resources and may potentially reduce travel and
associated costs whenever training can be conducted closer to the home
port of a DSF unit.
* Coast Guard field officials with whom we spoke also offered several
additional options that could potentially be used to help address
these training constraints, including reevaluating the need for all
designated DSF units nationwide to be capable of vertical insertion;
training additional pilots to perform at least basic vertical
insertion training; and allocating designated training hours on
helicopters to DOG units. Further consideration of some of these
approaches may be important to help mitigate ongoing training
constraints, particularly in light of the reallocation of two H-60
helicopters proposed in the Coast Guard's FY 2011 budget.[Footnote 11]
Limited Resources Available to Meet Demand for TACLET/LEDET Aerial Use
of Force:
* According to Coast Guard officials, the aerial use of force (AUF)
capability”comprised of a combination of an aerial gunner and, under
some circumstances, a supporting "controller"”is extremely important
for interdicting illicit drug trafficking (see figure 11).
* However, officials stated that a lack of dedicated flight hours for
AUF makes it difficult to obtain training for additional gunners and
controllers.
* With counternarcotics funding provided in FY 2010, the Coast Guard
expanded the number of qualified gunners to 13, as of November 2009.
However, DOG officials stated that they would like to have a qualified
gunner assigned to each of the 17 LEDETs.
* The DOG plans to increase each LEDET from 11 to 12 team members by
reinvesting billets resulting from the decommissioning of 5 MSSTs.
[Footnote 12] According to officials, this increase will help ensure
that additional gunners and associated trainers are available.
Figure 11: Aerial Gunner Targeting a Suspect Vessel:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
Objective 2: Challenges Facing the DOG: Proposed MSST Decommissioning:
Decommissioning of Five Maritime Safety and Security Teams Likely to
Impact Operational Capacity of the Coast Guard's Deployable
Specialized Forces:
* Coast Guard officials stated that the decommissioning of five MSSTs,
as proposed in the FY 2011 budget, would represent a shift towards a
more regionally based approach.
- Officials noted that MSSTs stood up quickly after the September 11th
attacks and no comprehensive analysis was conducted at that time to
determine the optimal number of teams and locations.[Footnote 13]
However, they noted that MSSTs are national deployable assets and are
not intended to be used exclusively at any individual sector or port.
- Officials stated that the remaining MSST locations were chosen
primarily to provide sufficient regional coverage. However, they noted
that operating costs and presence of other Coast Guard assets also
played a role in decommissioning decisions.
* A reduction in MSST capacity will present greater demands on the DOG
to ensure optimal DSF employment and rapid mobilization during an
emerging incident.
- Though remaining MSSTs are to maintain readiness to respond to
emerging events and are to continue performing routine security
operations (vessel escorts, critical infrastructure patrols, and law
enforcement aboard high-interest vessels), their ability to support
local sectors in meeting operational activity goals may be diminished.
[Footnote 14]
- A reduction in MSST locations may also increase the potential for
time and distance challenges when mobilizing and deploying forces for
rapid response operations.
Objective 2: Challenges Facing the DOG: Future of Advanced
Interdiction Capabilities:
The Coast Guard originally envisioned MSRT-type teams on the East,
West, and Gulf Coasts. To date, the Coast Guard has established one
East Coast team, which is dedicated to conducting high-risk law
enforcement and counterterrorism operations nationwide.[Footnote 15]
* In 2009, the Coast Guard developed a Concept of Operations document,
which, according to officials, includes considerations to establish
advanced interdiction capabilities in other U.S. regions.
- Officials stated that the Concept of Operations is undergoing review
within the Coast Guard but no established timeline exists, as it
remains subject to continued discussion and input from interagency
partners.[Footnote 16]
* In contrast to units such as MSSTs, which are used routinely during
daily operations, it is difficult to assess the need and requirements
for an additional MSRT team because the unit is generally designed to
respond to low probability but high consequence events. However,
officials noted that MSRT personnel are also used as part of adaptive
force packages, where applicable. For example, MSRT components have
been deployed to help support U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).
Objective 2: Challenges Facing the DOG: Demand Likely Increasing, but
Not Always Documented:
Coast Guard Officials Cite Increase in Worldwide Demand for PSU, MSST,
and TACLET/LEDET Capabilities:
* In addition to the PSU team deployed in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, a second PSU was requested by DOD Southern Command and
deployed to meet security needs at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
- However, because PSUs are reserve units and typically cannot perform
consecutive deployments, DOG officials are currently rotating MSST
units to meet this ongoing demand.
* Further, the Coast Guard may be required to activate additional PSU
teams in response to global events, such as recent recovery operations
in Haiti, for which a PSU team was recently deployed for 35 days.
* According to officials, the existing eight PSUs have already been
programmed and allocated through the next 6 years, and it will be
difficult to meet any additional demand for these assets over this
time period.
Limited Capacity Makes It Difficult for LEDETs to Meet High
Operational Tempo:
* According to DOG officials, an average of 7 LEDETs are detailed to
Navy vessels at any given time.
- Collectively, the 17 LEDETs perform approximately 40 deployments per
year, with each detachment averaging over 185 days away from its home
base.
- LEDET deployments since 2007 include (1) drug interdiction
operations under DOD Southern Command; (2) Operation Iraqi Freedom
activities under DOD Central Command; and (3) anti-piracy operations
in the Gulf of Aden and the eastern coast of Somalia conducted as part
of a multinational task force.
* DOG officials reported that the high operational tempo for LEDETs
can make it difficult to assemble a full, qualified team, particularly
when illness or injury occurs.
- For example, to meet minimum team readiness requirements, some LEDET
members have served multiple consecutive deployments”impacting
training and/or scheduled leave”and some LEDETs have been replaced
with other DSF personnel.
* Officials noted that the planned increase in the size of LEDETs in
2011 should help mitigate this challenge. DOG officials also stated
that they are working to increase the total number of LEDETs to help
address the rise in demand for these units.
Demand for DOG Resources Not Always Documented, and Deployment of
Forces May Occur in Advance of the RFF Process:
* DOG and DOD officials noted that some potential requests for forces
are not documented through an RFF because they are outside the scope
of normal operations or preliminary inquiries to the Coast Guard
indicate that resources are not likely to be available.
- For example, DOD officials noted that Coast Guard DSF units would be
well suited to assist with security and other training with
international partners, but they recognize that the DOG does not have
the capacity to assume a much greater role at this time.
- DOG officials stated that international assistance is likely an area
of latent demand and they are awaiting development of a national
policy to help determine their future role.
* DOG officials also noted that DSF forces may be required to deploy
with little or no notice in some cases, such as in supporting the U.S.
Secret Service to protect the president, and may occur in advance of
the RFF process.
Objective 2: Challenges Facing the DOG: Impact of Force Readiness
Command Still Unknown:
* As previously noted, while FORCECOM has been established, it will
not become fully operational without enactment of a legislative change
proposal intended to realign senior leadership and organizational
positions.
* As a result, the Coast Guard has reported that some role ambiguity
currently exists due to the combination of both new and legacy
organizational components operating concurrently.
- For example, some personnel originally designated to FORCECOM have
been temporarily reallocated to Pacific Area, and other FORCECOM staff
are performing functions for both commands concurrently. According to
a senior FORCECOM official, while staff are currently able to shift
resources internally to meet changing demands, the situation is not
sustainable. He stated that without the legislative changes, personnel
will not be able to fully focus on FORCECOM duties as envisioned.
* Despite some administrative challenges associated with the remaining
two-Area structure, DOG officials reported that they have, and will
retain, primary responsibility for managing and allocating DSF
resources, even after the full implementation of FORCECOM.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland
Security and the U.S. Coast Guard for review and comment.
* The Department of Homeland Security provided no written comments.
* The U.S. Coast Guard provided technical comments that have been
incorporated into the report, as appropriate.
[End of Enclosure I]
Enclosure II: Deployable Specialized Forces:
This enclosure provides additional information on the specific
deployable specialized forces under the command of the Deployable
Operations Group (DOG). The DOG is responsible for coordinating and
executing all deployments of the Coast Guard's deployable specialized
forces, which consist of five types of teams or units (see table 1).
Table 1: The U.S. Coast Guard's Deployable Specialized Forces--
Component Teams and Unit Descriptions:
Component teams or units (type, number, and locations): National
Strike Force:
* National Strike Force Coordination Center (Elizabeth City, North
Carolina)[B];
* Atlantic Strike Team (Fort Dix, New Jersey);
* Gulf Strike Team (Mobile, Alabama);
* Pacific Strike Team (Novato, California;
Number of personnel[A]: 270;
Unit description: First created in 1973, the National Strike Force is
composed of a cadre of Coast Guard professionals--with incident-
management skills and specialized equipment--who deploy in response to
oil and hazardous substance pollution incidents (i.e., biological,
chemical, and radiological response);
* Each Strike Team is comprised of approximately 80 personnel, of
which about half are active duty personnel. The remainder includes a
combination of reservists, auxiliarists, and civilians;
* Members typically deploy for up to 21 days. If an incident extends
beyond this period, additional responders are deployed to backfill
positions. Responders deploy on average approximately 160 days per
year;
* The National Strike Force responded to a total of 21 oil spill
incidents and 27 hazardous material release incidents in fiscal year
2008, as reported by the National Strike Force Coordination Center.
Component teams or units (type, number, and locations): Tactical Law
Enforcement Teams (two teams):
* Pacific Tactical Law Enforcement Team (San Diego, California);
- Eight Law Enforcement Detachments;
* Tactical Law Enforcement Team South (Miami, Florida);
- Nine Law Enforcement Detachments;
Number of personnel[A]: 204;
Unit description: Tactical Law Enforcement Teams provide specialized
law enforcement and maritime security capabilities to enforce U.S.
laws across a spectrum of maritime missions, including drug
interdiction and vessel interception operations;
* The Coast Guard's two Tactical Law Enforcement Teams collectively
are composed of 17 smaller units (Law Enforcement Detachments) whose
average complement consists of 9 personnel with a range of
capabilities--e.g., precision marksmen and law enforcement boarding
officers;
* Tactical Law Enforcement Teams collectively perform around 40
deployments per year, with each detachment averaging over 185 days
away from its home base;
* Teams typically conduct their primary mission (law enforcement) in
the Caribbean Sea and Eastern Pacific Ocean. Teams have also provided
training to foreign naval, coast guard, and police forces in the
Caribbean, Pacific Ocean, Asia, Africa, Central and South America, and
the Middle East. More recently, Law Enforcement Detachments have been
deployed to the Gulf of Aden and the eastern coast of Somalia as part
of a multinational task force to suppress piracy.[C]
Component teams or units (type, number, and locations): Port Security
Units (eight units):
* California (San Pedro);
* California (San Francisco);
* Florida (Tampa);
* Massachusetts (Cape Cod);
* Mississippi (Gulfport);
* Ohio (Port Clinton);
* Virginia (Fort Eustis);
* Washington (Tacoma);
Number of personnel[A]: 1,171;
Unit description: Manned largely by Coast Guard reservists, Port
Security Units conduct port operations, security, and defense in
support of combatant commanders' operations worldwide. A primary
mission of Port Security Units is to provide waterside protection to
U.S. Navy vessels and other high-value assets, including pier areas
and harbor entrances. Units are currently deployed to Kuwait Naval
Base to support Operation Iraqi Freedom and in January 2010 were also
activated to assist with U.S. operations in Haiti. According to the
Coast Guard, Port Security Units:
* are deployed as 117 person teams and have sufficient equipment to
sustain operations for up to 30 days; and;
* operate fast, highly maneuverable and armed transportable port
security boats and have land-based security forces that complement
waterborne operations, and protect unit personnel, equipment, and
command and control facilities.
Component teams or units (type, number, and locations): Maritime
Safety and Security Teams (12 teams):[D]
* Alaska (Anchorage);
* California (San Diego);
* California (San Francisco);
* California (San Pedro);
* Florida (Miami);
* Georgia (Kings Bay);
* Hawaii (Honolulu);
* Louisiana (New Orleans);
* Massachusetts (Boston);
* New York (New York);
* Texas (Galveston);
* Washington (Seattle);
Number of personnel[A]: 1,014;
Unit description: Created under the Maritime Transportation Security
Act of 2002, the Maritime Safety and Security Teams constitute a
maritime security antiterrorism force. The teams are managed as
national deployable assets responsible for safeguarding the public and
protecting vessels, harbors, ports, facilities, and cargo in U.S.
territorial waters;
* The teams are to maintain readiness to deploy to events such as
terrorist threats or incidents; storm recovery operations;
and routinely deploy to national special security events such as the
Super Bowl and the presidential inauguration. The teams also enforce
security zones during transit of high-interest vessels and at other
times when additional levels of security are needed within the
nation's ports and waterways;
* Among other capabilities, team elements include canines trained to
search for explosives; divers trained for underwater detection;
and remotely operated submersible vehicles equipped with cameras used
for a variety of underwater applications.
Component teams or units (type, number, and locations): Maritime
Security Response Team (one team):
* Virginia (Chesapeake);
Number of personnel[A]: 225;
Unit description: Charged with maintaining a high readiness posture
365 days a year, the Maritime Security Response Team is the Coast
Guard's advanced interdiction force for counterterrorism and higher
risk law enforcement operations. The team provides a variety of
advanced capabilities or skills, including addressing threats posed by
weapons of mass destruction and vertically inserting from a helicopter
to a ship's deck to engage potentially hostile personnel;
* The Maritime Security Response Team, like other Coast Guard units,
may be deployed unilaterally or as part of an interagency adaptive
force package.
Total personnel: 2884[E].
Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
[A] Includes active, reserve, and civilian billets assigned to the
units as of March 2010. Total does not include any fiscal year 2010
billet additions that have not yet been staffed.
[B] The National Strike Force Coordination Center (NSFCC) provides
support and standardization guidance to the Atlantic Strike Team, the
Gulf Strike Team, and the Pacific Strike Team. The NSFCC is also home
to the Public Information Assist Team, which provides emergency public
information services to federal on-scene coordinators primarily during
oil spills and hazardous material releases. The NSFCC is responsible
for and oversees the maintenance of functions mandated by the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 and is comprised of 18 active duty personnel, 3
reservists, and 8 civilians. However, the Coast Guard's fiscal year
2011 budget request proposes decommissioning the Coordination Center,
eliminating 9 billets, and relocating the17 remaining billets between
the Strike Teams, the Deployable Operations Group, and Coast Guard
Headquarters.
[C] In January 2009, the U.S. Central Command created Combined Task
Force 151, an international coalition consisting of command personnel
from the United States, Turkey, Singapore, Greece, Pakistan, and the
United Kingdom. Its mission is to actively deter, disrupt, and
suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security and
secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.
[D] The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2011 budget request proposes the
disestablishment of five Maritime Safety and Security Teams, and the
reallocation of some of these billets to Tactical Law Enforcement
Teams.
[E] The Deployable Operations Group also oversees and manages 49 Coast
Guard reserve personnel who are assigned to work within three U.S.
Navy components: Naval Expeditionary Combatant Commander; Maritime
Expeditionary Security Groups; and Maritime Security Squadrons.
[End of table]
[End of Enclosure II]
Enclosure III: Related GAO Products:
Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2011 Budget and Related
Performance and Management Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-411T]. Washington, D.C.: February
25, 2010.
Coast Guard: Service Has Taken Steps to Address Historic Personnel
Problems, but It Is too Soon to Assess the Impact of These Efforts.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-268R]. Washington,
D.C.: January 29, 2010.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Genesis and Progress of the Service's
Modernization Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-530R]. Washington, D.C.: June 24,
2009.
Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were
Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-672]. Washington, D.C.: June 20,
2008.
Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct
Facility Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program's Staffing,
Practices, and Data. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-12]. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14,
2008.
Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in
Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity
Tankers. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-141].
Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2007.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One
Year Later. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-126T].
Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007.
Maritime Security: Information on Port Security in the Caribbean
Basin. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-804R].
Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery
Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-903]. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2006.
Maritime Security: Information Sharing Efforts Are Improving.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-933T]. Washington,
D.C.: July 10, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and
Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-91].
Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-448T]. Washington, D.C.: May 17,
2005.
Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective
Port Security Assessment Program. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-1062]. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30,
2004.
[End of Enclosure III]
Footnotes:
[1] H. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong., Committee Print on H.R.
2764/Public Law 110-161 at 1059 (2008), and S. Rep. No. 110-84, at 69-
70 (2007).
[2] In 2009, we completed an assessment of the Coast Guard's overall
modernization program. See GAO, Coast Guard: Observations on the
Genesis and Progress of the Service's Modernization Program,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-530R] (Washington,
D.C., June 24, 2009).
[3] See enclosure II for further details on the deployable specialized
forces.
[4] A related entity, the National Strike Force Coordination Center,
provides support and standardization guidance to the three strike
teams.
[5] H. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong., Committee Print on H.R.
2764/Public Law 110-161 at 1059 (2008), and S. Rep. No. 110-84, at 69-
70 (2007).
[6] Field locations were selected based on the availability of units
during the time frames of our planned visits. In addition, the
proximity of several different units in these locations provided an
opportunity to maximize travel resources.
[7] This initiative proposes decommissioning existing MSST teams in
New York; Anchorage; San Francisco; New Orleans; and Kings Bay,
Georgia.
[8] However, Strike Team units do conduct personal interviews to
assess suitability for assignment to those billets.
[9] The Coast Guard's personnel manual outlines basic qualifications
necessary for enlisted personnel to be assigned to these positions.
[10] Coast Guard officials noted that this issue is not unique to DOG
assignments and occurs servicewide.
[11] Officials noted that the proposed reallocation of two H-60
helicopters from Elizabeth City to the Great Lakes region will impact
the Coast Guard's ability to train qualified pilots required to
perform vertical insertion operations and conduct training for MSRT
and other DSF units.
[12] The Conference Report (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 111-298, at 84 (2009))
accompanying the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
2010, (Pub. L No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142 (2009)) contained direction
by the Conferees authorizing additional funding to enhance Coast Guard
counternarcotics enforcement efforts that was used to increase the
number of personnel on each LEDET from 9 to 11. According to
officials, as of March 2010, this change was in the process of being
implemented.
[13] The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General
is conducting a review of the MSSTs which is to address the decision
process used to form the teams and select initial locations, among
other objectives.
[14] MSST units on the west coast are currently allocated to local
sectors up to 10 days per month, and routinely assist them in meeting
designated targets for monthly sector security activities.
[15] Lacking a dedicated MSRT team on the West Coast, Pacific Area
developed a rotating team of MSST personnel to provide enhanced
readiness for potential interdiction and antiterrorism activities. The
team serves on a 2-week rotation schedule.
[16] Officials noted that some options addressing expanded advanced
interdiction capabilities were guided by language and principles set
forth in the DOD Contingency Plan 7500-”a classified document of plans
to address the Global War on Terror.
[End of section]
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