Secure Border Initiative
DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program Gao ID: GAO-10-340 May 5, 2010The technology component of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI), referred to as SBInet, is to put observing systems along our nation's borders and provide Border Patrol command centers with the imagery and related tools and information needed in deciding whether to deploy agents. SBInet is being acquired and deployed in incremental blocks of capability, with the first block to cost about $1.3 billion. Because of the program's importance, size, and challenges, GAO was asked to, among other things, determine the extent to which DHS has (1) defined the scope of its proposed SBInet solution, (2) developed a reliable schedule for this solution, (3) demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of this solution, and (4) acquired the solution using key management processes. To do this, GAO compared key program documentation to relevant guidance and industry practices.
DHS has defined the scope of the first incremental block of SBInet capabilities; however, these capabilities have continued to shrink from what the department previously committed to deliver. For example, the geographical "footprint" of the initially deployed capability has been reduced from three border sectors spanning about 655 miles to two sectors spanning about 387 miles. Further, the stringency of the performance capabilities has been relaxed, to the point that, for example, system performance will be deemed acceptable if it identifies less than 50 percent of items of interest that cross the border. The result is a system that is unlikely to live up to expectations. DHS has not developed a reliable integrated master schedule for delivering the first block of SBInet. Specifically, the schedule does not sufficiently comply with seven of nine key practices that relevant guidance states are important to having a reliable schedule. For example, the schedule does not adequately capture all necessary activities, assign resources to them, and reflect schedule risks. As a result, it is unclear when the first block will be completed, and continued delays are likely. DHS has also not demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of this first system block. In particular, it has not reliably estimated the costs of this block over its entire life cycle. To do so requires DHS to ensure that the estimate meets key practices that relevant guidance states are important to having an estimate that is comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible. However, DHS's cost estimate for the initial block does not sufficiently possess any of these characteristics. Further, DHS has yet to identify expected benefits from the initial block, whether quantitative or qualitative, and analyze them relative to costs. As a result, it does not know whether its planned investment will produce mission value commensurate with costs. DHS has also not acquired the initial SBInet block in accordance with key life cycle management processes. While processes associated with, among other things, requirements development and management and risk management, have been adequately defined, they have not been adequately implemented. For example, key risks have not been captured in the risk management repository and thus have not been proactively mitigated. As a result, DHS is at increased risk of delivering a system that does not perform as intended. SBInet's decreasing scope, uncertain timing, unclear value proposition, and limited life cycle management discipline and rigor are due to a range of factors, including limitations in both defined requirements and the capabilities of commercially available system components, as well as the need to address competing program priorities, such as meeting aggressive system deployment milestones. As a result, it remains unclear whether the department's pursuit of SBInet is a cost effective course of action, and if it is, that it will produce expected results on time and within budget.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Randolph C. Hite Team: Government Accountability Office: Information Technology Phone: (202) 512-6256GAO-10-340, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
May 2010:
Secure Border Initiative:
DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed Investment in Key Technology
Program:
GAO-10-340:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-340, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The technology component of the Department of Homeland Security‘s
(DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI), referred to as SBInet, is to put
observing systems along our nation‘s borders and provide Border Patrol
command centers with the imagery and related tools and information
needed in deciding whether to deploy agents. SBInet is being acquired
and deployed in incremental blocks of capability, with the first block
to cost about $1.3 billion. Because of the program‘s importance, size,
and challenges, GAO was asked to, among other things, determine the
extent to which DHS has (1) defined the scope of its proposed SBInet
solution, (2) developed a reliable schedule for this solution, (3)
demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of this solution, and (4) acquired
the solution using key management processes. To do this, GAO compared
key program documentation to relevant guidance and industry practices.
What GAO Found:
DHS has defined the scope of the first incremental block of SBInet
capabilities; however, these capabilities have continued to shrink
from what the department previously committed to deliver. For example,
the geographical ’footprint“ of the initially deployed capability has
been reduced from three border sectors spanning about 655 miles to two
sectors spanning about 387 miles. Further, the stringency of the
performance capabilities has been relaxed, to the point that, for
example, system performance will be deemed acceptable if it identifies
less than 50 percent of items of interest that cross the border. The
result is a system that is unlikely to live up to expectations.
DHS has not developed a reliable integrated master schedule for
delivering the first block of SBInet. Specifically, the schedule does
not sufficiently comply with seven of nine key practices that relevant
guidance states are important to having a reliable schedule. For
example, the schedule does not adequately capture all necessary
activities, assign resources to them, and reflect schedule risks. As a
result, it is unclear when the first block will be completed, and
continued delays are likely.
DHS has also not demonstrated the cost-effectiveness of this first
system block. In particular, it has not reliably estimated the costs
of this block over its entire life cycle. To do so requires DHS to
ensure that the estimate meets key practices that relevant guidance
states are important to having an estimate that is comprehensive, well-
documented, accurate, and credible. However, DHS‘s cost estimate for
the initial block does not sufficiently possess any of these
characteristics. Further, DHS has yet to identify expected benefits
from the initial block, whether quantitative or qualitative, and
analyze them relative to costs. As a result, it does not know whether
its planned investment will produce mission value commensurate with
costs.
DHS has also not acquired the initial SBInet block in accordance with
key life cycle management processes. While processes associated with,
among other things, requirements development and management and risk
management, have been adequately defined, they have not been
adequately implemented. For example, key risks have not been captured
in the risk management repository and thus have not been proactively
mitigated. As a result, DHS is at increased risk of delivering a
system that does not perform as intended.
SBInet‘s decreasing scope, uncertain timing, unclear value
proposition, and limited life cycle management discipline and rigor
are due to a range of factors, including limitations in both defined
requirements and the capabilities of commercially available system
components, as well as the need to address competing program
priorities, such as meeting aggressive system deployment milestones.
As a result, it remains unclear whether the department‘s pursuit of
SBInet is a cost effective course of action, and if it is, that it
will produce expected results on time and within budget.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations to DHS aimed at (1) limiting near-term
investment in the first incremental block of SBInet, (2) economically
justifying any longer-term investment in SBInet, and (3) improving key
program management disciplines. DHS agreed with 10 of GAO‘s 12
recommendations, and partially agreed with the other 2. For all of the
recommendations, DHS also described planned and ongoing actions to
address them.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-340] or key
components. For more information, contact Randolph C. Hite at (202)
512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Block 1 Capabilities, Geographic Coverage, and Performance Standards
Continue to Decrease:
A Reliable Schedule for Completing Block 1 Has Not Been Developed:
Cost-Effectiveness of Block 1 Has Not Been Demonstrated:
Block 1 Has Not Been Managed in Accordance with Key Life Cycle
Management Processes:
DHS Has Yet to Implement GAO's Recent SBInet Recommendations:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: Status of Key GAO Recommendations:
Appendix IV: Detailed Results of GAO Assessment of SBInet Program
Schedule:
Appendix V: Detailed Results of GAO Assessment of SBInet Cost Estimate:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Summary of SBInet Task Orders as of December 2009:
Table 2: SBInet Requirements Types:
Table 3: Overview of Formal Test Events:
Table 4: Summary of SBInet Integrated Master Schedule Satisfaction of
Schedule Estimating Practices:
Table 5: SBInet Requirements Traceability Results:
Table 6: Summary of DHS Implementation of GAO's Recent SBInet
Recommendations:
Table 7: Status of DHS Implementation of Key GAO Recommendations:
Table 8: Detailed Results of SBInet Satisfaction of Scheduling Best
Practices:
Table 9: Summary of SBInet Satisfaction of Cost Estimating
Characteristics and Related Practices/Steps:
Table 10: Detailed Results of SBInet Satisfaction of 12 Cost
Estimating Practices/Steps:
Figures:
Figure 1: Potential Long-Term SBInet Concept of Operations:
Figure 2: Map of Block 1 Deployments:
Figure 3: Illustration of Reduction in Block 1 Requirements:
Figure 4: Projected TUS-1 and AJO-1 Acceptance Dates Presented at
Monthly Program Review Meetings:
Abbreviations:
AJO-1: Ajo Border Patrol Station:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
CDR: Critical Design Review:
CMMI: Capability Maturity Model Integration:
COP: common operating picture:
COTS: commercial off-the-shelf:
C3I: command, control, communications, and intelligence:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOORS: Dynamic Object-Oriented Requirements System:
DT&E: developmental test and evaluation:
EVM: earned value management:
IMP: integrated master plan:
IT: information technology:
NOC/SOC: Network Operations Center/Security Operations Center:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
OT&E: operational test and evaluation:
SEP: Systems Engineering Plan:
SBI: Secure Border Initiative:
SBInet: Secure Border Initiative Network:
SEI: Software Engineering Institute:
SPO: SBInet System Program Office:
TEMP: Test and Evaluation Master Plan:
TUS-1: Tucson Border Patrol Station:
WBS: work breakdown structure:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
May 5, 2010:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Christopher P. Carney:
Chairman:
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Mike Rogers:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
Securing the 6,000 miles of international borders that the contiguous
United States shares with Canada and Mexico is a challenge and a
mission imperative to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Although hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens are prevented from
entering the country each year, many more are not detected. To enhance
border security and reduce illegal immigration, DHS launched its
multiyear, multibillion dollar Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program
in November 2005. Through SBI, DHS intends to enhance surveillance
technologies, raise staffing levels, increase domestic enforcement of
immigration laws, and improve the physical infrastructure along the
nation's borders.
Within SBI, Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) is a
multibillion dollar program that includes the acquisition,
development, integration, deployment, and operation and maintenance of
surveillance technologies to create a "virtual fence" along the
border, as well as command, control, communications, and intelligence
(C3I) technologies to create a picture of the border in command
centers and vehicles. Managed by DHS's Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), SBInet is intended to strengthen the ability of CBP to detect,
identify, classify, track, and respond to illegal breaches at and
between land ports of entry.[Footnote 1]
In September 2008, we reported that SBInet was at risk because of a
number of acquisition management weaknesses, and we made
recommendations to address them that DHS largely agreed with and
committed to addressing.[Footnote 2] Because of the importance, high
cost, and challenges facing SBInet, you subsequently asked us to
continue to review DHS's management of SBInet. As agreed, our
objectives were to determine the extent to which DHS has (1) defined
the scope of its proposed system solution, (2) developed a reliable
schedule for delivering this solution, (3) demonstrated the cost-
effectiveness of this solution, (4) acquired this solution in
accordance with key life cycle management processes, and (5) addressed
our recent recommendations.
To accomplish our objectives, we largely focused on the first
increment of SBInet known as Block 1. In doing so, we reviewed key
program documentation, including guidance, plans, schedules, cost
estimates, and artifacts related to system life cycle events,
requirements, risks, and testing. We also analyzed a random
probability sample of requirements and their related verification
methods. In addition, we interviewed program officials about SBInet
cost and schedule estimates, program commitments, the development and
implementation of the SBInet system life cycle approach, requirements
development and management, test management, and risk management. We
then compared this information to relevant federal guidance, leading
industry practices, and the recommendations in our September 2008
report on SBInet to identify any deviations and interviewed program
officials as to the reasons for any deviations. To assess the
reliability of the data that we relied on to support the findings in
the report, we reviewed relevant program documentation to substantiate
evidence obtained through interviews with knowledgeable agency
officials, where available. We determined that the data used in this
report are sufficiently reliable. We have also made appropriate
attribution indicating the sources of the data used.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2008 to May 2010 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Further
details of our objectives, scope, and methodology are in appendix I.
Background:
SBInet includes the acquisition, development, integration, deployment,
and operations and maintenance of a mix of surveillance technologies,
such as cameras, radars, sensors, and C3I technologies. The initial
focus of SBInet has been on addressing the requirements of CBP's
Office of Border Patrol, which is responsible for securing the borders
between the land ports of entry. Longer term, SBInet is to address
requirements of CBP's Office of Field Operations, which controls
vehicle and pedestrian traffic at the ports of entry, and its Office
of Air and Marine Operations, which operates helicopters, fixed-wing
aircraft, and marine vessels used in securing the borders. (See figure
1 for the potential long-term SBInet concept of operations.)
Figure 1: Potential Long-Term SBInet Concept of Operations:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
The following are depicted on the illustration:
* U.S. border;
* Unattended ground sensors;
* Radar/camera tower;
* Port of entry;
* Mobile surveillance system;
* Agent vehicles (Mobile data terminal);
* Command center:
- Border patrol station;
- Border patrol sector headquarters;
* Air and marine station;
* Air support;
* Marine support;
* Unmanned aerial surveillance.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data, Art Explosion (clip art).
[End of figure]
Surveillance technologies are to include a variety of sensor systems.
Specifically, unattended ground sensors are to be used to detect heat
and vibrations associated with foot traffic and metal associated with
vehicles. Radar mounted on fixed and mobile towers is to detect
movement, and cameras on fixed and mobile towers are to be used by
operators to identify and classify items of interest detected and
tracked by ground sensors and radar. Aerial assets are also to be used
to provide video and infrared imaging to enhance tracking targets.
These technologies are generally to be acquired through the purchase
of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products.
C3I technologies (software and hardware) are to produce a common
operating picture (COP)--a uniform presentation of activities within
specific areas along the border. Together, the sensors, radar, and
cameras are to gather information along the border and transmit this
information to COP terminals located in command centers and agents'
vehicles, which in turn are to assemble it to provide CBP agents with
border situational awareness. Among other things, COP hardware and
software are to allow agents to (1) view data from radar and sensors
that detect and track movement in the border areas, (2) control
cameras to help identify and classify illegal entries, (3) correlate
entries with the positions of nearby agents, and (4) enhance tactical
decision making regarding the appropriate response to apprehend an
entry, if necessary.
Overview of SBInet Management Structure, Acquisition Approach, and
Status:
To increase border security and decrease illegal immigration, DHS
launched SBI more than 4 years ago after canceling its America's
Shield Initiative program.[Footnote 3] Since fiscal year 2006, DHS has
received about $4.4 billion in appropriations for SBI, including about
$2.5 billion for physical fencing and related infrastructure, about
$1.5 billion for virtual fencing (surveillance systems) and related
technical infrastructure (towers), and about $300 million for program
management.[Footnote 4] The SBI Program Executive Office, which is
organizationally within CBP, is responsible for managing key
acquisition functions associated with SBInet, including prime
contractor tracking and oversight.[Footnote 5] It is organized into
four components: SBInet System Program Office (referred to as the SPO
in this report), Systems Engineering, Business Management, and
Operational Integration.[Footnote 6] As of December 31, 2009, the SBI
Program Executive Office was staffed with 188 people--87 government
employees, 78 contractor staff, and 13 detailees.
In September 2006, CBP awarded a 3-year prime contract to the Boeing
Company, with three additional 1-year options for designing,
producing, testing, deploying, and sustaining SBI. In 2009, CBP
exercised the first option year. Under this contract, CBP has issued
10 task orders that relate to SBInet, covering for example, COP design
and development, system deployment, and system maintenance and
logistics support. As of December 2009, 4 of the 10 task orders had
been completed and 6 were ongoing. (See table 1 for a summary of the
SBInet task orders.)
Table 1: Summary of SBInet Task Orders as of December 2009 (Dollars in
millions):
Task order: Program Management;
Description: Mission engineering, facilities and infrastructure,
systems engineering, test and evaluation, and program management
services;
Period of performance: Sep. 2006-Apr. 2008 (completed);
Approximate contract value: $146.9;
Approximate contract obligation: $146.9;
Contract type: Cost-plus-fixed-fee[A].
Task order: Project 28;
Description: Prototype along 28 miles of the border in the Tucson
Sector;
Period of performance: Oct. 2006-Feb. 2008 (completed);
Approximate contract value: $20.7;
Approximate contract obligation: $20.7;
Contract type: Firm-fixed-price.
Task order: Project 28 Contractor Maintenance Logistics and Support;
Description: Project 28 operational maintenance and logistics support;
Period of performance: Dec. 2007-Dec. 2009 (completed);
Approximate contract value: $10.6;
Approximate contract obligation: $10.6;
Contract type: Cost-plus-fixed-fee.
Task order: Design for Buffalo Sector;
Description: SBInet design of remote video surveillance system
capability for the Buffalo Sector;
Period of performance: Feb. 2009- July 2009 (completed);
Approximate contract value: $0.6;
Approximate contract obligation: $0.6;
Contract type: Firm-fixed- price[B].
Task order: Design;
Description: Design of deployment solution, environmental clearance
support, and other location-related work for the Tucson Sector;
Period of performance: Aug. 2007-July 2010 (ongoing);
Approximate contract value: $115.0;
Approximate contract obligation: $115.0;
Contract type: Cost- plus-fixed-fee.
Task order: Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I)
Common Operating Picture (COP);
Description: Design, development, demonstration, and operations and
maintenance of a functional C3I/COP system;
Period of performance: Dec. 2007-Feb. 2010 (ongoing);
Approximate contract value: $73.0;
Approximate contract obligation: $71.0;
Contract type: Cost-plus-award-fee/cost-plus-fixed-fee/firm-fixed-
price[C].
Task order: System;
Description: Program management and system engineering activities
required to integrate all task orders;
Period of performance: Apr. 2008-Mar. 2010 (ongoing);
Approximate contract value: $205.8;
Approximate contract obligation: $200.8;
Contract type: Cost-plus-award-fee.
Task order: Arizona Deployment;
Description: Deployment to two sites covering approximately 53 miles
of the southwest border in the Tucson Sector;
Period of performance: June 2008-May 2010 (ongoing);
Approximate contract value: $115.0;
Approximate contract obligation: $90.5;
Contract type: Cost-plus-incentive-fee/cost-plus-award-fee[D].
Task order: Integrated Logistics Support;
Description: Maintenance logistics and operational support;
Period of performance: Aug. 2008-Sep. 2010 (ongoing);
Approximate contract value: $61.6;
Approximate contract obligation: $61.6;
Contract type: Cost-plus-fixed-fee[E].
Task order: Northern Border Project;
Description: Design, installation, and deployment of surveillance
capabilities in the Detroit and Buffalo Sectors;
Period of performance: Mar. 2009-Mar. 2010 (ongoing);
Approximate contract value: $22.4;
Approximate contract obligation: $20.9;
Contract type: Fixed-price[F].
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
Note: Fixed-price types of contracts provide for a firm price or, in
appropriate cases, an adjustable price; firm-fixed-price contracts
provide for a price not subject to adjustment on the basis of the
contractor's experience in performing the contract; cost-plus-
incentive-fee contracts provide for the reimbursement of allowable
costs plus an initially negotiated fee, to be adjusted later based on
the relationship of total allowable costs to total target costs; cost-
plus-award-fee contracts provide for the reimbursement of allowable
costs plus a base fee fixed at the contract's inception (which may be
zero) and an award amount that the government determines to be
sufficient to motivate excellence in performance; cost-plus-fixed-fee
contracts provide for the reimbursement of allowable costs plus a
negotiated fee fixed at the inception of the contract.
[A] The initial contract type of the task order was a cost-plus-award-
fee. A final award fee determination did not take place because of
scope and schedule changes. In lieu of the final award fee
determination, the contract type was changed to a cost-plus-fixed-fee.
[B] The travel component of the task order is cost reimbursable.
[C] The initial contract type of the task order was cost-plus-award-
fee. On July 31, 2009, additional development work was definitized as
a cost-plus-fixed-fee structure. Further, on September 30, 2009, the
software operations and maintenance component of the task order was
changed to a firm-fixed-price structure.
[D] The initial contract type of the task order was a cost-plus-
incentive-fee. On November 20, 2009, the performance and schedule
incentives component of the task order was changed to a cost-plus-
award-fee. The cost incentives component remains a cost-plus-
incentive- fee structure.
[E] The initial contract type of the task order was cost-plus-
incentive-fee. On November 6, 2009, future work under the task order
was changed to a cost-plus-fixed-fee structure.
[F] The travel component of the task order is cost reimbursable.
[End of table]
One of the completed task orders is for an effort known as Project 28,
which is a prototype system that covers 28 miles of the border in
CBP's Tucson Sector[Footnote 7] in Arizona, and has been operating
since February 2008. However, its completion took 8 months longer than
planned because of problems in integrating system components (e.g.,
cameras and radars) with the COP software. As we have reported,
[Footnote 8] these problems were attributable to, among other things,
limitations in requirements development and contractor oversight.
Through the task orders, CBP's strategy is to deliver SBInet
capabilities incrementally. To accomplish this, the SPO has adopted an
evolutionary system life cycle management approach in which system
capabilities are to be delivered to designated locations in a series
of discrete subsets of system functional and performance capabilities
that are referred to as blocks. The first block, which has been
designated as Block 1, includes the purchase of commercially available
surveillance systems, development of customized COP systems and
software, and use of existing CBP communications and network
capabilities. Such an incremental approach is a recognized best
practice for acquiring large-scale, complex systems because it allows
users access to new capabilities and tools sooner, and thus permits
both their early operational use and evaluation. Subsequent increments
of SBInet capabilities are to be delivered based on feedback and unmet
requirements, as well as the availability of new technologies.
In general, the SBInet life cycle management approach consists of four
primary work flow activities: (1) Planning Activity, (2) System Block
Activity, (3) Project Laydown Activity, and (4) Sustainment Activity.
During the Planning Activity, the most critical user needs are to be
identified and balanced against what is affordable and technologically
available. The outcome of this process is to be a set of capability
requirements that are to be acquired, developed, and deployed as a
specific block. This set of capabilities, once agreed to by all
stakeholders, is then passed to the System Block Activity, during
which the baseline system solution to be fielded is designed and
built. Also as part of this activity, the verification steps are to be
conducted on the individual system components and the integrated
system solution to ensure that they meet defined requirements. The
Project Laydown Activity is performed to configure the block solution
to a specific geographic area's unique operational characteristics.
This activity involves assessing the unique threats, terrain, and
environmental concerns associated with a particular area,
incorporating these needs into the system configuration to be deployed
to that area, obtaining any needed environmental permits, and
constructing the infrastructure and installing the configured system.
It also involves test and evaluation activities, including system
acceptance testing, to verify that the installed block system was
built as designed. The final activity, Sustainment, is focused on the
operations and maintenance of the deployed block solution and
supporting the user community.
Associated with each of these activities are various milestone or gate
reviews. For example, a key review for the System Block Activity is
the Critical Design Review (CDR). At this review, the block design and
requirements are baselined and formally controlled to approve and
track any changes. Among other things, this review is to verify that
the block solution will meet the stated requirements within the
program's cost and schedule commitments. An important review conducted
during the Project Laydown Activity is the Deployment Design Review.
At this review, information such as the status of environmental
reviews and land acquisitions for a specific geographic area is
assessed, and the location-specific system configuration is
determined. The Deployment Readiness Review is another key event
during this activity. During this review, readiness to begin site
preparation and construction is assessed.
In addition to the four above described workflow activities are
various key life cycle management processes, such as requirements
development and management, risk management, and test management.
Requirements development and management, among other things, involves
defining and aligning a hierarchy of five types of SBInet
requirements. These five types begin with high-level operational
requirements and are followed by increasingly more detailed lower-
level requirements, to include system, component, C3I/COP software,
and design requirements. To help it manage the requirements, the SPO
relies on Boeing's use of a database known as the Dynamic Object-
Oriented Requirements System (DOORS). The various types of SBInet
requirements are described in table 2.
Table 2: SBInet Requirements Types:
Type: Operational requirements;
Description: Describe the operational capabilities that the resulting
system must satisfy, and can be viewed as user requirements.
Type: System requirements;
Description: Describe the system performance, functional, and
nonfunctional characteristics, and provide the basis for system
design, development, integration, verification, and deployment.
Type: Component requirements;
Description: Describe required features of various surveillance
components (e.g., cameras and radars), and infrastructure (e.g.,
communications).
Type: C3I/COP requirements;
Description: Describe the functionality and capability of the COP
software, such as allowing the user to control and view information
from the sensors.
Type: Design requirements;
Description: Describe the operational, behavioral, and physical
characteristics of hardware and software interfaces.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of table]
Risk management entails taking proactive steps to identify and
mitigate potential problems before they become actual problems. The
SPO has defined a "risk" to be an uncertain event or condition that,
if it occurs, will have a negative effect on at least one program
objective, such as schedule, cost, scope, or technical performance.
The SPO has defined an "issue" as a risk that has been realized (i.e.,
a negative event or condition that currently exists or has a 100
percent future certainty of occurring). According to SBInet's risk
management process, anyone involved in the program can identify a
risk. Identified risks are submitted to the Risk Management Team,
which includes both the SPO Risk Manager and Boeing Risk Manager, for
preliminary review. If approved for further consideration, the risk is
entered into the Boeing-owned risk database, which is accessible by
SPO and Boeing officials. These risks are subsequently reviewed by the
Joint Risk Review Board, which is composed of approximately 20 SPO and
Boeing officials. If a risk is approved, it is to be assigned an owner
who will be responsible for managing its mitigation.
Test management involves planning, conducting, documenting, and
reporting on a series of test events that first focus on the
performance of individual system components, then on the performance
of integrated system components, followed by system-level tests that
focus on whether the system (or major system increments) are
acceptable and operationally suitable. For SBInet, the program's
formal test events fall into two major phases: developmental test and
evaluation (DT&E) and operational test and evaluation (OT&E). DT&E is
to verify and validate the systems engineering process and provide
confidence that the system design solution satisfies the desired
capabilities. It consists of four test events--integration testing,
component qualification testing, system qualification testing, and
system acceptance testing. OT&E is to ensure that the system is
effective and suitable in its operational environment with respect to
key considerations, including reliability, availability,
compatibility, and maintainability. SBInet defines three operational
testing events-- User Assessment, Operational Test, and Follow-on
Operational Test and Evaluation. (See table 3 for each test event's
purpose, responsible parties, and location.)
Table 3: Overview of Formal Test Events:
DT&E events:
Test: Integration testing;
Purpose: Demonstrate interoperability among system components, and
ensure the proper functioning of individual component hardware and
software interfaces;
Party responsible: Contractor performs with SPO witnesses;
Location: Laboratory and field test site.
Test: Component qualification testing;
Purpose: Verify the functional performance of individual components
against component requirements;
Party responsible: Contractor performs with SPO witnesses;
Location: Laboratory and field test site.
Test: System qualification testing;
Purpose: Verify that the system design satisfies system-level
requirements;
Party responsible: Contractor performs with SPO witnesses;
Location: Field test site and deployment site.
Test: System acceptance testing;
Purpose: Verify that the deployed system is built as designed and
performs as predicted in the deployed environment;
Party responsible: Contractor performs with SPO witnesses;
Location: Deployment site.
OT&E events:
Test: User assessment;
Purpose: Identify potential operational problems and progress toward
meeting requirements using the version of the system tested during
system qualification testing;
Party responsible: CBP, SPO, and U.S. Army Independent Test &
Evaluation Team performs;
Location: Field test site.
Test: Operational test;
Purpose: Determine whether the system meets defined key performance
parameters in its operational environment;
Party responsible: CBP and U.S. Army Independent Test & Evaluation
Team performs;
Location: Deployment site.
Test: Follow-on operational test and evaluation;
Purpose: Refine estimates made during OT&E, evaluate changes, and re-
evaluate the system to ensure that it continues to meet operational
needs;
Party responsible: U.S. Army Independent Test & Evaluation Team
performs;
Location: Deployment site.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of table]
As of December 2009, the program was in the Project Laydown Activity.
Specifically, the SBInet CDR was completed in October 2008, and the
Block 1 design has been configured and is being tested and readied for
deployment to the Tucson Border Patrol Station (TUS-1), and then to
the Ajo Border Patrol Station (AJO-1), both of which are located in
the CBP's Tucson Sector of the southwest border. More specifically,
the Deployment Design Review covering both TUS-1 and AJO-1 was
completed in June 2007, the TUS-1 Deployment Readiness Review was
completed in April 2009, and the AJO-1 Deployment Readiness Review was
completed in December 2009. Together, these two deployments are to
cover 53 miles of the 1,989-mile-long southern border[Footnote 9] (see
figure 2). Once a deployed configuration has been accepted and is
operational, the program will be in the Sustainment Activity. As of
November 2009, program documentation showed that TUS-1 and AJO-1 were
to be accepted in January and July 2010, respectively. However, the
SBI Executive Director told us in December 2009 that these and other
SBInet scheduled milestones are currently being re-evaluated. As of
February 2010, TUS-1 and AJO-1 were proposed to be accepted in
September 2010 and November 2010, respectively. However, this proposed
schedule has yet to be approved by CBP.
Figure 2: Map of Block 1 Deployments:
[Refer to PDF for image: map of the southwestern U.S.]
Depicted on the map are the following:
TUS-1;
AJO-i;
Area of deployment for Block 1;
Tucson sector;
Yuma sector.
Sources: GAO analysis of DHS data, MapArt (map).
[End of figure]
GAO Has Previously Reported on Numerous SBInet Management Weaknesses
and Risks:
Since 2007, we have identified a range of management weaknesses and
risks facing SBInet and we have made a number of recommendations to
address them that DHS has largely agreed with and, to varying degrees,
taken actions to address. For example, in February 2007, we reported
that DHS had not fully defined activities, milestones, and costs for
implementing the program; demonstrated how program activities would
further the strategic goals and objectives of SBI; and reported on the
costs incurred, activities, and progress made by the program in
obtaining operational control of the border.[Footnote 10] Further, we
reported that the program's schedule contained a high level of
concurrency among related tasks and activities, which introduced
considerable risk. Accordingly, we recommended that DHS define
explicit and measurable commitments relative to, among other things,
program capabilities, schedules, and costs, and re-examine the level
of concurrency in the schedule and adjust the acquisition strategy
appropriately. We are currently reviewing DHS's Fiscal Year 2010 SBI
Expenditure Plan to, among other things, determine the status of DHS's
actions to address these recommendations.
In October 2007, we testified that DHS had fallen behind in
implementing Project 28 due to software integration problems, although
program officials stated at that time that Boeing was making progress
in correcting the problems.[Footnote 11] Shortly thereafter, we
testified that while DHS had accepted Project 28, it did not fully
meet expectations.[Footnote 12] To benefit from this experience,
program officials stated that they identified a number of lessons
learned, including the need to increase input from Border Patrol
agents and other users in SBInet design and development.
In September 2008, we reported that important aspects of SBInet were
ambiguous and in a continued state of flux, making it unclear and
uncertain what technological capabilities were to be delivered
when.[Footnote 13] We concluded that the absence of clarity and
stability in key aspects of SBInet impaired the ability of Congress to
oversee the program and hold DHS accountable for results, and hampered
DHS's ability to measure program performance. As a result, we
recommended that the SPO establish and baseline the specific program
commitments, including the specific system functional and performance
capabilities that are to be deployed, and when they were to be
deployed.
Also, we reported that the SPO had not effectively performed key
requirements definition and management practices. For example, it had
not ensured that different levels of requirements were properly
aligned, as evidenced by our analysis of a random probability sample
of component requirements showing that a large percentage of them
could not be traced to higher-level system and operational
requirements. Also, some of SBInet's operational requirements, which
are the basis for all lower-level requirements, were found by an
independent DHS review to be unaffordable and unverifiable, thus
casting doubt on the quality of lower-level requirements that were
derived from them. As a result of these limitations, we concluded that
the risk of SBInet not meeting mission needs and performing as
intended was increased, as were the chances of the program needing
expensive and time-consuming system rework. We recommended that the
SPO implement key requirements development and management practices to
include (1) baselining requirements before system design and
development efforts begin; (2) analyzing requirements prior to being
baselined to ensure that they are complete, achievable, and
verifiable; and (3) tracing requirements to higher-level requirements,
lower-level requirements, and test cases.
We also reported that SBInet testing was not being effectively
managed. For example, the SPO had not tested the individual system
components to be deployed to the initial deployment locations, even
though the contractor had initiated integration testing of these
components with other system components and subsystems. Further, while
a test management strategy was drafted, it had not been finalized and
approved, and it did not contain, among other things, a clear
definition of testing roles and responsibilities; a high-level master
schedule of SBInet test activities; or sufficient detail to
effectively guide project-specific test planning, such as milestones
and metrics for specific project testing. We concluded that without a
structured and disciplined approach to testing, the risk that SBInet
would not satisfy user needs and operational requirements, thus
requiring system rework, was increased. We recommended that the SPO
(1) develop and document test practices prior to the start of testing;
(2) conduct appropriate component-level testing prior to integrating
system components; and (3) approve a test management strategy that, at
a minimum, includes a relevant testing schedule, establishes
accountability for testing activities by clearly defining testing
roles and responsibilities, and includes sufficient detail to allow
for testing and oversight activities to be clearly understood and
communicated to test stakeholders.
In light of these weaknesses and risks, we further recommended that
(1) the risks associated with planned SBInet acquisition, development,
testing, and deployment activities be immediately assessed and (2) the
results, including proposed alternative courses of action for
mitigating the risks, be provided to the CBP Commissioner and DHS's
senior leadership, as well as to the department's congressional
authorization and appropriations committees. DHS agreed with all but
one of the recommendations in our September 2008 report. The status of
DHS's efforts to implement these recommendations is summarized later
in this report and discussed in detail in appendix III.
In September 2009, we reported that SBInet had continued to experience
delays.[Footnote 14] For example, deployment to the entire southwest
border had slipped from early 2009 to 2016, and final acceptance of
TUS-1 and AJO-1 had slipped from November 2009 and March 2010 to
December 2009 and June 2010, respectively. We did not make additional
SBInet recommendations at that time.
Most recently, we reported in January 2010 that SBInet testing was not
being effectively managed.[Footnote 15] Specifically, while DHS's
approach to testing appropriately consisted of a series of
progressively expansive developmental and operational test events, the
test plans, cases, and procedures for the most recent test events were
not defined in accordance with important elements of relevant
guidance. For example, none of the plans adequately described testing
risks and only two of the plans included quality assurance procedures
for making changes to test plans during their execution. Further, a
relatively small percentage of test cases for these events described
the test inputs and the test environment (e.g., facilities and
personnel to be used), both of which are essential to effective
testing.
In addition, a large percentage of the test cases for these events
were changed extemporaneously during execution. While some of the
changes were minor, others were more significant, such as re-writing
entire procedures and changing the mapping of requirements to test
cases. Moreover, these changes to procedures were not made in
accordance with documented quality assurance processes, but rather
were based on an undocumented understanding that program officials
said they established with the contractor. Compounding the number and
significance of changes were questions raised by the SPO and a support
contractor about the appropriateness of some changes. For example, the
SPO wrote to the prime contractor that changes made to system
qualification test cases and procedures appeared to be designed to
pass the test instead of being designed to qualify the system.
Further, we reported that from March 2008 through July 2009, that
about 1,300 SBInet defects had been found, with the number of new
defects identified during this time generally increasing faster than
the number being fixed--a trend that is not indicative of a system
that is maturing and ready for deployment. While the full magnitude of
these unresolved defects was unclear because the majority were not
assigned a priority for resolution, some of the defects that had been
found were significant. Although DHS reported that these defects had
been resolved, they had nevertheless caused program delays, and
related problems had surfaced that continued to impact the program's
schedule. Further, an early user assessment of SBInet had raised
significant concerns about the performance of key system components
and the system's operational suitability.
In light of these weaknesses, we recommended that DHS (1) revise the
program's overall test plan to include (a) explicit criteria for
assessing the quality of test documentation, including test plans and
test cases, and (b) a process for analyzing, prioritizing, and
resolving program defects; (2) ensure that test schedules, plans,
cases, and procedures are adequately reviewed and approved consistent
with the revised test plan; (3) ensure that sufficient time is
provided for reviewing and approving test documents prior to beginning
a given test event; and (4) triage the full inventory of unresolved
system problems, including identified user concerns, and periodically
report on their status to CBP and DHS leadership. DHS fully agreed
with the last three recommendations and partially agreed with the
first.
Block 1 Capabilities, Geographic Coverage, and Performance Standards
Continue to Decrease:
For Block 1, functional and performance capabilities and the number of
geographic locations to which they are to be deployed have continued
to decrease. We reported in September 2008 that the capabilities and
deployment locations of SBInet were decreasing.[Footnote 16] Since
that time, the number of component-level requirements to be deployed
to TUS- 1 and AJO-1 has decreased by about 32 percent. In addition,
the number of sectors that the system is to be deployed to has been
reduced from three to two, and the stringency of the system
performance measures that the deployed system is to meet has been
reduced. According to program officials, the decreases are due to
poorly defined requirements and limitations in the capabilities of
commercially available system components. The result will be a
deployed and operational system that, like Project 28, does not live
up to user expectations and provides less mission support than was
envisioned.
Functional Capabilities Have Been Reduced:
Since our September 2008 report, the number of requirements that Block
1 is to meet has dropped considerably. Specifically, in September
2008, DHS directed the SPO to identify the operational requirements to
be allocated to Block 1. In response, 106 operational requirements
were established, such as providing border surveillance, facilitating
decision support and situational awareness, enabling communications,
providing operational status and readiness metrics, and enabling
system audits. Of the 106 requirements, 69 were to be included in the
initial technology deployments planned for TUS-1 and AJO-1. The
remaining 37 were to be addressed in future blocks.
To implement the 69 operational requirements, the SPO developed a
system-level requirement specification and 12 component-level
requirements specifications.[Footnote 17] More specifically, as part
of CDR, which concluded in October 2008, the 69 operational
requirements for TUS-1 and AJO-1 were associated with 97 system-level
requirements. Also during CDR, the 97 system-level requirements were
associated with 1,286 component-level requirements.
However, between October 2008 and September 2009, the number of
component-level requirements was reduced from 1,286 to 880, or by
about 32 percent. First, 281 requirements related to the
specifications for three components--communications, network
operations, and network security--were eliminated, leaving 1,005
baselined requirements.[Footnote 18]
Examples of the 281 requirements that were eliminated include the
following:
* the failure in a single piece of hardware or software would not
affect mission critical functions which include detection and
resolution of border incursions;
* the failure of a Network Operations Center/Security Operations
Center[Footnote 19] (NOC/SOC) workstation would not prevent the system
from operating; and:
* the failure of one network power supply would be compensated for by
additional backup power supplies.
In addition, another 125 component-level requirements were granted
"waivers" or "deviations,"[Footnote 20] further reducing the number of
Block 1 requirements to be deployed to TUS-1 and AJO-1 to 880 (as of
September 2009). For example, the unattended ground sensors were
required to differentiate between human, vehicle, and animal targets.
However, because the sensors that are to be deployed to TUS-1 and AJO-
1 are only able to identify potential vehicles and are not able to
differentiate between humans and animals, this requirement was
deviated. Similarly, the radar was required to classify targets as
humans or vehicles. However, the radar also cannot differentiate
between classes of targets (e.g., humans and vehicles). As a result,
the requirement in the radar specification was also deviated.
Figure 3 summarizes the roughly 32 percent drop in requirements that
has occurred over the last 15 months.
Figure 3: Illustration of Reduction in Block 1 Requirements:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
As of October 2008: 1,286;
As of September 2009: 1,005;
After waivers and deviations as of September 2009: 880.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of figure]
According to program officials, component requirements were eliminated
because they were either poorly written or duplicative of other
requirements, or because the capabilities of commercially available
products were limited. In addition, they attributed a significant
number of eliminated requirements to a decision to not use a Boeing
designed and developed network and instead to use an existing DHS
network. To the SPO's credit, this decision was made to align SBInet
with DHS technical standards and to increase the use of COTS products.
Compounding this reduction in Block 1 requirements is the likelihood
that further requirements deviations and waivers will be granted based
on the results of an early user assessment of the system.[Footnote 21]
According to the July 2009 assessment report, certain SBInet
components did not meet requirements. For example:
* The daytime cameras were judged to be operationally ineffective over
5 kilometers for identifying humans, while the requirement is that the
cameras be usable to 10 kilometers.
* The laser range finder[Footnote 22] was determined to have an
effective range of less than 2 kilometers, while the requirement is
for the effective range to be 10 kilometers.
Program officials told us that many of the limitations found during
the user assessment were previously known, and corrective actions were
already under way or planned for future technology upgrades to address
them. However, the officials also stated they plan to issue a waiver
or deviation for the camera and the laser range finder to address the
two problems discussed above. In addition, they stated that a
previously known limitation of the range of the radar will also need
to be addressed through a deviation. In this case, the radar is
required to have a range of 20 kilometers, but testing shows a maximum
range of 10 kilometers.
Geographic Coverage Has Been Reduced:
Beyond the requirement reductions, the geographic locations to receive
the initial SBInet capabilities have also been reduced. As of
September 2008, the initial Block 1 deployment was to span three
border patrol sectors: Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso--a total of 655
miles. According to program officials, deployment to these three areas
was the expressed priority of the Border Patrol due to the high threat
levels in these areas. However, the Acquisition Program Baseline,
[Footnote 23] which was drafted in December 2008, states that initial
deployment will be to just the Tucson and Yuma Sectors, which will
cover only 387 miles.
According to program officials, deployment to the 268 miles of the El
Paso Sector was dropped from the initial deployment in anticipation
that the sector will instead receive the capabilities slated for the
next SBInet increment (i.e., build). However, plans for the next
increment have not been developed. According to the SBI Executive
Director in December 2009, the SPO is re-evaluating where and when
future deployments of SBInet will occur, and a date for when the
revised deployment plans will be available has not been set.
Performance Capabilities Have Decreased:
System performance measures define how well a system is to perform
certain functions, and thus are important in ensuring that the system
meets mission and user needs. According to program documentation,
failure to meet a key performance parameter can limit the value of the
system and render it unsuccessful. In November 2008, the SPO re-
evaluated its existing SBInet key performance parameters and
determined that SBInet must meet three such parameters: (1) the
probability of detecting items of interest between the border and the
control boundary; (2) the probability of correctly identifying items
of interest as human, conveyance, or others; and (3) the operational
availability of the system.[Footnote 24] According to program
officials, subject matter experts and CBP staff concluded that these
three were critical to determining whether the system successfully
meets mission and user needs.
Associated with each parameter is a threshold for acceptable
performance. In November 2008, the SPO re-evaluated the thresholds for
its three key performance parameters, and it significantly relaxed
each of the thresholds:
* The threshold for detecting items of interest dropped from 95
percent to 70 percent.
* The threshold for identifying items of interest declined from 95
percent to 70 percent.[Footnote 25]
* The threshold for operational availability decreased from 95 to 85
percent.
These threshold reductions significantly lower what constitutes
acceptable system performance. For example, the system will meet its
detection and identification performance requirements if it identifies
70 percent of the 70 percent of items that it detects, thus producing
a 49 percent probability of identifying items of interest that cross
the border. Furthermore, the reduction in operational availability
means that the time that the system can be unavailable for use has
gone from 18.25 days per year to 54.75 days per year--or from
approximately 2.5 weeks to about 7 weeks per year, excluding downtime
for planned maintenance.
The SBI Executive Director attributed the performance reductions to
program officials' limited understanding of needed operational
capabilities at the time the parameters and thresholds were set. The
director further stated that once Block 1 has been deployed and Border
Patrol personnel gain experience operating it, decisions will be made
as to what additional changes to make to the key performance
parameters and associated thresholds. Until then, system performance
relative to identifying items of interest and operational availability
will remain as described above, which program officials agreed fall
short of expectations.
A Reliable Schedule for Completing Block 1 Has Not Been Developed:
The success of a large-scale system acquisition program like SBInet
depends in part on having a reliable schedule of when the program's
set of work activities and milestone events will occur, how long they
will take, and how they are related to one another. Among other
things, a reliable schedule provides a road map for systematic
execution of a program and the means by which to gauge progress,
identify and address potential problems, and promote accountability.
Our research has identified nine best practices associated with
developing and maintaining a reliable schedule.[Footnote 26] These are
(1) capturing all activities, (2) sequencing all activities, (3)
assigning resources to all activities, (4) establishing the duration
of all activities, (5) integrating activities horizontally and
vertically, (6) establishing the critical path for all activities, (7)
identifying reasonable float between activities, (8) conducting a
schedule risk analysis, and (9) updating the schedule using logic and
durations. To be considered reliable, a schedule should meet all nine
practices.
The August 2009 SBInet integrated master schedule, which was the most
current version available for our review, is not reliable because it
substantially complies with only two of the nine key schedule
estimating practices and it does not comply with, or only partially or
minimally complies with, the remaining seven practices (see table 4
for a summary and appendix IV for the detailed results of our analysis
of the extent to which the schedule meets each of the nine practices).
Table 4: Summary of SBInet Integrated Master Schedule Satisfaction of
Schedule Estimating Practices:
Practice: Capturing all activities;
Met? Minimally.
Practice: Sequencing all activities;
Met? Substantially.
Practice: Assigning resources to all activities;
Met? Minimally.
Practice: Establishing the duration of all activities;
Met? Substantially.
Practice: Integrating schedule activities horizontally and vertically;
Met? Partially.
Practice: Establishing the critical path for all activities;
Met? Partially.
Practice: Identifying reasonable float between activities;
Met? Partially.
Practice: Conducting a schedule risk analysis;
Met? Not.
Practice: Updating the schedule using logic and durations to determine
the dates;
Met? Partially.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
Note: "Not" means the program provided no evidence that satisfies any
portion of the criterion. "Minimally" means the program provided
evidence that satisfies less than one-half of the criterion.
"Partially" means the program provided evidence that satisfies about
one-half of the criterion. "Substantially" means the program provided
evidence that satisfies more than one-half of the criterion.
[End of table]
Examples of practices that were either substantially, partially,
minimally, or not met are provided below. Without having a reliable
schedule, it is unlikely that actual program execution will track to
plans, thus increasing the risk of cost, schedule, and performance
shortfalls.
* Capturing all activities: The schedule does not capture all
activities as defined in the program's work breakdown structure
[Footnote 27] or integrated master plan.[Footnote 28] First, 57
percent of the activities listed in the work breakdown structure (71
of 125) and 67 percent of the activities listed in the integrated
master plan (46 of 69) were not in the integrated master schedule. For
example, the schedule is missing efforts associated with systems
engineering, sensor towers, logistics, system test and evaluation,
operations support, and program management. Second, the schedule does
not include key activities to be performed by the government. For
example, while the schedule shows the final activity in the government
process for obtaining an environmental permit in order to construct
towers, it does not include the related government activities needed
to obtain the permit.
* Sequencing all activities: The schedule identifies virtually all of
the predecessor and successor activities. Specifically, only 9 of
1,512 activities (less than 1 percent) were missing predecessor links.
Further, only 21 of 1,512 activities (about 1 percent) had improper
predecessor and successor links. While the number of unlinked
activities is very small, not linking a given activity can cause
problems because changes to the durations of these activities will not
accurately change the dates for related activities. More importantly,
403 of 1,512 activities (about 27 percent) are constrained by "start
no earlier than" dates, which is significant because it means that
these activities are not allowed to start earlier, even if their
respective predecessor activities have been completed.
* Establishing the critical path for all activities: The schedule does
not reflect a valid critical path[Footnote 29] for several reasons.
First, and as noted above, it is missing government and contractor
activities, and is thus not complete. Second, as mentioned above, the
schedule is missing some predecessor links, and improperly establishes
other predecessor and successor links. Problems with the critical path
were recognized by the Defense Contract Management Agency[Footnote 30]
as early as November 2008, when it reported that the contractor could
not develop a true critical path that incorporates all program
elements.
* Conducting a schedule risk analysis: An analysis of the schedule's
vulnerability to slippages in the completion of tasks has not been
performed. Further, program officials described the schedule as not
sufficiently stable to benefit from a risk analysis.
Reasons that these practices were not fully met vary and include the
program's use of Boeing to develop and maintain the integrated master
schedule, even though Boeing's processes and tools do not allow it to
include in the schedule work that it does not have under contract to
perform, as well as the constantly changing nature of the work to be
performed. Without a reliable schedule that includes all activities
necessary to complete Block 1, the SPO cannot accurately determine the
amount of time required to complete Block 1, and it does not have an
adequate basis for guiding the program's execution and measuring
progress, thus reducing the likelihood of meeting the program's
completion dates.
Collectively, the weaknesses in meeting the nine key practices for the
program's integrated master schedule increase the risk of schedule
slippages and related cost overruns and make meaningful measurement
and oversight of program status and progress, as well as
accountability for results, difficult to achieve. In the case of Block
1, this risk has continued to be realized. For example, the dates
presented at the December 2008 to November 2009 monthly program review
meetings for government acceptance of Block 1 at TUS-1 and AJO-1
showed a pattern of delays, with TUS-1 and AJO-1 acceptance slipping
by 4 months and 7 months, respectively. (See figure 4.) Moreover,
these slipped dates have not been met, and the SBI Executive Director
told us in December 2009 that when Block 1 will be accepted and
operational continues to change and remains uncertain. As of February
2010, TUS-1 and AJO-1 were proposed to be accepted in September 2010
and November 2010, respectively; however, this proposed schedule has
yet to be approved by CBP.
Figure 4: Projected TUS-1 and AJO-1 Acceptance Dates Presented at
Monthly Program Review Meetings:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Program review date: December 2008;
TUS-1 acceptance: September 2009;
AJO-1 acceptance: December 2009.
Program review date: January 2009;
TUS-1 acceptance: November 2009;
AJO-1 acceptance: May 2010.
Program review date: February 2009;
TUS-1 acceptance: November 2009;
AJO-1 acceptance: May 2010.
Program review date: March 2009;
TUS-1 acceptance: November 2009;
AJO-1 acceptance: March 2010.
Program review date: April 2009;
TUS-1 acceptance: December 2009;
AJO-1 acceptance: July 2010.
Program review date: May 2009;
TUS-1 acceptance: January 2010;
AJO-1 acceptance: June 2010.
Program review date: June 2009;
TUS-1 acceptance: January 2010;
AJO-1 acceptance: July 2010;
Program review date: July 2009;
TUS-1 acceptance: January 2010;
AJO-1 acceptance: March 2010.
Program review date: August 2009;
TUS-1 acceptance: February 2010;
AJO-1 acceptance: June 2010.
Program review date: September 2009;
TUS-1 acceptance: No report this month;
AJO-1 acceptance: No report this month.
Program review date: October 2009;
TUS-1 acceptance: January 2010;
AJO-1 acceptance: June 2010.
Program review date: November 2009;
TUS-1 acceptance: January 2010;
AJO-1 acceptance: July 2010.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of figure]
Cost-Effectiveness of Block 1 Has Not Been Demonstrated:
As we have previously reported,[Footnote 31] the decision to invest in
any system or major system increment should be based on reliable
estimates of costs and meaningful forecasts of quantifiable and
qualitative benefits over the system's useful life. For Block 1, DHS
does not have a complete and current life cycle cost estimate.
Moreover, it has not projected the mission benefits expected to accrue
from Block 1 over the same life cycle. According to program officials,
it is premature to project such benefits given the uncertainties
surrounding the role that Block 1 will ultimately play in overall
border control operations. Without a meaningful understanding of
SBInet costs and benefits, DHS lacks an adequate basis for knowing
whether the initial system solution on which it plans to spend at
least $1.3 billion is cost-effective. Moreover, DHS and congressional
decision makers continue to lack a basis for deciding what investment
in SBInet beyond this initial capability is economically prudent.
Life Cycle Costs Have Not Been Reliably Estimated:
A reliable cost estimate is critical to successfully delivering large-
scale information technology (IT) systems, like SBInet, as well as
major system increments, like Block 1. Such an estimate provides the
basis for informed investment decision making, realistic budget
formulation, meaningful progress measurement, and accountability for
results. According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
[Footnote 32] federal agencies must maintain current and well-
documented estimates of program costs, and these estimates must
encompass the program's full life cycle. Among other things, OMB
states that a reliable life cycle cost estimate is critical to the
capital planning and investment control process. Without such an
estimate, agencies are at increased risk of making poorly informed
investment decisions and securing insufficient resources to
effectively execute defined program plans and schedules, and thus
experiencing program cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls.
Our research has identified a number of practices that form the basis
of effective program cost estimating.[Footnote 33] These practices are
aligned with four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate. To be
reliable, a cost estimate should possess all four characteristics,
each of which is summarized below. (See appendix V for the key
practices associated with each characteristic, including a description
of each practice and our analysis of the extent to which the SBInet
cost estimate meets each practice.)
* Comprehensive: The cost estimate should include all government and
contractor costs over the program's full life cycle, from program
inception through design, development, deployment, and operation and
maintenance to retirement. It should also provide sufficient detail to
ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor double counted, and
it should document all cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions.
* Well-documented: The cost estimate should capture in writing things
such as the source and significance of the data used, the calculations
performed and their results, and the rationale for choosing a
particular estimating method or reference. Moreover, this information
should be captured in such a way that the data used to derive the
estimate can be traced back to, and verified against, their sources.
Finally, the cost estimate should be reviewed and accepted by
management to demonstrate confidence in the estimating process and the
estimate.
* Accurate: The cost estimate should not be overly conservative or
optimistic, and should be, among other things, based on an assessment
of most likely costs, adjusted properly for inflation, and validated
against an independent cost estimate. In addition, the estimate should
be updated regularly to reflect material changes in the program and
actual cost experience on the program. Further, steps should be taken
to minimize mathematical mistakes and their significance and to ground
the estimate in documented assumptions and a historical record of
actual cost and schedule experiences on comparable programs.
* Credible: The cost estimate should discuss any limitations in the
analysis due to uncertainty or biases surrounding the data and
assumptions. Major assumptions should be varied and other outcomes
computed to determine how sensitive the estimate is to changes in the
assumptions. Risk and uncertainty inherent in the estimate should be
assessed and disclosed. Further, the estimate should be properly
verified by, for example, comparing the results with one or more
independent cost estimates.
The SPO's Block 1 life cycle cost estimate includes the costs to
complete those portions of Block 1 that are to be deployed to the
Tucson and Yuma Sectors, which together cover about 387 miles of the
southwest border (53 miles associated with both TUS-1 and AJO-1, which
are in the Tucson Sector, as well as an additional 209 miles in the
Tucson Sector and 125 miles in the Yuma Sector). More specifically,
this estimate, which is dated December 2008, shows the minimum cost to
acquire and deploy Block 1 to the Tucson and Yuma Sectors to be $758
million, with another $544 million to operate and maintain this
initial capability, for a total of about $1.3 billion.
However, this Block 1 cost estimate is not reliable because it does
not sufficiently possess any of the above four characteristics.
Specifically:
* The estimate is not comprehensive because it does not include all
relevant costs, such as support contractor costs and costs associated
with system and software design, development, and testing activities
that were incurred prior to December 2008. Moreover, it includes only
1 year of operations and maintenance costs rather than these costs
over the expected life of the system. Further, the estimate does not
document and assess the risks associated with all ground rules and
assumptions, such as known budget constraints, staff and schedule
variations, and technology maturity.
* The estimate is not well-documented because, among other things, the
sources and significance of key data have not been captured and the
quality of key data, such as historical costs and actual cost reports,
is limited. For example, instead of identifying and relying on
historical costs from similar programs, the estimate was based, in
part, on engineering judgment. Further, the calculations performed and
their results, while largely documented, did not document contingency
reserves and the associated confidence level for the risk-adjusted
cost estimate. Also, as noted above, assumptions integral to the
estimate, such as those for budget constraints, and staff and schedule
variances, were not documented.
* The estimate is not accurate because it was not, for example,
validated against an independent cost estimate. Further, it has not
been updated to reflect material program changes since the estimate
was developed. For example, the estimate does not reflect development
and testing activities that were added since the estimate was approved
to correct problems discovered during testing. Further, the estimate
has not been updated with actual cost data available from the
contractor.
* The estimate is not credible because its inherent risk and
uncertainty were not adequately assessed, and thus the estimate does
not address limitations associated with the assumptions used to create
it. For example, the risks associated with software development were
not examined, even though such risks were known to exist. In fact, the
only risks considered were those associated with uncertainty in labor
rates and hardware costs, and instead of being based on historical
quantitative analyses, these risks were expressed by assigning them
arbitrary positive or negative percentages. In addition, and for the
reasons mentioned above, the estimate did not specify contingency
reserve amounts to mitigate known risks, and an independent cost
estimate was not used to verify the estimate.
Program officials attributed these limitations in the cost estimate's
comprehensiveness, documentation, accuracy, and credibility to a range
of factors, including competing program office priorities and the
department's limited cost estimating capabilities. For example,
program officials stated that the DHS Cost Analysis Division did not
prepare an independent estimate because it did not have, among other
things, the people and tools needed to do so. In this regard, this
division reports that as of July 2009, DHS only had eight cost
estimators (six in headquarters and two in program offices) for
departmentwide needs.
Because the estimate does not adequately display these four
characteristics, it does not provide a reliable picture of Block 1's
life cycle costs. As a result, DHS does not have complete information
on which to base informed investment decision making, understand
system affordability, and develop justifiable budget requests.
Moreover, the Block 1 cost estimate does not provide a meaningful
standard against which to measure cost performance, is likely to show
large cost overruns, and does not provide a good basis for informing
future cost estimates.
Expected Mission Benefits Have Yet to Be Adequately Defined:
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 and OMB guidance[Footnote 34] emphasize
the need to ensure that IT investments actually produce tangible,
observable improvements in mission performance. As we have previously
reported,[Footnote 35]to accomplish this, benefits that are expected
to accrue from investments need to be forecast and their actual
accrual needs to be measured.
In the case of Block 1, however, expected mission benefits have not
been defined and measured. For example, while program officials told
us that system benefits are documented in the SBInet Mission Need
Statement dated October 2006, this document does not include either
quantifiable or qualitative benefits. Rather, it provides general
statements such as "the lack of a program such as SBInet increases the
risks of terrorist threats and other illegal activities."
Congress recognized the importance of having a meaningful
understanding of SBInet's value proposition when it required DHS in
2008 to provide in its Border Security, Fencing, Infrastructure, and
Technology Fiscal Year 2009 Expenditure Plan[Footnote 36] a
description of how the department's planned expenditure of funds would
be linked to expected SBI mission benefits and outcomes. However, we
reported that the plan DHS submitted only described links among
planned activities, expenditures, and outputs. It did not link these
to outcomes associated with improving operational control of the
border.[Footnote 37] More recently, we reported that while SBI
technology and physical infrastructure, along with increases in Border
Patrol personnel, are intended to allow DHS to gain effective control
of U.S. borders, CBP's measures of effective control are limited.
Thus, we recommended that CBP conduct a cost-effectiveness evaluation
of the SBI tactical infrastructure's impact on effective control of
the border, and DHS agreed with this recommendation.[Footnote 38]
Further, program officials noted that uncertainty about SBInet's role
in and contribution to effective control of the border makes it
difficult to forecast SBInet benefits. Rather, they said that
operational experience with Block 1 is first needed in order to
estimate such benefits.
While we recognize the value of operationally evaluating an early,
prototypical version of a system in order to better understand, among
other things, its mission impact, and thus to better inform investment
decisions, we question the basis for spending in excess of a billion
dollars to gain this operational experience. Without a meaningful
understanding and disclosure of SBInet benefits, to include the extent
to which expected mission benefits are known and unknown, DHS did not
have the necessary basis for justifying and making informed decisions
about its sizeable investment in Block 1, as well as for measuring the
extent to which the deployed Block 1 will actually deliver mission
value commensurate with costs.
Block 1 Has Not Been Managed in Accordance with Key Life Cycle
Management Processes:
Successful management of large IT programs, like SBInet, depends in
large part on having clearly defined and consistently applied life
cycle management processes. Our evaluations and research show that
applying system life cycle management rigor and discipline increases
the likelihood of delivering expected capabilities on time and within
budget.[Footnote 39] In other words, the quality of a system is
greatly influenced by the quality of the processes used to manage it.
To the SPO's credit, it has defined key life cycle management
processes that are largely consistent with relevant guidance and
associated best practices. However, it has not effectively implemented
these processes. Specifically, it has not consistently followed its
systems engineering plan, requirements development and management
plan, and risk management approach. Reasons cited by program officials
for not implementing these processes include the decision by program
officials to rely on contract task order requirements that were
developed prior to the systems engineering plan, and competing SPO
priorities, including meeting an aggressive deployment schedule. Until
the SPO consistently implements these processes, it will remain
challenged in its ability to successfully deliver SBInet.
Key System Life Cycle Management Activities Have Not Been Consistently
Performed:
Each of the steps in a life cycle management approach serves an
important purpose and has inherent dependencies with one or more other
steps. In addition, the steps used in the approach should be clearly
defined and repeatable. Thus, if a life cycle management step is
omitted or not performed effectively, later steps can be affected,
potentially resulting in costly and time-consuming rework. For
example, a system can be effectively tested to determine whether it
meets requirements only if these requirements have been completely and
correctly defined. To the extent that interdependent life cycle
management steps or activities are not effectively performed, or are
performed concurrently, a program will be at increased risk of cost,
schedule, and performance shortfalls.
The SPO's Systems Engineering Plan documents its life cycle management
approach for SBInet definition, development, testing, deployment, and
sustainment. As noted earlier, we reported in September 2008 on a
number of weaknesses in the SBInet life cycle management approach and
made recommendations to improve it.[Footnote 40]In response, the SPO
revised its Systems Engineering Plan in November 2008, and to its
credit, the revised plan is largely consistent with DHS and other
relevant guidance.[Footnote 41] For example, it defines a number of
key life cycle milestone or "gate" reviews that are important in
managing the program, such as initial planning reviews, requirements
reviews, system design reviews, and test reviews. In addition, the
revised plan requires most of the key artifacts and program documents
that DHS guidance identified as important to each gate review, such as
a concept of operations, an operational requirements document, a
deployment plan, a risk management plan, a life cycle cost estimate,
requirements documentation, and test plans. To illustrate, the plan
identifies CDR as the important milestone event where a design
baseline is to be established, requirements traceability is to be
demonstrated, and verification and testing plans are to be in place.
However, the Systems Engineering Plan does not address the content of
the key artifacts that it requires. For example, it does not provide a
sample document or content template for the concept of operations, the
operational requirements document, or the deployment plan. As a
result, the likelihood of the developers and reviewers of these
artifacts sharing and applying a consistent and repeatable
understanding of their content is minimized, thus increasing the risk
that they will require costly and time-consuming rework. As we
recently reported,[Footnote 42] the absence of content guidance or
criteria for assessing the quality of the prime contractor's test-
related deliverables was a primary reason that limitations were found
in test plans.
Beyond the content of the Systems Engineering Plan, the SPO has not
consistently implemented key system life cycle management activities
for Block 1 that are identified by the plan. For example, the
following artifacts were not reviewed or considered during the CDR
that concluded in October 2008:
* Security Test Plan, which describes the process for assessing the
robustness of the system's security capabilities (e.g., physical
facilities, hardware, software, and communications) in light of their
vulnerabilities.
* Quality Plan, which documents the process for verifying that the
contractor deliverables satisfy contractual requirements and meet or
exceed quality standards.
* Test Plan, which describes the overall process for the test and
evaluation, including the development of detailed test event plans,
test procedure instructions, data collection methods, and evaluation
reports.
* Block Training Plan, which outlines the objectives, strategy, and
curriculum for training that are specific to each block, including the
activities needed to support the development of training materials,
coordination of training schedules, and reservation of personnel and
facilities.
* Block Maintenance Plan, which lays out the policies and concepts to
be used to maintain the operational availability of hardware and
software.
To the SPO's credit, it reviewed and considered all but one of the key
artifacts for the TUS-1 Deployment Readiness Review that concluded in
April 2009. The omitted artifact was the Site Specific Training Plan,
which outlines the objectives, strategy, and curriculum for training
that are specific to each geographic site, including the activities
needed to support the development of training materials, coordination
of training schedules, and reservation of personnel and facilities.
According to program officials, even though the Systems Engineering
Plan cites the training plan as integral to the Deployment Readiness
Review, this training plan is to be reviewed as part of a later
milestone review.
Program officials stated that a reason that the artifacts were omitted
is that they have yet to begin implementing the Systems Engineering
Plan. Instead, they have, for example, enforced the CDR requirements
in the System Task Order that Boeing was contractually required to
follow. To address this, they added that the SPO intends to bring the
task orders into alignment with the Systems Engineering Plan, but they
did not specify when this would occur. As a result, key milestone
reviews and decisions have not always benefited from life cycle
management documentation that the SPO has determined to be relevant
and important to these milestone events. More specifically, the
Systems Engineering Plan states that the gate reviews are intended to
identify and address problems early and thus minimize future costs and
avoid subsequent operational issues. By not fully informing these gate
reviews and associated decisions with key life cycle management
documentation, the risk of Block 1 design and deployment problems is
increased, as is the likelihood of expensive and time-consuming system
rework.
Key Block 1 Requirements Have Not Been Adequately Developed and
Managed:
Well-defined and managed requirements are essential to successfully
acquiring large-scale systems, like SBInet. According to relevant
guidance,[Footnote 43] effective requirements development and
management include establishing a baseline set of requirements that
are complete, unambiguous, and testable. It also includes ensuring
that system-level requirements are traceable backwards to higher-level
operational requirements and forward to design requirements and the
methods used to verify that they are met. Among other things, this
guidance states that such traceability should be used to verify that
higher-level requirements have been met by first verifying that the
corresponding lower-level requirements have been satisfied.
However, not all Block 1 component requirements were sufficiently
defined at the time that they were baselined, and operational
requirements continue to be unclear and unverifiable. In addition,
while requirements are now largely traceable backwards to operational
requirements and forward to design requirements and verification
methods, this traceability has not been used until recently to verify
that higher-level requirements have been satisfied. Program officials
attributed these limitations to competing SPO priorities, including
aggressive schedule demands. Without ensuring that requirements are
adequately defined and managed, the risks of Block 1 not performing as
intended, not meeting user needs, and costing more and taking longer
than necessary to complete are increased.
Not All Requirements Were Adequately Baselined:
The SBInet Requirements Development and Management Plan states that a
baseline set of requirements should be established by the time of the
CDR and that these requirements should be complete, unambiguous, and
testable. Further, the program's Systems Engineering Plan states that
the CDR is intended to establish the final allocated requirements
baseline and ensure that system development, integration, and testing
can begin.
To the SPO's credit, it established a baseline set of requirements for
the TUS-1 and AJO-1 system deployments at CDR. However, the baseline
requirements associated with the NOC/SOC were not adequately defined
at this time, as evidenced by the fact that they were significantly
changed 2 months later. Specifically, about 33 percent of the
component-level requirements and 43 percent of the design
specifications for NOC/SOC were eliminated from the Block 1 design
after CDR. Program officials attributed these changes to the NOC/SOC
requirements to (1) requirements that were duplicative of another
specification, and thus were redundant; (2) requirements that were
poorly written, and thus did not accurately describe needs; and (3)
requirements that related to the security of a system that SBInet
would not interface with, and thus were unnecessary.
According to program officials, the NOC/SOC was a late addition to the
program, and at the time of CDR, the component's requirements were
known to need additional work. Further, they stated that while the
requirements were not adequately baselined at the time of CDR, the
interface requirements were understood well enough to begin system
development.
Without properly baselined requirements, system testing challenges are
likely to occur, and the risk of system performance shortfalls, and
thus cost and schedule problems, are increased. In this regard, we
recently reported that NOC/SOC testing was hampered by incorrect
mapping of requirements to test cases, failure to test all of the
requirements, and significant changes to test cases made during the
testing events.[Footnote 44] This occurred in part because ambiguities
in requirements caused testers to rewrite test steps during execution
based on interpretations of what they thought the requirements meant,
and they required the SPO to conduct multiple events to test NOC/SOC
requirements.
Block 1 Operational Requirements Remain Poorly Defined:
According to the SBInet Requirements Development and Management Plan,
requirements should be achievable, verifiable, unambiguous, and
complete. To ensure this, the plan contains a checklist that is to be
used in verifying that each requirement possesses these
characteristics.
However, not all of the SBInet operational requirements that pertain
to Block 1 possess these characteristics. Specifically, a November
2007 DHS assessment[Footnote 45]determined that 19 operational
requirements, which form the basis for the lower-level requirements
used to design and build the system, were not complete, achievable,
verifiable, or affordable. Further, our analysis of the 12 Block 1
requirements that are included in these 19 operational requirements
shows that they have not been changed to respond to the DHS findings.
[Footnote 46] According to the assessment, 6 of the 12 were
unaffordable and unverifiable, and the other 6 were incomplete.
Examples of these requirements and DHS's assessment follow:
* A requirement that the system should provide for complete coverage
of the border was determined to be unverifiable and unaffordable
because defining what complete coverage meant was too difficult and
ensuring complete coverage, given the varied and difficult terrain
along the border, was cost prohibitive.
* A requirement that the system should be able to detect and identify
multiple simultaneous events with different individuals or groups was
determined to be incomplete because the requirement did not specify
the number of events to be included, the scope of the area to be
covered, and the system components to be involved.
As we have previously reported,[Footnote 47]these limitations in the
operational requirements affect the quality of system, component, and
software requirements. This is significant because, as of September
2009, these 12 operational requirements were associated with 16 system-
level requirements, which were associated with 152 component-level
requirements, or approximately 15 percent of the total number of
component-level requirements. According to program officials, these
requirements were not updated because the SPO planned to resolve the
problems through the testing process. However, we recently reported
that requirements limitations actually contributed to testing
challenges.[Footnote 48] Specifically, we reported that about 71
percent of combined system qualification and component qualification
[Footnote 49] test cases had to be rewritten extemporaneously during
test execution. According to program officials, this was partly due to
ambiguities in requirements, which led to differing opinions among the
program and contractor staff about what was required to effectively
demonstrate that the requirements were met.
Further, program officials stated that a number of requirements have
been granted deviations or waivers because they were poorly written.
For example:
* A requirement for camera equipment to "conform to the capabilities
and limitations of the users to operate and maintain it in its
operational environment and not exceed user capabilities" was
determined to be subjective and unquantifiable and thus was waived.
* A requirement for the tower design to accommodate the future
integration of components "without causing impact on cost, schedule,
and/or technical performance" was determined to have no specific
criteria to objectively demonstrate closure decision and thus was also
waived.
As a result of these deviations and waivers, the system capabilities
that are to be delivered as part of Block 1 will be less than
originally envisioned.
Requirements Traceability Has Improved, but Until Recently Has Not
Been Used To Determine If Operational Requirements Were Met:
Consistent with relevant guidance,[Footnote 50]the SBInet Requirements
Development and Management Plan provides for maintaining bidirectional
traceability from high-level operational requirements through detailed
low-level requirements to test plans. More specifically, it states
that operational requirements should trace to system requirements,
which in turn should trace to component requirements that trace to
design requirements, which further trace to verification methods.
Since September 2008, the SPO has worked with Boeing to manually
review each requirement and develop a bidirectional traceability
matrix. Further, it has used this matrix to update the DOORS
requirements database. Our analysis of the traceability of a random
sample of Block 1 component-level requirements in the DOORS database
shows that they are largely traceable backwards to operational
requirements and forward to design requirements and verification
methods. For example, we estimate that only 5 percent (with a 95
percent confidence interval between 1 and 14 percent) of a random
sample of component requirements cannot be traced to the system
requirements and then to the operational requirements. In addition, we
estimate that 0 percent (with a 95 percent confidence interval between
0 and 5 percent) of the component requirements in the same sample do
not trace to a verification method. (See table 5 for the results of
our analysis along with the associated confidence intervals.)[Footnote
51]
Table 5: SBInet Requirements Traceability Results:
Traceability links from component requirements: To system requirement
then to operational requirement;
Estimated failure rate: 5%;
95 percent confidence interval: 1-14%.
Traceability links from component requirements: To system requirement;
Estimated failure rate: 3%;
95 percent confidence interval: 0-11%.
Traceability links from component requirements: To verification method;
Estimated failure rate: 0%;
95 percent confidence interval: 0-5%.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of table]
By establishing this traceability, the SPO is better positioned to
know the extent to which the acquired and deployed system can meet
operational requirements.
However, the SPO has not used its requirements traceability in closing
higher-level component requirements. According to relevant guidance,
[Footnote 52]all lower-level requirements (i.e., children) should be
closed in order to sufficiently demonstrate that the higher- level
requirements (i.e., parents) have been met. Consistent with this
guidance, the SBInet Requirements Development and Management Plan
states that ensuring the traceability of requirements from children to
their parents is an integral part of ensuring that testing is properly
planned and conducted. However, 4 of 8 higher-level component
requirements (parents) in the above cited random sample of system-
level requirements were closed regardless of whether their
corresponding lower-level design requirements (children) had been
closed. According to program officials, this is because their standard
practice in closing parent requirements, until recently, was to
sometimes close them before their children were closed. Further, they
said that this was consistent with their verification criteria
[Footnote 53] for closing higher-level requirements, which did not
require closure of the corresponding lower-level requirements. They
also said that the reason parent verification criteria did not always
reflect children verification criteria was that traceability was still
being established when the verification criteria were developed and
thus parent-child relationships were not always available to inform
the closure criteria. Furthermore, they stated that schedule demands
did not permit them to ensure that the verification criteria for
requirements were aligned with the traceability information.
After we shared our findings on parent requirement closure with the
SPO, officials stated that they had changed their approach and will no
longer close parent requirements without ensuring that all of the
children requirements have first been closed. However, they did not
commit to reviewing previously closed parents to determine that all of
the children were closed. Without fully ensuring traceability among
requirements verification methods, the risks of delivering a system
solution that does not fully meet user needs or perform as intended,
and thus requires additional time and resources to deliver, are
increased.
Key Risks Have Not Been Effectively Managed and Disclosed:
Risk management is a continuous, forward-looking process that
effectively anticipates and mitigates risks that may have a critical
impact on a program's success. In 2008, the SPO documented a risk
management approach[Footnote 54] that largely complies with relevant
guidance. However, it has not effectively implemented this approach
for all risks. Moreover, available documentation does not demonstrate
that significant risks were disclosed to DHS and congressional
decision makers in a timely fashion, as we previously recommended and,
while risk disclosure to DHS leadership has recently improved, not all
risks have been formally captured and thus shared. As a result, the
program will likely continue to experience actual cost, schedule, and
performance shortfalls, and key decision makers will continue to be
less than fully informed.
Risk Management Approach Has Been Adequately Defined:
According to relevant guidance,[Footnote 55] effective risk management
includes defining a process that, among other things, proactively
identifies and analyzes risks on the basis of likelihood of occurrence
and impact, assigns ownership, provides for mitigation, and monitors
status. To the SPO's credit, it has developed an approach for risk
management that is largely consistent with this guidance. For example,
the approach provides for:
* continuously identifying risks throughout the program's life cycle
before they develop into actual problems, including suggested methods
for doing so, such as conducting brainstorming sessions and
interviewing subject matter experts;
* analyzing identified risks to determine their likelihood of
occurring and potential impact;
* assigning responsibility for risks;
* developing a risk mitigation plan, to include a set of discrete,
measurable actions or events which, if successfully accomplished, can
avoid or reduce the likelihood of occurrence or severity of impact of
the risk; and:
* executing and regularly monitoring risk mitigation plans to ensure
that they are implemented and to allow for corrective actions if the
desired results are not being achieved.
In February 2007, we reported that the program's risk management
approach was in the process of being established.[Footnote 56]
Specifically, we noted that at that time the SPO had drafted a risk
management plan, established a governance structure, developed a risk
management database, and identified 30 risks. In April 2009, we
reported that the DHS Chief Information Officer had certified that
this approach provided for the regular identification, evaluation,
mitigation, and monitoring of risks throughout the system life cycle,
and that it provided for communicating high-risk conditions to DHS
investment decision makers.[Footnote 57]
Risk Management Approach Has Not Been Fully Implemented, although
Improvements Are Under Way:
The SPO has not adhered to key aspects of its defined process for
managing program risks. In particular, the program's risk management
repository, which is the tool used for capturing and tracking risks
and their mitigation, has not included key risks that have been
identified by stakeholders. For example, our analysis of reports from
the repository showing all open and closed risks from April 2006 to
September 2009 shows that the following program risks that have been
identified by us and others were not captured in the repository:
* program cost and schedule risks briefed by the SPO to senior SBInet
officials in January 2009, such as unplanned and unauthorized work
impacting the credibility of the program cost data, and program costs
and schedule plans lacking traceability;
* program schedule and cost estimate risks identified by the Defense
Contract Management Agency prior to March 2009, such as contractor-
provided documentation not permitting adequate assessment of critical
path accuracy, and cost projections not including all applicable
elements and thus lacking credibility; and:
* the risk of the SPO's heavy reliance on contractors, reported by the
DHS Office of Inspector General in June 2009.
In addition, the SBI Executive Director told us that the program faces
a number of other risks, all but one of which were also not in the
repository. These include the lack of well-defined acquisition
management processes, staff with the appropriate acquisition
expertise, and agreement on key system performance parameters.
According to program officials, some of these risks are not in the
repository because Boeing is responsible for operating and maintaining
the repository, and the specifics surrounding the risks and their
mitigation are considered acquisition sensitive, meaning that they
should not be shared with Boeing. In this regard, the officials
acknowledged that the SPO needs a risk database independent of the
contractor to manage these acquisition-sensitive risks.
Further, the Risk Manager identified other limitations that have
hindered the SPO's risk management efforts, along with recent actions
intended to address them. For example:
* Risk review meetings were only being held once a month, which was
resulting in lost opportunities to mitigate risks that were to be
realized as actual problems within 30 days. As a result, the frequency
of these meetings has been increased to twice a month.
* Risk information provided to senior SBI managers at monthly Joint
Program Management Review Meetings[Footnote 58]was not sufficiently
detailed, and thus has been expanded.
* Changes were being made to the risk management repository by
contractor staff without sufficient justification and without the
approval of the Joint Risk Review Board. For example, program
officials cited an instance in which a risk's severity was changed
from medium to high and no board member knew the reason for the
change. As a result, the number of contractor staff authorized to
modify data in the repository was reduced.
* The repository did not include all requisite information for all
identified risks. For example, some risks were missing the rationale
for the likelihood of occurrence and the potential impact. As a
result, the Joint Risk Review Board has adopted a policy of not
accepting risks that are missing requisite information.
According to the Risk Manager, competing program priorities have
resulted in insufficient resources devoted to risk management
activities, which has contributed to the state of the SPO's risk
management efforts. However, he added that the SPO is taking steps to
improve risk management by revising risk management guidance,
implementing a CBP-approved database tool for managing government-only
risks, and increasing risk management training and oversight.
Until the program's risk management is strengthened and effectively
implemented, the program will continue to be challenged in its ability
to forestall cost, schedule, and performance problems.
Risks Have Not Been Fully Disclosed, but Improvement Has Recently
Occurred:
As noted earlier, we recommended in September 2008 that the SPO assess
SBInet risks and that the results of these assessments, along with
alternative courses of action to address them, be provided to DHS
leadership and congressional committees.[Footnote 59] According to
program officials, shortly after receiving our draft report they
briefed the DHS Acquisition Review Board[Footnote 60] on, among other
things, SBInet risks. However, the briefing slides used for this
meeting do not identify individual risks. Instead, the briefing
contains one slide that only identifies "contributing factors" to
changes in the program's schedule, including a reallocation SBInet
funding to SBI physical infrastructure, concurrencies and delays that
have occurred in testing, and the need for environmental studies. The
slides do not identify risks and alternative courses of action to
address or mitigate them.
In addition, program officials told us that they briefed congressional
committees during the fall of 2008 on the program's status, which they
said included disclosure of program risks. However, they did not have
any documentation of these briefings to show which committees were
briefed, when the briefings occurred, who was present, and what was
discussed and disclosed. Further, House Committee on Homeland Security
staff stated that while program officials briefed them following our
September 2008 report, specific program risks were not disclosed. As a
result, it does not appear that either DHS or congressional
stakeholders received timely information on risks facing the program
at a crucial juncture in its life cycle.
To the SPO's credit, it has recently improved its disclosure of risks
facing the program. In particular, the SBI Executive Director briefed
the DHS Chief Information Officer in November 2009 on specific program
risks. However, this briefing states that the risks presented were the
Block 1 risks as captured in the contractor's risk repository and that
additional risks have not yet been formalized (see above discussion
about repository limitations). Until all key risks are formally
managed and regularly disclosed to department and congressional
stakeholders, informed SBInet investment decision making will be
constrained.
DHS Has Yet to Implement GAO's Recent SBInet Recommendations:
As noted earlier, we reported on a number of SBInet program management
weaknesses in September 2008, and we concluded that these weaknesses
introduced considerable risk that the program would not meet
expectations and would require time-consuming and expensive rework.
[Footnote 61] In summary, these problems included a lack of clarity
and certainty surrounding what technological capabilities would be
delivered when, and a lack of rigor and discipline around requirements
definition and management and test management. To address these
problems and thereby reduce the program's exposure to cost, schedule,
and performance risks, we made eight recommendations. DHS concurred
with seven of the recommendations and disagreed with one aspect of the
remaining one.
In summary, the department has not implemented two of the
recommendations and has partially implemented the remaining six. See
table 6 for a summary and appendix III for a detailed discussion of
the status of each recommendation.
Table 6: Summary of DHS Implementation of GAO's Recent SBInet
Recommendations:
Recommendation: (1/2) Assess risks associated with the SBInet
acquisition and provide the results of the risk assessment to DHS
senior leadership and congressional authorization and appropriation
committees;
DHS comment: Concurred;
Status: Not implemented.
Recommendation: (3) Establish and baseline the program commitments;
DHS comment: Concurred;
Status: Partially implemented.
Recommendation: (4) Finalize and approve an integrated master schedule;
DHS comment: Concurred;
Status: Partially implemented.
Recommendation: (5) Revise and approve consistent and up-to-date
versions of the SBInet life cycle management approach that reflect
relevant federal guidance and leading practices;
DHS comment: Concurred;
Status: Partially implemented.
Recommendation: (6) Implement the revised life cycle management
approach;
DHS comment: Concurred;
Status: Partially implemented.
Recommendation: (7) Implement key practices for developing and
managing system requirements;
DHS comment: Concurred;
Status: Partially implemented.
Recommendation: (8) Implement key test management practices;
DHS comment: Partially disagreed;
Status: Partially implemented.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
Note: "Partially implemented" means that some, but not all, aspects of
the recommendation have been fully implemented. "Not implemented"
means that none of the aspects of the recommendation have been fully
implemented.
[End of table]
Conclusions:
DHS has yet to demonstrate that its proposed SBInet solution is a cost-
effective course of action, and thus whether the considerable time and
money being invested to acquire and deploy it is a wise and prudent
use of limited resources. Given that the magnitude of the initial
investment in SBInet spans more than 3 years of effort and totals
hundreds of millions of dollars, coupled with the fact that the scope
of the initial system's capabilities and areas of deployment have
continued to shrink, the program is fraught with risk and uncertainty.
As a result, the time is now for DHS to thoughtfully reconsider its
proposed SBInet solution, and in doing so, to explore ways to both
limit its near-term investment in an initial set of operational
capabilities and develop and share with congressional decision makers
reliable projections of the relative costs and benefits of longer-term
alternatives for meeting the mission goals and outcomes that SBInet is
intended to advance, or reasons why such information is not available
and the uncertainty and risks associated with not having it.
Compounding the risks and uncertainty surrounding whether the
department is pursuing the right course of action are a number of
system life cycle management concerns, including limitations in the
integrated master schedule; shortcomings in the documentation
available to inform key milestone decisions; and weaknesses in how
requirements have been developed and managed, risks have been managed,
and tests have been conducted. Collectively, these concerns mean that
the program is not employing the kind of acquisition management rigor
and discipline needed to reasonably ensure that proposed system
capabilities and benefits will be delivered on time and on budget.
Because of SBInet's decreased scope, uncertain timing, unclear costs
relative to benefits, and limited life cycle management discipline and
rigor, in combination with its size and mission importance, the
program represents a risky undertaking. To minimize the program's
exposure to risk, it is imperative for DHS to move swiftly to first
ensure that SBInet, as proposed, is the right course of action for
meeting its stated border security and immigration management goals
and outcomes, and once this is established, for it to move with equal
diligence to ensure that it is being managed the right way. To this
end, our prior recommendations to DHS relative to SBInet provide for
strengthening a number of life cycle management processes, including
requirements development and management and test management.
Accordingly, we are not making additional recommendations that focus
on these processes at this time.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To address the considerable risks and uncertainties facing DHS on its
SBInet program, we are making 12 recommendations. Specifically, we
recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the
Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection to limit future
investment in the program to only work that meets one or both of the
following two conditions: (1) is already under contract and supports
deployment, acceptance, and operational evaluation of only those Block
1 capabilities (functions and performance levels) that are currently
targeted for TUS-1 and AJO-1; or (2) provides the analytical basis for
informing a departmental decision as to what, if any, expanded
investment in SBInet, both in terms of capabilities (functions and
performance) and deployment locations, represents a prudent,
responsible, and affordable use of resources for achieving the
department's border security and immigration management mission.
With respect to the first condition, we further recommend that the
Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs
and Border Protection to have the SBI Executive Director make it a
program priority to ensure that:
* the integrated master schedule for delivering Block 1 capabilities
to TUS-1 and AJO-1 is revised to address the key schedule estimating
practices discussed in this report;
* the currently defined Block 1 requirements, including key
performance parameters, are independently validated as complete,
verifiable, and affordable and any limitations found in the
requirements are addressed;
* the Systems Engineering Plan is revised to include or reference
documentation templates for key artifacts required at milestone gate
reviews;
* all parent requirements that have been closed are supported by
evidence of the closure of all corresponding and associated child
requirements; and:
* all significant risks facing the program are captured, mitigated,
tracked, and periodically reported to DHS and congressional decision
makers.
Also with respect to the first condition, we reiterate our prior
recommendations, as stated in our September 2008 report,[Footnote
62]relative to establishing program commitments, implementing the
Systems Engineering Plan, defining and managing requirements, and
testing.
With respect to the second condition, we further recommend that the
Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Commissioner of U.S. Customs
and Border Protection to have the SBI Executive Director make it a
program priority to ensure that:
* a life cycle cost estimate for any incremental block of SBInet
capabilities that is to include capabilities and cover locations
beyond those associated with the TUS-1 and AJO-1 deployments is
developed in a manner that reflects the four characteristics of a
reliable estimate discussed in this report;
* a forecast of the qualitative and quantitative benefits to be
derived from any such incremental block of SBInet over its useful
life, or reasons why such forecasts are not currently possible, are
developed and documented;
* the estimated life cycle costs and benefits and associated net
present value of any such incremental block of SBInet capabilities, or
reasons why such an economic analysis cannot be performed, are
prepared and documented; and:
* the results of these analyses, or the documented reasons why such
analyses cannot be provided, are provided to the Commissioner of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection and the DHS Acquisition Review Board.
Also with respect to this second condition, we recommend that the
Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Deputy Secretary of Homeland
Security, as the Chair of the DHS Acquisition Review Board, to (1)
decide, in consultation with the board and Commissioner of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, what, if any, expanded investment in
SBInet, both in terms of capabilities (functions and performance) and
deployment locations, represents a prudent, responsible, and
affordable use of resources for achieving the department's border
security and immigration management mission; and (2) report the
decision, and the basis for it, to the department's authorization and
appropriations committees.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In written comments on a draft of this report, signed by the Director,
Departmental GAO/Office of Inspector General Liaison, and reprinted in
appendix II, DHS stated that it agreed with ten of our recommendations
and partially agreed with the remaining two. In this regard, it
described ongoing and planned actions to address each, and it provided
milestones for completing these actions. In addition, DHS provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated in the report as
appropriate.
In agreeing with our first recommendation, however, DHS commented that
the words "one of" were omitted before the two conditions contained in
the recommendation. However, this interpretation is not correct.
Rather, the intent of our recommendation is to limit future investment
on the program to either of the conditions, meaning "one or both of."
Notwithstanding DHS's interpretation, we believe that actions that it
described to address this recommendation, which include freezing
funding beyond the initial deployments to TUS-1 and AJO-1 until it
completes a comprehensive reassessment of the program that includes an
analysis of the cost and mission effectiveness of alternative
technologies, is consistent with the intent of the recommendation.
Nevertheless, we have slightly modified the recommendation to avoid
any further confusion.
Regarding its partial agreement with our recommendation for revising
the integrated master schedule in accordance with a range of best
practices embodied in our cost and schedule estimating guide, DHS
acknowledged the merits of employing these practices and stated that
it is committed to adopting and deploying them. However, it added that
the current contract structure limits its ability to fully implement
all the practices prior to completing the TUS-1 and AJO-1 deployments.
We understand that program facts and circumstances create practical
limitations associated with some of the practices, and believe that
DHS's planned actions are consistent with the intent of our
recommendation.
Regarding its partial agreement with our recommendation that
reiterated a number of the recommendations that we made in a prior
report,[Footnote 63] DHS stated that, while these prior
recommendations reflect program management best practices and it
continues to make incremental improvements to address each, the scope
of the program had narrowed since these recommendations were made. As
a result, DHS stated that these prior recommendations were not fully
applicable until and unless a decision was made to move the program
forward and conduct future deployments beyond TUS-1 and AJO-1. We
acknowledge that the facts and circumstances surrounding the program
have recently changed and that these changes impact the nature and
timing of actions appropriate for implementing them. Moreover, we
believe that DHS's planned actions are consistent with the intent of
our recommendation.
DHS also commented that it believed that it had implemented two of our
recommendations and that these recommendations should be closed.
Because closure of our recommendations requires evidentiary validation
of described actions, and because many of the actions that DHS
described were planned rather than completed, we are not closing any
of our recommendations at this time. As part of our recurring review
of the status of all of our open recommendations, we will determine if
and when the recommendations have been satisfied and thus can be
closed.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to interested congressional committees and other parties. We will also
send copies to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commissioner of
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Director of the Office
of Management and Budget. In addition, this report will be available
at no cost on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your offices have any questions on matters discussed in
this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3439 or at hiter@gao.gov.
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors
to this report are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Randolph C. Hite:
Director, Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to determine the extent to which the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has (1) defined the scope of its proposed
Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) solution, (2) developed a
reliable schedule for delivering this solution, (3) demonstrated the
cost-effectiveness of this solution, (4) acquired this solution in
accordance with key life cycle management processes, and (5) addressed
our recent SBInet recommendations. To accomplish our objectives, we
largely focused on the first increment of SBInet, known as Block 1.
To determine the extent to which DHS has defined the scope of its
proposed system solution, we reviewed key program documentation
related to the Block 1 functional and performance requirements and
deployment locations, such as the SBInet Acquisition Program Baseline
and related acquisition decision memorandums, the Operational
Requirements Document, the Operational Requirements Document Elements
Applicable to Block 1 System, the Requirements Traceability Matrix,
the Requirements Verification Matrix, and the SBInet Block 1 User
Assessment. In addition, we compared Block 1 requirements that were
baselined in October 2008 as part of the Critical Design Review (CDR)
to the Block 1 requirements as defined as of September 2009 to
identify what, if any, changes had occurred, and we interviewed
program officials as to the reasons for any changes. We also compared
the locations, including the miles of border associated with these
locations, that were to receive Block 1 as of September 2008 to the
locations specified in the program's March 2009 Acquisition Program
Baseline to identify any changes, and we interviewed program officials
as to the reasons for any changes. Further, we compared the key
performance parameters listed in the Operational Requirements
Document, dated March 2007, to the key performance parameters in the
program's Acquisition Program Baseline dated March 2009.
To determine the extent to which DHS has developed a reliable schedule
for its proposed system solution, we analyzed the SBInet integrated
master schedule as of June 2009 against the nine key schedule
estimating practices in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide.
[Footnote 64] In doing so, we used commercially available software
tools to determine whether it, for example, included all critical
activities, a logical sequence of activities, and reasonable activity
durations. Further, we observed a demonstration of the schedule in
June 2009 provided by contractor officials responsible for maintaining
the schedule and program officials responsible for overseeing the
contractor. In July 2009, we observed a demonstration of the program
office's efforts to reconcile the version of the integrated master
schedule that is exported for the government's use with the version of
the schedule that the prime contractor uses to manage the program.
During this demonstration, we discussed some of our concerns regarding
the integrated master schedule with program officials and we inquired
about deviations from some of the key practices. Subsequently, the
program office provided us with a revised version of the integrated
master schedule as of August 2009, which we analyzed. In doing so, we
repeated the above described steps. Further, we characterized the
extent to which the revised schedule met each of the practices as
either Not Met, Minimally Met, Partially Met, Substantially Met, or
Met.[Footnote 65] In addition, we analyzed changes in the scheduled
Block 1 deployment dates presented at each of the monthly program
reviews for the 1-year period beginning in December 2008 and ending in
November 2009.
To determine the extent to which DHS has demonstrated the cost-
effectiveness of the proposed solution, we evaluated the reliability
of the Block 1 life cycle cost estimate and the definition of expected
system benefits, both of which are addressed below.
* Cost estimate: We first observed a demonstration of the cost model
used to develop the estimate, which was provided by the contractor
officials who are responsible for maintaining it and the program
officials who are responsible for overseeing the contractor. We then
analyzed the derivation of the cost estimate relative to 12 key
practices associated with four characteristics of a reliable estimate.
As defined in our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide,[Footnote 66]
these four characteristics are comprehensive, well-documented,
accurate, and credible, and the practices address, for example, the
methodologies, assumptions, and source data used. We also interviewed
program officials responsible for the cost estimate about the
estimate's derivation. We then characterized the extent to which each
of the four characteristics was met as either Not Met, Minimally Met,
Partially Met, Substantially Met, or Met.[Footnote 67] To do so, we
scored each of the 12 individual key practices associated with the
four characteristics on a scale of 1-5 (Not Met = 1, Minimally Met =
2, Partially Met = 3, Substantially Met = 4, and Met = 5), and then
averaged the individual practice scores associated with a given
characteristic to determine the score for that characteristic.
* Benefits: We interviewed program officials to identify any forecasts
of qualitative and quantitative benefits that the system was to
produce. In this regard, we were directed to the SBInet Mission Need
Statement dated October 2006, which we analyzed. In addition, we
reviewed our prior reports on the Secure Border Initiative (SBI),
including a report on the SBI expenditure plan, which is a plan that
DHS has been required by statute to submit to the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees to, among other things, identify expected
system benefits. We also interviewed program officials to determine
the extent to which the system's life cycle costs and expected
benefits had been analyzed together to economically justify DHS's
proposed investment in SBInet.
To determine the extent to which DHS has acquired its proposed system
solution in accordance with key life cycle management processes, we
focused on three key processes: the system engineering approach,
requirements development and management, and risk management, each of
which is addressed below.
* Systems engineering approach: We compared the program's defined
system engineering approach, as defined in the SBInet Systems Program
Office's (SPO) Systems Engineering Plan, to DHS and other relevant
guidance.[Footnote 68] To determine the extent to which the defined
systems engineering approach had been implemented, we focused on two
major "gates" (i.e., life cycle milestone reviews)--the CDR and the
Deployment Readiness Review. For each of these reviews, we compared
the package of documentation prepared for and used during these
reviews to the program's defined system engineering approach as
specified in the Systems Engineering Plan to determine what, if any,
deviations existed. We also interviewed program officials as to the
reason for any deviations.
* Requirements development and management: We compared relevant
requirements management documentation, such as the Requirements
Development and Management Plan, the Requirements Management Plan, the
Configuration and Data Management Plan, the Operational Requirements
Document, the system-level requirements specification,[Footnote 69]
and the component-level requirements specifications,[Footnote 70] to
relevant requirements development and management guidance[Footnote 71]
to identify any variances, focusing on the extent to which
requirements were properly baselined, adequately defined, and fully
traced. With respect to requirements baselining, we compared the
component and system requirements as of September 2008, which were
approved during the CDR that concluded in October 2008, to the
component and system requirements as of November 2008, and identified
the number and percentage of requirements changes. We also interviewed
program officials as to the reasons for any changes. For requirements
definition, we assessed the extent to which operational requirements
that were identified as poorly defined in November 2007 had been
clarified in the Operational Requirements Document, Elements
Applicable to Block 1 System, dated November 2008. In doing so, we
focused on those operational requirements that are associated with
Block 1. We also traced these Block 1 operational requirements to the
lower-level system requirements (i.e., system and component
requirements) to determine how many of the lower-level requirements
were associated with any unchanged operational requirements. For
requirements traceability, we randomly selected a sample of 60
requirements from 1,008 component requirements in the program's
requirements management tool, known as the Dynamic Object-Oriented
Requirements System (DOORS), as of July 2009. Before doing so, we
reviewed the quality of the access controls for the database, and we
interviewed program and contractor officials and received a DOORS
tutorial to understand their respective roles in requirements
management and development and the use of DOORS. Once satisfied as to
the reliability of the data in DOORS, we then traced each of the 60
requirements backwards to the system requirements and then to the
operational requirements and forward to design requirements and
verification methods. Because we followed a probability procedure
based on random selection, we are 95 percent confident that each of
the confidence intervals in this report will include the true values
in the study population. We used statistical methods appropriate for
audit compliance testing to estimate 95 percent confidence intervals
for the traceability of requirements in our sample.
* Risk management: We reviewed relevant documentation, such as the
SBInet Risk/Issue/Opportunity Management Plan, the SBInet SPO Risk/
Issue/Opportunity Management Process, and the SBInet Risk Management
Policy, as well as extracts from the SBInet risk management database
and minutes of meetings and agendas from the Risk Management Team and
the Joint Risk Review Board. In doing so, we compared the risk
management process defined in these documents to relevant guidance
[Footnote 72] to determine the extent to which the program has defined
an effective risk management approach. Further, we observed a
demonstration of the risk database, and we compared SBInet risks
identified by us and others, including the SBI Executive Director, to
the risks in the database to determine the extent to which all key
risks were being actively managed. Further, we discussed actions
recently taken and planned to improve risk management with the person
responsible for SBInet risk management. We also reviewed briefings and
related material provided to DHS leadership during oversight reviews
of SBInet and interviewed program officials to ascertain the extent to
which program risks were disclosed at these reviews and at meetings
with congressional committees. In this regard, we also asked cognizant
staff with the House Homeland Security Committee about the extent to
which program risks were disclosed by program officials in status
briefings.
To determine the extent to which DHS has addressed our prior SBInet
recommendations, we focused on the eight recommendations that we made
in our September 2008 report.[Footnote 73] For each recommendation, we
leveraged the work described above, augmenting it as necessary to
determine any plans or actions peculiar to a given recommendation. For
example, to determine the status of efforts to address our prior
recommendation related to SBInet testing, we reviewed key testing
documentation, such as the Test and Evaluation Master Plan; SBInet
component and system qualification test plans, test procedures, and
test reports; program management reviews; program office briefings;
and DHS Acquisition Review Board decision memoranda. We also
interviewed program officials.
To support our work across the above objectives, we also interviewed
officials from the Department of Defense's Defense Contract Management
Agency, which provides contractor oversight services, to understand
its reviews of the contractor's integrated master schedule,
requirements development and management activities, risk management
practices, and testing activities. We also reviewed Defense Contract
Management Agency documentation, such as monthly status reports and
reports pertaining to the integrated master schedule and cost
reporting.
To assess the reliability of the data that we relied on to support the
findings in the report, we reviewed relevant program documentation to
substantiate evidence obtained through interviews with knowledgeable
agency officials, where available. We determined that the data used in
this report are sufficiently reliable. We have also made appropriate
attribution indicating the sources of the data used.
We performed our work at the Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
headquarters and contractor facilities in the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area and at a contractor facility and a Defense Contract
Management Agency office in Huntsville, Alabama. We conducted this
performance audit from December 2008 to May 2010 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
[hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov]
April 19, 2010:
Mr. Randolph C. Hite:
Director:
Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Hite:
RE: Draft Report GAO-10-340, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to
Reconsider Its Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program (GAO Job
Code 310673):
The Department of Homeland Security (Department/DHS) appreciates the
opportunity to review and comment on the draft report referenced
above. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) makes twelve
recommendations and, with two partial exceptions, we agree with them.
The first eleven recommendations are addressed to U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) officials and the last one to the Department.
The GAO was asked to determine the extent to which the Department has
(1) defined the scope of its proposed SBInet solution, (2) developed a
reliable schedule for this solution, (3) demonstrated the cost
effectiveness of this solution, and (4) acquired the solution using
key management processes.
Over the last several months the Secretary and CBP officials have
publicly indicated the need to take another, more deliberative look at
the case for SBInet deployment. The Secretary's recently directed
assessment (described below) reinforces, strengthens, and expands on
that need.
In the September 2008 report ("Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to
Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment"
(GAO-08-1086)), the GAO identified a range of management weaknesses
and program risks facing SBInet Block 1 deployment to Arizona. Those
findings were consistent with CBP's conclusions about the state of the
SBInet program. Beginning in August 2008, CBP and DHS implemented more
rigorous oversight of planned SBInet acquisition, development,
testing, and deployment activities. In this process SBInet was
required at specified milestones to report its progress to the
Department's Acquisition Review Board (ARB), and receive approval
before continuing with the next deployment increment. The ARB
completed a series of reviews to establish and baseline the technical
and programmatic way ahead for the SBInet program. Between September
2008 and May 2009, the ARB issued three Acquisition Decision
Memorandums (ADM) approving milestone attainment and SBInet deployment
to portions of Arizona. The next Acquisition Decision Event (ADE-3)
for SBInet is to occur after Tuscon-1 (TUS-1) and Ajo-1 (AJO-1)
complete operational testing.
At the same time, the SBInet program office began taking stronger
steps to improve the overall management of the effort. Initial focus
areas included, among others, earned value management, risk
management, schedule management, requirements management, and test
discipline. CBP officials have made significant progress but the
Department including CBP acknowledges that the work is not complete.
In fact, correcting the weaknesses identified both by the GAO and by
CBP teams are significant undertakings and will not be completed
quickly. CBP officials are taking incremental steps based on their
assessments of which areas are most critical to the program. The
Department appreciates GAO's acknowledgement in the draft report that
CBP has initiated many corrective actions.
Since last year, CBP and the Department have been re-thinking the
investment strategy not only with respect to SBInet, but other
alternative technologies as well. In January 2010, the Secretary
directed a department-wide assessment of the SBInet program that
includes an analysis of other potential alternatives for addressing
security on the southwest border. The Secretary's decision was
motivated by continuing delays in the development and deployment of
SBInet capabilities, questions about the long-term viability of the
program and a concern that the SBInet system had not yet been
adequately justified by a quantitative assessment of cost and benefit.
The goal of the SBInet assessment is to review and assess near and
long-term requirements and technology solutions to enhance border
security. In the near-term assessment, the Department will identify
areas of the border where deployment of technology is required earlier
than SBInet deployments could occur. For those areas, the Department
plans to procure readily available technologies”like individual
cameras or Mobile Surveillance SyStems to provide needed capability
relatively quickly. The Department has redeployed $50 million in
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 funds originally
programmed to support SBInet Block I to these readily available
technologies. In the longer-term assessment, the Department plans to
conduct a comprehensive, science-based SBInet Block-1 analysis of
alternatives (AoA) to evaluate the appropriateness (as it relates to
cost and mission effectiveness) of SBInet deployment in areas
identified and prioritized by the Office of the Border Patrol along
the Southwest border. The results of the AoA will aid in ensuring that
SBInet is utilizing the most efficient and effective technological and
operational solutions in all border security efforts. If this analysis
suggests that the current, proven SBInet capabilities will
significantly increase border security and are worth the cost relative
to other alternatives, the Department will aggressively pursue the
deployment of those capabilities. If the analysis suggests that some
modifications of the current technology at different sectors of the
border would enhance security, accelerate deployment, or lower the
cost, then the Secretary will direct changes as necessary. If the
analysis suggests that alternative technology options represent the
best balance of capability and cost-effectiveness, then the Secretary
will begin the process of 'redirecting resources currently allocated
to border security efforts to such stronger and more cost-effective
options. Regardless, the decisions will be based on solid, objective
analysis.
The recommendations and planned corrective actions follow.
Recommendation 1:
To address the considerable risks and uncertainties facing DHS on its
SBInet program, GAO recommended that the Secretary direct the
Commissioner of CBP to limit future investment in the program to only
work that meets one of (GAO provided clarification on the
recommendation sentence preceding the conditions. The words "one of
were inadvertently omitted.) the following two conditions: (1) is
already under contract and supports deployment, acceptance, and
operational evaluation of only those Block I capabilities (functions
and performance levels) that are currently targeted for TUS- I and MO-
I; or (2) provides the analytical basis for informing a Departmental
decision as to what, if any, expanded investment in SBInet, both in
terms of capabilities (functions and performance) and deployment
locations, represents a prudent, responsible, and affordable use of
resources for achieving the Department's border security and
immigration management mission.
CBP Response:
CBP concurs. An assessment of the SBInet program is being conducted
and funding for SBInet Block 1 has been frozen beyond the initial
deployments to TUS- I and AJO-1 until the assessment is completed. The
assessment has near-term and a long-term phase. The near-term
assessment will identify areas of the border where deployment of
technology is required earlier than SBInet could be ready. CBP and the
Department will consider procurement of already-existing systems”like
individual cameras or Mobile Surveillance Systems”that could provide
needed capability relatively quickly. The long-term assessment will
continue to evaluate the progress of SBInet. The Secretary will
evaluate SRI/2er initial deployment tests and analysis of alternatives
to determine if it makes sense to authorize future SBInet deployments,
and, if so, where. The decision on future deployments would be made at
Acquisition Decision Event-3 (ADE-3), which will occur after TUS-1 and
AJO-1 operational testing.
Department and CBP officials believe the intent of this recommendation
has been satisfied and the recommendation should be considered closed.
With respect to the first condition, GAO further recommended [see
recommendations 2-61 that the Secretary direct the Commissioner of CBP
to have the SBI Executive Director make it a program priority to
ensure that:
Recommendation 2: the integrated master schedule for delivering Block
1 capabilities to TUS1 and MO-1 is revised to address the key schedule
estimating practices discussed in this report;
CBP Response:
CBP partially concurs. CBP acknowledges the merits of GAO's key
schedule estimating and management practices described in the draft
report. CBP is committed to adopting and deploying these practices for
the full SBI portfolio of projects. In fact, the SB1 program is making
significant progress in effecting these "best practices" for the
SBInet program. Challenges with the current contract structure (e.g.,
creating linkages between multiple Task Orders, significant degree of
Level of Effort tasks) and "legacy" work breakdown structure (e.g.,
work break down structure is not product oriented and has not been
updated to reflect the program's substantial evolution) will preclude
CBP from fully implementing this recommendation before completion of
the remainder of the TUS-1 and AJO-1 deployment effort. Nonetheless,
CBP is taking the appropriate steps to improve the completeness and
utility of the TUS-1 and AJO-1 schedules; these improvements will be
introduced into the schedules over the next several months. The
estimated completion date is May 2011.
Recommendation 3: the currently defined Block 1 requirements,
including key performance parameters, are independently validated as
complete, verifiable, and affordable and any limitations found in the
requirements are addressed;
CBP Response:
CBP concurs. One of the program "lessons learned" has been that the
existing SBInet Block 1 requirements were not the most effective
representation of system needs. Nonetheless, given the fact that they
are the currently defined requirements, CBP personnel have focused
efforts on tightening their requirements management process. CBP has
also recognized the fact that their requirements allocation and flow
down is incomplete or ambiguous in some areas, and that those gaps
increase risk to their verification and validation plans. CBP
management is continuing their effort to improve in this area. Block 1
requirements are being verified through a number of increasingly
comprehensive tests such as component qualification tests, functional
qualification tests, and system qualification tests. Key performance
parameters have been validated through modeling as well as actual data
taking with the Playas test facility. Final verification and
identification of limitations will occur during System Acceptance
Testing and subsequent Operational Test & Evaluation activities.
Affordability will be one of the key considerations during the
Department-wide assessment described above. The estimated completion
date is June 2011.
Recommendation 4: the Systems Engineering Plan is revised to include
or reference documentation templates for key artifacts required at
milestone gate reviews;
CBP Response:
CBP concurs. The GAO was provided a copy of the currently approved
version of the Systems Engineering Plan (SEP) dated November 24, 2008.
SBInet is managing Block 1 to the current SEP. As discussed with the
GAO, the current version was written in anticipation of Block 2 and
subsequent future Blocks. The next revision of the SEP will occur only
if the DHS Acquisition Decision Event-3 approves further deployment of
SBInet technology. Should the SEP be updated it will include or
reference documentation templates for key artifacts required at
milestone gate reviews. The completion date will be determined by the
Secretary's Assessment and/or the ADE-3.
Recommendation 5: all parent requirements that have been closed are
supported by evidence of the closure of all corresponding and
associated child requirements;
CBP Response:
CBP concurs. All parent requirements that have been previously closed
are being reassessed to ensure the proper closure and documentation of
associated child requirements. The estimated completion date is May
2010.
Recommendation 6: all significant risks facing the program are
captured, mitigated, tracked, and periodically reported to DHS and
congressional decision makers.
CBP Response:
CBP concurs. As noted above, risk management has been an area of
program focus for the last several months. SBInet's initial efforts
focused on improving the contractor's risk management processes. These
risks are captured and tracked, and mitigation strategies and actions
are discussed at weekly SBInet Risk Review Board meetings. Significant
SBInet risks are briefed at the monthly Joint Program Review Meeting
and reported each month to DHS via the Next Generation Program
Reporting System (nPRS). More recent efforts have focused on adding
management of SBI program risks that are NOT necessarily within the
purview or influence of the contractor. These SBI risks and mitigation
strategies are documented and tracked by the SBI Program Office and
periodically briefed to DHS and Congressional decision makers.
Department and CBP officials believe the intent of this recommendation
has been satisfied and request closure of the recommendation.
Recommendation 7:
With respect to the first condition, GAO reiterated their prior
recommendations, as stated in the September 2008 report "Secure Border
Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key
Technology Investment" (GAO-08-1086), relative to establishing program
commitments, implementing the Systems Engineering Plan, defining and
managing requirements, and testing.
CBP Response:
CBP partially concurs. While the GAO recommendations reflect normal
"best practices" for sound program management, the program commitments
and plans have changed a great deal since the earlier GAO reports.
SBInet's immediate scope for initial deployment of Block 1 is now
narrowed to TUS-1 and AJO-1. As noted above, CBP is making incremental
improvements in each of the areas highlighted by the GAO. The
Secretary will make a decision on future SBInet Block 1 deployments
after the alternative of analysis assessment is completed, and TUS1
and AJO-1 operational tests results have been reviewed. Consistent
with DHS Acquisition Decision Memoranda 2, CBP will present
comprehensive plans and cost estimates at the next ADE-3 as well as an
updated program baseline for continuing the Block 1 program if that is
the conclusion of the review. The estimated completion date will be
determined by the Secretary's Assessment and/or the ADE-3.
With respect to the second condition, GAO recommended [recommendations
8-111 that the Secretary direct the Commissioner of CBP to have the
SBI Executive Director make it a program priority to ensure that:
Recommendation 8: a life cycle cost estimate for any incremental block
of SBInet capabilities that is to include capabilities and cover
locations beyond those associated with the TUS-1 and AJO-1 deployments
is developed in a manner that reflects the four characteristics of a
reliable estimate discussed in this report;
CBP Response:
CBP concurs. Consistent with prior DHS Acquisition Decision Memoranda
provided for the SBInet program, CBP will present comprehensive plans
and cost estimates, as well as an updated program baseline, at the
next SBInet Block 1 ADE-3 for continuing the Block 1 program beyond
TUS-1 and AJO-1 deployments. ADE-3 will only occur if the analysis of
alternatives assessment, and TUS-1 and AJO-1 operational tests
validate that expanded investment in SBInet Block 1 makes sense and is
cost efficient. Completion will be determined by the Secretary's
Assessment and/or the ADE-3.
Recommendation 9: a forecast of the qualitative and quantitative
benefits to be derived from any such incremental block of SBInet over
its useful life, or reasons why such forecasts are not currently
possible, are developed and documented;
CBP Response:
CBP concurs. Consistent with prior DHS Acquisition Decision Memoranda
provided for the SBInet program, CBP will present comprehensive plans
and cost estimates, as well as an updated program baseline, at the
next SBInet Block 1 Acquisition Decision Event-3 for continuing the
Block 1 program beyond TUS-1 and AJO-1 deployments. The planned AoA
will represent an initial view of both qualitative and quantitative
benefits of the program. However, a more complete assessment will
depend on experience with the system, data gathering, and data
analysis. The analysis will also change as other factors change”like,
for example, concepts of operation and migration of cross-border
traffic. It is not possible to attribute a specific amount of border
control just to technology”much less to SBInet, which is a subset of
the larger technology program. Over time, however, it is possible to
correlate technology with changes in border security, and to use those
analyses to advise future cost/benefit analyses. CBP intends for these
types of analyses to continue indefinitely. The completion date will
be determined by the Secretary's Assessment and/or the ADE-3.
Recommendation 10: the estimated life cycle costs and benefits and
associated net present value of any such incremental block of SBInet
capabilities, or reasons why such an economic analysis cannot be
performed, are prepared and documented;
CBP Response:
CBP concurs. Consistent with prior DHS Acquisition Decision Memoranda
provided for the SBInet program, CBP will present comprehensive plans
and cost estimates, as well as an updated program baseline at the next
SBInet Block 1 ADE-3. Additional deployments of SBInet Block I and
investments in subsequent blocks will only occur if the assessment
directed by the Secretary, and TUS-I and AM- l operational tests
validate that additional investments make sense. The estimated
completion date will be determined by the Secretary's Assessment
and/or the ADE-3.
Recommendations 11: the results of these analyses, or the documented
reasons why such analyses cannot be provided, are provided to the
Commissioner of CBP and the DHS Acquisition Review Board.
CBP Response:
CBP concurs. Consistent with prior DHS Acquisition Decision Memoranda
provided for the SBInet program, CBP will, at the next SBInet Block 1
ADE-3, present comprehensive plans and cost estimates as well as an
updated program baseline. Additional deployments of SBInet Block I
will only occur if the assessment directed by the Secretary and TUS-1
and A30-1 operational tests validate that additional investments make
sense. The results of ADE-3, including all supporting documentation,
will be provided to the CBP Commissioner and the DHS Acquisition
Review Board. The estimated completion date will be determined by the
Secretary's Assessment and/or the ADE-3.
Recommendation 12:
With respect to the second condition, GAO recommended that the
Secretary direct the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, as the
Chair of the DHS Acquisition Review Board, to (1) decide, in
consultation with the board and Commissioner of CBP, what, if any,
expanded investment in SBInet, both in terms of capabilities
(functions and performance) and deployment locations, represents a
prudent, responsible, and affordable use of resources for achieving
the department's border security and immigration management mission;
and (2) report the decision, and the basis for it, to the department's
authorization and appropriations committees.
Response:
The Secretary became uniquely aware of the promises that had been made
about SBInet and the shortfalls it has faced during her tenure as the
Governor of Arizona. Upon her appointment as Secretary of DHS, she
took a hard look at the Department's progress with SBInet and gave the
then current team at CBP a fair chance to prove that they were on the
right track.
In late 2009 the Secretary directed the then-Acting Commissioner to
provide his assessment of the path forward for SBInet and based upon
the results of his review, ordered a Department-wide reassessment of
the program to determine if there are alternatives that may more
efficiently, effectively and economically meet our nation's border
security needs.
The Department-wide review is motivated by two major considerations.
The first is that continued and repeated delays in the deployment of
the first sectors of SBInet raise fundamental questions about SBInet's
viability and availability to meet the ultimate need for technology
along the border.
The second is that the high and growing cost of SBInet obligates this
administration to conduct a full and comprehensive analysis of
alternative options to ensure the Department is maximizing the impact
and effectiveness of the substantial taxpayer resources being devoted
to border security technology. This type of comprehensive analysis of
alternatives was not undertaken prior to initiating the program. Since
the inception of the SBInet program, and since the beginning of the
Secretary's tenure, DHS has significantly enhanced the review and
approval processes for its major acquisition programs. The Secretary
has now directed the application of that process to re-assess the
value of this program.
The assessment is being led by the Department's Office of Management
in conjunction with CBP and the Science and Technology Directorate.
The assessment has an immediate, near-term and a long-term phase.
The immediate phase was necessary to address concerns over Recovery
Act funding. This phase concluded on March 16 when Department
officials announced that they would be redirecting $50 million in
Recovery Act funds that were scheduled to be spent on SBInet to
alternative technology projects that will immediately improve the
Department's ability to secure the U.S.- Mexico border.
In the near-term phase, Department and CBP officials will review
currently available technology options, including SBInet Block I and
others such as remote-controlled camera systems called Remote Video
Surveillance Systems truck-mounted systems with cameras and radar
called Mobile Surveillance Systems, thermal imaging devices, ultra-
light detection, backscatter units, mobile radios, and cameras and
laptops for pursuit vehicles, to determine if the Department needs to
redirect already enacted SBInet funds to other proven solutions to
meet urgent needs, as identified by the Office of Border Patrol (OBP),
within the Arizona portion of the Southwest Border.
In the long-term phase, Department and CBP officials will conduct a
comprehensive, science-based SBInet Block 1 AoA to evaluate the
appropriateness, as it relates to cost and mission effectiveness, of
SBInet deployment in areas identified and prioritized by OBP along the
Southwest Border. The results of the AoA will aid in ensuring
Department personnel are employing the most efficient and effective
technological and operational solutions in all border security
efforts. If this analysis suggests that the current, proven
capabilities of SBInet will significantly increase border security and
are worth the cost relative to other alternatives, the Department will
aggressively pursue its deployment. If the analysis suggests that some
modifications of the current technology at different sectors of the
border would enhance security, accelerate deployment or lower cost,
then the Secretary will direct changes as necessary. If the analysis
suggests that alternative technology options represent the best
balance of capability and cost-effectiveness, then the Secretary will
begin redirecting resources currently allocated for border security
efforts to such stronger and more cost effective options. Regardless,
the decisions will be based on solid, objective analysis. Furthermore,
future deployment decisions will be informed by the Administration's
continued refinement of border strategies and desired outcomes. The
alternatives developed for use in the AoA will need to be informed by
these processes, as available, and be distributed across a sufficient
range to ensure relevance to these processes to develop greater
clarity on strategic questions like level of effort and prioritization
across threats.
As part of the assessment officials are reaching outside of the
Department, to ensure that management has a chance to review ideas
from other sources. We will look forward to continued discussion with
the Congress as part of that process.
Sincerely,
Singed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/01G Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Status of Key GAO Recommendations:
In September 2008, we reported on a number of SBInet program
management weaknesses and associated risks related to establishing
program commitments, developing an integrated master schedule,
defining and implementing a life cycle management approach, developing
and managing requirements, and testing. To address these weaknesses
and risks, we made a number of recommendations. Table 7 provides
details on DHS efforts to address each recommendation.[Footnote 74]
Table 7: Status of DHS Implementation of Key GAO Recommendations:
Recommendation: (1/2) Ensure the risks associated with planned SBInet
acquisition, development, testing, and deployment activities are
immediately assessed and the results, including proposed alternative
courses of action for mitigating the risks, are provided to DHS's
senior leadership, as well as to the department's congressional
authorization and appropriation committees;
DHS comment: Concurred;
Status: Not implemented;
GAO analysis: The SBInet Program Office (SPO) did not immediately
assess key risks facing the program and brief key decision makers.
According to agency documentation, shortly after receiving our draft
report, the SPO met with the DHS Acquisition Review Board to formally
discuss program risks and agree on courses of action to best mitigate
them. However, the briefing slides from the meeting do not identify
risks and alternative courses of action to mitigate them. Instead, the
briefing contained one slide that identified factors contributing to
changes in the program's schedule. Further, the SPO has yet to
formally capture a number of acquisition risks such as lack of staff
with appropriate acquisition expertise, lack of formalized acquisition
processes, problems with the integrated master schedule and earned
value management (EVM)[A] reporting, and lack of agreement on key
performance parameters. The SPO also could not demonstrate that it
briefed the key congressional committees regarding the risks facing
the program or specific mitigation plans. While program officials
stated that they briefed congressional committees during the fall of
2008, which they said included disclosure of risks, these officials
did not have any documentation to show when these briefings occurred,
who was present, and whether or not program risk was a topic of
discussion. Further, House Homeland Security Committee staff told us
that while they received several briefings on SBInet during the fall
of 2008, they were not specifically briefed on program risks.
Recommendation: (3) Establish and baseline the specific program
commitments, including the specific system functional and performance
capabilities that are to be deployed to the Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso
Sectors, and establish when these capabilities are to be deployed and
are to be operational;
DHS comment: Concurred;
Status: Partially implemented;
GAO analysis: The SPO has established and baselined program
commitments, including the system's functional and performance
capabilities to be deployed and the timing of their deployment and
operational use. However, these commitments have continued to
decrease. For example, the SPO has defined the capabilities to be
deployed in the Tucson and Yuma Sectors;
however, it dropped the El Paso Sector from its Block 1 deployment
plans. Further, the functional capabilities for Block 1 have also been
reduced. Specifically, the number of component- level requirements for
Block 1 has decreased by about 32 percent since they were baselined in
late 2008. In addition, system performance has been reduced. For
example, the system is now only required to achieve a 49 percent
probability of identifying items of interest that cross the border.
Moreover, a time frame for when these capabilities are to be deployed
and begin operating continues to be delayed, and is still uncertain.
To illustrate the extent of changes to schedule commitments, as of
July 2008, program officials stated that the deployments to the Tucson
Border Patrol Station (TUS-1) and the Ajo Border Patrol Station (AJO-
1) would be operational "sometime" during 2009. However, August 2009
documentation shows that TUS-1 and AJO-1 were scheduled for acceptance
by the government in February 2010 and July 2010, respectively.
Moreover, the SBI Executive Director stated in December 2009 that the
entire Block 1 schedule is being reviewed and revised because of
uncertainties with projected completion dates. Further, as of February
2010, TUS-1 and AJO-1 are proposed to be accepted in September 2010
and November 2010, respectively. However, this proposed schedule has
yet to be approved by CBP. Finally, the program's cost commitments are
not based on complete, current, or reliable estimates. The Block 1
life cycle cost estimate does not cover all costs, has not been
updated to reflect changes to the program, and does not otherwise
sufficiently address leading best practices for cost estimating, such
as properly identifying the ground rules and assumptions used to
estimate costs, using an independent cost estimate to verify the
estimate's validity, and undergoing risk and uncertainty analysis.
Recommendation: (4) Finalize and approve an integrated master schedule
that reflects the timing and sequencing of the work needed to achieve
these commitments;
DHS comment: Concurred;
Status: Partially implemented;
GAO analysis: The SPO finalized an integrated master schedule for
SBInet, and DHS approved the schedule in March 2009. However, the
schedule is not reliable because it does not adequately comply with
key practices for schedule estimation, as discussed in this report.
For example, the schedule does not capture all activities as defined
in the work breakdown structure or integrated master plan.
Specifically, 57 percent of the activities listed in the work
breakdown structure (71 of 125) and 67 percent of the activities
listed in the integrated master plan (46 of 69) were not in the
integrated master schedule. In particular, the schedule is missing
efforts associated with systems engineering, sensor towers, logistics,
system test and evaluation, operations support, and program
management. Further, the schedule does not include key activities to
be performed by the government. While the schedule shows the final
activity in the government process for obtaining an environmental
permit in order to construct towers, it does not include the related
government activities needed to obtain the permit. In addition, the
schedule does not reflect a valid critical path. For example, it is
missing government and contractor activities, and is thus not
complete, and it is missing some predecessor links, and improperly
establishes other predecessor and successor links.
Recommendation: (5) Revise and approve versions of the SBInet life
cycle management approach, including the draft Systems Engineering
Plan (SEP) and draft Test and Evaluation Management Plan (TEMP), and
in doing so, ensure that these revised and approved versions are;
(a) consistent with one another; (b) reflect program officials'
recently described changes to the engineering and testing approaches,
and; (c) reflect relevant federal guidance and associated leading
practices;
DHS comment: Concurred;
Status: Partially implemented;
GAO analysis: (a) The SEP and TEMP were revised and approved in
November 2008, and these documents are largely consistent with one
another; (b) The SEP and TEMP reflect the program officials' described
changes to its engineering and testing approaches; (c) The revised SEP
and TEMP reflect many aspects of relevant guidance and leading
practices, as discussed in this report. For example, the SEP defines a
number of gate reviews to guide system development and operations,
such as initial planning reviews, requirements reviews, system design
reviews, and test reviews. In addition, it requires key artifacts and
program documents identified in DHS guidance, such as a concept of
operations, an operational requirements document, a deployment plan, a
risk management plan, a life cycle cost estimate, requirements
documentation, and test plans. However, the SEP does not address the
content of the key artifacts that it requires. For example, it does
not provide a sample document or content template for the required
documents, such as the concept of operations, the operational
requirements document, or a deployment plan. Furthermore, the TEMP,
while consistent with some aspects of relevant guidance, still has
limitations. For example, and as discussed in more detail below, the
TEMP describes the program's test strategy, scope, and resource
requirements, but does not adequately define roles and
responsibilities and provide sufficient detail for key testing and
management activities.
Recommendation: (6) Ensure that the revised and approved life cycle
management approach is fully implemented;
DHS comment: Concurred;
Status: Partially implemented;
GAO analysis: Program officials stated that they have yet to fully
implement the Systems Engineering Plan. As a result, they have not
consistently implemented the plan when conducting gate reviews for
life cycle activities. For example, while the SPO reviewed and
considered all but one of the key artifacts for the TUS-1 Deployment
Readiness Review that concluded in April 2009, a number of key
documents were not reviewed during the CDR, including the quality
plan, security test plan, and plans for testing, training, and system
maintenance. According to program officials, this was because the
contractor is required to follow criteria in the task order, which was
written prior to the CDR. Program officials stated that they are
working to bring the task orders into alignment with the revised SEP.
Recommendation: (7) Implement key requirements development and
management practices to include; (a) baselining requirements before
system design and development efforts begin; (b) analyzing
requirements prior to being baselined to ensure that they are
complete, achievable, and verifiable; and; (c) tracing requirements to
higher-level requirements, lower-level requirements, and test cases;
DHS comment: Concurred;
Status: Partially implemented;
GAO analysis: (a) A baseline set of requirements for the TUS-1 and AJO-
1 system deployments were established in October 2008. Baselined
requirements associated specifically with the Network Operations
Center/Security Operations Center (NOC/SOC) were not adequately
defined at this time, as evidenced by the fact that about 43 percent
of these requirements were significantly changed 2 months later;
(b) Twelve of Block 1's 69 operational requirements are not yet
complete, achievable, verifiable, or affordable. The 12 operational
requirements, which were reported as deficient by DHS in November
2007, are associated with 16 system-level requirements, which in turn
are linked to 152 component-level requirements, which represent
approximately 15 percent of the total number of component-level
requirements. Program officials stated that they planned to address
the problems with requirements during testing. However, they also told
us that unclear and ambiguous requirements contributed to numerous and
extensive rewriting of test cases. As we recently reported,[B] most
SBInet system qualification and component qualification test cases had
to be rewritten extemporaneously during test execution, in part
because of differing opinions among staff about what was required to
effectively test and satisfy the requirements; (c) The Block 1
component-level requirements are now largely traceable backward to
system and operational requirements, and forward to design
requirements and verification methods.
Recommendation: (8) Implement key test management practices to include;
(a) developing and documenting test plans prior to the start of
testing; (b) conducting appropriate component-level testing prior to
integrating system components; and; (c) approving a test management
strategy that, at a minimum, includes a relevant testing schedule,
establishes accountability for testing activities by clearly defining
testing roles and responsibilities, and includes sufficient detail to
allow for testing and oversight activities to be clearly understood
and communicated to test stakeholders;
DHS comment: Partially disagreed;
Status: Partially implemented;
GAO analysis: (a) Test plans and procedures were developed for
component and system qualification testing; however, they were not
defined in accordance with key aspects of guidance. For example, none
of the 10 system and component test plans adequately described testing
risks, and only 2 of the plans included quality assurance procedures
for making changes to test plans during execution. In addition, a
large number of test procedures were changed during test execution,
and these changes were not made in accordance with documented quality
assurance processes. Rather, changes were made based on an
undocumented understanding that program officials said they had
established with the contractor; (b) Qualification testing for 9
SBInet components occurred prior to qualification testing of the
entire system; (c) A test management approach has been established
that is consistent with some, but not all, aspects of relevant
guidance. For example, the 2008 TEMP describes (1) a test management
strategy that is consistent with the program's system development
approach, (2) a progressive sequence of tests to verify that both
individual system parts, as well as the integrated system, meet
specified requirements, and (3) the staff, resources (equipment and
facilities), and funding requirements associated with SBInet testing.
However, while the TEMP includes high-level descriptions of various
test documentation and reports associated with developmental and
operational testing, it does not include sufficient detail to allow
for key testing and oversight activities. In addition, the TEMP
defines high-level roles and responsibilities for various entities
related to program testing, but similar to what we reported in 2008,
these responsibilities are defined in vague terms and contain errors.
Further, the TEMP lacks a clear definition for how the program is to
prioritize and analyze all problems discovered during testing.
Specifically, while the TEMP requires that test plans include guidance
for recording anomalies during testing, it does not describe a process
for analyzing and prioritizing anomalies according to severity, nor
does it describe a process for resolving them. Finally, although the
TEMP and related SBInet task orders include descriptions of certain
metrics, some of those metrics are not associated with desired quality
outcomes and do not identify how they support specific test objectives.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[A] EVM is a management tool for monitoring a program's cost and
schedule performance by measuring the value of the work accomplished
in a given period, compared to the planned value of the work scheduled
for that period and the actual cost of the work accomplished.
[B] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and
Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk, GAO-
10-158 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2010).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Detailed Results of GAO Assessment of SBInet Program
Schedule:
Our research has identified a range of best practices associated with
effective schedule estimating.[Footnote 75] These are (1) capturing
all activities, (2) sequencing all activities, (3) assigning resources
to all activities, (4) establishing the duration of all activities,
(5) integrating activities horizontally and vertically, (6)
establishing the critical path for all activities, (7) identifying
reasonable float time between activities, (8) conducting a schedule
risk analysis, and (9) updating the schedule using logic and
durations. We assessed the extent to which the SBInet integrated
master schedule, dated August 2009, met each of the nine practices as
either Not Met (the program provided no evidence that satisfies any
portion of the criterion), Minimally Met (the program provided
evidence that satisfies less than one-half of the criterion),
Partially Met (the program provided evidence that satisfies about one-
half of the criterion), Substantially Met (the program provided
evidence that satisfies more than one-half of the criterion), and Met
(the program provided evidence that satisfies the entire criterion).
Table 8 shows the detailed results of our analysis.
Table 8: Detailed Results of SBInet Satisfaction of Scheduling Best
Practices:
Practice: (1) Capturing all activities;
Description: The schedule should reflect all activities (steps,
events, outcomes, etc.) as defined in the program's work breakdown
structure (WBS)[A] to include activities to be performed by both the
government and its contractors;
Met? Minimally;
Results: The schedule does not capture all activities as defined in
the program's WBS or integrated master plan (IMP).[B] For example, 57
percent (71 of 125) of the activities listed in the WBS and 67 percent
(46 of 69) of the activities listed in the IMP were not in the
integrated master schedule. In particular, the schedule does not
include key efforts associated with systems engineering, sensor
towers, logistics, system test and evaluation, operations support, and
program management. Further, the schedule only includes a few
activities to be performed by the government. For example, while the
schedule shows the final activity in the government process for
obtaining an environmental permit in order to construct towers, it
does not include the related government activities needed to obtain
the permit.
Practice: (2) Sequencing all activities;
Description: The schedule should sequence activities in the order that
they are to be implemented. In particular, activities that must finish
prior to the start of other activities (i.e., predecessor activities)
as well as activities that cannot begin until other activities are
completed (i.e., successor activities) should be identified;
Met? Substantially;
Results: The schedule identifies virtually all of the predecessor and
successor activities. Specifically, only 9 of 1,512 activities (less
than 1 percent) were missing predecessor links. Further, only 21 of
1,512 activities (about 1 percent) had improper predecessor and
successor links. While the number of unlinked activities is very
small, not linking a given activity can cause problems because changes
to the durations of these activities will not accurately change the
dates for related activities. More importantly, 403 of 1,512
activities (about 27 percent) are constrained by "start no earlier
than" dates, which is significant because it means that these
activities are not allowed to start earlier, even if their respective
predecessor activities have been completed.
Practice: (3) Assigning resources to all activities;
Description: The schedule should reflect who will do the work
activities, whether all required resources will be available when they
are needed, and whether any funding or time constraints exist;
Met? Minimally;
Results: The schedule does not assign the resources needed to complete
the captured activities. Instead, the contractor's resource data are
maintained separately as part of its EVM system and are available to
the government upon request.
Practice: (4) Establishing duration of all activities;
Description: The schedule should reflect the duration of each
activity. These durations should be as short as possible and have
specific start and end dates;
Met? Substantially;
Results: The schedule establishes the duration of key activities and
includes specific start and end dates for most of the activities. For
example, the schedule establishes reasonable durations for 1,164 of
the 1,241[C] activities (about 94 percent) in the schedule. However,
the remaining 77 activities (or 6 percent) are not always of short
duration, with 15 of the 77 having durations that ranged from 102 to
177 days.
Practice: (5) Integrating schedule activities horizontally and
vertically;
Description: The schedule should be horizontally integrated, meaning
that it should link the products and outcomes associated with
sequenced activities. The schedule should also be vertically
integrated, meaning that traceability exists among varying levels of
activities and supporting tasks and subtasks;
Met? Partially;
Results: The schedule is not fully integrated horizontally. While
horizontal integration exists between task orders for work that is
under contract, the schedule does not capture all key activities in
the WBS and IMP. Further, as discussed above, the schedule is missing
some predecessors and improperly establishes other predecessor and
successor links. The schedule is also not fully integrated vertically.
While the schedule provides traceability between higher-level and
lower-level schedule views, it does not capture all of the WBS and IMP
activities, as noted above, and thus these activities are not
integrated.
Practice: (6) Establishing the critical path for all activities;
Description: The critical path represents the chain of dependent
activities with the longest total duration in the schedule;
Met? Partially;
Results: The schedule does not reflect a valid critical path for
several reasons. First, it is missing government and contractor
activities, and is thus not complete. Second, the schedule does not
include all predecessor links between activities, and in some cases,
the predecessor and successor links are not correct. Unless all
activities are included and properly linked, it is not possible to
generate a true critical path. These problems were recognized by the
Defense Contract Management Agency[D] as early as November 2008, when
it reported that the contractor could not develop a true critical path
that incorporates all program elements.
Practice: (7) Identifying reasonable float between activities;
Description: The schedule should identify a reasonable amount of float-
-the time that a predecessor activity can slip before the delay
affects successor activities--so that schedule flexibility can be
determined. As a general rule, activities along the critical path
typically have the least amount of float;
Met? Partially;
Results: The schedule identifies float;
however, the amount of float is excessive. For example, 202 of 1,512
activities (about 13 percent) show float between 101 and 150 days, or
about 3 to 5 months. Another 5 of the 1,512 activities (less than 1
percent) show float between 970 and 1,427 days (about 2.5 to almost 4
years). This high level of float is being driven by the lack of
successor relationships among activities, as previously discussed, and
may be due to incorrect dependencies between activities. Moreover, 138
of the 208 activities (about 85 percent) on the critical path show
negative float, meaning that the activities must be completed ahead of
schedule in order for the overall program to be on time. Much of the
negative float in the schedule is due to a number of activities with
start-no-earlier-than constraints, which means that these activities
cannot start earlier even if the predecessor is complete. Program
officials stated that they plan to review the need for these
constraints.
Practice: (8) Conducting a schedule risk analysis;
Description: A schedule risk analysis is used to predict the level of
confidence in the schedule, determine the amount of time contingency
needed, and identify high-priority schedule risks;
Met? Not;
Results: A risk analysis of the schedule's vulnerability to slippages
in the completion of activities has not been performed.
Practice: (9) Updating the schedule using logic and durations;
Description: The schedule should use logic and durations in order to
reflect realistic start and completion dates, be continually monitored
to determine differences between forecasted completion dates and
planned dates, and avoid logic overrides and artificial constraint
dates;
Met? Partially;
Results: The SPO and the contractor review the schedule during the
weekly Program Management Reviews and discuss updates, confirm status
and progress of activities, and document any concerns and impacts.
Further, program officials stated that critical- path and near-
critical-path activities are managed continuously to determine if
float conditions are worsening or improving and to ensure that changes
are reported to management as soon as possible. Further, the program
generates several monthly reports related to the critical path,
schedule metrics, and diagnostic filters that provide specific
information about each task order and the program as a whole.
Moreover, both SPO and contractor officials responsible for updating
and monitoring the schedule have received the proper training and have
experience in critical path method scheduling. Nevertheless, the
schedule does not reflect a valid critical path, as discussed above.
Further, problems with the predecessor and successor links, and
durations also previously discussed, as well as other anomalies in the
schedule, raise questions about the reliability of the activities'
start and end dates. For example, 37 of 1,512 activities (about 2
percent) should have started as of August 2009, but did not, yet the
schedule software did not automatically advance the start date
accordingly. Further, the schedule showed 95 of 1,512 activities
(about 6 percent) with actual start dates after the date of the
schedule (August 2009), and 84 of 1,512 activities (about 6 percent)
with actual finish dates after these dates, neither of which should be
the case. In addition, 403 of 1,512 activities (about 27 percent)
activities have "start no earlier than" constraints, which means that
the schedule does not allow activities to start earlier, even when the
predecessor has been completed.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
Note: "Not Met" = DHS provided no evidence that satisfies any of the
criterion. "Minimally Met" = DHS provided evidence that satisfies less
than one-half of the criterion. "Partially Met" = DHS provided
evidence that satisfies about one-half of the criterion.
"Substantially Met" = DHS provided evidence that satisfies more than
one-half of the criterion. "Met" = DHS provided complete evidence that
satisfies the entire criterion.
[A] The WBS is a document that defines in detail the work necessary to
complete a program's objectives.
[B] An IMP is an event-based hierarchy of program events that must be
completed to complete the program.
[C] This number of activities does not include milestones, which by
definition have a duration of zero.
[D] Based on a letter of commitment with CBP, the Defense Contract
Management Agency is to provide CBP with contract administration
services for SBInet, including the identification of issues that could
impact Boeing's ability to perform the requirements in the task orders
in accordance with established criteria. In this regard, the Defense
Contract Management Agency provides the SPO with monthly reports that
include an assessment of Boeing's system engineering processes, the
current and projected status of operational and technical issues, and
the results of ongoing internal audits.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Detailed Results of GAO Assessment of SBInet Cost Estimate:
Our research has identified 12 practices that are integral to
effective program life cycle cost estimating.[Footnote 76] These 12
practices in turn relate to four characteristics of a high-quality and
reliable cost estimate:
* Comprehensive: The cost estimate should include all government and
contractor costs over the program's full life cycle, from program
inception through design, development, deployment, and operation and
maintenance to retirement. It should also provide sufficient detail to
ensure that cost elements are neither omitted nor double-counted, and
it should document all cost-influencing ground rules and assumptions.
* Well-documented: The cost estimate should capture in writing things
such as the source and significance of the data used, the calculations
performed and their results, and the rationale for choosing a
particular estimating method or reference. Moreover, this information
should be captured in such a way that the data used to derive the
estimate can be traced back to, and verified against, their sources.
Finally, the cost estimate should be reviewed and accepted by
management to demonstrate confidence in the estimating process and the
estimate.
* Accurate: The cost estimate should not be overly conservative or
optimistic, and should be, among other things, based on an assessment
of most likely costs, adjusted properly for inflation, and validated
against an independent cost estimate. In addition, the estimate should
be updated regularly to reflect material changes in the program and
actual cost experience with the program. Further, steps should be
taken to minimize mathematical mistakes and their significance and to
ground the estimate in documented assumptions and a historical record
of actual cost and schedule experiences with other comparable programs.
* Credible: The cost estimate should discuss any limitations in the
analysis due to uncertainty or biases surrounding data or assumptions.
Major assumptions should be varied and other outcomes computed to
determine how sensitive the estimate is to changes in the assumptions.
Risk and uncertainty inherent in the estimate should be assessed and
disclosed. Further, the estimate should be properly verified by, for
example, comparing the results with an independent cost estimate.
Our analysis of the $1.3 billion SBInet life cycle cost estimate
relative to each of the 12 best practices, as well as to each of the
four characteristics, is summarized in table 9. A detailed analysis
relative to the 12 practices is in table 10.
Table 9: Summary of SBInet Satisfaction of Cost Estimating
Characteristics and Related Practices/Steps:
Characteristic: Comprehensive;
Met? Partially;
Practice/step: Did the team develop a well-written study plan?
(Practice 2);
Met? Partially.
Practice/step: Was the estimating structure determined? (Practice 4);
Met? Partially.
Practice/step: Were ground rules and assumptions identified? (Practice
5);
Met? Minimally.
Characteristic: Well-documented;
Met? Partially;
Practice/step: Are the cost estimate's purpose and scope defined and
documented? (Practice 1);
Met? Partially.
Practice/step: Were program characteristics defined? (Practice 3);
Met? Substantially.
Practice/step: Were ground rules and assumptions identified? (Practice
5);
Met? Minimally.
Practice/step: Were valid and useful historical data collected?
(Practice 6);
Met? Partially.
Practice/step: Was the estimate documented? (Practice 10);
Met? Substantially.
Practice/step: Was the estimate presented to management for approval?
(Practice 11);
Met? Minimally.
Characteristic: Accurate;
Met? Minimally;
Practice/step: Was the point estimate developed and compared to an
independent cost estimate? (Practice 7);
Met? Minimally.
Practice/step: Is the estimate updated to reflect actual costs and
changes? (Practice 12);
Met? Minimally.
Characteristic: Credible;
Met? Partially;
Practice/step: Was a sensitivity analysis conducted? (Practice 8);
Met? Partially.
Practice/step: Was a risk and uncertainty analysis conducted?
(Practice 9);
Met? Partially.
Practice/step: Was the point estimate developed and compared to an
independent cost estimate? (Practice 7);
Met? Minimally.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
Note: "Not Met" = DHS provided no evidence that satisfies any portion
of the criterion. "Minimally Met" = DHS provided evidence that
satisfies less than one-half of the criterion. "Partially Met" = DHS
provided evidence that satisfies about one-half of the criterion.
"Substantially Met" = DHS provided evidence that satisfies more than
one-half of the criterion. "Met" = DHS provided complete evidence that
satisfies the entire criterion.
[End of table]
Table 10: Detailed Results of SBInet Satisfaction of 12 Cost
Estimating Practices/Steps:
Practice: (1) Are the cost estimate's purpose and scope defined and
documented?
Description: A life cycle cost estimate provides a structured
accounting of all resources and associated cost elements required to
develop, produce, deploy, and sustain a program. As such, the estimate
should include; (a) a level of detail consistent with the level of
detail available for the program; (b) all applicable costs, including
all past (or sunk), present, and future costs for every aspect of the
program, regardless of funding source; and; (c) a defined scope for
the estimate;
Met? Partially;
Results: The Block 1 life cycle cost estimate of $1.3 billion does not
account for all resources and cost elements associated with Block 1
development, acquisition, deployment, and sustainment. In particular:
(a) The cost estimate is generally defined at a level of detail that
is consistent with the WBS[A] for the program, and thus allows for the
development of a quality estimate; (b) The cost estimate does not
include all applicable costs. For example, the estimate excludes sunk
costs, including design, development, and testing, as well as
contractor and government program management and support costs.
Further, it includes only 1 year of operations and maintenance costs;
(c) Program officials stated that the scope of the cost estimate
includes the cost to complete Block 1 as of the time of the
Acquisition Program Baseline, which was approved in March 2009.
However, this scope is not consistent with the estimate's stated
purpose, as it excludes sunk costs and operation and maintenance costs
over the system's useful life.
Practice: (2) Did the team develop a well-written study plan?
Description: A cost estimate should be based on a written study plan
that identifies, among other things; (a) the estimating team's
composition,; (b) the subject matter experts that the estimating team
will rely on for information; (c) the estimating approach, and;
(d) a schedule for completing the estimate that includes adequate time
to perform the work;
Met? Partially;
Results: The cost estimate was not based on a written study plan;
however, it partially met other aspects of this practice. Specifically:
(a) A contractor with many years of experience in government cost
estimating was hired to develop the estimate; (b) The contractor had
access to government subject matter experts, including program office
logisticians, engineers, and technicians, as well as Border Patrol
staff, for key information, such as ground rules, assumptions, and
requirements for labor and material; (c) Program officials described
the overall cost estimating approach and this approach largely follows
relevant estimating procedures, including developing a detailed WBS,
identifying cost estimating methods, identifying source data and
subject matter experts for each WBS element, conducting data analysis,
deriving the estimate, and performing recursive updates as data become
available; (d) A schedule for completing and updating the estimate
does not exist.
Practice: (3) Were program characteristics defined?
Description: Critical to developing a reliable cost estimate is having
an adequate understanding of the program's key characteristics (i.e.,
a defined technical program baseline), including documented
requirements, purpose, technical characteristics, development plan,
acquisition strategy, operational plan, and risk. The less such
information is known, the more assumptions must be made, thus
increasing the risk associated with the estimate;
Met? Substantially;
Results: The SPO has defined and documented a technical program
baseline across various documents that together describe the program's
requirements, purpose, technical characteristics, development plan,
acquisition strategy, operational plan, and risks. Examples of the
source data for this baseline include critical design review and
deployment readiness review documentation as the basis for the
requirements and technical characteristics, and the Project Laydown
Workbook Revision 12 as the basis for the master tower construction
plan for the location, tower height, and radar and camera type.
Practice: (4) Was the estimating structure determined?
Description: A WBS is the cornerstone of every program. It defines the
detailed work elements needed to accomplish the program's objectives
and the logical relationship among these elements, and it provides a
systematic and standardized way for collecting data across the
program. Thus, it is an essential part of developing a program's life
cycle cost estimate. As such, a WBS should: (a) decompose product-
oriented elements to an appropriate level of detail (generally to at
least three levels of decomposition) to ensure that cost elements are
neither omitted nor double counted; (b) provide a standardized way for
collecting data across the program; (c) be consistent across the cost
estimate, integrated master schedule and EVM system;[B]; (d) be
updated as the program becomes better defined and to reflect changes
as they occur; and; (e) include a dictionary that defines each element
and how it is related to others in the hierarchy;
Met? Partially;
Results: The SPO has a WBS that defines much, but not all, of the
detailed work and the relationships among work elements needed to
accomplish the program's objectives. More specifically:
(a) The WBS decomposes product-oriented work elements (as well as
process-oriented work elements). For example, radar, camera, tower,
and unattended ground sensor products are visible and decomposed to a
third level of detail, thus ensuring that associated costs are neither
omitted nor double counted. However, the WBS omits several key
elements, such as sunk costs for contractor program management;
overhead; system design, development and testing; and software design,
development, and testing. Therefore, it does not fully represent all
work necessary to accomplish the program's objectives; (b) The WBS and
the cost estimate are standardized to a third level of decomposition.
The cost estimate is further decomposed to provide greater granularity
in the estimate; (c) The WBS is consistent with the cost estimate and
the EVM system to the third level of decomposition. However, the WBS
is not consistent with the integrated master schedule. In particular,
the schedule is missing several level-2 WBS elements, including
Project Sector Deployment, Logistics, Test and Evaluation, Operations
Support, Program Management, and Transportation; (d) The WBS has been
modified over time to reflect an updated view of the program. For
example, while the WBS is decomposed to level 5 for Project Sector
Acquisitions, the cost estimate further decomposes this work element
to level 8 based on the availability of more detailed information;
(e) The WBS includes a dictionary that defines each work element down
to a third level of decomposition and its relationships with other
work elements.
Practice: (5) Were ground rules and assumptions identified?
Description: Cost estimates are typically based on limited information
and therefore need to be bound by the constraints that make estimating
possible. Among other things, these constraints, which include ground
rules and assumptions, should at a minimum be identified. More
specifically: (a) risks associated with assumptions should be
identified and traced to WBS elements; (b) budget constraints should
be identified; (c) inflation indices and their source should be
identified; (d) dependencies on other organizational entities, and the
effect on the estimate if the assumptions fail, should be identified;
(e) items that have been excluded from the estimate should be
identified, documented, and explained; (f) the effect on cost and
schedule if technology maturity assumptions fail should be addressed;
and; (g) risk distributions for all assumptions should be determined;
Met? Minimally;
Results: The ground rules and assumptions affecting the cost estimate
were largely not identified, documented, and assessed. In particular:
(a) Risk was estimated and documented for material unit prices and
labor rates. However, the risk associated with the assumptions that
drive the cost estimate, such as number of towers and staff and
schedule variations, were not identified and traced to WBS elements;
(b) Budget constraints are not identified in the cost estimate
documentation; (c) The inflation rates were taken from Office of
Management and Budget Circular A-94.[C] However, they were improperly
derived. Specifically, the SPO overstated the inflation rate by using
the projected interest rate rather than the projected inflation rate;
(d) The estimate includes only contractor costs and does not recognize
assumptions about, for example, government costs; (e) The estimate
documents excluded costs, such as government effort, operations and
maintenance costs beyond the first year of steady state support,
operations and maintenance costs of legacy equipment, and
participating agency support costs. Further, other excluded costs were
documented in a supplemental briefing from program officials,
including sunk costs, software, government program management and
support costs, and costs of expected block evolutions. Also,
explanations as to why these costs were excluded were not documented;
(f) SBInet is to be largely based on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
products, and thus the cost estimate depends on assumptions about the
maturity of these products. However, the estimate does not address the
effect of the failure of these product maturity assumptions on the
cost estimate. These assumptions are significant because COTS
limitations have been identified as a key contributor to Block 1's
reduced scope and schedule delays; (g) The estimate includes risk
distributions for some, but not all, of the assumptions. The majority
of these distributions were based on "industry standards" and opinions
from subject matter experts (e.g., logisticians, engineers,
technicians, and Border Patrol staff from various integrated product
teams).
Practice: (6) Were valid and useful historical data collected?
Description: Cost estimates should be rooted in historical data. To
ensure that these data are applicable and useful, the following
activities should be performed:
(a) cost drivers should be identified; (b) data should be collected
from primary sources, and the data's source, content, time, and units
should be documented and their accuracy and reliability should be
assessed; (c) data should be continually collected so that they are
available for future use; (d) understanding of the data should include
meeting with parties who are responsible for them; (e) the data should
be reviewed and benchmarked for reasonableness; and; (f) scatter plots
and descriptive statistics should be used to analyze the data;
Met? Partially;
Results: Cost estimates were, in part, grounded in historical data.
However, key activities associated with using such data were not
performed. Specifically: (a) The cost estimate did not specifically
identify cost drivers. However, a supplemental briefing did identify
key cost drivers. For example, the top five cost drivers for
deployment were identified as land tower systems, unattended ground
systems, vehicle communications upgrades, program management for
deployment, and microwave transceivers and equipment, and the top five
cost drivers for operations and maintenance were identified as
maintenance technicians, vehicle console technicians, depot repair
(normal wear and tear), camera overhaul, and depot repair (vandalism);
(b) For hardware and material cost estimates, historical data were
collected from Boeing primary data sources, such as technical data
from design reviews, engineering drawings, technical workbooks, bills
of material data, and purchase agreements. For construction labor cost
estimates, data were collected from a secondary source--the Davis-
Bacon National Construction estimate labor rates. For nonconstruction
labor cost estimates, data were collected from Boeing (and General
Services Administration) labor rates and labor hours that were
estimated via engineering judgment, which is not a credible primary
estimating method according to GAO best practices. Further, the
documentation for these nonconstruction labor estimates did not
indicate the source of the data. To assess the data's accuracy and
reliability, officials told us that the estimators met with program
office subject matter experts and regularly attended program
management reviews, design reviews, and integrated product team
meetings; (c) The SPO regularly receives Boeing EVM data. However,
program officials stated that the data are not used for cost
estimating; (d) The estimating team met with program office subject
matter experts and regularly attended program management reviews,
design reviews, and integrated product team meetings to help
understand the data collected; (e) The data used were not benchmarked
against relevant historical data, such as Project 28 deployment and
logistics costs; (f) Scatter plots or statistical analysis were not
used.
Practice: (7) Was the point estimate developed and compared to an
independent cost estimate?
Description: A point estimate represents the most likely estimate of
costs given the underlying data, and thus it should be developed and
validated. To accomplish this: (a) the WBS cost element estimates
should be aggregated using a cost estimating method; (b) the estimate
should be checked for accuracy, double- counting, and omissions, and
it should be validated against an independent cost estimate;
and; (c) estimates of software costs should be based on software cost
estimating best practices;
Met? Minimally;
Results: A point estimate of $1.302 billion was developed, but it was
not adequately validated. Specifically: (a) The point estimate was
developed using primarily the "engineering build-up" method, with a
few cost elements estimated using the "analogy" method; (b) While the
use of cross-checks was limited to only a few hardware elements, no
instances of double-counting were visible, and the spreadsheet
calculations were accurate given the input parameters and assumptions.
However, no independent cost estimate was developed; (c) Software
costs were not estimated. According to program officials, these costs
were considered to be outside the scope of the estimate.
Practice: (8) Was a sensitivity analysis conducted?
Description: A sensitivity analysis examines the effects of changing
assumptions and ground rules. To be useful: (a) the analysis should
identify key cost drivers and their parameters and assumptions should
be examined; (b) the cost estimate should be redone by varying each
parameter between its minimum and maximum range; (c) the analysis
should be documented, and the re-estimate should be repeated for
parameters associated with key cost drivers;
Met? Partially;
Results: A sensitivity analysis was not conducted. Specifically:
(a) The cost estimate did not identify and vary most major cost
drivers and their underlying assumptions and parameters. However, a
supplemental briefing did identify key cost drivers. For example, the
top five cost drivers for deployment are land tower systems,
unattended ground systems, vehicle communications upgrades, program
management for deployment, and microwave transceivers and equipment,
and the top five cost drivers for operations and maintenance are
maintenance technicians, vehicle console technicians, depot repair
(normal wear and tear), camera overhaul, and depot repair (vandalism);
(b) The cost estimate did not vary key cost driver parameters;
(c) As noted above, the cost estimate did not vary key cost driver
parameters. However, program officials described one sensitivity
excursion that was performed in which tower quantities were varied.
Specifically, the addition of one tower was shown to increase
deployment costs by $2.2 million and increase operation and
maintenance costs by $2.5 million (both then-year dollars).
Practice: (9) Was a risk and uncertainty analysis conducted?
Description: A cost estimate is a prediction based on assumptions,
constraints, and unknowns, and thus the risk exists that actual costs
will differ from the estimate. To understand this risk and associated
uncertainty, both should be analyzed. Specifically: (a) a probability
distribution for each cost element's uncertainty should be modeled to
identify risk; (b) relationships among cost elements should be
assessed to capture risk; (c) a Monte Carlo simulation[D] to develop a
distribution of total possible costs and derive an S curve[E] to show
alternative cost estimate probabilities should be conducted; (d) a
probability should be associated with the point estimate; (e)
contingency reserves should be recommended for achieving the desired
confidence level; (f) the risk-adjusted estimate should be developed,
and the associated risks should be identified for mitigation; and;
(g) a plan should be implemented jointly with the contractor for
identifying, analyzing, mitigating, and tracking risks;
Met? Partially;
Results: A risk and uncertainty analysis was conducted, but it was
limited. In particular: (a) Probability distributions were modeled for
each cost element based on engineering judgment, rather than discrete
analysis. However, since some cost elements, as noted earlier, such as
those associated with government activities and development of
software for the common operating picture, were excluded, the
uncertainty analysis does not capture all risks; (b) Relationships
among cost element estimates were assessed. However, since, as noted
earlier, some cost elements were excluded, this assessment does not
capture all risks; (c) A Monte Carlo simulation model that used the
Latin Hypercube algorithm was conducted to derive a cumulative density
function S-curve; (d) A probability was identified for the point
estimate in the documentation. Specifically, the point estimate of
$984.5 million (then-year dollars) is at the 37 percent confidence
level, and is bounded by a low estimate of $895 million (at the 10th
percentile) and a high estimate of $1,140 million (at the 90th
percentile). However, the estimate does not specify a target
confidence level, and it has not been updated to include risk ranges
and confidence levels for the revised point estimate of $1.302 billion;
(e) Program officials stated that contingency reserves were estimated,
but the estimate documentation does not identify either the amount of
reserves or the desired confidence level; (f) Program officials stated
that a risk-adjusted budget estimate was developed. However, no
documentation exists to demonstrate this; (g) The SPO has a risk
management plan, and its risk database identifies seven cost-related
risks that were opened in 2008. However, none of these seven risks
mention the cost estimate or life cycle costs as part of the risk
description.
Practice: (10) Was the estimate documented?
Description: Documentation should describe the cost estimating
process, data sources, and methods, so that a cost analyst unfamiliar
with the program could understand how the estimate was derived. Among
other things: (a) actual costs and program changes should be
documented and available to update the estimate; (b) narrative and
cost tables, including an executive summary, introduction, and
descriptions of methods, should be used to describe the estimate.
Further, data should be broken out by WBS elements, and sensitivity
analysis, risk and uncertainty analysis, management approval, and
updates to reflect actual costs and program changes should be
documented; (c) the 12 key practices in this table should be cited or
referenced; (d) contingency reserves and how they were derived from
risk and uncertainty analysis should be discussed; and; (e) an
electronic copy of the cost estimate should exist;
Met? Substantially;
Results: Most, but not all, aspects of the cost estimate, such as the
data and calculations associated with the WBS elements, were
documented in enough detail so that an analyst unfamiliar with the
program could use the documentation to recreate the estimate and get
the same results. Specifically: (a) Actual costs and program changes
were generally not used to regularly update the estimate; (b) The
document's introductory sections include a program overview, program
description, program strategy, documentation overview, and program
cost baseline overview. The body was organized in accordance with the
WBS, thus providing a logical flow structure, and the narrative was
supported by cost tables for each major section. The documentation
also included some analysis of risks, but did not include a
sensitivity analysis and management approval of the estimate, and it
did not address how the estimate is updated to reflect actual costs
and program changes; (c) The documentation does not explicitly
identify the twelve practices. However, the cost estimate does address
these practices to varying degrees; (d) Contingency reserves and the
associated level of confidence for the risk-adjusted cost estimate are
not documented; (e) An electronic version of the cost estimate exists.
Practice: (11) Was the estimate presented to, and approved by,
management?
Description: A briefing should be prepared for management that
contains enough detail to show that the estimate is accurate,
complete, and reliable, and management should approve the estimate.
More specifically: (a) the briefing should include an overview of the
program's technical foundation and objectives, the life cycle cost
estimate in time-phased constant year dollars, a discussion of ground
rules and assumptions, the method and process for each WBS cost
element estimate including data sources, the results of sensitivity
and risk/uncertainty analysis along with a confidence interval, the
comparison of the point estimate to an independent cost estimate along
with any differences, an affordability analysis based on funding and
contingency reserves, a discussion of any concerns or challenges, as
well as conclusions about the estimate's reasonableness and
recommendations for approval, and; (b) feedback from management should
be acted on and documented, along with management's approval of the
estimate;
Met? Minimally;
Results: The cost estimate was briefed to the CBP Investment Review
Board and was approved by management. However, the briefing was not
detailed enough to show that the estimate is accurate, complete, and
reliable. Specifically: (a) The briefing contains information on the
approach and methods used and the estimate itself. Specifically, the
briefing included a high-level overview of the program's technical
foundation, the cost estimating method for each WBS cost element, and
the results of risk/uncertainty analysis along with a confidence
interval and a level of confidence for the point estimate, and a
discussion of affordability. However, the briefing did not include the
results of a sensitivity analysis, a discussion of ground rules and
assumptions, the life cycle cost estimate in both time-phased constant
year dollars and then-year dollars, or identify a level of contingency
reserve associated with a risk-adjusted cost estimate. In addition, it
did not include a comparison or reconciliation of the estimate with an
independent cost estimate; (b) According to program officials,
feedback was received from various parties to whom the briefing was
provided, but the feedback was not documented. Among others, the
briefing was provided to the SBI Executive Director, CBP Investment
Review Board, the DHS Cost Analysis Division, and the DHS Acquisition
Review Board on the estimate. The estimate was approved in March 2009
by the DHS Deputy Secretary as the Acquisition Authority for SBInet.
Practice: (12) Is the estimate updated to reflect actual costs and
program changes?
Description: The cost estimate should be updated to ensure that it is
current. Specifically: (a) the estimate should be regularly updated to
reflect relevant changes to the technical and program baseline;
(b) the estimate should incorporate actual costs when available;
and; (c) the estimate should address lessons learned for elements
whose actual costs differed from the estimate;
Met? Minimally;
Results: The estimate is not routinely updated and reasons for
variances between estimated and actual costs are not addressed;
(a) The cost estimate documentation highlights 10 adjustments that
were made to reconcile the estimate with the Acquisition Program
Baseline. However, the estimate has not been updated to reflect
current information on an ongoing basis. For example, the estimate
does not reflect development and testing activities that were added
since the estimate was approved to correct problems discovered during
testing; (b) Program officials stated that they do not use actual cost
data from EVM reports to update the estimate; (c) Reasons for cost
variances, and thus lessons learned, are not addressed.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[A] The WBS is a document that defines in detail the work necessary to
complete a program's objectives.
[B] EVM is a management tool for monitoring a program's cost and
schedule performance by measuring the value of the work accomplished
in a given period, compared to the planned value of work scheduled for
that period and the actual cost of work accomplished.
[C] Office of Management and Budget, Guidelines and Discount Rates for
Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs, Circular A-94 Revised,
(Washington, D.C., Oct. 29, 1992).
[D] A Monte Carlo simulation involves the use of random numbers and
probability distributions to examine outcomes.
[E] An S curve is a cumulative probability distribution, most often
derived from a simulation, such as Monte Carlo, that is particularly
useful in portraying the uncertainty implications of various cost
estimates.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Randolph C. Hite, (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Deborah Davis (Assistant
Director), David Alexander, Rebecca Alvarez, Carl Barden, Tisha
Derricotte, Neil Doherty, Nancy Glover, Dan Gordon, Cheryl
Dottermusch, Thomas J. Johnson, Kaelin P. Kuhn, Jason T. Lee, Lee
McCracken, Jamelyn Payan, Karen Richey, Karl W.D. Seifert, Matt
Snyder, Sushmita Srikanth, Jennifer Stavros-Turner, Stacey L. Steele,
and Karen Talley made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] At a port of entry location, CBP officers secure the flow of
people and cargo into and out of the country, while facilitating
travel and trade.
[2] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant
Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22,
2008).
[3] GAO, Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation
of Border Surveillance Technology Program, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-295] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22,
2006).
[4] The remaining $126 million was for upgrading the supporting CBP
telecommunications links.
[5] In addition to the SBI Program Office, the SBI Acquisition Office
is responsible for performing contract administration activities.
[6] The physical infrastructure (e.g., physical fencing) portion of
SBI is managed on a day-to-day basis by CBP's Office of Finance
Facilities Management and Engineering division.
[7] CBP divides the United States' borders with Mexico and Canada into
20 sectors responsible for detecting, interdicting, and apprehending
those who attempt illegal entry or to smuggle contraband across U.S.
borders.
[8] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of
SBInet Program Implementation, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-131T] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24,
2007) and Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of
Applying Lessons Learned to Future Projects, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-508T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27,
2008).
[9] The area that will be covered by TUS-1 covers 23 of the 28 miles
associated with Project 28. According to the SPO, the Project 28
capabilities (surveillance systems and COP) will be replaced with
Block 1 capabilities as part of the TUS-1 deployment.
[10] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to
Better Support Oversight and Accountability, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-309] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15,
2007).
[11] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-131T].
[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-508T].
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086].
[14] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays
Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Addressed,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 9, 2009).
[15] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and
Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-158] (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 29, 2010).
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086].
[17] A specification is the written collection of individual
requirements for a given hardware component (e.g., camera or radar) or
a software subsystem (e.g., COP).
[18] The requirements baseline establishes a set of requirements that
have been formally reviewed, agreed upon, and placed under formal
change control. The requirements baseline serves as the basis for
system design and development.
[19] The NOC monitors SBInet equipment with network connections and
provides alerts of network events. The SOC protects SBInet equipment
with network connections from external and internal network-based
attacks and provides user authentication services.
[20] According to program documentation, a deviation is a request from
the contractor to deliver a product that temporarily departs from a
specified requirement, with the expectation that the product will
eventually be modified to meet the requirement. A waiver is a request
from the contractor to deliver a product that will not meet a
specified requirement, but is considered suitable for use as
delivered. In the case of a waiver, there is no expectation that the
product will ever be changed to meet the requirement.
[21] The user assessment was conducted from March 27, 2009, to April
3, 2009, in conjunction with personnel from the Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory. While the purpose of the
assessment was to obtain the users' views of the system's operational
effectiveness, and was not designed to be a test of system performance
against requirements, the assessment report nonetheless identified
instances in which requirements were not met.
[22] The laser range finder is mounted to the cameras to provide
accurate distance data on targets and thereby allows operators to
direct Border Patrol agents more effectively.
[23] The Acquisition Program Baseline formally documents a program's
critical cost, schedule, and performance parameters, expressed in
measurable, quantitative terms that must be met in order to accomplish
the program's goals. By tracking and measuring actual program
performance against this formal baseline, the program's management is
alerted to potential problems, such as cost growth or requirements
creep, and has the ability to take early corrective action.
[24] System availability is defined as the time the system is
operating satisfactorily, expressed as a percentage of time that the
system is required to be operational.
[25] The original performance parameter called for the system to be
able to "classify" an item of interest as human, vehicle, or animal.
Program officials stated that they changed the term to "identify"
because "classification" involves determining the level of threat that
an identified item of interest presents. For example, a target could
be identified as a human, and then classified as a high threat if the
person appeared to be carrying a weapon.
[26] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March
2009), 218-224.
[27] A work breakdown structure defines in detail the hierarchy of
work tasks necessary to complete a program's objectives.
[28] An integrated master plan is an event-based hierarchy of program
events that must be completed.
[29] The critical path represents the chain of dependent activities
with the longest total duration in the schedule. If any activity on
the critical path slips, the entire program will be delayed.
[30] Based on a letter of commitment with CBP, the Defense Contract
Management Agency is to provide CBP with contract administration
services for SBInet, including the identification of issues that could
impact Boeing's ability to perform the requirements in the task orders
in accordance with established criteria. In this regard, the Defense
Contract Management Agency provides the SPO with monthly reports that
include an assessment of Boeing's system engineering processes, the
current and projected status of operational and technical issues, and
the results of ongoing internal audits.
[31] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP], 31-36.
[32] OMB, Circular No. A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of
the Budget (Washington, D.C., Executive Office of the President, June
2006); Circular No. A-130 Revised, Management of Federal Information
Resources (Washington, D.C., Executive Office of the President, Nov.
28, 2000); and Capital Programming Guide: Supplement to Circular A-11,
Part 7, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget
(Washington, D.C., Executive Office of the President, June 2006).
[33] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP], 8-13.
[34] Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, 40 U.S.C. sections 11101-11704, and
OMB, Circular No. A-130, Management of Federal Information Resources
(Washington, D.C., Nov. 30, 2000).
[35] GAO, DOD Business Systems Modernization: Planned Investment In
Navy Program to Create Cashless Shipboard Environment Needs to be
Justified and Better Managed, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-922] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8,
2008).
[36] Pub. L. No. 110-329, 122 Stat. 3574, 3655-57 (2008).
[37] GAO, U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Secure Border
Initiative Fiscal Year 2009 Expenditure Plan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-274R] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,
2009).
[38] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896].
[39] See, for example, GAO, Homeland Security: Despite Progress, DHS
Continues to Be Challenged in Managing Its Multi-Billion Dollar
Investment in Large-Scale Information Technology Systems, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1002T] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15,
2009) and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086].
[40] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086].
[41] Department of Homeland Security, Acquisition Instruction/
Guidebook, 102-01-001, Appendix B, Systems Engineering Life Cycle,
Interim Version 1.9 (Nov. 7, 2008); and IEEE Standard for Application
and Management of the Systems Engineering Process, IEEE Std. 1220-2005
(New York, N.Y., Sept. 9, 2005).
[42] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-158].
[43] Software Engineering Institute (SEI), Capability Maturity Model
Integration (CMMI)Ž for Acquisition, Version 1.2 (Pittsburgh, Penn.,
November 2007).
[44] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-158].
[45] SBInet Program Deep Dive Review (Nov. 26, 2007).
[46] Of the12 requirements, 11 were unchanged, and while the remaining
requirement was slightly modified, nothing was added to this
requirement to address the DHS findings.
[47] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086].
[48] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-158].
[49] System qualification testing verifies that the system design
satisfies system-level requirements, and component qualification
testing verifies that components satisfy performance requirements.
[50] SEI, CMMIŽ for Acquisition.
[51] An insufficient number of design requirements were sampled to
generalize the results for the entire database. However, all design
requirements that we sampled traced to a verification method.
[52] SEI, CMMIŽ for Acquisition.
[53] Verification criteria are assigned to each requirement and,
according to program officials, are used to determine that a
requirement has been satisfied, and therefore can be considered
"closed."
[54] This approach is described in three documents: the SBInet Risk
Management Plan, dated June 6, 2008; the SBInet SPO Risk/Issue/
Opportunity Management Process, dated October 9, 2008; and the SBInet
Risk Management Policy, dated November 6, 2008.
[55] SEI, CMMIŽ for Acquisition.
[56] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-309].
[57] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-274R].
[58] The Joint Program Management Review meetings take place on a
monthly basis to discuss program status. They are attended by program
officials, contractor senior staff, and such key stakeholders as
Border Patrol, Air and Marine, Office of Intelligence, Office of
Information Technology, and Office of Asset Management.
[59] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086].
[60] This board is chaired by the Deputy Secretary and includes a
number of senior DHS leaders.
[61] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086].
[62] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086].
[63] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086].
[64] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March
2009), 218-224.
[65] "Not Met" = DHS provided no evidence that satisfies any portion
of the criterion. "Minimally Met" = DHS provided evidence that
satisfies less than one-half of the criterion. "Partially Met" = DHS
provided evidence that satisfies about one-half of the criterion.
"Substantially Met" = DHS provided evidence that satisfies more than
one-half of the criterion. "Met" = DHS provided complete evidence that
satisfies the entire criterion.
[66] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP], 8-13.
[67] "Not Met" = DHS provided no evidence that satisfies any portion
of the criterion. "Minimally Met" = DHS provided evidence that
satisfies less than one-half of the criterion. "Partially Met" = DHS
provided evidence that satisfies about one-half of the criterion.
"Substantially Met" = DHS provided evidence that satisfies more than
one-half of the criterion. "Met" = DHS provided complete evidence that
satisfies the entire criterion.
[68] Department of Homeland Security, DHS Acquisition Instruction/
Guidebook #102-01-001, Appendix B, Systems Engineering Life Cycle,
Interim Version 1.9 (Nov. 7, 2008); and IEEE Standard for Application
and Management of the Systems Engineering Process, IEEE Std. 1220-2005
(New York, N.Y., Sept. 9, 2005).
[69] The SPO refers to the system-level requirements specification as
the "System of System A-Level Specification."
[70] The SPO refers to the component-level requirements specifications
as the "B-2" specifications.
[71] Software Engineering Institute (SEI), Capability Maturity Model
Integration (CMMIŽ) for Acquisition, Version 1.2 (Pittsburgh, Penn.,
November 2007).
[72] SEI, CMMIŽ for Acquisition, Version 1.2 (Pittsburgh, Penn.,
November 2007).
[73] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant
Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22,
2008).
[74] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086].
[75] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March
2009), 218-224.
[76] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March
2009), 8-13.
[End of section]
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