Secure Border Initiative
DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border Gao ID: GAO-10-651T May 4, 2010Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens and contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a major challenge. In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI)--a multiyear, multibillion dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Within DHS, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provides agents and officers to support SBI. As requested, this statement summarizes (1) the findings and recommendations of GAO's reports on SBI's technology, known as SBInet (including such things as cameras and radars), and DHS's recent actions on SBInet; and (2) the findings and recommendations of GAO's reports on tactical infrastructure, such as fencing, and the extent to which CBP has deployed tactical infrastructure and assessed its operational impact. This statement is based on products issued from 2007 through 2010, with selected updates as of April 2010. To conduct these updates, GAO reviewed program schedules, status reports and funding and interviewed DHS officials.
Since the inception of SBInet, GAO has reported on a range of issues regarding design and implementation, including program challenges, management weaknesses, and cost, schedule, and performance risks; DHS has largely concurred with GAO's recommendations and has started to take some action to address them. For example, in October 2007, GAO testified that the project involving the first segment of SBInet technology across the southwest border had fallen behind its planned schedule. In a September 2008 testimony, GAO reported that CBP plans to initially deploy SBInet technology along the southwest border had slipped from the end of 2008 to 2011 and that SBInet would have fewer capabilities than originally planned. As of April 2010, SBInet's promised capabilities were still not operational. Limitations in the system's ability to function have contributed to delays. GAO has also reviewed CBP expenditure plans and found a lack of specificity on such things as planned activities and milestones. GAO made recommendations, including the need for future expenditure plans to include explicit and measurable commitments relative to the capabilities, schedule, costs, and benefits associated with individual SBI program activities. While DHS has concurred with GAO's recommendations, and its expenditure plans have improved from year to year in detail and quality, the plans, including the one for fiscal year 2009, did not fully satisfy the conditions set out by law. Further, in September 2008, GAO made recommendations to address SBInet technological capabilities that were ambiguous or in a state of flux. DHS generally concurred with them. In January 2010, GAO reported that the number of new system defects identified over an 17 month period while testing was underway was generally increasing faster than the number of defects being fixed, not indicative of a maturing system. Given the program's shortcomings, in January 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security ordered an assessment of the program, and in March 2010, the Secretary froze a portion of the program's fiscal year 2010 funding. GAO plans to report in May 2010 on the SBInet solution and the status of its September 2008 recommendations. CBP has completed deploying most of its planned tactical infrastructure and has begun efforts to measure its impact on border security, in response to a GAO recommendation. As of April 2010, CBP had completed 646 of the 652 miles of fencing it committed to deploy along the southwest border. CBP plans to have the remaining 6 miles of this baseline completed by December 2010. CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional trained agents, had increased the miles of the southwest border under control, but despite a $2.6 billion investment, it cannot account separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure. In a September 2009 report, GAO recommended that to improve the quality of information available to allocate resources and determine tactical infrastructure's contribution to effective control of the border, the Commissioner of CBP conduct a cost-effective evaluation of the impact of tactical infrastructure. DHS concurred with our recommendation and, in April 2010, told GAO that the Homeland Security Institute had undertaken this analysis.
GAO-10-651T, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border
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Statement for the Record:
To the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 5 p.m. EDT:
Tuesday, May 4, 2010:
Secure Border Initiative:
DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the
Southwest Border:
Statement for the Record of Richard M. Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-10-651T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-651T, a statement for the record to the Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Securing the nation‘s borders from illegal entry of aliens and
contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction,
continues to be a major challenge. In November 2005, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) announced the launch of the Secure Border
Initiative (SBI)-”a multiyear, multibillion dollar program aimed at
securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Within DHS,
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provides agents and
officers to support SBI. As requested, this statement summarizes (1)
the findings and recommendations of GAO‘s reports on SBI‘s technology,
known as SBInet (including such things as cameras and radars), and DHS‘
s recent actions on SBInet; and (2) the findings and recommendations
of GAO‘s reports on tactical infrastructure, such as fencing, and the
extent to which CBP has deployed tactical infrastructure and assessed
its operational impact. This statement is based on products issued
from 2007 through 2010, with selected updates as of April 2010. To
conduct these updates, GAO reviewed program schedules, status reports
and funding and interviewed DHS officials.
What GAO Found:
Since the inception of SBInet, GAO has reported on a range of issues
regarding design and implementation, including program challenges,
management weaknesses, and cost, schedule, and performance risks; DHS
has largely concurred with GAO‘s recommendations and has started to
take some action to address them. For example, in October 2007, GAO
testified that the project involving the first segment of SBInet
technology across the southwest border had fallen behind its planned
schedule. In a September 2008 testimony, GAO reported that CBP plans
to initially deploy SBInet technology along the southwest border had
slipped from the end of 2008 to 2011 and that SBInet would have fewer
capabilities than originally planned. As of April 2010, SBInet‘s
promised capabilities were still not operational. Limitations in the
system‘s ability to function have contributed to delays. GAO has also
reviewed CBP expenditure plans and found a lack of specificity on such
things as planned activities and milestones. GAO made recommendations,
including the need for future expenditure plans to include explicit
and measurable commitments relative to the capabilities, schedule,
costs, and benefits associated with individual SBI program activities.
While DHS has concurred with GAO‘s recommendations, and its
expenditure plans have improved from year to year in detail and
quality, the plans, including the one for fiscal year 2009, did not
fully satisfy the conditions set out by law. Further, in September
2008, GAO made recommendations to address SBInet technological
capabilities that were ambiguous or in a state of flux. DHS generally
concurred with them. In January 2010, GAO reported that the number of
new system defects identified over an 17 month period while testing
was underway was generally increasing faster than the number of
defects being fixed, not indicative of a maturing system. Given the
program‘s shortcomings, in January 2010, the Secretary of Homeland
Security ordered an assessment of the program, and in March 2010, the
Secretary froze a portion of the program‘s fiscal year 2010 funding.
GAO plans to report in May 2010 on the SBInet solution and the status
of its September 2008 recommendations.
CBP has completed deploying most of its planned tactical
infrastructure and has begun efforts to measure its impact on border
security, in response to a GAO recommendation. As of April 2010, CBP
had completed 646 of the 652 miles of fencing it committed to deploy
along the southwest border. CBP plans to have the remaining 6 miles of
this baseline completed by December 2010. CBP reported that tactical
infrastructure, coupled with additional trained agents, had increased
the miles of the southwest border under control, but despite a $2.6
billion investment, it cannot account separately for the impact of
tactical infrastructure. In a September 2009 report, GAO recommended
that to improve the quality of information available to allocate
resources and determine tactical infrastructure‘s contribution to
effective control of the border, the Commissioner of CBP conduct a
cost-effective evaluation of the impact of tactical infrastructure.
DHS concurred with our recommendation and, in April 2010, told GAO
that the Homeland Security Institute had undertaken this analysis.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO has made numerous recommendations on SBI design and
implementation, which DHS generally concurred with and has begun
taking action to implement.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-651T] or key
components. For more information, contact Richard Stana at (202) 512-
8777 or RichardS@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins, and Members of the
Committee:
I am pleased to submit this statement on the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI) program--a multiyear,
multibillion dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and
reducing illegal immigration. Securing the nation's borders from
illegal entry of aliens and contraband, including terrorists and
weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a major challenge. In
November 2005, DHS announced the launch of SBI to help address this
challenge. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) supports this
initiative by providing agents and officers to patrol the borders,
secure the ports of entry, and enforce immigration laws.[Footnote 1]
In addition, CBP's SBI program is responsible for developing a
comprehensive border protection system using technology, known as
SBInet, and tactical infrastructure--fencing, roads, and lighting--
along the southwest border to deter smugglers and aliens attempting
illegal entry.[Footnote 2] Since fiscal year 2005, SBI has received
funding amounting to about $4.5 billion. Approximately $1.6 billion
has been allocated to SBInet and $2.6 billion to tactical
infrastructure.[Footnote 3]
SBInet is to consist of surveillance technologies, such as sensors,
cameras, and radars, as well as command, control, communications, and
intelligence (C3I) technologies, including software and hardware to
produce a Common Operating Picture (COP)--which, among other things,
presents a display of activities within specific areas along the
border at CBP command centers. SBInet technology is to be initially
deployed in two geographic areas--referred to as Tus-1 and Ajo-1--that
jointly span 53 miles of the Tucson sector.[Footnote 4] In September
2006, CBP awarded a 3-year contract to the Boeing Company, with three
additional 1-year options for the development and deployment of SBI
projects. In September 2009, CBP extended its contract with Boeing for
the first option year. As of December 2009, CBP had awarded 13 task
orders to Boeing for a total amount of approximately $1.2 billion.
Table 1 is a summary of the task orders awarded to Boeing.
Table 1: Task Orders Awarded to Boeing for SBI projects as of December
2009A (Dollars in millions):
Task Order Description: Program Management: The mission engineering,
facilities and infrastructure, systems engineering, test and
evaluation, and program management services to develop and deploy the
SBInet system;
Date Awarded: 09/21/2006;
Ceiling of Funds[B]: $146.9;
Approximate Task order obligation: $146.9.
Task Order Description: Project 28: Boeing's pilot project and initial
implementation of SBInet technology for 28 miles of the border in the
Tucson sector[C];
Date Awarded: 10/20/2006;
Ceiling of Funds[B]: $20.7;
Approximate Task order obligation: $20.7.
Task Order Description: Barry M. Goldwater Range (BMGR): The
construction of 32 miles of vehicle and pedestrian barriers on the
southern border of the BMGR in the Yuma Sector;
Date Awarded: 01/12/2007;
Ceiling of Funds[B]: $122.2;
Approximate Task order obligation: $122.2.
Task Order Description: Fence Lab: The testing of potential pedestrian
and vehicle fence and barrier solutions;
Date Awarded: 03/14/2007;
Ceiling of Funds[B]: $0.7;
Approximate Task order obligation: $0.7.
Task Order Description: Design: SBInet deployment design solution,
including design, environmental-clearance support, and locations for
the SBInet technology solution in the Yuma, Tucson, and El Paso
sectors;
Date Awarded: 08/01/2007;
Ceiling of Funds[B]: $115.0;
Approximate Task order obligation: $115.0.
Task Order Description: Project 28 Contractor Maintenance and
Logistics Support: Provides Project 28 with the required maintenance
and logistics support to operate the system;
Date Awarded: 12/07/2007;
Ceiling of Funds[B]: $10.6;
Approximate Task order obligation: $10.6.
Task Order Description: Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence (C3I) and Common Operating Picture (COP): The development
of the next version of the SBInet operating software to design,
develop, and demonstrate a functional SBInet C3I/COP system;
Date Awarded: 12/07/2007;
Ceiling of Funds[B]: 73.0;
Approximate Task order obligation: 71.0.
Task Order Description: Supply and Supply Chain Management: The
development and implementation of a supply and supply chain management
system solution to execute tactical infrastructure projects;
Date Awarded: 01/07/2008;
Ceiling of Funds[B]: $318.6;
Approximate Task order obligation: $318.6.
Task Order Description: System: A follow on to the program management
task order, this task order specifies the program management and
system-engineering activities required to achieve an integrated
program across all task orders issues under the SBI contract;
Date Awarded: 04/15/2008;
Ceiling of Funds[B]: $205.8;
Approximate Task order obligation: $200.8.
Task Order Description: Arizona Deployment: Boeing's deployment of two
projects of the SBInet system along approximately 53 miles of the
southwest border in the Tucson sector;
Date Awarded: 06/25/2008;
Ceiling of Funds[B]: $115.0;
Approximate Task order obligation: $90.5.
Task Order Description: Integrated Logistics Support: Provides SBInet
with the required maintenance and logistics support to operate the
system;
Date Awarded: 08/16/2008;
Ceiling of Funds[B]: $61.6;
Approximate Task order obligation: $61.6.
Task Order Description: Design for Buffalo Sector: Provides for the
design of a remote video surveillance system (RVSS) capability--a
system of towers with cameras that transmit information to video
monitors at a sector's headquarters--in the Buffalo sector;
Date Awarded: 02/05/2009;
Ceiling of Funds[B]: $0.6;
Approximate Task order obligation: $0.6.
Task Order Description: Northern Border Project: Provides for the
design, installation, and deployment of surveillance technology
capabilities in the Detroit and Buffalo Border Patrol sectors;
Date Awarded: 03/31/2009;
Ceiling of Funds[B]: $22.4;
Approximate Task order obligation: $20.9.
Task Order Description: Total;
Ceiling of Funds[B]: $1,213.1;
Approximate Task order obligation: $1,180.1.
Source: CBP.
[A] Values for Barry M. Goldwater Range, Fence Lab, and Supply and
Supply Chain Management task order awards are as of July, 2009. All
other values are as of December, 2009.
[B] This is the maximum value of the task order. For example, the
Northern Border Project task order has a "ceiling" of $22.4 million;
however, as of December 2009, obligations under the task order were
$20.9 million.
[C] The first SBInet deployment task order was a pilot or prototype
effort known as Project 28. The scope of Project 28, as described by
the task order, was to provide a system with the capabilities required
to control 28 miles of border in Arizona.
[End of table]
In addition to deploying technology across the southwest border, DHS
originally planned to deploy 370 miles of single-layer pedestrian
fencing and 300 miles of vehicle fencing by December 31, 2008.
Pedestrian fencing is designed to prevent people on foot from crossing
the border and vehicle fencing consists of physical barriers meant to
stop the entry of vehicles. In September 2008, DHS revised its goal,
committing instead to having 661 miles either built, under
construction, or under contract by December 31, 2008. As of January
2010, DHS officials told us that due to engineering and hydrology
constraints, the agency revised its goal to 652 miles. Although some
tactical infrastructure exists in all the southwest border sectors,
most of what has been built through the SBI program is located in the
San Diego, Yuma, Tucson, El Paso, and Rio Grande Valley sectors.
My statement is based on our extensive body of work on SBI over the
last 3 years, including our most recent reports in September 2009
[Footnote 5] and January 2010[Footnote 6] and selected updates we
conducted in April 2010. All told, we have issued 16 reports and
testimonies that collectively address the SBI program.[Footnote 7] As
requested, our statement (1) summarizes the findings and
recommendations from our SBInet reports, and DHS's recent actions on
the program; and (2) summarizes the findings and recommendations from
our reports on tactical infrastructure and describes the extent to
which CBP has deployed the SBI tactical infrastructure program and
assessed its operational impact. Detailed information on the scope and
methodology for each of the reports used to prepare this statement
appears in the respective reports. To update our September 2009
report, we reviewed recently available DHS documents, including
current program schedules, status reports, and funding information. We
determined that funding and fencing mileage data provided by CBP were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this statement. We based our
decision on an assessment of each respective area by questioning
cognizant DHS officials about the source of the data and policies and
procedures used to maintain the integrity of these data. All of the
work supporting this statement was performed in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings based
on our audit objectives.
SBInet Program Challenges, Management Weaknesses, and Cost, Schedule,
and Performance Risks Exist:
Since the inception of SBInet, we have reported on a range of issues
regarding program design and implementation. For example, in October
2007, we testified that DHS had made some progress in implementing
Project 28--the first segment of SBInet technology across the
southwest border--but had fallen behind its planned schedule.[Footnote
8] In our February 2008 testimony, we noted that although DHS accepted
Project 28 and was gathering lessons learned from the project, CBP
officials responsible for the program said it did not fully meet their
expectations and would not be replicated.[Footnote 9] We also reported
issues with the system that remained unresolved. For example, the
Border Patrol, a CBP component, reported that as of February 2008,
problems remained with the resolution of cameras at distances over 5
kilometers, while expectations had been that the cameras would work at
twice that distance. In our September 2008 testimony, we reported that
CBP had initially planned to deploy SBInet technology along the
southwest border by the end of 2008, but as of February 2008, this
date had slipped to 2011 and that SBInet would have fewer capabilities
than originally planned.[Footnote 10]
In September 2009, we reported that SBInet technology capabilities had
not yet been deployed and delays required the Border Patrol to rely on
existing technology for securing the border, rather than using the
newer SBInet technology planned to overcome the existing technology's
limitations.[Footnote 11] As of April 2010, SBInet's promised
technology capabilities are still not operational and delays continue
to require Border Patrol to rely on existing technology for securing
the border, rather than using the newer SBInet technology planned to
overcome the existing technology's limitations. When CBP initiated
SBInet in 2006, it planned to complete SBInet deployment along the
entire southwest border in fiscal year 2009, but by February 2009, the
completion date had slipped to 2016. The first deployments of SBInet
technology projects are to take place along 53 miles in the Tucson
border sector, designated as Tus-1 and Ajo-1. As of April 7, 2010, the
schedule for Tus-1 and Ajo-1 had slipped from the end of calendar year
2008 as planned in February 2008, and government acceptance of Tus-1
was expected in September 2010 and Ajo-1 in the fourth quarter of
calendar year 2010.[Footnote 12]
Limitations in the system's ability to function as intended as well as
concerns about the impact of placing towers and access roads in
environmentally sensitive locations have contributed to these delays.
Examples of these system limitations include continued instability of
the cameras and mechanical problems with the radar at the tower, and
issues with the sensitivity of the radar. As of January 2010, program
officials stated that the program was working to address system
limitations, such as modifications to the radar. As a result of the
delays, Border Patrol agents continue to use existing technology that
has limitations, such as performance shortfalls and maintenance
issues.[Footnote 13] For example, on the southwest border, Border
Patrol relies on existing equipment such as cameras mounted on towers
that have intermittent problems, including signal loss. Border Patrol
has procured and delivered some new technology to fill gaps or augment
existing equipment.
We have also been mandated to review CBP's SBI expenditure plans,
beginning with fiscal year 2007. In doing so, in February 2007, we
reported that CBP's initial expenditure plan lacked specificity on
such things as planned activities and milestones, anticipated costs,
staffing levels, and expected mission outcomes.[Footnote 14] We noted
that this, coupled with the large cost and ambitious time frames,
added risk to the program. At that time, we made several
recommendations to address these deficiencies.[Footnote 15] These
recommendations included one regarding the need for future expenditure
plans to include explicit and measurable commitments relative to the
capabilities, schedule, costs, and benefits associated with individual
SBI program activities. Although DHS agreed with this recommendation,
to date, it has not been fully implemented. In our June 2008 report on
the fiscal year 2008 expenditure plan, we recommended that CBP ensure
that future expenditure plans include an explicit description of how
activities will further the objectives of SBI, as defined in the DHS
Secure Border Strategic Plan, and how the plan allocates funding to
the highest priority border security needs.[Footnote 16] DHS concurred
with this recommendation and implemented it as part of the fiscal year
2009 expenditure plan. In reviewing the fiscal year 2008 and 2009
expenditure plans, we have reported that, although the plans improved
from year to year, providing more detail and higher quality
information than the year before; the plans did not fully satisfy all
the conditions set out by law.[Footnote 17]
In addition to monitoring program implementation and reviewing
expenditure plans, we have also examined acquisition weaknesses that
increased the risk that the system would not perform as intended, take
longer to deliver than necessary, and cost more than it should. In
particular, we reported in September 2008[Footnote 18] that important
aspects of SBInet were ambiguous and in a continued state of flux,
making it unclear and uncertain what technological capabilities were
to be delivered and when. Further, we reported at that time that
SBInet requirements had not been effectively developed and managed and
that testing was not being effectively managed. Accordingly, we
concluded that the program was a risky endeavor, and we made a number
of recommendations for strengthening the program's chances of success.
DHS largely agreed with these recommendations and we have ongoing work
that will report on the status of DHS's efforts to implement them. We
reported in January 2010[Footnote 19] that key aspects of ongoing
qualification testing had not been properly planned and executed. For
example, while DHS's testing approach appropriately consisted of a
series of test events, many of the test plans and procedures were not
defined in accordance with relevant guidance, and over 70 percent of
the approved test procedures had to be rewritten during execution
because the procedures were not adequate. Among these changes were
ones that appeared to have been made to pass the test rather than to
qualify the system. We also reported at this time that the number of
new system defects identified over a 17 month period while testing was
underway was generally increasing faster than the number of defects
being fixed--a trend that is not indicative of a maturing system that
is ready for acceptance and deployment.[Footnote 20] Compounding this
trend was the fact that the full magnitude of this issue was unclear
because these defects were not all being assigned priorities based on
severity. Accordingly, we made additional recommendations and DHS
largely agreed with them and has efforts underway to address them.
Most recently, we concluded a review of SBInet that addresses the
extent to which DHS has defined the scope of its proposed SBInet
solution, demonstrated the cost effectiveness of this solution,
developed a reliable schedule for implementing the solution, employed
acquisition management disciplines, and addressed the recommendations
in our September 2008 report. Although we plan to report on the
results of this review later this month, we briefed DHS on our
findings in December 2009, and provided DHS with a draft of this
report, including conclusions and recommendations in March 2010. Among
other things, these recommendations provide a framework for how the
program should proceed.
In light of program shortcomings, continued delays, questions
surrounding SBInet's viability, and the program's high cost vis-à-vis
other alternatives, in January 2010, the Secretary of Homeland
Security ordered a department assessment of the SBI program. In
addition, on March 16, 2010, the Secretary froze fiscal year 2010
funding for any work on SBInet beyond Tus-1 and Ajo-1 until the
assessment is completed and the Secretary reallocated $50 million of
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act[Footnote 21] funds
allocated to SBInet to procure alternative tested and commercially
available technologies, such as mobile radios, to be used along the
border. In March 2010, the SBI Executive Director stated that the
department's assessment ordered in January 2010, would consist of a
comprehensive and science-based assessment of alternatives intended to
determine if there are alternatives to SBInet that may more
efficiently, effectively and economically meet U.S. border security
needs. According to the SBI Executive Director, if the assessment
suggests that the SBInet capabilities are worth the cost, DHS will
extend its deployment to sites beyond Tus-1 and Ajo-1. However, if the
assessment suggests that alternative technology options represent the
best balance of capability and cost-effectiveness, DHS intends to
immediately begin redirecting resources currently allocated for border
security efforts to these stronger options.
As part of our continuing support to the Congress in overseeing the
SBI program, we are currently reviewing DHS's expenditure plan for the
fiscal year 2010 Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure, and
Technology appropriation, which provides funding for the SBI program.
Additionally, we are completing a review of the internal control
procedures in place to ensure that payments to SBInet's prime
contractor were proper and in compliance with selected key contract
terms and conditions. Finally, we are reviewing controls for managing
and overseeing the SBInet prime contractor, including efforts to
monitor the prime contractor's progress in meeting cost and schedule
expectations. We expect to report on the results of these reviews
later this year.
SBI Has Completed Deploying Most of Its Planned Tactical
Infrastructure and Has Begun Efforts to Measure Its Impact on Border
Security:
In addition to monitoring SBInet implementation, we also reported on
the tactical infrastructure component of the SBI program. For example,
in October 2007, we reported that tactical infrastructure deployment
along the southwest border was on schedule, but meeting CBP's fencing
goal by December 31, 2008, might be challenging and more costly than
planned.[Footnote 22] In September 2008, we also reported that the
deployment of fencing was ongoing, but costs were increasing, the life-
cycle cost for fencing was not yet known, and finishing the planned
number of miles by December 31, 2008 would be challenging.[Footnote
23] We also reported on continuing cost increases and delays with
respect to deploying tactical infrastructure. In September 2009, we
reported, among other things, that delays continued in completing
planned tactical infrastructure primarily because of challenges in
acquiring the necessary property rights from landowners.[Footnote 24]
As of today, planned fencing-related deployments are almost complete,
but their impact on border security has not been measured. As of April
2010, CBP had completed 646 of the 652 miles of fencing it committed
to deploy along the southwest border. CBP plans to have the remaining
6 miles of this baseline completed by December 2010, pending
resolution of litigation for portions of property along the border.
Also, CBP plans to construct an additional 14 miles of pedestrian
fencing in the Rio Grande Valley Sector by September 2010.[Footnote
25] See table 2 for more information. While fencing costs increased
over the course of construction, because all construction contracts
have been awarded, costs are less likely to change. CBP plans to use
$110 million in fiscal year 2010 funds for new construction costs--
which includes $10 million for land acquisition--and $75 million for
operations and maintenance of existing infrastructure. The life-cycle
cost study prepared by a contractor for CBP shows that total 20 year
life-cycle costs for all tactical infrastructure--including pre-SBI
infrastructure as well as that planned for fiscal years 2009, 2010,
and 2011--and consisting of deployment and operations and future
maintenance costs for the fence, roads, and lighting, among other
things, are estimated at about $6.5 billion.
Table 2: Tactical Infrastructure Deployment Progress as of April 2010:
Infrastructure Type: Pedestrian fencing;
Miles in place before SBI[A]: 65;
Miles deployed through SBI as of April 2010: 282;
Total miles in place as of April 2010: 347;
Current target: 367[B];
Miles remaining to meet target: 20.
Infrastructure Type: Vehicle fencing;
Miles in place before SBI[A]: 72;
Miles deployed through SBI as of April 2010: 227;
Total miles in place as of April 2010: 299;
Current target: 299;
Miles remaining to meet target: 0.
Infrastructure Type: Total fencing;
Miles in place before SBI[A]: 137;
Miles deployed through SBI as of April 2010: 509;
Total miles in place as of April 2010: 646;
Current target: 666;
Miles remaining to meet target: 20.
Source: GAO analysis of SBI data.
[A] Seventy-eight miles of pedestrian fencing and 57 miles of vehicle
fencing were in place before the SBI program began. However, since SBI
began construction, some miles of fencing have been removed, replaced
or retrofitted resulting in mileage totals that are different from
those we have reported in earlier reports.
[B] Includes 14 miles of pedestrian fence planned for the Rio Grande
Valley Sector that will be constructed as a stand alone project, not
as a part of the original baseline.
[End of table]
CBP reported that tactical infrastructure, coupled with additional
trained agents, had increased the miles of the southwest border under
control, but despite a $2.6 billion investment, it cannot account
separately for the impact of tactical infrastructure. CBP measures
miles of tactical infrastructure constructed and has completed
analyses intended to show where fencing is more appropriate than other
alternatives, such as more personnel, but these analyses were based
primarily on the judgment of senior Border Patrol agents. Leading
practices suggest that a program evaluation would complement those
efforts.[Footnote 26] Until CBP determines the contribution of
tactical infrastructure to border security, it is not positioned to
address the impact of this investment. In our September 2009 report,
we recommended that to improve the quality of information available to
allocate resources and determine tactical infrastructure's
contribution to effective control of the border, the Commissioner of
CBP conduct a cost-effective evaluation of the impact of tactical
infrastructure on effective control of the border.[Footnote 27]
DHS concurred with our recommendation and described actions recently
completed, underway, and planned that it said will address our
recommendation. In April 2010, SBI officials told us that the Homeland
Security Institute was conducting an analysis of the impact of
tactical infrastructure on border security. We believe that this
effort would be consistent with our recommendation, further complement
performance management initiatives, and be useful to inform resource
decision making.
This concludes my statement for the record.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For further information on this statement, please contact Richard M.
Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our
offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this statement. In addition to the contact named
above, Frances Cook, Katherine Davis, Jeanette Espinola, Dan Gordon,
Kaelin Kuhn, Jeremy Manion, Taylor Matheson, Jamelyn Payan, Susan
Quinlan, Jonathan Smith, Sushmita Srikanth, and Juan Tapia-Videla made
key contributions to this statement.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Secure Border Initiative: Testing and Problem Resolution Challenges
Put Delivery of Technology Program at Risk. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-511T]. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 18,
2010.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and Performance
Limitations that Place Key Technology Program at Risk. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-158]. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29,
2010.
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the
Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1013T]. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17,
2009.
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the
Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896]. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9,
2009.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Secure Border Initiative Fiscal
Year 2009 Expenditure Plan. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-274R]. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,
2009.
Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-244R]. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29,
2009.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in
Delivering Key Technology Investment. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086]. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22,
2008.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in
Delivering Key Technology Investment. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1148T]. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10,
2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1141T]. Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 10, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Fiscal Year 2008 Expenditure Plan Shows
Improvement, but Deficiencies Limit Congressional Oversight and DHS
Accountability. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-739R].
Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2008.
Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Oversight Needed
to Improve Complex Service Acquisition Outcomes. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-765T]. Washington, D.C.: May 8,
2008.
Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Assessment Needed
to Improve Outcomes for Complex Service Acquisitions [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-263]. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 22,
2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of Applying
Lessons Learned to Future Projects. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-508T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27,
2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet
Program Implementation. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-131T]. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24,
2007.
Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Planning and Management Improvements
Needed to Control Risks. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-504T]. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27,
2007.
Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better
Support Oversight and Accountability. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-309]. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15,
2007.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] At a port of entry location, CBP officers secure the flow of
people and cargo into and out of the country, while facilitating
legitimate travel and trade.
[2] The SBI Program Executive Office, referred to in this statement as
the SBI program office, has overall responsibility for overseeing all
SBI activities for acquisition and implementation, including
establishing and meeting program goals, objectives, and schedules for
overseeing contractor performance; and for coordinating among DHS
agencies. However, as of March 2009, the tactical infrastructure
program office was realigned and is now managed on a day to day basis
by CBP's Office of Administration Facilities Management and
Engineering division.
[3] Remaining funds were allocated to program management and
environmental requirements.
[4] The U.S. Border Patrol has 20 sectors in which it is responsible
for detecting, interdicting, and apprehending those who engage in
illegal activity across U.S. borders between official ports of entry.
[5] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays
Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 9, 2009).
[6] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and
Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-158] (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 29, 2010).
[7] See list of these related GAO products at the end of this document.
[8] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of
SBInet Program Implementation, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-131T] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24,
2007).
[9] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of
Applying Lessons Learned to Future Projects, GAO-08-508T (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 27, 2008).
[10] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Secure Border Initiative:
Observations on Deployment Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1141T] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10,
2008).
[11] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays
Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 9, 2009), and Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment
Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1013T] (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 17, 2009).
[12] The SBI program office defines government acceptance as the SBI
program office taking ownership of the SBInet technology system from
the contractor and comes before handing the technology over to Border
Patrol.
[13] According the SBI Executive Director, starting in February 2010,
Office of Border Patrol agents began to use the Tus-1 technology
system during night operations as part of their early operational
assessment of the system while Boeing works to complete deployment
activities during the day.
[14] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to
Better Support Oversight and Accountability, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-309] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15,
2007).
[15] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-309] for
additional recommendations.
[16] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Fiscal Year 2008 Expenditure Plan
Shows Improvement, but Deficiencies Limit Congressional Oversight and
DHS Accountability, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-739R] (Washington, D.C.: June 26,
2008).
[17] GAO-08-739R, and GAO, U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal
Year 2009 Expenditure Plan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-274R] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,
2009)
[18] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant
Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22,
2008).
[19] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and
Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-158] (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 29, 2010).
[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-158].
[21] American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
5, 123 Stat. 115, 162, 302 (2009).
[22] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects
of SBInet Program Implementation. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-131T]. (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 24,
2007).
[23] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment
Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1141T].
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2008).
[24] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays
Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896]. (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 9, 2009).
[25] With the addition of the 14 miles of pedestrian fencing, CBP
plans to construct a total of 666 miles of fencing through December
2010.
[26] GAO, Agency Performance Plans: Examples of Practices That Can
Improve Usefulness to Decisionmakers, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69], (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 26, 1999).
[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896].
[End of section]
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