Aviation Security
TSA Has Made Progress but Faces Challenges in Meeting the Statutory Mandate for Screening Air Cargo on Passenger Aircraft
Gao ID: GAO-10-446 June 28, 2010
Billions of pounds of cargo are transported on U.S. passenger flights annually. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the primary federal agency responsible for securing the air cargo system. The 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 mandated DHS to establish a system to screen 100 percent of cargo flown on passenger aircraft by August 2010. As requested, GAO reviewed TSA's progress in meeting the act's screening mandate, and any related challenges it faces for both domestic (cargo transported within and from the United States) and inbound cargo (cargo bound for the United States). GAO reviewed TSA's policies and procedures, interviewed TSA officials and air cargo industry stakeholders, and conducted site visits at five U.S. airports, selected based on size, among other factors.
TSA has made progress in meeting the air cargo screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, but faces challenges in doing so that highlight the need for a contingency plan. TSA has, for example, increased required domestic cargo screening levels from 50 percent in February 2009 to 75 percent in May 2010, increased the amount of cargo subject to screening by eliminating many domestic screening exemptions, created a voluntary program to allow screening to take place at various points in the air cargo supply chain, conducted outreach to familiarize industry stakeholders with screening requirements, and tested air cargo screening technologies. However, TSA faces several challenges in developing and implementing a system to screen 100 percent of domestic air cargo, and it is questionable, based on reported screening rates, whether 100 percent of such cargo will be screened by August 2010 without impeding the flow of commerce. For example, shipper participation in the voluntary screening program has been lower than targeted by TSA. In addition, TSA has not completed a staffing study to determine the number of inspectors needed to oversee the screening program. Because it is unclear how many industry stakeholders will join the program, TSA could benefit from establishing milestones to complete a staffing study to help ensure that it has the resources it needs under different scenarios. Moreover, TSA faces technology challenges that could affect its ability to meet the screening mandate. Among these, there is no technology approved by TSA to screen large pallets or containers of cargo, which suggests the need for alternative approaches to screening such cargo. TSA also does not verify the self-reported data submitted by screening participants. Several of these challenges suggest the need for a contingency plan, in case the agency's current initiatives are not successful in meeting the mandate without impeding the flow of commerce. However, TSA has not developed such a plan. Addressing these issues could better position TSA to meet the mandate. TSA has made some progress in meeting the screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo by taking steps to increase the percentage of screened inbound cargo--including working to understand the screening standards of other nations and coordinating with them to mutually strengthen their respective security efforts. Nevertheless, challenges remain and TSA does not expect to achieve 100 percent screening of inbound air cargo by the mandated August 2010 deadline. TSA officials estimate that air carriers are meeting the current mandated screening level of 50 percent of inbound cargo based on estimates rather than on actual data as required by law. Thus, TSA cannot verify if mandated screening levels are being met. In addition, the agency has not determined how it will eventually meet the screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo; developing such a plan could better position TSA to assess its progress toward meeting the mandate.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director:
Stephen M. Lord
Team:
Government Accountability Office: Homeland Security and Justice
Phone:
(202) 512-4379
GAO-10-446, Aviation Security: TSA Has Made Progress but Faces Challenges in Meeting the Statutory Mandate for Screening Air Cargo on Passenger Aircraft
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2010:
Aviation Security:
TSA Has Made Progress but Faces Challenges in Meeting the Statutory
Mandate for Screening Air Cargo on Passenger Aircraft:
GAO-10-446:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-446, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Billions of pounds of cargo are transported on U.S. passenger flights
annually. The Department of Homeland Security‘s (DHS) Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) is the primary federal agency
responsible for securing the air cargo system. The 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007 mandated DHS to establish a system to screen 100 percent of
cargo flown on passenger aircraft by August 2010. As requested, GAO
reviewed TSA‘s progress in meeting the act‘s screening mandate, and
any related challenges it faces for both domestic (cargo transported
within and from the United States) and inbound cargo (cargo bound for
the United States). GAO reviewed TSA‘s policies and procedures,
interviewed TSA officials and air cargo industry stakeholders, and
conducted site visits at five U.S. airports, selected based on size,
among other factors.
What GAO Found:
TSA has made progress in meeting the air cargo screening mandate as it
applies to domestic cargo, but faces challenges in doing so that
highlight the need for a contingency plan. TSA has, for example,
increased required domestic cargo screening levels from 50 percent in
February 2009 to 75 percent in May 2010, increased the amount of cargo
subject to screening by eliminating many domestic screening
exemptions, created a voluntary program to allow screening to take
place at various points in the air cargo supply chain, conducted
outreach to familiarize industry stakeholders with screening
requirements, and tested air cargo screening technologies. However,
TSA faces several challenges in developing and implementing a system
to screen 100 percent of domestic air cargo, and it is questionable,
based on reported screening rates, whether 100 percent of such cargo
will be screened by August 2010 without impeding the flow of commerce.
For example, shipper participation in the voluntary screening program
has been lower than targeted by TSA. In addition, TSA has not
completed a staffing study to determine the number of inspectors
needed to oversee the screening program. Because it is unclear how
many industry stakeholders will join the program, TSA could benefit
from establishing milestones to complete a staffing study to help
ensure that it has the resources it needs under different scenarios.
Moreover, TSA faces technology challenges that could affect its
ability to meet the screening mandate. Among these, there is no
technology approved by TSA to screen large pallets or containers of
cargo, which suggests the need for alternative approaches to screening
such cargo. TSA also does not verify the self-reported data submitted
by screening participants. Several of these challenges suggest the
need for a contingency plan, in case the agency‘s current initiatives
are not successful in meeting the mandate without impeding the flow of
commerce. However, TSA has not developed such a plan. Addressing these
issues could better position TSA to meet the mandate.
TSA has made some progress in meeting the screening mandate as it
applies to inbound cargo by taking steps to increase the percentage of
screened inbound cargo”including working to understand the screening
standards of other nations and coordinating with them to mutually
strengthen their respective security efforts. Nevertheless, challenges
remain and TSA does not expect to achieve 100 percent screening of
inbound air cargo by the mandated August 2010 deadline. TSA officials
estimate that air carriers are meeting the current mandated screening
level of 50 percent of inbound cargo based on estimates rather than on
actual data as required by law. Thus, TSA cannot verify if mandated
screening levels are being met. In addition, the agency has not
determined how it will eventually meet the screening mandate as it
applies to inbound cargo; developing such a plan could better position
TSA to assess its progress toward meeting the mandate.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that TSA establish milestones for a staffing study,
verify the accuracy of all reported screening data, develop a
contingency plan for screening domestic cargo, and develop plans for
meeting the mandate as it applies to inbound cargo. TSA partially
concurred with verifying screening data and did not concur with
developing a contingency plan because it did not believe such actions
were feasible. GAO believes these recommendations remain valid, as
discussed in this report. TSA agreed with all other recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-446] or key
components. For more information, contact Steve Lord at (202) 512-4379
or lords@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
TSA Has Made Progress toward Screening 100 Percent of Domestic Cargo
Transported on Passenger Aircraft, but Remaining Challenges Highlight
the Need for a Contingency Plan:
TSA Has Made Progress but Faces Several Challenges and Lacks a Plan
for Achieving 100 Percent Screening of Inbound Cargo:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: TSA and DHS Directorate for Science and Technology Programs
to Test Technologies to Screen Air Cargo:
Figures:
Figure 1: Various Types of Air Cargo:
Figure 2: Approved Air Cargo Screening Methods:
Figure 3: Flow of Cargo Screening at CCSFs and Air Carriers:
Figure 4: TSA's Reported and Ideal Screening Percentage Breakdowns for
Domestic Air Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft from February
2009 through March 2010:
Abbreviations:
ATS: Automated Targeting System:
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
CCSF: certified cargo screening facility:
CCSP: Certified Cargo Screening Program:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
EC: European Commission:
EDS: explosives detection system:
EMD: electronic metal detection:
ETD: explosives trace detection:
IATA: International Air Transport Association:
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization:
IFR: interim final rule:
S&T Directorate: Directorate for Science and Technology:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
TSI: transportation security inspector:
ULD: unit load device:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 28, 2010:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John D. Rockefeller, IV:
Chairman:
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Edward J. Markey:
House of Representatives:
In 2008, about 7.3 billion pounds of cargo was transported on U.S.
passenger flights--approximately 58 percent of which was transported
domestically (domestic cargo) and 42 percent of which was transported
on flights arriving in the United States from a foreign location
(inbound cargo).[Footnote 1] The 2009 Christmas Day plot to detonate
an explosive device during an international flight bound for Detroit
demonstrates that terrorists continue to view passenger aircraft as
attractive targets. According to the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), the security threat posed by terrorists
introducing explosive devices in air cargo shipments is significant,
and the risk and likelihood of such an attack directed at passenger
aircraft is high.[Footnote 2] Created by the November 2001 Aviation
and Transportation Security Act, TSA is responsible for the screening
of all passengers and property, including cargo, U.S. mail, and carry-
on and checked baggage, transported on passenger aircraft.[Footnote 3]
In addition to TSA, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) plays a
role in securing inbound cargo by selectively screening cargo upon its
arrival in the United States.[Footnote 4]
To help enhance the security of air cargo, the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission
Act) mandated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a
system to physically screen 50 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft--
including the domestic and inbound flights of foreign and U.S.
passenger operations--by February 2009, and 100 percent of such cargo
by August 2010.[Footnote 5] The 9/11 Commission Act defines screening
for purposes of the air cargo screening mandate as a physical
examination or nonintrusive methods of assessing whether cargo poses a
threat to transportation security.[Footnote 6] The act also requires
that such a system provide a level of security commensurate with the
level of security for the screening of checked baggage. According to
TSA, the mission of its air cargo security program is to secure the
air cargo transportation system while not unduly impeding the flow of
commerce. Although the mandate is applicable to both domestic and
inbound cargo, TSA stated that it must address the mandate for
domestic and inbound cargo through separate systems because of
differences in its authority to regulate domestic and international
air cargo industry stakeholders. This report will therefore address
efforts to meet the screening mandate as it applies to domestic and
inbound cargo separately.
You asked us to review TSA's progress in meeting the air cargo
screening mandate. In response to this request, this report addresses
the following questions:
1. What progress has TSA made in meeting the 9/11 Commission Act
screening mandate as it applies to domestic air cargo, and what
related challenges, if any, does TSA face?
2. What progress has TSA made in meeting the 9/11 Commission Act
screening mandate as it applies to inbound air cargo, and what related
challenges, if any, does TSA face?
To assess TSA's progress and challenges in implementing a system to
meet the 9/11 Commission Act screening mandate as it applies to
domestic cargo, we reviewed TSA's air cargo security policies and
procedures, screening program documents, technology assessment
procedures, TSA's Regulatory Activities Plan, the September 2009 air
cargo interim final rule, and various DHS and industry stakeholder
reports and testimony related to air cargo security, such as DHS
Inspector General and industry reports.[Footnote 7] In addition, we
conducted site visits to four category X U.S. commercial airports and
one category I U.S. commercial airport that process domestic and
inbound air cargo.[Footnote 8] We selected these airports based on the
following criteria: airport size, passenger and air cargo volumes,
location, and participation in TSA's screening program. At these
airports, we observed screening operations and technologies and
interviewed local TSA officials, airport management officials, and
representatives from 7 air carriers, 24 freight forwarders, 3
shippers, and 2 handling agents to obtain their views on TSA's system
to implement the screening mandate.[Footnote 9] We selected these air
carriers, freight forwarders, shippers, and handling agents based on
input from TSA and from industry stakeholders. We also interviewed TSA
air cargo program officials, officials from DHS's Directorate for
Science and Technology (S&T Directorate), TSA Office of Inspections
officials, DHS Office of Inspector General officials, Department of
Commerce officials, three air cargo industry consultants and experts,
and representatives from six air cargo industry associations that
represent a variety of air cargo industry stakeholders.[Footnote 10]
We selected these industry associations because they represent a large
portion of the air cargo industry. We selected the industry
consultants and experts based on their experience in the field of
aviation security, and their recognition in the aviation security
community. Our site visits and interviews with industry stakeholders
were based on a nonprobability sample and are not generalizable to the
entire air cargo industry. However, this sample allowed us to observe
cargo screening operations and programs in various parts of the
country with differing air cargo volumes and commodities, and thus
provided important perspectives on TSA's air cargo screening program.
We also analyzed TSA data on cargo screening levels and compliance
violations from February 2009 through December 2009, and TSA data on
compliance inspections from February 2009 through February 2010. We
selected these date ranges because the air cargo screening requirement
started in February 2009 and, at the time of our request, TSA data for
cargo screening levels, compliance violations, and compliance
inspections were only available through December 2009, December 2009,
and February 2010, respectively. To assess the reliability of the
data, we discussed quality control procedures with agency officials;
reviewed TSA's data collection, entry, and analysis processes; and
observed data entry and processing activities for screening data. We
found the data to be sufficiently reliable to provide a general
indication of cargo screening and compliance levels. We assessed TSA's
efforts against criteria for successful project planning and standard
practices for program management to determine if TSA's efforts
evaluate staffing implications and include time frames and milestones.
[Footnote 11] In addition, we assessed TSA efforts against
qualification testing procedures and time frames established by TSA to
determine its progress in completing qualification testing of air
cargo screening technologies. We also assessed TSA's screening
verification procedures against the Office of Management and Budget's
guidelines for ensuring information quality to determine if TSA
reviews and substantiates the integrity of information before it is
disseminated.[Footnote 12] In addition, we assessed TSA's efforts
against the agency's policies and procedures and criteria for
successful project planning to determine if the agency's plan
considers all phases of the project and includes schedules and
deadlines.[Footnote 13] Finally, we assessed TSA's plan for meeting
the screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo against criteria
for comprehensive planning to determine whether it included
contingency planning.[Footnote 14]
To assess TSA's progress and challenges in implementing a system to
meet the 9/11 Commission Act screening mandate as it applies to
inbound air cargo, we reviewed TSA's air cargo policies and procedures
and various DHS and industry stakeholder reports and testimony related
to inbound air cargo security. We also interviewed local TSA
officials, airport management officials, and representatives from
seven air carriers at the five airports we visited to obtain their
views on inbound cargo screening issues. In addition, we interviewed
TSA air cargo program officials, including TSA international cargo
inspectors, and representatives from six air cargo industry
associations, and discussed TSA's plans with CBP officials.[Footnote
15] We assessed TSA's plans for inbound cargo screening verification
against standard practices for program management.[Footnote 16] We
also assessed TSA's plan for inbound cargo screening against criteria
for successful project planning to determine if the agency's plan
considers all phases of the project and includes schedules and
deadlines.[Footnote 17]
We conducted this performance audit from September 2008 through June
2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Background:
Approximately 16 percent of air cargo transported to, from, or within
the United States is shipped on passenger aircraft, while the
remainder is transported on all-cargo aircraft.[Footnote 18] Overall,
approximately 20 million pounds of cargo is transported on domestic
and inbound passenger aircraft daily.[Footnote 19] This cargo ranges
in size from 1 pound to several tons and in type from perishable
commodities to machinery. Air cargo can include such varied items as
electronic equipment, automobile parts, clothing, medical supplies,
fresh produce, and human remains. As seen in figure 1, cargo can be
shipped in various forms, including unit load devices (ULD) that allow
many packages to be consolidated into one large container or pallet
that can be loaded onto an aircraft, wooden skids or crates, and
individually wrapped/boxed pieces, known as loose or break bulk cargo.
Figure 1: Various Types of Air Cargo:
[Refer to PDF for image: 4 photographs]
ULD container;
ULD pallet;
Wooden skids;
Loose cargo.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Participants in the air cargo shipping process include shippers, such
as individuals and manufacturers of various product types; freight
forwarders, such as a company that accepts packages and ships them on
behalf of individuals or manufacturers; air cargo handling agents, who
process and load cargo onto aircraft on behalf of air carriers; and
air carriers that load and transport cargo. A shipper may take or send
its packages to a freight forwarder that in turn consolidates cargo
from many shippers onto a master air waybill--a manifest of the
consolidated shipment--and delivers the shipment to air carriers for
transport. A shipper may also send freight by directly packaging and
delivering it to an air carrier's ticket counter or sorting center,
where the air carrier or a cargo handling agent will sort and load
cargo onto the aircraft.
TSA's responsibilities for securing air cargo include establishing
security requirements governing domestic and foreign passenger air
carriers that transport cargo, and domestic freight forwarders. TSA is
also responsible for overseeing the implementation of air cargo
security requirements by air carriers and freight forwarders through
compliance inspections by transportation security inspectors (TSI)--
staff within TSA responsible for aviation or cargo security
inspections--and, in coordination with DHS's S&T Directorate, for
guiding research and development of air cargo security technologies.
Of the over $5.2 billion provided to TSA for aviation security in
fiscal year 2010, approximately $123 million is for air cargo security
as called for in the Conference Report for the DHS Appropriations Act,
2010. Of this amount, TSA was directed to use $15 million to test,
evaluate, and deploy screening technologies; to expand canine teams
operated by TSA by transferring 35 teams from those operated by local
law enforcement; to deploy technologies to screen skids and pallets;
and to increase the number of TSIs who oversee participants in the
newly developed Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP)--a voluntary
cargo screening program for freight forwarders, shippers, and other
air cargo industry participants.[Footnote 20] For fiscal year 2011,
TSA has requested approximately $118 million for its air cargo
security efforts.
U.S. and foreign air carriers, freight forwarders, and certified cargo
screening facilities (CCSF)--industry stakeholders that have joined
the CCSP--are responsible for implementing TSA security requirements,
including maintaining a TSA-approved security program that describes
the security policies, procedures, and systems the air carriers,
freight forwarders, and CCSFs must implement to ensure compliance.
These requirements include measures related to the acceptance,
handling, and screening of cargo; training of employees in security
and cargo screening procedures; testing for employee proficiency in
cargo screening; and access to cargo areas and aircraft. Air carriers,
freight forwarders, and CCSFs must also abide by security requirements
imposed by TSA through security directives and amendments to security
programs.
In addition to TSA, CBP and foreign governments play a role in
securing inbound cargo. Unlike TSA, which requires screening prior to
departure, CBP determines the admissibility of cargo into the United
States and is authorized to inspect inbound air cargo for terrorists
or weapons of mass destruction upon its arrival in the United States.
[Footnote 21] Foreign governments may also impose their own security
requirements on cargo departing from their airports.
The 9/11 Commission Act specifies that air cargo screening methods
include X-ray systems, explosives detection systems (EDS), explosives
trace detection (ETD), explosives detection canine teams certified by
TSA, physical search together with manifest verification, and any
additional methods approved by the TSA Administrator.[Footnote 22]
However, solely performing a review of information about the contents
of cargo or verifying the identity of the cargo's shipper does not
constitute screening for purposes of satisfying the mandate. Figure 2
shows some approved screening methods.
Figure 2: Approved Air Cargo Screening Methods:
[Refer to PDF for image: 5 photographs and associated text]
X-ray screening:
Uses images to enable detection of explosive threats by a qualified
operator.
ETD screening:
Uses chemical analysis to detect traces of explosive material vapors
or residues in samples taken from the exterior of cargo by trained
personnel.
Physical screening:
Uses trained personnel to open cargo and inspect contents manually, in
conjunction with manifest verification.
EDS screening:
Uses computerized tomography X-rays to recognize the characteristic
signatures of explosives.
Canine screening:
Uses canine teams certified by TSA to detect explosive materials.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
TSA Has Made Progress toward Screening 100 Percent of Domestic Cargo
Transported on Passenger Aircraft, but Remaining Challenges Highlight
the Need for a Contingency Plan:
TSA has made progress in meeting the 9/11 Commission Act air cargo
screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, and has taken
several key steps in this effort, such as increasing the amount of
domestic cargo subject to screening, creating a voluntary program--the
CCSP--to allow screening to take place at various points along the air
cargo supply chain, and taking steps to test air cargo screening
technologies, among other actions. However, TSA faces several
challenges in fully developing and implementing a system to screen 100
percent of domestic air cargo. For example, shipper participation in
the CCSP has been lower than targeted by TSA. Furthermore, TSA lacks
information to help ensure that it has the inspection resources it may
need to provide effective oversight of CCSP entities. In addition,
there is currently no technology approved or qualified by TSA to
screen ULD pallets or containers, and TSA is working to complete
qualification testing of several air cargo screening technologies to
provide reasonable assurance of their effectiveness. Questions also
exist about the reliability of the data used to calculate screening
levels reported by TSA. Moreover, in-transit cargo--such as cargo that
is transferred from an inbound to a domestic passenger flight--is not
currently required to undergo physical screening. Finally, TSA has not
developed a contingency plan to address CCSP participation and
screening technology challenges, which could be implemented should
TSA's current efforts not be sufficient to achieve the 100 percent
screening mandate without impeding the flow of commerce.
Progress in Meeting the 100 Percent Screening Mandate as It Applies to
Domestic Cargo:
TSA has taken several steps to address the air cargo screening mandate.
TSA increased the amount of domestic cargo subject to screening.
Effective October 1, 2008, several months prior to the first mandated
deadline of 50 percent screening by February 2009, TSA established a
requirement for 100 percent screening of nonexempt cargo transported
on narrow-body passenger aircraft.[Footnote 23] In 2008, narrow-body
flights transported about 24 percent of all cargo on domestic
passenger flights.[Footnote 24] Effective February 1, 2009, pursuant
to the 9/11 Commission Act, TSA also required air carriers to ensure
the screening of 50 percent of all nonexempt air cargo transported on
all passenger aircraft. Furthermore, effective May 1, 2010, air
carriers were required to ensure that 75 percent of such cargo was
screened. Although screening may be conducted by various entities,
according to TSA regulations, each air carrier must ensure that the
screening requirements are fulfilled. Furthermore, TSA eliminated or
revised most of its screening exemptions for domestic cargo. For
example, TSA eliminated the screening exemptions for palletized shrink-
wrapped skids, effective February 2009, and for sealed pharmaceuticals
and certain electronics, effective September 2009. As a result of the
elimination of exemptions, most domestic cargo is now subject to TSA
screening requirements. However, TSA is retaining several of the
screening exemptions that apply to sensitive cargo.[Footnote 25]
TSA created a voluntary program to facilitate screening throughout the
air cargo supply chain. Since TSA concluded that relying solely on air
carriers to conduct screening would result in significant cargo
backlogs and flight delays, TSA created the voluntary CCSP to allow
screening to take place earlier in the shipping process, prior to
delivering the cargo to the air carrier (see figure 3). Under this
decentralized approach, air carriers, freight forwarders, shippers,
and other entities each play an important role in the screening of
cargo. Under the CCSP, facilities at various points in the air cargo
supply chain, such as shippers, manufacturers, warehousing entities,
distributors, third-party logistics companies, and freight forwarders
that are located in the United States, may voluntarily apply to TSA to
become CCSFs. Once in the program, they are regulated by TSA.
According to TSA officials, sharing screening responsibilities across
the air cargo supply chain is expected to minimize the potential
increases in cargo transit time, which could result if the majority of
screening were conducted by air carriers at the airport. While the
CCSP allows for a number of entities to conduct air cargo screening,
according to TSA regulations, air carriers are responsible for
ensuring that all domestic cargo transported on passenger aircraft is
screened.[Footnote 26] TSA officials stated that effective August
2010, unscreened domestic cargo would not be transported on passenger
aircraft.
Figure 3: Flow of Cargo Screening at CCSFs and Air Carriers:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Shipper: CCSF:
Passenger aircraft: Prescreened cargo ready to load onto passenger
aircraft.
Shipper: Non-CCSF;
Freight forwarder: CCSF;
Passenger aircraft: Prescreened cargo ready to load onto passenger
aircraft.
Shipper: Non-CCSF;
Freight forwarder: Non-CCSF;
Air carrier: Cargo screened by air carrier ready to load onto
passenger aircraft.
Sources: GAO (analysis), Art Explosion (clip art).
Note: After screening at a shipper CCSF, cargo may be transported to a
freight forwarder for purposes other than screening, such as
consolidation. However, this figure shows the locations of cargo
screening and does not show cargo routes for purposes other than
screening.
[End of figure]
TSA initiated the CCSP at 18 U.S. airports that process high volumes
of air cargo, and then expanded the program to all U.S. airports in
early 2009. CCSP participants were certified to begin screening cargo
as of February 1, 2009. The shipper participants were regulated
pursuant to an order, and the rules for freight forwarder participants
were instituted through an amendment to their security programs.
[Footnote 27] On September 16, 2009, TSA issued an interim final rule
(IFR) that effective November 16, 2009, regulates the shippers,
freight forwarders, and other entities participating in the CCSP.
[Footnote 28] According to the IFR, to become a CCSF, a facility's
screening measures must be evaluated by TSA or a TSA-approved
validation firm. Under its certification process, TSA requires each
CCSF to demonstrate compliance with its security standards that
include facility, personnel, procedural, perimeter, and information
technology security.
Prior to certification, the CCSP applicant must submit for review and
approval its training programs related to physical screening, facility
access controls, and chain of custody, among other things. CCSF
applicants must also implement TSA-approved security programs and
appoint security coordinators before they can become certified. CCSFs
must ensure that certain employees have undergone TSA-conducted
security threat assessments; adhere to control measures for storing,
handling, and screening cargo; screen cargo using TSA-approved
methods; and implement chain of custody requirements.[Footnote 29]
Once certified, CCSFs must apply for recertification, including a new
examination by TSA or a TSA-approved validator, every 36 months.
As part of the current program, and using TSA-approved screening
methods, freight forwarder CCSFs must screen 50 percent of cargo being
delivered to wide-body passenger aircraft and 100 percent of cargo
being delivered to narrow-body passenger aircraft. According to TSA,
although shipper CCSFs are not required to screen shipments to be
delivered to a passenger aircraft, when they choose to conduct
screening, such shipments must be screened at 100 percent.[Footnote
30] In addition, each CCSF must deliver the screened cargo to air
carriers while maintaining a secure chain of custody to prevent
tampering with the cargo after it is screened. In fiscal year 2009,
entities that were certified by TSA to participate in the CCSP were
subject to annual inspections by TSIs and additional inspections at
TSA's discretion. According to the 2010 TSI Regulatory Activities
Plan, the agency plans to conduct at least two comprehensive
inspections a year (i.e., a review of the implementation of all air
cargo security requirements) for each CCSP participant. In addition,
the agency plans to conduct more frequent inspections based on each
entity's compliance history, among other factors.
TSA is in the process of clarifying CCSF screening and training
requirements. During the course of our site visit conducted in July
2009, we identified two instances where CCSFs misinterpreted CCSP
screening requirements. For example, a freight forwarder
representative with whom we spoke stated that the freight forwarder's
certified facilities have flexibility in the levels of cargo they have
to screen, such as screening a percentage of cargo on some days while
not screening any cargo on others. This interpretation is contrary to
the view of senior TSA officials who are responsible for implementing
the program, that freight forwarder CCSFs must screen a percentage of
cargo on a daily basis, as required in their TSA-approved security
programs. While the extent to which misinterpretation of the CCSP
requirements occurs among program participants is unclear, the
instances we identified indicated that freight forwarder CCSFs may not
be applying TSA screening requirements consistently. When we brought
this issue to the attention of a senior TSA official, he stated that
the agency would benefit from strengthening and clarifying CCSP
screening requirements. In March 2010, TSA officials reported that the
agency has taken steps to clarify the requirements, though they did
not specify what those steps were, and said the agency is planning to
communicate these clarifications to relevant stakeholders.
During our site visits conducted in June and July 2009, we also
observed two cases where training materials used by freight forwarder
CCSFs to educate their employees on the use of technology to screen
cargo may not have been consistent with TSA screening procedures. For
example, one freight forwarder representative we interviewed during
our site visit stated that his company compiled training materials on
how to screen cargo with ETD technology from public information found
on the Internet. However, TSA has no way of knowing whether the public
information gathered from the Internet or from other sources used to
develop training materials is reliable or consistent with TSA policies
and procedures. After we brought this issue to the attention of TSA
officials, TSA reported that the agency plans to clarify the CCSF
training requirements regarding how to use technology to screen air
cargo. Specifically, TSA plans to update these requirements in
amendments to the freight forwarder CCSF policies and procedures. TSA
officials also stated that the agency is considering providing CCSFs
with a TSA-approved technology training package or a list of approved
training vendors that CCSP participants can use to facilitate the
training of their employees. The agency is in the early stages of this
effort and has not yet developed time frames for when this effort will
be completed.
TSA is conducting outreach efforts to air cargo industry stakeholders.
Starting in September 2007, TSA began outreach to freight forwarders
and subsequently expanded its outreach efforts to shippers and other
entities to encourage participation in the CCSP. While industry
participation in the CCSP is central to TSA's approach to spread
screening responsibilities across the U.S. supply chain and,
ultimately, meet the screening mandate, attracting shippers and
freight forwarders to join the program is challenging because of the
effect of the economic downturn on their resources and cargo volume,
and the perception by some in the shipping and freight forwarder
industry that screening costs and delays associated with air carriers
conducting cargo screening will be minimal. TSA is focusing its
outreach on particular industries, such as producers of perishable
foods, pharmaceutical and chemical companies, and funeral homes, which
may experience damage to their cargo if it is screened by a freight
forwarder or an air carrier. TSA officials stated that they reach out
to entities through a combination of conferences, outreach meetings,
Internet presentations, and information posted in numerous trade
association newsletters and on Web sites.
To enhance its outreach efforts, TSA established a team of 12 TSA
field staff, or CCSP outreach coordinators, to familiarize industry
with the air cargo screening mandate and the CCSP, as well as educate
potential CCSP applicants on the program requirements.[Footnote 31] In
addition, outreach coordinators are responsible for certifying cargo
screening facilities.[Footnote 32] They visit the facilities of the
CCSP applicants to assess their ability to meet program requirements
and to address any deficiencies identified during the assessment. To
complete the certification process, the outreach coordinator ensures
that the facility has appropriate procedures and training in place to
screen cargo. According to TSA officials, in February 2009, the agency
also began using its air cargo TSIs in the field to conduct outreach.
Officials from the one domestic passenger air carrier association and
the one freight forwarder association with whom we spoke reported that
TSA's staff has been responsive and helpful in answering questions
about the program and providing information on CCSP requirements.
[Footnote 33]
TSA is taking steps to test technologies for screening air cargo. The
9/11 Commission Act specifies that the permitted methods of air cargo
screening are X-ray systems, EDS, ETD, explosives detection canine
teams, physical search together with manifest verification, and any
additional methods approved by the TSA Administrator. However, TSA is
responsible for determining which specific equipment models are
authorized for use by industry stakeholders. We reported in March 2009
that TSA and DHS's S&T Directorate were pilot testing a number of
technologies to screen air cargo.[Footnote 34] For example, to test
select screening technologies among CCSFs, TSA created the Air Cargo
Screening Technology Pilot in January 2008, and selected some of the
nation's largest freight forwarders to use these technologies and
report on their experiences.[Footnote 35] The screening that pilot
participants perform counts toward meeting TSA screening requirements
and in turn the air cargo screening mandate. In a separate effort, in
July 2009, DHS's S&T Directorate completed the Air Cargo Explosives
Detection Pilot Program that tested the performance of select baggage
screening technologies for use in screening air cargo at three U.S.
airports. TSA officials stated that the agency will be reviewing the
pilot results and conducting additional testing on the technologies
identified in the resulting S&T Directorate report.
Furthermore, TSA initiated a qualification process to test the
technologies that it plans to allow air carriers and CCSP participants
to use in meeting the August 2010 screening mandate against TSA
technical requirements. In November 2008, in addition to the canine
and physical search screening methods permitted by TSA to screen air
cargo, as an interim measure, TSA issued to air carriers and CCSFs a
list of X-ray, ETD, and EDS models that the agency approved for
screening air cargo until August 3, 2010.[Footnote 36] TSA approved
these technologies based on its subject matter expertise and the
testing and performance of these technologies in the checkpoint and
checked baggage environments. In March 2009, TSA initiated a
laboratory and field-based qualification testing process to ensure
effectiveness of approved and other technologies in the air cargo
environment and qualify them for use after August 3, 2010.[Footnote
37] Once the initial stage of the qualification testing process is
accomplished, TSA's policy is to add successful candidates to a list
of qualified products for industry stakeholders to utilize when
purchasing technologies. For example, TSA added X-ray technologies to
the list of qualified products in October 2009. TSA recommends that
industry stakeholders purchase technologies from a list of qualified
products because the technologies that do not pass the qualification
testing process within 36 months of becoming approved are to be
removed from a list of products authorized to screen air cargo. After
issuing the list of qualified products, TSA plans to conduct
additional stages of qualification testing and evaluation to determine
the suitability of the screening equipment in an operational setting.
During the qualification testing process, TSA expects to utilize the
results of the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot and conduct
additional operational tests independent of the pilot. A description
of several programs to test screening technologies for air cargo and
their status is included in table 1.
Table 1: TSA and DHS Directorate for Science and Technology Programs
to Test Technologies to Screen Air Cargo:
Program: Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot;
Description: Pilot participants--freight forwarder CCSFs and
independent cargo screening facilities--operationally test ETD and X-
ray technologies to determine their ability to screen high volumes of
various cargo types and test chain of custody procedures. TSA provided
the first round of participants with reimbursements up to $375,000 for
purchasing technology, and the second with reimbursements up to
$300,000;
Status: As of December 31, 2009, 76 of 113 pilot participants were
reporting screening data to TSA, such as cargo throughput, the number
of equipment alarms triggered and resolved during screening, and chain
of custody methods and their cost. TSA plans to complete the pilot in
August 2010.
Program: Air Cargo Explosives Detection Pilot;
Description: DHS tested the effectiveness, cost, and throughput of
technologies and methods approved for screening checked baggage--EDS,
ETD, standard X-ray machines, canine teams, and manual screening--in
the air cargo environment;
Status: In July 2009, DHS's S&T Directorate submitted the final report
to Congress that identified some challenges related to applicability
of technologies to the air cargo environment, such as the limited
ability of ETD systems to detect threats in an air cargo environment,
and recommended further technology testing.
Program: Air Cargo Qualification Testing;
Description: TSA plans to test the capabilities of four technologies
to identify a small amount of explosives in air cargo--X-ray, ETD,
electronic metal detection (EMD), and EDS.[A] TSA determines the
effectiveness of a particular technology through tests in laboratory
and operational settings;
Status: TSA reported that several X-ray technologies have successfully
passed initial qualification testing and announced which X-ray devices
qualified in December 2009. In addition, TSA qualified EDS
technologies based on past testing results, and will initiate
qualification testing after August 2010. TSA planned to begin initial
qualification testing for the ETD, EMD, and additional X-ray
technologies in early 2010, and anticipates qualifying these
technologies by summer of 2010.
Source: GAO analysis of information provided by TSA.
[A] EMD devices are capable of detecting metallic-based explosive
components, such as wires, within a variety of perishable commodities
at the cargo piece, parcel, and pallet levels.
[End of table]
TSA expanded its explosives detection canine program. TSA has taken
steps to expand the use of TSA-certified explosives detection canine
teams. According to TSA, in fiscal year 2009, TSA canine teams
screened over 145 million pounds of cargo, which represents a small
portion of domestic air cargo.[Footnote 38] As of February 2010, TSA
had 113 dedicated air cargo screening canine teams--operating in 20
major airports--and is in the process of adding 7 additional canine
teams.[Footnote 39] TSA worked with air carriers to identify peak
cargo delivery times, in order to schedule canine screening during
times that would be most helpful to air carriers. TSA also deployed
canine teams to assist the Pacific Northwest cherry industry during
its peak harvest season from May through July 2009, to help air
carriers and CCSFs handling this perishable commodity to meet the 50
percent screening requirement without disrupting the flow of commerce.
TSA established a system to verify that screening is being conducted
at the mandated levels. The agency established a system to collect and
analyze data from screening entities to verify that requisite levels
for domestic cargo are being met. Effective February 2009, TSA
adjusted air carrier reporting requirements and added CCSF reporting
requirements to include monthly screening reports on the number and
weight of shipments screened. Based on reporting guidance issued by
the agency, air carriers and CCSFs provided to TSA the first set of
screening data in mid-March 2009, to be used as the basis for TSA's
quarterly reports to Congress.[Footnote 40] Under TSA's current
process, screening data are manually reviewed and analyzed to
determine if the screening is conducted at the mandated levels.
According to TSA officials, the agency plans to transition from a
manual process to automated data collection, review, and analysis by
mid-2010. Based on these preliminary data, TSA has determined that
over 50 percent of air cargo (by weight and number of shipments)
transported on domestic passenger aircraft has been screened since the
50 percent requirement went into effect. For fiscal year 2009, TSA
submitted its 2nd Quarter report, due in May 2009, on October 2, 2009,
verifying these screening levels.[Footnote 41] The 3rd Quarter report,
due in August 2009, was submitted on January 7, 2010. The 4th Quarter
report, due in November 2009, is undergoing Office of Management and
Budget review.
TSA is developing a covert testing program to identify security
vulnerabilities in the air cargo environment. TSA conducts undercover,
or covert, tests that are designed to approximate techniques that
terrorists may use in order to identify vulnerabilities in the people,
processes, and technologies that make up the aviation security system.
TSA officials reported that the agency plans to carry out a covert
testing program for the air cargo environment in two phases and will
conduct tests at shipper, freight forwarder, and air carrier
facilities.[Footnote 42] Both phases are scheduled to begin in 2010.
TSA is in the early stages of developing the testing protocols and
thus has not yet established a timetable for their completion.
According to TSA officials, the agency plans to use the results of
these tests to identify and remedy vulnerabilities in the air cargo
system.
In addition, TSA operates a risk-based Air Cargo Vulnerability
Assessment program to identify weaknesses and potential
vulnerabilities in the domestic air cargo supply chain. As of March
2010, TSA has conducted assessments at 33 U.S. airports and completed
assessments at all domestic category X airports in December 2009.
After completing these assessments, TSA stated that it will utilize
the results to refine policy for air cargo security.
Challenges in Meeting the Screening Mandate as It Applies to Domestic
Air Cargo:
TSA faces industry participation, oversight, technology, and other
challenges, and could benefit from a contingency plan to identify
alternatives for meeting the air cargo screening mandate.
Lower-Than-Targeted Levels of Shipper Participation in the CCSP Could
Affect TSA Progress in Meeting the Screening Mandate:
Although TSA is relying on the voluntary participation of industry
stakeholders to meet the screening mandate, some stakeholders have not
participated in the program at targeted levels. As shown in figure 4,
TSA officials have estimated that an ideal mix of screening to achieve
the 100 percent mandate as it applies to domestic cargo without
impeding the flow of commerce would be about one-third of cargo weight
screened by air carriers, one-third by freight forwarders, and one-
third by shippers and independent CCSFs.[Footnote 43] The air carrier
portion includes a small amount of screening by TSA canine teams and
by TSIs at the smaller category II through IV airports. TSA officials
emphasized that this estimated ideal mix is not precise but is
intended to illustrate that balanced industry participation is needed
to achieve the goals of the program.
Figure 4: TSA's Reported and Ideal Screening Percentage Breakdowns for
Domestic Air Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft from February
2009 through March 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Date: February 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 19%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 39%;
Total: 59%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: March 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 2%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 15%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 44%;
Total: 61%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: April 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 19%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 42%;
Total: 62%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: May 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 12%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 49%;
Total: 62%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: June 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 15%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 46%;
Total: 62%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: July 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 22%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 39%;
Total: 62%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: August 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 22%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 39%;
Total: 62%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: September 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 23%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 37%;
Total: 62%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: October 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 24%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 37%;
Total: 62%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: November 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 26%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 38%;
Total: 65%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: December 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 2%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 28%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 35%;
Total: 65%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: January 2010;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 2%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 29%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 33%;
Total: 64%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: February 2010;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 2%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 30%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 35%;
Total: 67%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: March 2010;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 2%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 32%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 35%;
Total: 67%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50% (75% required as of May 2010).
Date: TSA's ideal screening breakdown in August 2010;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 33%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 33%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 33%;
Total: 100%;
TSA-required screening levels: 100%.
Source: GAO analysis of TSA screening data and information.
Notes: TSA was not able to provide us with screening data more recent
than March 2010. We found these industry-reported data to be
sufficiently reliable to provide a general indication of cargo
screening levels. The reported and ideal screening breakdown
percentages have been rounded to the nearest percentage point. The
ideal screening breakdown percentages actually sum to 100 percent. The
reported screening percentages for December 2009 actually sum to 64
percent, for February 2010 actually sum to 66 percent, and for March
2010 actually sum to 68 percent.
[End of figure]
However, as of March 2010, the percentage of cargo reported as
screened by shipper and independent CCSFs remained at 2 percent--far
lower than the 33 percent TSA cites as the portion these entities
should ideally screen. To achieve TSA's ideal mix of screening by
August 2010, shipper and independent CCSF screening efforts would need
to increase by over sixteenfold. Moreover, as shown in figure 4, the
total percentage of reported screened cargo rose on average by less
than a percentage point per month (from 59 to 68 percent) from
February 2009 through March 2010.[Footnote 44] At these rates, it is
questionable whether TSA's screening system will achieve 100 percent
screening of domestic cargo by August 2010 without impeding the flow
of commerce. Effective May 1, 2010, TSA requires that 75 percent of
air cargo transported on passenger aircraft be screened. However, even
if this requirement is met, an additional 25 percent of domestic
passenger air cargo would still need to be screened in the 3 months
prior to the August 2010 deadline, including some of the most
challenging types of cargo to screen, such as ULD pallets and
containers.
In March 2010, TSA officials stated that they surveyed current CCSFs
and CCSP applicants to estimate these air cargo industry stakeholders'
capacity for screening domestic cargo--this could help predict the
industry's success in meeting the 100 percent screening deadline.
[Footnote 45] According to TSA officials, the survey indicated that
current and prospective CCSFs have the potential capacity needed to
screen cargo so that short-term delays at only the nation's 18 major
airports will result when the 100 percent deadline goes into effect.
However, TSA did not have supporting documentation of the survey's
methodology or results. Thus, we were unable to independently verify
TSA's assertions or the rigor of TSA's methodology and analysis. For
example, it is unclear whether TSA's survey and estimation took into
account cargo that is inherently difficult to screen, such as ULD
pallets or containers, or whether it focused primarily on loose cargo
that is being screened with relative ease. It is also important to
note that having the potential capacity to screen air cargo does not
ensure that this capacity will be fully utilized to meet the air cargo
screening mandate.
In addition, TSA officials stated that they did not develop milestones
to monitor CCSP progress because air cargo screening by industry
stakeholders is driven by market forces that are beyond the control of
the government and are impossible to forecast. Further, according to
TSA officials, if the CCSP participants cannot contribute the amount
of screening needed to achieve 100 percent screening by the August
2010 deadline, the air carriers will be responsible for screening any
remaining unscreened cargo at the airport or ensuring that it does not
fly on a passenger aircraft. However, according to officials from the
two major air carrier industry associations and the one freight
forwarder association with whom we spoke, if the volume of cargo is
too great for air carriers to handle, it could significantly disrupt
the air cargo industry because of delays from cargo screening at the
airport and the shift of unscreened cargo to alternate modes of
transportation, such as all-cargo aircraft or trucks. Officials from
one major air carrier industry association further noted that this
would particularly be a problem if the volume of large cargo
configurations--such as ULD pallets or containers--that air carriers
have to disassemble and screen is too great for air carriers to
handle. As discussed earlier, according to TSA officials, these
disruptions will be short term and limited to 18 major airports.
However, these 18 airports process 65 percent of domestic cargo
transported on passenger aircraft, which suggests that disruptions may
be substantial. TSA's rationale for creating the CCSP, and spreading
screening responsibilities throughout the supply chain, is to mitigate
the risks of these sorts of disruptions. However, these CCSP
participation challenges demonstrate that TSA could benefit from
developing a contingency plan, as we will discuss later, should it
become clear that participation rates are not sufficient to achieve
the screening mandate without impeding the flow of commerce.
Regulatory and Economic Factors May Affect Industry Participation in
the CCSP:
According to TSA officials, some shippers have expressed interest in
the CCSP, particularly those in certain industries, such as the
pharmaceutical industry, whose cargo would be compromised if opened
and screened by others. However, TSA and industry officials reported
that several factors, such as lack of economic and regulatory
incentives, are contributing to low shipper participation levels. For
example, TSA and the freight forwarder industry association official
with whom we spoke reported that flexibility in applying current TSA
screening requirements--such as the ability to screen only easier-to-
screen cargo and leave more challenging cargo unscreened--and low
cargo volumes have minimized screening-related cargo delays and cargo
screening costs. For example, until the 100 percent screening mandate
goes into effect in August 2010, air carriers may be able to meet TSA
screening requirements by screening mostly loose or break-bulk cargo
and not the more challenging and time-consuming cargo, such as ULD
pallets and containers or large wooden crates.
Officials from the domestic passenger air carrier association and
freight forwarder industry association with whom we spoke reported
that because of the difficult economic environment and flexibility
stakeholders have in choosing what cargo to screen, most air carriers
are not currently charging freight forwarders or shippers for cargo
screening in order to attract and retain customers. As a result, TSA
and the domestic passenger air carrier and freight forwarder industry
association officials we interviewed stated that many shippers and
freight forwarders are not incurring significant screening costs from
air carriers, which decreases the financial pressure on the entities
to join the CCSP and invest resources into screening cargo, factors
that are making TSA's outreach efforts more challenging.
Moreover, the freight forwarder industry association official with
whom we spoke stated that some industry participants may not be able
to join the program because of potential program costs. TSA has
estimated in the IFR that the total cost for industry participation in
the CCSP will be about $2.2 billion over a 10-year period, though the
agency has not provided per capita cost estimates for industry. The
freight forwarder industry association official with whom we spoke
reported that business models of large freight forwarders require them
to purchase time-saving screening equipment so that screeners can
avoid physically opening and examining each piece of cargo.[Footnote
46] However, TSA and this industry official agreed that the majority
of small freight forwarders-
-which handle 20 percent of the cargo but make up 80 percent of the
total number of freight forwarding companies--would likely find the
costs of joining the CCSP, including acquiring expensive technology,
hiring additional personnel, conducting additional training, and
making facility improvements, prohibitive. Moreover, shippers that
distribute products from other companies in addition to or instead of
their own manufactured goods might also find it cost prohibitive to
join the CCSP if they were required to purchase screening equipment.
However, TSA officials stated that most shippers can incorporate
physical searches into their packing and shipping processes to satisfy
TSA screening requirements, thereby avoiding such capital expenses.
TSA established the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot program to
make some financial reimbursement available to large freight
forwarders and independent CCSFs for the technology they have
purchased. TSA reported that it targeted high-volume facilities (i.e.,
facilities processing at least 200 ULDs or their equivalent weight of
approximately 500,000 pounds annually, shipments annually that contain
cargo consolidated from multiple shippers) for the pilot in order to
have the greatest effect in helping industry achieve the new screening
requirements. As of February 2010, 113 CCSFs have joined the pilot.
However, the majority of CCSFs do not ship large enough volumes of
consolidated cargo to qualify for the pilot, and thus cannot receive
funding for technology or other related costs. The freight forwarder
industry association official with whom we spoke expressed concerns
regarding the cost of purchasing and maintaining screening equipment.
In response to concerns of medium and small freight forwarders that
they might not be able to join the program because of potential costs,
TSA officials stated that the agency is allowing independent CCSFs to
join the CCSP and screen cargo on behalf of freight forwarders and
shippers. In this scenario, small freight forwarders or shippers would
not need to join the CCSP or purchase technology to avoid screening at
the airport, but could send their cargo for a fee to an independent
CCSF for screening. However, TSA and the freight forwarder industry
association official with whom we spoke stated that the independent
CCSFs are having difficulties attracting clientèle in the current
depressed economic environment. According to these officials, shippers
and other supply chain participants might use independent CCSFs to
screen their cargo once the 100 percent screening requirement goes
into effect, if cargo volumes increase before that time or if cargo
experiences screening delays. Many of the challenges in attracting
industry participation in the CCSP are outside of TSA's control, and
agency officials stated that they are working to raise industry
awareness of the benefits of joining the program through TSA's ongoing
outreach efforts.
Determining the Level of Inspection Resources Needed to Effectively
Oversee CCSP Entities Could Help TSA Efforts to Ensure the Program's
Success:
While TSA has amended its Regulatory Activities Plan to include
inspections of CCSP participants, the agency has not completed its
staffing study to assess its staffing needs and determine how many
inspectors will be necessary to provide oversight of the additional
program participants when the 100 percent screening mandate goes into
effect.[Footnote 47] TSA's compliance inspections range from reviews
of the implementation of all air cargo security requirements (i.e.,
comprehensive) to a more frequent review of at least one security
requirement (i.e., supplemental). TSA recognized that the creation of
the CCSP added additional regulated entities to TSI oversight
responsibilities, and incorporated additional inspection requirements
into the TSI Regulatory Activities Plan. Beginning under the plan for
fiscal year 2009, TSIs are to perform compliance inspections of new
regulated entities, such as shippers and manufacturers, that
voluntarily become CCSFs, as well as new inspections of freight
forwarder CCSFs that are in addition to inspections related to their
freight forwarder responsibilities. In addition to their pre-CCSP
inspection responsibilities, under the plan for fiscal year 2010, TSIs
are to conduct at least two comprehensive inspections a year for each
CCSF to verify compliance with the program requirements.[Footnote 48]
As of March 2010, TSA had 1,258 TSIs, of which 533 were dedicated
cargo TSIs or cargo TSI canine handlers. The agency was authorized 50
new cargo TSI positions in fiscal year 2010 to provide additional
oversight of CCSP operations. TSA officials reported that they have
developed an interim program-level methodology to allocate these TSIs
to airports based on CCSP participation and cargo volume, among other
factors, and that they believe they have a sufficient number of
inspectors to ensure compliance with the CCSP. However, the agency
staffing study, which would determine the resources necessary to
provide CCSP oversight, is not yet complete. According to TSA, the
agency's staffing study is continuing through fiscal year 2010 and is
therefore not yet available to provide guidance in helping to plan for
inspection resources needed to provide oversight.
Complicating TSA efforts to determine the level of inspection
resources needed is the extent to which market forces will affect CCSP
participation and therefore how many additional CCSFs will join the
program and thus be subject to TSA's inspection requirements. As of
March 1, 2010, 583 entities had joined the CCSP. Given this level of
participation, TSA's TSI workforce must conduct at least 1,166
comprehensive inspections of CCSFs per year. According to our analysis
of TSA data, in the next year, inspectors will need to at least double
their comprehensive inspections of CCSFs to reach this target.
[Footnote 49] Moreover, according to our analysis of TSA data,
approximately one-quarter to one-third of CCSFs have not received a
comprehensive inspection.[Footnote 50]
According to TSA officials, CCSFs that have never been inspected are
deemed high risk and must be inspected by the following quarter.
However, since TSA officials anticipate that CCSP participation will
continue to grow, and that there could be a groundswell in CCSP
participants as the 100 percent screening deadline approaches, TSIs
may be challenged in dealing with the increased inspection workload
once the screening mandate goes into effect in August 2010. For
example, the IFR stated that about 5,600 entities are expected to join
the CCSP. Based on these figures, TSA would be required to conduct
11,200 comprehensive inspections annually. TSA officials questioned
the accuracy of this estimate, and stated that for workforce planning
purposes, a more realistic near-term estimate for the number of CCSFs
TSA is expected to oversee is the number of current CCSFs and CCSP
applicants. However, TSA did not provide us this total figure.
Moreover, as discussed earlier, TSA does not know how many CCSFs will
join the program in the future, and does not plan to estimate the
number of CCSP participants needed to meet the 100 percent screening
mandate. Without this key information, it will be difficult for TSA to
obtain a reasonable estimate of the number of inspectors that will be
needed to oversee the CCSP participants--highlighting the need for a
staffing study that considers various scenarios.
In addition, according to TSA data, of the CCSF compliance inspections
conducted from February 1, 2009, to December 29, 2009, some resulted
in at least one violation of CCSF security requirements--and a
percentage of these violations were screening related.[Footnote 51]
Having the resources needed to provide effective oversight will be
critical to ensuring that CCSFs are comprehensively inspected soon
after being certified, in order to identify violations and provide TSA
with some assurance that CCSFs are conducting their new screening
activities in accordance with TSA requirements.
As we reported in prior work, successful project planning should
evaluate staffing implications.[Footnote 52] Since fiscal year 2008,
TSA officials have reported on a planned TSI staffing study, and air
cargo program officials stated that this study would include an
analysis of the resources necessary to provide CCSP oversight and
would incorporate information on the number of CCSFs to be inspected
in order to assess workforce needs. Officials stated in March 2010
that the study would continue through fiscal year 2010. However, the
agency has not established an estimated completion date or interim
milestones (i.e., dates and related tasks) for completion of the
study, and officials did not provide an explanation for why this has
not yet occurred. Standard practices for program management call for
the establishment of time frames and milestones.[Footnote 53] Creating
time frames with milestones could help ensure completion of the
staffing study, the results of which should better position TSA to
ensure that the inspectors it needs are in place in order to oversee
effective CCSF implementation of TSA security requirements.
TSA and Industry Stakeholders Face Challenges in Screening Certain
Types of Cargo, and TSA Is Working to Test the Effectiveness of
Screening Technologies:
TSA faces challenges related to screening certain types of cargo,
qualification testing of technology, and securing the chain of custody.
Screening Cargo in ULD Pallets and Containers:
There is currently no technology approved or qualified by TSA to
screen cargo once it is loaded onto a ULD pallet or container--both of
which are common means of transporting air cargo on wide-body
passenger aircraft. Cargo transported on wide-body passenger aircraft
makes up 76 percent of domestic air cargo shipments transported on
passenger aircraft.[Footnote 54] Prior to May 1, 2010, canine
screening was the only screening method, other than physical search,
approved by TSA to screen such cargo. Canine teams were deployed to 20
airports to assist air carriers with such screening. In addition, the
2009 S&T Directorate technology pilot study reported canine teams to
be an effective method of screening ULD pallets and containers, but it
identified an urgent need to find other effective methods for
screening such cargo because of the shortage of available canine
teams. TSA officials, however, still have some concerns about the
effectiveness of the canine teams, and effective May 1, 2010, the
agency no longer allows canine teams to be used for primary screening
of ULD pallets and containers. Instead, TSA allows canines to conduct
primary screening of only loose cargo and 48-by-48-inch cargo skids.
Canine teams still may be used for secondary screening of ULD pallets
and containers; however, secondary screening does not count toward
meeting the air cargo screening mandate.
TSA officials reported that they have conducted preliminary
assessments of technologies that are capable of screening ULD pallets
and containers but that commercially available technologies do not
exist that effectively detect explosives in the amounts described in
TSA standards. TSA officials stated that TSA continues to work with
technology vendors on developing technologies that will be able to
effectively screen ULD pallets and containers. In the interim, TSA
officials indicated that the agency is encouraging industry
stakeholders through the CCSP to screen such cargo earlier in the
supply chain, before cargo is consolidated. However, according to
representatives of the two major air carrier industry associations and
the one freight forwarder association with whom we spoke, technology
available to screen consolidated or palletized cargo, including cargo
in a ULD, is critical in meeting the 100 percent screening mandate
given that such cargo represents a primary means for transporting
cargo transported on passenger aircraft. Moreover, while industry
participation in the CCSP may help ensure that screening takes place
earlier in the supply chain, which will help alleviate the challenges
posed by ULD pallets and containers, to date, far fewer shippers have
joined the CCSP than TSA anticipated, and these ULD pallets and
containers currently make up about 76 percent of domestic air cargo
transported on passenger aircraft, with no efficient method to screen
them. These technology challenges suggest the need for TSA to consider
alternative approaches to meet the screening mandate without unduly
affecting the flow of commerce, as we will discuss later.
TSA Is Working to Qualify Some Air Cargo Screening Technologies:
In addition, TSA is working to complete qualification testing of air
cargo screening technologies; thus, until all stages of qualification
testing are concluded, the agency may not have reasonable assurance
that the technologies that air carriers and program participants are
currently allowed to use to screen air cargo are effective.
Qualification tests are designed to verify that a technology system
meets the technical requirements specified by TSA. TSA qualified
several X-ray technologies for purchase by industry stakeholders based
on initial test results and qualified EDS technologies based on their
past performance in other testing processes. TSA has not yet qualified
ETD and other X-ray technologies that TSA allows program participants
to use to screen air cargo. Once these technologies have been added to
the list of qualified products, the agency is to conduct additional
stages of qualification testing. TSA officials expressed confidence in
the initial qualification test results because the commercial off-the-
shelf technologies being used for cargo screening have a proven record
in the passenger checkpoint and checked baggage environments. However,
TSA acknowledged that if the results of additional stages of
qualification testing do not meet its technical requirements, these
technologies can be removed from the list of qualified products.
Furthermore, because of the mandated deadlines, TSA is conducting
qualification testing to determine which screening technologies are
effective at the same time that air carriers are using these
technologies to meet the mandated requirement to screen air cargo
transported on passenger aircraft. For example, according to TSA, ETD
technology will undergo the initial phase of qualification testing in
the air cargo environment in 2010, although many air carriers and
CCSFs are currently using it to screen air cargo. Moreover, technology
reports and TSA officials disagree as to the effectiveness of ETD
technology. For example, a pilot program completed by DHS's S&T
Directorate in July 2009 found that the ability of ETD technology to
detect explosive threats in cargo by sampling the external surfaces of
cargo shipments for explosive residue--the standard ETD protocol
required by TSA--is poor. According to TSA officials, external
sampling of cargo shipments is a method of screening preferred by
freight forwarders and air carriers in order to avoid opening all
cargo pieces, which can result in possible damage to the contents and
significantly greater screening time. The pilot program recommended
further research to evaluate the applicability and efficacy of
external sampling using ETD systems, as well as other screening
systems, to detect threats, such as explosives, in air cargo. However,
TSA officials disputed the findings of this S&T Directorate study.
They also stated that other S&T Directorate reports support the
acceptance of ETD technology; however, we were unable to review these
reports since this information was provided late in our review.
[Footnote 55] The lack of consensus within DHS regarding the
effectiveness of ETD technology in the air cargo environment suggests
the need for additional study.
Although TSA officials stated that simultaneous testing and use of
technology by the industry is not ideal, they noted that this was
necessary to meet the screening deadlines mandated by the 9/11
Commission Act. While we recognize that certain circumstances, such as
mandated deadlines, require expedited deployment of technologies, our
prior work has shown that programs with immature technologies have
experienced significant cost and schedule growth.[Footnote 56] For
example, we reported in October 2009 that TSA deployed a passenger
checkpoint technology--the explosives trace portal (ETP)--to airports
without proving its performance in an operational environment,
contrary to TSA's acquisition guidance, which recommends such testing.
[Footnote 57] The agency purchased hundreds of these machines but was
forced to halt their deployment because of performance, maintenance,
and installation issues. All but 9 ETPs have been withdrawn from
airports and 18 remain in inventory. TSA determined that the remainder
of the ETPs was excess capacity.
Since TSA plans to issue a list of qualified technologies before all
stages of qualification testing are complete, the industry lacks
assurance that the qualification status of technologies established by
TSA for use after August 2010 will not change. Further testing could
result in modifications to the list of qualified technologies
authorized for use after August 3, 2010, and to the list of
technologies approved by TSA for use through January 2012. TSA has
reserved the option of revising the status of any particular
technology or system in the event that its performance in an
operational environment indicates that it is losing effectiveness or
suitability to an unacceptable degree as it ages or that constantly
evolving threats require new detection capabilities. The domestic
passenger air carrier and freight forwarder industry association
officials with whom we spoke expressed concerns about purchasing
technology from the lists of approved and qualified technologies that
are subject to change. TSA officials stated that the agency is
accelerating its testing timeline and the release of the qualification
testing results for these technologies to meet the screening deadlines
mandated by Congress. For example, TSA originally planned to release
the X-ray qualification results after completing all stages of
qualification testing. Because of approaching deadlines, however, in
December 2009 and based on initial test results, TSA announced the
qualification of certain X-ray technologies. It is unclear, however,
whether the challenges TSA faces in issuing a list of fully qualified
screening technologies will allow the industry to make informed
decisions about technology purchases to meet the screening
requirements of the 9/11 Commission Act.
Securing the Chain of Custody in the Air Cargo Shipping Process:
With regard to technology, another area of concern in the
transportation of air cargo is the chain of custody between the
various entities that handle and screen cargo before it is loaded onto
an aircraft. TSA officials stated that the agency has taken steps to
analyze the chain of custody under the CCSP, and has issued cargo
procedures to all entities involved in the CCSP to ensure that the
chain of custody of cargo is secure. We found that the procedures
issued by TSA to the CCSFs include guidance on when and how to secure
cargo with tamper-evident technology, but do not include standards for
the types of technologies that should be used. TSA officials noted
that they are in the process of compiling a list of existing tamper-
evident technologies and their manufacturers. Once the list is
complete, TSA plans to test and evaluate these technologies and issue
recommendations to the industry. TSA has not yet set any time frames
for issuing such recommendations because, according to TSA officials,
they need to explore cost-effective technologies first.
Securing the chain of custody for cargo screened under the CCSP takes
on additional significance in light of the DHS Inspector General's
2009 report findings that TSA could improve its efforts to secure air
cargo during ground handling and transportation.[Footnote 58] For
example, the report determined that industry personnel were accessing,
handling, or transporting cargo without the required background
checks. In addition, the report stated that TSA's inspection process
has not been effective in ensuring that requirements for securing air
cargo during ground transportation are understood or followed. In
response to the DHS Inspector General report, TSA concurred with the
recommendation to improve the security threat assessment process and
stated that the IFR requires recordkeeping for security threat
assessments. TSA also concurred with the DHS Inspector General
recommendation to revise the Regulatory Activities Plan to allow more
time for inspectors to provide support and education to regulated
entities to ensure that air cargo security requirements are understood
and implemented. TSA reported that the fiscal year 2010 Regulatory
Activities Plan addresses this concern.
TSA Is Working to Verify That Domestic Screening Is Being Conducted at
the Requisite Levels, but Questions Exist about the Reliability of the
Reported Data:
While TSA reported to Congress that industry achieved the February
2009 50 percent screening deadline as it applies to domestic cargo,
questions exist about the reliability of the screening data, which are
self-reported by industry representatives. TSA has been collecting and
analyzing data from screening entities, such as air carriers, freight
forwarders, and shippers, since March 2009 to verify that domestic
screening is being conducted at the requisite levels. As of March 2010
TSA reported that 68 percent of domestic cargo by weight had been
screened. After receiving data from screening entities, TSA performs
preliminary data quality checks, such as viewing the data to identify
missing or duplicate values. However, TSA does not have a mechanism to
verify the accuracy of the data reported by the industry.[Footnote 59]
TSA stated that as part of its compliance inspections for air carriers
and CCSFs, TSIs check industry screening logs--which include
information on how and by whom a specific shipment was screened--to
verify that the required screening levels have been met. However, TSIs
do not compare these screening logs to the reports that air carriers
and CCSFs submit to TSA with their screening levels because according
to senior TSA officials, such comparisons would be significantly
burdensome to the industry. Specifically, senior TSA officials stated
that the air carrier reports do not contain details on specific
shipments, thus verification is not feasible. However, senior TSA
officials agreed that it is important to verify the accuracy of the
data reported by the industry through random checks or other practical
means, and that greater coordination among TSA program and compliance
officials is necessary to ensure that these checks are taking place.
The Office of Management and Budget's guidelines for ensuring quality
of information call for agencies to develop procedures for reviewing
and substantiating the integrity of information before it is
disseminated.[Footnote 60] Given that TSA uses the data submitted by
screening entities to verify its compliance with the mandate as it
applies to domestic cargo and to report to Congress, ensuring the
accuracy of the self-reported data is of particular significance. In
order to do this, TSA could, for example, adopt a program similar to
CBP's compliance measurement program, which is used to determine the
extent to which importers are in compliance with laws and regulations.
As part of this program, CBP conducts regular quality reviews to
ensure accuracy in findings and management oversight to validate
results. Verifying the accuracy of the self-reported screening data
could better position TSA in providing reasonable assurance that
screening is being conducted at reported levels.
TSA Requirements Do Not Ensure That In-Transit Cargo Transferred from
an Inbound to a Domestic Flight Is Physically Screened:
Cargo that has already been transported on one leg of a passenger
flight--known as in-transit cargo--may be subsequently transferred to
another passenger flight without undergoing screening. For example,
cargo transported on an inbound flight, a significant percentage of
which is exempt from screening, can be transferred to a domestic
flight without physical screening.[Footnote 61] According to TSA
officials, though the agency does not have a precise figure, industry
estimates suggest that about 30 percent of domestic cargo is
transferred from an inbound flight. According to TSA officials, the
agency had determined that additional screening of this cargo was not
required, in part because an actual flight mimics a screening method
that until recently was approved for use.[Footnote 62]
A senior TSA official also stated that because in-transit cargo
transferred from an inbound flight has flown under a TSA-approved
passenger aircraft security program, it is in compliance with TSA
screening requirements. However, a significant amount of inbound cargo
is exempt from screening.[Footnote 63] In contrast, TSA's policies and
procedures require all cargo flown on domestic flights to be screened
at 75 percent, effective May 1, 2010. As a result, despite being flown
under a TSA-approved security program, in-transit cargo originating in
foreign countries is not required to be screened at the same levels as
cargo transported on domestic flights. Therefore, TSA lacks assurance
that this cargo is being screened in accordance with 9/11 Commission
Act required screening levels.
In response to our questions as part of this review, TSA officials
stated that transporting in-transit cargo without screening could pose
a vulnerability, but as of February 2010, the agency was not planning
to require in-transit cargo transferred from an inbound flight to be
physically screened because of the logistical difficulties associated
with screening cargo that is transferred from one flight to another.
However, these logistical difficulties could be minimized if more
cargo were screened prior to departure from a foreign location. Thus,
addressing the potential security vulnerability posed by in-transit
cargo is directly linked to TSA's efforts to secure and screen inbound
cargo, which is discussed later in this report. Although TSA officials
stated that they plan to explore measures for screening in-transit
cargo in the future, these officials did not provide documentation of
these measures or information on milestones for their implementation.
A successful project plan--such as a plan that would be used to
establish such measures--should consider all phases of the project,
and clearly state schedules and deadlines.[Footnote 64] Developing a
plan with milestones that addresses how in-transit cargo will be
screened in accordance with 9/11 Commission Act requirements could
better position TSA to meet the mandate and reduce potential
vulnerabilities associated with such cargo.
Contingency Planning Could Help TSA Identify Alternatives for Meeting
the Air Cargo Screening Mandate:
Although TSA faces industry participation and technology challenges
that could impede the CCSP's success and the agency's efforts to meet
the 100 percent screening mandate, the agency has not developed a
contingency plan that considers alternatives to address these
challenges. As discussed earlier, as of December 2009, the percentage
of cargo screened by shipper and independent CCSFs remains far lower
than the percentage TSA cites as the portion these entities should
ideally screen. Without adequate CCSP participation, industry may not
be able to screen enough cargo prior to its arrival at the airport to
maintain the flow of commerce while meeting the mandate. Likewise,
without technology solutions for screening cargo in a ULD pallet or
container--which makes up about 76 percent of cargo transported on
domestic passenger aircraft--industry may not have the capability to
effectively screen 100 percent of air cargo without affecting the flow
of commerce. TSA is continuing to work with vendors on developing
technology to effectively screen ULD pallets and containers, and in
the interim, is encouraging industry stakeholders as part of the CCSP
to screen such cargo earlier in the supply chain, before it is loaded
onto ULDs, but such actions will not ensure that such cargo is
screened. We have previously reported that a comprehensive planning
process, including contingency planning, is essential to help an
agency meet current and future capacity challenges.[Footnote 65]
Alternatives could include, but are not limited to, mandating CCSP
participation for certain members of the air cargo supply chain--
instead of relying on their voluntary participation--and requiring the
screening of some or all cargo before it is loaded onto ULD pallets
and containers. Developing a contingency plan that addresses the
participation and technology challenges that could impede the
screening program's success, and identifies alternate or additional
security measures to implement in case the program is unable to
effectively facilitate the screening of sufficient amounts of cargo
prior to reaching air carriers at the airport, could better position
TSA to meet the requirements in the air cargo screening mandate.
With regard to the consideration of alternatives to the CCSP, TSA
reported that it considered requiring air carriers to bear the full
burden of the screening mandate and also considered creating TSA-
operated screening facilities at airports, but determined that both
strategies would result in severe disruptions to commerce because of
limited airport space for screening. Representatives of the two major
air carrier associations with whom we spoke stated that additional TSA
screening by canine teams would be helpful, and industry stakeholders
have also identified the option of using private companies to provide
canine screening in order to expand the number of canines available
for screening. According to TSA, the agency is considering whether to
pursue this option because of concerns regarding certification of
canines that have not been trained by TSA and are not handled by TSA
staff. In addition, TSA officials stated that the agency does not plan
to provide canine teams as a long-term primary screening method once
the CCSP grows and industry develops more capacity to screen cargo, as
industry, not the federal government, is responsible for screening air
cargo under TSA's regulations.
TSA officials also stated that alternative or additional screening
measures will not be necessary because unscreened cargo will simply
not be transported on passenger aircraft, that is, "will not fly."
Although this approach would ensure that 100 percent of air cargo
transported on passenger aircraft is screened, part of TSA's mission
is ensuring the flow of commerce. Not transporting unscreened cargo
could place the air cargo transportation industry at risk of
experiencing economic disruptions, including shifts of cargo to other
modes of transportation, which could negatively affect the air cargo
business. In order to help ensure that it fulfills its mission and
meets the 9/11 Commission Act mandate, TSA could benefit from
identifying alternative measures in a contingency plan, should it
become clear that the CCSP will not achieve the screening mandate
while maintaining the flow of commerce.
TSA Has Made Progress but Faces Several Challenges and Lacks a Plan
for Achieving 100 Percent Screening of Inbound Cargo:
TSA has made progress toward meeting the screening mandate as it
applies to inbound cargo by taking steps to increase the percentage of
inbound air cargo that has undergone screening. However, the agency
faces several challenges in ensuring that 100 percent of inbound air
cargo is screened, which will prevent it from meeting the mandate by
the August 2010 deadline. While TSA is aware that it is unable to meet
the screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo, it has not yet
determined when or how it will eventually meet the deadline.
TSA Has Taken Several Steps to Increase the Percentage of Inbound
Cargo Being Screened:
TSA has taken several steps to increase the percentage of inbound air
cargo being screened. For example, TSA revised its requirements for
foreign and U.S. air carrier security programs, effective May 1, 2010,
to generally require air carriers to screen a certain percentage of
shrink-wrapped and banded inbound cargo and 100 percent of inbound
cargo that is not shrink-wrapped or banded.[Footnote 66] According to
our analysis of TSA information, shrink-wrapped and banded cargo makes
up approximately 96 percent of inbound cargo, which means that a
significant percentage of inbound air cargo is not required to be
screened.[Footnote 67] According to TSA, implementation of this
requirement will result in the screening of 100 percent of inbound
cargo transported on narrow-body aircraft since none of this cargo is
shrink-wrapped or banded.[Footnote 68]
Since TSA does not have the same regulatory reach to the supply chain
in foreign countries as it does in the United States, it is taking a
different approach to implementing the screening mandate as it applies
to inbound cargo. This approach focuses on harmonizing its security
standards with those of other nations.[Footnote 69] For example, TSA
is working with foreign governments to increase the amount of screened
cargo, including working bilaterally with the European Commission (EC)
and Canada, and quadrilaterally with the EC, Canada, and Australia. As
part of these efforts, TSA recommended to the United Nations'
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that the next
revision of Annex 17 to the Convention of International Civil Aviation
include an approach that would allow screening to take place at
various points in the air cargo supply chain.[Footnote 70] According
to TSA, ICAO's Aviation Security Panel met in March 2010 to finalize
revisions to Annex 17, including TSA's proposed revision to add
"screening" as a supply chain security concept. TSA has also supported
the International Air Transport Association's (IATA) efforts to
establish a secure supply chain approach to screening cargo for its
member airlines and IATA's efforts to have these standards recognized
internationally.[Footnote 71]
In addition, TSA is working with CBP to leverage an existing CBP
system, known as the Automated Targeting System (ATS), to identify and
target elevated-risk inbound air cargo. ATS is a model that combines
information from inbound cargo manifest lists and entry declaration
information into shipment transactions and uses historical and other
data to help target cargo shipments for inspection.[Footnote 72] While
CBP currently uses ATS to identify cargo for screening once it arrives
in the United States, according to officials, TSA has established a
TSA-CBP working group to focus on using ATS to target inbound air
cargo for possible screening prior to departure from foreign
locations. TSA and CBP officials stated that the working group met
regularly since June 2009, though agency officials did not specify how
frequently they met. As of February 2010, TSA and CBP officials stated
that they were conducting an exercise at Dulles International Airport
for TSA to observe CBP's use of ATS, understand the full capabilities
of ATS, and determine whether ATS can assist TSA's inbound air cargo
screening efforts. TSA officials said that they were not in a position
to provide time frames for completing the exercise since the effort is
in the early stages. Should TSA determine that ATS is effective for
targeting the screening of inbound air cargo, TSA plans for air
carriers to conduct the screening of shipments identified as elevated
risk prior to the cargo's transport to the United States. The air
carriers will also be responsible for providing TSA with the results.
In discussing how a system to target certain, elevated-risk shipments
for screening will fit into TSA's overall plans to screen 100 percent
of inbound air cargo, officials stated that ATS would provide an
additional layer of scrutiny for all cargo entering the United States.
[Footnote 73]
To help assess the rigor and quality of foreign screening practices,
TSA is also in the process of obtaining information from foreign
countries on their respective air cargo screening levels and
practices. According to officials, the agency has developed an
assessment methodology in a question and answer format to collect
information on each foreign country's air cargo security practices,
and it has used the new methodology to collect initial information
from one country. TSA has indicated that it will use the methodology
to identify key security practices and that the information collected
will also help determine if these practices are comparable to TSA
requirements, which will provide TSA with details that can help
determine how foreign standards align with TSA standards. TSA
officials indicated that the methodology used to collect the
information is part of a larger process that will involve collecting
initial information, analyzing what was received, and submitting
additional questions to the foreign countries. TSA anticipates storing
the information gathered in a database, which it has not yet created.
TSA officials were unable to provide time frames for use of the
assessment methodology or completing the database because the effort
is in the early stages.
TSA Faces Several Challenges in Meeting the Screening Mandate as It
Applies to Inbound Cargo:
While TSA has taken steps to increase the percentage of inbound cargo
that has undergone screening, the agency faces several challenges in
meeting the mandate. Consequently, TSA has stated that it will not be
able to meet the screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo. For
example, in a March 4, 2010, hearing before the Subcommittee on
Homeland Security, House Committee on Appropriations, in responding to
questions, the Acting TSA Administrator stated that it could take
several years before 100 percent of inbound cargo is screened.
According to TSA, screening inbound air cargo poses unique challenges,
related, in part, to TSA's limited ability to regulate foreign
entities. As such, TSA officials stated that the agency is focusing
its air cargo screening efforts on domestic cargo and on screening
elevated-risk inbound cargo as it works to address the challenges it
faces in screening 100 percent of inbound cargo.
Inbound air cargo is currently being screened at lower levels than
domestic air cargo. For example, while TSA removed almost all its
screening exemptions for domestic cargo, TSA requirements continue to
exempt from screening a significant amount of shrink-wrapped air cargo
transported to the United States, which represents about 96 percent of
all inbound cargo.[Footnote 74] Effective May 1, 2010, TSA requires
that a certain percentage of this cargo be screened. In April 2007, we
reported that TSA's screening exemptions for inbound cargo could pose
a risk to the air cargo supply chain and recommended that TSA assess
whether these exemptions pose an unacceptable vulnerability and, if
necessary, address these vulnerabilities. TSA agreed with our
recommendation, but beyond expanding its requirement to screen 100
percent of inbound air cargo transported on narrow-body aircraft and a
certain percentage of inbound cargo that is shrink-wrapped or placed
on banded skids, has not yet reviewed, revised, or eliminated
screening exemptions for cargo transported on inbound passenger
flights, and did not provide a time frame for doing so.[Footnote 75]
We continue to believe that TSA should assess whether these exemptions
pose an unacceptable security risk. TSA officials stated that once the
modified ATS is in place, screening exemptions will be less relevant
because air carriers will be more able to target the screening of
elevated-risk cargo as an interim measure before 100 percent screening
is achieved. However, the 9/11 Commission Act requires that all air
cargo be physically screened and does not make exceptions for cargo
that is not elevated risk.
TSA faces challenges in meeting the 100 percent screening mandate as
it applies to inbound air cargo. For example, although TSA is
authorized under U.S. law to ensure that all air carriers, foreign and
domestic, operating to, from, or within the United States maintain the
security measures included in their TSA-approved security programs and
any applicable security directives or emergency amendments issued by
TSA, this authority is limited.[Footnote 76] Also, TSA has no legal
jurisdiction over foreign nations. Specifically, TSA has been
authorized by Congress to set standards for aviation security,
including the authority to require that inbound cargo be screened
before it departs for the United States. However, the agency also
relies on foreign governments to implement and enforce--including
conducting actual screening, in some cases--TSA's regulatory
requirements.
Harmonizing TSA regulatory standards with those of foreign governments
may be challenging because these efforts are voluntary and some
foreign countries do not share the United States' concerns regarding
air cargo security threats and risks. TSA officials caution that if
TSA were to impose a strict cargo screening standard on all inbound
cargo, many nations likely would be unable to meet such standards in
the near term. This raises the prospect of reducing the flow of cargo
on passenger aircraft. According to TSA, the effect of imposing such
screening standards in the near future could result in increased costs
for international passenger travel and for imported goods and possible
reduction in passenger traffic and foreign imports. According to TSA
officials, this could also undermine TSA's ongoing cooperative efforts
to develop commensurate security systems with international partners.
TSA's ongoing efforts to harmonize security standards with those of
foreign nations are essential to achieving progress toward meeting the
100 percent screening mandate as it applies to inbound air cargo.
Identifying the precise level of screening being conducted on inbound
air cargo is difficult because TSA lacks a mechanism to obtain actual
data on all screening that is being conducted on inbound air cargo.
TSA officials estimate that 55 percent of inbound cargo by weight is
currently being screened and that 65 percent of inbound cargo by
weight will be screened by August 2010.[Footnote 77] However, these
estimates are based on the current screening requirements of certain
countries and are not based on actual data collected from air carriers
or other entities, such as foreign governments, on what percentage of
cargo is actually being screened.[Footnote 78] For example, if a
country requires that 100 percent of its cargo be screened, as the
United Kingdom does, TSA counts all the cargo coming from that country
as screened. While TSA officials stated that they discuss screening
percentages with foreign government officials, the agency does not
conduct any additional data verification to assess whether screening
is conducted at, above, or below the required levels. In addition,
because TSA's efforts to complete assessments of other countries'
screening requirements are ongoing, the agency does not always know
whether the screening requirements are consistent with TSA standards.
The DHS Appropriations Act, 2009, requires TSA to report on the actual
screening being conducted, by airport and air carrier.[Footnote 79] To
improve data collection efforts, as of May 2010, TSA requires air
carriers to report on their actual screening levels for inbound air
cargo, and TSA officials stated that an automated cargo reporting tool
would be operational in May 2010 for this purpose. The May 2010
security program changes only require air carriers to report on the
screening that they conduct and not on the screening conducted by
other entities in the air cargo supply chain to meet the air cargo
screening mandate. TSA officials stated that it may be challenging to
obtain screening data from some foreign governments and other entities
that conduct cargo screening. As such, TSA officials also stated that
the agency may still use estimates, such as the current screening
requirements of certain countries, when reporting data to Congress.
Officials could not provide information on milestones or time frames
for obtaining actual screening data for all inbound screening,
including that conducted by air carriers and other entities in the air
cargo supply chain, because the agency is still working to overcome
inbound regulatory challenges. However, establishing time frames for
implementing a plan is consistent with standard practices for program
management.[Footnote 80] Finalizing a plan to obtain actual screening
data could help TSA obtain greater assurance that mandated screening
levels are being met.
TSA Has Not Yet Determined How It Will Meet the Screening Mandate as
It Applies to Inbound Cargo:
TSA has not yet determined how it will meet the screening mandate as
it applies to inbound air cargo. Although TSA has taken steps to
increase the percentage of inbound cargo transported on passenger
aircraft that is screened, the agency has not developed a plan,
including milestones, for meeting the mandate as it applies to inbound
cargo. While TSA officials have stated that the agency does not expect
to meet the mandate as it applies to inbound cargo by the August 2010
deadline, TSA has not provided estimates of when the mandate will be
met or when steps toward its achievement will be completed. Moreover,
the steps that the agency is taking to enhance inbound air cargo
security do not fully support the 100 percent cargo screening mandate.
For example, TSA is focusing on developing its ability to utilize
CBP's ATS to target elevated-risk cargo for screening. While we
recognize this as a reasonable step to strengthen inbound air cargo
security, TSA does not have a plan that articulates how this and other
steps it is taking will fit together to achieve 100 percent screening.
The 9/11 Commission Act requires the establishment of a system to
screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft,
including inbound cargo. As we have reported in our prior work, a
successful project plan--such as a plan that would be used to
establish such a system--should consider all phases of the project and
clearly state schedules and deadlines[Footnote 81]. TSA reported that
it is unable to identify a timeline for meeting the mandate for
inbound cargo, stating that its efforts are long term, given the
extensive work it must conduct with foreign governments and
associations. However, interim milestones could help the agency
provide reasonable assurance to Congress that it is taking steps to
meet the mandate as it applies to inbound cargo. A plan that considers
all phases of the project and clearly states schedules and deadlines
could help position TSA to better measure progress it is making toward
meeting the 9/11 Commission Act mandate as it relates to inbound air
cargo and provide reasonable assurance that its efforts are
implemented in a relatively timely manner.
Conclusions:
Meeting the August 2010 mandate to establish a system to physically
screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on passenger aircraft is a
daunting task. In August 2010, unscreened cargo will not be allowed to
fly on passenger aircraft, but leaving behind such cargo could affect
the flow of commerce. Although the CCSP should help TSA meet the
mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, addressing certain challenges
could strengthen agency efforts and help ensure the CCSP's success.
For example, TSA might benefit from developing a contingency plan
should it become clear that participation levels are not sufficient to
achieve the screening mandate without disruptions to the flow of
commerce. Establishing milestones for completion of a staffing study
to determine the number of inspectors needed to oversee CCSP
participants could provide results that should better position TSA to
obtain these inspection resources and help ensure that air carriers
and CCSFs comply with TSA requirements. Moreover, the technology
challenges TSA faces in screening cargo once it is loaded onto ULD
pallets and containers highlight the need for a contingency plan in
the event that industry stakeholders do not have the capacity to
screen such air cargo. In addition, verifying industry-reported
screening data could better position TSA in providing reasonable
assurance that screening is being conducted at reported levels.
Furthermore, developing a plan and milestones for screening in-transit
cargo, which is not currently required to undergo physical screening,
could help ensure that such cargo is screened in accordance with 9/11
Commission Act requirements and mitigate a risk to the air cargo
transportation system. Developing a contingency plan that considers
additional or alternative security measures will better position TSA
to meet the mandate without disrupting the flow of commerce should it
become clear that the challenges related to CCSP participation and
screening technology will hinder the agency's efforts.
With regard to inbound air cargo, while TSA has taken some positive
steps to increase the percentage of cargo that is screened, the agency
could better address the challenges to screening this cargo. For
example, finalizing its plans to obtain actual screening data for all
inbound cargo screening, including time frames and milestones, could
provide greater assurance that mandated screening levels are being
met. In addition, determining how it will meet the screening mandate
as it applies to inbound air cargo, including related milestones,
could better position TSA in providing reasonable assurance that the
agency is making progress toward meeting the screening mandate in a
timely manner.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To enhance efforts to secure the air cargo transportation system and
establish a system to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on
passenger aircraft, we are recommending that the Administrator of TSA
take the following five actions:
* Establish milestones for the completion of TSA's staffing study to
assist in determining the resources necessary to provide CCSP
oversight.
* Develop a mechanism to verify the accuracy of all screening data,
both self-reported domestic data and inbound cargo data, through
random checks or other practical means. For inbound air cargo,
complete the agency's plan to obtain actual data, rather than
estimates, for all inbound screening, including establishing time
frames and milestones for completion of the plan.
* Develop a plan, with milestones, for how and when the agency intends
to require the screening of in-transit cargo.
* Develop a contingency plan for meeting the mandate as it applies to
domestic cargo that considers alternatives to address potential CCSP
participation shortfalls and screening technology limitations.
* Develop a plan, with milestones, for how and when the agency intends
to meet the mandate as it applies to inbound cargo.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of our report to DHS and TSA on May 19, 2010, for
review and comment. On June 23, 2010, DHS provided written comments
from the department and TSA, which are reprinted in appendix I. In
commenting on our report, TSA stated that it concurred with three
recommendations, concurred in part with one recommendation, and did
not concur with another recommendation. For the recommendations for
which TSA concurred or concurred in part, the agency identified
actions taken or planned to implement them. Although TSA concurred
with part of our second recommendation, the actions TSA reported that
the agency has taken do not fully address the intent of this
recommendation.
Regarding our first recommendation that TSA establish milestones for
the completion of its staffing study to assist in determining the
resources necessary to provide CCSP oversight, TSA concurred. TSA
stated that as part of the staffing study, the agency is working to
develop a model to identify the number of required TSIs and that this
effort would be completed in the fall of 2010. If this model includes
an analysis of the resources needed to provide CCSP oversight under
various scenarios, it will address the intent of our recommendation.
TSA concurred in part with our second recommendation that the agency
develop a mechanism to verify the accuracy of domestic and inbound
screening data, including obtaining actual data on all inbound
screening. TSA concurred with the need to capture data for inbound
cargo and stated that as of May 1, 2010, the agency issued changes to
air carriers' standard security programs that require air carriers to
report inbound cargo screening data to TSA. However, as noted in this
report, these requirements apply to air carriers and the screening
that they conduct and not to the screening conducted by other
entities, such as foreign governments. Thus, TSA will continue to rely
in part on estimates to report inbound cargo screening levels. We
recognize that it may be challenging for TSA to obtain cargo screening
data from foreign governments; however, the agency could require air
carriers to report on cargo screening for all inbound cargo they
transport, including the screening conducted by foreign governments or
other entities. This would be similar to air carriers' domestic cargo
screening reporting requirements which require air carriers to report
on cargo that they screen as well as cargo screened by CCSFs. We
continue to believe that it is important for TSA to obtain data for
all screening conducted on inbound cargo so that it can provide
assurance to Congress that this cargo is being screened in accordance
with the 9/11 Commission Act screening mandate. TSA stated that
verifying the accuracy of domestic screening data will continue to be
a challenge because there is no means to cross-reference local
screening logs--which include screening information on specific
shipments--with screening reports submitted by air carriers to TSA
that do not contain such information. We acknowledge TSA's potential
challenges in cross-referencing screening logs with screening reports
and have modified the report to reflect this challenge. However, as
noted in this report, TSA could consider a quality review mechanism
similar to the compliance measurement program used by CBP, which
includes regular quality reviews to ensure accuracy in findings and
management oversight to validate results. TSA could also develop
another mechanism for verifying the accuracy of the screening data
through random checks--other than those of the screening logs--or
other practical means. Doing so would address the intent of our
recommendation. Given that the agency uses these data to report to
Congress its compliance with the screening mandate as it applies to
domestic cargo, we continue to believe that verifying the accuracy of
the screening data is important so that TSA will be better positioned
to provide reasonable assurance that screening is being conducted at
reported levels.
TSA concurred with our third recommendation that TSA develop a plan
for how and when the agency intends to require the screening of in-
transit cargo. TSA stated that the agency has implemented changes,
effective August 1, 2010, that will require 100 percent of in-transit
cargo to be screened unless it can otherwise be verified as screened.
TSA's action is an important step toward addressing the potential
security vulnerability associated with in-transit cargo and if
implemented effectively, will address the intent of our
recommendation. Because this is a significant change and potentially
operationally challenging, it will be important to closely monitor the
industry's understanding and implementation of this requirement to
help ensure that 100 percent screening of in-transit cargo is being
conducted.
TSA did not concur with our fourth recommendation to develop a
contingency plan for meeting the mandate as it applies to domestic
cargo that considers alternatives to address potential CCSP
participation shortfalls and screening technology limitations. TSA
stated that a contingency plan is unnecessary since effective August
1, 2010, 100 percent of domestic cargo transported on passenger
aircraft will be required to be screened. The agency also stated that
there is no feasible contingency plan that can be implemented by TSA
that does not compromise security or create disparities in the
availability of screening resources. However, the agency noted that
several alternatives are available to and are currently being
exercised by industry. The agency also stated that TSA developed the
CCSP in collaboration with industry stakeholders to alleviate the
burden on airlines to screen 100 percent of cargo while still meeting
the mandate. We disagree that a contingency plan is unnecessary and
unfeasible. As noted in this report, although TSA's approach would
ensure that 100 percent of domestic cargo transported on passenger
aircraft is screened, not transporting unscreened cargo could
negatively affect the flow of commerce. In addition, while we
recognize the CCSP as a positive and critical step toward achieving
the screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, we continue to
believe that there are feasible alternatives that TSA should consider
to address potential CCSP participation shortfalls and screening
technology limitations. Such alternatives discussed in this report
include mandating CCSP participation for certain members of the air
cargo supply chain and requiring the screening of some or all cargo
before it is loaded onto ULD pallets and containers. Effective May 1,
2010, TSA embraced one of the alternatives cited in this report by
requiring freight forwarder CCSFs to screen all cargo before it is
loaded onto ULD pallets and containers. Expanding this requirement to
additional industry stakeholders could be a feasible alternative to
address both CCSP participation shortfalls and screening technology
limitations. Moreover, although many industry stakeholders may support
the CCSP, key partners in the program--shippers--have not joined the
program at the levels targeted by TSA, thus jeopardizing its success.
Therefore, we continue to believe that it is prudent that TSA consider
developing a contingency plan for meeting the air cargo screening
mandate without disrupting the flow of commerce.
Finally, in regard to our fifth recommendation that TSA develop a plan
for how and when the agency intends to meet the mandate as it applies
to inbound cargo, TSA concurred and stated that TSA is drafting
milestones as part of a plan that will generally require air carriers
to conduct 100 percent screening by a specific date. If implemented
effectively, this plan will address the intent of our recommendation.
In addition, DHS noted in its written comments that CCSFs have
reported to TSA that they have the capacity to screen nearly the
entire remaining unscreened cargo volume and that air carriers have
reported to TSA that they do not anticipate any major disruptions to
the transport of air cargo on August 2010. We were not able to verify
these assertions because TSA did not provide supporting documentation.
It is also important to note that having the potential capacity to
screen air cargo does not ensure that this screening will take place
when the 100 percent screening mandate goes into effect in August 2010.
TSA also provided us with technical comments, which we considered and
incorporated in the report where appropriate.
As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until
2 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the
Secretary of Homeland Security, interested congressional committees,
and other interested parties. The report also will be available at no
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report or wish to
discuss these matters further, please contact me at (202) 512-4379 or
lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.
Signed by:
Stephen M. Lord:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
June 22, 2010:
Mr. Steve Lord:
Director, Homeland Security & Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO):
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Lord:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on GAO 10-446, the
draft report titled: Aviation Security: Mt Has Made Progress But Faces
Challenges in Meeting the Statutory Mandate for Screening Air Cargo on
Passenger Aircraft. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
appreciates the professionalism demonstrated by GAO's team members in
conducting this difficult and broad-ranging review. TSA also values
the investigative panel's review of this agency's efforts to enable
the air cargo industry to achieve the 100 percent air cargo screening
mandate of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
(9/11 Act).
Since August 2007, when TSA was tasked with establishing a system to
screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger aircraft, we have
implemented a major new security program called the Certified Cargo
Screening Program (CCSP), issued regulations and security program
amendments to incrementally increase the level of screening of cargo
transported on passenger aircraft departing U.S. locations, engaged in
a broad-based campaign to educate industry on the 100 percent
screening requirement and the benefits of CCSP participation, and
significantly increased the number and types of technologies approved
for screening air cargo to support the screening mandate.
TSA has certified over 720 entities as Certified Cargo Screening
Facilities (CCSFs) since the CCSP was initiated as a pilot program in
2008, These entities currently are screening more than 40 percent of
the cargo, by weight, carried on passenger aircraft departing U.S.
airports. They have reported to TSA that they have the capacity to
screen nearly the entire remaining unscreened volume as we approach
the August 2010 deadline. Additionally, air carriers are continuing to
invest in screening equipment, and have also reported that they do not
anticipate any major disruptions.
In October 2008, TSA began increasing the level of screening required
on cargo transported on passenger aircraft in the United States by
establishing a requirement to screen 100 percent of cargo transported
on narrow body aircraft. This measure fully protects 96 percent of all
domestic passenger aircraft flights, which carry more than 86
percent of all aircraft passengers in the United States. Subsequent
updates to TSA security programs required 50 percent screening by
February 1, 2009. and most recently, 75 percent screening by May 1,
2010. Both levels have been successfully met by industry.
TSA has reached out to more than 100,000 entities on the 100 percent
screening requirement and the CCSP, working largely through major
industry associations to engage stakeholders through webinars,
conferences, newsletters, articles and advertisements in trade
journals and the popular press.
When the 9/11 Act was passed, no equipment had been tested or approved
specifically for cargo screening. TSA has since created an approved
technologies list that contains more than 50 technologies, including
Advanced Technology (AT) X-ray capable of screening large cargo
configurations, as well as Explosives Trace Detection (ETD), Explosive
Detection Systems (EDS), and most recently Electromagnetic Devices
(EMD).
While industry has not yet achieved 100 percent screening for
international inbound cargo due to the challenges of implementing a
supply chain screening program internationally, TSA intends to require
an increased level of screening for international inbound cargo as we
continue to facilitate industry's achievement of 100 percent screening
in the next few years. A combination of incremental increases in the
screening requirements for carriers as well as recognition of foreign
national cargo security programs, are key components of that strategy.
TSA appreciates the work of GAO in its review of TSA Air Cargo
Programs, and we will continue to address the issues identified by
GAO. Our continued progress demonstrates our commitment to TSA's
mission of securing our Nation's transportation systems and ensuring
the freedom of movement of people and commerce. TSA's specific
responses to GAO's recommendations are below.
Recommendation 1: Establish milestones for the completion of TSA's
staffing study.
TSA concurs. As part of the Transportation Security Inspector (TSI)
study, TSA is working to develop a demand model to be used to identify
the number of TSIs needed at a particular location based on various
factors, to include the number of regulated entities, such as CCSFs.
This is expected to be completed in the Fail of 2010. TSA has already
established an interim model that determines a ratio of inspectors to
entities and that also considers other factors, such as cargo volume.
TSA has already used the interim model in order to develop a plan for
deployment of 50 TSI-Cargo (TSI-C) in fiscal year 2010.
Recommendation 2: Develop a mechanism to verify the accuracy of all
screening data, both self-reported domestic data and inbound cargo
data, through random checks or other practical means. For Inbound
cargo data, complete the agency's plan to obtain actual data, rather
than estimates, on all inbound screening, including establishing
timeframes and milestones for completion of the plan.
TSA concurs in part. TSA concurs with the need to capture data for
inbound cargo and as of May I, 2010, TSA issued changes to the
standard security programs that require this data to be reported to
TSA. However, the ability to verify the accuracy of screening data
provided by regulated parties will continue to be a challenge. While
TSI-C's can obtain specific screening logs for screening activity,
there is currently no means to cross-reference local screening logs
(which provide information as to how and by whom a particular shipment
was screened) with carrier-level reports. Carrier reports themselves
are a compilation of statistics provided by multiple locations. No
specific shipment numbers are required as part of this process, and to
add such a requirement would be a significant burden to industry. TSA
will verify the accuracy of this data through random checks and
inspections of screening logs.
Recommendation 3: Develop a plan, with milestones, for how and when
the agency intends to require the screening of in-transit cargo.
TSA concurs. TSA has already taken significant steps to accomplish
this objective, and has implemented changes to the Foreign Air Carrier
Model Security Program and the U.S. Aircraft Operator Standard
Security Program; effective August 1. 2010, 100 percent of all cargo
transported on passenger aircraft from U.S. airports will be required
to be screened.
Recommendation 4: Develop a contingency plan for meeting the mandate
as it applies to domestic cargo that considers alternatives to address
potential CCSP participation shortfalls and screening technology
limitations.
TSA does not concur. Effective August 1, 2010, 100 percent of all
cargo transported on passenger aircraft from U.S. airports will be
required to be screened; to develop a contingency plan that suggests
otherwise is unnecessary. TSA contends that there is no feasible
contingency plan that can be implemented by TSA that does not
compromise security or create disparities in the availability of
screening resources among airports and/or commodity sectors. However,
based on each entity's business model, there are alternatives that an
entity can use including earlier shipment delivery times by air
carriers for unscreened cargo, as well as the use of all cargo
aircraft or surface alternatives. TSA has developed the CCSP in
collaboration with industry stakeholders to alleviate the burden on
airlines to screen 100 percent of cargo while still meeting this
mandate. Industry supports this decision to screen cargo earlier in
the supply chain before reaching the airlines.
Recommendation 5: Develop a plan, with milestones, for how and when
the agency intends to meet the mandate as it applies to inbound cargo.
TSA concurs. TSA is drafting a set of milestones that will require all
carriers to attain 100 percent screening by a specific date, unless
other national cargo security programs are submitted, reviewed, and
accepted as providing commensurate levels of security. We will be
happy to share this plan with GAO when it is completed.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Stephen M. Lord, (202) 512-4379 or lords@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Steve D. Morris, Assistant
Director, and Rebecca Kuhlmann Taylor, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this
review. Scott M. Behen, Erin C. Henderson, Elke Kolodinski, Linda S.
Miller, Matthew Pahl, and Yanina Golburt Samuels made significant
contributions to the work. David K. Hooper and Thomas Lombardi
provided legal support. Stanley J. Kostyla assisted with design and
methodology. Pille Anvelt and Tina Cheng helped develop the report's
graphics. John W. Cooney, Elizabeth C. Dunn, Richard B. Hung, Brendan
Kretzschmar, and Amelia B. Shachoy also provided support.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] For the purposes of this report, domestic cargo refers to cargo
transported by air within the United States and from the United States
to a foreign location by both U.S. and foreign air carriers, and
inbound cargo refers to cargo transported by both U.S. and foreign air
carriers from a foreign location to the United States. These cargo
statistics were provided by the Transportation Security Administration
from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
[2] Specific threat details are classified and are not discussed in
this report. Generally, the threat that has been identified by TSA is
that of an improvised explosive device.
[3] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
[4] CBP has primary responsibility for preventing terrorists and
implements of terrorism from entering the United States.
[5] Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1602, 121 Stat. 266, 477-80 (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 44901(g)).
[6] See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)(5). For the purposes of this report,
physical screening is generally used to describe screening for
purposes of the air cargo screening mandate.
[7] The policies and procedures we reviewed include Aircraft Operator
Standard Security Program, Change 5A, February 26, 2009; Aircraft
Operator Standard Security Program, Change 9, April 1, 2010; Aircraft
Operator Standard Security Program, Change 9A, June 3, 2010; Alternate
Procedure to Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Program (AP-IACSSP-
08-002-C), February 25, 2009; Alternate Procedure to Indirect Air
Carrier Standard Security Program (AP-IACSSP-08-001-E), February 25,
2009; Alternate Procedure to Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security
Program (AP-IACSSP-08-002-E), April 19, 2010; Certified Cargo
Screening Program Order, Change 2, February 26, 2009; Foreign Air
Carrier Model Security Program, Change 8A, February 26, 2009; Foreign
Air Carrier Model Security Program, Change 12, April 1, 2010; Foreign
Air Carrier Model Security Program, Change 12A, June 3, 2010; and
Indirect Air Carrier Standard Security Program, Change 3A, February
26, 2009.
[8] There are about 450 commercial airports in the United States. TSA
classifies airports into one of five categories (X, I, II, III, and
IV) based on various factors, such as the total number of takeoffs and
landings annually, the extent to which passengers are screened at the
airport, and other special security considerations. In general,
category X airports have the largest number of passenger boardings,
and category IV airports have the smallest.
[9] For the purposes of this report, the term freight forwarder only
includes those freight forwarders that are regulated by TSA, also
referred to as indirect air carriers. A freight forwarder is a company
that consolidates cargo from multiple shippers onto a master air
waybill--a manifest of the consolidated shipment--and delivers the
shipment to air carriers for transport.
[10] The associations whose officials we interviewed include one air
carrier association that represents 16 of the principal U.S. air
carriers and their affiliates, which transport more than 90 percent of
U.S. air carrier passenger and cargo traffic; one air carrier
association that represents about 230 U.S. and foreign air carriers
that account for 93 percent of scheduled international air traffic;
one air carrier association that represents 16 small U.S. air
carriers, many of which fly all-cargo and charter aircraft; one
freight forwarder association that represents 330 companies and about
3,000 offices out of approximately 4,500 domestic freight forwarders,
and a variety of small, medium, and large domestic freight forwarders;
one airport association whose commercial airport members represent
more than 95 percent of domestic air carrier passenger and air cargo
traffic in North America; and one pilots' association that represents
28,000 out of 90,000 pilots at U.S. air carriers.
[11] GAO, 2010 Census: Cost and Design Issues Need to Be Addressed
Soon, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-37] (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 15, 2004). This report reviewed a number of guides to
project management and business process reengineering to help
determine the key elements for successful project planning. The guides
include Project Management Institute Standards Committee, A Guide to
the Project Management Body of Knowledge © (1996); Information
Technology Resource Board, Project Management for Mission Critical
Systems: A Handbook for Government Executives (Apr. 5, 2001); Carnegie
Mellon Software Engineering Institute, Capability Maturity Model
Integration Project Planning Guide (March 2001); and GAO, Business
Process Reengineering Assessment Guide, Version 3, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-10.1.15] (Washington, D.C.: May
1997). See The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program
Management © (2006).
[12] Office of Management and Budget, Guidelines for Ensuring and
Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies (October 2001).
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-37].
[14] GAO, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center: Capacity Planning
and Management Oversight Need Improvement, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-736] (Washington, D.C.: July 24,
2003).
[15] The six air cargo industry associations are those discussed
earlier in this report.
[16] The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program
Management.
[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-37].
[18] All-cargo aircraft are aircraft that transport only cargo.
[19] These cargo statistics were provided by TSA from the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics.
[20] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 111-298, at 79 (2009). In fiscal year 2009,
TSA allocated 85 proprietary canine teams--teams that are owned and
operated full-time by TSA staff. TSA also has agreements with local
law enforcement agencies, such as local police departments, for some
of their canine teams to operate part-time in the air cargo
environment. The transfer of 35 local law enforcement teams to TSA
would increase the number of allocated TSA proprietary canine teams to
120. TSA tests technologies in laboratory and operational
environments, evaluates the performance and effectiveness of
technology against preset standards, and upon successful completion of
the assessments, deploys the technology at airports and air cargo
facilities.
[21] A weapon of mass destruction could include nuclear, biological,
chemical, or radiological devices.
[22] See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)(5). EDS uses computer-aided tomography X-
rays to examine objects inside baggage and identify the characteristic
signatures of threat explosives. ETD requires human operators to
collect samples of items to be screened with swabs, which are
chemically analyzed to identify any traces of explosive material.
Certified explosives detection canine teams have been evaluated by TSA
and shown to effectively detect explosive devices. Physical search
together with manifest verification entails comparisons between air
waybills and cargo contents to ensure that the contents of the cargo
shipment match the cargo identified in documents filed by the shipper.
[23] TSA exempts some categories of air cargo from physical screening
and requires alternative methods of screening, such as verifying
shipper and cargo information and visually inspecting the cargo
shipment, rather than opening the shipment and physically searching
its contents or screening it with technology. TSA determines whether
domestic cargo is subject to alternative methods of screening based on
professional judgment and the results of the air cargo vulnerability
assessments. For the purposes of this report, the phrase "exempt
cargo" and the word "exemption" refer to cargo that is subject to such
alternative screening measures. Narrow-body aircraft, such as Boeing
737s and Airbus 320s, are defined by fuselage diameter, and most
narrow-body aircraft have only one aisle. Narrow-body aircraft that
fly in the United States do not carry ULDs that allow packages to be
consolidated in a container or pallet. Wide-body aircraft are also
defined by fuselage diameter and can carry ULDs.
[24] According to statistics provided by TSA from the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, narrow-body aircraft make up 97 percent of
passenger flights and transport more than 90 percent of passengers
traveling on domestic passenger flights.
[25] Details on TSA's screening exemptions are Sensitive Security
Information and are not discussed in this report.
[26] 49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.205(g)(1)(ii), 1546.205(g)(1)(ii).
[27] The agency issued an interim order in December 2008 to allow
shippers and other entities that were previously not regulated by TSA
to screen, accept, and transfer air cargo.
[28] 74 Fed. Reg. 47672, September 16, 2009.
[29] A security threat assessment is a check of personnel against
intelligence records and databases, including terrorist watch lists,
and a limited immigration check, to verify that they do not pose a
security threat.
[30] Beginning in August 2010, at the 100 percent screening deadline,
TSA officials told us that freight forwarder CCSFs will also be
required to screen 100 percent of cargo being delivered to wide-body
aircraft.
[31] TSA refers to CCSP outreach coordinators as principal cargo
security analysts.
[32] Under the IFR, TSA plans to engage TSA-approved third-party firms
to validate and certify CCSP applicants. TSA refers to these third-
party validators as third-party assessment validation firms. According
to TSA officials, CCSP outreach coordinators plan to manage the
oversight and certification of the third-party validators.
[33] The other industry association officials with whom we spoke did
not comment on this issue.
[34] GAO, Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's
Progress and Challenges in Meeting the Statutory Mandate for Screening
Air Cargo on Passenger Aircraft, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-422T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 18,
2009).
[35] Initially, the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot, or the
Indirect Air Carrier technology pilot as it is named in the IFR, was
limited to high-volume freight forwarders (i.e., freight forwarders
processing at least 200 shipments annually per location that contain
cargo consolidated from multiple shippers). However, in November 2008,
TSA issued a second announcement seeking additional high-volume
freight forwarders and independent cargo screening facilities to apply
for the pilot. Moreover, entities that do not participate in the pilot
will not receive TSA funding to purchase screening technology.
[36] In December 2009, TSA extended the expiration date of the
approved technologies to January 2012. For the purposes of this
report, when discussing TSA's approved or qualified technology lists,
X-ray refers to X-ray, advanced technology X-ray, or both.
[37] The qualification process will also test future technologies not
currently on the approved list once they mature and become approved.
[38] TSA canine teams conduct primary and secondary screening of
cargo. Primary screening counts toward meeting the air cargo screening
mandate. Secondary screening provides spot checks of the screening
already conducted by air carriers and CCSFs. TSA could not provide a
breakdown of the 145 million pounds of cargo between primary and
secondary screening. Based on 2008 cargo totals, 145 million pounds of
cargo represents about 3 percent of domestic air cargo.
[39] In fiscal year 2010, TSA projects a total of 805 canine teams in
aviation, mass transit, and maritime systems. In the fiscal year 2011
budget justification, TSA is requesting funding for an additional 275
explosives detection canine teams to operate in the area of aviation
security.
[40] The DHS Appropriations Act, 2009, requires TSA to report to the
House and Senate Appropriations Committees quarterly on the actual
screening conducted, by airport and air carrier. See Pub. L. No. 110-
329, § 515(d), 122 Stat. 3574, 3683.
[41] Through an agreement with the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees, TSA did not provide a 1st Quarter report.
[42] Details on TSA's covert testing program are Sensitive Security
Information and are not discussed in this report.
[43] The CCSP allows air cargo industry stakeholders, such as an air
cargo handling agent, to establish independent cargo screening
facilities to provide screening services for shippers or freight
forwarders that have not joined the program and do not want the air
carriers to screen their cargo. These independent facilities screen
cargo for a fee, according to CCSP guidelines. For the purposes of
this report, we refer to independent cargo screening facilities as
independent CCSFs.
[44] The screening percentages in figure 4 have been rounded to the
nearest percentage point. However, the actual percentages for March
2010 sum to 68 percent.
[45] According to TSA, as of March 2010, the agency had certified 397
freight forwarder CCSFs, 143 shipper CCSFs, and 43 independent CCSFs
out of an estimated population of 4,500 freight forwarders at 12,000
locations and 15,000 shippers at 2 million locations.
[46] A freight forwarder's size is determined by its annual sales. For
example, a freight forwarder with $5 million or less in annual sales
is considered to be small.
[47] TSA's Regulatory Activities Plan establishes the minimum number
of inspections, depending on airport size and other factors, TSIs are
to conduct for each type of regulated entity.
[48] During the 90-day nonenforcement period following certification--
during which CCSFs are not required to screen at mandated levels while
they are developing their screening systems--TSA field offices may
also require TSIs to visit CCSFs in their areas of responsibility to
provide guidance on the TSA screening requirements that the entities
must implement. TSA field offices are to schedule comprehensive
inspections after the 90-day period expires.
[49] According to TSA data, inspectors conducted 553 comprehensive
inspections of CCSFs from February 1, 2009, through February 22, 2010,
as the program was developing. Therefore, in the next year, inspectors
will need to at least double their comprehensive inspections of CCSFs
to reach the 1,166 target. Additional CCSFs and extra comprehensive
inspections will further affect this increase.
[50] We analyzed inspection data from February 1, 2009, through
February 22, 2010. As of February 22, 2010, TSIs had performed
inspections on 68 percent (392 of 576) of all certified CCSFs and
approximately 77 percent (392 of 508) of those eligible for inspection
that were beyond the 90-day nonenforcement period. We also calculated
that as of February 22, 2010, 146 CCSFs had received two annual
inspections. Because CCSFs are not eligible for inspection within 90
days of certification, and some CCSFs had been certified for less than
6 months and had not had their second required annual inspections, we
calculated that 445 CCSFs were enrolled approximately 6 months prior
to February 22, 2010, and at least 285 CCSFs were enrolled 9 months
prior to February 22, 2010.
[51] Details on the number and type of CCSF compliance inspection
violations are Sensitive Security Information and are not discussed in
this report.
[52] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-37].
[53] The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program
Management.
[54] Cargo may be screened before it is loaded onto ULD pallets or
containers.
[55] According to TSA officials, these other S&T Directorate reports
include Test and Evaluation Report for Trace Explosives Detection for
Cargo Screening of September 2008, and Comparative Report of Eight
Explosive Trace Detection Systems in Particle Mode for Cargo Screening
of September 2009.
[56] See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD's
Weapon Programs Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-543T] (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 1, 2009). For an additional example of such programs, see
GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying
Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-651T] (Washington, D.C.: May 4,
2010).
[57] See GAO, Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched,
Developed, and Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening
Technologies, but Continue to Face Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-128] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7,
2009).
[58] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General,
Security of Air Cargo During Ground Transportation, OIG-10-09
(Washington, D.C., November 2009).
[59] We used the industry-reported data in figure 4 of this report
because we found them to be sufficiently reliable to provide a general
indication of cargo screening levels. However, as discussed here,
questions exist about the accuracy of the industry-reported data.
[60] Office of Management and Budget, Guidelines for Ensuring and
Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies.
[61] Details on TSA's screening exemptions are Sensitive Security
Information and are not discussed in this report.
[62] Details on TSA's approved screening methods are Sensitive
Security Information and are not discussed in this report.
[63] TSA requirements to screen inbound cargo will be discussed in
further detail in a later section of this report. Details on TSA's
screening exemptions are Sensitive Security Information and are not
discussed in this report. For additional information on the issue of
screening exemptions, see GAO, Review of the Transportation Security
Administration's Air Cargo Screening Exemptions Report, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1055R] (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15,
2008).
[64] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-37].
[65] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-736].
[66] Details on TSA's screening requirements are Sensitive Security
Information and are not discussed in this report. Prior to May 1,
2010, TSA generally required air carriers to screen 50 percent of
nonexempt inbound cargo transported on passenger aircraft and a
certain percentage of all inbound cargo transported on passenger
aircraft.
[67] Banded cargo is cargo with heavy-duty metal, plastic, or nylon
bands that secure all sides of the cargo shipment or secure the cargo
shipment to a skid. While TSA officials could not provide a precise
estimate of what percentage of inbound cargo this shrink-wrapped or
banded cargo represents, about 96 percent of inbound cargo arrives in
the United States on wide-body aircraft--the vast majority of which is
transported on shrink-wrapped or banded skids.
[68] According to statistics provided by TSA from the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, in 2008, narrow-body flights made up 69
percent of inbound flights and transported 45 percent of inbound
passengers.
[69] TSA does not regulate foreign freight forwarders, or individuals
or businesses that have their cargo shipped by air to the United
States. The term harmonization is used to describe countries' efforts
to coordinate their security practices to enhance security and
increase efficiency by avoiding duplication of effort. Harmonization
efforts can include countries mutually recognizing and accepting each
other's existing practices--which could represent somewhat different
approaches to achieve the same outcome--as well as working to develop
mutually acceptable uniform standards.
[70] ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations with the
primary objective to provide for the safe, orderly, and efficient
development of international civil aviation.
[71] IATA is an industry association that represents about 230 air
carriers constituting 93 percent of international scheduled air
traffic. IATA's approach, called Secure Freight, is an attempt to
create an air cargo industry comprising certified secure operators in
secure supply chains operating to international cargo security
standards recognized by relevant state authorities. A pilot of the
Secure Freight program is scheduled to begin in the first half of 2010.
[72] Air carriers departing from any foreign location in the Americas,
including Mexico, Central America, and areas of South America north of
the equator, must submit manifest information to CBP no later than the
time of flight departure (the time at which wheels are up on the
aircraft and the aircraft is en route directly to the United States).
In the case of air carriers departing from any other foreign location,
CBP requires that manifest information be submitted 4 hours prior to
the flight's arrival in the United States. Unlike TSA's planned
efforts to screen cargo prior to departure, CBP screens cargo once it
enters the United States.
[73] We have previously reported on TSA and CBP efforts regarding
securing inbound cargo and recommended that the agencies improve
coordination and information sharing. TSA and CBP's collaboration on
ATS is a response to this recommendation. In addition, CBP created the
International Air Cargo Strategic Plan in June 2007 to assist the
agency in increasing aviation security related to inbound air cargo.
For more information, see GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to
Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be
Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2007).
[74] Details on TSA's screening requirements and exemptions are
Sensitive Security Information and are not discussed in this report.
[75] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-660].
[76] See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44903, 44906; see also 49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.3,
1546.3. Although TSA security requirements follow the ICAO standards
and recommended practices, TSA may subject air carriers operating to,
from, or within the United States to any requirements necessary and
assess compliance with such requirements, as the interests of aviation
and national security dictate. See 49 U.S.C. § 44906.
[77] This includes both exempt and nonexempt cargo, under TSA's
definitions. Since the screening of inbound cargo is conducted based
on the standards of each individual country, it may not be conducted
in accordance with TSA standards. For example, at least one country
allows the use of large X-ray machines to inspect entire pallets of
cargo that will be transported on passenger aircraft, without
requiring the pallets to be broken down. In addition, two European
countries use canines in a different manner than TSA to inspect air
cargo for explosives. Specifically, these countries are using the
Remote Air Sampling for Canine Olfaction technique, which involves the
use of highly trained dogs to sniff air samples collected from air
cargo or trucks through a specially designed filter. Such screening
standards may produce different results from TSA's screening
standards. See GAO-07-660 for more details.
[78] According to TSA officials, the agency does not know the
screening requirements for every country that transports air cargo
into the United States. TSA assumes that other countries are in
compliance, at a minimum, with TSA's regulation that a certain
percentage of inbound air cargo be screened.
[79] Pub. L. No. 110-329, § 515(d), 122 Stat. 3574, 3683.
[80] The Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program
Management.
[81] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-37].
[End of section]
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