Aviation Security
Progress Made but Actions Needed to Address Challenges in Meeting the Air Cargo Screening Mandate Gao ID: GAO-10-880T June 30, 2010This testimony discusses air cargo screening. In 2008, about 7.3 billion pounds of cargo was transported on U.S. passenger flights--approximately 58 percent of which was transported domestically (domestic cargo) and 42 percent of which was transported on flights arriving in the United States from a foreign location (inbound cargo). The 2009 Christmas Day plot to detonate an explosive device during an international flight bound for Detroit provided a vivid reminder that terrorists continue to view passenger aircraft as attractive targets. According to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the security threat posed by terrorists introducing explosive devices in air cargo shipments is significant, and the risk and likelihood of such an attack directed at passenger aircraft is high. To help enhance the security of air cargo, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) mandated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a system to physically screen 50 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft--including the domestic and inbound flights of foreign and U.S. passenger operations--by February 2009, and 100 percent of such cargo by August 2010. The 9/11 Commission Act defines screening for purposes of the air cargo screening mandate as a physical examination or nonintrusive methods of assessing whether cargo poses a threat to transportation security. The act also requires that such a system provide a level of security commensurate with the level of security for the screening of checked baggage. According to TSA, the mission of its air cargo security program is to secure the air cargo transportation system while not unduly impeding the flow of commerce. Although the mandate is applicable to both domestic and inbound cargo, TSA stated that it must address the mandate for domestic and inbound cargo through separate systems because of differences in its authority to regulate domestic and international air cargo industry stakeholders. This testimony is based on a report we are publicly releasing today that assesses TSA's progress and related challenges in meeting the air cargo screening mandate. It addresses the following key issues in our report: progress TSA has made in meeting the 9/11 Commission Act screening mandate as it applies to (1) domestic air cargo and (2) inbound air cargo and related challenges it faces for each. For our report, we reviewed documents such as TSA's air cargo security policies and procedures. We also conducted site visits to four category X U.S. commercial airports and one category I U.S. commercial airport that process domestic and inbound air cargo. We selected these airports based on airport size, passenger and air cargo volumes, location, and participation in TSA's screening program. At these airports, we observed screening operations and technologies and interviewed local TSA officials, airport management officials, and representatives from 7 air carriers, 24 freight forwarders, 3 shippers, and 2 handling agents to obtain their views on TSA's system to implement the screening mandate. We selected these air carriers, freight forwarders, shippers, and handling agents based on input from TSA and industry stakeholders. More detailed information about our scope and methodology is included in our June 2010 report. We conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
TSA has taken a number of actions to meet the screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, including creating a voluntary program to allow screening to take place at various points in the air cargo supply chain and mandating that, effective May 1, 2010, 75 percent of all cargo transported on passenger aircraft is screened. However, TSA faces several challenges in developing and implementing a system to screen 100 percent of domestic air cargo, and it is questionable, based on reported screening rates, whether 100 percent of such cargo will be screened by August 2010 without impeding the flow of commerce. Moreover, TSA has made some progress in meeting the screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo, but challenges exist, in part related to TSA's limited ability to regulate foreign entities. TSA does not expect to achieve 100 percent screening of inbound air cargo by the mandated August 2010 deadline. We made five recommendations to TSA to address these challenges. TSA concurred with three of these recommendations, partially concurred with one, and did not concur with the remaining recommendation, which we discuss in more detail later in this statement. TSA has made progress in meeting the 9/11 Commission Act air cargo screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, and has taken several key steps in this effort, such as increasing the amount of domestic cargo subject to screening, creating a voluntary program to allow screening to take place at various points along the air cargo supply chain, and taking steps to test air cargo screening technologies, among other actions. However, TSA faces several challenges in fully developing and implementing a system to screen 100 percent of domestic air cargo, including those related to industry participation and technology.
GAO-10-880T, Aviation Security: Progress Made but Actions Needed to Address Challenges in Meeting the Air Cargo Screening Mandate
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, June 30, 2010:
Aviation Security:
Progress Made but Actions Needed to Address Challenges in Meeting the
Air Cargo Screening Mandate:
Statement of Steve Lord, Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
GAO-10-880T:
[End of section]
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing to
discuss air cargo screening. In 2008, about 7.3 billion pounds of
cargo was transported on U.S. passenger flights--approximately 58
percent of which was transported domestically (domestic cargo) and 42
percent of which was transported on flights arriving in the United
States from a foreign location (inbound cargo).[Footnote 1] The 2009
Christmas Day plot to detonate an explosive device during an
international flight bound for Detroit provided a vivid reminder that
terrorists continue to view passenger aircraft as attractive targets.
According to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the
security threat posed by terrorists introducing explosive devices in
air cargo shipments is significant, and the risk and likelihood of
such an attack directed at passenger aircraft is high.[Footnote 2] To
help enhance the security of air cargo, the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission
Act) mandated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a
system to physically screen 50 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft--
including the domestic and inbound flights of foreign and U.S.
passenger operations--by February 2009, and 100 percent of such cargo
by August 2010.[Footnote 3] The 9/11 Commission Act defines screening
for purposes of the air cargo screening mandate as a physical
examination or nonintrusive methods of assessing whether cargo poses a
threat to transportation security.[Footnote 4] The act also requires
that such a system provide a level of security commensurate with the
level of security for the screening of checked baggage.
According to TSA, the mission of its air cargo security program is to
secure the air cargo transportation system while not unduly impeding
the flow of commerce. Although the mandate is applicable to both
domestic and inbound cargo, TSA stated that it must address the
mandate for domestic and inbound cargo through separate systems
because of differences in its authority to regulate domestic and
international air cargo industry stakeholders. My statement is based
on a report we are publicly releasing today that assesses TSA's
progress and related challenges in meeting the air cargo screening
mandate.[Footnote 5] It addresses the following key issues in our
report: progress TSA has made in meeting the 9/11 Commission Act
screening mandate as it applies to (1) domestic air cargo and (2)
inbound air cargo and related challenges it faces for each.
For our report, we reviewed documents such as TSA's air cargo security
policies and procedures. We also conducted site visits to four
category X U.S. commercial airports and one category I U.S. commercial
airport that process domestic and inbound air cargo.[Footnote 6] We
selected these airports based on airport size, passenger and air cargo
volumes, location, and participation in TSA's screening program. At
these airports, we observed screening operations and technologies and
interviewed local TSA officials, airport management officials, and
representatives from 7 air carriers, 24 freight forwarders, 3
shippers, and 2 handling agents to obtain their views on TSA's system
to implement the screening mandate.[Footnote 7] We selected these air
carriers, freight forwarders, shippers, and handling agents based on
input from TSA and industry stakeholders. More detailed information
about our scope and methodology is included in our June 2010 report.
We conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
In summary, TSA has taken a number of actions to meet the screening
mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, including creating a
voluntary program to allow screening to take place at various points
in the air cargo supply chain and mandating that, effective May 1,
2010, 75 percent of all cargo transported on passenger aircraft is
screened. However, TSA faces several challenges in developing and
implementing a system to screen 100 percent of domestic air cargo, and
it is questionable, based on reported screening rates, whether 100
percent of such cargo will be screened by August 2010 without impeding
the flow of commerce. Moreover, TSA has made some progress in meeting
the screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo, but challenges
exist, in part related to TSA's limited ability to regulate foreign
entities. TSA does not expect to achieve 100 percent screening of
inbound air cargo by the mandated August 2010 deadline. We made five
recommendations to TSA to address these challenges. TSA concurred with
three of these recommendations, partially concurred with one, and did
not concur with the remaining recommendation, which we discuss in more
detail later in this statement.
TSA Has Made Progress toward Screening 100 Percent of Domestic Cargo,
but Remaining Challenges Highlight the Need for a Contingency Plan:
TSA has made progress in meeting the 9/11 Commission Act air cargo
screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo, and has taken
several key steps in this effort, such as increasing the amount of
domestic cargo subject to screening, creating a voluntary program to
allow screening to take place at various points along the air cargo
supply chain, and taking steps to test air cargo screening
technologies, among other actions. However, TSA faces several
challenges in fully developing and implementing a system to screen 100
percent of domestic air cargo, including those related to industry
participation and technology.
Progress Made:
TSA has taken several steps to address the air cargo screening mandate
as it applies to domestic cargo including the following.
TSA increased the amount of domestic cargo subject to screening.
Effective October 1, 2008, TSA established a requirement for 100
percent screening of nonexempt cargo transported on narrow-body
passenger aircraft.[Footnote 8] In 2008, narrow-body flights
transported about 24 percent of all cargo on domestic passenger
flights.[Footnote 9] Effective February 1, 2009, pursuant to the 9/11
Commission Act, TSA also required air carriers to ensure the screening
of 50 percent of all nonexempt air cargo transported on all passenger
aircraft. Furthermore, effective May 1, 2010, air carriers were
required by TSA to ensure that 75 percent of such cargo was screened.
TSA also eliminated or revised most of its screening exemptions for
domestic cargo.
TSA created a voluntary program to facilitate screening throughout the
air cargo supply chain. Since TSA concluded that relying solely on air
carriers to conduct screening would result in significant cargo
backlogs and flight delays, TSA created the voluntary Certified Cargo
Screening Program (CCSP) to allow screening to take place earlier in
the shipping process, prior to delivering the cargo to the air
carrier. Under the CCSP, facilities at various points in the air cargo
supply chain, such as shippers, manufacturers, warehousing entities,
distributors, third-party logistics companies, and freight forwarders
that are located in the United States, may voluntarily apply to TSA to
become certified cargo screening facilities (CCSF). TSA initiated the
CCSP at 18 U.S. airports that process high volumes of air cargo, and
then expanded the program to all U.S. airports in early 2009.
TSA is conducting outreach efforts to air cargo industry stakeholders.
Starting in September 2007, TSA began outreach to freight forwarders
and subsequently expanded its outreach efforts to shippers and other
entities to encourage participation in the CCSP. TSA is focusing its
outreach on particular industries, such as producers of perishable
foods, pharmaceutical and chemical companies, and funeral homes, which
may experience damage to their cargo if it is screened by a freight
forwarder or an air carrier.
TSA is taking steps to test technologies for screening air cargo. To
test select screening technologies among CCSFs, TSA created the Air
Cargo Screening Technology Pilot in January 2008, and selected some of
the nation's largest freight forwarders to use these technologies and
report on their experiences.[Footnote 10] In a separate effort, in
July 2009, DHS's Directorate for Science and Technology completed the
Air Cargo Explosives Detection Pilot Program that tested the
performance of select baggage screening technologies for use in
screening air cargo at three U.S. airports. In November 2008, in
addition to the canine and physical search screening methods permitted
by TSA to screen air cargo, TSA issued to air carriers and CCSFs a
list of X-ray, explosives trace detection (ETD), and explosives
detection systems (EDS) models that the agency approved for screening
air cargo until August 3, 2010.[Footnote 11] In March 2009, TSA
initiated a qualification process to test these and other technologies
that it plans to allow air carriers and CCSP participants to use in
meeting the screening mandate against TSA technical requirements.
TSA expanded its explosives detection canine program. TSA has taken
steps to expand the use of TSA-certified explosives detection canine
teams. According to TSA, in fiscal year 2009, TSA canine teams
screened over 145 million pounds of cargo, which represents a small
portion of domestic air cargo. As of February 2010, TSA had 113
dedicated air cargo screening canine teams--operating in 20 major
airports--and is in the process of adding 7 additional canine teams.
TSA also deployed canine teams to assist the Pacific Northwest cherry
industry during its peak harvest season from May through July 2009, to
help air carriers and CCSFs handling this perishable commodity to meet
the 50 percent screening requirement without disrupting the flow of
commerce.
TSA established a system to verify that screening is being conducted
at the mandated levels. The agency established a system to collect and
analyze data from screening entities to verify that requisite levels
for domestic cargo are being met. Effective February 2009, TSA
adjusted air carrier reporting requirements and added CCSF reporting
requirements to include monthly screening reports on the number and
weight of shipments screened.
Challenges Facing TSA:
TSA faces industry participation, technology, planning, oversight, and
other challenges in meeting the air cargo screening mandate as it
applies to domestic cargo.
Industry Participation. Although TSA is relying on the voluntary
participation of industry stakeholders to meet the screening mandate,
far fewer shippers and independent CCSFs have joined the program than
TSA had targeted. As shown in figure 1, TSA officials have estimated
that an ideal mix of screening to achieve the 100 percent mandate as
it applies to domestic cargo without impeding the flow of commerce
would be about one-third of cargo weight screened by air carriers, one-
third by freight forwarders, and one-third by shippers and independent
CCSFs.[Footnote 12]
Figure 1: TSA's Reported and Ideal Screening Percentage Breakdowns for
Domestic Air Cargo Transported on Passenger Aircraft from February
2009 through March 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Date: February 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 19%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 39%;
Total: 59%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: March 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 2%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 15%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 44%;
Total: 61%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: April 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 19%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 42%;
Total: 62%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: May 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 12%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 49%;
Total: 62%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: June 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 15%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 46%;
Total: 62%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: July 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 22%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 39%;
Total: 62%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: August 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 22%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 39%;
Total: 62%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: September 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 23%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 37%;
Total: 62%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: October 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 24%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 37%;
Total: 62%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: November 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 1%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 26%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 38%;
Total: 65%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: December 2009;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 2%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 28%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 35%;
Total: 65%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: January 2010;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 2%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 29%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 33%;
Total: 64%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: February 2010;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 2%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 30%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 35%;
Total: 67%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50%.
Date: March 2010;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 2%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 32%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 35%;
Total: 67%;
TSA-required screening levels: 50% (75% required as of May 2010).
Date: TSA's ideal screening breakdown in August 2010;
Shipper and independent CCSFs: 33%;
Freight forwarder CCSFs: 33%;
Air carriers, TSA canines, and TSA staff: 33%;
Total: 100%;
TSA-required screening levels: 100%.
Source: GAO analysis of TSA screening data and information.
Note: Totals for reported and ideal screening percentage breakdowns
may not add up precisely because of rounding.
[End of figure]
To achieve TSA's ideal mix of screening by August 2010, shipper and
independent CCSF screening efforts would need to increase by over
sixteenfold. As shown in figure 1, the total percentage of reported
screened cargo rose on average by less than a percentage point per
month (from 59 to 68 percent) from February 2009 through March 2010.
[Footnote 13] At these rates, it is questionable whether TSA's
screening system will achieve 100 percent screening of domestic cargo
by August 2010 without impeding the flow of commerce. Effective May 1,
2010, TSA requires that 75 percent of air cargo transported on
passenger aircraft be screened. However, even if this requirement is
met, an additional 25 percent of domestic air cargo would still need
to be screened in the 3 months prior to the August 2010 deadline,
including some of the most challenging types of cargo to screen, such
as unit load device (ULD) pallets and containers.
TSA and industry officials reported that several factors, such as lack
of economic and regulatory incentives, are contributing to low shipper
participation levels. TSA and the domestic passenger air carrier and
freight forwarder industry association officials we interviewed stated
that many shippers and freight forwarders are not incurring
significant screening costs from air carriers. This decreases the
financial pressure on the entities to join the CCSP and invest
resources into screening cargo, factors that are making TSA's outreach
efforts more challenging.
Screening Technology. There is currently no technology approved or
qualified by TSA to screen cargo once it is loaded onto a ULD pallet
or container--both of which are common means of transporting air cargo
on wide-body passenger aircraft. Cargo transported on wide-body
passenger aircraft makes up 76 percent of domestic air cargo shipments
transported on passenger aircraft.[Footnote 14] Prior to May 1, 2010,
canine screening was the only screening method, other than physical
search, approved by TSA to screen such cargo. However, TSA officials
still have some concerns about the effectiveness of the canine teams,
and effective May 1, 2010, the agency no longer allows canine teams to
be used for primary screening of ULD pallets and containers.[Footnote
15] Canine teams still may be used for secondary screening of ULD
pallets and containers; however, secondary screening does not count
toward meeting the air cargo screening mandate.
In addition, TSA is working to complete qualification testing of air
cargo screening technologies; thus, until all stages of qualification
testing are concluded, the agency may not have reasonable assurance
that the technologies that air carriers and program participants are
currently allowed to use to screen air cargo are effective.
Qualification tests are designed to verify that a technology system
meets the technical requirements specified by TSA. Because of the
mandated deadlines, TSA is conducting qualification testing to
determine which screening technologies are effective at the same time
that air carriers are using these technologies to meet the mandated
requirement to screen air cargo transported on passenger aircraft.
While we recognize that certain circumstances, such as mandated
deadlines, require expedited deployment of technologies, our prior
work has shown that programs with immature technologies have
experienced significant cost and schedule growth.[Footnote 16] We
reported that these technology challenges suggest the need for TSA to
consider a contingency plan to meet the screening mandate without
unduly affecting the flow of commerce.
Contingency Planning. Although TSA faces industry participation and
technology challenges that could impede the CCSP's success and the
agency's efforts to meet the 100 percent screening mandate by August
2010, the agency has not developed a contingency plan that considers
alternatives to address these challenges. Without adequate CCSP
participation, industry may not be able to screen enough cargo prior
to its arrival at the airport to maintain the flow of commerce while
meeting the mandate. Likewise, without technology solutions for
screening cargo in a ULD pallet or container, industry may not have
the capability to effectively screen 100 percent of air cargo without
affecting the flow of commerce. We have previously reported that a
comprehensive planning process, including contingency planning, is
essential to help an agency meet current and future capacity
challenges.[Footnote 17] Alternatives could include, but are not
limited to, mandating CCSP participation for certain members of the
air cargo supply chain--instead of relying on their voluntary
participation--and requiring the screening of some or all cargo before
it is loaded onto ULD pallets and containers. In the report being
released today, we recommended that TSA develop a contingency plan for
meeting the mandate as it applies to domestic cargo that considers
alternatives to address potential CCSP participation shortfalls and
screening technology limitations. TSA did not concur with this
recommendation and stated that a contingency plan is unnecessary since
effective August 1, 2010, 100 percent of domestic cargo transported on
passenger aircraft will be required to be screened. The agency also
stated that there is no feasible contingency plan that can be
implemented by TSA that does not compromise security or create
disparities in the availability of screening resources. However, we
continue to believe that there are feasible alternatives that TSA
should consider to address potential CCSP participation shortfalls and
screening technology limitations. Thus, it is prudent that TSA
consider developing a contingency plan that would allow for the
security and legitimate flow of air cargo.
Inspection Resources. While TSA has amended its Regulatory Activities
Plan to include inspections of CCSP participants, the agency has not
completed its staffing study to determine how many inspectors will be
necessary to provide oversight of the additional program participants
when the 100 percent screening mandate goes into effect. According to
TSA, the agency's staffing study is continuing through fiscal year
2010 and is therefore not yet available to provide guidance in helping
to plan for inspection resources needed to provide oversight.
According to our analysis of TSA data, in the next year, inspectors
will need to at least double their comprehensive inspections of CCSFs
to reach the agency's inspection goals. We recommended that TSA create
milestones to help ensure completion of the staffing study. TSA
concurred and stated that as part of the staffing study, the agency is
working to develop a model to identify the number of required
transportation security inspectors and that this effort would be
completed in the fall of 2010. If this model includes an analysis of
the resources needed to provide CCSP oversight under various
scenarios, it will address the intent of our recommendation.
Reported Screening Data. While TSA reported to Congress that industry
achieved the February 2009 50 percent screening deadline domestically,
questions exist about the reliability of the screening data, which are
self-reported by industry representatives, because TSA does not have a
mechanism to verify the accuracy of the data reported by the industry.
We recommended that TSA develop a mechanism to verify the accuracy of
all screening data through random checks or other practical means. TSA
stated that verifying the accuracy of domestic screening data will
continue to be a challenge because there is no means to cross-
reference local screening logs--which include screening information on
specific shipments--with screening reports submitted by air carriers
to TSA that do not contain such information. However, TSA could
consider a quality review mechanism similar to the compliance
measurement program used by CBP, which includes regular quality
reviews to ensure accuracy in findings and management oversight to
validate results.
In-Transit Cargo. Cargo that has already been transported on one leg
of a passenger flight--known as in-transit cargo--may be subsequently
transferred to another passenger flight without undergoing screening.
According to TSA officials, though the agency does not have a precise
figure, industry estimates suggest that about 30 percent of domestic
cargo is transferred from an inbound flight. TSA officials stated that
transporting in-transit cargo without screening could pose a
vulnerability, but as of February 2010, the agency was not planning to
require in-transit cargo transferred from an inbound flight to be
physically screened because of the logistical difficulties associated
with screening cargo that is transferred from one flight to another.
We recommended that TSA develop a plan with milestones for how and
when it intends to require the screening of in-transit cargo. TSA
concurred with our recommendation and stated that the agency has
implemented changes, effective August 1, 2010, that will require 100
percent of in-transit cargo to be screened unless it can otherwise be
verified as screened. Because this is a significant change and
potentially operationally challenging, it will be important to closely
monitor the industry's understanding and implementation of this
requirement to help ensure that 100 percent screening of in-transit
cargo is being conducted.
TSA Has Made Progress but Faces Several Challenges and Lacks a Plan
for Achieving 100 Percent Screening of Inbound Cargo:
TSA has taken steps to increase the percentage of inbound cargo
transported on passenger aircraft that is screened, but the agency has
not developed a plan, including milestones, for meeting the mandate as
it applies to inbound cargo. Consequently, TSA officials have stated
that the agency will not be able to meet the mandate as it applies to
inbound cargo by the August 2010 deadline.
Steps Taken:
Steps TSA has taken to increase the percentage of inbound air cargo
that is screened include the following:
* Revising its requirements for foreign and U.S. air carrier security
programs, effective May 1, 2010, to generally require air carriers to
screen a certain percentage of shrink-wrapped and banded inbound cargo
and 100 percent of inbound cargo that is not shrink-wrapped or banded.
[Footnote 18] According to TSA, implementation of this requirement
will result in the screening of 100 percent of inbound cargo
transported on narrow-body aircraft since none of this cargo is shrink-
wrapped or banded.[Footnote 19]
* Obtaining information from foreign countries on their respective air
cargo screening levels and practices to help assess the rigor and
quality of foreign screening practices.
* Working to harmonize security standards with those of foreign
nations.[Footnote 20]
Challenges TSA Faces:
According to TSA, screening inbound air cargo poses unique challenges,
related, in part, to TSA's limited ability to regulate foreign
entities. As such, TSA officials stated that the agency is focusing
its air cargo screening efforts on domestic cargo and on screening
elevated-risk inbound cargo as it works to address the challenges it
faces in screening 100 percent of inbound cargo. In April 2007, we
reported that TSA's screening exemptions for inbound cargo could pose
a risk to the air cargo supply chain and recommended that TSA assess
whether these exemptions pose an unacceptable vulnerability and, if
necessary, address these vulnerabilities.[Footnote 21] TSA agreed with
our recommendation, but beyond its requirement to screen 100 percent
of inbound cargo transported on narrow-body aircraft and a certain
percentage of shrink-wrapped or banded inbound cargo, has not
reviewed, revised, or eliminated inbound screening exemptions, and did
not provide a time frame for doing so. We continue to believe that TSA
should assess whether these exemptions pose an unacceptable security
risk.
In addition, identifying the precise level of screening being
conducted on inbound air cargo is difficult because TSA lacks a
mechanism to obtain actual data on all screening that is being
conducted on inbound air cargo. TSA officials estimate that 55 percent
of inbound cargo by weight is currently being screened and that 65
percent of inbound cargo by weight will be screened by August 2010.
However, these estimates are based on the current screening
requirements of certain countries and are not based on actual data
collected from air carriers or other entities, such as foreign
governments, on what percentage of cargo is actually being screened.
[Footnote 22] We recommended that TSA develop a mechanism to verify
the accuracy of all screening data through random checks or other
practical means and obtain actual data on all inbound screening. TSA
concurred in part with our recommendation, stating that as of May 1,
2010, the agency issued changes to air carriers' standard security
programs that require air carriers to report inbound cargo screening
data to TSA. However, as noted in our report, these requirements apply
to air carriers and the screening that they conduct and not to the
screening conducted by other entities, such as foreign governments.
Thus, TSA will continue to rely in part on estimates to report inbound
cargo screening levels. TSA officials stated that it may be
challenging to obtain screening data from some foreign governments and
other entities that conduct cargo screening, but TSA has not developed
a plan for how it could obtain these data. We recognize that it may be
challenging for TSA to obtain cargo screening data from foreign
governments; however, similar to domestic reporting requirements, the
agency could require air carriers to report on cargo screening for all
inbound cargo they transport, including the screening conducted by
other entities.
Moreover, the 9/11 Commission Act requires the establishment of a
system to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger
aircraft, including inbound cargo. As we have reported in our prior
work, a successful project plan--such as a plan that would be used to
establish such a system--should consider all phases of the project and
clearly state schedules and deadlines.[Footnote 23] TSA officials
reported that the agency is unable to identify a timeline for meeting
the mandate for inbound cargo, stating that its efforts are long term,
given the extensive work it must conduct with foreign governments and
associations. However, interim milestones could help the agency
provide reasonable assurance to Congress that it is taking steps to
meet the mandate as it applies to inbound cargo. In our June 2010
report, we recommended that TSA develop a plan with milestones for how
and when the agency intends to meet the mandate as it applies to
inbound cargo. TSA concurred with our recommendation and stated that
the agency is drafting milestones as part of a plan that will
generally require air carriers to conduct 100 percent screening by a
specific date. If implemented effectively, this plan will address the
intent of our recommendation.
Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my statement. I look forward to
answering any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee
may have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For questions about this statement, please contact Stephen M. Lord at
(202) 512-4379 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony are Steve D. Morris, Assistant Director; Tina Cheng; Barbara
A. Guffy; David K. Hooper; Richard B. Hung; Stanley J. Kostyla; Linda
S. Miller; Yanina Golburt Samuels; and Rebecca Kuhlmann Taylor.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] For the purposes of this statement, domestic cargo refers to cargo
transported by air within the United States and from the United States
to a foreign location by both U.S. and foreign air carriers, and
inbound cargo refers to cargo transported by both U.S. and foreign air
carriers from a foreign location to the United States. These cargo
statistics were provided by the Transportation Security Administration
from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
[2] Specific threat details are classified and are not discussed in
this statement. Generally, the threat that has been identified by TSA
is that of an improvised explosive device.
[3] Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1602, 121 Stat. 266, 477-80 (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 44901(g)).
[4] See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)(5). For the purposes of this statement,
physical screening is generally used to describe screening for
purposes of the air cargo screening mandate.
[5] GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Has Made Progress but Faces Challenges
in Meeting the Statutory Mandate for Screening Air Cargo on Passenger
Aircraft, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-446]
(Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2010).
[6] There are about 450 commercial airports in the United States. TSA
classifies airports into one of five categories (X, I, II, III, and
IV) based on various factors, such as the total number of takeoffs and
landings annually, the extent to which passengers are screened at the
airport, and other special security considerations. In general,
category X airports have the largest number of passenger boardings,
and category IV airports have the smallest.
[7] For the purposes of this statement, the term freight forwarder
only includes those freight forwarders that are regulated by TSA, also
referred to as indirect air carriers. A freight forwarder is a company
that consolidates cargo from multiple shippers onto a master air
waybill--a manifest of the consolidated shipment--and delivers the
shipment to air carriers for transport.
[8] TSA exempts some categories of air cargo from physical screening
and requires alternative methods of screening, such as verifying
shipper and cargo information and visually inspecting the cargo
shipment, rather than opening the shipment and physically searching
its contents or screening it with technology. For the purposes of this
statement, the phrase "exempt cargo" and the word "exemption" refer to
cargo that is subject to such alternative screening measures. Narrow-
body aircraft, such as Boeing 737s and Airbus 320s, are defined by
fuselage diameter, and most narrow-body aircraft have only one aisle.
Narrow-body aircraft that fly in the United States do not carry unit
load devices (ULD) that allow packages to be consolidated in a
container or pallet. Wide-body aircraft are also defined by fuselage
diameter and can carry ULDs.
[9] According to statistics provided by TSA from the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, narrow-body aircraft make up 97 percent of
domestic passenger flights and transport more than 90 percent of
passengers traveling on domestic passenger flights.
[10] Initially, the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot was limited
to high-volume freight forwarders (i.e., freight forwarders processing
at least 200 shipments annually per location that contain cargo
consolidated from multiple shippers). However, in November 2008, TSA
sought additional high-volume freight forwarders and independent cargo
screening facilities to apply for the pilot. Moreover, entities that
do not participate in the pilot will not receive TSA funding to
purchase screening technology.
[11] ETD requires human operators to collect samples of items to be
screened with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any
traces of explosive material. EDS uses computer-aided tomography X-
rays to examine objects inside baggage and identify the characteristic
signatures of threat explosives. In December 2009, TSA extended the
expiration date of the approved technologies to January 2012.
[12] The CCSP allows air cargo industry stakeholders, such as an air
cargo handling agent, to establish independent cargo screening
facilities to provide screening services for shippers or freight
forwarders that have not joined the program and do not want the air
carriers to screen their cargo. These independent facilities screen
cargo for a fee, according to CCSP guidelines. For the purposes of
this statement, we refer to independent cargo screening facilities as
independent CCSFs.
[13] The screening percentages in fig. 1 have been rounded to the
nearest percentage point. The actual percentages for March 2010 sum to
68 percent.
[14] Cargo may be screened before it is loaded onto ULD pallets or
containers.
[15] TSA canine teams conduct primary and secondary screening of
cargo. Primary screening counts toward meeting the air cargo screening
mandate. Secondary screening provides spot checks of the screening
already conducted by air carriers and CCSFs.
[16] See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD's
Weapon Programs Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-543T] (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 1, 2009).
[17] GAO, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center: Capacity Planning
and Management Oversight Need Improvement, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-736] (Washington, D.C.: July 24,
2003).
[18] Details on TSA's screening requirements are Sensitive Security
Information and are not discussed in this statement. Prior to May 1,
2010, TSA generally required air carriers to screen 50 percent of
nonexempt inbound cargo transported on passenger aircraft and a
certain percentage of all inbound cargo transported on passenger
aircraft. Banded cargo is cargo with heavy-duty metal, plastic, or
nylon bands that secure all sides of the cargo shipment or secure the
cargo shipment to a skid.
[19] According to statistics provided by TSA from the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, in 2008, narrow-body flights made up 69
percent of inbound flights and transported 45 percent of inbound
passengers.
[20] The term harmonization is used to describe countries' efforts to
coordinate their security practices to enhance security and increase
efficiency by avoiding duplication of effort. Harmonization efforts
can include countries mutually recognizing and accepting each other's
existing practices--which could represent somewhat different
approaches to achieve the same outcome--as well as working to develop
mutually acceptable uniform standards.
[21] GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air
Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-660] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,
2007).
[22] According to TSA officials, the agency does not know the
screening requirements for every country that transports air cargo
into the United States. TSA assumes that other countries are in
compliance, at a minimum, with TSA's regulation that a certain
percentage of inbound air cargo be screened.
[23] GAO, 2010 Census: Cost and Design Issues Need to Be Addressed
Soon, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-37] (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 15, 2004).
[End of section]
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