Combating Nuclear Smuggling
DHS Has Made Some Progress but Not Yet Completed a Strategic Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection Efforts or Closed Identified Gaps Gao ID: GAO-10-883T June 30, 2010In April 2005, a Presidential Directive established the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to enhance and coordinate federal, state, and local efforts to combat nuclear smuggling abroad and domestically. DNDO was directed to develop, in coordination with the departments of Defense, Energy, and State, an enhanced global nuclear detection system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities. (DNDO refers to this system as an architecture.) DNDO is to implement the domestic portion of the architecture. Federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings, and DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection strategies along other pathways. Over the past 7 years, GAO has issued numerous recommendations on nuclear or radiological detection to the Secretary of Homeland Security, most recently in January 2009. This testimony discusses the status of DHS efforts to (1) complete the deployment of radiation detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the United States at ports of entry, (2) prevent smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials via the critical gaps DNDO identified, and (3) develop a strategic plan for the global nuclear detection architecture. GAO's testimony is based on prior work that was updated by obtaining DHS documents and interviewing DHS officials.
DHS has made significant progress in both deploying radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo and conveyances entering the United States through fixed land and sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials since GAO's 2006 report. While DHS reports it scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the United States through land borders and major seaports, it has made less progress scanning for radiation (1) in railcars entering the United States from Canada and Mexico; (2) in international air cargo; and (3) for international commercial aviation aircraft, passengers, or baggage. DHS efforts to prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials into the United States through gaps DNDO identified in developing the nuclear detection architecture remain largely developmental since GAO's 2009 report. The gaps DHS identified include land border areas between ports of entry into the United States, international general aviation, and small maritime craft such as recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels. These gaps are important because of their size, volume of traffic, and the difficulty of deploying available radiological and nuclear detection technologies. DHS's actions to address these gaps consist primarily of efforts to develop, test, and deploy radiation detection equipment; conduct studies or analyses to identify and address particular threats or gaps; develop new procedures to guide scanning for radiation; and develop and learn from pilot programs. DHS does not yet have a strategic plan for the global nuclear detection architecture, but DHS officials said they began working on a plan earlier this year and expect to complete it by fall 2010--2 years after GAO last recommended this to DNDO--and more than 7 years after we first identified the need for a comprehensive plan in October 2002. The lack of a strategic plan has limited DHS's efforts to complete such an architecture, because although each agency with a role in combating nuclear smuggling has its own planning documents, without an overarching strategic plan, it is difficult to address the gaps and move to a more comprehensive global nuclear detection strategy. DNDO's 4-year effort to develop an advanced radiation detection monitor is an example of the consequences of not having a strategic plan and not reaching consensus on such a plan with other federal agencies. In GAO's view, the proposed deployment of this monitor distracted DNDO from its mission to fully deploy the architecture and close the gaps it identified. Also, in 2006 GAO recommended that the decision to deploy this monitor be based on an analysis of both benefits and costs--which GAO later estimated at over $2 billion--and a determination of whether any additional detection capability provided by the monitor was worth its additional cost. DNDO proceeded with advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) testing without fully completing such an analysis. Further, DNDO focused this monitor deployment effort on replacing components of the architecture where a radiation detection system was already in place--at established ports of entry--and shifting its focus away from closing the gaps it identified in the architecture.
GAO-10-883T, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Some Progress but Not Yet Completed a Strategic Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection Efforts or Closed Identified Gaps
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Testimony:
Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Wednesday, June 30, 2010:
Combating Nuclear Smuggling:
DHS Has Made Some Progress but Not Yet Completed a Strategic Plan for
Its Global Nuclear Detection Efforts or Closed Identified Gaps:
Statement of Gene Aloise, Director,
Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-10-883T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-GAO-10-883T, a testimony before the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In April 2005, a Presidential Directive established the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to enhance and coordinate federal, state, and local
efforts to combat nuclear smuggling abroad and domestically. DNDO was
directed to develop, in coordination with the departments of Defense,
Energy, and State, an enhanced global nuclear detection system of
radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities. (DNDO
refers to this system as an architecture.) DNDO is to implement the
domestic portion of the architecture. Federal efforts to combat
nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of entry,
such as seaports and land border crossings, and DNDO has also been
examining nuclear detection strategies along other pathways.
Over the past 7 years, GAO has issued numerous recommendations on
nuclear or radiological detection to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, most recently in January 2009. This testimony discusses the
status of DHS efforts to (1) complete the deployment of radiation
detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the
United States at ports of entry, (2) prevent smuggling of nuclear or
radiological materials via the critical gaps DNDO identified, and (3)
develop a strategic plan for the global nuclear detection
architecture. GAO‘s testimony is based on prior work that was updated
by obtaining DHS documents and interviewing DHS officials.
What GAO Found:
DHS has made significant progress in both deploying radiation
detection equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo and
conveyances entering the United States through fixed land and sea
ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials since GAO‘s 2006
report. While DHS reports it scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and
conveyances entering the United States through land borders and major
seaports, it has made less progress scanning for radiation (1) in
railcars entering the United States from Canada and Mexico; (2) in
international air cargo; and (3) for international commercial aviation
aircraft, passengers, or baggage.
DHS efforts to prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological
materials into the United States through gaps DNDO identified in
developing the nuclear detection architecture remain largely
developmental since GAO‘s 2009 report. The gaps DHS identified include
land border areas between ports of entry into the United States,
international general aviation, and small maritime craft such as
recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels. These gaps are
important because of their size, volume of traffic, and the difficulty
of deploying available radiological and nuclear detection
technologies. DHS‘s actions to address these gaps consist primarily of
efforts to develop, test, and deploy radiation detection equipment;
conduct studies or analyses to identify and address particular threats
or gaps; develop new procedures to guide scanning for radiation; and
develop and learn from pilot programs.
DHS does not yet have a strategic plan for the global nuclear
detection architecture, but DHS officials said they began working on a
plan earlier this year and expect to complete it by fall 2010––2 years
after GAO last recommended this to DNDO”and more than 7 years after we
first identified the need for a comprehensive plan in October 2002.
The lack of a strategic plan has limited DHS‘s efforts to complete
such an architecture, because although each agency with a role in
combating nuclear smuggling has its own planning documents, without an
overarching strategic plan, it is difficult to address the gaps and
move to a more comprehensive global nuclear detection strategy. DNDO‘s
4-year effort to develop an advanced radiation detection monitor is an
example of the consequences of not having a strategic plan and not
reaching consensus on such a plan with other federal agencies. In GAO‘
s view, the proposed deployment of this monitor distracted DNDO from
its mission to fully deploy the architecture and close the gaps it
identified. Also, in 2006 GAO recommended that the decision to deploy
this monitor be based on an analysis of both benefits and costs”which
GAO later estimated at over $2 billion”and a determination of whether
any additional detection capability provided by the monitor was worth
its additional cost. DNDO proceeded with ASP testing without fully
completing such an analysis. Further, DNDO focused this monitor
deployment effort on replacing components of the architecture where a
radiation detection system was already in place––at established ports
of entry––and shifting its focus away from closing the gaps it
identified in the architecture.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-883T] or key
components. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 202-512-3841
or aloisee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office's (DNDO) efforts to develop a global nuclear
detection architecture--an integrated system of radiation detection
equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in
foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States--
and to provide an update on the deployment of radiation detection
equipment at U.S. borders. Preventing terrorists from using
radiological or nuclear material to carry out an attack in the United
States is a top national priority. DNDO, within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), is charged with enhancing and coordinating
federal, state, and local efforts to prevent radiological and nuclear
attacks.[Footnote 1] Among other things, DNDO is required to
coordinate with other federal agencies to develop an enhanced global
nuclear detection architecture. It is also responsible for developing,
acquiring, and deploying radiation detection equipment to support the
efforts of DHS and other federal agencies. While federal efforts to
combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of
entry, such as seaports and land border crossings, DNDO has also been
examining nuclear detection strategies along other potential pathways
and has identified several gaps in the architecture, including (1)
land border areas between ports of entry into the United States; (2)
international general aviation; and (3) small maritime craft, such as
recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels.
Even before DNDO's inception in 2005, we were highlighting the need
for a more comprehensive strategy for nuclear detection. In 2002, we
reported on the need for a comprehensive plan for installing radiation
detection equipment, such as radiation portal monitors, at all U.S.
border crossings and ports of entry that (1) addresses vulnerabilities
and risks; (2) identifies the complement of radiation detection
equipment that should be used at each type of border entry point--air,
rail, land, and sea--and whether equipment could be immediately
deployed; (3) identifies longer-term radiation detection needs; and
(4) develops measures to ensure that the equipment is adequately
maintained.[Footnote 2] More recently, in July 2008, we testified that
DNDO had still not developed an overarching strategic plan,[Footnote
3] and recommended that DHS coordinate with the Departments of
Defense, Energy, and State to develop one. In January 2009, we
recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a
strategic plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear detection
strategy to help ensure the success of initiatives aimed at closing
gaps and vulnerabilities.[Footnote 4] We stated that this plan should
focus on, among other things, establishing time frames and costs for
the three gaps DNDO had identified--land border areas between ports of
entry, aviation, and small maritime vessels. DHS agreed with the
recommendation that we made in our 2008 testimony on the need for an
overarching strategic plan to guide future efforts to combat nuclear
smuggling and move toward a more comprehensive global nuclear
detection strategy.
In addition, since 2006, we have been reporting on longstanding
problems with DNDO's efforts to deploy advanced spectroscopic portal
(ASP) radiation detection monitors, a more advanced and significantly
more expensive type of radiation portal monitor to replace the
polyvinyl toluene (PVT) portal monitors in many locations that the
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), an agency within DHS, currently
uses to screen cargo at ports of entry.[Footnote 5] We have issued
seven reports and testified before Congress five times identifying
problems with the cost and performance of the ASPs and the lack of
rigor in testing this equipment. For example, we found that tests DNDO
conducted in early 2007 used biased test methods that enhanced the
apparent performance of ASPs and did not use critical CBP operating
procedures that are fundamental to the performance of current
radiation detectors.[Footnote 6] In addition, in 2008 we estimated the
lifecycle cost of each standard cargo version of the ASP (including
deployment costs) to be about $822,000, compared with about $308,000
for the PVT standard cargo portal monitor, and the total program cost
for DNDO's latest plan for deploying radiation portal monitors to be
about $2 billion. Based in part on our work, DHS informed this
committee in February 2010, after spending over $224 million, that the
department had scaled back its plans for development and use of ASP
technology. However, this $224 million figure does not include the
considerable cost of physical testing of ASPs at national labs, the
Nevada Test Site, and field validation at working ports of entry at
land borders and seaports. We have asked DNDO for this information,
and DNDO officials are in the process of providing it to us.
As I will discuss today, while some progress has been made, DHS and
other federal agencies have yet to fully address critical gaps in the
global nuclear detection architecture. Specifically, my testimony
discusses the status of DHS efforts to (1) complete the deployment of
radiation detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances
entering the United States at ports of entry, (2) prevent smuggling of
nuclear or radiological materials via the critical gaps DNDO
identified, and (3) develop a strategic plan for the global nuclear
detection architecture.
My testimony is based on our prior work on U.S. government efforts to
detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials
from October 2002 through January 2009,[Footnote 7] and details on the
scope and methodology for those reviews are available in our published
reports. With information from DHS officials, we updated our prior
work on (1) DHS's deployment of radiation detection equipment since we
last reported on this topic in 2006 and (2) DHS efforts to develop a
strategic plan since we last reported on this topic in 2009. We
conducted the work for this performance audit in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
DHS Scans Almost All Cargo and Conveyances Entering the United States
through Land Borders and Major Seaports but Is Still Developing
Options to More Systematically Scan Rail, Air Cargo, and Commercial
Aviation:
DHS has made significant progress in deploying both radiation
detection equipment and developing procedures to scan cargo and
conveyances entering the United States through fixed land and sea
ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials. Specifically,
DHS has deployed nearly two-thirds of the more than 2,100 radiation
portal monitors identified in its deployment plan--over 1,400--but
needs to deploy more than 700 more to complete the plan. According to
DHS officials, the department scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo
and conveyances entering the United States through land borders and
major seaports. However, DHS has made less progress scanning for
radiation (1) in railcars entering the United States from Canada and
Mexico; (2) in international air cargo; and (3) for international
commercial aviation aircraft, passengers, or baggage.
Land Ports of Entry:
According to DHS officials, since November 2009 almost all non-rail
land ports of entry have been equipped with one or more PVTs. Of the
over 1,400 radiation portal monitors deployed, 885 PVTs have been
deployed along the northern and southern borders of the lower 48
states to all but a few non-rail ports of entry. At present, 100
percent of all cargo, conveyances, drivers, and passengers driving
into the United States through commercial lanes at land borders are
scanned for radiation, as are more than 99 percent of all personally
operated vehicles (non-commercial passenger cars and light trucks),
drivers, and passengers.
Seaports:
According to DHS officials, the department now scans nearly all
containerized cargo entering the U.S. seaports for nuclear and
radiological materials. Specifically, in addition to the PVTs deployed
for land ports of entry, DHS has deployed 444 PVTs to major American
seaports--including the largest seaports accounting for the majority
of cargo. However, some smaller seaports that receive cargo may not be
equipped with PVTs. DHS officials stated that current deployment plans
have been in place to address all the remaining gaps in the deployment
of PVTs to seaports but that current and future budget realities
require a complete re-planning of the deployment schedule.
International Rail:
At present there is limited systematic radiation scanning of the
roughly 4,800 loaded railcars in approximately 120 trains entering the
United States each day from Canada and Mexico through 31 rail ports of
entry. Much of what scanning for radioactive materials takes place at
these ports of entry is conducted with portable, hand-held radioactive
isotope identification devices (RIID). Such scans are triggered when,
for example, anomalous readings are detected from imaging scans of
rail car contents. According to DHS officials, international rail
traffic represents one of the most difficult challenges for radiation
detection systems due to the nature of trains and the need to develop
close cooperation with officials in Mexico and Canada. In addition,
there are unique operational challenges in this environment due to the
length of the trains (up to 2 miles), the distance required to stop
moving trains, and the difficulties in separating alarming cars for
further examination. Furthermore, DHS officials told us that rail
companies resist doing things that might slow down rail traffic and
typically own the land where DHS would need to establish stations for
primary and secondary screening. Moreover, DHS officials said that it
takes time to develop the necessary close cooperation with officials
in Mexico and Canada and that an effective solution would require
scanning of at least some rail traffic on Mexican or Canadian soil,
before a train enters the United States. As a result, DHS is only in
the early stages of developing the procedures and technology to
feasibly scan international rail traffic. DHS is currently undertaking
an International Rail Threat and Gap Study to determine the most
promising radiation detection approach. DHS officials also told us
that implementing the results of this study is subject to the
availability of adequate funding.
International Air Cargo and Commercial Aviation:
DHS is in the early stages of addressing the challenges of scanning
for radioactive materials presented by air cargo and commercial
aviation. At present DHS is scanning for radioactive materials at
certain major international airports in the United States, and has
deployed some of the PVTs in its plans. It plans to deploy more PVTs
by the end of 2011.
International Air Cargo. At present, DHS officials are developing
plans to increase their capacity to scan for radioactive materials in
international air cargo conveyed on commercial airlines. DHS officials
stated that their experience scanning air cargo at a few major
international airports in the United States has helped them develop
scanning procedures and inform current and future deployment
strategies for both fixed and mobile radiation detection equipment.
However, these officials told us that scanning air cargo planes is a
challenge because of the lack of natural choke points in airports
where fixed detection equipment could be deployed. They believe that
further operational experience and research is necessary before they
can develop practicable mobile scanning strategies and procedures.
Until solutions to these challenges can be found, DHS's goal of
scanning 99 percent of air cargo at 33 international airports by 2014
is currently on hold. According to DHS officials, whatever scanning
for radioactive materials occurs at these 33 airports is currently
conducted with hand-held detectors.
International Commercial Aviation. As part of a pilot program, DHS is
developing plans to effectively scan commercial aviation aircraft,
passengers, and baggage for radioactive materials.
DHS's Efforts to Prevent Smuggling of Nuclear and Radiological
Materials into the United States via the Gaps DNDO Identified Are
Still in the Early Stages of Development:
DHS efforts to prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological
materials into the United States through the critical gaps DNDO
identified--land border areas between ports of entry, international
general aviation, and small maritime craft--remain largely
developmental. These pathways are important because dangerous
quantities of nuclear and radiological material can be small and
portable enough to be carried across land borders by vehicles or
pedestrians, on most private aircraft, or by small maritime craft.
In addition, these pathways are challenging because of their size,
volume of traffic, and the difficulty of deploying available
radiological and nuclear detection capabilities and technologies. For
example, the United States has more than 6,000 miles of land border
with many locations outside of established ports of entry where people
and vehicles can enter the United States. In the maritime environment,
a Coast Guard risk assessment revealed that small boats pose a greater
threat for nuclear smuggling than shipping containers. There are at
least 13 million registered domestic pleasure craft in the United
States and 110,000 commercial fishing vessels. These small boats have
traditionally been used to smuggle drugs and people but could be used
to smuggle nuclear or radiological material.
DHS's actions to address these gaps consist primarily of efforts to
develop, test, and deploy current generation or newly developed
radiation detection equipment; conduct studies or analyses to identify
and address particular threats or gaps; develop new procedures to
guide scanning for radiation in pathways where no scanning had
occurred before; and develop and learn from pilot programs.
Land Border Areas between Ports of Entry:
DHS is taking a number of steps it believes will improve its odds of
deterring or detecting attempts to smuggle nuclear or radiological
materials across the more than 6,000 miles of land border susceptible
to illegal crossings by people and vehicles into the United States.
Specifically, according to DHS officials, the department is procuring
more current generation mobile radiation detection technology, seeking
new technology, and further studying gaps in the detection
architecture and the threat they pose. These efforts are, however, not
yet complete and in some cases are behind schedule. For example, DHS
is currently working to equip Border Patrol officers responsible for
patrolling the U.S. borders with Canada and Mexico between ports of
entry with current generation portable radiological and nuclear
detection equipment--specifically, personal radiation detectors (PRD)
and RIIDs. Portability is critical to strengthening radiation
detection efforts, according to DHS officials, because it expands
border patrol agents' ability to detect a potential radiological
threat beyond fixed ports of entry. According to its deployment plan,
DHS planned to buy a certain number of PRDs and RIIDs each fiscal year
from 2008 through 2011 to complete acquisition by 2012. However, the
department has fallen short of these targets, citing a lack of funds.
International General Aviation:
According to officials, DHS has undertaken some initiatives to scan
private aircraft entering the United States as international general
aviation. Since December 2007, DHS has been scanning 100 percent of
arriving international general aviation aircraft (approximately 400
flights per day) with a standard hand-held RIID for nuclear and
radiological material. DHS depends on the aircraft operators to obey
the law by either arriving in the United States only at an
international airport--which are all equipped with scanning
capability--or departing for the United States from one of four
overseas airports where such aircraft can be scanned before departure.
Accordingly, DHS has already initiated studies to help it address this
challenge and plans, according to officials, to initiate further
studies in 2011. Specifically, among other things, DHS plans to update
its analysis of pre-clearance scanning capabilities at airports
overseas and evaluate the feasibility of expanding the number of
overseas airports with scanning capabilities. It also plans to study
the characteristics of aircraft that do not comply with U.S. scanning
requirements and develop interim surveillance options to enhance DHS
capabilities and mitigation strategies to detect and interdict these
aircraft.
Small Maritime Craft:
A Coast Guard analysis revealed that small boats pose a greater threat
than shipping containers for nuclear smuggling.[Footnote 8] These
small boats, which include maritime craft less than 300 gross tons,
number in the millions. DHS has developed and tested equipment for
detecting nuclear material on small maritime vessels. However, efforts
to use this equipment in a port area have been limited to pilot
programs. Whereas initiatives to combat smuggling at land border areas
between established ports of entry and through aviation routes are
being integrated into already existing CBP screening operations,
initiatives in the maritime environment require DHS to acquire and
test new equipment and procedures with the Coast Guard and local law
enforcement agencies. DHS is currently conducting 3-year pilot
programs in Puget Sound, Washington, and San Diego, California, to
design, field test, and evaluate equipment and is working with CBP,
the Coast Guard, state, local, tribal officials, and others as they
develop procedures for screening. These pilot programs are scheduled
to end in 2010, when DHS will decide the future path of screening of
small vessels for nuclear and radiological materials. According to DHS
officials, initial feedback from federal, state, and local officials
involved in the pilot programs has been positive.
DHS hopes to sustain the capabilities created through the pilot
programs via federal grants to state and local authorities through the
port security grant program.[Footnote 9] By working with state and
local authorities in Puget Sound and San Diego since 2007, DHS hopes
that equipment and procedures can be developed that could be
transferred to other ports and other waterways and sustained with
federal grants. DHS's goal is to build some capacity for radiation
detection in all small and large ports so that federal, state and
local law enforcement has the capacity for, at the least, random
searches to keep would-be smugglers guessing, thereby offering some
measure of deterrence to nuclear and radiological smuggling in this
pathway.
According to DHS officials, the Puget Sound and San Diego pilot
programs have been useful for assessing and developing technologies to
address the specific challenges of nuclear and radiological detection
in a maritime environment. DHS expects its testing of existing
commercial and government off-the-shelf boat-mounted sensors to
conclude in the summer of 2010 and, depending on the results, will
either move forward with acquisition of this technology for future
deployment or initiate a program to develop new technology to meet
this need. According to officials, DHS also plans to complete or
initiate a number of studies to analyze options for underwater
detection and offshore secondary screening of nuclear and radiological
materials and study the existing detection architecture of inland
waterways. DHS also plans to conduct a top-down analysis of sea ports
of entry to assess the effectiveness of existing and proposed nuclear
and radiological detection architectures.
DHS Has Not Yet Completed a Strategic Plan for the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture:
DHS does not yet have a strategic plan for the global nuclear
detection architecture, but DHS officials told us they began working
on a strategic plan earlier this year and expect to complete it by the
fall of 2010--2 years after we last recommended such a plan--and more
than 7 years after we first identified the need for comprehensive plan
in October 2002. In our view, DHS might have made greater progress
towards completing the architecture if it had a strategic plan.
DHS Officials Are Working on a Strategic Plan:
According to DHS officials, DNDO is in the process of establishing a
steering committee to guide and oversee the development of the
strategic plan with interagency partners including the Departments of
Defense, Energy, Justice, and State, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
DHS officials attributed the delay in developing a strategic plan to a
number of factors, including DNDO's initial focus on installing
radiation detection equipment at ports of entry at land border
crossings and major seaports in response to the requirements of the
SAFE Port Act, which set a number of benchmarks and deadlines for
scanning cargo entering the United States. DHS officials also cited
the challenges and difficult decisions involved in addressing gaps in
the areas between ports of entry.
In addition, DHS officials said that they recognized that increasing
detection capabilities in one area of the architecture could simply
lead a potential smuggler of nuclear or radiological materials to use
another pathway into the United States. In developing the strategic
plan, they are considering ways to cover a greater range of potential
pathways into the United States. Drawing lessons from the tactics
police use to catch speeding motorists, DHS officials have concluded
that the most effective way to deter and make more difficult the
smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials into the United States
is to develop more agile and randomly deployed detection capabilities,
similar to how local and state police deploy officers and speed
detection equipment randomly to deter drivers from traveling over the
lawful speed limit. DHS officials described this approach as a shift
from "detection to prevention." This approach is consistent with the
basic design principles developed by DHS, as part of a multinational
collaborative process, to guide countries' efforts to prevent nuclear
terrorism. DHS identified several attributes of an effective nuclear
detection architecture including, among other things, the capacity to
balance risk reduction and cost effectiveness, rely on multiple layers
of protection, adapt and evolve over time to changing threats, be
unpredictable to the adversary, augment the effectiveness of radiation
detection technologies with the use of intelligence and other
information sources that could help law enforcement select certain
targets for scrutiny, and be integrated within a larger national and
international security framework.
DHS Might Have Completed the Architecture Sooner If It Had a Strategic
Plan:
In our view, the lack of a strategic plan has limited DNDO's efforts
to develop a global nuclear detection architecture. Strategic planning
is a way to respond to this governmentwide problem on a governmentwide
scale. Our past work on crosscutting issues suggests that
governmentwide strategic planning can integrate activities that span a
wide array of federal, state, and local entities.[Footnote 10]
Although each agency with a role in combating nuclear smuggling has
its own planning documents, an overarching strategic plan is needed to
guide these efforts to address the gaps and move to a more
comprehensive global nuclear detection strategy. In 2005, we reported
that strategic plans should clearly define objectives to be
accomplished, identify the roles and responsibilities for meeting each
objective, ensure that the funding necessary to achieve the objectives
is available, and employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress
and identify needed improvements.[Footnote 11] For example, such a
plan would define how DNDO would monitor the goal of detecting the
movement of radiological and nuclear materials through potential
smuggling routes, such as small maritime craft or land border areas in
between ports of entry. Moreover, this plan would include agreed-upon
processes and procedures to guide the improvement of the efforts to
combat nuclear smuggling and coordinate the activities of the
participating federal agencies. DNDO's 4-year effort to develop ASPs
is an example of the consequences of not having a strategic plan and
not reaching consensus on such a strategic plan with other federal
agency partners. We believe the proposed deployment of ASPs distracted
DNDO from its mission to fully deploy a nuclear architecture and close
the gaps it identified in the architecture. In addition, in 2006 we
recommended that the decision to deploy ASPs be based on an analysis
of both the benefits and costs[Footnote 12]--which we later estimated
at over $2 billion[Footnote 13]--and a determination of whether any
additional detection capability provided by the ASP is worth its
additional cost. DNDO has proceeded with ASP testing without fully
completing such an analysis. Furthermore, DNDO focused its ASP
deployment efforts on replacing components of the architecture with
ASPs where a detection system was already in place--established ports
of entry that were using PVTs and RIIDs--and shifting its focus away
from finishing the PVT deployments at ports of entry and closing the
gaps it identified in the architecture.
Similarly, in our view, had a strategic plan to complete the global
nuclear detection architecture been in place, DHS may have been less
likely to expend time and resources on ASPs when a radiation detection
system was already in place at ports of entry but not at other
potential pathways into the United States. A recent development that
complicates the future deployments of radiation detection equipment is
that both PVTs and ASPs require helium-3, which was recently found to
be in short supply.[Footnote 14] According to DHS officials, if an
alternative to helium-3 is not found by late 2011, further deployments
of PVTs planned for the southern land border and at seaports may be
delayed. We are currently conducting work on the helium-3 shortage--
describing the federal government's current priority for how the
limited supply of helium-3 will be allocated and assessing, among
other things, what alternative technologies are currently available or
in development that could replace helium-3. We plan to issue a report
later this year.
In addition to lacking a strategic plan, we also found that DHS did
not use the Joint Annual Interagency Review of the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture to effectively coordinate U.S. government
nuclear detection priorities. In July 2007, Congress passed the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,
[Footnote 15] which required DHS to collaborate with the Departments
of Defense, Energy, Justice, and State as well as the Director of
National Intelligence on an annual report assessing federal agencies'
involvement, support, and participation in the development, revision,
and implementation of the global nuclear detection architecture. In
January 2009, we recommended that DHS use this review to guide future
strategic efforts to combat nuclear smuggling, including analyzing
overall budget allocations to determine whether governmentwide
resources clearly align with identified priorities to maximize results
and whether there is duplication of effort across agencies.[Footnote
16] DHS did not directly comment on our recommendation and did not use
the most recent Joint Annual Interagency Review it issued in January
2010 as a tool to analyze nuclear detection budgets across the
agencies with which it is required to collaborate on the report.
Specifically, the 2010 report does not describe a process through
which DHS used the review to guide or modify budget allocations or
better align resources with identified priorities. While the report
has been reviewed and approved by DHS and the Departments of Defense,
Energy, Justice, State, and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, the report does not make clear whether it is used as a
part of these agencies' programmatic or strategic planning processes.
In conclusion, DHS is at a crossroads. With such vast land borders,
coast lines, and air space to protect, addressing the gaps in the
architecture is, in many respects, a more difficult task than
preventing the smuggling of nuclear material through ports of entry.
Now that land border crossings and seaports appear to have become more
secure through law enforcement and technology, it makes the other gaps
in the architecture potentially more attractive to would-be smugglers
and terrorists. At a time of flat or declining federal agency budgets,
it is especially important that DHS develop a strategic plan for its
global nuclear detection architecture so that it can articulate its
priorities in addressing these gaps and allocate resources based on
those priorities to maximize results. In addition, given the national
security implications and urgency attached to combating nuclear
smuggling globally, and that multiple federal agencies are involved,
we continue to believe that such a plan needs to be established as
soon as possible. Without an overarching plan that ties together the
various domestic and international efforts to combat nuclear smuggling
and clearly describes goals, responsibilities, priorities, resource
needs, and performance metrics, it is unclear how a strategy will
evolve or whether it is evolving in the right direction.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy
to respond to any questions that you or the other Members of the
committee may have at this time.
GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information about this testimony, please contact me at
(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Dr. Timothy Persons (Chief
Scientist), Ned Woodward (Assistant Director), Joseph Cook, Carol
Kolarik, Jonathan Kucskar, Alison O'Neill, Kevin Tarmann, and Kiki
Theodoropoulos made key contributions to this testimony.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] National Security Presidential Directive 43/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 14, Domestic Nuclear Detection, April 15, 2005.
DNDO was established in statute by the Security and Accountability for
Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port) Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 501
(codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 591-596a).
[2] GAO, Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation
Detection Equipment, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-235T] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17,
2002).
[3] GAO, Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office's Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-999T] (Washington, D.C.: July 16,
2008).
[4] GAO, Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should
Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-257] (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 29, 2009).
[5] CBP conducts primary inspections with radiation detection
equipment called portal monitors--large stationary detectors through
which cargo containers and vehicles pass as they enter the United
States where they are screened for smuggled nuclear or radiological
material that could be used in an improvised nuclear device or
radiological dispersal device (a "dirty bomb"). When radiation is
detected, CBP conducts secondary inspections using a second portal
monitor to confirm the original alarm and a handheld radioactive
isotope identification device to identify the radiation's source and
determine whether it constitutes a threat.
[6] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to
Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection
Equipment, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1247T]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2007).
[7] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-235T]; GAO,
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation
Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-389] (Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 22, 2006); GAO, Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's Efforts to Develop a Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-999T] (Washington, D.C.: July 16,
2008); and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-257].
[8] From testimony delivered by Vice Admiral Thad Allen on the role of
Coast Guard in border and maritime security, Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, U.S. Senate, Apr.
6, 2006.
[9] The Port Security Grant Program (PSGP), established by the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, is one of several DHS
grant programs focusing on transportation infrastructure security. The
purpose of the PSGP is to promote sustainable, risk-based efforts to
protect critical port infrastructure from terrorism, particularly
attacks using explosives and non-conventional threats that could cause
major disruption to commerce. In fiscal year 2010, the total amount of
funds distributed under this grant will be $288 million.
[10] GAO, A Call For Stewardship: Enhancing the Federal Government's
Ability to Address Key Fiscal and Other 21st Century Challenges,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-93SP] (Washington,
D.C.: Dec. 17, 2007).
[11] GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance
Information for Management Decision Making, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-927] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9,
2005); GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help
Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[12] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-389].
[13] GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Needs to Consider the Full
Costs and Complete All Tests Prior to Making a Decision on Whether to
Purchase Advanced Portal Monitors, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1178T] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25,
2008).
[14] Helium-3 is a by product of the production of tritium, a key
isotope used in nuclear weapons. With the end of the Cold War the
production of helium-3 has been reduced significantly. However, since
September 2001, the demand of helium-3 has increased dramatically
because radiation portal monitors deployed for homeland security and
non-proliferation use it for neutron detection; neutrons are emitted
by special nuclear materials, which can be used to construct a nuclear
weapon.
[15] Pub. L. No. 110-53 (2007).
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-257].
[End of section]
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