Department of Homeland Security
Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions Gao ID: GAO-10-588SP June 30, 2010Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acquisitions represent hundreds of billions of dollars in life-cycle costs to support a wide range of missions. Creating acquisition policies and processes to provide insight into the performance of a wide array of complex investments, while also providing oversight for many component agencies new to acquisition management, has been an ongoing challenge for DHS. GAO performed this review because DHS implementation and transformation is on GAO's high risk list. This report (1) provides an update on DHS's efforts to implement acquisition oversight for all investments; (2) describes acquisition performance and common challenges across selected programs; and (3) provides individual profiles for 18 selected programs, 15 of which were major programs that had initiated acquisition activities. GAO selected programs based on relevance to frontline homeland security missions and assessed cost and schedule performance and acquisition planning challenges.
DHS continues to develop its acquisition oversight function and has begun to implement a revised acquisition management directive that includes more detailed guidance for programs to use when informing component and departmental decision making. The senior-level Acquisition Review Board (ARB) has begun to meet more frequently and has provided programs decision memorandums with action items to improve performance. The ARB reviewed 24 major acquisition programs in fiscal years 2008 and 2009; however, more than 40 major acquisition programs had not been reviewed, and programs have not consistently implemented review action items by established deadlines. Additionally, DHS has developed a database to capture and track key program information, including cost and schedule performance, contract awards, and program risks. At the component level, oversight officials are establishing new acquisition executive positions to manage acquisition processes, but departmental leadership has limited their decision authority due to staffing levels and inconsistencies between component- and department-level acquisition policies. Further, DHS acquisition management processes do not inform budget decisions as required by DHS policy, and as a result DHS is at risk of failing to maximize resources and ultimately meet critical mission needs. GAO has found that program performance metrics for cost and schedule can provide useful indicators of the health of acquisition programs and can be valuable tools for improving insight and oversight of programs. Further, realistic program baselines with stable requirements, an adequate and skilled program office workforce, and knowledge of long-term support requirements are important factors to successful acquisitions. However, program performance cannot be accurately assessed without valid baseline requirements established at the program start, particularly those that establish the minimum acceptable threshold required to satisfy user needs. Using the best available information, GAO found that of the 15 major programs that had started acquisition activities, 12 reported cost growth, and almost all programs reported schedule delays. DHS policy requires acquisition oversight officials to assess the accuracy of life-cycle cost estimates for all major programs estimated to exceed $1 billion and provides guidance for programs to develop life-cycle cost estimates. The responsible DHS acquisition oversight officials have raised concerns about the accuracy of cost estimates for most major programs, making it difficult to assess the significance of the reported cost growth. Further, over half of the programs GAO reviewed initiated acquisition activities without approved key planning documents that set operational requirements and establish program baselines. Programs also experienced other acquisition planning challenges, such as staffing shortages, and lack of sustainment planning, as well as execution challenges related to technical capability, partner dependence, and funding issues. DHS's success in improving acquisition depends on further implementation of needed improvements and sustained management attention. GAO is not making any new recommendations as this is intended as a status report. However, GAO has previously made numerous recommendations intended to improve acquisition management. DHS generally agreed with the findings and noted actions taken and efforts under way to improve the Department's acquisition review process.
GAO-10-588SP, Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-10-588SP
entitled 'Department Of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected
Complex Acquisitions' which was released on July 1, 2010.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility.
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features,
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters,
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to Congressional Addressees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2010:
Department Of Homeland Security:
Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions:
GAO-10-588SP:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-588SP, a report to congressional addressees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acquisitions represent hundreds
of billions of dollars in life-cycle costs to support a wide range of
missions. Creating acquisition policies and processes to provide
insight into the performance of a wide array of complex investments,
while also providing oversight for many component agencies new to
acquisition management, has been an ongoing challenge for DHS.
GAO performed this review because DHS implementation and
transformation is on GAO‘s high risk list. This report (1) provides an
update on DHS‘s efforts to implement acquisition oversight for all
investments; (2) describes acquisition performance and common
challenges across selected programs; and (3) provides individual
profiles for 18 selected programs, 15 of which were major programs
that had initiated acquisition activities. GAO selected programs based
on relevance to frontline homeland security missions and assessed cost
and schedule performance and acquisition planning challenges.
What GAO Found:
DHS continues to develop its acquisition oversight function and has
begun to implement a revised acquisition management directive that
includes more detailed guidance for programs to use when informing
component and departmental decision making. The senior-level
Acquisition Review Board (ARB) has begun to meet more frequently and
has provided programs decision memorandums with action items to
improve performance. The ARB reviewed 24 major acquisition programs in
fiscal years 2008 and 2009; however, more than 40 major acquisition
programs had not been reviewed, and programs have not consistently
implemented review action items by established deadlines.
Additionally, DHS has developed a database to capture and track key
program information, including cost and schedule performance, contract
awards, and program risks. At the component level, oversight officials
are establishing new acquisition executive positions to manage
acquisition processes, but departmental leadership has limited their
decision authority due to staffing levels and inconsistencies between
component- and department-level acquisition policies. Further, DHS
acquisition management processes do not inform budget decisions as
required by DHS policy, and as a result DHS is at risk of failing to
maximize resources and ultimately meet critical mission needs.
GAO has found that program performance metrics for cost and schedule
can provide useful indicators of the health of acquisition programs
and can be valuable tools for improving insight and oversight of
programs. Further, realistic program baselines with stable
requirements, an adequate and skilled program office workforce, and
knowledge of long-term support requirements are important factors to
successful acquisitions. However, program performance cannot be
accurately assessed without valid baseline requirements established at
the program start, particularly those that establish the minimum
acceptable threshold required to satisfy user needs. Using the best
available information, GAO found that of the 15 major programs that
had started acquisition activities, 12 reported cost growth, and
almost all programs reported schedule delays. DHS policy requires
acquisition oversight officials to assess the accuracy of life-cycle
cost estimates for all major programs estimated to exceed $1 billion
and provides guidance for programs to develop life-cycle cost
estimates. The responsible DHS acquisition oversight officials have
raised concerns about the accuracy of cost estimates for most major
programs, making it difficult to assess the significance of the
reported cost growth. Further, over half of the programs GAO reviewed
initiated acquisition activities without approved key planning
documents that set operational requirements and establish program
baselines. Programs also experienced other acquisition planning
challenges, such as staffing shortages, and lack of sustainment
planning, as well as execution challenges related to technical
capability, partner dependence, and funding issues.
DHS‘s success in improving acquisition depends on further
implementation of needed improvements and sustained management
attention.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not making any new recommendations as this is intended as a
status report. However, GAO has previously made numerous
recommendations intended to improve acquisition management. DHS
generally agreed with the findings and noted actions taken and efforts
under way to improve the Department‘s acquisition review process.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-588SP] or key
components. For more information, contact John P. Hutton at (202) 512-
4841 or huttonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Forward:
Letter:
DHS Continues To Develop and Implement Acquisition Oversight:
Acquisition Performance and Program Challenges:
Program Assessments:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments From The Department Of Homeland Security:
Appendix III: The Acquisition Life Cycle, Systems Engineering Life
Cycle and Key Acquisition Documents at DHS:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: DHS Oversight Officials' Roles and Responsibilities:
Table 2: Comparison of Department and Component-Level Review under
Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 (Interim) and Management
Directive 1400:
Table 3: Acquisition Decision Memo Action Items (fiscal years 2008 and
2009):
Table 4: DHS Major Acquisition Program Costs:
Table 5: Summary of Major Program Planning Challenges:
Table 6: Status of Integrated Logistics Support Plans (ILSP):
Figures:
Figure 1: Summary of DHS Acquisition Programs Assessed:
Figure 2: Programs with Estimated Schedule Delay to Full Capability:
Figure 3: Key Document Approval Timeframes:
Figure 4: DHS Major Program Government Staff and Contractor Support:
Abbreviations:
APB: Acquisition Program Baseline:
ARB: Acquisition Review Board:
C4ISR: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance:
CAE: Component Acquisition Executive:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
CDC: Centers for Disease Control:
DCI: Data Collection Instrument:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD:; Department of Defense:
EDS: Explosive Detection System:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigations:
FDA: Food and Drug Administration:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
FOC: Full Operating Capability:
ILSP: Integrated Logistics Support Plans:
IOC: Initial Operating Capability:
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
OMB: Office of Management and Budget:
SBInet: Secure Border Initiative Network:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
USDA: United States Department of Agriculture:
US-VISIT: United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 30, 2010:
Congressional Addressees:
I am pleased to present GAO's assessment of complex acquisitions at
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This report provides a
snapshot of DHS acquisition oversight, planning, and execution--a
topic that has been of interest since DHS was created in 2003. Soon
after DHS began operations, we designated its implementation and
transformation as a high-risk area due to the enormous management
challenge of integrating 22 disparate agencies, and the size,
complexity, and importance of the effort to the nation's security.
[Footnote 1]
Our prior work has highlighted the issues DHS has faced in designing
and implementing the necessary management structure and processes to
support some of the broadest and most complex needs among federal
agencies. Critical issues include the need for sound acquisition
planning to reduce program management challenges that lead to cost and
schedule growth, and the department's need to integrate acquisition
review and budgeting for major investments. In order to accomplish a
wide range of frontline homeland security missions, as well as provide
management information capabilities, DHS's acquisition spending has
increased by 66 percent--from $8.5 billion in fiscal year 2004 to
$14.2 billion in fiscal year 2009[Footnote 2]--and its portfolio of
complex acquisitions continues to expand. While DHS has made recent
progress in clarifying acquisition oversight processes, much remains
to be done to ensure proper implementation and department wide
coordination. In a time of fiscal constraints, it is increasingly
important that DHS's acquisitions maximize resources to effectively
meet critical homeland security missions.
Signed by:
Gene L. Dodaro:
Acting Comptroller General of the United States:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 30, 2010:
Congressional Addressees:
In fiscal year 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had 67
major acquisitions intended to support a wide range of missions
including securing our borders, mitigating natural disasters, and
investigating security threats. Our work on major acquisitions at
other federal departments and agencies has provided a framework for
assessing DHS's acquisitions.[Footnote 3] We have found that a program
must have a sound business case that includes firm requirements, a
knowledge-based acquisition strategy, and realistic cost estimates in
order to reduce program challenges.[Footnote 4] Further, we have found
that acquisition oversight is more effective when regular reviews are
held, an adequate workforce has been developed, and reliable cost,
schedule and performance metrics are available.[Footnote 5] These
conditions provide a program a reasonable chance of meeting its
challenges yet delivering on time and within budget.
The department's acquisitions, representing hundreds of billions of
dollars in life-cycle costs, are managed by 12 components and offices
through a structure of dual accountability. While the Undersecretary
for Management serves as the Chief Acquisition Officer and bears
responsibility for acquisition policy, the component heads bear
responsibility for individual programs designed to achieve mission
specific goals and objectives. Many of the 67 major acquisition
programs existed prior to the creation of DHS and were managed by 1 of
the 22 separate agencies that merged to form the department. Creating
acquisition policies and processes to provide insight into the
performance of a wide array of complex acquisitions, while also
providing oversight for many component agencies new to acquisition
management, has been an ongoing need. Our work over the past several
years has consistently pointed to the challenges involved in
effectively managing and overseeing this large and varied acquisition
portfolio to meet performance expectations. We have raised these
concerns in the context of our work on the department's acquisition
oversight and in assessments of specific acquisitions across various
components.
We have reported that DHS's implementation of its investment review
process generally resulted in investment decisions that were
inconsistent with established policy and oversight, and weaknesses in
some component management practices further compounded the problem.
[Footnote 6] The department has not always reviewed its major
investments at key phases in the acquisition life cycle, employed
reliable cost and schedule estimating practices, or used effective
requirements development and test management practices. These
management weaknesses have led to major programs aimed at delivering
important mission capabilities not living up to expectations.[Footnote
7] For example, we reported that the Rescue 21 program did not follow
established processes for managing requirements which contributed to
deployment delays and limited the Coast Guard's ability to conduct
search and rescue missions.[Footnote 8] U.S. Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) did not sufficiently define
what capabilities and benefits would be delivered, by when, and at
what cost, which contributed to development and deployment delays.
[Footnote 9] Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) did not
adequately define requirements, perform testing, or oversee
contractors, delaying security of the southwest border.[Footnote 10]
The department has acknowledged many of these issues and is making
efforts to address them at the departmental and program levels.
Because DHS relies on its complex acquisitions to fulfill critical
homeland security missions, we assessed the department's oversight and
implementation of complex acquisitions. This report (1) provides an
update on the department's efforts to implement acquisition oversight
for all acquisitions; (2) describes acquisition performance and common
challenges across selected programs; and (3) provides individual
profiles for each of the selected programs.
To provide an update on acquisition oversight, we assessed the
department's efforts to implement its interim acquisition management
directive. We reviewed the department's acquisition management
directives, acquisition decision memorandums, and key program tracking
documents, and we interviewed departmental acquisition oversight
officials. At the component level, we interviewed acquisition
officials at the six components in our review--Customs and Border
Protection, Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Protection
and Programs Directorate, Office of Health Affairs, Transportation
Security Administration, and the United States Coast Guard--about
their policies and practices, staffing, departmental coordination, and
relevant challenges. We did not, however, specifically assess the
extent to which the department's acquisition guidance is consistent
with best practices.[Footnote 11]
To assess the implementation of complex acquisitions, we focused on
acquisition planning. We selected 18 programs across six components--
16 major acquisition programs, as well as 2 smaller programs critical
to DHS's mission based on several factors, including total projected
funding for fiscal years 2007 through 2012, current stage in the DHS
acquisition life cycle, and relevance to front-line homeland security
missions. The 18 programs selected represent about $100 billion in
life-cycle costs and about $38 billion in acquisition costs. We
developed a data collection instrument to obtain key data on program
cost, schedule, performance, and staffing, for the selected programs,
and we reviewed it with program offices to clarify data requested in
advance of completion. We also researched cost data reported in the
Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Exhibit 300 as part of the
executive branch capital planning process and Coast Guard's Quarterly
Acquisition Reports to Congress. We based our analysis on these
sources as they represented more complete and official data used for
making important planning and budgeting decisions. We interviewed
officials from the 18 program offices to learn more about acquisition
performance and program challenges. We also reviewed relevant GAO and
DHS Inspector General reports on the selected acquisitions. The
analysis of acquisition performance and common challenges across the
selected programs focuses on 15 programs for which data were
available.[Footnote 12] The profiles of the selected programs include
all 18 programs selected for our review. All data were current as of
2009, with the exception of latest estimates of program costs obtained
from OMB Exhibits 300, which were current as of either January or
February 2010.
We assessed program data using criteria based on best practices
established in prior work on major acquisitions. We have frequently
reported on the importance of using a solid, executable business case
before committing resources to a new acquisition. Our body of work on
best practices has shown that a sound business case is one that
provides demonstrated evidence that (1) needs are valid and can best
be met with the chosen concept; and (2) the chosen concept can be
developed and produced within existing resources. If a valid business
case is not established by the start of an acquisition program, then
requirements are likely to change, which can lead to significant cost
increases and schedule delays as the government and contractor gain a
better understanding of requirements. Program cost, schedule, and
performance, and changes in these factors over time can provide useful
indicators of the health of acquisition programs. When assessed
regularly for changes and the reasons that cause changes, such
indicators can be valuable tools for improving insight and oversight
of individual programs as well as total portfolio of major
acquisitions.[Footnote 13] However, performance metrics are of little
value without knowledge-based, realistic program baselines, which are
critical to acquisition programs achieving goals. Without realistic
baselines established at the start of a program, there is no
foundation for accurately measuring the knowledge and health of
programs.
We conducted our work from March 2009 to June 2010 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for
additional information on our scope and methodology. We do not make
recommendations in this report; however, we have previously made
numerous recommendations intended to improve the department's
acquisition management and oversight, and DHS is taking steps to
address them. We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and
comment. DHS generally concurred with our findings citing the review
of actions taken and efforts under way to improve the acquisition
review process, particularly the development and implementation of the
department's acquisition management directive. The department's
comments are reprinted in appendix II. DHS also provided technical
comments which we incorporated as appropriate and where supporting
documentation was provided.
DHS Continues To Develop and Implement Acquisition Oversight:
DHS continues to develop its acquisition oversight function and has
produced and begun to implement a revised acquisition management
directive. As part of the implementation process, the senior-level
Acquisition Review Board (ARB) has begun to meet more frequently and
has provided decision memorandums with action items to improve program
performance. The ARB reviewed 24 major acquisition programs in fiscal
years 2008 and 2009; however, more than 40 major acquisition programs
had not been reviewed, and programs have not consistently implemented
review action items by established deadlines. The acquisition
oversight office has created a tracking system to monitor key program
information for all acquisitions. At the component level, acquisition
oversight offices have begun to update policies and staff capacity
needed to oversee program activities. While these efforts are positive
steps toward improving acquisition management and oversight, the
department has not yet established a departmentwide requirements
oversight body for all acquisitions or integrated the acquisition
review and budget processes as required by DHS policy. As a result,
DHS is at risk of failing to maximize resources and ultimately meet
critical mission needs. DHS's success in improving acquisition depends
on further implementation and sustained management attention.
Acquisition Management Directive:
In 2008, we reported that DHS had not effectively implemented its
investment review process, and as a result, the department had not
provided the oversight needed to identify and address cost, schedule,
and performance problems for its major acquisitions.[Footnote 14]
Since the time of that review, DHS has established a revised oversight
process and begun to implement an interim acquisition management
directive and an accompanying guidebook explaining how the department
should meet the directive's requirements.[Footnote 15] The interim
directive includes more detailed guidance than the previous 2006
management directive for programs to use in preparing key
documentation to support component and departmental decision making.
For example, the interim directive, in effect at the time we reviewed
the selected acquisitions, establishes four acquisition life-cycle
phases: (1) identify a capability need; (2) analyze and select the
means to provide that capability; (3) obtain the capability; and (4)
produce, deploy and support the capability. The directive requires ARB
review of each major acquisition program at least three times at key
acquisition decision events during a program's acquisition life cycle.
Table 1 describes the roles and responsibilities of the entities
involved in the review process.
Table 1: DHS Oversight Officials' Roles and Responsibilities:
Officials: Acquisition Review Board members;
Roles: Officials that comprise the departmental executive board that
reviews major acquisition programs;
The chair of the Board is the Acquisition Decision Authority;
individual authority differs depending on the level of the acquisition;
Members include the Under Secretary for Management, Assistant
Secretary for Policy, General Counsel, Chief Financial Officer, Chief
Procurement Officer, Chief Information Officer, Chief Administrative
Officer, Chief Security Officer, Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, and user representatives from components sponsoring the
capability, and other representatives as appropriate;
Responsibilities: Review Level 1 and Level 2 acquisitions for
executable business strategy, resources, management, accountability,
and alignment to strategic initiatives. Support the Acquisition
Decision Authority as it reviews acquisitions to ensure compliance
with Acquisition Management Directive AD 102-01, and approves
acquisitions to proceed to their next acquisition life-cycle phases
upon satisfaction of applicable criteria.
Officials: Chief Acquisition Officer;
Roles: Normally serves as the Acquisition Decision Authority for Level
1 and Level 2 acquisitions (see table 2);
Designates the Component Acquisition Executives;
Responsibilities: Management, administration, and oversight of the
department's acquisition policies and procedures.
Officials: Director of the Acquisition Program Management Division,
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer;
Roles: Serves as the DHS executive agent and coordinator for the
acquisition review process and as the executive secretary of the
Acquisition Review Board;
Responsibilities: Developing and maintaining acquisition policy,
procedures, and guidance; providing support and assistance to
department acquisition and acquisition personnel.
Officials: Director of the Cost Analysis Division, Office of the Chief
Procurement Officer;
Roles: Serves as the focal point within DHS for policy, process, and
procedures regarding acquisition cost estimating and analysis;
Responsibilities: Assessing life-cycle cost estimates for Level 1
acquisitions, assisting acquisition management offices by providing
guidance and support regarding data sources, methodology, modeling,
and documentation.
Officials: Component Head;
Roles: The highest ranking individual within a component, nominates
the Component Acquisition Executive;
Responsibilities: Oversees acquisition within the component in
accordance with DHS acquisition policies and procedures, and ensures
sound management, review, support, approval, and oversight of all
types of acquisitions within the component.
Officials: Component Acquisition Executive;
Roles: Nominated by the component head and designated by the Chief
Acquisition Officer, the senior acquisition official within a
component;
Responsibilities: Establishing acquisition processes within the
component; managing the component's acquisition portfolio; and serving
as the Acquisition Decision Authority for Level 3 acquisitions, and
Level 2 acquisitions if assigned by the Chief Acquisition Officer (see
table 2).
Source: GAO presentation of Department of Homeland Security
Acquisition Management Directive AD 102-01, interim version, and
Acquisition Instruction/Guidebook 102-01-001, interim version.
[End of table]
ARB reviews provide an opportunity to determine a program's readiness
to proceed to the following life-cycle phase. The directive also
requires the ARB chairperson to approve key acquisition documents
critical to establishing a program's business case, operational
requirements, acquisition baseline, and document testing and support
plans. See appendix III for the four phases of the acquisition life
cycle, related acquisition decision events, and key acquisition
documents, such as the Mission Need Statement, Operational
Requirements Document and Acquisition Program Baseline.
The directive also changes the basis for program reviews from total
acquisition costs to total life-cycle costs and assigns specific
oversight responsibilities to the DHS components based on life-cycle
cost estimates.[Footnote 16] The Under Secretary for Management can
delegate authority for oversight of major acquisition programs with
life-cycle cost estimates of less than $1 billion to a designated
Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) with responsibility for managing
the acquisition functions at each component.[Footnote 17] See table 2
for a comparison of program review responsibilities based on dollar
thresholds for the interim and previous acquisition management
directive.
Table 2: Comparison of Department and Component-Level Review under
Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 (Interim) and Management
Directive 1400:
Acquisition Management Directive 102-01:
Cost basis and level of review for each management directive: Life-
cycle cost estimate;
Level 1: $1 billion or greater (major programs);
Level 2: $300 million to $1 billion (major programs);
Level 3: Less than $300 million (nonmajor programs).
Cost basis and level of review for each management directive: Level of
review;
Level 1: Department;
Level 2: Department or component;
Level 3: Component.
Management Directive 1400:
Cost basis and level of review for each management directive: Life-
cycle cost estimate (for information technology investments);
Level 1: Greater than $200 million;
Level 2: Between $100 million and $200 million;
Level 3: Between $20 million and $100 million.
Cost basis and level of review for each management directive:
Acquisition cost (for other than information technology investments);
Level 1: Greater than $100 million;
Level 2: Between $50 million and $100 million;
Level 3: N/A.
Cost basis and level of review for each management directive: Level of
review;
Level 1: Department;
Level 2: Department;
Level 3: Department.
Source: GAO presentation of information in Acquisition Management
Directive 102-01 and Management Directive 1400.
[End of table]
Acquisition Review Board Activities:
DHS has increased its departmental oversight activities, reviewing 7
programs in fiscal year 2008 and 25 programs--10 more than originally
planned--in fiscal year 2009.[Footnote 18] However, at the end of
fiscal year 2009, only 24 of 67 major acquisition programs had been
reviewed by the ARB. As they have not yet been able to review all
programs, DHS oversight officials told us they have prioritized ARB
reviews based on program funding levels and a program's stage in the
acquisition life cycle. Officials also indicated they may waive some
oversight requirements on a case-by-case basis, without clear
criteria, for programs that have passed certain phases--such as
departmental approval of a Mission Need Statement for a program that
has already deployed a capability.[Footnote 19] Additionally, to
provide some level of departmental oversight for major programs not
yet reviewed by the ARB, DHS acquisition oversight staff worked with
selected components to conduct brief reviews of acquisition portfolios
and examined 61 of 67 major acquisition programs during fiscal year
2009. These reviews have helped DHS to identify and prioritize
programs for the more detailed ARB reviews.
DHS acquisition oversight officials said that funding and staffing
levels have limited the number of programs they can review. The
department's oversight office increased its staff from 8 government
employees in 2008 to 22 government employees by the end of fiscal year
2009 and plans to hire another 11 government employees in 2010.
However, budget documentation suggests this staffing level will not
provide the capacity needed to support the 50 to 60 annual ARB
meetings that acquisition oversight officials said would be needed to
oversee all of DHS's major acquisitions. DHS has not produced a plan
identifying overall staffing and skill levels needed to meet the
department's acquisition oversight needs. We have previously
recommended that DHS identify and align sufficient management
resources to implement oversight reviews in a timely manner throughout
the investment life cycle.[Footnote 20]
In 2008, we found that limitations in the department's ability to
conduct formal investment reviews led DHS component officials to seek
approval directly from the Deputy Secretary; as a result, some
decisions were very informal and DHS officials said they did not
always know whether a decision had been made. We recommended that DHS
ensure investment decisions are transparent and documented as
required. Oversight officials have since documented ARB decisions with
Acquisition Decision Memorandums including action items and timeframes
for addressing them. Memorandums from fiscal years 2008 and 2009 ARB
meetings most often instructed programs to draft or redraft key
acquisition documents that help present business cases. Our work at
the Department of Defense (DOD) has found that a program must have the
key elements of a business case before any measurement of its
performance can be valuable.[Footnote 21] Action items also instructed
programs to identify alternative acquisition approaches; document
testing, implementation or support plans; and produce summaries of
related activities within DHS and DOD, including similar acquisitions.
Oversight officials and program officials said they work together to
address action items and noted that it can be an iterative process. As
of September 2009, oversight officials reported that 13 of 26 programs
[Footnote 22] had not addressed all action items by established
deadlines, and approximately a quarter of all action items were
completed late or overdue, as shown in table 3.
Table 3: Acquisition Decision Memorandum Action Items (fiscal years
2008 and 2009):
Action items: Completed;
Assigned: 57;
Late or overdue: 17.
Action items: Outstanding;
Assigned: 98;
Late or overdue: 24.
Action items: Total;
Assigned: 155;
Late or overdue: 41.
Source: GAO presentation of DHS data for 26 programs reviewed in
fiscal years 2008 and 2009.
[End of table]
Tracking Program Status:
In 2008, we found DHS had not fully implemented the periodic reporting
system intended to track program performance data, and many programs
had cost, schedule, or performance shortfalls, while nearly 80 percent
of major programs lacked basic acquisition documents, such as program
baselines. We recommended that DHS establish a mechanism to track on a
regular basis major investments and ensure compliance with department-
level decisions. DHS's directive requires major programs to
participate in an acquisition reporting process, and DHS has developed
the Next Generation Periodic Reporting System, to capture and track
key program information, including cost and schedule performance,
contract awards, and program risks. The database became fully
operational in September 2009, and DHS expects program offices to
update program data each month. As of November 2009, DHS told us that
108 major and nonmajor programs were reporting into the database.
Acquisition oversight officials review these data in preparation for
upcoming reviews; however, the database relies on self-reported data,
which is not independently verified outside of the program.
Component Oversight:
With regard to component oversight, the DHS guidebook allows the Under
Secretary for Management to delegate acquisition decision authority
for Level 2 acquisition programs provided that (1) the respective
component has a departmentally approved Component Acquisition
Executive (CAE) in place, (2) the component has working policies and
processes consistent with the current acquisition management
directive, and (3) the component's CAE has adequate support staff
commensurate with the size of the delegated portfolio. In 2008, we
found that component review processes were not fully in place, and we
recommended that DHS ensure that components have established processes
to manage major investments consistent with departmental policies and
establish a mechanism to ensure major investments comply with
established component and departmental investment review policy
standards. In 2008, DHS established the position of CAE to implement,
manage, and oversee the components' acquisition processes. As of
November 2009, the Under Secretary for Management had approved CAE
nominations at seven components, but had not yet delegated decision
authority because components are still in the process of developing
policies consistent with the department's revised directive and
reaching staff levels sufficient to oversee their respective
acquisition programs. Component acquisition oversight activities vary
across components. While officials from five of the six component
acquisition oversight offices we met with said that they had accounted
for and were tracking all of their major acquisition programs, Federal
Emergency Management Agency acquisition officials said they were still
working to identify all of their major acquisitions, and that they had
only assessed programs accounting for about $5 billion of $30 billion
in estimated life-cycle costs for their acquisition portfolio.
[Footnote 23] Furthermore, four of the components we reviewed reported
challenges involving staffing levels, and two of the four specifically
stated that staff vacancies were preventing them from further
supporting oversight efforts.
Acquisition Oversight and Budget Decisions:
In 2008, we found that the acquisition review process had not
appropriately informed DHS's annual budget process for funding major
programs, and that many major programs received funding without
validation of mission needs and requirements, largely because
department-level reviews were seldom conducted. We reported that the
Joint Requirements Council, which is responsible for validating
program requirements, stopped meeting in 2006 and had not effectively
carried out its responsibilities involving identification of
crosscutting opportunities and overlapping or common requirements. We
recommended that the department ensure that budget decisions are
informed by the results of investment reviews including approved
acquisition information and life-cycle cost estimates and reinstate
the Joint Requirements Council or establish another departmental
oversight board to perform this function.
The department's guidebook states that both the Joint Requirements
Council and the ARB should inform the department's budget decisions,
and that they must do so effectively in order to deliver needed
capabilities to end users. However, while the ARB has begun to meet
more frequently, most major programs have not been reviewed. Further,
acquisition management processes do not inform budget decisions as
required by DHS policy. DHS has not reestablished the Joint
Requirements Council, although DHS oversight officials said that by
fall 2010, they expect to complete a proposal for DHS leadership to
consider and approve that would address this need. Shortly thereafter,
DHS plans to initiate a limited pilot program, which will not review
all programs departmentwide.
Acquisition Performance and Program Challenges:
Our prior work has found that program performance metrics for cost and
schedule can provide useful indicators of the health of acquisition
programs and, when assessed regularly for changes and the reasons that
cause changes, such indicators can be valuable tools for improving
insight and oversight of individual programs as well as the total
portfolio of major acquisitions.[Footnote 24] We have also found that
the following factors are important to successful acquisitions
delivering capabilities within cost and schedule: realistic program
baselines with stable requirements for cost, schedule, and
performance; an adequate and skilled program office workforce; and
knowledge of long-term support requirements.[Footnote 25] Importantly,
program performance cannot be accurately assessed without valid
baseline requirements established at the program start, particularly
those that establish the minimum acceptable threshold required to
satisfy user needs.[Footnote 26]
Most of the selected DHS programs we reviewed exhibited cost growth
and schedule delays from initial estimates. DHS acquisition oversight
officials have raised concerns about the accuracy of cost estimates
for most major programs, making it difficult to assess the
significance of the cost growth we identified. Further, over half of
the programs we reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition
activities without component or department approval of documents
essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational requirements,
and establishing acquisition program baselines. Programs also
experienced other acquisition planning challenges--potential and
realized program issues that contribute to negative performance
outcomes--such as staffing shortages, and lack of sustainment planning
as well as common execution challenges related to a range of technical
capability, partner dependence, and funding issues.
We selected 18 DHS programs for this review--16 major programs and two
nonmajor programs. The two nonmajor programs selected, and one major
program that had not started acquisition activities at the time of our
review,[Footnote 27] were excluded from the analysis of overall
acquisition performance and program challenges. As a result, we
reviewed cost or schedule data for 15 major programs. Schedule data
were not complete for two programs--the Automated Commercial
Environment and US-VISIT.[Footnote 28] Figure 1 provides the status of
the selected programs at the time of our review.
Figure 1: Summary of DHS Acquisition Programs Assessed:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Total programs reviewed: 18:
Excluded from analysis: Nonmajor programs: 2;
Excluded from analysis: Pre-acquisition programs: 1;
Programs included in analysis: 15;
Programs with incomplete schedule data: 2;
Programs with cost growth or schedule delays: 12;
Programs without cost growth or schedule delays: 1.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of figure]
Most Programs Experienced Cost Increases and Schedule Delays:
We assessed life-cycle cost and acquisition cost data for the 15 major
acquisition programs in our review. Accurate cost estimates are
critical to making funding decisions, evaluating resource
requirements, and developing performance measurement baselines. Life-
cycle costs include all resources and associated cost elements
required to develop, produce, deploy, and sustain a particular program
from initial concept through operations, support, and disposal.
Acquisition costs include costs for all supplies and services for a
designated investment. DHS policy requires acquisition oversight
officials to assess the accuracy of life-cycle cost estimates for all
major programs estimated to exceed $1 billion. The DHS guidebook
includes an appendix on life-cycle cost estimates.[Footnote 29] The
responsible officials have raised concerns that many programs used
cost estimation methods that did not follow established best
practices, such as fully defining program requirements, accounting for
sustainment costs, and including costs for the full life cycle of a
program. As a result, officials have doubts about the credibility,
comprehensiveness, and accuracy of most program cost estimates.
Officials said they are working to address this concern by assisting
programs in developing cost estimates, and obtaining independent cost
estimates for selected high-risk programs. [Footnote 30] To provide
additional support, they have temporarily placed cost analysis
specialists within selected components.
Most programs we reviewed reported cost growth from initial to latest
estimates. Inaccurate or incomplete cost estimates were likely a
factor in cost growth for the programs we reviewed, according to DHS
officials. In some cases, programs reported that changes in scope or
requirements contributed to cost growth. Further, initial cost
estimates for most programs were developed after the start of
acquisition activities, so they do not capture earlier cost changes.
Because DHS does not have one consistent source for acquisition and
life-cycle cost estimates, we analyzed the best available data
reported to OMB and congressional appropriations committees for each
of the major programs in our review.[Footnote 31] Table 4 summarizes
the changes to life-cycle and acquisition cost estimates for the
programs in our review.
Table 4: DHS Major Acquisition Program Costs:
Customs and Border Protection:
Automated Commercial Environment;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$2,125;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$2,222;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 5%;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$4,776;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$4,532;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: -5%;
Months between initial and current estimates: 37.
SBInet;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$284;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$1,885;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 564%;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$579;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$3,738;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 546%;
Months between initial and current estimates: 42.
TECS Modernization;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$406;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$410;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 1%;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$888;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$1,104;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 24%;
Months between initial and current estimates: 24.
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$312;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$311;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 0%;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$863;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$1,362;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 58%;
Months between initial and current estimates: 24.
National Protection and Programs Directorate:
National Cybersecurity Protection System;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$664;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$546;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: -18%;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$1,366;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$1,257;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: -8%;
Months between initial and current estimates: 8.
US-VISIT Unique Identity;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$160;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$79;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: -51%;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$225;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$132;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: -41%;
Months between initial and current estimates: 8.
Transportation Security Administration:
Electronic Baggage Screening Program;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$11,360;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$15,316;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 35%;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$19,930;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$23,696;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 19%;
Months between initial and current estimates: 17.
Passenger Screening Program;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$1,872;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$2,559;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 37%;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$2,593;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$4,306;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 66%;
Months between initial and current estimates: 17.
Secure Flight;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$97;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$153;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 59%;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$685;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$1,362;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 99%;
Months between initial and current estimates: 28.
United States Coast Guard:
C4ISR;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$1,353;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$1,353;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 0%;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$1,353;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$1,353;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 0%;
Months between initial and current estimates: 28.
Maritime Patrol Aircraft;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$1,706;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$2,223;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 30%;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$22,773;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$12,285;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: -46%;
Months between initial and current estimates: 42.
National Security Cutter;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$3,450;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$4,749;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 38%;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$22,998;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$24,277;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 6%;
Months between initial and current estimates: 42.
Rescue 21;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$827;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$1,067;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 29%;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$1,639;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$2,693;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 64%;
Months between initial and current estimates: 28.
Response Boat-Medium;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$401;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$610;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 52%;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$1,210;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$1,419;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 17%;
Months between initial and current estimates: 68.
Sentinel;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$3,206;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$3,928;
Acquisition cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: 23%;
[Empty];
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Initial:
$22,256;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Current:
$14,475;
Life-cycle cost estimate (then-year dollars in millions): Percentage
change: -35%;
Months between initial and current estimates: 31.
Source: GAO analysis of official cost data reported in Acquisition
Program Baselines and Quarterly Acquisition Reports to Congress to the
House and Senate Appropriations Committees for the Maritime Patrol
Aircraft, National Security Cutter, Response Boat-Medium and Sentinel
Class programs. For all other programs, GAO analyzed official cost
data in the Exhibit 300 required by OMB.
[End of table]
Changes in life-cycle cost estimates ranged widely from decreases of
over 40 percent to an increase of over 500 percent. Nine of the 15
programs reported cost growth from initial to current estimates. The
three programs reporting significant cost decreases also reported
inconsistencies in estimating life-cycle costs. The interval of
initial and latest cost estimates varied from 8 months to over 5 years
for the programs we reviewed, and as a result some programs had a
longer period of time to incur cost growth. Changes in acquisition
cost estimates also ranged widely--from a decrease of 50 percent to an
increase of over 500 percent. Of the 11 programs with acquisition cost
growth, 8 programs reported cost growth of over 25 percent.
Almost all of the selected major acquisition programs experienced
delays in delivering system capabilities. We assessed schedule
performance for delivering both initial capabilities, when initial end-
users would receive the new system and could use it operationally, as
well as delivery of full capabilities, the point at which all end-
users would receive the system. DHS guidance requires major programs
to set a formal schedule baseline prior to the start of an acquisition
in order to measure program performance in achieving its
goals.[Footnote 32] Schedule delays can lead to loss of program
credibility with stakeholders, increased acquisition costs, new
systems not being available to meet department needs, and continued
use of less capable systems. Fifteen of the major programs we reviewed
reported estimated or actual schedule delays in delivery of initial
operating capability of an average of 12 months, and eight programs
reported delays of a year or more. Thirteen programs reporting data on
delivery of full operating capability indicated estimated delays of
over 2 years on average. None of the selected programs reported
delivering full operating capability for all increments. Figure 2
summarizes the estimated schedule delays to full operating capability
for major programs reporting data.
Figure 2: Programs with Estimated Schedule Delay to Full Capability:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
On time: 3 programs;
Up to 2 years late: 4 programs;
Over 2 years to 4 years late: 1 program;
More than 4 years late: 5 programs.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
Note: Programs do not total to 15 as 2 programs did not report:
Automated Commercial Environment and US-VISIT.
[End of figure]
Several Program Challenges Affect Ability to Deliver Within Cost and
on Time:
The major acquisition programs we assessed experienced similar
planning challenges affecting cost and schedule outcomes: unapproved
or unstable baseline requirements; program office workforce shortages;
long-term support, and acquisition cost planning. Table 5 summarizes
the program planning challenges for each of the programs we reviewed.
Our prior work has shown that establishing a sound business case is
key to a successful acquisition that delivers capabilities within cost
and schedule and minimizes the challenges we identified.[Footnote 33]
The first, and perhaps best, opportunity to reduce acquisition risk is
in the planning phase, when critical decisions are made that have
significant implications for the overall success of an acquisition. We
also identified execution challenges related to a range of technical
capability, partner dependence, and funding issues.
Table 5: Summary of Major Program Planning Challenges:
Customs and Border Protection:
Automated Commercial Environment;
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Unapproved
or unstable baseline requirements: Customs and Border Protection:
[Check];
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Lack of
timely approval of acquisition documents[A]: [Check];
Major program planning challenges: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Program office workforce shortages:
[Empty];
Lack of sustainment planning: [Check];
Performance: Cost growth[B]: [Check];
Performance: Schedule delays: N/A[D].
SBInet, Block 1[C];
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Unapproved
or unstable baseline requirements: Customs and Border Protection:
[Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Lack of
timely approval of acquisition documents[A]: [Check];
Major program planning challenges: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Program office workforce shortages:
[Check];
Lack of sustainment planning: [Empty];
Performance: Cost growth[B]: [Check];
Performance: Schedule delays: [Check].
TECS Modernization;
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Unapproved
or unstable baseline requirements: Customs and Border Protection:
[Check];
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Lack of
timely approval of acquisition documents[A]: [Check];
Major program planning challenges: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Program office workforce shortages:
[Empty];
Lack of sustainment planning: [Check];
Performance: Cost growth[B]: [Check];
Performance: Schedule delays: [Check].
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative;
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Unapproved
or unstable baseline requirements: Customs and Border Protection:
[Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Lack of
timely approval of acquisition documents[A]: [Check];
Major program planning challenges: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Program office workforce shortages:
[Empty];
Lack of sustainment planning: [Check];
Performance: Cost growth[B]: [Check];
Performance: Schedule delays: [Check].
National Protections and Programs Directorate:
National Cybersecurity Protection System;
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Unapproved
or unstable baseline requirements: Customs and Border Protection:
[Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Lack of
timely approval of acquisition documents[A]: [Check];
Major program planning challenges: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Program office workforce shortages:
[Check];
Lack of sustainment planning: [Check];
Performance: Cost growth[B]: [Empty];
Performance: Schedule delays: [Empty].
US-VISIT Unique Identity;
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Unapproved
or unstable baseline requirements: Customs and Border Protection:
[Check];
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Lack of
timely approval of acquisition documents[A]: [Check];
Major program planning challenges: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Program office workforce shortages:
[Check];
Lack of sustainment planning: [Check];
Performance: Cost growth[B]: [Empty];
Performance: Schedule delays: N/A[D].
Transportation Security Administration:
Electronic Baggage Screening Program;
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Unapproved
or unstable baseline requirements: Customs and Border Protection:
[Check];
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Lack of
timely approval of acquisition documents[A]: [Check];
Major program planning challenges: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Program office workforce shortages:
[Check];
Lack of sustainment planning: [Empty];
Performance: Cost growth[B]: [Check];
Performance: Schedule delays: [Check].
Passenger Screening Program;
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Unapproved
or unstable baseline requirements: Customs and Border Protection:
[Check];
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Lack of
timely approval of acquisition documents[A]: [Check];
Major program planning challenges: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Program office workforce shortages:
[Empty];
Lack of sustainment planning: [Empty];
Performance: Cost growth[B]: [Check];
Performance: Schedule delays: [Check].
Secure Flight;
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Unapproved
or unstable baseline requirements: Customs and Border Protection:
[Check];
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Lack of
timely approval of acquisition documents[A]: [Check];
Major program planning challenges: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Program office workforce shortages:
[Empty];
Lack of sustainment planning: [Check];
Performance: Cost growth[B]: [Check];
Performance: Schedule delays: [Check].
United States Coast Guard:
C4ISR;
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Unapproved
or unstable baseline requirements: Customs and Border Protection:
[Check];
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Lack of
timely approval of acquisition documents[A]: [Check];
Major program planning challenges: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Program office workforce shortages:
[Empty];
Lack of sustainment planning: [Empty];
Performance: Cost growth[B]: [Empty];
Performance: Schedule delays: [Check].
Maritime Patrol Aircraft;
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Unapproved
or unstable baseline requirements: Customs and Border Protection:
[Check];
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Lack of
timely approval of acquisition documents[A]: [Check];
Major program planning challenges: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Program office workforce shortages:
[Check];
Lack of sustainment planning: [Check];
Performance: Cost growth[B]: [Check];
Performance: Schedule delays: [Check].
National Security Cutter;
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Unapproved
or unstable baseline requirements: Customs and Border Protection:
[Check];
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Lack of
timely approval of acquisition documents[A]: [Check];
Major program planning challenges: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Program office workforce shortages:
[Empty];
Lack of sustainment planning: [Check];
Performance: Cost growth[B]: [Check];
Performance: Schedule delays: [Check].
Rescue 21;
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Unapproved
or unstable baseline requirements: Customs and Border Protection:
[Check];
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Lack of
timely approval of acquisition documents[A]: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Program office workforce shortages:
[Empty];
Lack of sustainment planning: [Empty];
Performance: Cost growth[B]: [Check];
Performance: Schedule delays: [Check].
Response Boat-Medium;
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Unapproved
or unstable baseline requirements: Customs and Border Protection:
[Check];
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Lack of
timely approval of acquisition documents[A]: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Program office workforce shortages:
[Check];
Lack of sustainment planning: [Check];
Performance: Cost growth[B]: [Check];
Performance: Schedule delays: [Check].
Sentinel;
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Unapproved
or unstable baseline requirements: Customs and Border Protection:
[Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Baseline requirements: Lack of
timely approval of acquisition documents[A]: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: [Empty];
Major program planning challenges: Program office workforce shortages:
[Empty];
Lack of sustainment planning: [Empty];
Performance: Cost growth[B]: [Check];
Performance: Schedule delays: [Check].
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data:
[A] We assessed whether key acquisition documents were approved at
either the component or department level.
[B] Cost Growth refers to either acquisition or life-cycle cost growth
or both.
[C] Cost performance refers to the entire SBInet program.
[D] N/A indicates that reportable data were not available.
[End of table]
Baseline Requirements:
Our prior work has found that program performance cannot be accurately
assessed without valid baseline requirements established at the
program start[Footnote 34]. According to DHS guidance, the baseline
requirements must include a threshold value that is the minimum
acceptable value which, in the user's judgment, is necessary to
satisfy the need. If threshold values are not achieved, program
performance is seriously degraded, the program may be too costly, or
the program may no longer be timely. Failure to achieve a threshold
would require rebaselining or termination of the program based upon a
decision by the Acquisition Decision Authority. Inadequate knowledge
of program requirements is a key cause of poor acquisition outcomes,
and as programs move into the execution phase of the acquisition
process, problems become much more costly to fix. DHS's acquisition
guidance states that the program baseline is the contract between the
program and departmental oversight officials regarding cost, schedule,
and technical performance of the program.
Over half of the programs we reviewed awarded contracts to initiate
acquisition activities without component or department approval of
documents essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational
requirements, and establishing acquisition program baselines. Our
prior work has shown that the development, review, and approval of
these key documents minimize the risks of poorly defined requirements
and plans negatively affecting program performance.[Footnote 35] The
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 requires agencies to
approve or define the cost, performance, or schedule goals for major
acquisition programs. Although DHS policy has required major
acquisition programs to set cost, schedule, and performance goals
prior to the start of an acquisition since its first acquisition
policy was issued in 2003,[Footnote 36] 7 of 15 programs in our review
did not have approved baselines until 2 years or more after program
start. For example, the Secure Flight program did not have an approved
program baseline until over 4 years after program start, and the TECS
Modernization program did not have a component or department approved
baseline after more than 6 years.
Among the 15 programs, delays ranged from 1 month to over 4 years
after contract award for other key acquisition documents, such as the
Mission Need Statement and the Operational Requirements Document. The
Mission Need Statement outlines the specific functional capabilities
required to accomplish DHS's mission and objectives, along with
deficiencies and gaps in these capabilities. The Operational
Requirements Document includes key performance parameters and
describes the mission, capabilities, and objectives to provide needed
capabilities. Figure 3 shows programs with key documents and when they
were approved.
Figure 3: Key Document Approval Time frames:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
On time:
Mission Need Statement: 6 programs;
Operational Requirements Document: 3 programs;
Acquisition Program Baseline: 7 programs.
Up to 1 year late:
Mission Need Statement: 4 programs;
Operational Requirements Document: 2 programs;
Acquisition Program Baseline: 0.
More than 1 year late:
Mission Need Statement: 5 programs;
Operational Requirements Document: 10 programs;
Acquisition Program Baseline: 8 programs.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of figure]
Most of the programs that had established baseline requirements
changed or plan to change them. For example, seven programs with an
approved program baseline changed key requirements after their initial
approval. An additional three programs were revising baseline
requirements, pending APB approval, at the time we completed our
review.
Program Office Workforce:
Program offices reported filling 79 percent of all government staff
positions; however, programs also reported high levels of government
staff vacancies for certain positions.[Footnote 37] Our prior work at
DHS found shortcomings in acquisition workforce planning, including a
lack of sufficient data to assess gaps in skills and staffing levels.
[Footnote 38] Lack of adequate staff, both in terms of skill and
staffing levels, increases the risk of insufficient program planning
and contractor oversight, and has been associated with negative cost
and schedule outcomes in major acquisition programs, emphasizing the
importance of sufficient, experienced staff for successful acquisition
outcomes.[Footnote 39] Figure 4 provides more details on government
and contractor staff for the programs we reviewed.
Figure 4: DHS Major Program Government Staff and Contractor Support:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph]
Total workforce:
Government staff: 40%;
Contractor staff: 60%;
Total: 1,760.
Customs and Border Protection:
Automated Commercial Environment:
Government staff: 63%;
Contractor staff: 37%;
Total: 108.
SBInet:
Government staff: 50%;
Contractor staff: 50%;
Total: 175.
TECS Modernization:
Government staff: 57%;
Contractor staff: 43%;
Total: 7.
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative:
Government staff: 23%;
Contractor staff: 77%;
Total: 88.
National Protection and Programs Directorate:
National Cybersecurity Protection System:
Government staff: 8%;
Contractor staff: 92%;
Total: 133.
US-VISIT:
Government staff: 38%;
Contractor staff: 62%;
Total: 421.
Transportation Security Administration:
Electronic Baggage Screening Program:
Government staff: 23%;
Contractor staff: 77%;
Total: 116.
Passenger Screening Program:
Government staff: 33%;
Contractor staff: 67%;
Total: 48.
Secure Flight:
Government staff: 38%;
Contractor staff: 62%;
Total: 300.
U.S. Coast Guard:
C4ISR:
Government staff: 31%;
Contractor staff: 69%;
Total: 103.
Maritime Patrol Aircraft:
Government staff: 85%;
Contractor staff: 15%;
Total: 7.
National Security Cutter:
Government staff: 63%;
Contractor staff: 37%;
Total: 79.
Rescue 21:
Government staff: 81%;
Contractor staff: 19%;
Total: 80.
Response Boat-Medium:
Government staff: 56%;
Contractor staff: 44%;
Total: 71.
Sentinel Class Patrol Boat:
Government staff: 54%;
Contractor staff: 46%;
Total: 24.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
Note: US-VISIT totals include staff for all investments within the
program.
[End of figure]
Filled government positions for each program ranged from 42 percent to
100 percent. Over half of the major programs reported that contractors
comprised 50 percent or more of all staff supporting program offices.
Similarly, our review of major acquisitions at the DOD found that, in
2009, contractors filled 51 percent of program office positions.
[Footnote 40]
Further, our work on contractors in the workforce has noted that use
of contractors to perform certain functions can place the government
at risk of transferring government responsibilities to contractors,
and potentially result in loss of government control over and
accountability for policy and program decisions.[Footnote 41] We
previously found that DHS used contractor support to provide services
related to planning activities, acquisition support, and policy
development--services that closely supported inherently governmental
functions. As a result, we recommended that DHS establish guidance for
determining the appropriate mix of government and contractor staff to
meet mission needs, and assess program office staff and expertise
necessary to provide sufficient oversight of contractor
services.[Footnote 42] DHS is still working to address this
recommendation.
All programs we reviewed report having a permanently assigned program
manager certified to manage a major acquisition as required by DHS
policy. By comparison, in 2007, 40 percent of major DHS programs
lacked a program manager with the required acquisition certification
level.[Footnote 43] Four programs reported program manager tenure of 3
or more years, and six programs report program manager tenure of 1
year or less. Our prior work has found frequent program manager
turnover can result in a lack of accountability for a program's
business case and performance outcomes.[Footnote 44]
Sustainment Planning:
Prior to the start of an acquisition, DHS acquisition policy requires
an approved Integrated Logistics Support Plan for all major programs.
This plan defines the program's sustainment and supportability
strategy and can comprise a significant portion of total life-cycle
costs--approximately 60 percent or more according to DHS guidance.
OMB's capital planning guide also calls for sustainment planning to
properly plan for and actively manage investments throughout the
program. Our prior work has found that understanding how programs will
be sustained in future years, along with the associated costs, is a
prerequisite for valid life-cycle cost estimates.[Footnote 45]
Most programs reported that they have developed a support plan, but
only six programs have a support plan approved at the component level,
and none of the programs in our review had a plan approved by DHS, as
required. Table 6 shows the status of the plans for the 15 programs
reporting.
Table 6: Status of Integrated Logistics Support Plans (ILSP):
Component: Customs and Border Protection:
Program: Automated Commercial Environment;
ILSP (approved or unapproved): [Empty];
Component-approved ILSP: [Empty];
DHS-approved ILSP: [Empty].
Program: SBInet, Block 1;
ILSP (approved or unapproved): [Check];
Component-approved ILSP: [Check];
DHS-approved ILSP: [Empty].
Program: TECS Modernization;
ILSP (approved or unapproved): [Check];
Component-approved ILSP: [Empty];
DHS-approved ILSP: [Empty].
Program: Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative;
ILSP (approved or unapproved): [Check];
Component-approved ILSP: [Empty];
DHS-approved ILSP: [Empty].
Component: National Protections and Programs Directorate:
Program: National Cybersecurity Protection System;
ILSP (approved or unapproved): [Check];
Component-approved ILSP: [Empty];
DHS-approved ILSP: [Empty].
Program: US-VISIT Unique Identity;
ILSP (approved or unapproved): [Check];
Component-approved ILSP: [Empty];
DHS-approved ILSP: [Empty].
Component: Transportation Security Administration:
Program: Electronic Baggage Screening Program;
ILSP (approved or unapproved): [Check];
Component-approved ILSP: [Check];
DHS-approved ILSP: [Empty].
Program: Passenger Screening Program;
ILSP (approved or unapproved): [Check];
Component-approved ILSP: [Check];
DHS-approved ILSP: [Empty].
Program: Secure Flight;
ILSP (approved or unapproved): [Check];
Component-approved ILSP: [Empty];
DHS-approved ILSP: [Empty].
Component: United States Coast Guard:
Program: C4ISR;
ILSP (approved or unapproved): [Check];
Component-approved ILSP: [Check];
DHS-approved ILSP: [Empty].
Program: Maritime Patrol Aircraft;
ILSP (approved or unapproved): [Check];
Component-approved ILSP: [Empty];
DHS-approved ILSP: [Empty].
Program: National Security Cutter;
ILSP (approved or unapproved): [Check];
Component-approved ILSP: [Empty];
DHS-approved ILSP: [Empty].
Program: Rescue 21;
ILSP (approved or unapproved): [Check];
Component-approved ILSP: [Check];
DHS-approved ILSP: [Empty].
Program: Response Boat-Medium;
ILSP (approved or unapproved): [Check];
Component-approved ILSP: [Empty];
DHS-approved ILSP: [Empty].
Program: Sentinel Class Patrol Boat;
ILSP (approved or unapproved): [Check];
Component-approved ILSP: [Check];
DHS-approved ILSP: [Empty].
Number of programs:
ILSP (approved or unapproved): 14;
Component-approved ILSP: 6;
DHS-approved ILSP: 0.
Total number of programs with available data:
ILSP (approved or unapproved): 15;
Component-approved ILSP: 15;
DHS-approved ILSP: 15.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS-provided data.
[End of table]
Program Execution Challenges:
In addition to challenges related to acquisition planning, the
programs we reviewed reported program execution challenges related to
technical capability, partner dependence, and funding. While the
challenges we identify below are not exhaustive, this summary provides
insight into the issues programs reported.
Technical capability includes hardware or software functionality, such
as the operation of radar equipment in the case of SBInet, or legacy
equipment nearing the end of its useful life in the case of the
Electronic Baggage Screening Program. Testing helps to ensure that
programs meet technical requirements to deliver needed capabilities,
and our prior work has found that programs proceeding with
acquisitions prior to completion of testing can result in delays in
achieving technical capability. Several programs in our review
reported substantial investment in acquisitions prior to completion of
testing. For example, three Coast Guard programs we reviewed, Maritime
Patrol Aircraft, Response Boat-Medium and Sentinel, reported placing
orders for or receiving significant numbers of units prior to
completing testing to demonstrate that what the programs are buying
meets Coast Guard needs. Our prior work has found that resolution of
problems discovered during testing can sometimes require costly
redesign or rework.[Footnote 46]
Programs also raised dependence on corporations, other agencies, or
other programs as a challenge to delivering certain capabilities. For
example, Secure Flight officials reported dependence on commercial
aircraft operators complying with the implementation schedule as the
greatest program risk. In another case, Customs and Border
Protection's delays in network upgrades have negatively affected
response times for the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative.
Almost half of all programs reported concerns over funding, although
the nature and cause of those concerns varied among programs. Our
prior work found that the budget process for funding major
acquisitions and the investment review process were not aligned. As a
result, many major DHS investments received funding without
determining that mission needs and requirements were justified. For
example, after DHS approved and funded the Automated Commercial
Environment program, program officials found that they did not have a
full understanding of all requirements and have experienced cost
growth. Program officials said the future of the program is dependent
on departmental funding decisions. In addition, our past work found
that many major acquisition budget decisions were reached without life-
cycle cost estimates, which are essential to making informed budget
decisions. For example, the Electronic Baggage Screening Program
reported that annual compliance costs and recapitalization expenses,
when combined with recurring programwide costs, have sometimes
exceeded the budget. In future years, program costs could grow
significantly as cost estimates are reassessed to include new
requirements. DHS has been working toward validating the program's
cost estimate. Changes in mandated requirements, such as legal or
regulatory changes that require system changes, can also affect
program budgets. For example, Rescue 21 reported cost increases due to
new protocols and external technology standards.
Program Assessments:
The two-page assessments of the 18 programs we reviewed provide an
overview of each program and describe the reported challenges. On the
first page of the assessment, we present a general description; a
program status narrative; a timeline identifying key dates for the
program; essential information about the program; a table showing the
initial and latest estimates of cost, schedule, and quantities; and
key program issues under "Program Challenges." We present approval
dates for key program documents requiring departmental or component
approval depending on the phase of the acquisition. On the second page
of the assessment, we provide background information, a description of
program performance, and an analysis of key program challenges.
The assessments are based on program office reported information as of
2009 with the exception of the cost data. We based our analysis of
cost on OMB's Exhibit 300s as of January or February 2010 and the
Coast Guard's Quarterly Acquisition Reports to Congress as these
sources represented more complete and official data used for making
important planning and budgeting decisions. See appendix I for more
information on our scope and methodology for reporting on cost and
schedule data, program challenges, and program office workforces.
[End of section]
Customs and Border Protection: Automated Commercial Environment:
[Photograph: Source: Automated Commercial Environment Program]
The Automated Commercial Environment is the commercial trade
processing system being developed by U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) that aims to facilitate the movement of legitimate
trade, strengthen border security, and serve as the single point of
collection and access for trade data among federal agencies.
Current Status:
The initial software releases delivered between 2003 and 2005
significantly exceeded their estimated costs. Three remaining software
releases will not be completed as initially planned and future
releases will be funded based on individual business cases.
Timeline:
Start of acquisition (5/01);
Initial capability (Release 1) (2/03);
Release 2 (10/03);
DHS program approval (11/03);
Release 3 (8/04);
Release 4 (4/05);
Advanced targeting (9/07);
Reference data (1/09);
Additional entry summary types (2/10);
Full operating capability (TBD).
Program Essentials:
Component: Customs and Border Protection;
Major contractor(s): International Business Machines Global Services;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $268 million;
Program office workforce: 68 total government positions planned; 68
total government staff employed; 40 support contractors.
Program Challenges:
* Unstable and undefined requirements;
* Software testing issues;
* Schedule delays;
* Cost growth and lack of funding.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $2,125 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $2,222 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $4,776 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $4,532 million[A];
Quantity: Initial estimate: N/A;
Quantity: Latest estimate: N/A;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: Feb. 2003;
Initial capability: Latest estimate: Feb. 2003;
Full capability: Initial estimate: Sept. 2010;
Full capability: Latest estimate: TBD.
[A] Note: Estimates submitted to the Office of Management and Budget
for 2008 and 2011. Program officials do not expect ACE to deliver all
initially planned capabilities.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of:Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: Jan. 2006.
Initial version of:Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Oct. 2004.
Initial version of:Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of:Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: Oct. 2004.
Initial version of:Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Automated Commercial Environment:
Background:
Initiated in 2001 to support Title VI of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, commonly known as the Customs Modernization Act, the
Automated Commercial Environment program seeks to replace and
supplement existing cargo processing technology.
Deployed in phases, the program incrementally provides capabilities
across all modes of transportation, replacing existing systems with a
single, multimodal manifest system for land, air, rail, and sea cargo.
The program will serve as the central data collection system for
federal agencies needing access to international trade data, and is
expected to deliver these capabilities in a secure, paper-free, web-
enabled environment.
Operational capabilities already delivered by the program include
screening cargo and conveyances, analyzing data to support targeting
of high-risk entities, and processing truck manifests electronically.
Performance:
The initial software releases delivered between 2003 and 2005
significantly exceeded their estimated costs. ACE's software lines of
code increased from the acquisition program baselines's figure of
1,156,566 to 4,255,000. According to program officials, the remaining
software releases will not be completed in accordance with the program
baseline, due to the program lacking sufficient funding to complete
them as planned. The estimated cost growth for these releases is not
yet included in the latest cost estimate, pending a decision being
made on the future of the program. Due to limited funding, one release
will likely be eliminated from the program and the two others will
likely be disaggregated into a number of smaller projects, some of
which will be discontinued. The decision as to which projects will be
continued or cut will be based on available funding.
The program office found in 2005 that it did not have a full
understanding of all requirements and that existing requirements were
missing about 20 percent of needed functionality. Program officials
acknowledged the development of some software releases was not divided
into sufficiently manageable blocks and requirements were not well
defined from the outset of the program.
Additionally, software integration testing of a key project was
incomplete and allowed poor code to enter the system, although this
code was not deployed. This resulted in a much longer system
integration testing period than originally estimated, leading to
programwide schedule delays.
Challenges:
The program has been executed using component-approved operational
requirements that are not yet approved by DHS. Program officials said
requirements growth and lack of requirements definition contributed to
the schedule delays and contract cost overruns. Program officials said
the future of the program is dependent on a number of factors, such as
DHS funding decisions and the results of software testing. Program
officials expect the remaining planned projects to move to smaller
programs so they will have better-defined and more manageable
requirements. Officials believe that simply restructuring the existing
program would result in additional cost growth and schedule delays.
The program is working with the department to better manage future
requirements and program risks. For example, the department has
recently tasked a high-level component official with taking the lead
on the program's requirements' oversight and prioritization.
Program Office Comments:
The program office provided technical comments on a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Customs and Border Protection: SBInet Block 1:
[Photograph: Source: SBInet Program Office]
SBInet Block 1 is a surveillance, command, control, communications,
and intelligence system being fielded in Arizona that is intended to
mitigate or eliminate vulnerabilities along the international border
between ports of entry. Block 1 is an element of DHS's Secure Border
Initiative, a comprehensive, multiyear plan to secure the borders of
the United States and reduce illegal cross border activities such as
smuggling of economic migrants, illegal drugs, and people with
terrorist intent.
Current Status:
DHS plans to complete Block 1 operational testing and evaluation and
complete final acceptance of systems at the initial Block 1 sites by
March 2011. Future project funding is being delayed by DHS until an
assessment of SBInet is completed.
Timeline:
Start of acquisition (9/06);
Preliminary design review (4/07);
Procurement start (6/08);
Program baseline approval (3/09);
Operational testing complete (3/11);
Nogales/Sonoita deployments (12/11);
Ajo-2/Casa Grande deployments (3/12);
Naco/Douglas/Wilcox deployments (6/12)
Full operating capability (12/13).
Program Essentials:
Component: Customs and Border Protection;
Major contractor(s): The Boeing Company;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $297.2 million;
Program Office workforce: 161 total government positions planned;
87 total government staff employed; 88 support contractors.
Program Challenges:
* Delayed approval of program baseline;
* Schedule delays;
* Technical problems;
* Understaffing.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $284 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $1,885 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $579 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $3,738 million[A];
Quantity: Initial estimate: 1;
Quantity: Latest estimate: 1;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: Oct. 2008
Initial capability: Latest estimate: Mar. 2011
Full capability: Initial estimate: Dec. 2008
Full capability: Latest estimate: Dec. 2013
[A] Note: Cost estimates are for overall SBInet program submitted to
the Office of Management and Budget for 2008 and 2011.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: Mar. 2009.
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Mar. 2007.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
SBInet Block 1:
Background:
SBInet Block 1 is a border security system being developed and
deployed to help secure portions of the international border in
Arizona. The system will detect and track intruders using a set of
fixed surveillance towers. The program is initially deploying to two
sites, known as Tucson-1 and Ajo-1. The program plans to complete
testing before DHS approves deployment at additional Block 1 sites.
Tucson-1, the planned site of Block 1 operational testing and
evaluation, covers 23 miles of border in one of CBP's busiest areas.
We have reported since 2007 on acquisition and information technology
management issues that increase the risk of SBInet underperformance.
Systems previously deployed in the Tucson area under the SBInet
Project 28 pilot in 2008 did not fully meet CBP's expectations; Block
1 will replace these systems. Our reviews and covert tests conducted
over the years identified numerous security vulnerabilities along U.S.
international borders and operational issues in program delays that
limited SBInet usefulness to CBP. CBP told us in 2008 that Block 1
would help address these vulnerabilities.
Performance:
The December 2006 SBInet Expenditure Plan that was approved by DHS
planned for SBInet to be deployed in the Tucson and Yuma Sectors by
December 2008. However, program officials now expect system
deployments to continue until December 2013. They expect to complete
operational testing and final acceptance of the initial Block 1
systems at the Tucson-1 and Ajo-1 sites by March 2011. The Block 1
program baseline currently requires the deployment of SBInet at all
sites in Arizona by September 2011. Program officials told us that a
decision on the deployment of SBInet beyond Block 1 at other locations
would be made in the future. Contract cost estimates related to the
Block 1 deployments have risen significantly higher than the initially
estimated amounts. Program officials said that Block 1's delays, have
led to substantial cost growth, and they expect to have an updated
program cost estimate before SBInet's next department-level review.
The program office reported that systems at Tucson-1 were
operational and used by Border Patrol for night operations as of March
2010. The Homeland Security Secretary ordered a reassessment of the
SBInet program in January 2010 citing unacceptable delays. In March
2010, she announced that $50 million in program funding is being
reallocated to other border security technologies, and that funding
for future projects is on hold, pending the completion of an
assessment of SBInet.
Challenges:
DHS approved the Block 1 acquisition program baseline more than 2
years after the start of the SBInet acquisition, and 4 months after
completion of the critical design review, precluding the initial
design from being informed by approved program requirements. As of the
fall of 2009, the program had identified several high and moderate
risks that could prevent SBInet from delivering a system that meets
the Border Patrol's needs under the existing schedule. Among these
risks are problems with radar functionality, problems with image
clarity, a lack of program analysis tools, and system security and
sustainment risks. Program officials said that the radar may be
modified to a point that it is no longer a commercial off-the-shelf
item, possibly leading to higher costs and to the program not meeting
a program requirement for using unmodified commercial equipment.
Program officials identified risks related to unique environmental
requirements at certain sites that could cause some systems deployed
after Tucson-1 to undergo significant rework or not meet program
requirements for correctly identifying detected subjects.
Additionally, the SBInet program office is staffed substantially below
planned staffing levels for government positions.
Program Office Comments:
The program office provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate. As of March 2010, SBInet program
officials indicated they did not expect any previously identified
challenges to delay the completion of Tucson-1 or interfere with other
currently planned program activities.
[End of section]
Customs and Border Protection: TECS Modernization:
[Photograph: Source: Customs and Border Protection]
The Department of the Treasury brought TECS online in the 1980s. DHS
is now responsible for the system. Customs and Border Protection uses
the mainframe-based application to disseminate data to support
inspections of travelers at ports of entry. The TECS Modernization
program plans to improve search capabilities, enhance data
integration, provide the flexibility necessary to respond to evolving
threats, and eliminate older, unreliable technology.
Current Status:
Customs and Border Protection plans to execute the modernization
program in five segments. Customs and Border Protection has begun
segments 1, 2 and 3, and expects to achieve full operating capability
for all five segments by the end of fiscal year 2015.
Timeline:
Start of acquisition (12/07);
Segment 1 and 2 start (4/08);
Segment 3 start (11/09);
Initial operating capability (3/10);
Segment 4 start (10/10);
Segment 5 start (1/12);
Full operating capability (9/15).
Program Essentials:
Component: Customs and Border Protection;
Major contractor(s): BART & Associates and Mythics;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $50 million;
Program office workforce: 1 total government position planned; 4
government staff employed*; 3 support contractors.
* Government staff numbers refer to full time equivalents.
Program Challenges:
* Schedule delays due to funding constraints;
* Lack of approved baseline, requirements and planning documents;
* Understaffing.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $406 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $410 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $888 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $1,104 million[A];
Quantity: Initial estimate: Not applicable;
Quantity: Latest estimate: Not applicable;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: Mar. 2010;
Initial capability: Latest estimate: Mar. 2010;
Full capability: Initial estimate: Sept. 2013;
Full capability: Latest estimate: Sept. 2015.
[A] Note: Cost estimates submitted to the Office of Management and
Budget for 2009 and 2011, represent both Customs and Border Protection
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement efforts.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
TECS Modernization:
Background:
TECS is increasingly difficult to maintain because of technology
obsolescence, and inability to support new requirements, particularly
those involving access to other systems. Customs and Border Protection
is migrating the system to a new architecture in order to meet DHS's
mission requirements. Additionally, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement manages a parallel but independent project modernizing the
functionality of TECS unique to its respective mission.
Performance:
The modernization program lacks an approved baseline, Operational
Requirements Document, and Acquisition Plan. Customs and Border
Protection expected full operating capability by the end of fiscal
year 2013, but program officials state that milestone has slipped by 2
years due to funding constraints.
The program has consolidated several projects originally identified as
independently providing capability. In September 2008, the program
office planned to execute system modernization through 16 discrete
projects, but by June 2009, the program office had reduced that number
to 13. In September 2009, these projects were further consolidated
into 5 discrete projects due to departmental guidance.
The program office also determined that its original cost estimation
approach did not accurately capture costs as part of the life-cycle
cost estimate. Costs considered part of the acquisition effort in 2007
were recategorized as part of the maintenance effort in 2009, and
program planning cost estimates increased because the program office
was required to maintain its planning function after the system
achieved full operating capability, and therefore needed to include
those costs in the estimates.
Challenges:
The system modernization program office submitted the program's
Operational Requirements Document, Acquisition Program Baseline, Test
Evaluation Master Plan, and Integrated Logistics Support Plan to DHS
oversight officials who reviewed the documents in July and August
2009. These documents were returned to Customs and Border Protection
to be revised, and had not yet been approved as of February 2010.
The program office requested and received funding to hire one full-
time government staff member in fiscal year 2009. In addition, three
other personnel funded through the Passenger Systems Program Office
were assigned to the system modernization program as of September
2009. The DHS Chief Information Officer reviewed the program in
October 2009, and stated that the program office appears understaffed
with respect to the size and scope of the program.
Program Office Comments:
DHS provided technical comments on a draft of this assessment, which
were incorporated as appropriate. Additionally, DHS emphasized that
the consolidation of projects did not reduce the scope of the program,
and that the planned full operating capability date changed to 2015
because anticipated funding increases for fiscal years 2011 through
2013 failed to materialize.
[End of section]
Customs and Border Protection: Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative:
[Photograph: Source: Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative]
The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative acquisition program intends
to enable Customs and Border Protection to effectively and efficiently
address new traveler documentation requirements. The program deploys
Radio Frequency Identification and License Plate Reader (RFID/LPR)
hardware and Vehicle Primary Client (VPC) software to land ports of
entry to improve traveler processing. The program has completed the
installation of VPC software.
Current Status:
The first phase of the program achieved full operating capability in
fiscal year 2009. However, program officials explained that the
program has been expanded and now expect a second phase to continue
through the end of fiscal year 2010.
Timeline:
Start of acquisition (9/06);
Cost benefit analysis (10/07);
VPC preliminary and critical design review (11/07);
RFID/LPR preliminary design review (2/08);
RFID/LPR critical design review (4/08);
Initial operating capability (9/08);
Phase I full operating capability (6/09);
Phase II full operating capability (9/10).
Program Essentials:
Component: Customs and Border Protection;
Major contractor(s): IBM, Unisys Corp., and ITS Services;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $168 million;
Program office workforce: 20 total government positions planned;
20 government staff employed; 68 support contractors.
Program Challenges:
* Increased program scope;
* Unfunded requirements;
* Delays in Customs and Border Protection network upgrades.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $312 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $311 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $863 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $1,362 million[A];
Quantity (RFID/LPR): Initial estimate: 354;
Quantity (RFID/LPR): Latest estimate: 487;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: Oct. 2008;
Initial capability: Latest estimate: Sept. 2008;
Full capability: Initial estimate: June 2009;
Full capability: Latest estimate: Sept. 2010.
[A] Note: Cost estimates submitted to the Office of Management and
Budget for 2009 and 2011; latest cost estimate does not account for
any acquisition costs beyond fiscal year 2010.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: Jan. 2009.
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Feb. 2007.
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Apr. 2008.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative:
Background:
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required
the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the Secretary
of State to develop and implement a plan, known as the Western
Hemisphere Travel Initiative, which requires all travelers to present
a passport or other acceptable document denoting identity and
citizenship when entering the United States.
Customs and Border Protection determined that the initiative could
increase costs to the traveling public and increase the agency's
workload. Improved processes, technology and facilities were needed to
prevent longer inspection processing times, and the program is
expected to limit potential border crossing delays created by new
traveler requirements.
Performance:
In June 2009, the program provided the full operating capability
originally expected. However, the program's scope and capability
requirements have been expanded, and a second phase of the program is
now scheduled to continue through September 2010. Customs and Border
Protection decided to increase the number of RFID/LPR deployed as well
as VPC installations. Additionally, the RFID/LPR equipment was
originally required to be compatible with four different types of
identification documents, but was revised to be compatible with twelve.
Program officials expect the program's acquisition costs, including
phase 2, to be $1 million lower than originally estimated due to lower
costs for the technology and individual RFID/LPR and VPC installations.
Challenges:
Although the current acquisition cost estimate is lower than the
program's original estimate, program officials anticipate total
funding shortfalls for fiscal years 2011 through 2015 because program
funding does not fully cover life-cycle cost estimates. This shortfall
would likely require the program to scale back operations and
maintenance efforts and delay future enhancements.
Additionally, program officials expect DHS to expand the program's
scope beyond the second phase during fiscal year 2010 to address new
requirements for pedestrian and outbound vehicle processing.
Further, schedule delays for a Customs and Border Protection effort to
upgrade local and wide area network bandwidth capacity at ports of
entry could jeopardize program performance, particularly in terms of
response times. Originally scheduled for completion by June 2009, as
of January 2010, Customs and Border Protection had not yet determined
when the wide area network upgrades would occur at 19 of 151 sites, or
when local area network upgrades would occur at 144 of 163 sites.
However, actual response times exceeded the objective performance
levels from June 2009 to June 2010.
Program Office Comments:
The program office generally concurred with the assessment and
provided technical comments which were incorporated as appropriate.
Additionally, DHS emphasized that the program provided the full
operating capability originally expected in June 2009, and that the
rollout of the second phase caused the change in the full capability
date.
[End of section]
Federal Emergency Management Agency: Integrated Public Alert and
Warning System:
[Illustration: Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency]
The Integrated Public Alert and Warning System is the nation's next-
generation infrastructure of alert and warning networks expanding upon
the traditional audio-only radio and television Emergency Alert System
by providing one message over more media to more people before,
during, and after a disaster. When complete, the program is planned as
a "system of systems" forming the country's comprehensive public alert
system.
Current Status:
The program is awaiting component approval of key program
documentation, including the initial acquisition program baseline and
the first operational requirements document.
Timeline:
Start of acquisition (9/06);
Preliminary design review (3/10);
Critical design review (9/10);
Test readiness review (12/10);
Initial operating capability (3/12);
Full operating capability (TBD).
Program Essentials:
Component: Federal Emergency Management Agency;
Major contractor(s): Booz Allen Hamilton, CACI, and Acuity Consulting;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $16.8 million;
Program office Workforce: 11 total government positions planned; 10
total government staff employed; 23 support contractors.
Program Challenges:
* Requirements instability;
* Lacking approved baseline, requirements, and planning documents;
* Turnover in program leadership and staffing.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $115 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $136 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $279 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $264 million[A];
Quantity*: Initial estimate: 32;
Quantity*: Latest estimate: 32;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: TBD;
Initial capability: Latest estimate: Not available;
Full capability: Initial estimate: Mar. 2012;
Full capability: Latest estimate: Not available.
[A] Note: Cost data provided by program office.
* Quantities are for Primary Entry Point stations.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: Not available.
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Not available.
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Not available.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: Not available.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date: Not available.
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System:
Background:
Through the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System program, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) seeks to expand the
Emergency Alert System to include more modern technologies. Since the
program began awarding contracts in 2005, program requirements have
changed.
The program originally planned to build an infrastructure to deliver
state and local alerts through multiple pathways. However, program
officials told us their vision changed to focus exclusively on
disseminating presidential messages and setting alert and warning
technical standards in 2007. In early 2009, the program shifted focus
to again include infrastructure for state and local alerts.
We have previously reported that FEMA has not systematically assessed
program outcomes or lessons learned from pilot projects, and has not
periodically reported on program progress as required by a June 2006
Executive Order.
Our prior work has shown that without validated requirements or a
program baseline, DHS will not know whether the program expenditures
fully satisfy department needs, how well the program is executed, or
whether further investments are warranted.
Performance:
Although the program was initiated in 2004, FEMA has not yet approved
an acquisition program baseline for the program or other key program
documents. According to program office officials, the program did not
begin to develop programwide life-cycle cost estimates until 2009, and
these estimates have not yet been finalized or approved.
Program officials told us that they are working with stakeholders to
better define requirements, and have drafted an operational
requirements document and acquisition program baseline. These
documents are currently under review by FEMA, which oversees the
program as a nonmajor acquisition.
Program officials said that they are transitioning to operate under
the November 2008 Department of Homeland Security acquisition guidance.
Challenges:
The program must overcome significant challenges in order to deliver a
comprehensive public alert and warning system. Program officials said
they face challenges in upgrading some Primary Entry Point stations,
which are radio stations providing emergency information, to meet
changing survivability requirements”as they are subject to legal
restrictions concerning the enhancement of private property using
government funds. This could have a significant negative impact on
system reliability and operations.
Moreover, frequent changes in organizational leadership and other
staffing-related issues have affected program performance. The program
office recently hired its fourth Program Director in 5 years. FEMA
officials acknowledge that leadership changes and high turnover make
it difficult to consistently manage the program.
Program Office Comments:
The program office provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate. Program officials indicated that
Acquisition Review Board reviews by both FEMA and DHS were planned to
occur by May 2010, and all required program documentation has been
drafted. Program officials stated that a recent FEMA program
management review provided top scores for scope, performance, cost,
schedule, and risk management controls and processes on the program.
[End of section]
National Protection and Programs Directorate: National Cybersecurity
Protection System:
[Photograph: Source: National Cybersecurity Protection System Program
Office]
The National Cybersecurity Protection System is intended to reduce the
federal government's vulnerabilities to cyber threats by decreasing
the frequency of cyberspace disruptions, and by minimizing the
duration and damage of those disruptions. The program consists of four
discrete "blocks," including the current state and three follow-on end-
to-end system upgrades.
Current Status:
The block 1.0 deployment began in 2003 and was completed after
deploying capabilities at 31 sites. DHS is currently deploying block
2.0, and plans to complete the deployment by March 2013. DHS plans to
deploy block 2.1 during fiscal years 2010 and 2011. DHS has classified
the block 3.0 deployment schedule.
Timeline:
Start of acquisition (6/08);
Block 2.0 operational readiness review (2/09);
Block 2.0 initial operating capability (8/09);
Block 2.1 operational readiness review (12/09);
Block 2.1 initial operating capability (9/10);
Block 2.1 full operating capability (6/11);
Block 2.0 full operating capability (3/13).
Program Essentials:
Component: National Protection and Programs Directorate;
Major contractor(s): General Dynamics Advanced Information Systems;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $186 million;
Program office workforce: 26 total government positions planned;
11 total government staff employed; 122 support contractors.
Program Challenges:
* Schedule slippage;
* Unstable architecture and deployment strategy;
* Lacks risk mitigation and key project management capabilities.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $664 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $546 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $1,366 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $1,257 million[A];
Quantity: Initial estimate: 100;
Quantity: Latest estimate: 100;
Initial capability (Block 2.0): Initial estimate: June 2009;
Initial capability (Block 2.0): Latest estimate: Aug. 2009;
Full capability (Block 2.0): Initial estimate: Mar. 2013;
Full capability (Block 2.0): Latest estimate: Mar. 2013.
[A] Note: Cost estimates submitted to the Office of Management and
Budget for 2010 and 2011.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: Feb. 2009.
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Feb. 2009.
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Oct. 2009.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date:Not yet approved.
National Cybersecurity Protection System:
Background:
We have reported over the last several years that DHS has yet to fully
satisfy its cybersecurity responsibilities. In response to National
Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 23, and the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative,
the National Cyber Security Division of the National Protection and
Programs Directorate established two programs”the National
Cybersecurity Protection Program and the National Cybersecurity
Protection System. The program encompasses the people, activities,
processes, and technologies intended to fulfill DHS's cyber mission,
and the system is expected to integrate the hardware and software
procured to support the program.
Block 1.0 currently provides flow collection and data storage
capabilities. Block 2.0 will add intrusion detection capabilities.
Block 2.1 will enhance visualization capabilities. Block 3.0
capabilities are classified. DHS also plans future blocks to improve
inter-department information sharing and add near real-time detect-and-
protect capabilities; however, schedules for these blocks have not yet
been determined.
The Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2009 and the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act of 2010 required DHS to submit an expenditure plan
for House and Senate Appropriations Committees' approval prior to
receiving 50 percent of the National Cyber Security Division's budget.
Performance:
In July 2009, program officials notified component and department-
level oversight officials that the program needed to reschedule the
deployments of blocks 2.1 and 3.0. The block 2.1 full operating
capability date slipped from the third quarter of fiscal year 2010 to
the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. The new deployment schedule for
block 3.0 is classified. Program officials attributed the
rescheduling to a delay in receiving half of 2009 funding based on
approval of the National Cyber Security Division's fiscal year 2009
expenditure plan. The funding was made available in June 2009.
Program officials said delayed funding also delayed the implementation
of the program's continuity of operations plan by 7 months. Program
officials said that the plan is expected to ensure that the system can
continue to operate despite disruptions, and will improve system data
services, which cannot currently handle block 2.0 data volume and
replication requirements. Program officials now expect completion of
the plan by the end of 2011.
Challenges:
The acquisition program's architecture and deployment strategy has not
been stabilized for blocks 2.0 and 3.0, although the block 2.0
deployment has begun, and DHS is planning to accelerate development
and implementation of certain block 3.0 activities. DHS has
acknowledged that the acquisition program lacks risk mitigation and
key project management capabilities. DHS has stated that the program
has efforts planned and under way to implement more effective
controls. Program officials said that they are developing a risk
mitigation plan based on an exercise concluding in 2010 or 2011,
depending on the decision to execute an additional, optional phase.
Program Office Comments and Our Response:
The program office provided technical comments to a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Regarding the
statement that the architecture and deployment strategy has not been
stabilized, the program office suggested that the December 2008
baseline provided such a strategy. However, in December 2008, the
program reported to the DHS acquisition oversight board that this
instability was a program risk, and the program also reported the risk
to us in July and October 2009.
[End of section]
National Protection and Programs Directorate: US-VISIT Unique Identity:
[Photograph: Source: US-VISIT]
United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-
VISIT) collects, maintains, and shares information on foreign
nationals, including biometric identifiers, acquired by several source
agencies. Unique Identity, one of several investments under US-VISIT,
is modernizing the current biometric data system by introducing 10-
print finger scans and adding identity management capabilities such as
data sharing and interoperability with Department of Defense (DOD) and
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) systems.
Current Status:
US-VISIT does not have an approved program baseline including all
relevant investments as DHS is restructuring the program. According to
program documents, Unique Identity will achieve full operating
capability in September 2014.
Timeline:
Start of Unique Identity acquisition (6/04);
Interoperability preliminary design review (3/08);
Interoperability critical design review (6/08);
Interoperability initial operating capability (10/08);
10-print initial operating capability (3/09);
Unique Identity full operating capability (9/14).
Program Essentials:
Component: National Protection and Programs Directorate;
Major contractor(s): Accenture LLP;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $28.7 million;
Program office: Not available for the separate workforce
investments under US-VISIT.
Program Challenges:
* Unstable and unapproved requirements;
* Lack of approved program baseline;
* Dependence on outside agency to achieve full operating capability.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $160 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $79 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $225 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $132 million[A];
Quantity: Initial estimate: Not applicable;
Quantity: Latest estimate: Not applicable;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: Sept. 2008;
Initial capability: Latest estimate: Mar. 2009;
Full capability: Initial estimate: Not defined;
Full capability: Latest estimate: Sept. 2014.
[A] Note: Estimates submitted to the Office of Management and Budget
for Unique Identity 2010 and 2011.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: June 2009.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
US-VISIT Unique Identity:
Background:
The US-VISIT program was started to meet congressional mandates to
record the entry and exit of foreign nationals. The program currently
provides identity management services through operations and
maintenance of IDENT”the current automated biometric identification
system, the Arrival and Departure Information System, and US-VISIT's
analytic support services. At the time of our review, US-VISIT was
restructuring the program into individual investments to provide
better visibility and traceability of investment dollars to individual
projects. Because of the restructuring, the program was unable to
provide complete data at either the program or project level. As a
result, we were not able to fully assess the program in its entirety.
US-VISIT development and deployment efforts consist of two ongoing
projects: (1) Unique Identity and (2) Comprehensive Exit. In fiscal
year 2015, Unique Identity is projected to enter the operations and
maintenance phase and become part of the overall IDENT investment. We
did not include Comprehensive Exit in our review because DHS did not
request fiscal year 2010 funds for this project.
We have previously reported on limitations and made recommendations to
improve DHS's efforts to plan and execute its efforts to deliver a
Comprehensive Exit capability.
Program Performance:
US-VISIT, which includes the Unique Identity investment, lacks an
approved acquisition program baseline and other acquisition planning
and requirements documents. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa
Entry Reform Act of 2002, as amended, mandated the use of a biometric
standard developed under the USA Patriot Act to track entry and exit
of foreign nationals by 2005. The program partially meets that
requirement, capturing fingerprint data for all foreign nationals
entering the U.S., transmitting the data to a central database, and
analyzing that data. Currently, an entry capability operates at almost
300 U.S. ports of entry but a Comprehensive Exit capability does not.
Although program officials said that the program has largely
transitioned from a 2-print to a 10-print system, the program has yet
to fully develop and deploy a back-end system to match the 10-prints
against other biographic or biometric data. Unique Identity has
reached initial operational capability and is interoperable with the
FBI's fingerprint database. According to program officials, most
responses from the FBI system are completed within 15 minutes;
however, this system can require up to 72 hours for results. Full
operational capability, which is in the initial planning stage, will
include record linking between the US-VISIT and the FBI fingerprint
systems, improved response times for searches, and notification
capabilities when updating a biometric record.
The program reported that cost estimates submitted to the Office of
Management and Budget for 2011 reflect Unique Identity cost reductions
to fit within budgetary constraints.
Challenges:
According to program officials, capabilities and requirements
constantly change as a result of new legislative and administrative
mandates. Officials do not know when US-VISIT will be fully
interoperable with the FBI fingerprint database, but they have already
agreed on capabilities and requirements work, which is in progress.
Interoperability depends upon completion of specific tasks on the
FBI's Next Generation biometric and fingerprint system, projected for
completion in 2014.
Program Office Comments:
The program office provided technical comments on a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Officials also
noted that the program has been restructured, increasing the scope of
Unique Identity, since our review began.
[End of section]
Office of Health Affairs: Biosurveillance Common Operating Network:
[Illustration: Source: SAIC]
The mission of the National Biosurveillance Integration Center is to
collect, integrate, analyze, and disseminate information from existing
human health, animal, plant, food, and water surveillance systems, and
relevant threat and intelligence information to provide early
recognition of bioevents in order to mitigate the consequences. The
Biosurveillance Common Operating Network, formerly known as National
Biosurveillance Integration System 2.0, is the information technology
system supporting the Center.
Current Status:
Program officials said that data backup capability has been delayed a
year and consider this delay a significant operational risk. The
Network is currently in the operations and maintenance phase.
Timeline:
Start of acquisition (9/06);
Preliminary design review (12/06);
Critical design review (3/07);
Initial operating capability (3/08);
Full operating capability (9/08).
Program Essentials:
Component: Office of Health Affairs;
Major contractor(s): SAIC;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $2.1 million;
Program office workforce: N/A total government positions planned;
1.25 total government staff employed; 2.5 support contractors.
Program Challenges:
* Lack of data sharing between agencies;
* Delay in data backup;
* Operations and maintenance cost increases.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $14.3 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $13.1 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $26.5 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $26.5 million[A];
Quantity: Initial estimate: 1;
Quantity: Latest estimate: 1;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: Nov. 2007;
Initial capability: Latest estimate: Mar. 2008;
Full capability: Initial estimate: Mar. 2008;
Full capability: Latest estimate: Sept. 2008*.
* Note: Capabilities delivered varied substantially from initial
estimates; the Center was not fully operational as an integration
center by Sept. 2008.
[A] Program reported cost estimates for 2006 and 2008.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: Not available.
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Not available.
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Not available.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: Apr. 2006.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date:Not available.
Biosurveillance Common Operating Network:
Background:
The Center was created to integrate real-time biosurveillance data
from multiple federal agencies such as the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) in order to rapidly identify and
characterize a bioterrorist attack. Once a potential event is
detected, the Center disseminates alerts to enable rapid response to a
biological event to mitigate the potential consequences.
In July 2007, the DHS Office of Inspector General reported that the
Center lacked sustained program leadership and was not a priority,
because ownership of the program shifted among department
organizations numerous times, with corresponding fluctuations in the
program approach, priority, and accomplishments.
The original information technology system was designed to process
structured data received directly from federal partners, such as CDC,
FDA, and USDA. However, the Center receives limited data from federal
partners and generally lacks assignments of personnel from other
agencies to leverage analytical expertise. As a result, the Network is
primarily used to search the Internet for media articles that may
contain relevant biosurveillance information for the Center's analysts.
Performance:
Program officials told us that the Network spent about $1 million less
on acquisition costs than initially estimated, although delivery of
full operating capability was delayed by 6 months. The program was
affected by lack of available biosurveillance data from other federal
agencies. The program significantly modified the system design to use
unstructured data from public sources rather than structured data from
other agencies. The program reduced costs by dropping three of six
systems, due to no longer requiring these classified systems.
Officials previously told us that they planned to add a software tool
to the Network to refine results when performing historical analysis
of archived data, but this has been put on hold due to budget
constraints.
Challenges:
We previously reported that the Center does not receive the kind of
data it has identified as most critical for supporting its mission”
particularly, data generated at the earliest stages of an event. The
Center is not fully equipped to carry out its mission because it lacks
key resources from its partner agencies”data and personnel”which
may be partially attributed to the need for greater collaboration. In
interviews with partner agencies, we found confusion, uncertainty, and
skepticism as to the value of participation in the interagency
community, as well as to the mission and purpose of the Center within
that community. Agency officials also expressed a lack of clarity
about roles, responsibilities, joint strategies, policies, and
procedures for operating across agency boundaries.
The program reported that the Network's operations and maintenance
costs are greater than originally anticipated, so the data backup
capability will be delayed for a year. Program officials consider this
delay a significant operational risk.
The program reported that no full-time government personnel are
dedicated to the Network. The Network and other Center functions share
staff, including contractor support. Furthermore, the program does not
have an approved sustainment plan although it is in the operations and
maintenance phase.
Program Office Comments and Our Response:
In responding to a draft of this assessment, the program office
provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate.
Program officials stated that all of the program's key acquisition
documents were component approved in December 2004. However, they were
unable to provide documentation of this at the time of our review.
Because the program is not a major investment, departmental approval
of key program documents is not required.
[End of section]
Office of Health Affairs: BioWatch Generation-3:
[Photograph: Source: BioWatch]
The BioWatch program's mission is to rapidly detect airborne
biological agents in order to speed response and recovery from a
terrorist event. BioWatch Generation-3 replaces manually-intensive,
primarily outdoor legacy systems with an automated detection
capability allowing a quicker response to a biological attack. This is
expected to greatly reduce the number of potential fatalities caused
by an attack by shortening the time elapsed between exposure and
treatment.
Current Status:
The program is currently evaluating biodetection technologies for a
future acquisition. Delivery of an initial capability has been delayed
18 months due to unavailability of vendor equipment, change in testing
responsibilities, and additional time required to complete DHS reviews.
Timeline:
Production readiness review (9/10);
Operational testing (9/11);
First Generation-3 deployment (9/11);
Initial operating capability (6/12);
Full operating capability (3/15).
Program Essentials:
Component: Office of Health Affairs;
Major contractor(s): Hamilton Sundstrand Northrup-Grumman;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $122 million;
Program office workforce: 5 total government positions planned;
3 total government staff employed; 9 support contractors.
Program Challenges:
* Understaffing;
* Technical risk.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $407 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $493 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $921 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $2,106 million[A];
Quantity: Initial estimate: 2,570;
Quantity: Latest estimate: 2,570;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: Dec. 2010;
Initial capability: Latest estimate: June 2012;
Full capability: Initial estimate: Mar. 2014;
Full capability: Latest estimate: Mar. 2015.
[A] Note: Estimates submitted to the Office of Management and Budget
for 2010 and 2011.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Dec. 2009.
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Apr. 2009.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: May 2009.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
BioWatch Generation-3:
Background:
Program officials told us that BioWatch Generation 1 and 2 detection
systems do not provide a long-term solution, because the collection
process is labor intensive and can require up to 36 hours to identify
a biological agent. The BioWatch Generation-3 detection system is
planned as a fully autonomous, networked biosensor that collects and
analyzes samples on-site and autonomously transmits the results to
BioWatch labs where the state laboratory directors interpret the
signal. Generation-3 is intended to detect all biological agents on
BioWatch's list of biological threats.
DHS's Office of Health Affairs developed the original Generation-3
requirements in coordination with the Science and Technology
Directorate. "Assay" validation-”testing to validate systems that can
detect biological agents”-was subsequently transitioned to the
BioWatch program.
Program officials expect to replace the about 600 existing legacy
collection systems and deploy approximately 2,000 additional detection
systems.
Performance:
Program officials said they are in the process of validating vendor
technologies to ensure meeting Generation-3 requirements. At the time
of our review, plans for testing and evaluation of new technologies
were not yet finalized. Program officials said that if no vendor
systems are proven to meet requirements, the program will return to
developing the technology of the Science and Technology Directorate.
The program is preparing for a competitive procurement.
Program officials reported that the shift of assay validation from the
Science and Technology Directorate to the Office of Health Affairs
required the program to establish a capability for evaluating existing
assays, leading to cost growth and testing delays as compared with
initial estimates. Officials also reported schedule delays due to
longer than expected time frames for vendors to deliver equipment and
internal review cycles.
The program reported a lack of concurrence with the Centers for
Disease Control on criteria for actionable assays that contributed to
increased cost and schedule delays. To address this issue, BioWatch
invested resources with a national lab and the Centers for Disease
Control to initiate a detailed plan of action for documenting
requirements for public health actionable assays.
Challenges:
The program reported that the Consolidated Security, Disaster
Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009 resulted in the
program using a competitive procurement, which prevented the use of
the incumbent contractor's more mature technologies developed by the
program. Program officials said that inclusion of the more mature
technologies would give the existing contractor an unfair advantage in
procuring future contracts. DHS officials stated that they expect the
currently identified candidate technologies to perform as well or
better than the previously developed prototypes. The program currently
lacks clear requirements due to lack of agreement between the program
office and the Centers for Disease Control on what constitutes a
public health assay. However, program officials do not expect this to
affect the first phase of the program, because they intend to use
contractor assays for this phase.
In addition, officials reported that insufficient program staffing
contributed to delays in developing plans and required documentation,
and that they were in the process of hiring additional staff.
Program Office Comments:
The program office provided technical comments on a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate.
[End of section]
Transportation Security Administration: Electronic Baggage Screening
Program:
[Photograph: Source: Transportation Security Administration]
The Electronic Baggage Screening Program is responsible for screening
all checked airline baggage in the United States, to reduce the
probability of a successful terrorist or criminal attack to the air
transportation system. The program relies on Explosive Detection
System (EDS) equipment and Explosives Trace Detector devices as
primary screening technologies.
Current Status:
The program does not have a required department-approved program
baseline or program requirements. The program is acquiring and
deploying next-generation explosive detection technology to replace
legacy systems and meet emerging threats. The program received $700
million in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) funds
which it is using to accelerate systems deployment by over 2 years.
Timeline:
Start of acquisition (8/03);
Initial operating capability (12/03);
EDS test and evaluation (5/10);
Award EDS procurement (1/11);
Full operating capability (9/19).
Program Essentials:
Component: Transportation Security Administration (TSA);
Major contractor(s): GE Homeland Protection, L-3 Communications, and
Reveal;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $336 million;
Program office workforce: 35 total government positions planned; 27
total government staff employed; 89 support contractors.
Program Challenges:
* Unapproved requirements;
* Lack of approved program baseline and planning documents;
* Technical problems.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $11,360 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $15,316 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $19,930 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $23,696 million[A];
Quantity: Initial estimate: Not applicable;
Quantity: Latest estimate: Not applicable;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: Dec. 2002;
Initial capability: Latest estimate: Dec. 2003;
Full capability: Initial estimate: Sept. 2029;
Full capability: Latest estimate: Sept. 2019.
[A] Note: Estimates submitted to the Office of Management and Budget
for 2010 and 2011.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Electronic Baggage Screening Program:
Background:
The Electronic Baggage Screening Program has received substantial
increases in funding since September 11, 2001. In addition to
receiving large supplemental appropriations in recent years, the
program received $700 million in Recovery Act funding to enhance
current threat detection capabilities, increase the efficiency of the
checked-baggage screening process, and contribute to the long-term
development of a flexible security infrastructure capable of
accommodating future growth.
Program officials explained that requirements could change in response
to emerging threats. The program does not directly fund research and
development of new technology. Instead, DHS's Science and Technology
Directorate or the Transportation Security Administration provide
specifications to vendors, allow vendors to build the systems, and
then run certification tests to verify that systems meet requirements.
If systems qualify, they undergo operational testing at TSA's System
Integration Facility.
Performance:
After a DHS review of the program's life-cycle cost estimate, program
officials informed the DHS Acquisition Review Board in November 2009
that the current estimate of $24 billion (then-year dollars) needed
more comprehensive detail and that its degree of accuracy could not be
determined. Program officials expected a complete estimate validated
by DHS in January 2010, after determining solutions for addressing
emerging threats and equipment upgrades. Program officials said that
other key program documents are moving forward in the approval process.
The program intends to award contracts for a competitive procurement
for Explosive Detection Systems screening technology by January 2011.
Program officials indicated that the sole-source contracts used for
legacy equipment were costly for the program. Program officials told
us that vendors are expected to meet the minimum subset of the new
detection requirements that include three different capability levels
for detecting homemade explosives.
Program officials reported that full capability will be reached when
optimal solutions have been deployed at all airports. However, the
time frame depends upon airport readiness and the ability of airports
to fund their share of project costs. TSA provides funding for
equipment purchase and installation and a portion of facility
modification costs, while the airport contributes the remaining share
of the funding.
Challenges:
Program officials indicated that some schedule delays have been caused
by activities related to testing, including data collection
activities, development of test sets, equipment availability, and test
scheduling. Future delays could be caused by new threats leading to
new requirements and a need for additional vendor development and
testing. Program officials stated that currently they can only test
new requirements based on the minimum level of detection required.
Furthermore, a substantial portion of legacy equipment is now nearing
the projected end of its useful life. In July 2009, the program
reported that annual compliance costs and recapitalization expenses,
when combined with recurring programwide costs, sometimes exceed the
budget. In future years, program costs could grow significantly as
cost estimates are reassessed to include new requirements.
Additionally, the program has no department-approved program documents.
Program Office Comments and Our Response:
The program office provided technical comments on a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Program officials
commented that detection requirements changed in January 2010 as a
result of a change in threats, rather than a failure to manage
requirements changes. However, detection requirements are only a
portion of program requirements, and the program does yet not have a
department-approved baseline.
[End of section]
Transportation Security Administration: Passenger Screening Program:
[Photograph: Source: Transportation Security Administration]
The Passenger Screening Program tests, deploys, and sustains screening
equipment to identify threats at airport terminal passenger screening
checkpoints. The program relies primarily on commercial-off-the-shelf
software technologies to meet requirements.
Current Status:
The Passenger Screening Program deploys next generation detection
systems to address existing security gaps and detect a wider variety
of threats (such as new explosive materials and nonmetallic weapons).
The program received $300 million in American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act) funds to accelerate deployment of new
equipment by more than 3 years.
Timeline:
Start of acquisition (9/03);
Advanced Imaging Technology initial operating capability (3/10);
Bottled Liquids Scanner full operating capability (6/11);
Enhanced Metal Detector full operating capability (3/15);
Explosives Trace Detector 2 full operating capability (6/15).
Program Essentials:
Component: Transportation Security Administration;
Major contractor(s): Smiths Detection, Rapiscan, and L-3
Communications;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $155.1 million;
Program office workforce: 20 total government positions planned; 16
total government staff employed; 32 support contractors.
Program Challenges:
* Unstable requirements;
* Technical problems;
* Sustainment funding.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $1,872 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $2,559 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $2,593 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $4,306 million[A];
Quantity: Initial estimate: Not applicable;
Quantity: Latest estimate: Not applicable;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: Dec. 2002;
Initial capability: Latest estimate: Apr. 2006;
Full capability: Initial estimate: Dec. 2009;
Full capability: Latest estimate: June 2015.
[A] Note: Estimates submitted to the Office of Management and Budget
for 2010 and 2011.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: May 2006.
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Sept. 2008.
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Passenger Screening Program:
Background:
The Transportation Security Administration reported meeting the
statutory deadline for screening passengers and baggage in 2002, but
with some capability shortfalls and the opportunity to improve
effectiveness and efficiency of passenger screening checkpoints and
equipment. Since fiscal year 2002, DHS invested over $921 million in
airline passenger screening technologies. Program officials told us
that ever-changing threats necessitate ongoing investment in new and
improved technology, to provide the traveling public with optimal
security screening benefits.
The program is acquiring numerous advanced technological systems and
testing and evaluating the systems based on detection and nondetection
requirements. Systems need to detect explosives, fit within the
constraints of existing airport floor space, and maintain passenger
and baggage screening throughput requirements.
In 2009, we reported that the Transportation Security Administration
had been unable to assess the extent to which technology investments
have reduced or mitigated the risk of terrorist attacks. We also
reported that Explosives Trace Portals were deployed without resolving
performance problems or validating operational requirements, and that
these systems have not been proven to increase security at
checkpoints. Explosive Trace Portals deployment was halted in June
2006 because of performance problems and high installation costs.
Performance:
DHS approved the program baseline in 2006; however, according to
program officials, the requirements have been revised each year since
2001 due to rapidly changing technologies and threats. DHS asked the
program manager to revise the life-cycle cost estimate to include long-
term costs. The program is also revising its Acquisition Program
Baseline to incorporate updated technologies.
Four projects have not begun acquisition activities and an additional
four are in the integration and testing phase. Achievement of full
operating capability for the program was initially planned for 2009,
but has been delayed until June 2015, due in part to changes in
technologies.
Challenges:
Program officials reported they are not able to field new technologies
quickly. The program must qualify new technology before the vendor can
compete at the direct order level. They also noted that commercial-off-
the-shelf technology may not address perceived threats to aviation.
Program officials also said that poor test results of new technologies
negatively affect the program because they cannot rapidly deploy new
technology. According to program officials, it is sometimes difficult
for detection systems to meet program requirements and vendors may
require multiple attempts to pass tests because they lack access to
restricted explosives.
The accelerated deployment using the $300 million in Recovery Act
funds”almost twice the amount of the program's budget request for
fiscal year 2010”places increased demands on the program staff to meet
the new schedule. Additionally, the program may not have the
maintenance and system sustainment funds to support the accelerated
deployment.
Program Office Comments:
Program office officials provided technical comments which were
incorporated as appropriate. Program officials stated that certain key
program documents did not previously require departmental approval and
that the component has produced life-cycle cost estimates from product
acquisition to disposal. However, they also told us that life-cycle
cost estimates have not yet been validated. In addition, they stated
new capability requirements are added within the existing program,
rather than creating new programs as time progresses, which affects
program schedule.
[End of section]
Transportation Security Administration: Secure Flight:
[Photograph: Source: Transportation Security Administration]
The Secure Flight program allows the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) to compare air passengers' information to
Terrorist Screening Center watch lists for international and domestic
flights. Aircraft operators collect passenger information and transmit
the data to TSA. Secure Flight conducts automated comparisons for all
passengers for whom data are submitted, and more than 99 percent will
be cleared in advance of their arrival at the airport, according to
program officials.
Current Status:
Program officials reported that Secure Flight achieved initial
operating capability in January 2009, and planned to implement the
program with all aircraft operators by December 2010. The program is
currently in the process of deploying the system to airlines.
Timeline:
Start of acquisition (2/04);
Preliminary design review (5/08);
Critical design review (7/08);
Production readiness review (12/08);
Initial operating capability (1/09);
Full operating capability (12/10).
Program Essentials:
Component: Transportation Security Administration;
Major contractor(s): Infozen, Deloitte, and International Business
Machines;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $85 million;
Program office workforce: 113 total government positions planned;
113 total government staff employed; 187 support contractors.
Program Challenges:
* Unstable and unapproved requirements;
* Cost growth;
* Schedule delays;
* Aircraft operator compliance.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $97 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $153 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $685 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $1,362 million[A];
Quantity: Initial estimate: Not applicable;
Quantity: Latest estimate: Not applicable;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: Dec. 2008;
Initial capability: Latest estimate: Jan. 2009;
Full capability: Initial estimate: Dec. 2009;
Full capability: Latest estimate: Dec. 2010.
[A] Note: Cost estimates submitted to the Office of Management and
Budget for 2009 and 2011.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: Dec. 2006.
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Oct. 2006.
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: Apr. 2008.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Secure Flight:
Background:
Prior to the Secure Flight program, aircraft operators were
responsible for screening passengers based on watch list data provided
to airlines by the Transportation Security Administration. This
resulted in inconsistent screening processes from airline to airline,
as well as limited control over sensitive homeland security data after
watch list information was distributed outside the U.S. government.
When Secure Flight is fully implemented, it will provide passenger
watch list matching for all covered airline flights, including flights
into and out of the U.S., flights over the continental U.S., and
international flights conducted by covered U.S. airlines. Secure
Flight intends to provide more consistent matching, enhanced redress
procedures, and improved privacy controls. In January 2009, Secure
Flight started implementing the program with a small number of
volunteer airlines and officials estimate full implementation with all
covered aircraft operators by December 2010. Program officials
estimate that Secure Flight will screen more than 2.5 million
passengers daily at full capacity.
We reported in May 2009 that Secure Flight had generally achieved 9 of
10 statutory requirements for the program, and had conditionally
achieved the last requirement regarding reliable cost and schedule
estimates. We have since concluded that the program has met the last
requirement.
Performance:
The Secure Flight program achieved initial operating capability in
January 2009, without significant delay to the milestone. However, the
estimated date of full operating capability has slipped by a year, to
December 2010. Program acquisition cost estimates have increased by
$57 million, or 59 percent over 2 years. Life-cycle cost estimates
have also increased by nearly 100 percent ($677 million).
Secure Flight officials attribute schedule delays and cost growth to
the program needing to increase total system capacity as a result of
system requirements changes during the rulemaking process. As the
program progressed, officials became more aware of the system size
requirements and aircraft operator system capabilities, which led to
cost increases for the volume and number of records to be processed.
Also, program scope increased as the initial schedule did not include
implementation with foreign airlines, according to officials.
Challenges:
In 2006, Secure Flight made significant changes in program
requirements due to privacy and security concerns. Requirements have
changed further since 2006, and only two of six performance
requirements remained the same in the revised 2008 acquisition program
baseline. For example, the program added requirements regarding the
Service Center, the Secure Flight customer service center that
provides resolution of airline operator inquiries. Program officials
report the risk of aircraft operators not complying with the
implementation schedule as the greatest program challenge. Officials
said that they are working with aircraft operators on a daily basis to
address schedule compliance. Some operators have expressed concern
about meeting the schedule because of the complexity and the cost of
system upgrade requirements. The program also faces risk with the
Service Center government and contractor personnel not receiving
timely security clearances.
Program Office Comments and Our Response:
Program officials emphasized that the cost increases and schedule
delays since 2006 were due to expanded program scope and modification
of the implementation strategy that resulted in rebaselining. They
point out that cost growth has been minimal since the rebaselining in
2008. They noted that performance requirements were altered in 2008 to
better measure the key metrics of quality for the program, but they do
not think that this indicates requirements instability.
[End of section]
U.S. Coast Guard: Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR):
[Illustration: Source: U.S. Coast Guard]
The Coast Guard's Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) program is
designed to be an interoperable network that combines information from
Coast Guard assets and sensors, allowing the Coast Guard to see,
comprehend, and communicate rapidly.
Current Status:
C4ISR is being developed incrementally: the first increment became
operational in 2009, the second is currently in design development,
and a third is in the "need" or requirements development phase.
Timeline:
Start of acquisition (6/02);
Segment 1 initial operating capability (4/09);
Segment 2, Spiral 1 preliminary design review (6/09)
Segment 2, Spiral 1 critical design review (9/09);
Full operating capability (2014).
Program Essentials:
Component: United States Coast Guard;
Major contractor(s): Integrated Coast Guard Systems;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $35 million;
Program office workforce: 38 total government positions planned; 32
government staff employed; 71 support contractors.
Program Challenges:
* Schedule delays;
* Development risk;
* Lack of approved requirements and acquisition planning documents.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $1,353 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $1,353 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $1,353 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $1,353 million[A];
Quantity: Initial estimate: Not applicable;
Quantity: Latest estimate: Not applicable;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: June 2007;
Initial capability: Latest estimate: Apr. 2009;
Full capability: Initial estimate: Sept. 2014;
Full capability: Latest estimate: Sept. 2014.
[A] Note: Cost estimates submitted to the Office of Management and
Budget for 2009 and 2011.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: May 2007.
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Apr. 2005.
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
C4ISR:
Background:
The Coast Guard is currently developing an infrastructure for C4ISR
that would introduce new sensors and communications systems in its
future, as well as some existing, assets. As designed, this
infrastructure will collect, integrate, and present information into a
single common operating picture to facilitate mission execution. The
Coast Guard is developing C4ISR in an evolutionary fashion, with more
functionality and assets added in increments, also referred to as
segments. Segment 2, which is currently in development, will produce
two spirals of capability intended to correct issues found in Segment
1, update software to avoid obsolescence, and add some new
functionality in the way that data are displayed, recorded, and
managed. Program officials state that development of the third segment
has been delayed due to funding constraints, although development of
capabilities for key assets, such as the Offshore Patrol Cutter, will
continue.
Performance:
According to program officials, the Coast Guard lacked visibility into
the software development processes and the requirements used by
Integrated Coast Guard Systems as a basis for Segment 1 development.
According to Coast Guard and contractor officials, costs grew as the
Coast Guard refined requirements to better meet their needs. Although
development and acquisition of C4ISR continues, DHS continues to
reevaluate and review C4ISR requirements, schedule, and costs. Despite
the lack of a department-approved acquisition program baseline, the
Coast Guard approved an acquisition strategy and awarded a contract”
authorized by DHS”for the design and development of Segment 2, which
includes options for up to $78 million worth of work through 2011.
Challenges:
According to program officials, the timely completion of acquisition
documentation is one of their challenges, especially as responsibility
for development shifts from Integrated Coast Guard Systems to the
Coast Guard, and could result in delays to future contract awards and
schedule. A second challenge is the dependence of requirements for
Segment 3 on the development of the Offshore Patrol Cutter. C4ISR
could be at risk of schedule delays if the Offshore Patrol Cutter does
not develop as anticipated.
A second challenge reported by program officials is the ability to
keep communications secure, especially in transferring classified
information. To maintain this capability, the Coast Guard must upgrade
key software and systems to remain in compliance with the regulations
of the agencies maintaining the architecture for secure
communications. If not planned and executed properly, the need for
upgrades to, or replacement of, key systems could result in cost
growth that delays the delivery of future capabilities. To facilitate
timely system upgrades and replacement, Coast Guard officials state
that they have obtained all the necessary data rights and software
code for Segment 1, and intend to develop future increments of
capability in a manner allowing the Coast Guard to support C4ISR
systems.
Program Office Comments and Our Response:
The program office provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate. Program officials indicated in their
comments that the planned full operating capability date for C4ISR has
been delayed to fiscal year 2018. However, the most recent Coast Guard
Quarterly Acquisition Report to Congress indicates the date as 2014.
[End of section]
U.S. Coast Guard: Maritime Patrol Aircraft:
[Photograph: Source: Integrated Coast Guard Systems]
The Maritime Patrol Aircraft is intended to be a transport and
surveillance, fixed-wing aircraft used to perform search and rescue
missions, enforce laws and treaties, and transport cargo and
personnel. The aircraft is to use the Mission System Pallet, a suite
of electronic equipment designed to provide the aircraft with improved
surveillance sensors and operational awareness, to complete homeland
security and other missions.
Current Status:
The program plans to procure 36 aircraft. Eight of the 11 aircraft
under contract were delivered, and 9 more have been approved for low-
rate production. The program expects to have its full-rate
production decision after the completion of operational test and
evaluation, in fiscal year 2012.
Timeline:
Start of acquisition (5/03);
Preliminary design review (12/04);
Critical design review (6/05);
Production readiness review (2/06);
Initial operating capability (4/09);
Operational testing completed (9/12);
Full operating capability (9/20).
Program Essentials:
Component: United States Coast Guard;
Major contractor(s): Integrated Coast Guard Systems;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $175 million;
Program office workforce: 7 total government positions planned; 5.5
total government staff employed; 1 support contractor.
Program Challenges:
* Planning significant procurement before completion of operational
testing;
* Understaffing;
* Lacking approved requirements and planning documents.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $1,706 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: 2,223 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $22,773 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $12,285 million[A];
Quantity: Initial estimate: 36;
Quantity: Latest estimate: 36;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: Dec. 2007;
Initial capability: Latest estimate: Apr. 2009;
Full capability: Initial estimate: Sept. 2016;
Full capability: Latest estimate: Sept. 2020.
[A] Note: Estimates based on May 2007 baseline and Dec. 2009 U.S.
Coast Guard Quarterly Report to Congress.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: Feb. 2009.
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Apr. 2005,
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Maritime Patrol Aircraft:
Background:
The Maritime Patrol Aircraft program plans to procure and maintain 36
aircraft, each equipped with a Mission Systems Pallet. Initially part
of the Deepwater program, in February 2009, DHS approved a separate
acquisition program baseline for the program. In that same month, the
Coast Guard submitted a test plan to DHS with the intent of obtaining
approval for full-rate production based on the results of a November
2008 operational assessment. In April 2009, the DHS Director,
Operational Test and Evaluation, approved the plan for testing leading
up to initial operational test and evaluation, but required the Coast
Guard to update and resubmit the plan before operational testing
begins. DHS and Coast Guard policy require operational testing to be
conducted before approval of full-rate production. The Coast Guard has
made a significant investment in this program before operational
testing can demonstrate that what it is buying meets Coast Guard needs.
Performance:
According to the February 2009 Program Baseline document, the program
is 4 years behind schedule for delivering full capability, due to
aircraft and mission system pallet cost increases, delays in the
mission system pallet, and funding limitations. However, the program
is currently on schedule to procure 16 aircraft by fiscal year 2014.
Should the schedule slip further, the service life of the legacy
aircraft may be extended, which may lead to additional legacy aircraft
sustainment costs.
Challenges:
With 8 of 36 Maritime Patrol Aircraft delivered, and another 3 under
contract, the Coast Guard has made a significant investment before
testing can demonstrate that the product meets Coast Guard needs. The
Coast Guard plans to procure 16 aircraft by the end of fiscal year 2014.
According to the senior official responsible for managing aviation
assets, budget constraints may limit the total amount procured on low-
rate production contracts to 17 of 20 aircraft.
DHS has not approved the operational requirements for the program,
which could increase the risk of having an unrealistic program baseline.
Further, the Coast Guard manages the program with 5.5 full-time
equivalent government staff and one support contractor.
Program Office Comments:
The program office provided technical comments on a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. In March 2010,
program officials said that the program's latest life-cycle cost
estimate is $23,879 million, $11,594 million more than reported to
Congress in December, 2009. Program officials also said that the
program's Acquisition Plan and requirements documents were Coast Guard
approved in accordance with relevant guidance at the time of their
approvals. Program officials told us the program office workforce is
assisted by staff working for other Coast Guard offices, including
staff at the Aviation Logistics Center, the Aviation Training Center,
and various Coast Guard technical authorities on integrated product
teams.
[End of section]
U.S. Coast Guard: National Security Cutter:
[Photograph: Source: U.S. Coast Guard]
The Coast Guard's National Security Cutter is intended to be the
flagship of the Coast Guard's fleet. The 418-foot cutter is designed
to achieve a 12,000 nautical mile range and to provide an extended on-
scene presence and the capability to perform long transits and forward
deployment. The cutter and its aircraft and boat assets are to operate
worldwide. Each cutter is expected to have a 30 year service life.
Current Status:
Two of the eight cutters have been delivered and the Coast Guard
expects operational testing to be complete by September 2011. Delivery
of full operating capability is expected in 2018”more than 3 years
later than initially planned.
Timeline:
Start of acquisition (7/02);
Preliminary design review (3/03);
Critical design review (6/03);
Production readiness review (5/04);
Initial operating capability (6/08);
Operational assessment (4/10);
Operational testing completed (9/11);
Full operating capability: (6/18).
Program Essentials:
Component: United States Coast Guard;
Major contractor(s): Integrated Coast Guard Systems;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $281.5 million;
Program office workforce: 50 total government positions planned; 50
total government staff employed; 29 support contractors.
Program Challenges:
* Limitations in operational performance;
* Insufficient support assets;
* Lacking approved operational requirements and planning documents.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $3,450 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $4,749 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $22,998 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $24,277 million[A];
Quantity: Initial estimate: 8;
Quantity: Latest estimate: 8;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: Sept. 2008;
Initial capability: Latest estimate: June 2008;
Full capability: Initial estimate: Sept. 2014;
Full capability: Latest estimate: June 2018.
[A] Note: Estimates based on 2006 baseline and 2009 U.S. Coast Guard
Quarterly Report to Congress.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: May. 2007.
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Apr. 2005.
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
National Security Cutter:
Background:
The National Security Cutter program is projected to take delivery of
a total of eight cutters between 2008 and 2018 and operate them for 30
years. In May 2008, the Coast Guard took delivery of the first-in-
class Bertholf, and took delivery of the second-in-class Waesche in
November 2009.
In 2002, the Coast Guard awarded a contract to Integrated Coast Guard
Systems to produce and manage the National Security Cutter and other
Deepwater assets as systems integrator. After a series of project
failures, the Coast Guard announced in April 2007 that it would take
over the system integrator role for all Deepwater assets, including
the National Security Cutter. DHS subsequently approved an acquisition
program baseline for the Cutter separate from other Deepwater projects
in December 2008.
Performance:
The Cutter program has experienced significant cost growth, which the
program partially attributes to changes in economic factors, such as
labor and commodity prices and international currency exchange rate
fluctuations.
Program officials stated that completion of operational testing and
evaluation has been delayed by a year beyond the initially estimated
date to allow for extended testing. The eighth and final cutter,
planned for 2014 in the original baseline, is now expected to be fully
operational in June 2018 based on current production plans.
Challenges:
According to Coast Guard officials, the cutters face deficiencies that
need to be addressed before the first and second cutters can be
certified as fully operational, currently planned for the fourth
quarter of fiscal year 2011 for the first-in-class Bertholf.
The cutters currently lack a shipboard classified information facility
required for participation in certain Department of Defense missions
and exercises. According to the Coast Guard, installation of this
facility is meeting schedule goals. However, as of July 2009, full
installation of sub-systems that aid the movement of helicopters into
the Cutter's two hangars was not yet complete, as the helicopters
accompanying the Cutter had not yet been modified to use this
subsystem. Additionally, the Coast Guard plans to deploy the first
cutter without unmanned aircraft”key support assets intended to
operate with the National Security Cutter.
The Coast Guard is conducting an analysis of alternatives to address
this issue and also assessing a Navy unmanned helicopter. Continued
delays in the delivery of these assets will result in the cutter's
operating with less capability than originally planned.
Operational requirements and acquisition planning documents are not
yet DHS approved, although they have been approved by the Coast Guard.
Program Office Comments:
The program office provided technical comments on a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Program officials
stated that key program documents did not require departmental
approval at the time they were created. They reported the Coast Guard
approved the program baseline and requirements documents in 2005-2006
and the Acquisition Plan in 2008.
[End of section]
U.S. Coast Guard: Rescue 21:
[Illustration: Source: U.S. Coast Guard]
Rescue 21 is an advanced command, control, and communications system
designed to improve the Coast Guard's ability to execute all missions
in the coastal zone, and is essential to its search and rescue
mission. The system seeks to leverage technology to more accurately
locate distress calls, enhance distress call clarity, reduce
coverage gaps, and provide significantly increased operational
availability.
Current Status:
The Rescue 21 program is currently deployed in 24 out of 39 locations.
The program plans to deliver full capability at all locations by the
end of fiscal year 2017, 9 years later than the date established in
its 2005 program baseline.
Timeline:
Start of acquisition (9/02);
Developmental test and evaluation (2/05);
Operational test and evaluation (3/05);
Initial operating capability (9/06);
Low-rate initial production (12/06);
Western Rivers project deployed (9/12);
Full operating capability (9/17).
Program Essentials:
Component: United States Coast Guard;
Major contractor(s): General Dynamics C4 Systems;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $117 million;
Program office workforce: 71 total planned government positions; 65
total government staff employed; 15 support contractors.
Program Challenges:
* Cost growth;
* Tower availability;
* Technical problems;
* Risk of technology becoming obsolete.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $827 million
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $1,067 million
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $1,639 million
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $2,693 million
Quantity: Initial estimate: 46;
Quantity: Latest estimate: 39;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: Sept. 2005;
Initial capability: Latest estimate: Sept. 2006;
Full capability: Initial estimate: Sept. 2008;
Full capability: Latest estimate: Sept. 2017.
[A] Note: Estimates submitted to the Office of Management and Budget
for 2009 and 2011.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: Apr. 2006;
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Rescue 21:
Background:
Rescue 21 is replacing antiquated communications systems used to
monitor the international distress frequency, coordinate rescue
operations, and communicate with vessels. The program is deploying
systems to 39 locations across the United States. The program's
contract with the prime contractor covers 34 locations and is
scheduled to end in fiscal year 2012. The Coast Guard is currently the
system integrator for the Ohio River Valley, the Lower Mississippi,
Upper Mississippi, and two Alaska locations. DHS decided not to
exercise additional contract options because the contractor's system
would require extensive modifications to work at remote Alaska sites,
and the Coast Guard had experience maintaining legacy systems fielded
before Rescue 21.
Performance:
Rescue 21 has experienced significant cost growth and delays. Since
its initial cost estimate under DHS in 2003, total program costs
increased by 131 percent. Achievement of full operating capability has
been delayed by 9 years since 2005. The program identified several
factors contributing to cost growth, including: underestimation of
costs for program management, deployment, operations, and maintenance;
schedule delays; a 6-year extension of the system's planned useful
life to 2027; and an unfunded mandate related to protocols and
standards requirements. Changes in out-year funding projections
required the program to modify its deployment tactic, resulting in
schedule delays.
According to program officials, Rescue 21's direction finding
capability”which allows the Coast Guard to locate boaters in distress”
is only possible in approximately one-third of the 65 tower sites in
the Alaska region. However, we have previously reported that the
direction-finding capability is more accurate and more reliable than
the legacy system, so regions lacking direction finding capability
will continue to be at risk of performing larger and potentially more
costly searches.
Challenges:
The Coast Guard is facing unanticipated challenges at some fielded
antenna tower sites. These challenges include availability of towers,
tower leasability, environmental concerns, electronic interference
with other communication systems, and telephone system outages.
Program officials acknowledge that challenges related to selecting
future antenna tower sites may put the program at risk of additional
schedule delays. Each site has unique factors being addressed
individually by the program.
Program officials said they must continually stay abreast of external
technology standards in order for the system to continue to operate
properly. According to officials, the program monitors technology
standards in order to mitigate any risk of the program not keeping up
with standards changes and has attempted to build related costs into
program cost estimates.
The program reported that its operational requirements and acquisition
planning documents have been approved by the Coast Guard, although
they have not yet received DHS approval.
Program Office Comments:
The program office provided technical comments on a draft of this
assessment, which were incorporated as appropriate. Program officials
stated that Rescue 21's key program documents did not require DHS
approval at the time they were created. Program officials also said
that the Rescue 21 system is mature and operational, and that the
program's remaining challenge is related to technical standards,
rather than system technical problems.
[End of section]
U.S. Coast Guard: Response Boat-Medium:
[Photograph: Source: U.S. Coast Guard]
The Response Boat-Medium replaces aging 41-foot utility boats and
other larger nonstandard boats to perform the Coast Guard's missions
of Search and Rescue, law enforcement, drug and migrant interdiction,
and homeland security. The boats will operate along the coasts of the
United States and its territories, as well as in larger lakes and
rivers.
Current Status:
The program has completed operational testing and evaluation of the
boats and has achieved initial operating capability and entered full
rate production. During full production, the program plans to order 30
boats per year contingent upon program funding.
Timeline:
Start of acquisition (6/06);
Critical design review (7/07);
Production review (7/07);
First asset delivered (3/08);
Initial operating capability (4/10);
Full operating capability (9/15).
Program Essentials:
Component: United States Coast Guard
Major contractor(s): Marinette Marine Corp.
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $103 million;
Program office workforce: 63 total government positions planned; 40
total government staff employed; 31 support contractors.
Program Challenges:
* Funding issues;
* Understaffing;
* Acquisition strategy risks.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $401 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $610 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $1,210 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $1,419 million[A];
Quantity: Initial estimate: 180;
Quantity: Latest estimate: 180;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: Sept. 2008;
Initial capability: Latest estimate: Apr. 2010;
Full capability: Initial estimate: Sept. 2013;
Full capability: Latest estimate: Sept. 2015.
[A] Note: Estimates based on 2005 baseline and 2009 U.S. Coast Guard
Quarterly Report to Congress.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: Sept. 2006.
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Response Boat-Medium:
Background:
The Response Boat-Medium program, authorized in 2002, plans to procure
180 medium-size boats intended to replace the aging 41-foot Utility
boat, as well as other nonstandard large boats in the Coast Guard
fleet. While the 41-foot Utility boat was designed to primarily engage
in Search and Rescue missions, the Response Boat-Medium will have
greater speed and range than its predecessor to fulfill expanding
operations in Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security consistent with
homeland security needs. The Coast Guard has awarded a contract to
Marinette Marine Corporation to produce the boats at facilities in
Kent, Washington, and Green Bay, Wisconsin. The program had ordered 66
boats as of September 2009, and the program reports receiving delivery
of 16 boats. The program expects to reach full operating capability by
the end of fiscal year 2015.
Performance:
According to Coast Guard officials, the new boats have successfully
met all technical requirements such as speed and range. While there
have been some modifications to boats, the program considers them
minor, and reports that costs of modifications have been within the
change order budget. For example, the program found performance issues
in air conditioning systems and seat design.
The program's projected acquisition costs grew $209 million (52
percent) from the initial estimate. Program officials attribute the
increase to contract costs, among others. The program awarded the
prime contract after the initial estimate, and the award price was
higher than originally projected. Logistics planning expenses also
increased over original estimates. Program officials reported that
they had planned to revise the life-cycle cost estimate before making
a full production decision in December 2009, and they expect further
cost growth related to maintenance and personnel expenses not included
in the current estimate. Currently 2 years behind schedule, the
program has also experienced significant schedule delays. Program
officials attribute the schedule delays to bid protests that delayed
the contract award.
Challenges:
With over one-third of boats ordered as of September 2009, the program
has made a substantial investment before the completion of operational
testing. The program reports that initial testing results have been
positive with no major design issues identified. Program officials
reported a shortage of government staff to support full-rate
production. For example, the Green Bay production facility has been
understaffed, and the program has used contractors to meet needs where
possible. The contract includes terms to increase unit price if the
program does not order a minimum number of boats in a given year,
according to officials. Program officials indicated they have not
incurred any price increases for late orders, but there is a risk that
future-year budgets will not be sufficient to maintain the order
schedule. The program schedule could also slip if the program does not
order a minimum number of boats.
Program Office Comments and Our Response:
Program officials stated that Response Boat-Medium completed
operational testing and evaluation in December 2009, and has entered
full-rate production. They stated that required personnel for full-
rate production have been approved and the Green Bay production
facility is now appropriately staffed. However, program office data
show that the program remains understaffed. Program officials stated
that key program documents did not require departmental approval at
the time they were approved. The program provided us with a revised
cost estimate, approved by the Coast Guard in January 2010 that shows
life-cycle costs increased to over $2 billion. The cost increase is
primarily due to operating crew personnel costs previously not
included in life-cycle estimates, as well as increased fuel costs.
[End of section]
U.S. Coast Guard: Sentinel Class Patrol Boat:
[Photograph: Source: Bollinger Shipyards, Inc.]
The Sentinel class patrol boat, previously known as the Fast Response
Cutter, is conceived as a patrol boat with high readiness, speed,
adaptability, and endurance to perform a wide range of missions. After
terminating previous design efforts under a systems integrator, the
Coast Guard pursued acquisition of a modified, commercially available
patrol boat. The Sentinel class will replace the legacy 110 foot
patrol boats.
Current Status:
In December 2009 the Coast Guard awarded a contract for three low-rate
production boats, bringing the total number of boats under contract to
four. Delivery is scheduled to begin in December 2011 with 58 boats
planned at a total acquisition cost of $3.9 billion.
Timeline:
Start of acquisition (9/08);
Preliminary design review (4/09);
Critical design review (11/09);
Low-rate production decision (12/09);
Initial operating capability (12/12);
Full operating capability (9/22).
Program Challenges:
* Cost increases;
* Schedule delays;
* Test and integration risks;
* Lack of approved requirements.
Program Essentials:
Component: United States Coast Guard;
Major contractor(s): Bollinger Shipyards;
Fiscal year 2010 funding requested: $243 million;
Program office workforce: 14 total government positions planned; 13
total government staff employed; 11 support contractors.
Performance (then-year dollars):
Total acquisition cost: Initial estimate: $3,206 million[A];
Total acquisition cost: Latest estimate: $3,928 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Initial estimate: $22,256 million[A];
Life-cycle cost estimate: Latest estimate: $14,475 million[A];
Quantity: Initial estimate: 58;
Quantity: Latest estimate: 58;
Initial capability: Initial estimate: Sept. 2011;
Initial capability: Latest estimate: Dec. 2012;
Full capability: Initial estimate: Sept. 2016;
Full capability: Latest estimate: Sept. 2022.
[A] Note: Estimates based on 2007 baseline and 2009 U.S. Coast Guard
Quarterly Acquisition Report to Congress.
Key Program Documents:
Initial version of: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Department approval date: May 2007.
Initial version of: Mission Need Statement;
Department approval date: Apr. 2005.
Initial version of: Operational Requirements Document;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Initial version of: Acquisition Plan;
Department approval date: Oct. 2009.
Initial version of: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Department approval date: Not yet approved.
Sentinel Class Patrol Boat:
Background:
In February 2008, the Coast Guard terminated the original patrol boat
designs proposed by Integrated Coast Guard Systems, the primary
contractor for Deepwater, after approximately $39 million had been
allocated. Since the need for a new patrol boat was pressing, the
Coast Guard pursued acquisition of a modified commercially available
patrol boat with similar performance capabilities to the original
design”now known as the Sentinel class patrol boat. In December 2009,
after Department of Homeland Security (DHS) authorization, the Coast
Guard awarded a contract to Bollinger Shipyards for low-rate initial
production of three boats, bringing the total number of boats on
contract to four.
Performance:
The project is currently estimated at approximately $722 million over
its original $3.2 billion baseline for acquisition cost, though the
number of planned boats has not changed. According to program
officials, the estimated life-cycle cost has decreased by over $7.8
billion due to an adjustment of the expected service life and use of
actual costs for support. Previous estimates for service life of the
two proposed Integrated Coast Guard Systems designs were 35 years and
15 years. The Sentinel class is expected to have a service life of 20
years, which reduces the years in service overall and, therefore, the
costs expected over the life cycle. Due to program restructuring and
contract delays, the project has experienced delays in the achievement
of both initial and full operating capability.
Challenges:
Because of the pressing need for the Sentinel class patrol boats, the
Coast Guard awarded a design and construction contract for the first
patrol boat before completing all the acquisition reviews and
documentation required. According to Coast Guard officials, DHS
reviewed the operational requirements document for Sentinel in
December 2009, prior to authorization and award of the low-rate
initial production contract, but further revisions are necessary
before approving the document.
The Coast Guard acknowledges that due to its accelerated schedule the
Sentinel class program faces testing, integration, and software
challenges. Currently the Coast Guard plans to place on contract up to
15 boats before completing operational testing and evaluation. This
could lead to expensive changes to the design once production has
begun if significant weaknesses are found in testing, a challenge the
Coast Guard acknowledges and expects to mitigate through the design
and review processes. Though the Coast Guard uses an existing design
for the Sentinel class, there may be challenges with integrating the
required sensors and antennae in a way that minimizes interference.
The Navy's Naval Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Virginia, will
assess the placement of the sensors and antennae and provide
recommendations to the Coast Guard to mitigate this problem. The Coast
Guard's plan to use existing government command and control software
to utilize many of these sensors may result in software and hardware
integration challenges. To address this challenge, the Coast Guard
plans to test the software on two operational mock-ups prior to
installation.
Program Office Comments:
The operational requirements document for the Sentinel class patrol
boat received approval from the Coast Guard in September 2009 and DHS
in March 2010. Other technical comments were incorporated as
appropriate.
[End of section]
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. DHS
generally concurred with our findings, citing the review of actions
taken and efforts under way to improve the acquisition review process,
particularly the development and implementation of the department's
acquisition management directive. The department's comments are
reprinted in appendix II. DHS also provided technical comments which
we incorporated as appropriate and where supporting documentation was
provided. DHS provided specific comments on four areas of our
findings, as follows.
With regard to our review of DHS's acquisition oversight, DHS noted
that we reported that more than 40 major programs have not yet been
reviewed by the ARB, and stated that the department complemented the
ARB process with a portfolio review process used for 61 of 67 major
acquisition programs in fiscal year 2009, which were used to
prioritize programs for ARB reviews. We acknowledge in our report that
in order to provide some level of departmental oversight for major
programs not yet reviewed by the ARB, DHS acquisition oversight staff
worked with selected components to conduct these portfolio reviews.
However, it is important to observe that these portfolio reviews do
not take the place of formal ARB reviews, do not include the senior
officials who comprise the ARB, and are not part of the acquisition
review process as described in DHS's acquisition management directive.
In response to a point in the report indicating that DHS may waive
some oversight requirements on a case-by-case basis, without clear
criteria, for programs that have passed certain phases, DHS stated
that flexibility was built into the acquisition review process to
allow programs to tailor some documentation requirements. DHS further
commented that this "tailoring criterion provides clear (albeit not
explicit) guidance" to program managers and the Acquisition Program
Management Division. However, DHS did not provide any examples of how
these requirements are tailored or how these waivers are applied and
documented, and we have no evidence that this is clearly understood by
program managers.
With regard to our statement that acquisition management processes do
not inform budget decisions as required by DHS policy, the department
stated that they designed acquisition policy to "interlink" with both
the budgeting and strategic requirements key decision processes.
Specifically, the Acquisition Program Management Division participates
in the budget formulation process. We agree that this is positive
collaboration. However, we reported in 2008 that DHS's previous
investment review process also highlighted links to the budget, yet
the results of oversight reviews did not consistently inform budget
decisions. While DHS's interim acquisition management directive more
clearly creates a link between the budget and requirements processes,
DHS has not provided evidence that budget decisions are informed by
the acquisition review process. Further, DHS has not yet reestablished
the Joint Requirements Council, which the department's revised
acquisition management directive states should inform the department's
budget decisions in order to deliver needed capabilities to end users.
With regard to our analysis of program cost, DHS stated that we chose
to use OMB's Exhibit 300 data for the programs we reviewed in lieu of
life-cycle cost estimates. DHS further stated that the Exhibit 300
data are based on the approved budget for a particular program, and
most of these data for existing DHS programs are not based on
validated cost estimates. Therefore, DHS believes that there is a
likelihood of significant error in cost growth comparisons and
analyses using these data. We explain in our analysis in the report
that we used the official Exhibit 300 data DHS reports to OMB because
DHS expressed concerns about the cost data programs reported to us in
our data collection instrument, and DHS was unable to provide us with
one consistent source for acquisition and life-cycle cost estimates.
The Exhibit 300 data, as part of the executive branch capital planning
process, are designed to meet the requirement for reports to the
Congress to ensure reliable business cases for investments[Footnote
47] and the data reported are intended to represent valid acquisition
and life-cycle cost estimates. Our analysis of cost growth provides
insights into how planned investment amounts for some acquisitions
have significantly increased over time, which can result in
insufficient funding to fulfill future mission requirements.
While DHS has made recent progress in clarifying acquisition oversight
processes, much remains to be done to ensure proper implementation and
departmentwide coordination. Managing hundreds of billions of dollars
of investments to maximize resources and effectively meet critical
homeland security missions will require DHS to ensure consistent
oversight, evaluation of affordability and trade-offs, and accurate
cost estimates for making investment decisions.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov] .
If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact
me at (202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. Principal contributors to this report
were Amelia Shachoy, Assistant Director; Sean Seales; Celina Davidson;
Daniel Novillo; LeAnna Parkey; Nathan Tranquilli; J. Kristopher
Keener; Kenneth Patton; Sylvia Schatz; Morgan Delaney Ramaker; and
Robert Swierczek.
Signed by:
John P. Hutton, Director:
Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
List of Addressees:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg:
Interim Chairman:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Claire C. McCaskill:
Chairman:
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Contracting Oversight:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Edolphus Towns:
Chairman:
The Honorable Darrell E. Issa:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable David E. Price:
Chairman:
The Honorable Harold Rogers:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope and Methodology:
Our objectives were to (1) provide an update on DHS's efforts to
implement acquisition oversight for all acquisitions; (2) describe
acquisition performance and common challenges across selected
programs; and (3) provide individual profiles for each of the selected
programs.
To provide an update on acquisition oversight, we reviewed the
department's interim acquisition management directive that was in
effect during the period of our review--Acquisition Management
Directive 102-01--and related guidance, and we identified whether
fiscal year 2009 oversight activities for all 67 major acquisition
programs were completed in accordance with the directive. To do this,
we collected and analyzed Acquisition Review Board (ARB) decision
memorandums, summary tracking documents, and program documents for key
decision events for major acquisitions. We identified ARB decision
memorandum action items, and characterized and identified the status
of those items. We also reviewed recommendations from our prior work
and the status of their implementation. To obtain a better
understanding of departmental oversight initiatives, we interviewed
officials responsible for acquisition oversight, including
representatives of the Chief Procurement Officer's Acquisition Program
Management and Cost Analysis Division, the Office of Policy's
Screening Coordination Office, and the Science and Technology
Directorate's Test & Evaluation and Standards Division. To learn more
about component-level oversight, we reviewed which components had
nominated and received departmental approval of Component Acquisition
Executives (CAE), and we interviewed acquisition officials at the six
components in our review--Customs and Border Protection, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, National Protection and Programs
Directorate, Office of Health Affairs, Transportation Security
Administration, and the United States Coast Guard--about their
acquisition policies and practices, staffing, departmental
coordination, and relevant challenges. We did not, however,
specifically assess the extent to which the department's acquisition
guidance is consistent with best practices.
To describe acquisition performance and common challenges and to
profile selected programs, we took several steps. We selected 18
programs across six components--16 major acquisition programs, as well
as 2 smaller programs critical to DHS's mission--based on several
factors, including total projected funding for fiscal years 2007
through 2012, current stage in the DHS acquisition life cycle, and
relevance to front-line homeland security missions. The 18 programs
selected represent about $100 billion in life-cycle costs and about
$38 billion in acquisition costs. The analysis of acquisition
performance and common challenges across the selected programs focused
on 15 programs. We did not include in this analysis two nonmajor
programs, which are not subject to the same requirements as major
programs--Biosurveillance Common Operating Network and the Integrated
Public Alert and Warning System--and one major program that had not
started acquisition activities at the time of our review, BioWatch
Generation-3. The profiles of the selected programs include all 18
programs selected for our review. To evaluate the program data, we
drew on criteria from our prior work on acquisition management,
including the methodologies we used for assessments of Department of
Defense (DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) programs;[Footnote 48] acquisition guidance from DHS and other
federal agencies; and OMB's guidance on capital planning.[Footnote 49]
We also reviewed relevant GAO and DHS Inspector General reports on the
selected acquisitions.
Data Collection and Limitations:
To collect program data, we developed a standardized data collection
instrument (DCI) for key data on performance and challenges for the
selected programs, and we met with the program offices to clarify data
requested in advance of completion. The DCI was organized by
categories including program contracts; issues; cost; schedule;
requirements; staffing; technology; design; and software. To confirm
the DCI data, we reviewed available official documents from each
program, including: the Acquisition Program Baseline; Acquisition
Plan; Acquisition Decision Memorandums; Program Management Review and
other relevant briefings; cost performance or Earned Value Management
reports; and Integrated Master Schedule. To learn more about program
data and issues, we interviewed program officials for each of the 18
programs we reviewed.
Because DHS acquisition oversight officials expressed concerns about
the reliability of the cost data reported by program offices in the
DCI, we also researched DHS Exhibit 300 cost data reported to OMB as
part of the executive branch capital planning process.[Footnote 50]
For four Coast Guard programs,[Footnote 51] we also reviewed the Coast
Guard's Quarterly Acquisition Reports to Congress and Acquisition
Program Baselines to obtain the best available data. We based our
analysis on these sources as they represented more complete and
official data used for making important planning and budgeting
decisions. In addition, not all programs reported data for all of the
categories in the DCI because some requested data did not apply to the
program, or the program could not obtain the requested data. We
excluded these programs from certain analyses. DCI information was
self-reported by the program offices, and we did not independently
verify the data provided, but we took appropriate steps to address
data reliability including reviewing related documentation;
interviewing knowledgeable agency officials; testing of data; and
reviewing related internal controls. Those data that were found to be
sufficiently reliable were used to report on the condition of selected
DHS acquisition programs. Findings from program data analysis cannot
be generalized to the total DHS portfolio of acquisition programs. All
data was current as of 2009, with the exception of latest estimates of
program costs obtained from OMB Exhibits 300, which were current as of
January or February 2010.
Cost and Schedule Analysis:
To assess cost and schedule performance across the selected DHS major
programs, we aggregated official program data and compared initial
cost and schedule estimates to latest available estimates. We used
initial cost and schedule estimates since 2003, after the creation of
DHS, although some of the 18 programs were initiated by other federal
agencies prior to 2003. All cost data are presented in nominal "then
year" dollars consistent with cost data available from OMB Exhibit
300s, the Coast Guard's Quarterly Acquisition Reports to congressional
appropriations committees, and official Acquisition Program Baselines.
[Footnote 52] BioWatch Generation-3, which had not started acquisition
activities at the time of our review, and two nonmajor programs in our
review--Biosurveillance Common Operating Network and Integrated Public
Alert and Warning System--were excluded from the overall analysis.
To assess schedule performance, we calculated the average delay from
initial to latest estimates for Initial Operating Capability (IOC) and
Full Operating Capability (FOC) for all selected programs having
available data. Initial capabilities are delivered when initial end-
users have received the new system and can use it operationally, and
delivery of full capabilities occurs when all end-users have received
the system. Some programs reported multiple IOC or FOC dates. In these
cases we used the first and last planned delivery of capabilities to
operational users as the basis for the program-level IOC and FOC date.
In some cases, programs reported schedule milestones using a period of
time, such as a month or year, and in these cases we used the last
date of the given period as the basis for the estimated date. Two
programs, Automated Commercial Environment and US-VISIT Unique
Identity, were unable to provide complete schedule data due to
unavailable information and, therefore, we excluded these programs
from all or part of the schedule analysis.
Common Program Challenges Analysis:
As federal acquisition policy and guidance emphasize the importance of
sound acquisition planning, we focused in particular on acquisition
planning issues. To assess common challenges for the selected
programs, we analyzed information programs reported on requirements,
key acquisition documents, program office staffing, and sustainment
planning across the programs. We also analyzed relevant program
documentation and assessed information from interviews with program
officials. Three programs were excluded from the assessment of overall
performance: the two nonmajor programs, the Biosurveillance Common
Operating Network and Integrated Public Alert and Warning System, and
the BioWatch Generation-3 program, which was pre-acquisition at the
time we collected the data. Challenges we identified do not represent
an exhaustive list; however, past work identifies these challenges as
detrimental to program performance.
To assess baseline requirements stability, we analyzed delays in
setting baseline requirements as well as changes to existing
requirements. According to DHS guidance, the baseline requirements
must include a threshold value that is the minimum acceptable value
which, in the user's judgment, is necessary to satisfy the need. If
threshold values are not achieved, program performance may be
seriously degraded, the program may be too costly, or the program may
no longer be timely. Baseline requirements, also referred to as Key
Performance Parameters, were categorized as cost, performance or
schedule requirements. We compared requirements from initial baselines
from 2003 or later, to most recent Acquisition Program Baseline (APB)
requirements. We also examined the approval of key acquisition
documents, including the Mission Need Statement, Operational
Requirements Document, and Acquisition Program Baseline, prior to
initiation of acquisition activities. We evaluated whether key
acquisition documents were approved at either the component or
department level prior to awarding contracts to initiate acquisition
activities.
To assess staffing levels, we evaluated planned and filled positions
for government staff and contractor support. We analyzed government
vacancy levels by primary function and calculated the ratios of
government staff and contractor support to total reported positions.
We obtained data on acquisition program managers, including
certification level, length of time as program manager, and permanent
assignment to the program.
To assess sustainment planning, we reviewed approval dates for the
Integrated Logistics Support Plan, and whether the plan was approved
beyond the program, at either the component or department level, as
required by DHS guidance.
To identify common program execution challenges, we analyzed
challenges reported in data collection instruments, program documents,
and interviews. We developed the following broad categories for
execution challenges: technical capability, partner dependence, and
funding issues. The execution challenges we identified are not
exhaustive; however, they provide a sense of the issues programs
reported.
Individual Program Assessments:
To assess each of the 18 selected acquisition programs, we summarized
individual program data in a two-page report format. We prepared the
individual program assessments based on DCI data and supporting
documentation, interviews with program officials, and our prior work.
Each individual program assessment outlines essential program
information including a description of program objectives and purpose;
current status, cost, and schedule performance; major contractors;
2010 budget request; staffing profile; a summary of program
challenges; and status of department-or component-level approval of
key acquisition documents. In addition, we provide a summary of
program background, performance, and challenges.
To present cost and schedule performance data, we compared initial
cost and schedule estimates to latest available estimates. We used
initial cost and schedule estimates since 2003, after the start of
DHS, although some of the 18 programs were initiated prior to this
time. All cost data are presented in then-year dollars, consistent
with official program budget documents, with the exception of the
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System program cost data which
were available in constant dollars only. To assess schedule
performance, we compared initial and latest estimates for IOC and FOC.
Other schedule milestones were also reported on the program timeline
including Preliminary Design Review; Critical Design Review;
Production Readiness Review; and First Asset Delivery. In some cases,
a milestone significant to the program was also included in the
timeline.
To assess the challenges for each program, we reviewed the data
reported by category in the DCI and official program documents, and we
interviewed the program office representatives about the information
reported. For individual programs we collected program data on
potential challenges, including requirements stability; staffing;
sustainment planning; contracting activity; technology maturity;
design maturity; and software development. Our analysis of
requirements stability, staffing and sustainment planning is
consistent with methods discussed above.
For programs reporting on technology maturity and design data, we
requested data based on best practice indicators[Footnote 53] for
technology maturity and design stability drawn from our body of work
established in DOD and NASA assessments of selected systems. However,
the selected DHS programs reported limited data on technology maturity
and design data as they do not consistently use technology readiness-
level data for critical technologies, and programs used varying
metrics to measure design stability. Furthermore, many of the programs
make extensive use of commercial-off-the-shelf products not developed
by the program.
We conducted our work from March 2009 to June 2010 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
June 22, 2010:
Mr. John P. Hutton:
Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Hutton:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity
to comment on the draft Government Accountability Office (GAO) report,
GAO-10-588SP, entitled "Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions."
The Department is encouraged that the draft report cites the progress
that we have made over the past several years to improve acquisition
processes. We have instituted several major changes that are beginning
to show results. The development and implementation of Directive 102-
01 (Acquisition Management) has provided improved discipline and
structure to the Department's acquisition and governance processes.
The improved Acquisition Review Board (ARB) process has been used over
sixty times since March 2008. The ARB provides a focused, issue-
oriented governance process ensuring that major programs are
accurately evaluated, and that decisions and actions are properly
documented and tracked to completion. The establishment of the
Acquisition Program Management Division and the Cost Analysis Division
in the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer has provided a
knowledgeable cadre of acquisition-experienced individuals that
support the governance process, and provide assistance to acquisition
programs on a day-to-day basis. Between these accomplishments, and
other initiatives currently underway, we expect to see additional
improvements in the near future.
DHS does wish to point out several areas where the Department
evaluation differs from that of GAO in this report:
* GAO identified that more than forty major programs have not yet been
reviewed by the ARB.
- DHS complements the ARB process with a portfolio review process
executed by the Acquisition Program Management Division in conjunction
with the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) or the Component's
senior acquisition staff. This review process, in its second year of
operation, executes a focused, collaborative review of each
Component's major program portfolio with APMD, and helps identify
program issues, including programs which need to proceed to an ARB on
an accelerated basis. In FY 2009, the portfolio process reviewed 61 of
the 67 DHS major acquisition programs.
* GAO evaluated the DHS acquisition management processes as not
sufficiently informing budget processes as required by DHS policy.
- DHS designed the revised acquisition policy to "interlink" with both
the budgeting and the strategic requirements key decision processes.
Key leaders in both these decision processes sit the Acquisition
Review Team and the Acquisition Review Board, ensuring that these
processes' perspectives are incorporated in the decisions made by the
ARB. In turn, APMD participates reciprocally with both processes.
Specifically, APMD is a standing team member with the Program Analysis
and Evaluation (PA&E) division in the review of submitted Resource
Allocation Proposals, and in the execution of the annual Program
Review Board process (a key component of DHS' annual budget
formulation process).
* GAO elected to use the OMB 300 budget submissions for the current
state of program costs, for the assessed major programs in this
report, in lieu of life cycle cost estimates (LCCEs). This was done
due to the early stage of LCCE implementation in DHS.
- DHS notes that OMB 300 data is based on the approved budget for the
particular program. Since LCCE information for DHS programs is in its
infancy, most OMB 300 data for existing programs is not based on
validated program LCCEs. Since the OMB 300 data in many cases is not
derived from validated cost estimates, DHS believes that there is the
likelihood of significant error in cost growth comparisons and
analyses using this data.
* GAO identified that DHS may "waive some oversight requirements on a
case-by-case basis, without clear criteria, for programs that passed
certain phases--such as departmental approval of a Mission Need
Statement for a program that has already deployed capability."
- DHS, in implementing the Directive 102-01 acquisition policy and
process in November 2008, was faced with the task of transitioning 67
operating major acquisition programs to this new directive.
Flexibility was built into the new process to allow programs that were
well into the "obtain" or "produce /deploy/support" phases of the D-
102-01 Acquisition Life Cycle to tailor some D-102-01 requirements
(for instance, not to generate documentation from earlier phases of
the life cycle). That tailoring criterion provides clear (albeit not
explicit) guidance to the program manager and APMD as each program is
assessed upon its entry into the new policy.
Technical comments are provided as an enclosure to this letter.
DHS wishes to thank you and the GAO audit team for the professionalism
and excellent dialog which characterized the execution of this audit.
This was particularly important given the challenges in implementing
this particular complex audit process (which will be re-executed on an
annual basis) in a way that addresses the specifics of this
Department's processes.
DHS looks forward to continuing our partnership, with the common goal
of improving the Department's execution of its acquisition
responsibilities.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
Enclosure:
[End of section]
Appendix III: The Acquisition Life Cycle, Systems Engineering Life
Cycle and Key Acquisition Documents at DHS:
[Figure: Refer to PDF for image: Life cycle map]
Acquisition decision Event: ADE 1;
Acquisition Life Cycle Phase: Need;
Documents Requiring Department Approval: MNS; CDP; AP.
Acquisition decision Event: ADE 2A;
Acquisition Life Cycle Phase: Analyze/Select;
Systems Engineering Life Cycle Phase: Solution Engineering;
Documents Requiring Department Approval: APB; ILSP; AP; ORD.
Acquisition decision Event: ADE 2B;
Acquisition Life Cycle Phase: Obtain;
Systems Engineering Life Cycle Phase: Planning;
Documents Requiring Department Approval: APB; ILSP; TEMP; SELC/SE TP;
Systems Engineering Life Cycle Phases: Requirements Definition;
Design; Development; Integration and Testing; Implementation;
Acquisition Decision Event: ADE 3;
Acquisition Life Cycle Phase: Produce/Deploy/Support;
Systems Engineering Life Cycle Phase: Operations and Maintenance;
Disposition;
Documents Requiring Department Approval: APB; ILSP.
MNS: Mission Need Statement;
CDP: Capability Development Plan;
AP: Acquisition Plan;
APB: Acquisition Program Baseline;
ILSP: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
ORD: Operational Requirements Document;
TEMP: Test and Evaluation Master Plan;
SELC/SE TP: Systems Engineering Life Cycle Tailoring Plan.
Source: DHS Acquisition Instruction/Guidebook 102-01-001, interim,
version 1.9, Nov. 7, 2008.
[End of figure]
Table: Key Acquisition Documents Requiring Department-level Approval:
Document Name: Mission Need Statement;
Description: Provides a high-level description of the mission need,
whether from a current or impending gap, based on business-case
planning. The Mission Need Statement, prepared by the Component,
outlines only the concept of the solution to fill the gap and does not
provide information on specific acquisitions/types of acquisition that
could provide that capability.
Document Name: Capability Development Plan;
Description: Serves as the agreement between the Component Head, the
Program/Project Manager, and the Acquisition Decision Authority on the
activities, cost, schedule, and performance boundaries of the work to
be performed in the Analyze/Select phase.
Document Name: Acquisition Plan;
Description: A living document that spans the life of the acquisition.
It provides a top-level strategy for future sustainment and support
and a recommendation for the overall acquisition approach and types of
acquisition.
Document Name: Acquisition Program Baseline;
Description: A summary of the critical cost, schedule, and performance
parameters, expressed in measurable, quantitative terms, which must be
met in order to accomplish the goals of the investment.
Document Name: Integrated Logistics Support Plan;
Description: The formal acquisition management document that describes
the management approach for obtaining a highly supportable capability
with an affordable and effective support structure.
Document Name: Operational Requirements Document;
Description: The Operational Requirements Document captures the
business or operational user Key Performance Parameters. They are
overarching documents that describe the mission, objectives, and
capabilities in operationally relevant terms.
Document Name: Test and Evaluation Master Plan;
Description: The basic "top-level" planning document for Test and
Evaluation related activities for major acquisition programs.
Describes the necessary Developmental Test and Evaluation and
Operational Test and Evaluation that needs to be conducted to
determine system technical performance, operational
effectiveness/suitability, and limitations.
Document Name: Systems Engineering Life Cycle Tailoring Plan;
Description: This plan tailors the phases, products and reviews in the
system engineering life cycle to meet the specific needs of each
program and project.
Source: DHS Acquisition Instruction/Guidebook 102-01-001 Version 1.9
and Appendices D and L.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
GAO Review of the Department of Homeland Security's Certification of
the Secure Flight Program--Cost and Schedule Estimates. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-535R]. Washington, D.C.: April 5,
2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP]. Washington,
D.C.: March 30, 2010.
NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-227SP]. Washington, D.C.: February
1, 2010.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and Performance
Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at Risk. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-158]. Washington, D.C.: January 29,
2010.
Defense Acquisitions: Managing Risk to Achieve Better Outcomes.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-374T]. Washington,
D.C.: January 20, 2010.
Biosurveillance: Developing a Collaboration Strategy Is Essential to
Fostering Interagency Data and Resource Sharing. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-171]. Washington, D.C.: December
18, 2009.
Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of
Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-13]. Washington, D.C.: November 19,
2009.
Information Technology: Agencies Need to Improve the Implementation
and Use of Earned Value Techniques to Help Manage Major System
Acquisitions. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-2].
Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2009.
Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and Begun
Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but Continue to
Face Challenges. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-128].
Washington, D.C.: October 7, 2009.
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the
Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1013T]. Washington, D.C.: September
17, 2009.
Homeland Security: Despite Progress, DHS Continues to Be Challenged in
Managing Its Multi-Billion Dollar Annual Investment in Large-Scale
Information Technology Systems. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1002T]. Washington, D.C.: September
15, 2009.
Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the
Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-896]. Washington, D.C.: September
9, 2009.
Emergency Preparedness: Improved Planning and Coordination Necessary
for Modernization and Integration of Public Alert and Warning System.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-834]. Washington, D.C.:
September 9, 2009.
Coast Guard: Better Logistics Planning Needed to Aid Operational
Decisions Related to the Deployment of the National Security Cutter
and Its Support Assets. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-497]. Washington, D.C.: July 17,
2009.
Coast Guard: As Deepwater Systems Integrator, Coast Guard Is
Reassessing Costs and Capabilities but Lags in Applying Its
Disciplined Acquisition Approach. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-682]. Washington, D.C.: July 14,
2009.
Aviation Security: TSA Has Completed Key Activities Associated with
Implementing Secure Flight, but Additional Actions Are Needed to
Mitigate Risks. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-292].
Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD's Weapon Programs
Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-543T]. Washington, D.C.: April 1,
2009.
Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP]. Washington,
D.C.: March 30, 2009.
Defense Acquisitions: DOD Must Prioritize Its Weapon System
Acquisitions and Balance Them with Available Resources. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-501T]. Washington, D.C.: March 18,
2009.
GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP]. Washington, D.C.: March 2,
2009.
High-Risk Series: An Update. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271SP]. Washington, D.C.: January
22, 2009.
Department of Homeland Security: A Strategic Approach Is Needed to
Better Ensure the Acquisition Workforce Can Meet Mission Needs.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-30]. Washington, D.C.:
November 19, 2008.
Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major Programs
Lack Appropriate Oversight. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-29]. Washington, D.C.: November 18,
2008.
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in
Delivering Key Technology Investment. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086]. Washington, D.C.: September
22, 2008.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Better Address Its
Cybersecurity Responsibilities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1157T]. Washington, D.C.: September
16, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative Fiscal Year 2008 Expenditure Plan Shows
Improvement, but Deficiencies Limit Congressional Oversight and DHS
Accountability. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-739R].
Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2008.
Coast Guard: Change in Course Improves Deepwater Management and
Oversight, but Outcome Still Uncertain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-745]. Washington, D.C.: June 24,
2008.
Border Security: Summary of Covert Tests and Security Assessments for
the Senate Committee on Finance, 2003-2007. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-757]. Washington, D.C.: May 16,
2008.
Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and Assessment Needed
to Improve Outcomes for Complex Service Acquisitions. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-263]. Washington, D.C.: April 22,
2008.
Privacy: Government Use of Data from Information Resellers Could
Include Better Protections. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-543T]. Washington, D.C.: March 11,
2008.
Homeland Security: Strategic Solution for US-VISIT Program Needs to Be
Better Defined, Justified, and Coordinated. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-361]. Washington, D.C.: February
29, 2008.
Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of Applying
Lessons Learned to Future Projects. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-508T]. Washington, D.C.: February
27, 2008.
Military Readiness: Navy Is Making Progress Implementing Its Fleet
Response Plan, but Has Not Fully Developed Goals, Measures, and
Resource Needs. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-264].
Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2008.
Terrorist Watch List Screening: Recommendations to Promote a
Comprehensive and Coordinated Approach to Terrorist-Related Screening.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-253T]. Washington,
D.C.: November 8, 2007.
Information Technology: Improvements for Acquisition of Customs Trade
Processing System Continue, but Further Efforts Needed to Avoid More
Cost and Schedule Shortfalls. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-46]. Washington, D.C.: October 25,
2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Improved Assessment and Oversight
Needed to Manage Risk of Contracting for Selected Services.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-990]. Washington, D.C.:
September 17, 2007.
United States Coast Guard: Improvements Needed in Management and
Oversight of Rescue System Acquisition. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-623]. Washington, D.C.: May 31,
2006.
Defense Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Funding for
Operation and Sustainment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-817]. Washington, D.C.:
September 6, 2005.
Homeland Security: Successes and Challenges in DHS's Efforts to Create
an Effective Acquisition Organization. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-179]. Washington, D.C.: March 29,
2005.
Defense Acquisitions: Information for Congress on Performance of Major
Programs Can Be More Complete, Timely, and Accessible. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-182]. Washington, D.C.: March 28,
2005.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-271SP] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 22,
2009).
[2] In 2009 constant dollars.
[3] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Program,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP] (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010) and NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale
Projects, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-227SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2010).
[4] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Managing Risk to Achieve Better
Outcomes, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-374T]
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 20, 2010).
[5] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major
Programs Lack Appropriate Oversight, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-29] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 18,
2008); Homeland Security: Challenges in Creating an Effective
Acquisition Organization, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-1012T] (Washington, D.C.: July 27,
2006); and Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD's Weapon
Programs Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-543T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1,
2009).
[6] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major
Programs Lack Appropriate Oversight, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-29] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 18,
2008).
[7] GAO, Homeland Security: Despite Progress, DHS Continues to Be
Challenged in Managing Its Multi-Billion Dollar Annual Investment in
Large-Scale Information Technology Systems, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1002T] (Washington, D.C.: Sept.15,
2009).
[8] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-29] and [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1002T].
[9] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1002T].
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-1002T].
[11] In a September 2009 testimony we did, however, discuss how DHS
acquisition and investment management processes had not adequately
addressed how DHS determines and ensures that an investment is aligned
with its Enterprise Architecture. See GAO-09-1002T.
[12] The two nonmajor programs selected--the Biosurveillance Common
Operating Network and the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System--
and one major program that had not started acquisition activities at
the time of our review, BioWatch Generation-3, were excluded from the
analysis of overall acquisition performance and program challenges.
Nonmajor programs at DHS are not subject to the same acquisition
planning requirements as major programs. Because BioWatch Generation-3
had not awarded contracts, it was considered pre-acquisition according
to our methodology.
[13] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-543T].
[14] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Billions Invested in Major
Programs Lack Appropriate Oversight, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-29] (Washington, D.C.: Nov.18,
2008).
[15] The department operated under the March 2006 Management Directive
No. 1400 on the Investment Review Process until November 2008 when DHS
issued Acquisition Management Directive 102-01, interim version, which
superseded Management Directive No. 1400. In January, 2010, DHS issued
Directive Number 102-01, Revision Number 01, which DHS officials
stated does not differ substantially from the interim acquisition
management directive.
[16] Acquisition costs include costs for all items and services for a
designated investment. Life-cycle costs include all resources and
associated cost elements required to develop, produce, deploy, and
sustain a particular program from initial concept through operations,
support, and disposal.
[17] DHS Acquisition Management Directive 102-01, interim version, and
DHS Acquisition Instruction/Guidebook 102-01-001, Interim Version 1.9
(Nov. 7, 2008).
[18] Fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 reviews included 5 nonmajor
programs, and 3 programs reviewed in fiscal year 2008 were again
reviewed in fiscal year 2009.
[19] Directive 102-01, Revision number 01 states that it applies to
acquisitions in existence on the directive's issuance date to the
maximum extent possible and to all future acquisitions; whereas, the
interim Directive 102-01 stated that it applied to all acquisitions
regardless of their life-cycle stage.
[20] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-29] and GAO,
Homeland Security: Successes and Challenges in DHS's Efforts to Create
an Effective Acquisition Organization, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-179] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29,
2005).
[21] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD's Weapon
Programs Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-543T] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1,
2009).
[22] As of September 2009, 26 programs were assigned action items: 16
major acquisition programs reviewed by the ARB; 7 major acquisition
programs not reviewed by the ARB but assigned action items as part of
DHS oversight reviews; 3 nonmajor acquisition programs reviewed by the
ARB. Additionally, 8 major acquisition programs reviewed by the ARB in
fiscal years 2008 or 2009 had not yet been assigned action items.
[23] The acquisition portfolio for the Federal Emergency Management
Agency includes both programs and major services, as defined by DHS's
acquisition management directive. The $5 billion assessed represents
programs. Officials said they were still working to identify
additional programs and the major services.
[24] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-543T].
[25] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Managing Risk to Achieve Better
Outcomes, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-374T]
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 20, 2010).
[26] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-543T].
[27] The two nonmajor programs are Biosurveillance Common Operating
Network and the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. BioWatch
Generation-3 had not started acquisition activities at the time of our
review.
[28] Automated Commercial Environment and US-VISIT programs could not
provide both initial and latest schedule estimates for reaching full
capability.
[29] This appendix is based on GAO, Cost Assessment Guide: Best
Practices for Estimating and Managing Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1134SP] (Washington, D.C.: July
2007).
[30] DHS officials report that three programs--Secure Flight, Sentinel
Class Patrol Boat and Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative--have
validated life-cycle cost estimates.
[31] For four Coast Guard programs, we analyzed the Quarterly
Acquisition Reports to Congress to the Senate and House appropriators.
For the nine other programs, we analyzed data reported in the Exhibit
300 required by OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 7: Planning, Budgeting,
Acquisition and Management of Capital Assets.
[32] According to DHS guidance, the program manager sets the point at
which initial operating capability is met during planning. The initial
operating capability milestone is not a specific time reference, but
reflects a point that indicates there is a major new capability with
measurable program benefit available to the designated user.
[33] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-374T].
[34] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-543T].
[35] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Must Prioritize Its Weapon System
Acquisitions and Balance Them with Available Resources, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-501T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25,
2009).
[36] DHS, Management Directive No. 1400, Investment Review Process
(Washington, D.C.: 2006) and DHS Acquisition Instruction Guidebook 102-
01-001 Version 1.9 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 7, 2008).
[37] All programs did not report data for all categories of program
office staffing requested in the data collection instrument. 15
programs reported total staffing data; 8 programs reported government
staffing data by function; and 6 reported contractor staffing by
function. Of the programs reporting government staffing by function,
programs indicated high levels of vacancies for scientist, program
management, financial management, and test and evaluation positions.
All workforce data are as of 2009.
[38] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: A Strategic Approach Is
Needed to Better Ensure the Acquisition Workforce Can Meet Mission
Needs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-30] (Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 19, 2008).
[39] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Better Planning and
Assessment Needed to Improve Outcomes for Complex Service
Acquisitions, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-263]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 22, 2008).
[40] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-388SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010).
[41] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-374T].
[42] GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Improved Assessment and
Oversight Needed to Manage Risk of Contracting for Selected Services,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-990] (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 17, 2007).
[43] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-30].
[44] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-467SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2008).
[45] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2,
2009).
[46] See for example: GAO, Best Practices: High Levels of Knowledge at
Key Points Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy
Shipbuilding, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-322]
(Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009); Joint Strike Fighter: Significant
Challenges and Decisions Ahead, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-478T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24,
2010); and Cost Increases in the Airborne Laser Program, GAO-04-643R
(Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004).
[47] 41 U.S.C. § 263
[48] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-326SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2009); NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-
Scale Projects, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-227SP]
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2010).
[49] OMB, Circular A-11, Part 7: Planning, Budgeting, and Acquisition
of Capital Assets, Capital Programming Supplement. 2006.
[50] We used OMB Exhibit 300 reports for all programs except four
Coast Guard programs: Sentinel Class, Maritime Patrol Aircraft,
Response Boat-Medium, and National Security Cutter. An Exhibit 300
must be submitted for all executive branch agency major investments,
and is designed to coordinate collection of agency information for
reports to Congress required by the Federal Acquisition Streamlining
Act of 1994 (FASA Title V). FASA requires agencies to establish cost,
schedule and measurable performance goals for all major acquisition
programs and achieve on average 90 percent of those goals. The Exhibit
300 is a component of the total performance budget justification for
executive agencies. Agencies are required to report total estimated
life-cycle costs and acquisition costs for programs in the Exhibit 300.
[51] The four Coast Guard programs are: Sentinel Class, Maritime
Patrol Aircraft, Response Boat-Medium, and National Security Cutter.
[52] We used official program acquisition program baselines for
initial cost estimates, and Quarterly Acquisition Reports to
congressional appropriations committees as current cost estimates for
the Sentinel Class, Maritime Patrol Aircraft, Response Boat-Medium,
and National Security Cutter programs. Acquisition program baselines
(APB) formally document a program's critical cost parameters,
including acquisition costs and life-cycle costs. The Quarterly
Acquisition Report to congressional appropriations committees includes
Total Acquisition Costs and Life-Cycle Cost Estimates reported to
Congress for Coast Guard programs.
[53] Our prior work has identified certain knowledge metrics regarding
technology and design. Specifically, our body of work on best
practices in product development indicates that (1) focus should be on
achieving a high level of technology maturity at the start of system
development in that critical technologies needed to meet essential
product requirements must be demonstrated to work in their intended
environment. The technology readiness level for each critical
technology is the metric we use to measure technology maturity; and
(2) product's design is stable as evidenced by the development of
engineering prototypes and the completion of engineering drawings for
an integrated product at the system design review. A best practice is
to achieve design stability at the system-level critical design
review, usually held midway through development.
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
