National Security
Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration
Gao ID: GAO-10-822T June 9, 2010
Recent terrorist events such as the attempted bomb attacks in New York's Times Square and aboard an airliner on Christmas Day 2009 are reminders that national security challenges have expanded beyond the traditional threats of the Cold War Era to include unconventional threats from nonstate actors. Today's threats are diffuse and ambiguous, making it difficult--if not impossible--for any single federal agency to address them alone. Effective collaboration among multiple agencies and across federal, state, and local governments is critical. This testimony highlights opportunities to strengthen interagency collaboration by focusing on four key areas: (1) developing overarching strategies, (2) creating collaborative organizations, (3) developing a well-trained workforce, and (4) improving information sharing. It is based on GAO's body of work on interagency collaboration.
Federal agencies have an opportunity to enhance collaboration by addressing long-standing problems and better positioning the U.S. government to respond to changing conditions and future uncertainties. Progress has been made in enhancing interagency collaboration, but success will require leadership commitment, sound plans that set clear priorities, and measurable goals. The agencies involved in national security will need to make concerted efforts to forge strong and collaborative partnerships, and seek coordinated solutions that leverage expertise and capabilities across communities. Today, challenges exist in four key areas: 1) Developing and implementing overarching strategies. Although some agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies on national security-related issues, GAO's work has identified cases where U.S. efforts have been hindered by the lack of information on roles and responsibilities of organizations involved or coordination mechanisms. 2) Creating collaborative organizations. Organizational differences--including differences in agencies' structures, planning processes, and funding sources--can hinder interagency collaboration. Agencies lack adequate coordination mechanisms to facilitate this collaboration during planning and execution of programs and activities. 3) Developing a well-trained workforce. Agencies do not always have the right people with the right skills in the right jobs at the right time to meet the challenges they face--including having a workforce that is able to quickly address crises. Moreover, agency performance management systems often do not recognize or reward interagency collaboration, and training is needed to understand other agencies' processes or cultures. 4) Sharing and integrating national security information across agencies. U.S. government agencies do not always share relevant information with their national security partners due to a lack of clear guidelines for sharing information and security clearance issues. Additionally, incorporating information drawn from multiple sources poses challenges to managing and integrating that information. Strengthening interagency collaboration--with leadership as the foundation--can help transform U.S. government agencies and create a more unified, comprehensive approach to national security issues at home and abroad.
GAO-10-822T, National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-10-822T
entitled 'National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to
Strengthen Interagency Collaboration' which was released on June 9,
2010.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility.
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features,
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters,
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT:
Wednesday, June 9, 2010:
National Security:
Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency Collaboration:
Statement of John H. Pendleton:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:
GAO-10-822T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-10-822T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Recent terrorist events such as the attempted bomb attacks in New
York‘s Times Square and aboard an airliner on Christmas Day 2009 are
reminders that national security challenges have expanded beyond the
traditional threats of the Cold War Era to include unconventional
threats from nonstate actors. Today‘s threats are diffuse and
ambiguous, making it difficult”if not impossible”for any single
federal agency to address them alone. Effective collaboration among
multiple agencies and across federal, state, and local governments is
critical.
This testimony highlights opportunities to strengthen interagency
collaboration by focusing on four key areas: (1) developing
overarching strategies, (2) creating collaborative organizations, (3)
developing a well-trained workforce, and (4) improving information
sharing. It is based on GAO‘s body of work on interagency
collaboration.
What GAO Found:
Federal agencies have an opportunity to enhance collaboration by
addressing long-standing problems and better positioning the U.S.
government to respond to changing conditions and future uncertainties.
Progress has been made in enhancing interagency collaboration, but
success will require leadership commitment, sound plans that set clear
priorities, and measurable goals. The agencies involved in national
security will need to make concerted efforts to forge strong and
collaborative partnerships, and seek coordinated solutions that
leverage expertise and capabilities across communities. Today,
challenges exist in four key areas:
* Developing and implementing overarching strategies. Although some
agencies have developed or updated overarching strategies on national
security-related issues, GAO‘s work has identified cases where U.S.
efforts have been hindered by the lack of information on roles and
responsibilities of organizations involved or coordination mechanisms.
* Creating collaborative organizations. Organizational differences”
including differences in agencies‘ structures, planning processes, and
funding sources”can hinder interagency collaboration. Agencies lack
adequate coordination mechanisms to facilitate this collaboration
during planning and execution of programs and activities.
* Developing a well-trained workforce. Agencies do not always have the
right people with the right skills in the right jobs at the right time
to meet the challenges they face”including having a workforce that is
able to quickly address crises. Moreover, agency performance
management systems often do not recognize or reward interagency
collaboration, and training is needed to understand other agencies‘
processes or cultures.
* Sharing and integrating national security information across
agencies. U.S. government agencies do not always share relevant
information with their national security partners due to a lack of
clear guidelines for sharing information and security clearance
issues. Additionally, incorporating information drawn from multiple
sources poses challenges to managing and integrating that information.
Strengthening interagency collaboration”with leadership as the
foundation”can help transform U.S. government agencies and create a
more unified, comprehensive approach to national security issues at
home and abroad.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO has recommended that federal agencies incorporate desirable
characteristics of national strategies; take actions to create
collaborative organizations; address human capital issues such as
staffing shortages, training, and strategic planning; and establish or
clarify guidelines for sharing national security information. Agencies
have generally concurred with GAO‘s recommendations and have taken
some actions to enhance interagency collaboration, but much work
remains.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-822T] or key
components. For more information, contact John H. Pendleton at (202)
512-3489 or pendeltonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss some of the key challenges
for interagency collaboration on national security matters and to
share with you ways U.S. government agencies could implement actions
to enhance collaboration. Recent terrorist events such as the
attempted bomb attacks in New York's Times Square and on board an
airliner on Christmas Day 2009 are reminders that national security
challenges have expanded beyond the traditional threats of the Cold
War era to include unconventional threats from nonstate actors.
Today's threats are diffuse and ambiguous. They include terrorist
threats from extremist groups, cyber attacks, drug trafficking,
infectious diseases, and energy threats. Moreover, they arise from
multiple sources and are interrelated, which makes it difficult, if
not impossible, for any single agency to effectively address alone.
Effective collaboration among multiple agencies and across federal,
state, and local governments is critical. The May 2010 National
Security Strategy highlighted the need to take a whole of government
approach to strengthening national capacity.[Footnote 1]
Congress and other organizations are becoming increasingly focused on
this topic and have recently taken steps to improve interagency
collaboration. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2008[Footnote 2] directed the Secretary of Defense to
submit a plan to improve and reform the Department of Defense's (DOD)
participation in and contribution to the interagency coordination
process on national security issues. In the Duncan Hunter National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009,[Footnote 3] Congress
gave authority to the Secretaries of Defense and State and the
Administrator of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to
jointly establish an advisory panel to advise, review, and make
recommendations on ways to improve coordination among those agencies
on national security issues, including reviewing their respective
roles and responsibilities. Most recently, National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010[Footnote 4] required the
President to designate an executive agency to commission a study on a
system for the career development and management of interagency
national security professionals. A number of commissions, research
institutions, and congressionally mandated studies have also put forth
proposals to reform part or all of the national security system. These
proposals range from far-reaching restructuring of the system to
smaller-scale proposals such as increasing resources for civilian
agencies. A recurring theme of many of these proposals is the need for
change to improve interagency collaboration on national security
matters.
Last September, we issued a report discussing key issues and actions
necessary to enhance interagency collaboration on national security
for Congress and the administration to consider in their oversight and
management agendas.[Footnote 5] For that report, we reviewed GAO's
body of work on interagency collaboration related to national
security, which includes reports and testimonies on a variety of
issues, including stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, DOD's establishment of U.S. Africa Command to build
partner capacity, planning and coordination for an influenza pandemic,
information sharing, critical infrastructure protection, disaster
recovery, acquisitions and contracting, strategic planning, human
capital, and foreign aid reform. We also examined studies from U.S.
government agencies and research institutions. Since that time, we
have continued to conduct work on various aspects of interagency
collaboration. We are conducting ongoing reviews of U.S. Africa
Command's activity planning with interagency partners, U.S. Southern
Command's efforts to enhance and sustain collaboration with
interagency partners, interagency collaboration on counterpiracy
efforts, and professional development activities intended to improve
the federal workforce's ability to collaborate on national security
issues. We plan to report on these issues later this year. My
statement today will highlight opportunities to strengthen interagency
collaboration by focusing on four key areas: (1) developing
overarching strategies, (2) creating collaborative organizations, (3)
developing a well-trained workforce, and (4) improving information
sharing. I will also discuss the importance of sustained leadership in
addressing these areas. This statement is based on completed GAO work,
which was performed in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
Summary:
Federal agencies have an opportunity to enhance interagency
collaboration by addressing long-standing problems and achieving
meaningful results that better position the U.S. government to respond
to changing conditions and future uncertainties. Progress has been
made in enhancing interagency collaboration, but success will require
leadership commitment, sound plans that set clear priorities, and
measurable goals--as well as results-oriented performance measures
that can be used to gauge progress and make adjustments. The federal
agencies involved in national security will need to make concerted
efforts to forge strong and collaborative partnerships, and seek
coordinated solutions that leverage the expertise and capabilities
across the community. Sustained and inspired attention is needed to
overcome the many barriers to working across agency boundaries.
Strengthening interagency collaboration--with leadership as the
foundation--can help transform our U.S. government agencies and create
a more unified, comprehensive approach to national security issues at
home and abroad.
Opportunities for Strengthening Interagency Collaboration:
National security threats have evolved and require involvement beyond
the traditional agencies of DOD, the Department of State, and USAID.
The Departments of Homeland Security, Energy, Justice, the Treasury,
Agriculture, Commerce, and Health and Human Services are now a bigger
part of the equation. What has not yet evolved are the mechanisms that
agencies use to coordinate national security activities such as
developing overarching strategies to guide planning and execution of
missions, or sharing and integrating national security information
across agencies. The absence of effective mechanisms can be a
hindrance to achieving national security objectives. Within the
following key areas, a number of challenges exist that limit the
ability of U.S. government agencies to work collaboratively in
responding to national security issues. Our work has also identified
actions that agencies can take to enhance collaboration.[Footnote 6]
Developing and Implementing Overarching, Integrated Strategies to
Achieve National Security Objectives:
Although some agencies have developed or updated overarching
strategies on national security-related issues, our work has
identified cases where U.S. efforts have been hindered by the lack of
information on roles and responsibilities of organizations involved or
the lack of mechanisms to coordinate their efforts. National security
challenges covering a broad array of areas, ranging from preparedness
for an influenza pandemic to Iraqi governance and reconstruction, have
necessitated using all elements of national power--including
diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic,
and law enforcement support. These elements fall under the authority
of numerous U.S. government agencies, requiring overarching strategies
and plans to enhance agencies' abilities to collaborate with each
other. Strategies can help agencies develop mutually reinforcing plans
and determine activities, resources, processes, and performance
measures for implementing those strategies. The Government Performance
and Results Act (GPRA) provides a strategic planning and reporting
framework intended to improve federal agencies' performance and hold
them accountable for achieving results. Effective implementation of
GPRA's results-oriented framework requires, among other things, that
agencies clearly establish performance goals for which they will be
held accountable, measure progress towards those goals, and determine
strategies and resources to effectively accomplish the goals.
Furthermore, defining organizational roles and responsibilities and
mechanisms for coordination in these strategies can help agencies
clarify who will lead or participate in which activities and how
decisions will be made. It can also help them organize their
individual and joint efforts, and address how conflicts would be
resolved.[Footnote 7]
Our prior work, as well as that by national security experts, has
found that strategic direction is required as a foundation for
collaboration toward national security goals.[Footnote 8] We have
found that, for example, in the past, multiple agencies, including the
State Department, USAID, and DOD, led separate efforts to improve the
capacity of Iraq's ministries to govern, without overarching direction
from a lead entity to integrate their efforts. Since 2007, we have
testified and reported[Footnote 9] that the lack of an overarching
strategy contributed to U.S. efforts not meeting the goal for key
Iraqi ministries to develop the capacity to effectively govern and
assume increasing responsibility for operating, maintaining, and
further investing in reconstruction projects.[Footnote 10] We
recommended that the Department of State, in consultation with the
Iraqi government, complete an overall strategy for U.S. efforts to
develop the capacity of the Iraqi government. State recognized the
value of such a strategy but expressed concern about conditioning
further capacity development investment on completion of such a
strategy. Moreover, our work on the federal government's pandemic
influenza preparedness efforts found that the Departments of Homeland
Security and Health and Human Services share most federal leadership
roles in implementing the pandemic influenza strategy and supporting
plans; however, we reported that it was not clear how this would work
in practice because their roles are unclear. The National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza and its supporting implementation plan describes
the Secretary of Health and Human Services as being responsible for
leading the medical response in a pandemic, while the Secretary of
Homeland Security would be responsible for overall domestic incident
management and federal coordination. However, since a pandemic extends
well beyond health and medical boundaries--to include sustaining
critical infrastructure, private-sector activities, the movement of
goods and services across the nation and the globe, and economic and
security considerations--it is not clear when, in a pandemic, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services would be in the lead and when
the Secretary of Homeland Security would lead. This lack of clarity on
roles and responsibilities could lead to confusion or disagreements
among implementing agencies that could hinder interagency
collaboration. Furthermore, a federal response could be slowed as
agencies resolve their roles and responsibilities following the onset
of a significant outbreak.[Footnote 11]
We have also issued reports recommending that U.S. government
agencies, including DOD, the State Department, and others, develop or
revise strategies to incorporate desirable characteristics for
strategies for a range of programs and activities. These include
humanitarian and development efforts in Somalia, the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership,[Footnote 12] foreign assistance
strategy, law enforcement agencies' role in assisting foreign nations
in combating terrorism, and meeting U.S. national security goals in
Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. In commenting on
drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred with our
recommendations. Officials from one organization--the National
Counterterrorism Center--noted that at the time of our May 2007 report
on law enforcement agencies' role in assisting foreign nations in
combating terrorism, it had already begun to implement our
recommendations.[Footnote 13]
Creating Collaborative Organizations That Facilitate Integrated
National Security Approaches:
Organizational differences--including differences in agencies'
structures, planning processes, and funding sources--can hinder
interagency collaboration. Agencies lack adequate coordination
mechanisms to facilitate this collaboration during planning and
execution of programs and activities. U.S. government agencies, such
as the Department of State, USAID, and DOD, among others, spend
billions of dollars annually on various diplomatic, development, and
defense missions in support of national security. Achieving meaningful
results in many national security-related interagency efforts requires
coordinated efforts among various actors across federal agencies;
foreign, state, and local governments; nongovernment organizations;
and the private sector. Given the number of agencies involved in U.S.
government national security efforts, it is important that there be
mechanisms to coordinate across agencies. Without such mechanisms, the
results can be a patchwork of activities that waste scarce funds and
limit the overall effectiveness of federal efforts.[Footnote 14]
A good example of where agencies involved in national security
activities define and organize their regions differently involves
DOD's regional combatant commands and the State Department's regional
bureaus. Both are aligned differently in terms of the geographic areas
they cover, as shown in figure 1. As a result of differing structures
and areas of coverage, coordination becomes more challenging and the
potential for gaps and overlaps in policy implementation is greater.
Moreover, funding for national security activities is budgeted for and
appropriated by agency, rather than by functional area (such as
national security), resulting in budget requests and congressional
appropriations that tend to reflect individual agency concerns. Given
these differences, it is important that there be mechanisms to
coordinate across agencies.
Figure 1: Comparison of the State Department's Regional Bureaus and
DOD's Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 illustrated world maps]
The maps are illustrated to depict the following:
State Department regional bureaus:
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs;
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs;
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs;
Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs;
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs;
Excluded region.
DOD combat commands:
U.S. European Command;
U.S. Central Commend;
U.S. Pacific Command;
U.S. Africa Commend;
U.S. Southern Command;
U.S. Northern Command;
Shared between U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command.
Source: DOD and State Department.
[End of figure]
In addition to regional bureaus, the State Department is organized to
interact through U.S. embassies located within other countries. As a
result of these differing structures, our prior work and that of
national security experts has found that agencies must coordinate with
a large number of organizations in their regional planning efforts,
potentially creating gaps and overlaps in policy implementation and
leading to challenges in coordinating efforts among agencies.[Footnote
15]
Given the differences among U.S. government agencies, developing
adequate coordination mechanisms is critical to achieving integrated
approaches. In some cases, agencies have established effective
mechanisms. For example, DOD's U.S. Africa Command had undertaken
efforts to integrate personnel from other U.S. government agencies
into its command structure because the command is primarily focused on
strengthening security cooperation with African nations and creating
opportunities to bolster the capabilities of African partners, which
are activities that traditionally require coordination with other
agencies.[Footnote 16] However, in other cases, challenges remain. For
example, we reported in May 2007 that DOD had not established adequate
mechanisms to facilitate and encourage interagency participation in
the development of military plans developed by the combatant
commanders. Furthermore, we noted that inviting interagency
participation only after plans have been formulated is a significant
obstacle to achieving a unified government approach in the planning
effort. In that report, we suggested that Congress require DOD to
develop an action plan and report annually on steps being taken to
achieve greater interagency participation in the development of
military plans.[Footnote 17]
Moreover, we reported in March 2010 that DOD has many strategy,
policy, and guidance documents on interagency coordination of its
homeland defense and civil support mission; however, DOD entities do
not have fully or clearly defined roles and responsibilities because
key documents are outdated, are not integrated, or are not
comprehensive.[Footnote 18] More specifically, conflicting directives
assigned overlapping law enforcement support responsibilities to three
different DOD entities, creating confusion as to which DOD office is
actually responsible for coordinating with law enforcement agencies.
DOD's approach to identifying roles and responsibilities and day-to-
day coordination processes could also be improved by providing
relevant information in a single, readily-accessible source. This
source could be accomplished through a variety of formats such as a
handbook or a Web-based tool and could provide both DOD and other
agencies a better understanding of each other as federal partners and
enable a unified and institutionalized approach to interagency
coordination. We recommended, and DOD agreed, that the department
update and integrate its strategy, policy, and guidance; develop a
partner guide; and implement key practices for management of homeland
defense and civil support liaisons.
We have reported other instances in which mechanisms are not
formalized or fully utilized. For example, we found that collaboration
between DOD's Northern Command and an interagency planning team on the
development of the command's homeland defense plan was largely based
on the dedicated personalities involved and informal
meetings.[Footnote 19],[Footnote 20] Without formalizing and
institutionalizing the interagency planning structure, we concluded
efforts to coordinate may not continue when personnel move on to their
next assignments. We made several recommendations, and DOD generally
concurred, that the department take several actions to address the
challenges it faces in its planning and interagency coordination
efforts.
In recent years we have issued reports recommending that the
Secretaries of Defense, State, and Homeland Security and the Attorney
General take a variety of actions to address creating collaborative
organizations, including taking actions to:
* provide implementation guidance to facilitate interagency
participation and develop clear guidance and procedures for
interagency efforts,
* develop an approach to overcome differences in planning processes,
* create coordinating mechanisms, and:
* clarify roles and responsibilities.
In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred
with our recommendations. In some cases, agencies identified planned
actions to address the recommendations. For example, in our April 2008
report on U.S. Northern Command's plans, we recommended that clear
guidance be developed for interagency planning efforts, and DOD stated
that it had begun to incorporate such direction in its major planning
documents and would continue to expand on this guidance in the future.
[Footnote 21]
Developing a Well-Trained Workforce:
Federal agencies do not always have the right people with the right
skills in the right jobs at the right time to meet the challenges they
face, to include having a workforce that is able to quickly address
crises. As the threats to national security have evolved over the past
decades, so have the skills needed to prepare for and respond to those
threats. To effectively and efficiently address today's national
security challenges, federal agencies need a qualified, well-trained
workforce with the skills and experience that can enable them to
integrate the diverse capabilities and resources of the U.S.
government. Our work has found that personnel often lack knowledge of
the processes and cultures of the agencies with which they must
collaborate. Some federal government agencies lack the personnel
capacity to fully participate in interagency activities and some
agencies do not have the necessary capabilities to support their
national security roles and responsibilities.[Footnote 22] For
example, in June 2009, we reported that DOD lacks a comprehensive
strategic plan for addressing its language skills and regional
proficiency capabilities.[Footnote 23] Moreover, as of September 2009,
we found that 31 percent of the State Department's generalists and
specialists in language-designated positions did not meet the language
requirements for their positions, an increase from 29 percent in 2005.
[Footnote 24] Similarly, we reported in September 2008 that USAID
officials at some overseas missions told us that they did not receive
adequate and timely acquisition and assistance support at times,
[Footnote 25] in part because the numbers of USAID staff were
insufficient or because the USAID staff lacked necessary competencies.
[Footnote 26] We also reported in February 2009 that U.S. Africa
Command has faced difficulties integrating interagency personnel into
its command.[Footnote 27] According to DOD and Africa Command
officials, integrating personnel from other U.S. government agencies
is essential to achieving Africa Command's mission because it will
help the command develop plans and activities that are more compatible
with those agencies. However, the State Department, which faced a 25
percent shortfall in midlevel personnel, told Africa Command that it
likely would not be able to fill the command's positions due to
personnel shortages. DOD has a significantly larger workforce than
other key agencies involved in national security activities as shown
in figure 2.
Figure 2: Number of Civilian Government Employees and Military
Personnel Employed by Key Agencies Involved in National Security:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Agency: DOD;
Number of personnel: 2,155,000.
Agency: State Department;
Number of personnel: 219,000.
Agency: Department of Homeland Security;
Number of personnel: 31,000.
Source: DOD, State Department, and Department of Homeland Security.
Notes: Data are as of the end of fiscal year 2008 and do not include
contractor personnel. Numbers are rounded.
[End of figure]
Furthermore, agencies' personnel systems often do not recognize or
reward interagency collaboration, which could diminish agency
employees' interest in serving in interagency efforts. In June 2009 we
reviewed compensation policies for six agencies that deployed civilian
personnel to Iraq and Afghanistan, and reported that variations in
policies for such areas as overtime rate, premium pay eligibility, and
deployment status could result in monetary differences of tens of
thousands of dollars per year.[Footnote 28] The Office of Personnel
Management acknowledged that laws and agency policy could result in
federal government agencies paying different amounts of compensation
to deployed civilians at equivalent pay grades who are working under
the same conditions and facing the same risks. In another instance, we
reported in April 2009 that officials from the Departments of
Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury stated
that providing support for State Department foreign assistance program
processes creates an additional workload that is neither recognized by
their agencies nor included as a factor in their performance ratings.
[Footnote 29]
Various tools can be useful in helping agencies to improve their
ability to more fully participate in collaboration activities. For
example, increasing training opportunities can help personnel develop
the skills and understanding of other agencies' capabilities. We have
previously testified that agencies need to have effective training and
development programs to address gaps in the skills and competencies
that they identified in their workforces.[Footnote 30] Moreover, we
issued a report in April 2010 on DOD's Horn of Africa task force,
which found that DOD personnel did not always understand U.S. embassy
procedures in carrying out their activities.[Footnote 31] This
resulted in a number of cultural missteps in Africa because personnel
did not understand local religious customs and may have
unintentionally burdened embassies that must continuously train new
staff on procedures. We recommended, and DOD agreed, that the
department develop comprehensive training guidance or a program that
augments personnel's understanding of African cultural awareness and
working with interagency partners. Training and developing personnel
to fill new and different roles will play a crucial part in the
federal government's endeavors to meet its transformation challenges.
Also, focusing on strategic workforce planning can support agencies'
efforts to secure the personnel resources needed to collaborate in
interagency missions. We have found that tools like strategic
workforce planning and human capital strategies are integral to
managing resources as they enable an agency to define staffing levels,
identify critical skills needed to achieve its mission, and eliminate
or mitigate gaps between current and future skills and competencies.
[Footnote 32]
In recent years we have recommended that the Secretaries of State and
Defense, the Administrator of USAID, and the U.S. Trade Representative
take a variety of actions to address the human capital issues
discussed above, such as staffing shortfalls, training, and strategic
planning. Specifically, we have made recommendations to:
* develop strategic human capital management systems and undertake
strategic human capital planning,
* include measurable goals in strategic plans,
* identify the appropriate mix of contractor and government employees
needed and develop plans to fill those needs,
* seek formal commitments from contributing agencies to provide
personnel to meet interagency personnel requirements,
* develop alternative ways to obtain interagency perspectives in the
event that interagency personnel cannot be provided due to resource
limitations,
* develop and implement long-term workforce management plans, and:
* implement a training program to ensure employees develop and
maintain needed skills.
In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred
with our recommendations. In some cases, agencies identified planned
actions to address the recommendations. For example, in our April 2009
report on foreign aid reform, we recommended that the State Department
develop a long-term workforce management plan to periodically assess
its workforce capacity to manage foreign assistance. The State
Department noted in its comments that it concurred with the idea of
further improving employee skill sets and would work to encourage and
implement further training.[Footnote 33]
Sharing and Integrating National Security Information Across Agencies:
U.S. government agencies do not always share relevant information with
their national security partners due to a lack of clear guidelines for
sharing information and security clearance issues. The timely
dissemination of information is critical for maintaining national
security. Federal, state, and local governments and private-sector
partners are making progress in sharing terrorism-related information.
For example, we reported in October 2007 that most states and many
local governments had established fusion centers--collaborative
efforts to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and
terrorist activity--to address gaps in information sharing.[Footnote
34] However, we found that non-DOD personnel could not access some DOD
planning documents or participate in planning sessions because they
may not have had the proper security clearances. Moreover, because of
concerns about agencies' ability to protect shared information or use
that information properly, other agencies and private-sector partners
may be hesitant to share information. For example, we have reported
that Department of Homeland Security officials expressed concerns
about sharing terrorism-related information with state and local
partners because such information had occasionally been posted on
public Internet sites or otherwise compromised. To facilitate
information sharing, it is important to establish clear guidelines,
agreements, and procedures that govern key aspects, such as how
information will be communicated, who will participate in interagency
information sharing efforts, and how information will be protected.
When agencies do share information, managing and integrating
information from multiple sources presents challenges regarding
redundancies in information sharing, unclear roles and
responsibilities, and data comparability. For example, we reported in
December 2008 that in Louisiana, reconstruction project information
had to be repeatedly resubmitted separately to state and Federal
Emergency Management Agency officials during post-Hurricane Katrina
reconstruction efforts because the system used to track project
information did not facilitate the exchange of documents. Information
was sometimes lost during this exchange, requiring state officials to
resubmit the information, creating redundancies and duplication of
effort. As a result, reconstruction efforts in Louisiana were delayed.
[Footnote 35] In another instance, we reported in October 2008 that
biometric data, such as fingerprints and iris images, collected in DOD
field activities such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, were not
comparable with data collected by other units or with large federal
databases that store biometric data, such as the Department of
Homeland Security biometric database or the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) fingerprint database. A lack of comparable data,
especially for use in DOD field activities, prevents agencies from
determining whether the individuals they encounter are friend, foe, or
neutral, and may put forces at risk.[Footnote 36]
Since 2005, we have recommended that the Secretaries of Defense,
Homeland Security, and State establish or clarify guidelines,
agreements, or procedures for sharing a wide range of national
security information, such as planning information, terrorism-related
information, and reconstruction project information. We have
recommended that such guidelines, agreements, and procedures:
* define and communicate how shared information will be protected;
* include provisions to involve and obtain information from nonfederal
partners in the planning process;
* ensure that agencies fully participate in interagency information-
sharing efforts;
* identify and disseminate practices to facilitate more effective
communication among federal, state, and local agencies;
* clarify roles and responsibilities in the information-sharing
process; and:
* establish baseline standards for data collecting to ensure
comparability across agencies.
In commenting on drafts of those reports, agencies generally concurred
with our recommendations. In some cases, agencies identified planned
actions to address the recommendations. For example, in our December
2008 report on the Federal Emergency Management Agency's public
assistance grant program, we recommended that the Federal Emergency
Management Agency improve information sharing within the public
assistance process by identifying and disseminating practices that
facilitate more effective communication among federal, state, and
local entities. In comments on a draft of the report, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency generally concurred with the
recommendation and noted that it was making a concerted effort to
improve collaboration and information sharing within the public
assistance process.[Footnote 37] Moreover, agencies have implemented
some of our past recommendations. For example, in our April 2006
report on protecting and sharing critical infrastructure information,
we recommended that the Department of Homeland Security define and
communicate to the private sector what information is needed and how
the information would be used.[Footnote 38] The Department of Homeland
Security concurred with our recommendation and, in response, has made
available, through its public Web site, answers to frequently asked
questions that define the type of information collected and what it is
used for, as well as how the information will be accessed, handled,
and used by federal, state, and local government employees and their
contractors.
Importance of Sustained Leadership:
Underlying the success of these key areas for enhancing interagency
collaboration for national security-related activities is committed
and effective leadership. Our prior work has shown that implementing
large-scale change management initiatives or transformational change--
which is what these key areas should be considered--are not simple
endeavors and require the concentrated efforts of leadership and
employees to realize intended synergies and to accomplish new goals.
[Footnote 39] Leadership must set the direction, pace, and tone and
provide a clear, consistent rationale for the transformation.
Sustained and inspired attention is needed to overcome the many
barriers to working across agency boundaries. For example, leadership
is important in establishing incentives to promote employees' interest
in serving in interagency efforts.
The 2010 National Security Strategy calls for a renewed emphasis on
building a stronger leadership foundation for the long term to more
effectively advance our interests in the 21st century.[Footnote 40]
Moreover, the strategy identifies key steps for improving interagency
collaboration. These steps include more effectively ensuring alignment
of resources with our national security strategy, adapting the
education and training of national security professionals to equip
them to meet modern challenges, reviewing authorities and mechanisms
to implement and coordinate assistance programs, and other policies
and programs that strengthen coordination. National security experts
also note the importance of and need for effective leadership for
national security issues. For example, a 2008 report by the Project on
National Security Reform notes that the national security system
requires skilled leadership at all levels and, to enhance interagency
coordination, these leaders must be adept at forging links and
fostering partnerships all levels.[Footnote 41] Strengthening
interagency collaboration--with leadership as the foundation--can help
transform U.S. government agencies and create a more unified,
comprehensive approach to national security issues at home and abroad.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee
may have.
For future information regarding this statement, please contact John
H. Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or at pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact
points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs
can be found on the last page of this statement. Key contributors to
this statement are listed in appendix II.
[End of section]
Appendix I: Related GAO Products:
Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of
Africa Task Force, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504], Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15,
2010.
Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance Interagency
Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support Missions,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-364], Washington, D.C.:
Mar. 30, 2010.
Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of
National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and
Information Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP], Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25,
2009.
Military Training: DOD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better Inventory and
Requirements Data to Guide Development of Language Skills and Regional
Proficiency. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-568].
Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2009.
Influenza Pandemic: Continued Focus on the Nation's Planning and
Preparedness Efforts Remains Essential. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-760T]. Washington, D.C.: June 3,
2009.
U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-679SP]. Washington,
D.C.: May 27, 2009.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight and
Interagency Coordination for the Commander's Emergency Response
Program in Afghanistan. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-61]. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2009.
Foreign Aid Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency Coordination,
and Operational Improvements Would Bolster Current Efforts.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-192]. Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 17, 2009.
Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to
Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S. Strategies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-476T]. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25,
2009.
Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland
Security and an Updated Accountability Framework Can Further Enhance
DEA's Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-63]. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 20,
2009.
Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns,
Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated
with the U.S. Africa Command. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-181]. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20,
2009.
Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-860]. Washington, D.C.: July 31,
2008.
Information Sharing: Definition of the Results to Be Achieved in
Terrorism-Related Information Sharing Is Needed to Guide
Implementation and Assess Progress. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-637T]. Washington, D.C.: July 23,
2008.
Highlights of a GAO Forum: Enhancing U.S. Partnerships in Countering
Transnational Terrorism. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-887SP]. Washington, D.C.: July 2008.
Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a
Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve
Corps. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-39]. Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 6, 2007.
Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some
Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-35]. Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 30, 2007.
Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability
Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-549]. Washington, D.C.: May 31,
2007.
Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to
Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-697]. Washington, D.C.:
May 25, 2007.
Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15]. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005.
[End of section]
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
John H. Pendleton, (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact name above, Marie Mak, Assistant Director;
Laurie Choi; Alissa Czyz; Rebecca Guerrero; and Jodie Sandel made key
contributions to this testimony.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] National Security Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: May 2010).
[2] Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 952(a) (2008).
[3] Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 1054 (2008).
[4] Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1054 (2009).
[5] GAO, Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce,
and Information Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25,
2009).
[6] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-904SP].
[7] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics
in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-408T] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3,
2004).
[8] See, for example, GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That
Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.:
Oct. 21, 2005); Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks
Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe
Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-622] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17,
2008); and Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield
(Arlington, Va.: Nov. 26, 2008).
[9] GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance
Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should Be Addressed in U.S.
Strategies, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-476T]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2009); Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq:
Actions Needed to Address Inadequate Accountability over U.S. Efforts
and Investments, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-568T]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008); Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq:
U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated
Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-117] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 1,
2007).
[10] The State Department hired a contractor in 2008 to develop a
strategic planning document for ministry capacity development in Iraq.
Additionally, the United States shifted its emphasis to helping Iraqi
ministries execute their capital investment budgets based on the
update to the U.S. strategy in Iraq in 2007.
[11] GAO, Influenza Pandemic: Continued Focus on the Nation's Planning
and Preparedness Efforts Remains Essential, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-760T] (Washington, D.C.: June 3,
2009); Influenza Pandemic: Sustaining Focus on the Nation's Planning
and Preparedness Efforts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-334] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26,
2009); and Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are Needed to Ensure
Clearer Federal Leadership Roles and an Effective National Strategy,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-781] (Washington, D.C.:
Aug. 14, 2007).
[12] The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership initiative is a
multiyear, multiagency effort to support diplomacy, development
assistance, and military activities aimed at strengthening country and
regional counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the spread of
extremist ideology.
[13] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack
Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and
Prosecute Terrorists, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-697] (Washington, D.C.: May 25,
2007).
[14] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] and Managing
for Results: Barriers to Interagency Coordination, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-00-106] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
29, 2000).
[15] See, for example, GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to
Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency
Planning, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-549]
(Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2007); Project on National Security Reform,
Forging a New Shield (Arlington, Va.: Nov. 26, 2008); and Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S.
Government and Defense Reform for a New Era, Phase 2 Report
(Washington, D.C.: July 2005).
[16] GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder
Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs
Associated with the U.S. Africa Command, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-181] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20,
2009).
[17] GAO, Military Operations: Actions Needed to Improve Stability
Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-549] (Washington, D.C.: May 31,
2007).
[18] GAO, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Take Actions to Enhance
Interagency Coordination for Its Homeland Defense and Civil Support
Missions, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-364]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2010).
[19] The Incident Management Planning Team is an interagency team
created by the Department of Homeland Security to provide contingency
and crisis action incident management planning based on 15 national
planning scenarios. Participating organizations include DOD; the
Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Energy, Transportation, and
Health and Human Services; the Environmental Protection Agency; and
the American Red Cross.
[20] GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress
but Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness Tracking Gaps, and
Other Issues, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-251]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2008).
[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-251].
[22] Catherine Dale, Nina M. Serafino, and Pat Towell, Congressional
Research Service, Organizing the U.S. Government for National
Security: Overview of the Interagency Reform Debates, RL34455
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 16, 2008).
[23] GAO, Military Training: DOD Needs a Strategic Plan and Better
Inventory and Requirements Data to Guide Development of Language
Skills and Regional Proficiency, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-568] (Washington, D.C.: June 19,
2010).
[24] GAO, Department of State: Comprehensive Plan Needed to Address
Persistent Foreign Language Shortfalls, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-955] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 17,
2009). We explained that although it can be difficult to link foreign
language shortfalls to a specific negative outcome or event, these
shortfalls could be negatively affecting several aspects of U.S.
diplomacy, including consular operations, security, public diplomacy,
economic and political affairs, the development of relationships with
foreign counterparts and audiences, and staff morale.
[25] Over the last few decades, as the U.S. government has
increasingly come to rely on the private sector to perform various
functions, USAID has shifted from conducting its own activities to
managing acquisition and assistance instruments, which are awarded to
and implemented by mainly nongovernmental organizations.
[26] GAO, USAID Acquisition and Assistance: Actions Needed to Develop
and Implement a Strategic Workforce Plan, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1059] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26,
2008).
[27] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-181].
[28] GAO, Human Capital: Actions Needed to Better Track and Provide
Timely and Accurate Compensation and Medical Benefits to Deployed
Federal Civilians, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-562]
(Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2009).
[29] GAO, Foreign Aid Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency
Coordination, and Operational Improvements Would Bolster Current
Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-192]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2009).
[30] GAO, Human Capital: Federal Workforce Challenges in the 21st
Century, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-556T]
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2007).
[31] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its
Horn of Africa Task Force, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-504] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15,
2010).
[32] The five key principles that strategic workforce planning should
address are: (1) involve management, employees, and other stakeholders
in developing and implementing the strategic workforce plan; (2)
determine the critical skills and competencies needed to achieve
results; (3) develop strategies to address gaps in human capital
approaches for enabling and sustaining the contributions of all
critical skills and competencies; (4) build the capability to address
requirements important to support workforce planning strategies; and
(5) monitor and evaluate the agency's progress toward its human
capital goals and the contribution that human capital results have
made. GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic
Workforce Planning, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-39]
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003).
[33] GAO, Foreign Aid Reform: Comprehensive Strategy, Interagency
Coordination, and Operational Improvements Would Bolster Current
Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-192]
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2009).
[34] GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate
Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion
Centers, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-35]
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007).
[35] GAO, Disaster Recovery: FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program
Experienced Challenges with Gulf Coast Rebuilding, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-129] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18,
2008).
[36] GAO, Defense Management: DOD Can Establish More Guidance for
Biometrics Collection and Explore Broader Data Sharing, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-49] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15,
2008).
[37] GAO, Disaster Recovery: FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program
Experienced Challenges with Gulf Coast Rebuilding, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-129] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18,
2008).
[38] GAO, Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More
Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical
Infrastructure Information, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-383] (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17,
2006).
[39] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-669] (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).
[40] National Security Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: May 2010).
[41] Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield
(Arlington, Va.: Nov. 26, 2008).
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548: