Secure Border Initiative
DHS Needs to Follow Through on Plans to Reassess and Better Manage Key Technology Program Gao ID: GAO-10-840T June 17, 2010The Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is intended to help secure the 6,000 miles of international borders that the contiguous United States shares with Canada and Mexico. The program, which began in November 2005, seeks to enhance border security and reduce illegal immigration by improving surveillance technologies, raising staffing levels, increasing domestic enforcement of immigration laws, and improving physical infrastructure along the nation's borders. Within SBI, the Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) is a multibillion dollar program that includes the acquisition, development, integration, deployment, and operation of surveillance technologies--such as unattended ground sensors and radar and cameras mounted on fixed and mobile towers--to create a "virtual border fence." In addition, command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) software and hardware are to use the information gathered by the surveillance technologies to create a real-time picture of what is transpiring within specific areas along the border and transmit the information to command centers and vehicles.
The testimony summarizes our most recent report on SBInet, which provided a timely and compelling case for DHS to rethink the plans it had in place at the beginning of this year for investing in SBInet. In this regard, we showed that the scope of the initial system's capabilities and areas of deployment have continued to shrink, thus making it unclear what capabilities are to be delivered when. Moreover, DHS had yet to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of the proposed SBInet solution, and thus whether the considerable time and money being invested represented a prudent use of limited resources. Further, DHS had not employed the kind of acquisition management rigor and discipline needed to reasonably ensure that the proposed system capabilities would be delivered on time and within budget. Collectively, we concluded that these limitations increased the risk that the proposed solution would not meet the department's stated border security and immigration management goals. To minimize the program's exposure to risk, we recommended that DHS determine whether its proposed SBInet solution satisfied the department's border security needs in the most cost-effective manner and that the department improve several key life cycle management areas. DHS largely agreed with our recommendations. More importantly, since receiving these recommendations in a draft of our report in March 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security has taken action to limit the department's near-term investment in SBInet pending its completion of an analysis of alternative investment options. This and other planned actions are consistent with the intent of our recommendations.
GAO-10-840T, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Follow Through on Plans to Reassess and Better Manage Key Technology Program
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Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Management, Investigations, and
Oversight; and Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism;
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:
Thursday, June 17, 2010:
Secure Border Initiative:
DHS Needs to Follow Through on Plans to Reassess and Better Manage Key
Technology Program:
Statement of Randolph C. Hite, Director:
Information Technology Architecture and System Issues:
GAO-10-840T:
[End of section]
June 17, 2010:
Messrs. Chairmen and Members of the Subcommittees:
I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's hearing on the
technology component of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
Secure Border Initiative (SBI). My statement today is based on our
report, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed
Investment in Key Technology Program, which is being released at this
hearing.[Footnote 1]
As you know, SBI is intended to help secure the 6,000 miles of
international borders that the contiguous United States shares with
Canada and Mexico. The program, which began in November 2005, seeks to
enhance border security and reduce illegal immigration by improving
surveillance technologies, raising staffing levels, increasing
domestic enforcement of immigration laws, and improving physical
infrastructure along the nation's borders. Within SBI, the Secure
Border Initiative Network (SBInet) is a multibillion dollar program
that includes the acquisition, development, integration, deployment,
and operation of surveillance technologies--such as unattended ground
sensors and radar and cameras mounted on fixed and mobile towers--to
create a "virtual border fence." In addition, command, control,
communications, and intelligence (C3I) software and hardware are to
use the information gathered by the surveillance technologies to
create a real-time picture of what is transpiring within specific
areas along the border and transmit the information to command centers
and vehicles.
Since 2007, we have identified a range of management weaknesses and
risks facing SBInet, and we have made a number of recommendations to
address them that DHS has largely agreed with and, to varying degrees,
taken actions to address. Recently, in September 2008, we reported
that important aspects of SBInet were still ambiguous and in a
continuous state of flux 3 years after the program began, making it
unclear and uncertain what technology capabilities were to be
delivered when.[Footnote 2] In addition, the program still lacked an
approved schedule to guide its execution, and key milestones continued
to slip. This schedule-related risk was exacerbated by the absence of
a clearly defined approach used for developing and deploying SBInet.
Furthermore, different levels of SBInet requirements were not properly
aligned, and not all requirements had been properly defined and
validated. Also, the program office was not effectively managing early
test events. We thus emphasized at that time that the program was not
on a path for success and that change was needed. In March 2010, we
reported that recently completed test events were not adequate, as
illustrated by poorly defined test plans and numerous and extensive
last-minute changes to test procedures, and we reported on a growing
number of system performance and quality problems, which we said was
not indicative of a maturing system.[Footnote 3] We have also reported
multiple times on the impact that SBInet performance limitations have
had on Border Patrol operations. In particular, we reported that the
instability of the cameras, mechanical problems with the tower-mounted
radar, and the sensitivity of the radar have limited system
reliability and contributed to significant delays in system deployment
along the southwest border. As a result, Border Patrol agents have
been forced to rely on existing technologies that have their own
limitations, such as cameras mounted on towers that intermittently
lose signals.[Footnote 4]
My statement today summarizes our most recent report on SBInet, which
is being released publicly at this hearing. In summary, the report
provided a timely and compelling case for DHS to rethink the plans it
had in place at the beginning of this year for investing in SBInet. In
this regard, we showed that the scope of the initial system's
capabilities and areas of deployment have continued to shrink, thus
making it unclear what capabilities are to be delivered when.
Moreover, DHS had yet to demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of the
proposed SBInet solution, and thus whether the considerable time and
money being invested represented a prudent use of limited resources.
Further, DHS had not employed the kind of acquisition management rigor
and discipline needed to reasonably ensure that the proposed system
capabilities would be delivered on time and within budget.
Collectively, we concluded that these limitations increased the risk
that the proposed solution would not meet the department's stated
border security and immigration management goals. To minimize the
program's exposure to risk, we recommended that DHS determine whether
its proposed SBInet solution satisfied the department's border
security needs in the most cost-effective manner and that the
department improve several key life cycle management areas. DHS
largely agreed with our recommendations. More importantly, since
receiving these recommendations in a draft of our report in March
2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security has taken action to limit the
department's near-term investment in SBInet pending its completion of
an analysis of alternative investment options. This and other planned
actions are consistent with the intent of our recommendations.
Background:
Managed by DHS's Customs and Border Protection (CBP), SBInet is
intended to strengthen CBP's ability to detect, identify, classify,
track, and respond to illegal breaches at and between ports of entry.
The SBI Program Executive Office, which is organizationally within
CBP, is responsible for managing key acquisition functions associated
with SBInet, such as requirements management and risk management.
Within the Executive Office, the SBInet System Program Office (SPO) is
responsible for managing the day-to-day development and deployment of
SBInet.
In September 2006, CBP awarded a 3-year contract to the Boeing Company
for SBI, with three additional 1-year options. As the prime
contractor, Boeing is responsible for designing, producing, testing,
deploying, and sustaining the system. In September 2009, CBP extended
its contract with Boeing for the first option year. CBP is acquiring
SBInet incrementally in a series of discrete units of capabilities,
referred to as "blocks." Each block is to deliver one or more system
capabilities from a subset of the total system requirements. The first
block, known as Block 1, is to include a mix of surveillance
technologies (e.g., cameras, radars, and sensors) and C3I technologies
that are to produce a common operating picture--a uniform presentation
of activities within specific areas along the border. Block 1 is to be
initially deployed within the Tucson Sector to the Tucson Border
Patrol Station (TUS-1) and to the Ajo Border Patrol Station (AJO-1).
As of May 2010, the TUS-1 system is scheduled for government
acceptance in September 2010, with AJO-1 acceptance in November 2010.
[Footnote 5]
In January 2010, the DHS Secretary ordered a departmentwide
reassessment of the program to include a comprehensive assessment of
alternatives to SBInet to ensure that the department utilizes the most
efficient and effective technological and operational solutions to
secure the border. Pending the results of the assessment, the
Secretary also froze all Block 1 expenditures beyond those needed to
complete the implementation of the initial SBInet deployments to TUS-1
and AJO-1. Further, in March 2010, the department announced its plans
to redeploy $50 million from its American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 funding to purchase currently available, stand-alone
technology, such as remote-controlled camera systems called Remote
Video Surveillance Systems, and truck-mounted systems with cameras and
radar, called Mobile Surveillance Systems, to meet near-term
operational needs.
Block 1 Capabilities, Geographic Coverage, and Performance Standards
Have Continued to Decrease:
In order to measure system acquisition progress and promote
accountability for results, organizations need to establish clear
commitments around what system capabilities will be delivered, and
when and where they will be delivered. In September 2008, we reported
that the scope of SBInet was becoming more limited without becoming
more specific, thus making it unclear and uncertain what system
capabilities would be delivered when and to what locations.[Footnote
6] Accordingly, we recommended that DHS establish and baseline the
specific program commitments, including the specific system functional
and performance capabilities that are to be deployed to the Tucson,
Yuma, and El Paso Sectors, and establish when these capabilities are
to be deployed and are to be operational.
To its credit, the SPO subsequently defined the scope of the first
incremental block of SBInet capabilities that it intended to deploy
and make operational; however, these capabilities and the number of
geographic locations to which they are to be deployed have continued
to shrink. For example, the number of component-level requirements
[Footnote 7] to be deployed to the TUS-1 and AJO-1 locations has
decreased by about 32 percent since October 2008 (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Illustration of Reduction in Block 1 Requirements from
October 2008 through September 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
As of October 2008: 1,286;
As of September 2009: 1,005;
After waivers and deviations as of September 2009: 880.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS data.
[End of figure]
In addition, the number of sectors that the system is to be deployed
to was reduced from three border sectors spanning about 655 miles to
two sectors spanning about 387 miles. Further, the stringency of the
performance measures was relaxed, to the point that system performance
is now deemed acceptable if it identifies less than 50 percent of
items of interest that cross the border. According to program
officials, the decreases are due to poorly defined requirements and
limitations in the capabilities of commercially available system
components. The result will be a deployed and operational system that
does not live up to user expectations and provides less mission
support than was envisioned.
A Reliable Schedule for Completing Block 1 Has Not Been Developed:
The success of a large-scale system acquisition program, like SBInet,
depends in part on having a reliable schedule of when the program's
set of work activities and milestone events will occur, how long they
will take, and how they are related to one another. Among other
things, a reliable schedule provides a road map for systematic
execution of a program and the means by which to gauge progress,
identify and address potential problems, and promote accountability.
In September 2008, we reported that the program did not have an
approved master schedule that could be used to guide the development
of SBInet. Accordingly, we recommended that the SPO finalize and
approve an integrated master schedule that reflects the timing and
sequencing of SBInet tasks.
However, DHS has yet to develop a reliable integrated master schedule
for delivering the first block of SBInet. Specifically, the August
2009 SBInet integrated master schedule, which was the most current
version available at the time of our review, did not sufficiently
comply with seven of nine schedule estimating practices that relevant
guidance[Footnote 8] states are important to having a reliable
schedule.[Footnote 9] For example, the schedule did not adequately
capture all necessary activities to be performed, including those to
be performed by the government, such as obtaining environmental
permits in order to construct towers. Further, the schedule did not
include a valid critical path, which represents the chain of dependent
activities with the longest total duration in the schedule, and it
does not reflect a schedule risk analysis, which would allow the
program to better understand the schedule's vulnerability to slippages
in the completion of tasks.
These limitations are due, in part, to the program's use of the prime
contractor to develop and maintain the integrated master schedule,
whose processes and tools do not allow it to include in the schedule
work that it does not have under contract to perform, as well as the
constantly changing nature of the work to be performed. Without having
a reliable schedule, it is unclear when the first block will be
completed, and schedule delays are likely to continue.
Cost-Effectiveness of Block 1 Has Not Been Demonstrated:
The decision to invest in any system, or major system increment,
should be based on reliable estimates of costs and meaningful
forecasts of quantifiable and qualitative benefits over the system's
useful life. However, DHS has not demonstrated the cost-effectiveness
of Block 1. In particular, it has not reliably estimated the costs of
this block over its entire life cycle. To do so requires DHS to ensure
that the estimate meets key practices that relevant guidance[Footnote
10] states are important to having an estimate that is comprehensive,
well-documented, accurate, and credible. However, DHS's cost estimate
for Block 1, which is about $1.3 billion, does not sufficiently
possess any of these characteristics.
Further, DHS has yet to identify expected quantifiable or qualitative
benefits from this block and analyze them relative to costs. According
to program officials, it is premature to project such benefits given
the uncertainties surrounding the role that Block 1 will ultimately
play in overall border control operations, and that operational
experience with Block 1 is first needed in order to estimate such
benefits. While we recognize the value of operationally evaluating an
early, prototypical version of a system in order to better inform
investment decisions, we question the basis for spending in excess of
a billion dollars to gain this operational experience. Without a
meaningful understanding of SBInet costs and benefits, DHS lacks an
adequate basis for knowing whether the initial system solution is cost-
effective.
Block 1 Has Not Been Managed in Accordance with Key Life Cycle
Management Processes:
Successful management of large information technology programs, like
SBInet, depends in large part on having clearly defined and
consistently applied life cycle management processes. In September
2008, we reported that the SBInet life cycle management approach had
not been clearly defined. Accordingly, we recommended that the SPO
revise, approve, and implement its life cycle management approach,
including implementing key requirements development and management
practices, to reflect relevant federal guidance and leading practices.
To the SPO's credit, it has defined key life cycle management
processes that are largely consistent with relevant guidance and
associated best practices. However, it has not effectively implemented
these processes. In particular:
* The SPO revised its Systems Engineering Plan, which documents its
life cycle management approach for SBInet definition, development,
testing, deployment, and sustainment, in November 2008, and this plan
is largely consistent with DHS and other relevant guidance. For
example, it defines a number of key life cycle milestone or "gate"
reviews that are important in managing the program, such as initial
planning reviews, requirements reviews, system design reviews, and
test reviews. The plan also requires most key artifacts and program
documents that DHS guidance identified as important to each gate
review, such as a risk management plan and requirements documentation.
However, the SPO has not consistently implemented these life cycle
management activities for Block 1. For example, the SPO did not review
or consider key artifacts, including plans for testing and evaluating
the performance of the system, as well as assessing the robustness of
the system's security capabilities, during its Critical Design Review,
which is the point when, according to the plan, verification and
testing plans are to be in place.
* The SBInet Requirements Development and Management Plan states that
(1) a baseline set of requirements should be established by the time
of the Critical Design Review; (2) requirements should be achievable,
verifiable, unambiguous, and complete; and (3) requirements should be
bi-directionally traceable from high-level operational requirements
through detailed low-level requirements to test plans. Further, the
plan states that ensuring traceability of requirements from lower-
level requirements to higher-level requirements is an integral part of
ensuring that testing is properly planned and conducted. However, not
all Block 1 component requirements were sufficiently defined at the
time that they were baselined at the Critical Design Review. Further,
operational requirements continue to be unclear and unverifiable,
which has contributed to testing challenges, including the need to
extemporaneously rewrite test cases during test execution. In
addition, while requirements are now largely traceable backwards to
operational requirements and forward to design requirements and
verification methods, this traceability has not been used until
recently to verify that higher-level requirements have been satisfied.
* In 2008, the SPO documented a risk management approach that largely
complies with relevant guidance. However, it has not effectively
implemented this approach for all risks. Moreover, available
documentation does not demonstrate that significant risks were
disclosed to DHS and congressional decision makers in a timely fashion
as we previously recommended, and, while risk disclosure to DHS
leadership has recently improved, not all risks have been formally
captured and thus shared. For example, some of the risks that have not
been formally captured include the lack of well-defined acquisition
management processes, staff with the appropriate acquisition
expertise, and agreement on key system performance parameters.
However, the SPO recently established a risk management process for
capturing SBI enterprisewide risks, including the lack of well-defined
acquisition management processes and staff expertise.
Reasons cited by program officials for not implementing these
processes include their decision to rely on task order requirements
that were developed prior to the Systems Engineering Plan and
competing SPO priorities, including meeting an aggressive deployment
schedule. Until the SPO consistently implements these processes, it
will remain challenged in its ability to successfully deliver SBInet.
DHS Has Agreed to Implement GAO Recommendations Aimed at Addressing
SBInet Longstanding Uncertainties and Risks:
To address the program's risks, uncertainties, and acquisition
management weaknesses, our report being released today provides 12
recommendations.
In summary, we recommended that DHS limit future investment in SBInet
to work that is either already under contract and supports the
completion of Block 1 activities for deployment to TUS-1 and AJO-1
and/or provides a basis for a departmental decision on what, if any,
expanded investment in SBInet is justifiable as a prudent use of DHS's
resources for carrying out its border security and immigration
management mission. As part of this recommendation, we reiterated
prior recommendations pertaining to program management challenges and
recommended that DHS address weaknesses identified in our report by,
for example, ensuring that the SBInet integrated master schedule,
Block 1 requirements, and the Systems Engineering Plan, among other
program elements, are consistent with best practices.
We also recommended that the program undertake a detailed cost-benefit
analysis of any incremental block of SBInet capabilities beyond Block
1 and report the results of such analyses to CBP and DHS leadership.
Further, we recommended that DHS decide whether proceeding with
expanded investment in SBInet represents a prudent use of the
department's resources, and report the decision, and the basis for it,
to the department's authorization and appropriations committees.
To DHS's credit, it has initiated actions to address our
recommendations. In particular, and as previously mentioned, the
department froze all funding beyond the initial TUS-1 and AJO-1
deployments until it completes a comprehensive reassessment of the
program that includes an analysis of the cost and projected benefits
of additional SBInet deployments, as well as the cost and mission
effectiveness of alternative technologies.
Further, in written comments on a draft of our report, DHS described
steps it is taking to fully incorporate best practices into its
management of the program. For example, DHS stated that, in response
to our previous recommendations, it has instituted more rigorous
oversight of SBInet, requiring the program to report to the
department's Acquisition Review Board at specified milestones and
receive approval before proceeding with the next deployment increment.
With respect to our new recommendations, DHS stated that it is, among
other things, taking steps to bring the Block 1 schedule into
alignment with best practices, verifying requirements and validating
performance parameters, updating its Systems Engineering Plan, and
improving its risk management process.
In closing, let me emphasize our long held position that SBInet is a
risky program. To minimize the program's exposure to risk, it is
imperative for DHS to follow through on its stated commitment to
ensure that SBInet, as proposed, is the right course of action for
meeting its stated border security and immigration management goals
and outcomes, and once this is established, for it to ensure that the
program is executed in accordance with proven acquisition management
best practices. To do less will perpetuate a program that has for too
long been oversold and under delivered.
This concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to
any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittees may have.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For questions about this statement, please contact Randolph C. Hite at
(202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this testimony. Individuals making key contributions to this
testimony include Deborah Davis, Assistant Director; David Alexander;
Rebecca Alvarez; Carl Barden; Sylvia Bascopé; Tisha Derricotte; Neil
Doherty; Nancy Glover; Dan Gordon; Cheryl Dottermusch; Thomas J.
Johnson; Kaelin P. Kuhn; Jason T. Lee; Jeremy Manion; Taylor Matheson;
Lee McCracken; Jamelyn Payan; Karen Richey; Karl W.D. Seifert; Matt
Snyder; Sushmita Srikanth; Jennifer Stavros-Turner; Stacey L. Steele;
Karen Talley; and Juan Tapia-Videla.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-340] (Washington,
D.C.: May 5, 2010). Both the report and this statement are based on
work performed in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained during the course of
this review does provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[2] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant
Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086] (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22,
2008).
[3] GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Testing and Problem Resolution
Challenges Put Delivery of Technology Program at Risk, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-511T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 18,
2010).
[4] See, for example, GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced
Challenges Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest
Border, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-651T]
(Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010).
[5] This schedule has yet to be approved by CBP.
[6] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086].
[7] Component-level requirements describe required features of various
surveillance components (e.g., cameras and radars) and infrastructure
(e.g., communications).
[8] GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP] (Washington, D.C.: March
2009), 218-224.
[9] These are (1) capturing all activities, (2) sequencing all
activities, (3) assigning resources to all activities, (4)
establishing the duration of all activities, (5) integrating
activities horizontally and vertically, (6) establishing the critical
path for all activities, (7) identifying reasonable float between
activities, (8) conducting a schedule risk analysis, and (9) updating
the schedule using logic and durations.
[10] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-3SP], 8-13.
[End of section]
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