Congress Should Clarify the Speedy Trial Act To Resolve Differing Interpretations

The intent of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 is to speed the prosecution of accused persons in order to isolate those found guilty and prevent additional crimes by setting uniform time limits within which U.S. district courts have to process criminal cases. As of July 1, 1980, the Act provides for the dismissal of Federal criminal cases not processed within established time limits. The first time limit, 30 days (Interval I), includes the period from arrest to indictment. The second time limit, 70 days (Interval II), includes the period from either indictment or the defendant's first appearance before the court to the start of trial, plea of guilty, or dismissal.

GAO found that compliance with the Act's requirements has increased steadily over the past 4 years. However, because the executive and judicial branches interpret some provisions of the act differently, future criminal cases might be inappropriately dismissed. After the start of Interval I, cases are sometimes dismissed because U.S. attorneys are unable or choose not to move the cases within the 30-day limit. With the case dismissed and the time limit removed, prosecutors gain more time to prepare their case and then indict at a later date. However, this practice has the effect of slowing down the processing of criminal cases. The Judicial Conference (JC) and the Executive Office of the U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA) believe that the Act does not prohibit this practice, and that it is often necessary to enable further investigation of criminal activities. EOUSA believes that the Act is not clear as to the starting date of Interval II. However, JC maintains that the Act is clear. Issues have arisen in the implementing of the 30-day minimum period after the defendant's first appearance. The issues are: (1) whether excludable periods of delay apply; (2) what constitutes a defendant's first appearance; and (3) whether the minimum period is applicable to superseding charges. GAO found that defendants were waiving their rights to dismissal before the case was subject to dismissal for exceeding the Act's time limits. The waivers had the effect of delaying the start of trials.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

Director: Ronald F. Lauve Team: General Accounting Office: General Government Division Phone: (202) 512-6113