Seized Drugs and Firearms

During the last decade, GAO has periodically reported on government operations at "high risk" for waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. One of these operations is the asset forfeiture program run by the Justice Department. Seized items typically remain in an agency's custody until used as evidence by federal prosecutors. This report focuses on the FBI's controls over seized drugs and firearms. Each of the four FBI field offices GAO reviewed had established physical safeguards in accordance with key FBI policy directives. However, overcrowding and inadequate packaging of drug evidence and improper maintenance of the night depository in the drug vault at one of the FBI field offices GAO visited increased the risk of theft, misuse, and loss of evidence. Also, inadequate ventilation in the drug vault at one field office could potentially harm the health and safety of evidence control workers. The FBI's ability to account for drug and firearms evidence was hampered at the field offices GAO reviewed by incomplete and missing information on chain of custody documents, the failure to promptly issue and reconcile reports that are used to verify the location of evidence, and poor documentation of bulk drug seizures. Notwithstanding these problems, FBI personnel were able to locate each item that GAO chose for testing at the field offices; for those items not in storage, they provided documentation supporting the current location or status of the item. GAO identified several instances in which evidence control personnel or FBI agents entered evidence into the FBI's Automated Case Support System late without the required explanatory memoranda. While reviewing selected drug items in storage at the four field offices, GAO noted many discrepancies between the actual weight of drug items observed during GAO's testing and the weight of these items recorded on attached evidence labels, which should reflect the current weight of the item, including packaging.

GAO noted that: (1) physical safeguards over drug and firearm evidence, which include adequate storage facilities and control procedures, are essential for guarding against theft, misuse, and loss of such evidence and securing it for federal prosecutors; (2) each of the four FBI offices GAO reviewed established physical safeguards in accordance with key FBI policy provisions that if operated effectively would help control access to and use of drug and firearm evidence; however, overcrowding and inadequate packaging of drug evidence and improper maintenance of the night depository in the drug vault at one field office increased the potential for theft, misuse, and loss of evidence at that location; (3) in some cases firearms were not certified as rendered safe in accordance with FBI policy; (4) the most recent FBI internal inspections identified similar findings involving the improper storage of drug evidence, inadequate ventilation in drug vaults, and the lack of documentation certifying that firearms were rendered safe, as well as weaknesses in physical access controls; (5) the FBI's ability to account for drug and firearm evidence was hampered by incomplete and missing information on chain of custody documents, failure to promptly issue and reconcile reports used to verify the location of evidence, and inadequate documentation for certain bulk drug seizures; evidence control personnel, however, were able to locate each item selected for GAO's testing that was in storage at the field offices, and for those items not in storage, they provided documentation supporting the location or status of the item; (6) timely data entry and data verification are key control procedures that help ensure data records are complete and accurate; however, GAO identified several instances where evidence control personnel or agents entered evidence into the FBI's Automated Case Support (ACS) system late without the required explanatory memoranda; (7) there were discrepancies between information recorded in the ACS system and information on written documents associated with the evidence; (8) there were numerous discrepancies between the actual weight of drug items and the weight recorded on attached evidence labels; and (9) the FBI's ability to account for drug evidence was hindered by the lack of policies and procedures on how to identify and address significant weight variances.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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