Drug Control

The corruption of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. Customs Service employees along the Southwest border by drug traffickers is a serious and continuing threat. Some of these employees have waved drug loads through ports of entry, coordinated the movement of drugs across the border, transported drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints, sold drugs, and revealed drug intelligence information. Both INS and Customs have policies and procedures to help ensure the integrity of their employees. However, neither agency is taking full advantage of its policies, procedures, and the lessons to be learned from closed corruption cases to address the rising threat of employee corruption on the Southwest border. For example, although the agencies generally completed background investigations for new hires by the end of their first year on the job, reinvestigations were typically overdue, in some cases by as much as three years. The Justice Department's Office of the Inspector General and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs, which deal with allegations of drug-related misconduct by INS and Customs employees, are required to formally report internal control weaknesses identified from closed corruption cases. However, GAO's review of 28 cases involving INS and Customs employees along the Southwest border who had been convicted of drug-related crimes between 1992 and 1997 found internal control weaknesses that were not formally reported or corrected. These weaknesses included instances where (1) drug smugglers chose the inspection lane at a port of entry, (2) INS and Customs employees did not recuse themselves from inspecting persons with whom they had close personal relationships, and (3) law enforcement personnel were allowed to cross the Southwest border or pass Border Control checkpoints without inspection. Also, INS and Customs have not formally evaluated their integrity procedures to determine their effectiveness. For example, GAO found that financial information required for background investigations and reinvestigations was either limited or not fully reviewed. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More to Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption, by Richard M. Stana, Associate Director for Administration of Justice Issues, before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control. GAO/T-GGD-99-86, Apr. 21 (16 pages).

GAO noted that: (1) both INS and Customs have policies and procedures designed to ensure the integrity of their employees; (2) however, neither agency is taking full advantage of its policies, procedures, and the lessons to be learned from closed corruption cases to fully address the increased threat of employee corruption on the Southwest Border; (3) these policies and procedures consist mainly of mandatory background investigations for new staff and 5-year reinvestigations of employees, as well as basic integrity training; (4) while the agencies generally completed background investigations for new hires by the end of their first year on the job, as required, reinvestigations were typically overdue, in some instances, by as many as 3 years; (5) both INS and Customs said the basic training that new employees are to receive includes integrity training; (6) agency records for 284 of 301 randomly selected INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border showed that they received several hours of integrity training as part of their basic training; (7) DOJ and Treasury have different organizational structures but similar policies and procedures for handling allegations of drug-related misconduct by INS and Customs employees; (8) DOJ's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is generally responsible for investigating criminal allegations against INS employees; (9) GAO found that the Justice OIG generally complied with its policies and procedures; (10) at the Treasury, Customs' Office of Internal Affairs is generally responsible for investigating both criminal and noncriminal allegations against Customs employees; (11) GAO could not assess Customs' compliance with its procedures because its automated case management system and case files did not provide the necessary information; (12) some INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border have engaged in a variety of illegal drug-related activities; (13) INS and Customs have missed opportunities to learn lessons and change their policies and procedures for preventing the drug-related corruption of their employees; (14) the Justice OIG and Customs' Internal Affairs Office are required to formally report internal control weaknesses identified from closed corruption cases, but have not done so; and (15) GAO's review of 28 cases involving INS and Customs employees assigned to the Southwest Border, who were convicted of drug-related crimes in fiscal years 1992-1997, revealed internal control weaknesses that were not formally reported or corrected.

Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

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