Major Management Challenges and Program Risks
Department of Justice Gao ID: GAO-03-105 January 1, 2003In its 2001 performance and accountability report on the Department of Justice, GAO identified five major management challenges. Justice has since made progress on (1) developing measurable performance targets in reducing illegal drugs and (2) improving management of its asset forfeiture program. However, three challenges remain and a fourth managing the FBI's transformation was added. GAO prepared this report to bring these major challenges to the attention of the Congress and Justice. This is part of a special series of reports on governmentwide and agency-specific issues.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the nation forever and drew the country's attention to the mission of the Department of Justice (Justice). In fulfilling its mission, Justice and its components confront several performance and accountability challenges in 2003. Congress recently passed legislation calling for the new Department of Homeland Security to absorb certain functions currently performed by Justice'such as some information analysis and infrastructure protection capabilities and immigration enforcement and services. Regardless of which agency has responsibility for such functions, management challenges will persist. Transform the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): After September 11, 2001, the FBI began transforming its culture to be more proactive and preventive in responding to terrorism. The FBI faces several challenges in reorganizing, including realigning staff to address terrorism, building analytic capabilities, improving information sharing and information technology, recruiting employees with specialized skills, and managing the ripple effect of reorganization on the law enforcement community. Although the Department of Homeland Security will absorb some of the FBI's information analysis and infrastructure protection capabilities, the FBI still faces challenges that will require considerable attention. Enforce Immigration Laws and Provide Immigration Services: In carrying out its enforcement and service functions, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) faces many challenges, including unfocused or ineffective efforts at combating benefit fraud, unauthorized employment, and alien smuggling; and problems with workload and information technology management. Although the INS will be transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security, these organizational, management, and programmatic challenges will remain. Support State and Local Efforts to Reduce Crime: While the Office of Justice Programs has taken steps to achieve more effective grant management procedures and systems, it has not resolved long-standing problems with monitoring grant programs, including data collection and sufficiently rigorous impact evaluation studies. Achieve Financial Accountability: Although Justice achieved an unqualified audit opinion on its fiscal year 2001 financial statements, material weaknesses remain in general and application controls over financial management systems, recording financial transactions, and preparing financial statements.
GAO-03-105, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice
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January 2003:
MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM RISKS:
Department of Justice:
GAO-03-105:
Agency at a Glance:
The Department of Justice‘s mission includes:
* enforcing the law and defending U.S. interests according to the law,
* providing federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime,
* seeking just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior,
* ensuring fair and impartial administration of justice for all
Americans, and;
* administering and enforcing the nation‘s immigration laws fairly and
effectively. [These immigration functions are transferring to the
new Department of Homeland Security]:
Figure: The Department of Justice‘s Budgetary and Staff Resources:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
This Series:
This report is part of a special GAO series, first issued in 1999
and updated in 2001, entitled the Performance and Accountability
Series: Major Management Challenges and Program Risks. The 2003
Performance and Accountability Series contains separate reports
covering each cabinet department, most major independent agencies,
and the U.S. Postal Service. The series also includes a
governmentwide perspective on transforming the way the government does
business in order to meet 21st century challenges and address long-term
fiscal needs. The companion 2003 High-Risk Series: An Update identifies
areas at high risk due to either their greater vulnerabilities to
waste,
fraud, abuse, and mismanagement or major challenges associated with
their
economy, efficiency, or effectiveness. A list of all of the reports in
this series is included at the end of this report.
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-105, a report to Congress included as part of
GAO‘s
Performance and Accountability Series:
January 2003:
Performance and Accountability Series:
Department of Justice:
Why GAO Did This Report:
In its 2001 performance and accountability report on the Department
of Justice, GAO identified five major management challenges. Justice
has since made progress on (1) developing measurable performance
targets
in reducing illegal drugs and (2) improving management of its asset
forfeiture program. However, three challenges remain and a fourth”
managing the FBI‘s transformation”was added. GAO prepared this report
to bring these major challenges to the attention of the Congress and
Justice. This is part of a special series of reports on governmentwide
and agency-specific issues.
What GAO Found:
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the nation
forever and drew the country‘s attention to the mission of the
Department of Justice (Justice). In fulfilling its mission, Justice
and its components confront several performance and accountability
challenges in 2003. Congress recently passed legislation calling for
the new Department of Homeland Security to absorb certain functions
currently performed by Justice”such as some information analysis and
infrastructure protection capabilities and immigration enforcement
and services. Regardless of which agency has responsibility for such
functions, management challenges will persist.
* Transform the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): After September
11, 2001, the FBI began transforming its culture to be more proactive
and preventive in responding to terrorism. The FBI faces several
challenges in reorganizing, including realigning staff to address
terrorism, building analytic capabilities, improving information
sharing and information technology, recruiting employees with
specialized skills, and managing the ripple effect of reorganization
on the law enforcement community. Although the Department of Homeland
Security will absorb some of the FBI‘s information analysis and
infrastructure protection capabilities, the FBI still faces
challenges that will require considerable attention.
* Enforce Immigration Laws and Provide Immigration Services: In
carrying out its enforcement and service functions, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) faces many challenges, including
unfocused or ineffective efforts at combating benefit fraud,
unauthorized employment, and alien smuggling; and problems with
workload and information technology management. Although the INS
will be transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security,
these organizational, management, and programmatic challenges will
remain.
* Support State and Local Efforts to Reduce Crime: While the Office
of Justice Programs has taken steps to achieve more effective grant
management procedures and systems, it has not resolved long-standing
problems with monitoring grant programs, including data collection
and sufficiently rigorous impact evaluation studies.
* Achieve Financial Accountability: Although Justice achieved an
unqualified audit opinion on its fiscal year 2001 financial
statements, material weaknesses remain in general and application
controls over financial management systems, recording financial
transactions, and preparing financial statements.
What Remains to Be Done:
GAO believes Justice should;
* manage the FBI‘s transformation,
* improve enforcement of immigration laws and the provision of
immigration services,
* better manage programs that support state and local crime reduction
efforts, and;
* achieve financial accountability for fiscal year 2002 and beyond.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-105.
To view the full report, click on the link above.
For more information, contact Norman J. Rabkin at 202-512-9110 or
rabkinn@gao.gov:
Contents:
Transmittal Letter:
Major Performance and Accountability Challenges:
GAO Contacts:
Related GAO Products:
Performance and Accountability Series:
This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain
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Transmittal Letter:
January 2003:
The President of the Senate:
The Speaker of the House of Representatives:
This report addresses the major management challenges and program risks
facing the U.S. Department of Justice (Justice) as it works to carry
out its multiple and highly diverse missions. The report discusses the
actions that Justice has taken and that are under way to address the
challenges GAO identified in its Performance and Accountability Series
2 years ago, and major events that have occurred which significantly
influence the environment in which the department carries out its
mission. Also, GAO summarizes the challenges that remain, new ones that
have emerged, and further actions that GAO believes are needed.
This analysis should help the new Congress and the administration carry
out their responsibility and improve government for the benefit of the
American people. For additional information about this report, please
contact Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, at (202) 512-9110 or at
rabkinn@gao.gov.
David M. Walker:
Comptroller General of the United States:
Signed by David M. Walker:
Major Performance and Accountability Challenges:
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the nation forever
and drew the country‘s attention to the mission of the Department of
Justice (Justice). According to its mission statement, Justice enforces
the law and defends U.S. interests according to the law, leads the
federal effort to prevent and control crime, seeks punishment for the
guilty, and ensures fair and impartial administration of justice for
all Americans. With budgetary resources for fiscal year 2002 at an
estimated $36 billion and staff resources at 136,000, Justice‘s
responsibilities are divided among a number of components, including
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), Office of Justice Programs (OJP), Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), and U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). In
helping Justice meet its overall mission, these components confront
several major performance and accountability challenges.
In our last report of January 2001, we identified five major
performance and accountability challenges for Justice and its
components. These included (1) improving the enforcement of immigration
laws and the provision of immigration and naturalization services, (2)
better managing programs designed to support state and local efforts to
reduce crime, (3) developing measurable performance targets to help the
DEA determine its progress in reducing the availability of illegal
drugs, (4) achieving excellence in financial management, and (5)
improving the management and accountability of Justice‘s asset
forfeiture program. We noted the specific steps Justice had taken to
address the challenges, while pointing out areas in which Justice had
not made enough progress.
Since Justice has made significant progress and commitment in
addressing two of the five challenges addressed in our last report, we
have removed these from consideration in this report. For the challenge
of developing measurable performance targets in reducing illegal drugs,
the DEA has developed management plans to help measure program
effectiveness and provide organizational accountability for priority
performance targets; established performance targets for disrupting and
dismantling international and domestic drug trafficking organizations;
and developed an automated system to capture, verify, and validate data
on all priority projects. In June 2002, the Justice Office of the
Inspector General initiated a review to determine whether the DEA has
developed strategic goals and objectives; established performance
measures to evaluate achievement of its goals and objectives; and
established a data collection, analysis, and reporting system for its
performance measures. The other challenge we dropped from this report
is improving management of Justice‘s asset forfeiture program. We
believe Justice has made good faith efforts to respond to our concern
that it reduce its program‘s administrative costs by taking advantage
of opportunities for cooperation and for sharing agency and contractor
resources with the Department of the Treasury‘s asset forfeiture
program.[Footnote 1]
Three challenges, however, continue to confront Justice--enforcing
immigration laws while providing immigration services, managing
programs that support state and local efforts to reduce crime, and
achieving excellence in financial management. Furthermore, given the
increased emphasis on homeland security, we have added one new
challenge to Justice‘s list--managing the transformation of the FBI.
Addressing these four challenges will require sustained managerial
attention and commitment, as well as oversight and evaluations from
independent organizations.
On November 22, 2002, Congress passed legislation calling for the newly
established Department of Homeland Security to absorb certain functions
currently performed by Justice.[Footnote 2] For example, part of the
FBI‘s National Infrastructure Protection Center and all of the INS will
be transferred to the new department. Regardless of which agency has
responsibility for such functions, these organizational, management,
and programmatic challenges will remain.
Figure: Performance and Accountability Challenges:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Manage the FBI‘s Transformation:
In December 2001 and May 2002, the Director of the FBI unveiled the
first two phases of a plan to reorganize the Bureau. The first phase is
designed to strengthen the FBI‘s management structure, enhance
accountability, reduce executive span of control, and establish two new
divisions for Records Management and Security. The second phase is
designed to build an FBI with a national terrorism response capability
that is larger and more mobile, agile, and flexible by shifting some
resources from long-standing areas of focus, such as drugs, to
counterterrorism and intelligence; building analytic capacity; and
recruiting to address selected skill gaps. In light of the events of
September 11, 2001, this shift is clearly not unexpected and is, in
fact, consistent with the FBI‘s 1998 Strategic Plan as well as the
current Department of Justice Strategic Plan, and is intended to move
the FBI to be more proactive and preventive in fighting terrorism
rather than reactive and investigative.
We discussed the FBI‘s proposed reorganization and realignment efforts
and the challenges yet to be faced in a June 2002 testimony.[Footnote
3] Our fundamental message was that any changes at the FBI must be part
of, and consistent with, broader governmentwide transformations that
are taking place. This is especially true as the establishment of a
Department of Homeland Security is put into place. Some steps are
critical and time sensitive. As a result, the FBI needs to develop a
comprehensive transformation plan with key milestones and assessment
points to guide its overall transformation efforts.
To effectively meet the challenges of the post-September 11
environment, the FBI should consider employing the major elements of
successful transformation efforts used by leading organizations here
and abroad. These begin with gaining the commitment of the agency head
and all in senior level leadership. It requires a redefinition and
communication of priorities and values; a performance management system
that will reinforce agency priorities; and a fundamental reassessment
of the organizational layers, levels, units, and locations. Any
realignment must support the agency‘s strategic plan and desired
transformation. Organizations that have successfully undertaken
transformation efforts also typically use best practices for strategic
planning; strategic human capital management; senior leadership and
accountability; realignment of activities, processes, and resources;
and internal and external collaboration among others.[Footnote 4]
Realign Staff to Address Terrorism:
The reorganization plan redirects about 5 percent of FBI‘s fiscal year
2002 agent workforce from drug, white-collar, and violent crime
investigations ’to ensure that all available energies and resources are
focused on the highest priority threat to the nation, i.e. terrorism.“
Careful monitoring will be needed to ensure that the agents working in
counterterrorism can be appropriately used and to what extent
additional resources will be needed.
Specifically, the FBI intends to shift a total of 518 agents from drug
(400), white-collar crime (59), and violent crime (59) investigations
to work on counterterrorism, security improvements, and training. This
shift represents about 30 percent of the staff currently assigned to
drug enforcement moving to counterterrorism, while for white-collar and
violent crime the shift is not as substantial, representing about 2.5
percent and 3 percent of their staff years, respectively.
Counterterrorism resources go from about 15 percent of total agent
resources to just under 20 percent. The plan also calls for building up
the FBI headquarters‘ Counterterrorism Division through the transfer of
150 counterterrorism agents from field locations to Washington, D.C.
These 150 positions would then be backfilled in the field through
recruitment of new agents.
Other staff realignment issues include (1) reconsideration of the 56
office structure in the field; (2) whether more de-layering of
management is needed to optimize the functioning of the organization;
and (3) significant succession planning issues--about 25 percent of the
special agent workforce is eligible for retirement through 2005 and 80
percent of the Senior Executive Corps was eligible to retire in 2001.
Build Analytic and Information-Sharing Capabilities:
The FBI‘s 1998 strategic plan identified shortcomings in its analytical
capabilities. For example, many analysts lacked academic or other
experience in the subject matter for which they were responsible and
most had little or no training in intelligence analysis. To build the
capacity to prevent future terrorist attacks, the FBI plans to expand
its Office of Intelligence, which was created in December 2001. The
Office will focus on improving the FBI‘s capacity to gather, analyze,
and share critical national security information. In addition, the FBI
plans to support the new Office by training analysts on the latest
tools and techniques for both strategic and tactical analysis.
The FBI Director also indicated that he has taken and will take
additional steps to enhance communication with the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and other outside organizations. Although there are
certain legal restrictions in sharing information in a law enforcement
setting, the recently passed USA PATRIOT Act, Public Law 107-56,
contains a number of provisions that authorize information sharing and
coordination of efforts relating to foreign intelligence
investigations. For example, section 905 of the PATRIOT Act requires
the Attorney General to disclose to the CIA Director foreign
intelligence information acquired by Justice in the course of a
criminal investigation, subject to certain exceptions. Internally, the
plan includes new provisions that provide more authority to FBI field
offices to initiate and continue investigations.
Comprehensive Written Policy Needed for National Infrastructure
Protection Center:
The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) at the FBI is the
’national focal point“ for providing comprehensive analyses on threats,
vulnerabilities and attacks; issuing timely warnings on threats and
attacks; and coordinating the federal government‘s response to
computer-based incidents. In April 2001[Footnote 5] we reported that
the development of NIPC‘s analysis and warning capabilities were
limited by multiple factors, including the lack of a comprehensive
governmentwide or national framework for promptly obtaining and
analyzing information on imminent attacks, a shortage of skilled staff,
the need to ensure that NIPC does not raise undue alarm for
insignificant incidents, and the need to ensure that sensitive
information is protected. We recommended that NIPC develop a
comprehensive written policy for establishing analysis and warning
capabilities. Although the Director of NIPC generally agreed with our
findings, we are not aware of any actions taken to address this
recommendation. In addition, the 2002 Homeland Security Act transfers
the NIPC (except for its Computer Investigations and Operations
Section) out of the FBI and into the Department of Homeland Security.
Recruitment may Be More Difficult Due to Increased Competition for
Specialized Skills:
The FBI‘s planned recruitment of additional agents, analysts,
translators, and others with certain specialized skills and backgrounds
may become more difficult because other law enforcement and commercial
entities may be competing for the same qualified candidates
(particularly those with specialized technology, language, and science
skills). In total, the FBI is expected to hire 900 agents this year--
about 500 to replace agents who are projected to be leaving the agency
and 400 to fill newly created positions.
Hiring new agents with foreign language proficiency, especially those
with skills in Middle Eastern and Asian languages, is essential but
could be difficult given competing market demands for their skills. In
January 2002 we reported on the FBI‘s need for additional translators
and interpreters.[Footnote 6] Of a total of about 11,400 FBI special
agents, just under 1,800 have some foreign language proficiency, with
fewer than 800 (about 7 percent) having language skills sufficient to
easily interact with native speakers. Obtaining security clearances and
basic training will add additional time to the process of enhancing the
FBI‘s strength in language proficiency. While the FBI has shared
linguistic resources with other agencies, more opportunities for
pooling these scarce resources should be considered.
Improve Communications and Information Technology:
Long-standing communication problems for the FBI, such as antiquated
computer hardware and software and the lack of a fully functional e-
mail system, hamper the FBI‘s ability to share time sensitive
information internally and with other intelligence and law enforcement
agencies. Sharing investigative information encompasses legal
requirements related to law enforcement sensitive and classified
information and its protection through methods such as
encryption.[Footnote 7] There are also cultural barriers related to a
tradition of agents holding investigative information close so as not
to jeopardize evidence in a case. The need for more functional
communication will be essential for successful partnering with other
law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community. We do not
believe the FBI will be able to successfully change its mission and
effectively transform itself without significantly upgrading its
communications and information technology (IT) capabilities.
In February 2002 we reported that the FBI needed to fully establish the
management foundation that is necessary to begin successfully
developing, implementing, and maintaining an enterprise
architecture.[Footnote 8] Enterprise architecture is a comprehensive
and systematically derived description of an organization‘s operations,
both in logical and technical terms, that has been shown to be
essential to successfully building major IT systems. While the FBI
implemented most of the core elements associated with establishing the
management foundation, it had not yet established a steering committee
or group that has responsibility for directing and overseeing the
development of the architecture. The FBI needs to fully implement the
practices associated with effective enterprise architecture
management, including having a written and approved policy for
developing and maintaining the enterprise architecture and requiring
that IT investments comply with the architecture. We have ongoing work
evaluating the FBI‘s management of IT.
The Justice OIG shares similar concerns about the FBI‘s management of
its IT investments. In a December 2002 report,[Footnote 9] the OIG
reiterated the findings of our February 2002 report and added that the
FBI does not have effective IT investment management processes,
including lacking the architectural context for making internal IT
investment decisions. In addition, the FBI Director has designated IT
as one of the agency‘s 10 priorities.
Develop Internal Control System to Protect Civil Liberties:
Although the FBI wishes to become a more proactive agency, it also
needs to be cognizant of individuals‘ civil liberties. Guidelines
created in the 1970s to stem abuses of civil liberties resulting from
the FBI‘s domestic intelligence activities have recently been revised
to permit agents to be more proactive. For example, permitting FBI
presence at public gatherings, which generally had been inhibited by
the prior guidelines. No information obtained from such visits can be
retained unless it relates to potential criminal or terrorist activity.
To better ensure that these new investigative tools do not infringe on
civil liberties, appropriate internal controls, such as training and
supervisory review, must be developed, implemented, and monitored.
Manage Reorganization‘s Ripple Effect on Law Enforcement Community:
These FBI reorganization changes may have a ripple effect on the nature
and volume of work of other Justice Department units and their resource
needs, including DEA, the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, the
U.S. Attorneys Offices, and the Criminal Division‘s Terrorism and
Violent Crime Section. For example, if the volume of FBI
counterterrorism investigations increases substantially, one could
expect an increased volume of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
requests to the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review.[Footnote 10]
Moreover, should those requests be approved and subsequent surveillance
or searches indicate criminal activity, U.S. Attorneys Offices and the
Terrorism and Violent Crime Section would be brought in to apply their
resources to those investigations. In addition, one could expect more
legal challenges to the admissibility of the evidence obtained and to
the constitutionality of the surveillance or search.[Footnote 11] State
and local law enforcement are also likely to be affected by a change in
FBI focus. Although the major gap that state and local law enforcement
may have to help fill because of this realignment is in the drug area,
if additional FBI resources are needed for counterterrorism, state and
local law enforcement may have to take on greater responsibility in
other areas of enforcement as well.
Improve Enforcement of Immigration Laws and Provision of Immigration
Services:
The U.S. government, primarily the INS[Footnote 12] with aid from other
federal agencies such as the State Department, is faced with the
formidable task of enforcing the nation‘s immigration laws and
providing immigration services to eligible legal aliens. Immigration
enforcement is a complex, multifaceted function that includes, among
other things, patrolling 8,000 miles of international boundaries to
prevent illegal entry into the U.S.; inspecting over 500 million
travelers each year to determine their admissibility; apprehending,
detaining, and removing criminal and illegal aliens; disrupting and
dismantling organized smuggling and trafficking; and investigating and
prosecuting those who engage in benefit fraud, document abuse, and the
willful hiring of undocumented workers. Immigration services include
providing benefits, such as employment authorization and
naturalization, to those who legally enter and reside in the United
States. In this capacity, INS is expected to process millions of
applications each year, make the right adjudicative decision in
approving or denying the applications, and render decisions in a timely
manner. INS‘s responsibilities in carrying out its enforcement and
service functions are daunting and its past challenges are many.
Congress has continued to express concern about INS‘s ability to carry
out its enforcement and service functions, and over the last several
years has significantly increased INS‘s budget and staffing to help it
deal with its considerable workload. INS‘s fiscal year 2003 budget
request calls for a total of $6.3 billion in budget authority for
enforcement, services and support activities, almost three times its
fiscal year 1995 budget, and 37,100 in authorized positions, about 77
percent more than in fiscal year 1995. (See fig. 1.) Since the
September 11 attacks on the United States, concerns about shortcomings
in this country‘s immigration enforcement system have been highlighted.
INS received $549 million in emergency counterterrorism funding
following September 11, augmenting the $3.3 billion that had already
been allocated to enforcement activities.
Figure 1: INS Budget Authority (immigration enforcement, services and
support activities), Fiscal Years 1994-2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
INS still has many challenges before it can achieve the intended
results of both effective enforcement and service delivery. Those
challenges relate to how the government‘s immigration function should
be managed; that is, how to manage efforts to implement programs to
control the border and reduce alien smuggling, reduce immigration
benefit fraud, reduce unauthorized alien employment, remove criminal
aliens, manage the immigration benefit application workload, and risks
posed by the State Department‘s visa operations. In addition, INS is
faced with significant IT challenges as it moves forward to implement
legislation and other initiatives passed since the September 11
attacks. Although INS‘s functions will be transferred to the new
Department of Homeland Security, many of the management and
programmatic challenges that we and others have identified will
continue if these challenges are not addressed by the new department.
INS Estimates That Significantly More INS Resources and Time Needed to
Fully Implement Border Control Strategy, Yet Overall Effectiveness
Still Unknown:
The INS Border Patrol is responsible for preventing and deterring
aliens from illegally entering the United States between ports of
entry. We reported in August 2001 that the Border Patrol was in the
seventh year of implementing a border control strategy.[Footnote 13] At
that time it was in the second phase of a four-phase strategy that
called for allocating additional Border Patrol resources along the
southwest border. The Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
reported in 2002 that INS developed a northern border strategy in 2000,
but implementation was initially delayed because of changes in
administration and in INS leadership, and the events of September 11,
2001.[Footnote 14] While INS has taken steps since our January 2001
management challenges report to begin evaluating its southwest border
strategy, it remains to be seen how reliable and meaningful the results
of the assessment will be.
Before September 11, INS had generally allocated its agents in
accordance with the strategy; that is, deploying agents and other
resources first to the areas with the highest levels of illegal
activity. In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, INS
accelerated deployment of personnel and resources to the northern
border and plans to continue doing so in fiscal year 2003. In fiscal
year 2002, 245 Border Patrol agents were allocated to the northern
border, a tenfold increase compared to the 24 allocated in fiscal year
2001. The southwest border had nearly 9,200 Border Patrol agents as of
August 2002. (See fig. 2.) We reported in August 2001 that INS‘s
preliminary estimates indicated that gaining control of the southwest
border could take at least 5 more years and between 11,700 and 14,000
Border Patrol agents, additional support personnel, and hundreds of
millions of dollars in technology and infrastructure. It is unclear
what impact redirecting resources to the northern border will have on
gaining control of the southwest border.
Figure 2: Onboard U.S. Border Patrol Agents on the Southwest Border,
Fiscal Years 1993 to August 2002:
[See PDF for image]
Note: The number of agents for fiscal year 2002 is as of August 2002.
[End of figure]
In addition to taking longer to control the southwest border than INS
originally thought, questions about the overall effectiveness of the
southwest border strategy remain. We reported in August 2001 that the
primary discernable effect of the southwest border strategy appeared to
be a shifting of illegal alien traffic, and at that time there was no
clear indication that overall illegal entry had declined along the
southwest border.[Footnote 15] However, after a relatively steady
increase in yearly apprehensions between fiscal years 1993 and 2000,
apprehensions declined 43 percent from 1.64 million in 2000 to 0.93
million in 2002. Although INS maintained data on apprehended aliens in
its automated fingerprint system, it had not analyzed the data to
determine how many aliens had been arrested, how many times they had
been arrested, where they had been arrested, and how the numbers
changed over time in response to border enforcement efforts. Such
information would provide a better understanding of the relationship
between INS‘s strategy and overall illegal entry along the southwest
border. In response to our recommendation that it use the data in its
automated fingerprint system to help measure the results of border
control efforts and refine its border enforcement strategy, INS
established a working group to examine how the data could be used in
such a manner.
In February 2002, INS issued a plan for evaluating its southwest border
strategy. The plan listed numerous indicators INS will use to evaluate
the overall effects of the strategy. For example, the plan indicated
that INS would measure changes over time in the number apprehensions of
illegal aliens between the ports of entry, locations of apprehensions,
alien smuggling patterns, fees charged by smugglers, and the number of
fraudulent entry attempts at the ports of entry. (See fig. 3.) It is
too early to tell how INS will conduct its evaluation or the extent to
which the study will yield reliable and meaningful results. INS‘s plan
did not specify the time frame for completing the evaluation.
Figure 3: U.S. Border Patrol Apprehensions on the Southwest Border,
Fiscal Years 1993-2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Fragmented and Unfocused INS Efforts to Combat Immigration Benefit
Fraud:
In January 2002,[Footnote 16] we noted that fraud to obtain immigration
benefits was a significant problem that threatened the integrity of the
legal immigration system because it results in INS granting valuable
benefits to ineligible aliens. Fraud involves attempts by aliens to
obtain benefits--such as naturalization, work authorization, and
adjustment of status--through illegal means (e.g. using fraudulent
documents). INS officials told us that they believed the problem was
’pervasive and serious“ and that some aliens were using the benefit
application process to carry out illegal activities, such as crimes of
violence, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism. While the extent of
immigration benefit fraud is unknown, INS investigations have uncovered
various schemes involving the filing of thousands of fraudulent
applications.
Although immigration benefit fraud has grown more serious,
institutionally, INS has not positioned itself to combat this
significant problem. As we reported in January 2002, several
difficulties have hampered INS‘s immigration benefit fraud
investigations. Immigration benefit fraud has been a comparatively low
priority within INS and resources devoted to it have been limited. For
example, four INS services centers receive several million applications
for immigration benefits yearly, yet in 2000, INS had only 40 positions
dedicated to fraud detection and analysis. As we reported, INS lacked a
comprehensive plan on how its different investigative components are to
coordinate their immigration benefit fraud investigations and how INS
had not established guidance to ensure the highest priority cases are
investigated. In addition, INS lacked an agencywide case tracking and
management capability to maintain important data on targets of fraud
investigations. Finally, INS staff who adjudicate applications for
immigration benefits did not have access to the data they needed to
ensure that only eligible aliens obtain immigration benefits.
INS agreed with our January 2002 report that it should more effectively
detect fraudulent applications and process applications in a more
timely manner, and has begun to implement some of our recommendations.
For example, in response to our recommendation that it better integrate
its many units involved in benefit fraud enforcement, INS developed a
strategic plan for combating immigration fraud describing, among other
things, how its different investigative components were to coordinate
their immigration benefit fraud investigations. In response to our
recommendation that it develop a method to track and manage benefit
fraud investigations, in April 2002, INS mandated that all
investigative components begin using the automated agencywide Criminal
Investigative Reporting System to track and manage all criminal
investigations. Also following the September 11 attacks, the Attorney
General mandated certain changes in processing immigration benefit
applications. For example, he required that all applications be checked
against a federal law enforcement database. Our ongoing work will
evaluate changes made to the immigration benefit application process
since the September 11 attacks.
Efforts to Reduce Unauthorized Employment Face Impediments:
Many immigration experts believe that as long as opportunities for
employment exist, the incentive to enter the United States illegally or
overstay visas will persist and that efforts at the U.S. borders to
prevent illegal entry will be undermined. The Census Bureau estimated
that there were about 8 million illegal aliens in the United States in
2000.[Footnote 17] We testified in June 2002[Footnote 18] that hundreds
of thousands of aliens unauthorized to work in the United States have
used fraudulent documents to circumvent the process designed to prevent
employers from hiring them. Employers who hire unauthorized workers
face little chance of being investigated by INS, in part because
resources for work site enforcement have been relatively small. In
1998, INS devoted slightly over 300 work years to work site
enforcement, which declined to about 124 work years in fiscal year
2002. How much INS can accomplish with its limited work site
enforcement resources is questionable. Although there has been a slight
increase in the number of work years devoted to work site enforcement
since September 11 (specifically, 124 work years in fiscal year 2002
compared to 109 work years for fiscal year 2001), the resources
allocated to work site enforcement continue to be limited. Therefore,
we concluded that INS needed to ensure that it is making the best use
of its limited enforcement resources.
Another impediment we testified about in June 2002 pertained to
difficulty INS had coordinating work site enforcement with the
Department of Labor. While INS implemented our 1999
recommendations[Footnote 19] to seek assistance from state labor
agencies in disseminating information to employers about its pilot
programs for verifying employees‘ eligibility to work, coordinating
these efforts with Labor was difficult because the two agencies have
different enforcement missions. Labor stated that if employees thought
that Labor investigators were trying to determine their immigration
status, the employees‘ willingness to report workplace violations to
Labor could be jeopardized.
As a result of the September 11 attacks, INS has changed its priorities
regarding the types of employers that it will investigate. Prior to
September 11, INS focused its work site investigations on employers in
industries that traditionally relied on unauthorized workers, such as
restaurants, hotels, and construction. INS now plans to turn its
attention to employers in industries critical to the nation‘s
infrastructure, such as airports and municipal water supplies. For
example, after September 11, INS launched Operation Tarmac to focus on
companies employing individuals who have direct access to commercial
aircraft or who provide airport security. According to a June 2002 INS
testimony, Operation Tarmac had resulted in over 500 arrests of
unauthorized aliens and over 260 criminal charges. INS also initiated a
similar operation focusing on nuclear power facilities.[Footnote 20] As
a result, INS plans to limit the number of investigations of
’traditional“ employers of unauthorized aliens. How this shift in focus
will affect unauthorized employment by these traditional employers is
unknown. Conceivably, it could reduce unauthorized employment in the
more sensitive national security areas, leaving the general problem
unsolved.
Improvements Needed in Identifying and Removing Criminal Aliens:
Based on nationwide data, we reported in 1997[Footnote 21] and again in
1999[Footnote 22] that INS efforts to identify and remove imprisoned
aliens needed improvement. INS had failed to identify all deportable
criminal aliens, including aggravated felons. As a result, INS did not
fully comply with the legal requirements that it (1) place criminal
aliens who had committed aggravated felonies in removal proceedings
while they are incarcerated or (2) take those aggravated felons into
custody upon their release from prison. Therefore, many aggravated
felons were released from prison without being taken into INS custody
and subsequently rearrested for such crimes as assault, robbery, and
drug offenses. In September 2002 the Justice OIG reached the same
conclusion. Based on data primarily from California and Florida, the
OIG reported that INS has not effectively managed its national program
to identify and remove criminal aliens.[Footnote 23]
In June 2001,[Footnote 24] the OIG reported that INS was placing the
traveling public at potential risk because it was not consistently
following its policy of providing INS escorts for violent aliens being
removed from the United States via commercial airlines. As a result,
some potentially violent aliens were removed without escorts on
commercial airlines. In addition, INS‘s escort policy failed to require
escorts for some aliens who may pose a danger to the public. The
Inspector General made a number of recommendations to INS for improving
its escort procedures through actions such as training staff in the use
of INS‘s escort standard, monitoring, verifying adherence to escort
standard, and clarifying its responsibilities.
Shortcomings in Alien Antismuggling Efforts:
We, along with the Justice Inspector General,[Footnote 25] have issued
reports identifying weaknesses in INS‘s antismuggling efforts. We
reported in May 2000[Footnote 26] and in our last management challenges
report, that alien smuggling was a significant and growing enforcement
problem. Although INS had developed an antismuggling strategy with both
domestic and international components, we found that INS‘s ability to
implement and evaluate the domestic component of its strategy was
impeded by several factors. First, INS‘s antismuggling program lacked
program coordination, which resulted in multiple antismuggling units
overlapping in their jurisdictions, made inconsistent decisions about
which cases to open, and functioned autonomously and without a single
chain of command. Second, INS lacked an agencywide automated case
tracking and management system that prevented antismuggling program
managers from being able to monitor their ongoing investigations,
determining if other antismuggling units were investigating the same
target, or knowing if previous investigations had been conducted on a
particular target. Third, INS had limited performance measures to
assess the strategy‘s effectiveness to deter and disrupt alien
smuggling.
We concluded that without improvements in its investigations and
intelligence programs, INS‘s antismuggling efforts would continue to be
hampered and INS would find it difficult, if not impossible, to meet
the challenges posed by increasingly sophisticated major smuggling
organizations. Since our January 2001 management challenges report, INS
implemented our recommendation that it set up a case tracking and
management system to facilitate sharing of case information and prevent
duplication of effort. As noted earlier in this report, in April 2002,
INS mandated that all investigative components begin using the
automated agencywide Criminal Investigative Reporting System to track
and manage all criminal investigations. INS also agreed to implement
our other recommendations that it establish (1) criteria for opening
antismuggling cases to help ensure that resources are focused on the
highest priority cases, and (2) performance measures to gauge the
effects of its efforts. INS also agreed to implement the Inspector
General‘s recommendations that it examine coordination, program
structure, and communication issues to make improvements in its
antismuggling program.
Problems Managing INS‘s Application Workload:
Despite years of increasing budgets and staff, INS has continued to
experience significant problems managing its workload of processing
applications for such services and benefits as naturalization,
immigrant status adjustment, employment authorization, and granting
asylum. Even though aliens pay fees to INS for processing their
applications, and even though INS‘s budget for processing immigration
benefit applications increased sevenfold from fiscal year 1994 to 2002,
aliens have faced long waits for decisions on their cases and have had
difficulty obtaining accurate information on how long they can expect
to wait. As of October 2002, INS had a backlog of 5.2 million
applications, an almost fivefold increase since October 1994.
We reported in May 2001[Footnote 27] that better automation capability
and a more streamlined application process would enable INS to provide
improved levels of service. Automation improvements would provide INS
with the necessary information to determine whether (1) all the
applications received are processed, (2) applications are worked on in
the order in which they are received, (3) prompt and correct responses
are provided to applicants inquiring about the status of their cases,
and (4) aliens have been waiting very long to have their applications
processed. Although INS believed that additional staff would reduce its
application backlog problem, it was not in a position to determine the
extent to which staff shortages played a part in this problem. INS did
not know how to deploy its staff to process applications in a timely
fashion because it lacked a systematically developed staff resource
allocation model. We made a number of recommendations that would help
INS improve the application process and its management of it. INS
concurred with our recommendations and has begun to implement some of
them. For example, in response to our recommendation that INS develop
guidance and training on how to screen adjustment of status
applications in order to reduce errors in granting work authorization,
INS developed standard operating procedures. INS said it has
implemented the procedures and also instituted quality assurance
reviews of the adjudication process.
The Justice‘s Inspector General said that since the September 11
terrorist attacks, INS has made efforts to decrease the times needed to
process applications for changing immigration status and extending
stays.[Footnote 28] However, although INS made processing these
applications a priority shortly after September 11, its processing
times slowed because it had to meet a new requirement to run the
applications through the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS)
database before rendering a decision. In addition, in 2002, the
President announced a 5-year, $500 million initiative to eliminate the
backlogs of applications for immigration benefits and maintain a 6-
month processing time standard for all applications by the end of
fiscal year 2003.
Problems Coordinating with State Department on Using the Visa Process
to Screen for Potential Terrorists:
Given the events of September 11, 2001, there is public concern that
terrorists or other criminals may be exploiting the visa granting
process to gain entry into the United States. Generally, citizens of
foreign countries must apply for and obtain a nonimmigrant visa travel
document at U.S. embassies or consulates abroad before arriving at U.S.
ports of entry for business, tourism, and other reasons.[Footnote 29]
State Department consular officers issued 7.6 million visas in fiscal
year 2001. All 19 of the September 11, 2001, terrorist hijackers were
issued nonimmigrant visas. The granting of visas is a State Department
responsibility. However, Justice entities, most importantly the FBI,
are responsible for assisting the State Department by doing name checks
of selected visa applicants to determine if they are potential
terrorists and, therefore, should be denied a visa on terrorism grounds
under section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA).
In the months following the terrorist attacks, the State Department
instituted two new name check procedures for selected categories of
applicants. Until recently, the FBI had not implemented these two name
checks in a thorough or timely manner. As a result of the initial
delays, the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force[Footnote 30] began
conducting one of the two name checks for the FBI in late April 2002.
Of the estimated 38,000 special name checks processed by August 1,
2002, the task force had identified about 280 visa applicants who
should be denied a visa under the INA‘s terrorism provision. The task
force either believed these applicants are suspected terrorists, or, in
the majority of the cases, needed additional information to determine
the applicant‘s true identity. As a result of delays in the FBI‘s name
check processing, State received the refusal recommendation for about
200 of these applicants after overseas posts had already issued them
visas. The State Department revoked the visas in these cases as a
prudent measure and notified the INS. In mid-September 2002, the
executive branch changed the name check procedures in an attempt to
reduce the review time for applicants subject to the name checks. In
October 2002[Footnote 31] we recommended that the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security coordinate with the appropriate
agencies to (1) reassess interagency headquarters security checks to
verify that all are necessary and ensure their timely coordination
among U.S. agencies; (2) consider reassessing, on an interagency basis,
visas issued before the implementation of the new security checks for
selected categories of applicants who may pose security risks; and (3)
ensure that law enforcement and intelligence agencies are promptly
providing information to the State Department on persons who may pose a
security risk and who, therefore, should not receive a visa.
Also, Justice and State have different views on how to apply the INA‘s
terrorism provision, section 212(a)(3)(B), to visa applicants whose
names have resulted in a possible match against FBI or Foreign
Terrorist Tracking Task Force databases.[Footnote 32] According to the
State Department, it requires specific evidence to prove an applicant
ineligible under this provision. State says that consular officers must
know the specific actions or associations that may render an applicant
ineligible to legally deny a visa. Justice, however, believes that a
consular officer need not have specific evidence that the applicant
participated in terrorist activities or associations to justify a visa
denial. In addition, Justice believes that it will often be impossible
to know for sure whether a visa applicant is indeed the same person
contained in the relevant databases, even after all the applicant‘s
information is shared between the two departments. In that situation,
State thinks it is appropriate to proceed cautiously and deny a visa on
the theory that the name check match does provide the consular officer
a ’reasonable ground to believe“ that the applicant presents a threat
to national security and is, therefore, ineligible for admission. We
recommended that the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security
coordinate with the appropriate agencies to establish a governmentwide
policy on the level of evidence needed to deny a visa on terrorism
grounds.
The President‘s Department of Homeland Security proposal calls for visa
policy-making authority to be transferred to this new department, while
retaining administration of visas within the Department of State.
Congress is studying this proposal and considering how the visas
functions should be organized.
INS‘s Information Technology Management Weaknesses:
Each year INS has invested hundreds of millions of dollars on IT
systems and activities to carry out its core missions of (1) preventing
aliens from entering the United States illegally and removing aliens
who succeed in doing so and (2) providing services or benefits to
facilitate entry, residence, employment, and naturalization of legal
immigrants. However, the September 11TH terrorist attacks and INS‘s
critical role in preventing future attacks have increased INS‘s need
for effectively leveraging technology to achieve mission goals. To
illustrate, INS reportedly obligated about $297 million on IT
activities in fiscal year 2001, and about $459 million in fiscal year
2002, a 50 percent increase.
Despite the importance and prevalence of IT systems in accomplishing
its core missions, INS has not yet established and implemented
effective controls for managing its IT resources. Over the last decade,
Justice‘s OIG has reported that INS was not following established IT
project management procedures. Most recently, the OIG reported in
August 2001[Footnote 33] that despite having spent $31.2 million on its
Automated I-94 system,[Footnote 34] INS did not know whether the system
was meeting its intended performance goals. The root cause of the INS
system problems has been an absence of effective enterprise
architecture management and IT investment management. In August and
December 2000, we reported on INS‘s management weaknesses in both of
these areas and concluded that INS was not in a position to know
whether its ongoing and planned IT investments are the right things to
do or that they are being done the right way.[Footnote 35] That is, INS
does not know whether these investments will produce value commensurate
with costs and risk, whether they are aligned with an agencywide
blueprint (enterprise architecture) defining how the agency plans to
function in the future (operationally and technologically), or whether
each investment is meeting its cost, schedule, and performance
commitments.
To address these weaknesses, we made a series of recommendations in
August and December 2000. In response to the recommendations, INS has
developed an enterprise architecture, including a current and target
architecture, and a transition plan. Similarly, INS has taken steps to
implement rigorous and disciplined investment management controls. In
particular, it has (1) developed policies and procedures for
implementing its investment management process and (2) established
selection criteria for assessing the relative merits of each IT
investment that address cost, schedule, benefits, and risk. While these
are positive steps, much remains to be done before INS can fully
implement effective investment management controls and be in a position
to make informed IT investment decisions.
Adding to these problems is the urgency for INS to strengthen its
border security operations, which means that INS needs to expeditiously
involve new system capabilities while it addresses its IT management
shortcomings. In October 2001,[Footnote 36] we testified that the
recent terrorist attacks and the demands that they have placed on INS‘s
border security mission will require INS to effectively leverage
technology as part of its response to these demands. Accordingly, we
stated that INS will have to actively compensate for missing management
controls by ensuring that the requisite human capital skills and
expertise are brought to bear on IT projects supporting its border
security mission; and in the long term, INS will need to establish
controls for implementing and maintaining its enterprise architecture
and follow through on its ongoing efforts to establish and implement
effective investment management process controls.
Better Manage Programs Designed to Support State and Local Efforts to
Reduce Crime:
Justice provides support to state and local efforts to prevent and
control crime, administer justice, and assist crime victims. As part of
its role, Justice awards grants to organizations, including state and
local governments, through the Office of Justice Programs (OJP).
Programs overseen by OJP include those administered by the Violence
Against Women Office (VAWO),[Footnote 37] the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), the Executive Office for
Weed and Seed (EOWS), the Office of Police Corps (OPC), and the Bureau
of Justice Assistance (BJA), which includes the Drug Courts Program
Office (DCPO). Our work over the past 5 years on a number of programs
administered by these offices has (1) shown long-standing problems with
OJP grant monitoring and (2) raised questions about the methodological
rigor of some of OJP‘s impact evaluation studies. Monitoring and
evaluations are needed to identify whether programs are operating as
intended, reaching those who should be served, and ultimately making a
difference in the fight against crime and delinquency.
Problems with OJP Grant Monitoring:
In March 2002[Footnote 38] we testified that our work at OJP since 1996
has shown continuing grant monitoring problems among some bureaus and
offices.[Footnote 39] We found that files for certain discretionary
grants often lacked the documentation necessary to ensure that required
monitoring activities occurred. Neither OJP nor our office could
determine the level of grant monitoring performed by grant managers
required by OJP and the comptroller general‘s internal control
standards, which call for documentation of all transactions and
significant events to ensure that management directives are carried
out.[Footnote 40] As a result, we recommended that OJP (1) study and
propose ways to systematically test or review grant files to ensure
consistent documentation across OJP and (2) explore ways to
electronically compile and maintain documentation of monitoring
activities to facilitate more consistent documentation, more accessible
management oversight, and sound performance measurement.
Others, including OJP and Justice‘s OIG, have identified problems with
grant monitoring. In 1996, an OJP-wide working group found that grant
monitoring was not standardized in OJP and that a tracking system was
needed to facilitate control of the monitoring process. In 2000, an
independent contractor found that OJP lacked consistent procedures and
practices for performing grant management functions across the
agency.[Footnote 41] The contractor recommended that, among other
things, OJP develop an agencywide, coordinated, and integrated
monitoring strategy; standardize procedures for conducting site visits
and other monitoring activities; and mandate the timeliness and filing
of monitoring reports. Finally, the OIG reported on OJP-wide monitoring
problems, having identified grant management as 1 of the 10 major
management challenges facing Justice in 2000 and 2001.[Footnote 42]
Among other things, the OIG stated that Justice‘s multibillion dollar
grant programs are a high risk for fraud, given the amount of money
involved and the tens of thousands of grantees. Additionally, past OIG
reviews determined that many grantees did not submit the required
progress and financial reports and that program officials‘ on-site
reviews did not consistently address all grant conditions.
Too Early to Gauge Effectiveness of OJP Efforts to Resolve Grant
Monitoring Problems:
It is too early to tell how effective OJP‘s efforts to resolve grant
monitoring problems will be. In its Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report
and Fiscal Year 2002 Performance Plan, OJP established a goal to
achieve effective grant management--in part by progressing toward fully
implementing a new grant management system. This new system is intended
to help set priorities for program monitoring and facilitate timely
program and financial reports from grantees. At the time of our review
in 2001, the new system covered grants for some organizations up to the
award stage.[Footnote 43] When fully operational, it is envisioned to
produce reports in response to informational requests, provide
information pertaining to grantees and all resources provided by OJP,
and maintain information from the opening to the closing of a grant
award. However, it was still unclear whether the new system will
include the full range and scope of monitoring activities.
We also reported that OJP had been working on other key efforts, such
as new OJP-wide guidance for grant administration, including grant
monitoring. In January 2001, OJP released its Grant Management Policies
and Procedures Manual to update and codify OJP‘s policies and
procedures regarding its business practices.[Footnote 44] At the time
of our review, OJP had trained over 300 grant managers and had plans to
train supervisors about the new guidance. However, there were no plans
to test or systematically monitor compliance with the new guidelines to
ensure that grant managers were fulfilling their responsibilities.
OJP‘s bureaus and program offices have taken steps to respond to our
reports. For example, with respect to our 1999 Weed and Seed
report,[Footnote 45] EOWS said it recognized the need to improve
program monitoring and documentation of all monitoring visits. In a
July 2000 letter, EOWS officials reported it had taken steps to improve
program monitoring, including documentation of site monitoring visits.
Also, VAWO has developed an internal monitoring manual that is intended
to enhance accountability in performing oversight and help improve
monitoring quality, consistency, and uniformity. OPC, another OJP
program highlighted in the 2001 issue of this report, continues to make
progress in obligating funds and establishing interagency agreements.
By the end of September 2002 OPC plans to award a total of $53 million
to 27 participating states, 22 of which are actively recruiting and
training. Although OPC‘s service agreements with 1,402 police corps
candidates[Footnote 46] is fewer than the 2,128 slots authorized, it
does reflect moderate program expansion.
Concerns about Methodological Rigor of Impact Evaluation Studies:
We have also issued reports questioning the methodological rigor of OJP
grant program impact evaluation studies. For example, as we reported in
March 2002,[Footnote 47] three impact evaluations examining VAWO
programs had methodological problems that question whether the
evaluations will produce definitive results. These evaluations are
particularly arduous because of variations in program implementation.
In addition, VAWO sites participating in the impact evaluations did not
appear to represent their programs, thereby limiting the evaluators‘
ability to generalize the results. Further, the lack of nonprogram
participant comparison groups hindered isolating external factors from
the program‘s impact alone. Finally, data collection and analytical
problems (e.g. related to statistical tests, assessment of change)
compromised the evaluators‘ ability to draw appropriate conclusions
from the results. We recommended, among other things, that OJP assess
its evaluation process and develop approaches to mitigate potential
methodological design and implementation problems. The assistant
attorney general agreed with the substance of our recommendations and
has begun or plans to take steps to address them.
Our October 2001 review[Footnote 48] of 10 OJJDP impact evaluations
undertaken since 1995 also raised some concerns about whether many of
the evaluations would produce definitive results. Two of the
evaluations that were in their later stages and three of those that
were in their formative stages at the time of our review lacked
specific plans for comparison groups. Furthermore, three of the five
evaluations that were well into implementation at the time of our
review had developed data collection problems. We recommended that
OJJDP assess the five impact evaluations that were in their formative
stages to address potential problems and intervene if necessary to help
ensure definitive results. In commenting on a draft of our report, the
assistant attorney general said that OJP would use our report to
improve the quality of its evaluations and design programs to achieve
greater impact. Two months after our report‘s issuance, OJP told us
that OJJDP had decided to discontinue the one evaluation that was to
use a comparison group because it was unable to identify a comparison
site. In addition, OJJDP was considering scaling back and refocusing
the scope of another evaluation because the program being studied did
not lend itself to an impact evaluation with comparison groups.
Better Data Collection and Evaluation Efforts Needed to
Measure Impact of Federally Funded Drug Court Programs:
Despite the increasing number of drug court programs[Footnote 49]
required to collect and maintain performance and outcome data, and
despite our recommendations in 1997[Footnote 50] to improve evaluation
efforts, Justice‘s DCPO continues to lack vital information on the
impact of its programs. Although certain DCPO programs must collect and
provide performance measurement and outcome data, Justice has not
effectively managed this effort because of (1) its inability to readily
identify the universe of DCPO-funded drug court programs, including
those subject to DCPO‘s data collection reporting requirements; (2) its
inability to accurately determine the number of drug court programs
responding to DCPO‘s semiannual data collection survey; (3)
inefficiencies in the administration of DCPO‘s semiannual data
collection effort; (4) the elimination of post-program impact questions
from DCPO‘s data collection survey effort; and (5) insufficient use of
the Drug Court Clearinghouse. Also, because of various administrative
and research factors that have hampered Justice‘s ability to complete
the two-phase National Institute of Justice-sponsored national impact
evaluation study, Justice cannot provide Congress and drug court
program stakeholders with reliable information on program performance
and impact.
To improve data collection on the performance and impact of federally
funded drug court programs, we recommended in April 2002[Footnote 51]
that the Attorney General (1) develop and implement a management
information system to track and identify the universe of DCPO-funded
drug court programs; (2) take steps to ensure and sustain an adequate
grantee response rate to DCPO‘s data collection efforts; (3) take
corrective actions toward grantees who do not comply; (4) reinstate the
collection of post-program data, selectively spot checking grantee
responses to ensure accurate reporting; (5) analyze performance and
outcome data collected from grantees and report annually on the
results; and (6) consolidate the multiple drug court program-related
data collection efforts to ensure the primary focus is on DCPO-funded
drug court programs. We also recommended that the Attorney General
accelerate the funding and implementation of a methodologically sound
national impact evaluation, consider ways to reduce the time needed to
provide information on overall program impact, and implement
appropriate oversight of this evaluation effort.
In response to our recommendations, Justice plans to (1) develop an
management information system that would track the universe of DCPO-
funded drug court programs and (2) revamp DCPO‘s data collection
efforts in conjunction with the National Institute on Drug Abuse. Both
are expected to be completed in 2003. However, we believe that it is
unclear whether Justice‘s plans will address all of the insufficiencies
we have cited or how well Justice will monitor grantee compliance with
data collection, reporting, and evaluation requirements. Until Justice
fully implements our recommendations, Congress, the public, and other
stakeholders will continue to lack sufficient information to measure
long-term program benefits and to assess how these programs affect
criminal behavior of substance abuse offenders and whether these
programs are an effective use of federal funds.
Achieve Financial Accountability for Fiscal Year 2002 and Beyond:
Justice achieved an unqualified audit opinion on its fiscal year 2001
departmentwide financial statements, which was one of the Attorney
General‘s foremost priorities. Justice improved from receiving a mixed
audit opinion on its fiscal year 2000 departmentwide financial
statements[Footnote 52] to receiving an unqualified audit opinion in
2001.[Footnote 53] One of key improvements made since we last reported
is the financial statement audit results of the INS. INS was the only
component of Justice that did not receive an overall unqualified audit
opinion in fiscal year 2000. For the fiscal year 2001 financial
statements, INS received its first overall unqualified audit opinion
after gathering appropriate accounting records and documents to support
its deferred revenue and vendor payable accounts. However, the auditors
continued to report material internal control weaknesses at the INS and
several other components. While obtaining an unqualified audit opinion
on the fiscal year 2001 financial statements for Justice as a whole and
for each of its components was an important milestone, it is not an end
in and of itself. The end goal is to achieve financial accountability
by having systems and controls in place that provide accurate, timely,
and useful financial information to manage Justice and its components
on a day-to-day basis.
Justice has 10 components for financial reporting purposes: (1) Assets
Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund (AFF); (2) Working
Capital Fund (WCF); (3) Offices, Boards, and Divisions (OBD); (4) USMS;
(5) OJP; (6) DEA; (7) FBI; (8) INS; (9) Federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP); and (10) Federal Prison Industries, Incorporated (FPI). Five of
these 10 components continue to have significant systems and material
internal control weaknesses that preclude them from achieving the goal
of financial accountability. The weaknesses identified can be
categorized into three major areas: (1) ineffective general and
application controls over financial management systems of various
components, (2) lack of adherence to established policies and
procedures for recording financial transactions in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles, and (3) ineffective financial
statement preparation processes. Furthermore, the auditors for the same
five components reported that they found internal control weaknesses
that were significant departures from the systems requirements of the
Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA). Until
these material weaknesses are addressed, Justice, regardless of the
type of audit opinion received, will continue to be at risk for errors,
fraud, or noncompliance that may not be promptly detected.
The auditors reported a total of 13 material weaknesses[Footnote 54]
for the Justice components for fiscal year 2001, compared to 15 and 14
material weaknesses reported for fiscal years 2000 and 1999,
respectively. While the 2001 results represent some improvement over
prior years, the large number of remaining material weaknesses
continues to indicate a lack of financial accountability in most
Justice components. As previously noted, these material weaknesses are
categorized into three main areas, which will be discussed in more
detail in the next section.
Material Weaknesses in General and Application Controls over Component
Financial Management Systems:
The auditors for 4 out of the 10 components reported weaknesses in
general and application controls over financial management information
systems. Specific concerns were found in the areas of entity-wide
security, access controls, application software development and change
controls, service continuity, segregation of duties, and system
software. For example, the component auditors reported that:
* Several of the DEA‘s data processing systems (1) have an expired
certification/accreditation, (2) cannot track personnel who are granted
access to the system or whose access should be terminated, (3) do not
have documented procedures for handling software changes, and (4)
cannot trace data entries to source documents.
* Security plans have not been completed for two financial management
applications at the USMS, and contingency plans were either outdated or
incomplete.
* Although the financial management system of record at the INS has
been
in development for almost 5 years, the implementation is not complete,
requiring the majority of INS‘s transactions to be entered into its
legacy system, which has many inherent control weaknesses. Auditors
reported that collectively, the DEA process presents significant risks
to the continued operation of INS‘s financial management system as a
whole.
The material weaknesses identified over program and application
controls increase the risk that programs and data processed on these
components‘ systems are not adequately protected from unauthorized
access or service disruption. These weaknesses could compromise
Justice‘s ability to ensure security over sensitive programmatic or
financial data, reliability of its financial reporting, and compliance
with applicable laws and regulations. Furthermore, without adequate
controls over financial management systems, the components could
experience a loss or manipulation of data as well as potential
financial losses from expensive efforts to recover such system or data
losses.
Material Weaknesses in Recording Financial Transactions in Accordance
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles:
The auditors reported that 4 of 10 components did not always follow
policies or procedures in place to ensure that financial transactions
were recorded in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles. Specifically, various component entities did not record
financial transactions in accordance with certain Statements of Federal
Financial Accounting Standards (SFFAS), which include the following:
* SFFAS No. 1, Accounting for Selected Assets and Liabilities--FBI
auditors reported that inefficient vendor invoice approval and payment
processes contributed to the initial under-reporting of liabilities and
increased FBI payments for interest and penalties under the Prompt Pay
Act. Auditors also reported that the DEA continues to have significant
unreconciled differences between the collections and disbursements
recorded in its accounting records and those recorded by the U.S.
Treasury.
* SFFAS No. 3, Accounting for Inventory and Related Property--FPI
auditors reported that financial accounting system deficiencies
continue to exist in the capture, processing, reporting, and use of
inventory data. These deficiencies affect the ability of the FPI to
reasonably estimate overhead rates and consistently value finished
goods inventories.
* SFFAS No. 5, Accounting for Liabilities of the Federal Government--
Auditors of the DEA, INS, and FBI reported that components‘ processes
to estimate accounts payable were not adequate or were not completed in
a timely manner. Specifically, some methods used were not well
supported, used noncurrent information, and did not properly record
some obligations.
* SFFAS No. 7, Accounting for Revenue and Other Financing Sources--
Auditors of the INS and FPI reported that improvements are needed in
the components‘ accounting for earned and deferred revenues. In some
instances, the components could not provide regular and timely support
for general ledger entries, consistently or adequately perform
collection efforts, or invoice customers in a timely manner.
The specific reporting deficiencies described raised concerns over the
components‘ abilities to make reasonable estimates, ensure the security
of assets, value and support recorded transactions appropriately, and
reduce unnecessary manual processing at year-end. Despite these
concerns over ongoing compliance with the SFFAS, an unqualified opinion
over the Justice‘s financial statements was obtained due to significant
manual correction efforts at year-end, which compensated for the lack
of integrated systems sufficient to support accounting operations.
However, the failure to address these reporting deficiencies may not
only affect future audit opinions, but may also result in the failure
to provide Justice management with meaningful information throughout
the year that is essential in making timely operational decisions.
Material Weaknesses in Financial Statement Preparation Processes:
The auditors for 2 of the 10 components reported material weaknesses in
the financial statement preparation process. In response to prior
auditor recommendations, the Justice Management Division issued a
number of departmentwide policies and held periodic meetings with the
Justice‘s components to discuss accounting and financial reporting
requirements. A key product of these efforts was the issuance of
Justice‘s Financial Statement Requirements and Preparation Guide. This
guide helped provide a solid foundation for improved financial
reporting in 2001, however, the auditors continued to identify material
weaknesses in the financial statement preparation process. For example,
component auditors reported that:
* Draft financial statements and Managements‘ Discussion and Analysis
(MD&A) submitted for audit by several components were not properly
prepared in accordance with existing Justice reporting requirements and
were not adequately reviewed by management. The drafts were found to
contain clerical errors, incomplete disclosures, and inconsistencies in
the financial statements and note disclosures.
* Accrual-based financial transaction processing at DEA was not
performed
on an ongoing basis, resulting in substantial year-end efforts to
obtain and analyze financial data necessary for financial statement
preparation.
* The FBI‘s financial management department lacked the staff to perform
the many tasks needed to produce annual financial statements and,
therefore, could not fully comply with Justice‘s financial reporting
requirements.
* Requirements to accumulate and report interagency elimination entries
to Justice were not consistently followed and resulted in the failure
to meet internal timelines, data not being provided in required
formats, and having financial activity among the components to go
unconfirmed.
* The reconciliation of intragovernmental transactions with other
federal
agencies was not fully completed and increased the risk of inaccurate
data being reported.
Proper financial management and reporting must be performed throughout
the year and must be complete in order to eliminate extensive manual
financial statement preparation efforts at the end of the fiscal year.
These year-end efforts are more susceptible to error and increase the
risk of misstatement in the Justice‘s and components‘ financial
statements. The reduction of these manual efforts is especially
important given the new financial reporting requirements of the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) for interim financial statements and the
acceleration of 2002 year-end financial statement deadlines by
approximately 1 month. Without improvements or fundamental changes to
how Justice and its components manage their financial activities, there
is a serious risk that the preparation and audit of Justice‘s fiscal
year 2002 financial statements will not comply with required deadlines.
This could result in a modification to the auditors‘ reports on
Justice‘s and its component‘s financial statements, internal controls,
and compliance with laws and regulations.
GAO Contacts:
Subjects covered in this report; Manage the FBI‘s Transformation;
Realign staff; Build analytic capability; Need for comprehensive
policy for National Infrastructure Protection Center; Recruitment
may be more difficult due to increased competition for specialized
skills; Improve communications and information technology; Develop
an internal control system to protect civil liberties; Manage the
ripple effect on the law enforcement community; Better Manage
Programs Designed to Support State and Local Efforts to Reduce Crime;
Problems with OJP grant monitoring; Too early to gauge effectiveness
of OJP efforts to resolve grant monitoring problems; Concerns about
methodological rigor of impact evaluation studies; Better DOJ
data collection and evaluation needed to measure impact of federally
funded drug court programs; Contact person: Laurie K. Ekstrand,
Director; (202) 512-8777; ekstrandl@gao.gov.
Subjects covered in this report; INS estimated that significantly
more INS resources and time needed to fully implement border control
strategy, yet overall effectiveness still unknown; ; Efforts to combat
immigration benefit fraud fragmented and unfocused; ; Efforts to reduce
unauthorized employment face impediments; ; Improvements needed in
identifying and removing criminal aliens; ; Shortcomings in alien
antismuggling efforts; ; Problems managing application workload;
Contact person: Richard M. Stana, Director; (202) 512-8777;
stanar@gao.gov.
Subjects covered in this report; Problems coordinating with State
Department on using the visa process to screen for potential
terrorists;
Contact person: Jess T. Ford, Director; International Affairs and
Trade;
(202) 512-4128; fordj@gao.gov.
Subjects covered in this report; INS‘s information technology
management
weaknesses; Contact person: Randolph C. Hite, Director; Information
Technology Architecture and Systems Issues; (202) 512-6204;
hiter@gao.gov.
Subjects covered in this report; Weaknesses in general and application
controls over component financial management systems; ; Weaknesses in
recording financial transactions in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles; ; Weaknesses in financial statement preparation;
Contact person: Linda M. Calbom, Director; Financial Management and
Assurance.; (202) 512-8341; calboml@gao.gov.
[End of table]
Related GAO Products:
Manage FBI‘s Transformation:
FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps Encouraging but Broad Transformation
Needed. GAO-02-865T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2002.
A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP.
Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2002.
Information Technology: Enterprise Architecture Use Across the Federal
Government Can Be Improved. GAO-02-6. Washington, D.C.: February 19,
2002.
Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct Staffing
and Proficiency Shortfalls. GAO-02-375. Washington, D.C.: January 31,
2002.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in
Developing National Capabilities. GAO-01-323. Washington, D.C.: April
25, 2001.
Information Security: Advances and Remaining Challenges to Adoption of
Public Key Infrastructure Technology. GAO-01-277. Washington, D.C.:
February 26, 2001.
Management Reform: Elements of Successful Improvement Initiatives. GAO/
T-GGD-00-26. Washington. D.C.: October 15, 1999.
Agencies‘ Annual Performance Plans Under the Results Act: An Assessment
Guide to Facilitate Congressional Decisionmaking. GAO/GGD/AIMD-
10.1.18. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 1998.
Agencies‘ Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate
Congressional Review. GAO/GGD-10.1.16. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 1997.
Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance
and Results Act. GAO/GGD-96-118. Washington, D.C.: June 1, 1996.
Improve the Enforcement of Immigration Laws and Provision of
Immigration Services:
Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an
Antiterrorism Tool. GAO-03-132NI. Washington, D.C.: October 21, 2002:
Immigration Enforcement: Challenges to Implementing the INS Interior
Enforcement Strategy. GAO-02-861T. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2002.
Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach Is Needed to Address
Problems. GAO-02-66. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2002.
Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of Recurring
Management Challenges. GAO-02-168T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2001.
Securing America‘s Borders: INS Faces Information Technology Planning
and Implementation Challenges. GAO-02-148T. Washington, D.C.: October
11, 2001.
INS‘ Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain After
Seven Years. GAO-01-842. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2001.
Immigration Benefits: Several Factors Impede Timeliness of Application
Processing. GAO-01-488. Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001.
Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational Improvements Needed to
Address Growing Problem. GAO/GGD-00-103. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2000.
Information Technology: INS Needs to Strengthen Its Investment
Management Capability. GAO-01-146. Washington, D.C.: December 29, 2000.
Information Technology: INS Needs to Better Manage the Development of
Its Enterprise Architecture. GAO/AIMD-00-212. Washington, D.C.: August
1, 2000.
Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien
Employment Exist. GAO/GGD-99-33. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 1999.
Criminal Aliens: INS‘ Efforts to Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens
Continue to Need Improvement. GAO/T-GGD-99-47. Washington, D.C.:
February 25, 1999.
INS Management: Follow-up on Selected Problems. GAO/GGD-97-132.
Washington, D.C.: July 22, 1997.
Criminal Aliens: INS‘ Efforts to Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens
Need to be Improved. GAO/T-GGD-97-154. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 1997.
Better Manage Programs Designed to Support State and Local Efforts to
Reduce Crime:
Drug Courts: Better DOJ Data Collection and Evaluation Efforts Needed
to Measure Impact of Drug Court Programs. GAO-02-434. Washington, D.C.:
April 18, 2002.
Violence Against Women: Problems with Grant Monitoring and Concerns
about Evaluation Studies. GAO-02-641T. Washington, D.C.: April 16,
2002.
Office of Justice Programs: Problems with Grant Monitoring and Concerns
about Evaluation Studies. GAO-02-507T. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2002.
Justice Impact Evaluations: One Byrne Evaluation Was Rigorous; All
Reviewed Violence Against Women Office Evaluations Were Problematic.
GAO-02-309. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2002.
Justice Discretionary Grants: Byrne Program and Violence Against Women
Office Grant Monitoring Should Be Better Documented. GAO-02-25.
Washington, D.C.: November 28, 2001.
Juvenile Justice: OJJDP Reporting Requirements for Discretionary and
Formula Grantees and Concerns About Evaluation Studies. GAO-02-23.
Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2001.
Juvenile Justice: Better Documentation of Discretionary Grant
Monitoring is Needed. GAO-02-65. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.
Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government. GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. Washington, D.C.: November 1999.
Federal Grants: More Can Be Done to Improve Weed and Seed Program
Management. GAO/GGD-99-110. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 1999.
Drug Courts: Overview of Growth, Characteristics, and Results. GAO/
GGD-97-106. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 1997.
Juvenile Justice: Selected Issues Relating to OJJDP‘s Reauthorization.
GAO/T-GGD-96-103. Washington, D.C.: May 8, 1996.
Achieve Financial Accountability for Fiscal Year 2002 and Beyond:
Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges Need to Be
Addressed. GAO-02-961T. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002.
Information Security: Additional Actions Needed to Fully Implement
Reform Legislation. GAO-02-470T Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2002.
Computer Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Risk to Critical
Federal Operations and Assets. GAO-02-231T. Washington, D.C.: November
9, 2001.
Performance and Accountability Series:
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide
Perspective. GAO-03-95.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Agriculture. GAO-03-96.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Commerce.
GAO-03-97.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense.
GAO-03-98.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Education.
GAO-03-99.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Energy.
GAO-03-100.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Health and
Human Services. GAO-03-101.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland
Security. GAO-03-102.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Housing
and Urban Development. GAO-03-103.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the
Interior. GAO-03-104.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice.
GAO-03-105.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Labor.
GAO-03-106.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of State.
GAO-03-107.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Transportation. GAO-03-108.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the
Treasury. GAO-03-109.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans
Affairs. GAO-03-110.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U.S. Agency for
International Development. GAO-03-111.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Environmental Protection
Agency. GAO-03-112.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Federal Emergency
Management Agency. GAO-03-113.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. GAO-03-114.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Office of Personnel
Management. GAO-03-115.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Small Business
Administration. GAO-03-116.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security
Administration. GAO-03-117.
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U.S. Postal Service.
GAO-03-118.
High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-03-119.
High-Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-03-120.
High-Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the Federal
Government and the Nation‘s Critical Infrastructures. GAO-03-121.
High-Risk Series: Federal Real Property. GAO-03-122.
FOOTNOTES
[1] We also removed the 2001 high-risk designation of Justice and
Treasury‘s asset forfeiture programs from our 2003 High-Risk Series: An
Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: Xxx. XX, 2003).
[2] The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (H.R. 5005) established the
Department of Homeland Security, was signed by the President on
November 25, 2002, and became public law P.L. 107-296.
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps
Encouraging but Broad Transformation Needed, GAO-02-865T (Washington,
D.C.: June 21, 2002).
[4] For GAO reports discussing the elements of successful
transformation in more detail, see Management Reform: Elements of
Successful Improvement Initiatives, GAO/T-GGD-00-26 (Washington. D.C.:
Oct. 15, 1999); Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the
Government Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington,
D.C.: June 1, 1996); Agencies‘ Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key
Questions to Facilitate Congressional Review, GAO/GGD-10.1.16 (Version
1) (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 1997); Agencies‘ Annual Performance Plans
Under the Results Act: An Assessment Guide to Facilitate Congressional
Decisionmaking, GAO/GGD/AIMD-10.1.18 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 1998);
and A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002).
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Significant Challenges in Developing National Capabilities, GAO-01-323
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2001).
[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Languages: Human Capital
Approach Needed to Correct Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls, GAO-02-
375 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2002).
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security: Advances and
Remaining Challenges to Adoption of Public Key Infrastructure
Technology, GAO-01-277 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2001).
[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Enterprise
Architecture Use Across the Federal Government Can Be Improved, GAO-02-
6 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 2002).
[9] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit
Report: Federal Bureau of Investigation‘s Management of Information
Technology Investments, Report Number 03-09 (Washington, D.C.: December
2002).
[10] The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-511),
as amended, among other things, established legal standards and a
process for seeking electronic surveillance and physical search
authority in national security investigations seeking to obtain foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence information within the United
States.
[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, FBI Intelligence Investigations:
Coordination Within Justice on Counterintelligence Criminal Matters is
Limited, GAO-01-780 (Washington, D. C.: July 16, 2001).
[12] P.L. 107-296 directed the abolishment of INS after its functions
are transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security. INS‘s
Border Patrol, detention, removal, intelligence, investigations, and
inspections programs will transfer to the new Bureau of Border
Security, and its adjudication functions of immigrant visa petitions,
naturalization petitions, asylum and refugee applications, and of its
service centers will transfer to the new Bureau of Citizenship and
Immigration Services.
[13] U.S. General Accounting Office, INS‘ Southwest Border Strategy:
Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years, GAO-01-842
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2001).
[14] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General,
Follow-up Report on Border Patrol‘s Efforts to Improve Northern Border
Security (Redacted Version), Report No. I-2002-004 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 2002)
[15] A July 2002 research report by the Public Policy Institute of
California, which we did not independently assess, went even further by
concluding that increased enforcement along the U.S.-Mexican border has
failed to reduce unauthorized immigration.
[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused
Approach Is Needed to Address Problems, GAO-02-66 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 31, 2002).
[17] U.S. Census Bureau, ESCAP II: Demographic Analysis Results,
Executive Steering Committee for A.C.E. Policy II, Report No. 1
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 13, 2001).
[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Enforcement:
Challenges to Implementing the INS Interior Enforcement Strategy, GAO-
02-861T (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2002).
[19] U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Aliens: Significant
Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien Employment Exist, GAO/GGD-99-
33 (Washington, D.C.: April 1999).
[20] Statement of Joseph R. Greene, Assistant Commissioner for
Investigations, before the House Subcommittee on Immigration and
Claims, regarding the INS Interior Enforcement Strategy, June 19, 2002.
[21] U.S. General Accounting Office, Criminal Aliens: INS‘ Efforts to
Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Need to be Improved, GAO/T-GGD-
97-154 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 1997).
[22] U.S. General Accounting Office, Criminal Aliens: INS‘ Efforts to
Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue to Need Improvement,
GAO/T-GGD-99-47 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 1999).
[23] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General,
Immigration and Naturalization Service Institutional Removal Program,
Audit Report No. 02-41 (Washington, D.C.: September 2002).
[24] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The
INS Escort of Criminal Aliens, Report No. I-2001-005 (Washington, D.C.:
June 2001).
[25] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General,
Survey of INS‘s Anti-Smuggling Units, Report No. I-2001-03 (Washington,
D.C.: March 2001).
[26] U.S. General Accounting Office, Alien Smuggling: Management and
Operational Improvements Needed to Address Growing Problem, GAO/GGD-00-
103 (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2000).
[27] U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefits: Several
Factors Impede Timeliness of Application Processing, GAO-01-488
(Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001).
[28] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The
Immigration and Naturalization Service‘s Contacts with Two September 11
Terrorists: A Review of the INS‘s Admission of Mohamed Atta and Marwan
Alshehhi, its Processing of their Change of Status Applications, and
its Efforts to Track Foreign Students in the United States (Washington,
D.C.: May 20, 2002).
[29] The United States also grants visas to people who intend to
immigrate to the United States. In this report section, we use the term
’visa“ to refer to nonimmigrant visas only. Citizens of 28 countries
that participate in the visa waiver program, Canada, and certain other
locations are not required to obtain visas for business or pleasure
stays of short duration.
[30] The President established the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task
Force, an interagency group under the auspices of the Department of
Justice, on October 30, 2001. The task force was to ensure that, to the
maximum extent permitted by law, federal agencies coordinate programs
to (1) deny U.S. entry of aliens who are associated with, suspected of
being engaged in, or supporting terrorist activity, and (2) locate,
detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already present in the
United States. The task force does not have legal authority to
adjudicate visa applications or applications for immigration benefits.
[31] U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Visa Process
Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002).
[32] As of August 1, 2002, this dispute applied to 567 visa applicants
whose names matched information in Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task
Force databases.
[33] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The
Immigration and Naturalization Service‘s Automated I-94 System, Report
Number 01-18 (August 6, 2001).
[34] The Automated I-94 system electronically captured arrival and
departure data for nonimmigrants at four airports. The system was
retired in February 2002.
[35] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: INS Needs
to Better Manage the Development of Its Enterprise Architecture, GAO/
AIMD-00-212 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 1, 2000) and Information
Technology: INS Needs to Strengthen Its Investment Management
Capability, GAO-01-146 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 29, 2000).
[36] U.S. General Accounting Office, Securing America‘s Borders: INS
Faces Information Technology Planning and Implementation Challenges,
GAO-02-148T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 11, 2001).
[37] VAWO was renamed the Office on Violence Against Women (OVAW) in
July 2002 as part of an OJP reorganization.
[38] U.S. General Accounting Office, Office of Justice Programs:
Problems with Grant Monitoring and Concerns about Evaluation Studies,
GAO-02-507T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 7, 2002).
[39] U.S. General Accounting Office, Justice Discretionary Grants:
Byrne Program and Violence Against Women Office Grant Monitoring Should
Be Better Documented, GAO-02-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 2001);
Juvenile Justice: OJJDP Reporting Requirements for Discretionary and
Formula Grantees and Concerns About Evaluation Studies, GAO-02-23
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2001); Juvenile Justice: Better
Documentation of Discretionary Grant Monitoring is Needed, GAO-02-65
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 10, 2001); and Juvenile Justice: Selected
Issues Relating to OJJDP‘s Reauthorization, GAO/T-GGD-96-103
(Washington, D.C.: May 8, 1996).
[40] U.S. General Accounting Office, Internal Control: Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999).
[41] Dougherty and Associates, Final Report of Finding &
Recommendations for Improvement of the Grant Management Process
(Alexandria, Va., 2000).
[42] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Top
Management Challenges in the Department of Justice - 2000, usdoj.gov/
oig/challenges/2000.htm (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 1, 2000) and 2001,
usdoj.gov/oig/challenges/2001.htm (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 31, 2001).
[43] Since then, OJP created a chief information officer position
charged with overseeing an agencywide grant management system.
[44] This document superseded OJP Handbook: Policies and Procedures for
the Administration of OJP Grants (Washington, D.C., 1992).
[45] U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Grants: More Can Be Done
to Improve Weed and Seed Program Management, GAO/GGD-99-110
(Washington, D.C.: July 16, 1999).
[46] This number is current as of July 5, 2002.
[47] U.S. General Accounting Office, Justice Impact Evaluations: One
Byrne Evaluation Was Rigorous; All Reviewed Violence Against Women
Office Evaluations Were Problematic, GAO-02-309 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
7, 2002).
[48] U.S. General Accounting Office, Juvenile Justice: OJJDP Reporting
Requirements for Discretionary and Formula Grantees and Concerns About
Evaluation Studies, GAO-02-23 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2001).
[49] The main purpose of a drug court program is to use the court‘s
authority to reduce crime by changing the defendants‘ substance abuse
behavior. In exchange for the possibility of dismissed charges or
reduced sentences, defendants are diverted to drug court programs.
[50] U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Courts: Overview of Growth,
Characteristics, and Results, GAO/GGD-97-106 (Washington, D.C.: July
31, 1997).
[51] U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Courts: Better DOJ Data
Collection and Evaluation Efforts Needed to Measure Impact of Drug
Court Programs, GAO-02-434 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18, 2002).
[52] INS and Justice received an unqualified opinion on the Balance
Sheet and Statement of Custodial Activity and a qualified opinion on
the Statements of Net Cost, Changes in Net Position, and Budgetary
Resources and Financing for fiscal year 2000.
[53] In our prior report on management challenges at Justice issued in
January 2001, we reported that Justice had improved from receiving a
disclaimer of opinion on its fiscal year 1998 departmentwide financial
statements to receiving a qualified opinion on its fiscal year 1999
departmentwide financial statements.
[54] A material weakness is a condition in which the design or
operation of one or more of the internal control components does not
reduce, to a relatively low level, the risk that errors or
irregularities, in amounts that would be material to the financial
statements, may occur and not be detected promptly by employees in the
normal course of performing their duties.
GAO‘s Mission:
The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress,
exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use
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