Weaknesses In Screening Entrants Into the United States
Gao ID: GAO-03-438T January 30, 2003This testimony discusses the weakness in screening entrants into the United States. This work was completed in response to a request that agents of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) attempt to enter the United States from Canada, Mexico, and Jamaica at land, air, and sea ports of entry using fictitious identities and counterfeit identification documents. The purpose was to test whether U.S. government officials conducting inspections at the port of entry would detect the counterfeit identification documents.
We created fictitious driver's licenses and birth certificates using off-the-shelf computer graphic software that is available to any purchaser. In addition, we obtained and carried credit cards in the fictitious names that were used in these tests. Our agents entered the United States from Canada, Mexico, and Jamaica through ports of entry using fictitious names and these counterfeit identification documents. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. Customs Service officials never questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents, and our agents encountered no difficulty entering the country using them. On two occasions, INS officials did not ask for or inspect any identification documents when our agents entered the United States. On another occasion an agent was able to walk across a major border checkpoint and was not stopped or inspected by any government official.
GAO-03-438T, Weaknesses In Screening Entrants Into the United States
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United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
Testimony:
Before the Committee on Finance United States Senate:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 10:00 a.m.:
Thursday, January 30, 2003:
Weaknesses In Screening Entrants Into The United States:
Statement of Robert J. Cramer, Managing Director:
Office of Special Investigations:
GAO-03-438T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am here today to discuss the results of our work described in our
January 30, 2003, Limited Official Use report to this Committee
entitled Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States (GAO-
03-425R).[Footnote 1] This work was completed in response to your
request that agents of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI)
attempt to enter the United States from Canada, Mexico and Jamaica at
land, air, and sea ports of entry using fictitious identities and
counterfeit identification documents. The purpose was to test whether
U. S. government officials conducting inspections at the port of entry
would detect the counterfeit identification documents.
I am accompanied this morning by Ronald Malfi, Director for
Investigations, and Assistant Director John Cooney.
In summary, we created fictitious driver‘s licenses and birth
certificates using off-the-shelf computer graphic software that is
available to any purchaser. In addition, we obtained and carried credit
cards in the fictitious names that were used in these tests. Our agents
entered the United States from Canada, Mexico, and Jamaica through
ports of entry using fictitious names and these counterfeit
identification documents. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
and U.S. Customs Service officials never questioned the authenticity of
the counterfeit documents, and our agents encountered no difficulty
entering the country using them. On two occasions, INS officials did
not ask for or inspect any identification documents when our agents
entered the United States. On another occasion an agent was able to
walk across a major border checkpoint and was not stopped or inspected
by any government official.
INS regulations require that all persons who arrive at a U.S. port of
entry be inspected by a government official. A U.S. citizen traveling
inside countries in the Western Hemisphere, such as those we visited
for purposes of these tests, is not required to show a passport when
entering the United States but is required to prove citizenship. INS
accepts as proof of citizenship documents such as a U.S. state or
federally issued birth certificate or a baptismal record, and photo
identification such as a driver‘s license. However, since the law does
not require that U.S. citizens present documents to prove citizenship
when entering the United States, INS also permits travelers to
establish U.S. citizenship by oral statements alone.
U.S. Border Crossings from Canada:
The first border crossing by OSI agents occurred when two of our agents
entered the United States through a sea port of entry from Canada. On
that occasion, the agents were not asked to show any identification. On
a subsequent occasion, two agents, driving a rented car with Canadian
plates, using fictitious names and counterfeit documents, crossed the
border into the United States at a Canadian land border crossing. A
U.S. Customs inspector asked for identification and was provided the
counterfeit documents. After the inspector reviewed the documents, the
agents were allowed to cross the border.
During the Canadian land border crossing, the agents discovered a
further potential security problem. A park straddles the U.S. and
Canada at this border crossing. One of our agents was able to walk
across this park into the United States from Canada without being
stopped or questioned by any U.S. government official. Later that agent
walked back to Canada through this park without being inspected by
Canadian authorities.
U.S. Border Crossing from Mexico:
The second series of border crossings were from Mexico. On one
occasion, at a land border crossing, an INS inspector asked our agent
if he was a U.S. citizen and whether he had brought anything across the
border from Mexico. After the agent responded that he was a U.S.
citizen and that he was not bringing anything into the United States
from Mexico, the inspector allowed him to proceed without requiring any
proof of identity.
On a subsequent occasion at the same border crossing, two of our agents
were asked by INS inspectors for identification. Both agents presented
counterfeit driver‘s licenses and were allowed to cross into the United
States.
U.S. Border Crossing from Jamaica:
The third set of border crossings were from Jamaica. Two of our agents
traveling on one-way tickets from Jamaica arrived at an airport in the
United States. Each agent presented to INS inspectors counterfeit
identification documents. The INS inspectors did not recognize any of
the documents presented as counterfeit and allowed the agents to enter
the United States.
Conclusion:
We recognize that weaknesses in inspection processes for entrants into
the United States raise complex issues. We are currently performing an
evaluation of those processes pursuant to the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 that will be reported
to Congress in the coming months. Although INS inspects millions of
people who enter the United States and detects thousands of individuals
who attempt to illegally enter the United States each year, the results
of our work indicate that (1) people who enter the United States are
not always asked to present identification, (2) security to prevent
unauthorized persons from entering the United States from Canada is
inadequate at the border park we visited, and (3) INS inspectors are not
readily capable of detecting counterfeit identification documents. We
plan to discuss further with INS options for better training of
inspectors in detecting counterfeit documents.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. We will be pleased
to respond to any questions you or other members of the Committee may
have at this time.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] The Immigration and Naturalization Service designated our report as
’Limited Official Use.“
[End of section]
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