Homeland Security
Challenges to Implementing the Immigration Interior Enforcement Strategy Gao ID: GAO-03-660T April 10, 2003Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Immigration Interior Enforcement Strategy's implementation is now the responsibility of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE). This strategy was originally created by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). In the 1990s, INS developed a strategy to control illegal immigration across the U.S. border and a strategy to address enforcement priorities within the country's interior. In 1994, INS's Border Patrol issued a strategy to deter illegal entry. The strategy called for "prevention through deterrence"; that is, to raise the risk of being apprehended for illegal aliens to a point where they would consider it futile to try to enter. The plan called for targeting resources in a phased approach, starting first with the areas of greatest illegal activity. In 1999, the INS issued its interior enforcement strategy designed to deter illegal immigration, prevent immigration-related crimes, and remove those illegally in the United States. Historically, Congress and INS have devoted over five times more resources in terms of staff and budget on border enforcement than on interior enforcement.
INS's interior enforcement strategy was designed to address (1) the detention and removal of criminal aliens, (2) the dismantling and diminishing of alien smuggling operations, (3) community complaints about illegal immigration, (4) immigration benefit and document fraud, and (5) employers' access to undocumented workers. These components remain in the BICE strategy. INS faced numerous challenges in implementing the strategy. For example, INS lacked reliable data to determine staff needs, reliable information technology, clear and consistent guidelines and procedures for working-level staff, effective collaboration and coordination within INS and with other agencies, and appropriate performance measures to help assess program results. As BICE assumes responsibility for strategy implementation, it should consider how to address these challenges by improving resource allocation, information technology, program guidance, and performance measurement. The creation of DHS has focused attention on other challenges to implementing the strategy. For example, BICE needs to coordinate and collaborate with the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) for the timely and proper adjudication of benefit applications, and with the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) to assist in antismuggling investigations and sharing intelligence. In addition, BICE needs to assure that training and internal controls are sufficient to govern investigators' antiterrorism activities when dealing with citizens and aliens.
GAO-03-660T, Homeland Security: Challenges to Implementing the Immigration Interior Enforcement Strategy
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims,
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:
Thursday, April 10, 2003:
Homeland Security:
Challenges to Implementing the Immigration Interior Enforcement
Strategy:
Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director
Homeland Security and Justice:
GAO-03-660T:
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Homeland
Security‘s (DHS) Immigration Interior Enforcement Strategy, whose
implementation is now the responsibility of the Bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (BICE). As you know, this strategy was
originally created by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
This statement discusses the interior enforcement strategy and selected
issues pertaining to its implementation and management.
In the 1990s, INS developed a strategy to control illegal immigration
across the U.S. border and a strategy to address enforcement priorities
within the country‘s interior. In 1994, INS‘s Border Patrol issued a
strategy to deter illegal entry. The strategy called for ’prevention
through deterrence“; that is, to raise the risk of being apprehended
for illegal aliens to a point where they would consider it futile to
try to enter. The plan called for targeting resources in a phased
approach, starting first with the areas of greatest illegal activity.
In 1999, the INS issued its interior enforcement strategy designed to
deter illegal immigration, prevent immigration-related crimes, and
remove those illegally in the United States. Historically, Congress and
INS have devoted over five times more resources in terms of staff and
budget on border enforcement than on interior enforcement.
In my statement today, I make the following points:
* INS‘s interior enforcement strategy was designed to address (1) the
detention and removal of criminal aliens, (2) the dismantling and
diminishing of alien smuggling operations, (3) community complaints
about illegal immigration, (4) immigration benefit and document fraud,
and (5) employers‘ access to undocumented workers. These components
remain in the BICE strategy.
:
* INS faced numerous challenges in implementing the strategy. For
example, INS lacked reliable data to determine staff needs, reliable
information technology, clear and consistent guidelines and procedures
for working-level staff, effective collaboration and coordination
within INS and with other agencies, and appropriate performance
measures to help assess program results. As BICE assumes responsibility
for strategy implementation, it should consider how to address these
challenges by improving resource allocation, information technology,
program guidance, and performance measurement.
* The creation of DHS has focused attention on other challenges to
implementing the strategy. For example, BICE needs to coordinate and
collaborate with the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services
(BCIS) for the timely and proper adjudication of benefit applications,
and with the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) to assist
in antismuggling investigations and sharing intelligence. In addition,
BICE needs to assure that training and internal controls are sufficient
to govern investigators‘ antiterrorism activities when dealing with
citizens and aliens.
My testimony today is based primarily on the results of work that we
have completed in recent years, namely, our February 1999 testimony on
INS‘s efforts to identify and remove criminal aliens,[Footnote 1] our
April 1999 report on INS‘s worksite enforcement program,[Footnote 2]
our May 2000 report on alien smuggling,[Footnote 3] our May 2001 report
on the processing of immigration benefits,[Footnote 4] our January 2002
report on immigration benefit fraud,[Footnote 5] our March 2002 report
on INS‘ Forensic Document Laboratory,[Footnote 6] our November 2002
report on INS‘s alien address information[Footnote 7], and our January
2003 reports on major management challenges and program risks at the
Departments of Homeland Security and Justice.[Footnote 8]
In these reports we made many recommendations to improve INS
operations. INS had implemented or was in the process of implementing
some of these recommendations. We plan to follow up on DHS plans to
improve the various programs.
Components of the Interior Enforcement Strategy:
In January 1999, INS issued its Interior Enforcement Strategy. This
strategy focused resources on areas that would have the greatest impact
on reducing the size and annual growth of the illegal resident
population. Certain criteria were used to develop the priorities and
activities of the strategy. The criteria focused on potential risks to
U.S. communities and persons, costs, capacity to be effective, impact
on communities, potential impact on reducing the size of the problem,
and potential value for prevention and deterrence. The strategy
established the following five areas in priority order:
1. Identify and remove criminal aliens and minimize recidivism. Under
this strategic priority, INS was to identify and remove criminal aliens
as they come out of the federal and state prison systems and those
convicted of aggravated felonies currently in probation and parole
status.
2. Deter, dismantle, and diminish smuggling or trafficking of aliens.
This strategic priority called for INS to disrupt and dismantle the
criminal infrastructure that encourages and benefits from illegal
migration. INS efforts were to start in source and transit countries
and continue inside the United States, focusing on smugglers,
counterfeit document producers, transporters, and employers who exploit
and benefit from illegal migration.
3. Respond to community reports and complaints about illegal
immigration. In addition to responding to local law enforcement issues
and needs, this strategic priority emphasizes working with local
communities to identify and address problems that arise from the impact
of illegal immigration, based on local threat assessments.
4. Minimize immigration benefit fraud and other document abuse. Under
this strategic priority, INS was to aggressively investigate and
prosecute benefit fraud and document abuse to promote integrity of the
legal immigration system.
5. Block and remove employers‘ access to undocumented workers. The
strategy emphasizes denying employers access to unauthorized workers by
checking their compliance with the employment verification requirements
in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. Coupled with its
efforts to control smuggling activity, this effort could have a
multiplier effect on access of employers to illegal workers and on the
overall number of illegal residents in the country.
Figure 1 shows that INS had generally allocated its interior
enforcement resources consistent with these priorities and that the
workyears devoted to several of INS‘s interior enforcement efforts had
either declined or stayed about the same between fiscal years 1998 and
2002.
Figure 1: INS Investigations Workyears:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO‘s analysis of INS‘s data.
Note: Workyear totals do not include administrative time.
[End of figure]
Challenges to Implementing the Interior Enforcement Programs:
Our work has shown that INS faced numerous daunting enforcement issues,
as will BICE as it assumes responsibility for the strategy. For
example, the potential pool of removable criminal aliens and fugitives
numbers in the hundreds of thousands. Many are incarcerated in hundreds
of federal, state, and local facilities, while others are fugitives at
large across the country. The number of individuals smuggled into the
United States has increased dramatically, and alien smuggling has
become more sophisticated, complex, organized, and flexible. Thousands
of aliens annually illegally seek immigration benefits, such as work
authorization and change of status, and some of these aliens use these
benefits to enable them to conduct criminal activities. Hundreds of
thousands of aliens unauthorized to work in the United States have used
fraudulent documents to circumvent the process designed to prevent
employers from hiring them. In many instances, employers are complicit
in this activity.
Given the nature, scope, and magnitude of these activities, BICE needs
to ensure that it is making the best use of its limited enforcement
resources. We found that fundamental management challenges exist in
several of the interior enforcement programs and that addressing them
will require the high-level attention and concerted efforts of BICE.
Need for Better Staff Levels and Allocations:
In several reports we noted that INS did not believe it had sufficient
staff to reach its program goals. Having data on how to effectively
allocate staff and placing sufficient staff in the right locations is
important if BICE is to achieve program goals. Staff shortages had
contributed to INS‘s inability to promptly remove the majority of
criminal aliens after they have completed their prison sentences. In
1997 INS did not place into removal proceedings 50 percent of
potentially deportable criminal aliens who were released from federal
prisons and state prisons from 5 states. In 1999 we reported that,
although the removal of criminal aliens was an INS management priority,
INS faced the same staff shortage issues in 1997 as it had in 1995. In
particular, agent attrition - about one-third of the workforce -
continued to impede INS‘s ability to meet its program goals. INS had
told us that since 1997, the attrition rates of agents in this program
has stabilized and that, in fiscal year 2003, the agents from this
program would be reclassified as detention removal officers, which INS
believed should further help reduce attrition.
Even if INS had additional staff working in these program areas, it
lacked good management information to determine how many staff it
needed to meet its program goals and how best to allocate staff given
the limited resources it did have. With respect to its program for
removing incarcerated criminal aliens, INS told us that beginning in
fiscal year 2002, the agency implemented our recommendation to use a
workload analysis model. This was to help identify the resources the
agency needed for its criminal alien program in order to achieve
overall program goals and support its funding and staffing requests. We
have not reviewed this new model to ascertain its usefulness.
With respect to alien smuggling, INS lacked field intelligence staff to
collect and analyze information. Both 1998 and 1999 INS Annual
Performance Plan reports stated that the lack of intelligence personnel
hampered the collection, reporting, and analysis of intelligence
information. Although INS‘s Intelligence Program proposed that each
district office have an intelligence unit, as of January 2000, 21 of
INS‘s 33 districts did not have anyone assigned full-time to
intelligence-related duties. Our ongoing work at land ports of entry
shows this to be a continuing problem.
The worksite enforcement program received a relatively small portion of
INS‘s staffing and budget. In fiscal year 1998, INS completed a total
of 6,500 worksite investigations, which equated to about 3 percent of
the estimated number of employers of unauthorized aliens. Given limited
enforcement resources, BICE needs to assure that it targets those
industries where employment of illegal aliens poses the greatest
potential risk to national security. The program now has several
initiatives underway that target sensitive industries.
Need for Better Information Technology:
INS had long-standing difficulty developing and fielding information
systems to support its program operations, and effectively using
information technology continued to remain a challenge. For example, in
2002 we reported that benefit fraud investigations had been hampered by
a lack of integrated information systems. The operations units at the
four INS service centers that investigate benefit fraud operate
different information systems that did not interface with each other or
with the units that investigate benefit fraud at INS district offices.
As a result, sharing information about benefit applicants is difficult.
The INS staff who adjudicate applications did not have routine access
to INS‘s National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS). Not
having access to or not using NAILS essentially means that officers may
be making decisions without access to or using significant information
and that benefits may be granted to individuals not entitled to receive
them. Thus, INS was not in the best position to review numerous
applications and detect patterns, trends, and potential schemes for
benefit fraud.
Further, in 2002 we reported that another INS database, the Forensic
Automated Case and Evidence Tracking System (FACETS), did not contain
sufficient data for managers to know the exact size and status of the
laboratory‘s pending workload or how much time is spent on each
forensic case by priority category. As a result, managers were not in
the best position to make fact-based decisions about case priorities,
staffing, and budgetary resource needs.
With respect to the criminal alien program, in 1999 we reported that
INS lacked a nationwide data system containing the universe of foreign-
born inmates for tracking the hearing status of each inmate. In
response to our recommendation, INS developed a nationwide automated
tracking system for the Bureau of Prisons and deployed the system to
all federal institutional hearing program sites. INS said that it was
working with the Florida Department of Corrections to integrate that
state‘s system with INS‘s automated tracking system. INS also said that
it planned to begin working with New York, New Jersey, and Texas to
integrate their systems and then work with California, Illinois, and
Massachusetts. We have not examined these new systems to determine
whether they were completed as planned or to ascertain their
effectiveness.
In 2000 we reported that INS lacked an agencywide automated case
tracking and management system that prevented antismuggling program
managers from being able to monitor their ongoing investigations,
determine if other antismuggling units were investigating the same
target, or know if previous investigations had been conducted on a
particular target. In response to our recommendation, INS deployed an
automated case tracking and management system for all of its criminal
investigations, including alien smuggling investigations. Again, we
have not examined the new system to ascertain its effectiveness.
Need for Better Guidance to Program Staff:
Our review of the various program components of the interior
enforcement strategy found that working-level guidance was sometimes
lacking or nonexistent. INS had not established guidance for opening
benefit fraud investigations or for prioritizing investigative leads.
Without such criteria, INS could not be ensured that the highest-
priority cases were investigated and resources were used optimally.
INS‘s interior enforcement strategy did not define the criteria for
opening investigations of employers suspected of criminal activities.
In response to our recommendation, INS clarified the types of employer-
related criminal activities that should be the focus of INS
investigations.
INS‘s alien smuggling intelligence program had been impeded by a lack
of understanding among field staff about how to report intelligence
information. Staff were unclear about guidelines, procedures, and
effective techniques for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating
intelligence information. They said that training in this area was
critically needed.
Need for Better Performance Measures:
INS had not established outcome-based performance measures that would
have helped it assess the results of its interior enforcement strategy.
For example, in 2000 we reported that while INS had met its numeric
goals for the number of smuggling cases presented for prosecution in
its antismuggling program, it had not yet developed outcome-based
measures that would indicate progress toward the strategy‘s objective
of identifying, deterring, disrupting, and dismantling alien smuggling.
This was also the case for the INS intelligence program. INS had not
developed outcome-based performance measures to gauge the success of
the intelligence program to optimize the collection, analysis, and
dissemination of intelligence information.
In 2002 we reported that INS had not yet established outcome-based
performance measures that would help it assess the results of its
benefit fraud investigations. Additionally, INS had not established
goals or measurement criteria for the service center operations units
that conduct fraud investigation activities. INS‘s interior enforcement
strategy did not clearly describe the specific measures INS would use
to gauge its performance in worksite enforcement. For example, in 1999
we reported that the strategy stated that INS would evaluate its
performance on the basis of such things as changes in the behavior or
business practices of persons and organizations, but did not explain
how they expected the behavior and practices to change. And although
INS indicated that it would gauge effectiveness in the worksite area by
measuring change in the wage scales of certain targeted industries, it
left unclear a number of questions related to how it would do this. For
example, INS did not specify how wage scales would be measured; what
constituted a targeted industry; and how it would relate any changes
found to its enforcement efforts or other immigration-related causes.
The strategy stated that specific performance measurements would be
developed in the annual performance plans required by the Government
Performance and Results Act.
According to INS‘s fiscal year 2003 budget submission, the events of
September 11th required INS to reexamine strategies and approaches to
ensure that INS efforts fully addressed threats to the United States by
organizations engaging in national security crime. As a result, with
regard to investigating employers who may be hiring undocumented
workers, INS planned to target investigations of industries and
businesses where there is a threat of harm to the public interest.
However, INS had not set any performance measures for these types of
worksite investigations.
Challenges Faced by DHS Relating to Interior Enforcement:
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and with the formation of DHS,
a number of management challenges are evident. Some of the challenges
discussed above carry over from the INS, such as the need for sound
intelligence information, efficient use of resources and management of
workloads, information systems that generate timely and reliable
information, clear and current guidance, and appropriate performance
measures. Other challenges are emerging. These include creating
appropriate cooperation and collaboration mechanisms to assure
effective program management, and reinforcing training and management
controls to help assure compliance with DHS policies and procedures and
the proper treatment of citizens and aliens.
Need for Program Collaboration/Coordination:
BICE will need to assure that appropriate cooperation and collaboration
occurs between it and other DHS bureaus. For example, both the Border
Patrol, now located in the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
(BCBP), and BICE‘s immigration investigations program conducted alien
smuggling investigations prior to the merger into DHS. These units
operated through different chains of command with different reporting
structures. As a result, INS‘s antismuggling program lacked
coordination, resulting in multiple antismuggling units overlapping in
their jurisdictions, making inconsistent decisions about which cases to
open, and functioning autonomously and without a single chain of
command. It‘s unclear at this time how the anti-smuggling program will
operate under DHS. Should both BCBP‘s Border Patrol and BICE‘s
Investigations program continue to conduct alien smuggling
investigations, Under Secretary Hutchinson will need to assure that
coordination and collaboration exists to overcome previous program
deficiencies.
The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) is
responsible for administering services such as immigrant and
nonimmigrant sponsorship, work authorization, naturalization of
qualified applicants for U.S. citizenship, and asylum. Processing
benefit applications is an important DHS function that should be done
in a timely and consistent manner. Those who are eligible should
receive benefits in a reasonable period of time. However, some try to
obtain these benefits through fraud, and investigating fraud is the
responsibility of BICE‘s Immigration Investigations program. INS‘
approach to addressing benefit fraud was fragmented and unfocused. INS‘
interior enforcement strategy did not address how the different INS
components that conducted benefit fraud investigations were to
coordinate their investigations. Also, INS had not established guidance
to ensure the highest-priority cases are investigated. Secretary Ridge
will need to ensure the two bureaus work closely to assure timely
adjudication for eligible applicants while identifying and
investigating potential immigration benefit fraud cases.
BICE‘s Intelligence Program is responsible for collecting, analyzing,
and disseminating immigration-related intelligence. Immigration-
related intelligence is needed by other DHS components such as Border
Patrol agents and inspectors within BCBP and personnel within BCIS
adjudicating immigration benefits. BICE will need to develop an
intelligence program structure to ensure intelligence information is
disseminated to the appropriate components within DHS‘s other bureaus.
Need to Reinforce Training and Internal Controls:
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and with the formation of DHS,
the linkages between immigration enforcement and national security have
been brought to the fore. Immigration personnel have been tapped to
perform many duties that previously were not part of their normal
routine. For example, as part of a special registration program for
visitors from selected foreign countries, immigration investigators
have been fingerprinting, photographing, and interviewing aliens upon
entry to the U.S. Immigration investigators have also participated in
anti-terrorism task forces across the country and helped interview
thousands of non-immigrant aliens to determine what knowledge they may
have had about terrorists and terrorist activities. As part of its
investigation of the attacks of September 11, the Justice Department
detained aliens on immigration charges while investigating their
potential connection with terrorism. An integrated Entry/Exit System,
intended to enable the government to determine which aliens have
entered and left the country, and which have overstayed their visas, is
currently under development and will rely on BICE investigators to
locate those who violate the terms of their entry visas.
All of these efforts attest to the pivotal role of immigration interior
enforcement in national security and expanded roles of investigators in
the fight against terrorism. It is important that BICE investigators
receive training to perform these expanded duties and help assure that
they effectively enforce immigration laws while recognizing the rights
of citizens and aliens. It is also important that DHS reinforce its
management controls to help assure compliance with DHS policies and
procedures.
Concluding Observations:
Having an effective interior enforcement strategy is an essential
complement to having an effective border strategy. To be sure, BICE‘s
tasks with regard to interior enforcement are considerable given the
nature, scope, and magnitude of illegal activity. INS faced significant
challenges in appropriately staffing program areas, providing reliable
information for program management, establishing clear and consistent
guidance for working-level staff to do their jobs consistent with the
goals of the program, and developing outcome-based measures that would
indicate progress toward the strategy‘s objectives. With the creation
of DHS, immigration functions are now in several different bureaus that
will require enhanced coordination. Addressing these issues are
important if BICE is to achieve full program potential.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement, I would be pleased
to answer any questions that you or other members of the subcommittees
may have.
Contacts and Acknowledgments:
For further information regarding this testimony, please contact
Richard M. Stana at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key
contributions to this testimony included Evi L. Rezmovic and Michael P.
Dino.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Criminal Aliens: INS‘ Efforts to
Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue to Need Improvement,
GAO/T-GGD-99-47 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 1999).
[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Aliens: Significant
Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien Employment Exist, GAO/
GGD-99-33 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 1999).
[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Alien Smuggling: Management and
Operational Improvements Needed to Address Growing Problem, GAO/
GGD-00-103 (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2000).
[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefits: Several
Factors Impede the Timeliness of Application Processing, GAO-01-488
(Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001).
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused
Approach Is Needed to Address Problems, GAO-02-66 (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 31, 2002).
[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, INS Forensic Document Laboratory:
Several Factors Impeded Timeliness of Case Processing, GAO-02-410
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 13, 2002)
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: INS Cannot
Locate Many Aliens Because It Lacks Reliable Address Information,
GAO-03-188 (Washington, D.C., Nov. 21, 2002).
[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and
Program Risks: Department of Homeland Security, GAO-03-102 (Washington,
D.C., Jan. 2003); and Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:
Department of Justice, GAO-03-105 (Washington, D.C., Jan. 2003).
