Justice Outcome Evaluations
Design and Implementation of Studies Require More NIJ Attention Gao ID: GAO-03-1091 September 24, 2003Policy makers need valid, reliable, and timely information on the outcomes of criminal justice programs to help them decide how to set criminal justice funding priorities. In view of previously reported problems with selected outcome evaluations managed by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), GAO assessed the methodological quality of a sample of completed and ongoing NIJ outcome evaluation grants.
From 1992 through 2002, NIJ managed 96 evaluation studies that sought to measure the outcomes of criminal justice programs. Spending on these evaluations totaled about $37 million. Our methodological review of 15 of the 96 studies, totaling about $15 million and covering a broad range of criminal justice issues, showed that sufficiently sound information about program effects could not be obtained from 10 of the 15. Five studies, totaling about $7.5 million (or 48 percent of the funds spent on the studies we reviewed), appeared to be methodologically rigorous in both design and implementation, enabling meaningful conclusions to be drawn about program effects. Six studies, totaling about $3.3 million (or 21 percent of the funds spent on the studies we reviewed), began with sound designs but encountered implementation problems that would render their results inconclusive. An additional 4 studies, totaling about $4.7 million (or 30 percent of the funds spent on the studies we reviewed), had serious methodological limitations that from the start limited their ability to produce reliable and valid results. Although results from 5 completed studies were inconclusive, DOJ program administrators said that they found some of the process and implementation findings from them to be useful. We recognize that optimal conditions for the scientific study of complex social programs almost never exist, making it difficult to design and execute outcome evaluations that produce definitive results. However, the methodological adequacy of NIJ studies can be improved, and NIJ has taken several steps--including the formation of an evaluation division and funding feasibility studies--in this direction. It is too soon to tell whether these changes will lead to evaluations that will better inform policy makers about the effectiveness of criminal justice programs.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-03-1091, Justice Outcome Evaluations: Design and Implementation of Studies Require More NIJ Attention
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Report to the Honorable Lamar Smith House of Representatives:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
September 2003:
Justice Outcome Evaluations:
Design and Implementation of Studies Require More NIJ Attention:
Justice Outcome Evaluations:
GAO-03-1091:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-1091, a report to The Honorable Lamar Smith,
House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
Policy makers need valid, reliable, and timely information on the
outcomes of criminal justice programs to help them decide how to set
criminal justice funding priorities. In view of previously reported
problems with selected outcome evaluations managed by the National
Institute of Justice (NIJ), GAO assessed the methodological quality of
a sample of completed and ongoing NIJ outcome evaluation grants.
What GAO Found:
From 1992 through 2002, NIJ managed 96 evaluation studies that sought
to measure the outcomes of criminal justice programs. Spending on
these evaluations totaled about $37 million. Our methodological review
of 15 of the 96 studies, totaling about $15 million and covering a
broad range of criminal justice issues, showed that sufficiently sound
information about program effects could not be obtained from 10 of the
15. Five studies, totaling about $7.5 million (or 48 percent of the
funds spent on the studies we reviewed), appeared to be
methodologically rigorous in both design and implementation, enabling
meaningful conclusions to be drawn about program effects. Six studies,
totaling about $3.3 million (or 21 percent of the funds spent on the
studies we reviewed), began with sound designs but encountered
implementation problems that would render their results inconclusive.
An additional 4 studies, totaling about $4.7 million (or 30 percent of
the funds spent on the studies we reviewed), had serious
methodological limitations that from the start limited their ability
to produce reliable and valid results. Although results from 5
completed studies were inconclusive, DOJ program administrators said
that they found some of the process and implementation findings from
them to be useful.
We recognize that optimal conditions for the scientific study of
complex social programs almost never exist, making it difficult to
design and execute outcome evaluations that produce definitive
results. However, the methodological adequacy of NIJ studies can be
improved, and NIJ has taken several steps”including the formation of
an evaluation division and funding feasibility studies--in this
direction. It is too soon to tell whether these changes will lead to
evaluations that will better inform policy makers about the
effectiveness of criminal justice programs.
What GAO Recommends:
* review its ongoing outcome evaluation grants and develop appropriate
strategies and corrective measures to ensure that methodological
design and implementation problems are overcome so the evaluations can
produce more conclusive results;
* continue efforts to respond to GAO‘s 2002 recommendation that NIJ
assess its evaluation process with the purpose of developing
approaches to ensure that future outcome evaluations are funded only
when they are effectively designed and implemented.
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOJ agreed with GAO‘s
recommendations, and cited several current and planned activities
intended to improve NIJ‘s evaluation program. DOJ also made two
substantive comments related to the presentation of information that
GAO responded to in the report.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-1091.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact Laurie E. Ekstrand
(202) 512-8777 or ekstrandl@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Overview of the Evaluations We Reviewed:
Most of the Reviewed NIJ Outcome Evaluations Could Not Produce
Sufficiently Sound Information on Program Outcomes:
Completed Outcome Evaluations Produced Useful Information on Processes
but Not on Outcomes for DOJ Program Administrators:
NIJ's Current and Planned Activities to Improve Its Evaluation Program:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Justice:
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed by GAO:
Table 2: Characteristics of 5 NIJ Outcome Evaluations with Sufficiently
Sound Designs and Implementation Plans:
Table 3: Problems Encountered during Implementation of 6 Well-Designed
NIJ Outcome Evaluation Studies:
Table 4: Design Limitations in 4 NIJ Outcome Evaluation Studies:
Table 5: Number and Size of Outcome Evaluation Awards Made by NIJ from
1992 through 2002, and Reviewed by GAO:
Table 6: Size and Completion Status of the 15 Evaluations Selected for
Methodological Review:
Table 7: Programs Evaluated and Funding Sources for Completed NIJ
Outcome Evaluations:
Abbreviations:
BTC: Breaking the Cycle
COPS: Community Oriented Policing Services
DOJ: Department of Justice
GREAT: Gang Resistance Education and Training
NIJ: National Institute of Justice
OJP: Office of Justice Programs
OVW: Office on Violence Against Women:
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 24, 2003:
The Honorable Lamar Smith House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Smith:
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) spent almost $4 billion in fiscal
year 2002 on assistance to states and local communities to combat
crime. These funds were used to reduce drug abuse and trafficking,
address the problems of gang violence and juvenile delinquency, expand
community policing, and meet the needs of crime victims, among other
things. In addition, state and local governments spend billions of
their dollars annually on law enforcement and criminal justice
programs. Given these expenditures, it is important to know which
programs are effective in controlling and preventing crime so that
limited federal, state, and local funds not be wasted on programs that
are ineffective. As the principal research, development, and evaluation
agency of DOJ, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) is responsible
for evaluating existing programs and policies that respond to crime. It
spends millions of dollars annually to support studies intended to
evaluate various DOJ funded programs as well as selected local
programs. To the extent that NIJ evaluations produce credible, valid,
reliable, and timely information on the efficacy of these programs in
combating crime, they can serve an important role in helping
policymakers make decisions about how to set criminal justice funding
priorities.
Pursuant to our previous reports in which we reported problems with
selected NIJ-managed outcome evaluations,[Footnote 1] in your former
position as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, House Judiciary
Committee, you asked us to undertake a more extensive review of the
outcome evaluation work performed under the direction of NIJ during the
last 10 years. Outcome evaluations are defined as those efforts
designed to determine whether a program, project, or intervention
produced its intended effects. As agreed with your office, we are
reporting on the methodological quality of a sample of completed and
ongoing NIJ outcome evaluation grants, and the usefulness of the
evaluations in producing information on outcomes. Because we learned of
changes NIJ has underway to improve its administration of outcome
evaluation studies, we are also providing information in this report
about these changes.
To meet our objectives, we reviewed outcome evaluation grants managed
by NIJ from 1992 through 2002. During this time period NIJ managed 96
outcome evaluation grants. Of these 96 grants, we judgmentally selected
and reviewed 15 outcome evaluations chosen so that they varied in grant
size, completion status, and program focus. The selected studies
accounted for about $15.4 million, or about 42 percent, of the
approximately $36.6 million spent on outcome evaluation studies during
the 10-year period. Although our sample is not representative of all
NIJ outcome evaluations conducted during the last 10 years, it includes
those that have received a large proportion of total funding for this
type of research, and tends to be drawn from the most recent work. Our
review assessed the methodological quality of these evaluations using
generally accepted social science standards,[Footnote 2] including such
elements as whether evaluation data were collected before and after
program implementation; how program effects were isolated (i.e., the
use of nonprogram participant comparison groups or statistical
controls); and the appropriateness of sampling, outcome measures,
statistical analyses, and any reported results. We grouped the studies
into 3 categories based on our judgment of their methodological
soundness. Although we recognize that the stronger studies may have had
some weaknesses, and that the weaker studies may have had some
strengths, our categorization of the studies was a summary judgment
based on the totality of the information provided to us by NIJ. We also
interviewed NIJ officials regarding the selection and oversight of
these evaluation studies. To assess the usefulness of NIJ's outcome
evaluations in producing information about program outcomes, we
reviewed the findings from all 5 of the completed NIJ outcome
evaluations in our sample that were funded in part by DOJ program
offices, and interviewed program officials at NIJ and program
administrators at DOJ's Office on Violence Against Women and Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services. Further details on our
methodology are provided in appendix I.
Results in Brief:
Our methodological review of 15 selected NIJ outcome evaluation studies
undertaken since 1992 showed that although most studies began with
sufficiently sound designs, most could not produce sufficiently sound
information on program outcomes. Specifically, the studies could be
characterized in the following ways:
* Studies that began with sufficiently sound evaluation designs: Eleven
of the 15 studies began with sufficiently sound designs. Some of these
well-designed studies were also implemented well, while others were
not. Specifically,
* Five of the 11 studies were sufficiently well designed and
implemented--including having appropriate comparison groups or random
assignment to treatment and control groups, baseline measures, and
follow-up data--so that meaningful conclusions could be drawn about
program effects. Funding for these methodologically sound studies
totaled about $7.5 million, or nearly 50 percent of the approximately
$15.4 million spent on the studies we reviewed.
* Six of the 11 studies began with sufficiently sound designs, but
encountered implementation problems that limited the extent to which
the study objectives could be achieved. For example, some evaluators
were unable to carry out a proposed evaluation plan because the program
to be evaluated was not implemented as planned, or they could not
obtain complete or reliable data on outcomes. In some cases,
implementation problems were beyond the evaluators' control, and
resulted from decisions made by agencies providing program services
after the study was underway. These studies were limited in their
ability to conclude that it was the program or intervention that caused
the intended outcome results. Funding for these studies with
implementation problems totaled about $3.3 million, or about 21 percent
of the approximately $15.4 million spent on the studies we reviewed.
* Studies that did not begin with sufficiently sound designs. Four of
the 15 studies had serious methodological problems from the beginning
that limited their ability to produce results that could be
attributable to the programs that were being evaluated. Methodological
shortcomings in these studies included the absence of comparison groups
or appropriate statistical controls, outcome measures with doubtful
reliability and validity, and lack of baseline data. Funding for these
studies that began with serious methodological problems totaled about
$4.7 million, or about 30 percent of the approximately $15.4 million
spent on the studies we reviewed.
Outcome evaluations are difficult to design and execute because optimal
conditions for the scientific study of complex social programs almost
never exist. Attributing results to a particular intervention can be
difficult when such programs are evaluated in real world settings that
pose numerous methodological challenges. All 5 of the completed NIJ
outcome evaluations that focused on issues of interest to DOJ program
offices had encountered some design and implementation problems.
Nonetheless, DOJ program administrators told us that these evaluations
produced information that prompted them to make a number of changes to
DOJ-funded programs. The majority of the changes enumerated by DOJ
program administrators occurred as a result of findings from the
process or implementation components[Footnote 3] of the completed
outcome evaluations, and not from findings regarding program results.
For example, as a result of NIJ's evaluation of a DOJ program for
domestic and child abuse victims in rural areas, DOJ developed a
training program to assist grantees in creating collaborative programs
based on the finding from the process evaluation that such information
was not readily available.
Although outcome evaluations are difficult to design and execute, steps
can be taken to improve their methodological adequacy and, in turn, the
likelihood that they will produce meaningful information on program
effects. NIJ officials told us that they have begun to take several
steps to try to increase the likelihood that outcome evaluations will
produce more definitive results, including the establishment of an
Evaluation Division responsible for ensuring the quality and utility of
NIJ evaluations, the funding of selected feasibility studies prior to
soliciting outcome evaluations, and greater emphasis on applicants'
prior performance in awarding evaluation grants.
We are making recommendations to the Attorney General to improve the
quality of NIJ's outcome evaluations. We recommend that NIJ review the
methodological adequacy of its ongoing grants and take action to
improve, refocus, or limit them, as appropriate; and that NIJ develop
approaches to ensure that future outcome evaluations are effectively
designed and implemented. In commenting on a draft of this report, the
DOJ's Office of Justice Programs' (OJP) Assistant Attorney General
agreed with our recommendations. She also provided technical comments,
which we evaluated and incorporated, as appropriate. The Assistant
Attorney General made two substantive comments on our draft report--one
relating to the fact that even rigorous study design and careful
monitoring of program implementation do not ensure that evaluation
results will be conclusive; the other relating to our purported focus
on experimental and quasi-experimental methods to the exclusion of
other high quality evaluation methods. We respond to these points in
the Agency Comments and Evaluation section of the report.
Background:
NIJ is the principal research development, and evaluation agency within
OJP. It was created under the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act,[Footnote 4] and is authorized to enter into grants,
cooperative agreements, or contracts with public or private agencies to
carry out evaluations of the effectiveness of criminal justice programs
and identify promising new programs. NIJ's Office of Research and
Evaluation oversees evaluations by outside researchers of a wide range
of criminal justice programs, including ones addressing violence
against women, drugs and crime, policing and law enforcement,
sentencing, and corrections.
According to NIJ officials, the agency initiates a specific criminal
justice program evaluation in one of three ways. First, congressional
legislation may mandate evaluation of specific programs. For example,
the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002,[Footnote 5] requires DOJ to
conduct independent evaluations of selected programs funded by OJP's
Bureau of Justice Assistance and selected projects funded by OJP's
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. DOJ determined
that NIJ would be responsible for overseeing these evaluations. Second,
NIJ may enter into an evaluation partnership with another OJP or DOJ
office, or another federal agency, to evaluate specific programs or
issues of interest to both organizations. In these cases, NIJ, in
partnership with the program offices, develops a solicitation for
proposals and oversees the resulting evaluation. Third, NIJ
periodically solicits proposals for evaluation of criminal justice
programs directly from the research community, through an open
competition for grants. These solicitations ask evaluators to propose
research of many kinds in any area of criminal justice, or in broad
conceptual areas such as violence against women, policing research and
evaluation, research and evaluation on corrections and sentencing, or
building safer public housing communities through research
partnerships.
According to NIJ officials, once the decision has been made to evaluate
a particular program, or to conduct other research in a specific area
of criminal justice, the process of awarding an evaluation grant
involves the following steps. First, NIJ issues a solicitation and
receives proposals from potential evaluators. Next, proposals are
reviewed by an external peer review panel, as well as by NIJ
professional staff. The external review panels are comprised of members
of the research and practitioner communities,[Footnote 6] and reviewers
are asked to identify, among other things, the strengths and weaknesses
of the competing proposals. External peer review panels are to consider
the quality and technical merit of the proposal; the likelihood that
grant objectives will be met; the capabilities, demonstrated
productivity, and experience of the evaluators; and budget constraints.
Reviews are to include constructive comments about the proposal, useful
recommendations for change and improvement, and recommendations as to
whether the proposal merits further consideration by NIJ. NIJ
professional staff are to review all proposals and all written external
peer reviews, considering the same factors as the peer review panels.
NIJ professional staff are also to consider the performance of
potential grantees on any other previous research grants with NIJ.
Next, the results of the peer and NIJ staff reviews are discussed in a
meeting of NIJ managers, led by NIJ's Director of the Office of
Research and Evaluation. Then, NIJ's Office of Research and Evaluation
staff meet with the NIJ Director to present their recommendations.
Finally, the NIJ Director makes the funding decision based on peer
reviews, staff recommendations, other internal NIJ discussions that may
have taken place, and consideration of what proposals may have the
greatest impact and contribute the most knowledge.
NIJ generally funds outcome evaluations through grants, rather than
with contracts. NIJ officials told us that there are several reasons
for awarding grants as opposed to contracts. Contracts can give NIJ
greater control over the work of funded researchers, and hold them more
accountable for results. However, NIJ officials said that NIJ most
often uses grants for research and evaluation because they believe that
grants better ensure the independence of the evaluators and the
integrity of the study results. Under a grant, NIJ allows the principal
investigator a great deal of freedom to propose the most appropriate
methodology and carry out the data collection and analysis, without
undue influence from NIJ or the agency funding the program. Grants also
require fewer bureaucratic steps than do contracts, resulting in a
process whereby a researcher can be selected in a shorter amount of
time.
NIJ officials told us that NIJ tends to make use of contracts for
smaller and more time-limited tasks--such as literature reviews or
assessments of whether specific programs have sufficient data to allow
for more extensive process or outcome evaluations--rather than for
conducting outcome evaluations. NIJ also occasionally makes use of
cooperative agreements, which entail a greater level of interaction
between NIJ and the evaluators during the course of the evaluation.
According to NIJ officials, cooperative agreements between NIJ and its
evaluators tend to be slight variations of grants, with the addition of
a few more specific requirements for grantees. NIJ officials told us
that they might use a cooperative agreement when NIJ wants to play a
significant role in the selection of an advisory panel, in setting
specific milestones, or aiding in the design of specific data
collection instruments.
NIJ is to monitor outcome evaluation grantees in accordance with
policies and procedures outlined in the OJP Grant Management Policies
and Procedures Manual. In general, this includes monitoring grantee
progress through regular contact with grantees (site visits, cluster
conferences, other meetings); required interim reports (semiannual
progress and quarterly financial reports); and a review of final
substantive evaluation reports. In some cases, NIJ will require
specific milestone reports, especially on larger studies. Grant
monitoring for all types of studies is carried out by approximately 20
full-time NIJ grant managers, each responsible for approximately 17
ongoing grants at any one time.
Overview of the Evaluations We Reviewed:
From 1992 through 2002, NIJ awarded about $36.6 million for 96
evaluations that NIJ identified as focusing on measuring the outcomes
of programs, policies, and interventions, among other things.[Footnote
7] The 15 outcome evaluations that we selected for review varied in
terms of completion status (8 were completed, 7 were ongoing) and the
size of the award (ranging between about $150,000 and about $2.8
million), and covered a wide range of criminal justice programs and
issues (see table 1). All evaluations were funded by NIJ through grants
or cooperative agreements.[Footnote 8] Seven of the 15 evaluations
focused on programs designed to reduce domestic violence and child
maltreatment, 4 focused on programs addressing the behavior of law
enforcement officers (including community policing), 2 focused on
programs addressing drug abuse, and 2 focused on programs to deal with
juvenile justice issues.
Table 1: NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed by GAO:
Domestic violence and child maltreatment:
Grant: Domestic violence and child maltreatment:
Grant: National Evaluation of the Rural Domestic Violence and Child
Victimization Enforcement Grant Program; Award: $719,949; No;
Status: Completed: Yes; Status: Ongoing: No.
Grant: National Evaluation of the Domestic Violence Victims' Civil
Legal Assistance Program; Award: $800,154; No; Status: Completed:
No; Status: Ongoing: Yes.
Grant: Multi-Site Demonstration of Collaborations to Address Domestic
Violence and Child Maltreatment; Award: $2,498,638; No; Status:
Completed: No; Status: Ongoing: Yes.
Grant: Evaluation of a Multi-Site Demonstration for Enhanced Judicial
Oversight of Domestic Violence Cases; Award: $2,839,954; No;
Status: Completed: No; Status: Ongoing: Yes.
Grant: An Evaluation of Victim Advocacy with a Team Approach; Award:
$153,491; No; Status: Completed: Yes; Status: Ongoing: No.
Grant: Culturally Focused Batterer Counseling for African-American Men;
Award: $356,321; No; Status: Completed: No; Status: Ongoing: Yes.
Grant: Testing the Impact of Court Monitoring and Batterer Intervention
Programs at the Bronx Misdemeanor Domestic Violence Court; Award:
$294,129; No; Status: Completed: No; Status: Ongoing: Yes.
Grant: Law enforcement:
Grant: An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide Community Policing Program;
Award: $2,157,859; No; Status: Completed: Yes; Status: Ongoing: No.
Grant: Corrections and Law Enforcement Family Support: Law Enforcement
Field Test; Award: $649,990; No; Status: Completed: No;
Status: Ongoing: Yes.
Grant: Reducing Non-Emergency Calls to 911: An Assessment of Four
Approaches to Handling Citizen Calls for Service; Award: $399,919;
No; Status: Completed: Yes; Status: Ongoing: No.
Grant: Responding to the Problem Police Officer: An Evaluation of Early
Warning Systems; Award: $174,643; No; Status: Completed: Yes;
Status: Ongoing: No.
Grant: Drug abuse:
Grant: Evaluation of Breaking the Cycle; Award: $2,419,344; No;
Status: Completed: Yes; Status: Ongoing: No.
Grant: Evaluation of a Comprehensive Service-Based Intervention
Strategy in Public Housing; Award: $187,412; No; Status:
Completed: Yes; Status: Ongoing: No.
Grant: Juvenile justice issues:
Grant: National Evaluation of the Gang Resistance Education and
Training Program; Award: $1,568,323; No; Status: Completed: Yes;
Status: Ongoing: No.
Grant: Evaluation of a Juvenile Justice Mental Health Initiative with
Randomized Design; Award: $200,000; No; Status: Completed:
No; Status: Ongoing: Yes.
Source: GAO analysis of NIJ data.
[End of table]
Most of the Reviewed NIJ Outcome Evaluations Could Not Produce
Sufficiently Sound Information on Program Outcomes:
Overall, we found that 10 of the 15 evaluations that we reviewed could
not produce sufficiently sound information about program outcomes. Six
evaluations began with sufficiently sound designs, but encountered
implementation problems that would render their results inconclusive.
An additional 4 studies had serious methodological problems that from
the start limited their ability to produce reliable and valid results.
Five studies appeared to be methodologically rigorous in both their
design and implementation. (Appendix II provides additional information
on the funding, objectives, and methodology of the 15 outcome
evaluation studies.):
Most of the Reviewed Studies Were Well Designed, but Many Later
Encountered Implementation Problems:
Our review found that 5 evaluations had both sufficiently sound designs
and implementation plans or procedures, thereby maximizing the
likelihood that the study could meaningfully measure program effects.
Funding for these methodologically sound studies totaled about $7.5
million, or nearly 50 percent of the approximately $15.4 million spent
on the studies we reviewed. Six evaluations were well designed, but
they encountered problems implementing the design as planned during the
data collection phase of the study. Funding for these studies with
implementation problems totaled about $3.3 million, or about 21 percent
of the approximately $15.4 million spent on the studies we reviewed.
Five Evaluations Were Sufficiently Well Designed and Implemented:
Five of the evaluations we reviewed were well designed and their
implementation was sufficiently sound at the time of our review. Two of
these evaluations had been completed and 3 were ongoing. All 5
evaluations met generally accepted social science standards for sound
design, including measurement of key outcomes after a follow-up period
to measure change over time, use of comparison groups or appropriate
statistical controls to account for the influence of external factors
on the results,[Footnote 9] random sampling of participants and/or
sites or other purposeful sampling methods to ensure generalizable
samples and procedures to ensure sufficient sample sizes, and
appropriate data collection and analytic procedures to ensure the
reliability and validity of measures (see table 2).
Studies Measured Change in Outcomes Over Time:
All 5 evaluations measured, or included plans to measure, specified
outcomes after a sufficient follow-up period. Some designs provided for
collecting baseline data at or before program entry, and outcome data
several months or years following completion of the program. Such
designs allowed evaluators to compare outcome data against a baseline
measurement to facilitate drawing conclusions about the program's
effects, and to gauge whether the effects persisted or were transitory.
For example, the National Evaluation of the Gang Resistance Education
and Training Program examined the effectiveness of a 9-week, school-
based education program that sought to prevent youth crime and violence
by reducing student involvement in gangs. Students were surveyed
regarding attitudes toward gangs, crime, and police, self-reported gang
activity, and risk-seeking behaviors 2 weeks before the program began,
and then again at yearly intervals for 4 years following the program's
completion.
Table 2: Characteristics of 5 NIJ Outcome Evaluations with Sufficiently
Sound Designs and Implementation Plans:
Evaluation study: National Evaluation of the Gang Resistance Education
and Training Program; Sufficient follow-up: Yes; Use of comparison groups
to control for external factors: Yes; Appropriate sampling procedures and
reasonable sample sizes: Yes; Appropriate data collection and analysis
procedures: Yes.
Evaluation study: Evaluation of Breaking the Cycle; Sufficient follow-
up: Yes; Use of comparison groups to control for external factors: Yes;
Appropriate sampling procedures and reasonable sample sizes: Yes;
Appropriate data collection and analysis procedures: Yes.
Evaluation study: Evaluation of a Multi-Site Demonstration for Enhanced
Judicial Oversight of Domestic Violence Cases; Sufficient follow-up:
Planned; Use of comparison groups to control for external factors: Yes;
Appropriate sampling procedures and reasonable sample sizes: Planned;
Appropriate data collection and analysis procedures: Planned.
Evaluation study: Culturally Focused Batterer Counseling for African-
American Men; Sufficient follow-up: Planned; Use of comparison groups
to control for external factors: Yes; Appropriate sampling procedures and
reasonable sample sizes: Planned; Appropriate data collection and
analysis procedures: Planned.
Evaluation study: Testing the Impact of Court Monitoring and Batterer
Intervention Programs at the Bronx Misdemeanor Domestic Violence
Court[A]; Sufficient follow-up: Planned; Use of comparison groups to
control for external factors: Yes; Appropriate sampling procedures and
reasonable sample sizes: Planned; Appropriate data collection and
analysis procedures: Planned.
Source: GAO analysis of NIJ data.
[A] Although we have categorized this evaluation as having a
sufficiently sound design and implementation plan, the grantee's
proposal did not discuss how differential attrition from the four
treatment groups would be handled if it occurred. Therefore, we do not
know if the grantee has made sufficient plans to address this potential
circumstance.
[End of table]
Measuring change in specific outcome variables at both baseline and
after a follow-up period may not always be feasible. When the outcome
of interest is "recidivism," such as whether drug-involved criminal
defendants continue to commit criminal offenses after participating in
a drug treatment program, the outcome can only be measured after the
program is delivered. In this case, it is important that the follow-up
period be long enough to enable the program's effects to be discerned.
For example, the ongoing evaluation of the Culturally Focused Batterer
Counseling for African-American Men seeks to test the relative
effectiveness of counseling that recognizes and responds to cultural
issues versus conventional batterer counseling in reducing batterer
recidivism. All participants in the study had been referred by the
court system to counseling after committing domestic violence
violations. The evaluators planned to measure re-arrests and re-
assaults 1 year after program intake, approximately 8 months after the
end of counseling. The study cited prior research literature noting
that two-thirds of first-time re-assaults were found to occur within 6
months of program intake, and over 80 percent of first-time re-assaults
over a 2-1/2 year period occur within 12 months of program intake.
Comparison Groups Were Used to Isolate Program Effects:
All 5 evaluations used or planned to use comparison groups to isolate
and minimize external factors that could influence the results of the
study. Use of comparison groups is a practice employed by evaluators to
help determine whether differences between baseline and follow-up
results are due to the program under consideration or to other programs
or external factors. In 3 of the 5 studies, research participants were
randomly assigned to a group that received services from the program or
to a comparison group that did not receive services. In constructing
comparison groups, random assignment is an effective technique for
minimizing differences between participants who receive the program and
those who do not on variables that might affect the outcomes of the
study. For example, in the previously mentioned ongoing evaluation of
Culturally Focused Batterer Counseling for African-American Men
participants who were referred to counseling by a domestic violence
court are randomly assigned to one of three groups: (1) a culturally
focused group composed of only African-Americans, (2) a conventional
counseling group composed of only African-Americans, or (3) a mixed
race conventional counseling group. The randomized design allows the
investigators to determine the effect of the culturally focused
counseling over and above the effect of participating in a same race
group situation.
In the remaining two evaluation studies, a randomized design was not
used and the comparison group was chosen to match the program group as
closely as possible on a number of characteristics, in an attempt to
ensure that the comparison and program groups would be similar in
virtually all respects aside from the intervention. For example, the
ongoing Evaluation of a Multi-Site Demonstration for Enhanced Judicial
Oversight of Domestic Violence Cases seeks to examine the effects of a
coordinated community response to domestic violence (including
advocacy, provision of victim services, and enhanced judicial
oversight) on victim safety and offender accountability. To ensure that
the comparison and program groups were similar, comparison sites were
selected based on having court caseload and population demographic
characteristics similar to the demonstration sites. Only the program
group is to receive the intervention; and neither comparison site has a
specialized court docket; enhanced judicial oversight; or a county-
wide, coordinated system for handling domestic violence cases.
Sufficiently Sound Sampling Procedures and Adequate Response Rates
Helped Ensure Representativeness:
All 5 evaluations employed or planned to employ sufficiently sound
sampling procedures for selecting program and comparison participants.
This was intended to ensure that study participants were representative
of the population being examined so that conclusions about program
effects could be generalized to that population. For example, in the
previously mentioned Judicial Oversight Demonstration evaluation,
offenders in program and comparison sites are being chosen from court
records. In each site, equal numbers of eligible participants are being
chosen consecutively over a 12-month period until a monthly quota is
reached. Although this technique falls short of random sampling, the
optimal method for ensuring comparability across groups, use of the 12-
month sampling period takes into consideration and controls for
possible seasonal variation in domestic violence cases.
The 5 evaluations also had adequate plans to achieve, or succeeded in
achieving, reasonable response rates from participants in their
samples. Failure to achieve adequate response rates threatens the
validity of conclusions about program effects, as it is possible that
selected individuals who do not respond or participate are
substantially different on the outcome variable of interest from those
who do respond or participate. The previously mentioned National
Evaluation of the Gang Resistance Education and Training Program sought
to survey students annually for up to 4 years after program
participation ended. The grantee made considerable efforts in years 2,
3, and 4 to follow up with students who had moved from middle school to
high school and were later enrolled in a large number of different
schools; in some cases, in different school districts. The grantee
achieved a completion rate on the student surveys of 76 percent after 2
years,[Footnote 10] 69 percent after 3 years, and 67 percent after 4
years. The grantee also presented analyses that statistically
controlled for differential attrition among the treatment and
comparison groups, and across sites, and showed that the program
effects that were found persisted in these specialized analyses.
Careful Data Collection and Analysis Procedures Were Used or Planned:
All 5 well-designed evaluations employed or had adequate plans to
employ careful data collection and analysis procedures. These included
procedures to ensure that the comparison group does not receive
services or treatment received by the program group, response rates are
documented, and statistical analyses are used to adjust for the effects
of selection bias or differential attrition on the measured
results.[Footnote 11] For example, the Breaking the Cycle evaluation
examined the effectiveness of a comprehensive effort to reduce
substance abuse and criminal activity among arrestees with a history of
drug involvement. The program group consisted of felons who tested
positive for drug use, reported drug use in the past, or were charged
specifically with drug-related felonies. The comparison group consisted
of persons arrested a year before the implementation of the Breaking
the Cycle intervention who tested positive for at least one drug. Both
groups agreed to participate in the study. Although groups selected at
different times and using different criteria may differ in systematic
ways, the evaluators made efforts to control for differences in the
samples at baseline. Where selection bias was found, a correction
factor was used in the analyses, and corrected results were presented
in the report.
Six Studies Were Well-Designed but Encountered Problems During
Implementation:
Six of the 11 studies that were well-designed encountered problems in
implementation during the data collection phase, and thus were unable
to or are unlikely to produce definitive results about the outcomes of
the programs being evaluated. Such problems included the use of program
and comparison groups that differed on outcome-related characteristics
at the beginning of the program or became different due to differential
attrition, failure of the program sponsors to implement the program as
originally planned, and low response rates among program participants
(see table 3). Five of the studies had been completed and 1 was
ongoing.
Table 3: Problems Encountered during Implementation of 6 Well-Designed
NIJ Outcome Evaluation Studies:
Evaluation study: An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide Community
Policing Program; Program and comparison groups differed: Yes; Program
not implemented as planned: Yes; Response rates were low: No.
Evaluation study: Evaluation of a Comprehensive Service-Based
Intervention Strategy in Public Housing; Program and comparison groups
differed: Yes; Program not implemented as planned: Yes; Response rates
were low: No.
Evaluation study: An Evaluation of Victim Advocacy with a Team
Approach; Program and comparison groups differed: No; Program not
implemented as planned: Yes; Response rates were low: Yes.
Evaluation study: Reducing Non-Emergency Calls to 911: An Assessment of
Four Approaches to Handling Citizen Calls for Service; Program and
comparison groups differed: No; Program not implemented as
planned: Yes; Response rates were low: Yes.
Evaluation study: Responding to the Problem Police Officer: An
Evaluation of Early Warning Systems; Program and comparison groups
differed: Yes; Program not implemented as planned: No; Response
rates were low: No.
Evaluation study: Evaluation of the Juvenile Justice Mental Health
Initiative with Randomized Design; Program and comparison groups
differed: No; Program not implemented as planned: Yes; Response
rates were low: No.
Source: GAO analysis of NIJ data.
[End of table]
Differences between Program and Comparison Group Characteristics Make
it Difficult to Attribute Outcomes to the Program:
Three of the 6 studies used a comparison group that differed from the
program group in terms of characteristics likely to be related to
program outcomes--either due to preexisting differences or to
differential attrition--even though the investigators may have made
efforts to minimize the occurrence of these problems.[Footnote 12] As a
result, a finding that program and comparison group participants
differed in outcomes could not be attributed solely to the program. For
example, the Comprehensive Service-Based Intervention Strategy in
Public Housing evaluation sought to reduce drug activity and promote
family self-sufficiency among tenants of a public housing complex in
one city through on-site comprehensive services and high profile police
involvement. The intervention site was a housing project in one section
of the city; the comparison site was another public housing complex on
the opposite side of town, chosen for its similarities to the
intervention site in terms of race, family composition, crime
statistics, and the number of women who were welfare recipients.
However, when baseline data from the two sites were examined, important
preexisting differences between the two sites became apparent. These
differences included a higher proportion of residents at the comparison
site who were employed, which could have differentially affected
intervention and comparison residents' propensity to utilize and
benefit from available services. Additionally, since there was
considerable attrition at both the intervention and comparison sites,
it is possible that the intervention and comparison group respondents
who remained differed on some factors related to the program outcomes.
Although it may have been possible to statistically control for these
differences when analyzing program outcomes, the evaluator did not do
so in the analyses presented in the final report.
Program Results Not Measurable Because Program Not Implemented as
Planned:
In 5 of the 6 studies, evaluators ran into methodological problems
because the program under evaluation was not implemented as planned,
and the investigators could not test the hypotheses that they had
outlined in their grant proposals. For the most part, this particular
implementation problem was beyond the evaluators' control. It resulted
from decisions made by agencies providing program services that had
agreed to cooperate with the evaluators but, for a number of reasons,
made changes in the programs or did not cooperate as fully as expected
after the studies were underway. This occurred in the evaluation of the
Juvenile Justice Mental Health Initiative with Randomized Design, a
study that is ongoing and expected to be completed in September 2003.
The investigators had proposed to test whether two interventions
provided within an interagency collaborative setting were effective in
treating youths with serious emotional disturbances referred to the
juvenile justice system for delinquency. Juveniles were to be randomly
assigned to one of two treatment programs, depending on age and offense
history (one for youth under the age of 14 without serious, violent, or
chronic offense history, and one for youth ages 14 and older with
serious, violent, or chronic delinquencies) or to a comparison group
that received preexisting court affiliated service programs. The
evaluators themselves had no power to develop or modify programs. The
funding agencies[Footnote 13] contracted with a local parent support
agency and with a nonprofit community-based agency to implement the
programs, but the program for youth under the age of 14 was never
implemented.[Footnote 14] In addition, partway through the study, the
funding agencies decided to terminate random assignment of juveniles,
and shortly thereafter ended the program. As a result, the evaluators
had complete data on 45 juveniles who had been in the treatment
program, rather than on the 100 juveniles they had proposed to study.
Although the study continued to collect data on juveniles eligible for
the study (who were then assigned to the comparison group, since a
treatment option was no longer available), the evaluators proposed to
analyze the data from the random experiment separately, examining only
those treatment and comparison youths assigned when program slots were
available. Because of the smaller number of participants than
anticipated, detailed analyses of certain variables (such as the type,
or amount of service received, or the effects of race and gender) are
likely to be unreliable.
Low Response Rates May Reduce the Reliability and Validity of Findings:
Low response rates were a problem in 2 of the 6 studies, potentially
reducing the reliability and validity of the findings. In a third
study, response rates were not reported, making it impossible for us to
determine whether this was a problem or not.[Footnote 15] In one study
where the response rate was a problem, the evaluators attempted to
survey victims of domestic abuse, a population that NIJ officials
acknowledged was difficult to reach. In An Evaluation of Victim
Advocacy With a Team Approach, the evaluators attempted to contact by
telephone women who were victims of domestic violence, to inquire about
victims' experiences with subsequent violence and their perceptions of
safety. Response rates were only about 23 percent, and the victims who
were interviewed differed from those who were not interviewed in terms
of the nature and seriousness of the abuse to which they had been
subjected. NIJ's program manager told us that when she became aware of
low response rates on the telephone survey, she and the principal
investigator discussed a variety of strategies to increase response
rates. She said the grantee expended additional time and effort to
increase the response rate, but had limited success. In the other study
with low response rates--Reducing Non-Emergency Calls to 911: An
Assessment of Four Approaches to Handling Citizen Calls for Service--
investigators attempted to survey police officers in one city regarding
their attitudes about the city's new non-emergency phone system. Only
20 percent of the police officers completed the survey.
Some Evaluation Studies Had Serious Design Limitations from the
Beginning:
Four of the evaluation studies began with serious design problems that
diminished their ability to produce reliable or valid findings about
program outcomes. One of the studies was completed, and 3 were ongoing.
The studies' design problems included the lack of comparison groups,
failure to measure the intended outcomes of the program, and failure to
collect preprogram data as a baseline for the outcomes of interest (see
table 4). Funding for these studies that began with serious
methodological problems totaled about $4.7 million, or about 30 percent
of the approximately $15.4 million spent on the studies we reviewed.
Table 4: Design Limitations in 4 NIJ Outcome Evaluation Studies:
Evaluation study: National Evaluation of the Rural Domestic Violence
and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program; No comparison group:
Yes; Intended outcomes not measured: Yes; Limited pre-program data: Yes.
Evaluation study: National Evaluation of the Domestic Violence Victims'
Civil Legal Assistance Program; No comparison group: Yes; Intended
outcomes not measured: No; Limited pre-program data: Yes.
Evaluation study: Multi-Site Demonstration of Collaborations to Address
Domestic Violence and Child Maltreatment; No comparison group: Yes;
Intended outcomes not measured: Yes; Limited pre-program data: No.
Evaluation study: Corrections and Law Enforcement Family Support: Law
Enforcement Field Test; No comparison group: Yes; Intended outcomes not
measured: No; Limited pre-program data: No.
Source: GAO analysis of NIJ data.
[End of table]
Lack of Comparison Groups:
None of the 4 outcome evaluation studies had a comparison group built
into the design--a factor that hindered the evaluator's ability to
isolate and minimize external factors that could influence the results
of the study. The completed National Evaluation of the Rural Domestic
Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program did not make
use of comparison groups to study the effectiveness of the federal
grant program that supports projects designed to prevent and respond to
domestic violence, dating violence, and child victimization in rural
communities. Instead, evaluators collected case study data from
multiday site visits to 9 selected sites.
The other three funded grant proposals submitted to NIJ indicated that
they anticipated difficulty in locating and forming appropriate
comparison groups. However, they proposed to explore the feasibility of
using comparison groups in the design phase following funding of the
grant. At the time of our review, when each of these studies was well
into implementation, none was found to be using a comparison group. For
example, the Evaluation of a Multi-Site Demonstration of Collaborations
to Address Domestic Violence and Child Maltreatment proposed to examine
whether steps taken to improve collaboration between dependency courts,
child protective services, and domestic violence service providers in
addressing the problems faced by families with co-occurring instances
of domestic violence and child maltreatment resulted in improvements in
how service providers dealt with domestic violence and child
maltreatment cases. Although NIJ stated that the evaluators planned to
collect individual case record data from similar communities, at the
time of our review these sites had not yet been identified, nor had a
methodology for identifying the sites been proposed. Our review was
conducted during the evaluation's third year of funding.
Intended Outcomes of Program Were Not Measured:
Although they were funded as outcome evaluations, 2 of the 4 studies
were not designed to provide information on intended outcomes for
individuals served by the programs. Both the Rural Domestic Violence
and the Multi-Site Demonstration of Collaborations programs had as
their objectives the enhanced safety of victims, among other goals.
However, neither of the evaluations of these programs collected data on
individual women victims and their families in order to examine whether
the programs achieved this objective. Most of the data collected in the
Rural Domestic Violence evaluation were indicators of intermediary
results, such as increases in the knowledge and training of various
rural service providers. While such intermediary results may be
necessary precursors to achieving the program's objectives of victim
safety, they are not themselves indicators of victim safety. The Multi-
Site Demonstration of Collaborations evaluation originally proposed to
collect data on the safety of women and children as well as perpetrator
recidivism, but in the second year of the evaluation project, the
evaluators filed a request to change the scope of the study.
Specifically, they noted that the original outcome indicators proposed
for victim safety were not appropriate given the time frame of the
evaluation compared to the progress of the demonstration project
itself. The modified scope, which was approved by NIJ, focused on
system rather than individual level outcomes. The new 'effectiveness'
indicators included such things as changes in policies and procedures
of agencies participating in the collaboration, and how agency
personnel identify, process, and manage families with co-occurring
domestic violence and child maltreatment. Such a design precludes
conclusions about whether the programs improved the lives of victims of
domestic violence or their children.
Lack of Pre-Program Data Hinders Ability to Show That Program Produced
Change:
As discussed in our March 2002 report, the Rural Domestic Violence
evaluation team did not collect baseline data prior to the start of the
program, making it difficult to identify change resulting from the
program. In addition, at the time of our review, in the third year of
the multi-year National Evaluation of the Domestic Violence Victims'
Civil Legal Assistance Program evaluation, the evaluator did not know
whether baseline data would be available to examine changes resulting
from the program. This evaluation, of the federal Civil Legal
Assistance program,[Footnote 16] proposed to measure whether there had
been a decrease in pro se representation (or self-representation) in
domestic violence protective order cases. A decrease in pro se
representation would indicate successful assistance to clients by Civil
Legal Assistance grantees. In May 2003, NIJ reported that the evaluator
was still in the process of contacting the court systems at the study
sites to see which ones had available data on pro se cases. The
evaluator also proposed to ask a sample of domestic violence victims
whether they had access to civil legal assistance services prior to the
program, the outcomes of their cases, and satisfaction with services.
Respondents were to be selected from a list of domestic violence
clients served by Civil Legal Assistance grantees within a specified
time period, possibly 3 to 9 months prior to the start of the outcome
portion of the study. Such retrospective data on experiences that may
have occurred more than 9 months ago must be interpreted with caution,
given the possibility of recall errors or respondents' lack of
knowledge about services that were available in the past.
NIJ Has Funded Outcome Evaluations Despite Major Gaps in Knowledge
about the Availability of Data and Comparison Groups:
Outcome evaluations are inherently difficult to conduct because in
real-world settings program results can be affected by factors other
than the intervention being studied. In addition, grantees' ability to
conduct such evaluations can depend on the extent to which information
is available up front about what data are available to answer the
research questions, where such data can be obtained, and how the data
can be collected for both the intervention and comparison groups. We
found that in 3 of the 15 NIJ evaluations we reviewed, NIJ lacked
sufficient information about these issues to assure itself that the
proposals it funded were feasible to carry out. These 3 studies totaled
about $3.7 million.
For the Evaluation of Non-Emergency Calls to 911, NIJ and DOJ's Office
of Community Oriented Policing Services jointly solicited grant
proposals to evaluate strategies taken by 4 cities to decrease non-
emergency calls to the emergency 911 system. NIJ officials told us that
they had conducted 3-day site visits of the 4 sites, and that
discussions with local officials included questions about availability
of data in each jurisdiction. The NIJ solicitation for proposals
contained descriptions of how non-emergency calls were processed at all
4 sites, but no information on the availability of outcome data to
assess changes in the volume, type, and nature of emergency and non-
emergency calls before and after the advent of the non-emergency
systems. Evaluators were asked to conduct both a process analysis and
an assessment analysis. The assessment analysis was to include
"compiling and/or developing data" on a number of outcome questions.
Once the study was funded, however, the grantee learned that only 1 of
the 4 cities had both a system designed specifically to reduce non-
emergency calls to 911, as well as reliable data for evaluation
purposes.
In the case of the Multi-Site Demonstration of Collaborations to
Address Domestic Violence and Child Maltreatment, NIJ funded the
proposal without knowing whether the grantee would be able to form
comparison groups. NIJ officials stated that one of the reasons for
uncertainty about the study design was that at the time the evaluator
was selected, the 6 demonstration sites had not yet been selected. The
proposal stated that the grantee would explore the "potential for
incorporating comparison communities or comparison groups at the site
level, and assess the feasibility, costs, and contributions and
limitations of a design that incorporates comparison groups or
communities." NIJ continued to fund the grantee for 3 additional years,
although the second year proposal for supplemental funding made no
mention of comparison groups and the third year proposal stated that
the grantee would search for comparison sites, but did not describe how
such sites would be located. In response to our questions about whether
comparison groups would be used in the study, NIJ officials said that
the plan was for the grantee to compare a random sample of case records
from before program implementation to those after implementation at
each of the demonstration sites. Designs utilizing pre-post treatment
comparisons within the same group are not considered to be as rigorous
as pre-post-treatment comparison group designs because they do not
allow evaluators to determine whether the results are due to the
program under consideration or to some other programs or external
factors.
NIJ also approved the Multi-Site Demonstration of Collaborations
proposal without knowing whether data on individual victims of domestic
violence and child maltreatment would be available during the time
frame of the evaluation. The first year proposal stated that the
grantee would examine outcomes for individuals and families, although
it also noted that there are challenges to assessing such outcomes and
that system outcomes should be examined first. Our review found that in
the third year of the evaluation, data collection was focused solely on
"system" outcomes, such as changes in policies and procedures and how
agency personnel identify, process, and manage families with co-
occurring domestic violence and child maltreatment. Thus, although the
original design called for answering questions about the outcomes of
the program for individuals and families, NIJ could not expect answers
to such questions.[Footnote 17]
In the case of the Civil Legal Assistance study, NIJ officials told us
that they have held discussions with the grantee about the feasibility
of adding comparison groups to the design. According to these
officials, the grantee said that a comparison group design would force
it to reduce the process sites to be studied from 20 to somewhere
between 6 and 8. NIJ advised the grantee that so large a reduction in
sites would be too high a price to pay to obtain comparison groups, and
advised the grantee to stay with the design as originally proposed.
Consequently, NIJ cannot expect a rigorous assessment of outcomes from
this evaluation.
Completed Outcome Evaluations Produced Useful Information on Processes
but Not on Outcomes for DOJ Program Administrators:
Of the 5 completed NIJ studies that focused on issues of interest to
DOJ program offices, findings related to program effectiveness were not
sufficiently reliable or conclusive. However, DOJ program
administrators told us that they found some of the process and
implementation findings from the completed studies to be
useful.[Footnote 18]
Program administrators from DOJ's Office on Violence Against Women said
that although they did not obtain useful outcome results from the Rural
Domestic Violence evaluation, they identified two "lessons learned"
from the process and implementation components of the study. First, the
evaluation found that very little information was available to grantees
regarding how to create collaborative programs. Thus, DOJ engaged a
technical assistance organization to develop a training program on how
to create collaborative projects based on the experiences of some of
the grantees examined by the Rural evaluation. Second, program
administrators told us that the evaluation found that because Rural
grants were funded on an 18-month schedule, programs did not have
adequate time to structure program services and also collect useful
program information. As a result, Rural programs are now funded for at
least 24 months.[Footnote 19]
While shortcomings in NIJ's outcome evaluations of law enforcement
programs leave questions about whether the programs are effective and
whether they should continue to be funded, program administrators in
DOJ's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services said that the
studies helped identify implementation problems that assisted them in
developing and disseminating information in ways useful to the law
enforcement community. These included curriculum development,
leadership conferences, and fact sheets and other research
publications. For example, as a result of the NIJ-managed study,
Responding to the Problem Police Officer: An Evaluation of Early
Warning Systems,[Footnote 20] DOJ officials developed a draft command
level guidebook that focuses on the factors to be considered in
developing an early warning system, developed an early warning
intervention training curriculum that is being taught by the 31
Regional Community Policing Institutes[Footnote 21] located across the
country, and convened a "state-of-art" conference for five top law
enforcement agencies that were developing early warning systems. DOJ
officials also said the studies showed that the various systems
evaluated had been well received by citizens and law enforcement
officials. For example, they said that citizens like the 311 non-
emergency number that was established in several cities to serve as an
alternative to calling the 911 emergency number. The system allows law
enforcement officers to identify hot spots or trouble areas in the city
by looking at various patterns in the citizen call data. Officials may
also be able to monitor the overall state of affairs in the city, such
as the presence of potholes, for example. Similarly, Chicago's City-
Wide Community Policing program resulted in the development of a crime
mapping system, enabling officers to track crime in particular areas of
the city. Like the non-emergency telephone systems, DOJ officials
believe that crime mapping helps inform citizens, police, and policy
makers about potential problem areas.
NIJ's Current and Planned Activities to Improve Its Evaluation Program:
NIJ officials told us that they have begun to take several steps to try
to increase the likelihood that outcome evaluations will produce more
definitive results. We recommended in our March 2002 report on selected
NIJ-managed outcome evaluations[Footnote 22] that NIJ assess its
evaluation process to help ensure that future outcome evaluations
produce definitive results. In November 2002, Congress amended the
relevant statute to include cost-effectiveness evaluation where
practical as part of NIJ's charge to conduct evaluations.[Footnote 23]
Since that time NIJ has established an Evaluation Division within NIJ's
Office of Research and Evaluation. NIJ officials told us that they have
also placed greater emphasis on funding cost-benefit studies, funded
feasibility studies prior to soliciting outcome evaluations, and placed
greater emphasis on applicants' prior performance in awarding grants.
In January 2003, NIJ established an Evaluation Division within NIJ's
Office of Research and Evaluation, as part of a broader reorganization
of NIJ programs. According to NIJ, the Division will "oversee NIJ's
evaluations of other agency's [sic] programs and—develop policies and
procedures that establish standards for assuring quality and utility of
evaluations."[Footnote 24] NIJ officials told us that among other
things, the Division will be responsible for recommending to the NIJ
Director which evaluations should be undertaken, assigning NIJ staff to
evaluation grants and overseeing their work, and maintaining oversight
responsibility for ongoing evaluation grants. In addition, NIJ
officials told us that one of the NIJ Director's priorities is to put
greater emphasis on evaluations that examine the costs and benefits of
programs or interventions. To support this priority, NIJ officials told
us that the Evaluation Division had recently developed training for NIJ
staff on cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis.[Footnote 25]
NIJ recently undertook 37 "evaluability assessments" to assess the
feasibility of conducting outcome evaluations of congressionally
earmarked programs prior to soliciting proposals for
evaluation.[Footnote 26] In 2002 and 2003, these assessments were
conducted to examine each project's scope, activities, and potential
for rigorous evaluation.[Footnote 27] The effort included telephone
interviews and site visits to gather information regarding such things
as what outcomes could be measured, what kinds of data were being
collected by program staff, and the probability of using a comparison
group or random assignment in the evaluation. Based on the review, NIJ
solicited proposals from the research community to evaluate a subset of
the earmarked programs that NIJ believed were ready for outcome
evaluation.[Footnote 28]
NIJ officials also stated that in an effort to improve the performance
of its grantees, it has begun to pay greater attention to the quality
and timeliness of their performance on previous NIJ grants when
reviewing funding proposals. As part of NIJ's internal review of grant
applications, NIJ staff check that applicants' reports are complete and
accurate and evaluate past work conducted by the applicant using
performance related measures. Although this is not a new activity, NIJ
officials told us that NIJ was now placing more emphasis on reviewing
applicants' prior performance than it had in the past.[Footnote 29] NIJ
officials told us that NIJ staff may also contact staff in other OJP
offices, where the applicant may have received grant funding, to assess
applicant performance on those grants.
Conclusions:
Our in-depth review of 15 outcome evaluations managed by NIJ during the
past 10 years indicated that the majority was beset with methodological
and/or implementation problems that limited the ability to draw
meaningful conclusions about the programs' effectiveness. Although our
sample is not representative of all NIJ outcome evaluations conducted
during the last 10 years, it includes those that have received a large
proportion of the total funding for this type of research, and tends to
be drawn from the most recent work. The findings from this review,
coupled with similar findings we reported in other reviews of NIJ
outcome evaluations, raise concerns about the level of attention NIJ is
focusing on ensuring that funded outcome evaluations produce credible
results.
We recognize that it is very difficult to design and execute outcome
evaluations that produce meaningful and definitive results. Real world
evaluations of complex social programs inevitably pose methodological
challenges that can be difficult to control and overcome. Nonetheless,
we believe it is possible to conduct outcome evaluations in real world
settings that produce meaningful results. Indeed, 5 of NIJ's outcome
evaluations can be characterized in this way, and these 5 accounted for
about 48 percent of the $15.4 million spent on the studies we reviewed.
We also believe that NIJ could do more to help ensure that the millions
of dollars it spends annually to evaluate criminal justice programs is
money well spent. Indeed, poor evaluations can have substantial costs
if they result in continued funding for ineffective programs or the
curtailing of funding for effective programs.
NIJ officials told us that they recognize the need to improve their
evaluation efforts and have begun to take several steps in an effort to
increase the likelihood that outcome evaluations will produce more
conclusive results. These steps include determining whether a program
is ready for evaluation and monitoring evaluators' work more closely.
We support NIJ's efforts to improve the rigor of its evaluations.
However, it is too soon to tell whether and to what extent these
efforts will lead to NIJ funding more rigorous effectiveness
evaluations, and result in NIJ obtaining evaluative information that
can better assist policy makers in making decisions about criminal
justice funding priorities. In addition to the steps that NIJ is
taking, we believe that NIJ can benefit from reviewing problematic
studies it has already funded in order to determine the underlying
causes for the problems and determine ways to avoid them in the future.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Attorney General instruct the Director of NIJ to:
* Conduct a review of its ongoing outcome evaluation grants--including
those discussed in this report--and develop appropriate strategies and
corrective measures to ensure that methodological design and
implementation problems are overcome so the evaluations can produce
more conclusive results. Such a review should consider the design and
implementation issues we identified in our assessment in order to
decide whether and what type of intervention may be appropriate. If,
based on NIJ's review, it appears that the methodological problems
cannot be overcome, NIJ should consider refocusing the studies'
objectives and/or limiting funding.
* Continue efforts to respond to our March 2002 recommendation that NIJ
assess its evaluation process with the purpose of developing approaches
to ensure that future outcome evaluation studies are funded only when
they are effectively designed and implemented. The assessment could
consider the feasibility of such steps as:
* obtain more information about the availability of outcome data prior
to developing a solicitation for research;
* require that outcome evaluation proposals contain more detailed
design specifications before funding decisions are made regarding these
proposals; and:
* more carefully calibrate NIJ monitoring procedures to the cost of the
grant, the risks inherent in the proposed methodology, and the extent
of knowledge in the area under investigation.
Agency Comments and our Evaluation:
We provided a copy of a draft of this report to the Attorney General
for review and comment. In a September 4, 2003, letter, DOJ's Assistant
Attorney General for the Office of Justice Programs commented on the
draft. Her comments are summarized below and presented in their
entirety in appendix III.
The Assistant Attorney General stated that NIJ agreed with our
recommendations. She also highlighted NIJ's current and planned
activities to improve its evaluation program. For example, as we note
in the report, NIJ has established an Evaluation Division and initiated
a new strategy of evaluability assessments. Evaluability assessments
are intended to be quick, low cost initial assessments of criminal or
juvenile justice programs to help NIJ determine if the necessary
conditions exist to warrant sponsoring a full-scale outcome evaluation.
To improve its grantmaking process, the Assistant Attorney General
stated that NIJ is developing a new grant "special conditions" that
will require grantees to document all changes in the scope and
components of evaluation designs. In response to our concerns, NIJ also
plans, in fiscal year 2004, to review its grant monitoring procedures
for evaluation grants in order to more intensively monitor the larger
or more complex grants. NIJ also plans to conduct periodic reviews of
its evaluation research portfolio to assess the progress of ongoing
grants. This procedure is to include documenting any changes in
evaluation design that may have occurred and reassessing the expected
benefits of ongoing projects.
In her letter, the Assistant Attorney General made two substantive
comments--both concerning our underlying assumptions in conducting the
review--with which we disagree. In her first comment, the Assistant
Attorney General noted that our report implies that conclusive
evaluation results can always be achieved if studies are rigorously
designed and carefully monitored. We disagree with this
characterization of the implication of our report. While sound research
design and careful monitoring of program implementation are factors
that can significantly affect the extent to which outcome evaluation
results are conclusive, they are not the only factors. We believe that
difficulties associated with conducting outcome evaluations in real
world settings can give rise to situations in which programs are not
implemented as planned or requisite data turn out not to be available.
In such instances, even a well-designed and carefully monitored
evaluation will not produce conclusive findings about program
effectiveness. Our view is that when such problems occur, NIJ should
respond and take appropriate action. NIJ could (1) take steps to
improve the methodological adequacy of the studies if it is feasible to
do so, (2) reconsider the purpose and scope of evaluation if there is
interest in aspects of the program other than its effectiveness, or (3)
decide to end the evaluation project if it is not likely to produce
useful information on program outcomes.
In her second comment, the Assistant Attorney General expressed the
view that our work excluded consideration of valid, high quality
evaluation methods other than experimental and quasi-experimental
design. We believe that our assessment of NIJ's outcome evaluations was
both appropriate and comprehensive. We examined a variety of
methodological attributes of NIJ's studies in trying to assess whether
they would produce sufficiently sound information on program outcomes.
Among other things, we systematically examined such factors as the type
of evaluation design used; how program effects were isolated (that is,
whether comparison groups or statistical controls were utilized); the
size of study samples and appropriateness of sampling procedures; the
reliability, validity, and appropriateness of outcome measures; the
length of follow-up periods on program participants; the extent to
which program attrition or program participant nonresponse may have
been an issue; the appropriateness of analytic techniques that were
employed; and the reported results. Therefore, we made determinations
about the cause and effect linkages between programs and outcomes using
a myriad of methodological information. In discussing the
methodological strengths of experimental and quasi-experimental
designs, we did not intend to be dismissive of other potential
approaches to isolating the effects of program interventions. For
example, if statistical controls can be employed to adequately
compensate for a methodological weakness such as the existence of a
comparison group that is not comparable on characteristics that could
affect the study's outcome, then we endorse the use of such a
technique. However, in those instances where our review found that
NIJ's studies could not produce sufficiently sound information about
program outcomes, we saw no evidence that program effects had been
isolated using alternative, compensatory, or supplemental methods.
In addition to these comments, the Assistant Attorney General also
provided us with a number of technical comments, which we incorporated
in the report as appropriate.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 14 days
from the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies to the
Attorney General, appropriate congressional committees and other
interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no
charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Sincerely yours,
Laurie E. Ekstrand
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
Signed by Laurie E. Ekstrand:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
In response to your request, we undertook a review of the outcome
evaluation work performed under the direction of the National Institute
of Justice (NIJ) during the last 10 years. We are reporting on (1) the
methodological quality of a sample of completed and ongoing NIJ outcome
evaluation grants and (2) the usefulness of the evaluations in
producing information on program outcomes.
Our review covered outcome evaluation grants managed by NIJ from 1992
through 2002. Outcome evaluations are defined as those efforts designed
to determine whether a program, project, or intervention produced its
intended effects. These kinds of studies can be distinguished from
process evaluations, which are designed to assess the extent to which a
program is operating as intended.
To determine the methodological quality of a sample of NIJ-managed
outcome evaluations, we asked NIJ, in June 2002, to identify and give
us a list of all outcome evaluations managed by NIJ that were initiated
during the last 10 years, or initiated at an earlier date but completed
during the last 5 years. NIJ identified 96 evaluation studies that
contained outcome evaluation components that had been awarded during
this period. A number of these studies included both process and
outcome components. We did not independently verify the accuracy or
completeness of the data NIJ provided.
These 96 evaluations were funded for a total of about $36.6 million.
Individual grant awards ranged in size from $22,374 to about $2.8
million. Twenty grants were awarded for $500,000 or more, for a total
of about $22.8 million (accounting for about 62 percent of all funding
for NIJ outcome evaluations during the 10-year review period); 51
grants for less than $500,000, but more than $100,000, for a total of
about $11.7 million (accounting for about 32 percent of all NIJ outcome
evaluation funding); and 25 grants for $100,000 or less, for a total of
about $2.1 million (accounting for about 6 percent of all NIJ outcome
evaluation funding). Fifty-one of the 96 evaluations had been completed
at the time of our review; 45 were ongoing.
From the list of 96 outcome evaluation grants, we selected a judgmental
sample of 16 grants for an in-depth methodological review. Our sample
selection criteria were constructed so as to sample both large and
medium-sized grants (in terms of award size), and both completed and
ongoing studies. We selected 8 large evaluations--funded at $500,000 or
above--and 8 medium-sized evaluations--funded at between $101,000 and
$499,000. Within each group of 8 we selected the 4 most recently
completed evaluations, and the 4 most recently initiated evaluations
that were still ongoing, in an effort to ensure that the majority of
the grants reviewed were subject to the most recent NIJ grant
management policies and procedures. One of the medium-sized ongoing
evaluations was dropped from our review when we determined that the
evaluation was in the formative stage of development; that is, the
application had been awarded but the methodological design had not yet
been fully developed. As a result, our in-depth methodological review
covered 15 NIJ-managed outcome evaluations accounting for about 42
percent of the total spent on outcome evaluation grants between 1992
and 2002 (see tables 5 and 6). These studies are not necessarily
representative of all outcome evaluations managed by NIJ during this
period.
Table 5: Number and Size of Outcome Evaluation Awards Made by NIJ from
1992 through 2002, and Reviewed by GAO:
Large ($500,000 or more): No.
Size of grant: Large ($500,000 or more); All NIJ outcome evaluations:
Number of grants: 20; All NIJ outcome evaluations: Total funding:
$22,801,186; NIJ outcome evaluations reviewed by GAO: Number
of grants (percent reviewed in category): 8 (40%); NIJ outcome
evaluations reviewed by GAO: Total funding (percent reviewed in
category): $13,654,211 (60%).
Size of grant: Medium ($101,000-$499,000); All NIJ outcome evaluations:
Number of grants: 51; All NIJ outcome evaluations: Total funding:
11,687,679; NIJ outcome evaluations reviewed by GAO: Number of
grants (percent reviewed in category): 7 (14%); NIJ outcome evaluations
reviewed by GAO: Total funding (percent reviewed in category):
1,765,915 (15%).
Size of grant: Small ($100,000 or less); All NIJ outcome evaluations:
Number of grants: 25; All NIJ outcome evaluations: Total funding:
2,110,737; NIJ outcome evaluations reviewed by GAO: Number of
grants (percent reviewed in category): N/A; NIJ outcome evaluations
reviewed by GAO: Total funding (percent reviewed in category): N/A.
Size of grant: Total; All NIJ outcome evaluations: Number of grants:
96; All NIJ outcome evaluations: Total funding: $36,599,602;
NIJ outcome evaluations reviewed by GAO: Number of grants (percent
reviewed in category): 15 (16%); NIJ outcome evaluations reviewed by
GAO: Total funding (percent reviewed in category): $15,420,126 (42%).
Source: GAO analysis of NIJ data.
[End of table]
Table 6: Size and Completion Status of the 15 Evaluations Selected for
Methodological Review:
Grant title:
National Evaluation of Gang Resistance Education and Training Program;
Award: $1,568,323; Size of award: Large: Yes; Size of award: Medium:
No; Status: Completed: Yes; Status: Ongoing: No.
Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide Community Policing Program; Award:
$2,157,859; Size of award: Large: Yes; Size of award: Medium: No;
No; Status: Completed: Yes; Status: Ongoing: No.
National Evaluation of the Rural Domestic Violence and Child
Victimization Enforcement Grant Program; Award: $719,949; Size of
award: Large: Yes; Size of award: Medium: No; No; Status:
Completed: Yes; Status: Ongoing: No.
Evaluation of Breaking the Cycle; Award: $2,419,344; Size of award:
Large: Yes; Size of award: Medium: No; No; Status: Completed:
Yes; Status: Ongoing: No.
National Evaluation of the Domestic Violence Victims' Civil Legal
Assistance Program; Award: $800,154; Size of award: Large: Yes; Size of
award: Medium: No; No; Status: Completed: No; Status:
Ongoing: Yes.
Evaluation of a Multi-Site Demonstration of Collaborations to Address
Domestic Violence and Child Maltreatment; Award: $2,498,638; Size of
award: Large: Yes; Size of award: Medium: No; No; Status:
Completed: No; Status: Ongoing: Yes.
Corrections and Law Enforcement Family Support: Law Enforcement Field
Test; Award: $649,990; Size of award: Large: Yes; Size of award: Medium:
No; No; Status: Completed: No; Status: Ongoing: Yes.
Evaluation of a Multi-Site Demonstration for Enhanced Judicial
Oversight of Domestic Violence Cases; Award: $2,839,954; Size of award:
Large: Yes; Size of award: Medium: No; No; Status: Completed:
No; Status: Ongoing: Yes.
Evaluation of a Comprehensive Service-Based Intervention Strategy in
Public Housing; Award: $187,412; Size of award: Large: No; Size of
award: Medium: Yes; No; Status: Completed: Yes; Status: Ongoing:
No.
An Evaluation of Victim Advocacy with a Team Approach; Award: $153,491;
Size of award: Large: No; Size of award: Medium: Yes; No;
Status: Completed: Yes; Status: Ongoing: No.
Reducing Non-Emergency Calls to 911: An Assessment of Four Approaches
to Handling Citizen Calls for Service; Award: $399,919; Size of award:
Large: No; Size of award: Medium: Yes; No; Status: Completed:
Yes; Status: Ongoing: No.
Responding to the Problem Police Officer: An Evaluation of Early
Warning Systems; Award: $174,643; Size of award: Large: No; Size
of award: Medium: Yes; No; Status: Completed: Yes; Status: Ongoing:
No.
Evaluation of a Juvenile Justice Mental Health Initiative with
Randomized Design; Award: $200,000; Size of award: Large: No; Size
of award: Medium: Yes; No; Status: Completed: No; Status:
Ongoing: Yes.
Culturally Focused Batterer Counseling for African-American Men; Award:
$356,321; Size of award: Large: No; Size of award: Medium: Yes;
No; Status: Completed: No; Status: Ongoing: Yes.
Testing the Impact of Court Monitoring and Batterer Intervention
Programs at the Bronx Misdemeanor Domestic Violence Court; Award:
$294,129; Size of award: Large: No; Size of award: Medium: Yes;
No; Status: Completed: No; Status: Ongoing: Yes.
Source: GAO analysis of NIJ data.
[End of table]
The evaluations we selected comprised a broad representation of issues
in the criminal justice field and of program delivery methods. In terms
of criminal justice issues, 7 of the 15 evaluations focused on programs
designed to reduce domestic violence, 4 focused on programs addressing
the behavior of law enforcement officers, 2 focused on programs
addressing drug abuse, and 2 focused on programs to deal with juvenile
justice issues. In terms of program delivery methods, 3 evaluations
examined national discretionary grant programs or nationwide
cooperative agreements, 4 examined multisite demonstration programs,
and 8 examined local programs or innovations.
For the 15 outcome evaluations we reviewed, we asked NIJ to provide any
documentation relevant to the design and implementation of the outcome
evaluation methodologies, such as the application solicitation, the
grantee's initial and supplemental applications, progress notes,
interim reports, requested methodological changes, and any final
reports that may have become available. We used a data collection
instrument to obtain information systematically about each program
being evaluated and about the features of the evaluation methodology.
We based our data collection and assessments on generally accepted
social science standards.[Footnote 30] We examined such factors as
whether evaluation data were collected before and after program
implementation; how program effects were isolated (i.e., the use of
nonprogram participant comparison groups or statistical controls); and
the appropriateness of sampling, outcome measures, statistical
analyses, and any reported results.[Footnote 31] A senior social
scientist with training and experience in evaluation research and
methodology read and coded the documentation for each evaluation. A
second senior social scientist reviewed each completed data collection
instrument and the relevant documentation for the outcome evaluation to
verify the accuracy of every coded item. We relied on documents NIJ
provided to us between October 2002 and May 2003 in assessing the
evaluation methodologies and reporting on each evaluation's status. We
grouped the studies into 3 categories based on our judgment of their
methodological soundness. Although we recognize that the stronger
studies may have had some weaknesses, and that the weaker studies may
have had some strengths, our categorization of the studies was a
summary judgment based on the totality of the information provided to
us by NIJ. Following our review, we interviewed NIJ officials regarding
NIJ's role in soliciting, selecting, and monitoring these grants, and
spoke to NIJ grant managers regarding issues raised about each of the
grants during the course of our methodological review.
In the course of our discussions with NIJ officials, we learned of
changes NIJ has underway to improve its administration of outcome
evaluation studies. To document these changes, we interviewed
responsible NIJ officials, and requested and reviewed relevant
documents. We are providing information in this report about these
changes.
To identify the usefulness of the evaluations in producing information
on program outcomes, we reviewed reported findings from completed NIJ-
managed outcome evaluations that either evaluated programs administered
or funded by the Department of Justice (DOJ), or had been conducted
with funding contributed by DOJ program offices (see table 7). Of the 8
completed evaluations that we reviewed for methodological adequacy, 5
had been conducted with funding contributed in part by DOJ program
offices, including 2 evaluations funded in part by DOJ's Office on
Violence Against Women (OVW) and 3 evaluations funded in part by DOJ's
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). Of the 2
evaluations funded by OVW, 1 was a review of a national program
administered by DOJ, and the other was a review of a locally
administered program funded partially by an OVW grant. Of the 3
evaluations funded by COPS, 2 were evaluations of programs funded at
least in part with COPS funding, and the other was an evaluation of a
program operating at several local law enforcement agencies, supported
with local funding. Because of our interest in the effectiveness of
criminal justice programs, we limited our review of the usefulness of
NIJ outcome evaluations to evaluations of DOJ programs, or evaluations
funded by DOJ program offices, and did not examine the 3 other
completed NIJ outcome evaluations that focused on programs funded by
agencies other than DOJ.
Table 7: Programs Evaluated and Funding Sources for Completed NIJ
Outcome Evaluations:
Completed NIJ evaluations: OVW Evaluations:
Completed NIJ evaluations: National Evaluation of the Rural Domestic
Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program; DOJ-funded
program: Yes; Evaluation funded by DOJ program offices: Yes.
Completed NIJ evaluations: An Evaluation of Victim Advocacy with a Team
Approach; DOJ-funded program: Yes; Evaluation funded by DOJ program
offices: Yes.
Completed NIJ evaluations: COPS Evaluations:
Completed NIJ evaluations: Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide Community
Policing Program; DOJ-funded program: Yes; Evaluation funded by DOJ
program offices: Yes.
Completed NIJ evaluations: Reducing Non-Emergency Calls to 911: An
Assessment of Four Approaches to Handling Citizen Calls for Service;
DOJ-funded program: Yes; Evaluation funded by DOJ program offices: Yes.
Completed NIJ evaluations: Responding to the Problem Police Officer: An
Evaluation of Early Warning Systems; DOJ-funded program: No; Evaluation
funded by DOJ program offices: Yes.
Completed NIJ evaluations: Other evaluations:
Completed NIJ evaluations: National Evaluation of Gang Resistance
Education and Training Program; DOJ-funded program: No; Evaluation
funded by DOJ program offices: No.
Completed NIJ evaluations: Evaluation of Breaking the Cycle; DOJ-funded
program: No; Evaluation funded by DOJ program offices: No.
Completed NIJ evaluations: Evaluation of a Comprehensive Service-Based
Intervention Strategy in Public Housing; DOJ-funded program: No;
Evaluation funded by DOJ program offices: No.
Source: GAO analysis of NIJ data.
[End of table]
We interviewed NIJ officials and relevant DOJ program administrators
regarding whether these findings were used to implement improvements in
the evaluated programs. At OVW and COPS, we asked officials the extent
to which they (1) were involved in soliciting and developing the
evaluation grant, and monitoring the evaluation; (2) were aware of the
evaluation results; and (3) had made any changes to the programs they
administered based on evaluation findings about the effectiveness of
the evaluated programs.
We conducted our work at NIJ headquarters in Washington, D.C., between
May 2002 and August 2003 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Summaries of the NIJ Outcome Evaluations Reviewed:
Table 8: Evaluations with Sound Designs and Sound Implementation Plans:
Evaluation: Principal investigator; The National Evaluation of the Gang
Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: University of
Nebraska at Omaha.
Evaluation: Program evaluated; The National Evaluation of the Gang
Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: The GREAT program
began in 1991 with the goal of using federal, state, and local law
enforcement agents to educate elementary school students in areas prone
to gang activity about the destructive consequences of gang membership.
The program seeks to prevent youth crime and violence by reducing
involvement in gangs. According to the evaluator's proposal, as of
April 1994, 507 officers in 37 states (150 sites) had completed GREAT
training. GREAT targets middle school students (with an optional
curriculum for third and fourth graders) and consists of 8 lessons
taught over a 9-week period.
Evaluation: Evaluation components; The National Evaluation of the Gang
Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: Process and outcome
evaluations began in 1994 and were completed in 2001. Total evaluation
funding was $1,568,323. The outcome evaluation involved a cross-
sectional and longitudinal design. For the cross-sectional component,
5,935 eighth grade students in 11 different cities were surveyed to
assess the effectiveness of GREAT. Schools that had offered GREAT
within the last 2 years were selected, and questionnaires were
administered to all eighth graders in attendance on a single day. This
sample constituted a 1-year follow-up of 2 ex-post facto groups:
students who had been through GREAT and those who had not. A 5-year
longitudinal, quasi-experimental component was conducted in 6 different
cities. Schools in the 6 cities were selected purposively, to allow for
random assignment where possible. Classrooms in 15 of 22 schools were
randomly assigned to receive GREAT or not, whereas assignment in the
remaining schools was purposive. A total of more than 3,500 students
initially participated, and active consent was obtained for 2,045
participants. Students were surveyed 2 weeks before the program, 2
weeks after completion, and at 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-year intervals after
completion. Significant follow-up efforts were employed to maintain
reasonable response rates. Concepts measured included attitudinal
measures regarding crime, gangs and police; delinquency; drug sales and
use; and involvement in gangs, gang activities, and risk-seeking
behaviors. In addition, surveys were conducted with parents of the
students participating in the longitudinal component, administrative
and teaching staff at the schools in the longitudinal design, and
officers who had completed GREAT training prior to July 1999.
Evaluation: Assessment of evaluation; The National Evaluation of the
Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: Although
conclusions from the cross-sectional component may be limited because
of possible pre-existing differences between students who had been
exposed to GREAT and students who had not and lack of detail about
statistical controls employed, the design and analyses for the
longitudinal component are generally sound, including random assignment
of classrooms to the intervention in 15 of the 22 schools, collection
of baseline and extensive follow-up data; and statistical controls for
differential attrition rates of participant and comparison groups.
Evaluation: Principal investigator; The National Evaluation of the Gang
Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: Urban Institute.
Evaluation: Program evaluated; The National Evaluation of the Gang
Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: A consortium of
federal agencies, led by the Office of National Drug Control Policy and
NIJ, developed the Breaking the Cycle (BTC) demonstration program in 3
sites to test the effectiveness of a comprehensive, coordinated
endeavor to reduce substance abuse and criminal activity, and improve
the health and social functioning of drug-involved offenders. The first
site, Birmingham, Ala., received funding in 1997, and the next 2 sites,
Tacoma, Wash., and Jacksonville, Fla. received funding in 1998.
Participants were adult arrestees (for any type of crime) who tested
positive for drug use and had a history of drug involvement. The
program was based on the recognition that there was a link between drug
use and crime, and it had the support of many criminal justice system
officials who were willing to use the authority of the criminal justice
system to reduce drug use among offenders. BTC intended to expand the
scope of earlier programs such as drug courts and Treatment
Alternatives to Street Crime by incorporating drug reduction activities
as part of handling felony cases. BTC included early intervention; a
continuum of treatment options tailored to participants' needs,
including treatment readiness programs in jails; regular judicial
monitoring and graduated sanctions; and collaboration among justice and
treatment agencies.
Evaluation: Evaluation components; The National Evaluation of the Gang
Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: Begun in 1997, and
the final report completed in 2003, the evaluation was funded for
$2,419,344, and included both outcome and process components.
Comparison groups were selected in each of the 3 sites, and were
composed of defendants similar to the BTC participants who were
arrested in the year before BTC was implemented. The evaluation
examined program success in (1) reducing drug use and criminal
activity, as measured by self-reported drug use in the 6 months prior
to follow-up interviews and officially recorded arrests in the 12
months after baseline; (2) improving the physical and mental health and
family/social well-being of participants, as measured by self-reported
interview data on problems experienced in these 3 areas during the 30
days before follow-up; and (3) improving labor market outcomes for
participating offenders, as measured by self-reported interview data on
employment and social difficulties in the 30 days before follow-up.
Survey data were collected at baseline and again at two intervals
between 9 and 15 months after baseline. At baseline the sample sizes
for the treatment and comparison groups were, respectively, 374 and 192
in Birmingham, 335 and 444 in Jacksonville, and 382 and 351 in Tacoma.
Response rates for the follow-up interviews varied across the 3 sites
from 65 to 75 percent for the treatment groups, and from 71 to 73
percent for the comparison groups. Method of assessment varied across
sites and across samples, with some participants in both the comparison
and treatment groups interviewed in person while others were
interviewed by telephone. Multiple statistical analyses, including
logistic regression, with controls for differences in demographics,
offense history, substance abuse history, and work history between
treatment and comparison groups were used. BTC's effect on the larger
judicial environment was also assessed, using official records on the
number of hearings, case closure rates, and other factors.; Cost-
benefit analyses of the BTC interventions were conducted at the three
locations. The costs attributable to the BTC program were derived from
budgetary information provided by program staff. The BTC program
benefits were conceptualized as "costs avoided" arising from the social
and economic costs associated with crime. The estimates of cost avoided
in the study were based on (1) the costs (to society) associated with
the commission of particular crimes and (2) the costs (to the criminal
justice system) associated with arrests. Estimates of these components
from the economic and criminal justice literature were applied to self-
reported arrest data from the program and comparison group subjects.
The derived estimates of benefits were compared to program costs to
form cost-benefit ratios for the interventions. An earlier effort to
incorporate estimates of savings in service utilization from BTC (as a
program benefit) was not included in the final report analysis due to
inconclusive results.
Evaluation: Assessment of evaluation; The National Evaluation of the
Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: The evaluation
was well designed and implemented. The study used comparison groups to
isolate and minimize external factors that could have influenced the
results. While the comparison groups were selected and baseline data
collected 1 year before the treatment groups were selected, the study
corrected for selection bias and attrition, using multivariate models
that incorporated control variables to measure observed sample
differences. The study appears to have handled successfully other
potential threats to the reliability and validity of results, by using
appropriate statistical analyses to make adjustments. For example, the
study relied on both self-reported measures of drug use and arrest
histories as well as official records of arrests, to assess the effects
of the program. Self-report measures are subject to errors in memory or
self-presentational biases, while official records can be inaccurate
and/or incomplete. The evaluators made use of both the self-report and
official measures to attempt to control for these biases.; The
methodological approach used in the cost benefit analysis was generally
sound. The report specified the assumptions underlying the cost and
benefit estimates, and appropriately discussed the limitations of the
analysis for policymaking.
Evaluation: Principal investigator; The National Evaluation of the Gang
Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: The Urban Institute.
Evaluation: Program evaluated; The National Evaluation of the Gang
Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: The Judicial
Oversight Demonstration (JOD) initiative is a multiyear program being
implemented at 3 sites (City of Boston/Dorchester District Court,
Mass.; Washtenaw County, Ann Arbor, Mich.; and Milwaukee County, Wis.)
to address the problem of domestic violence. JOD tests the idea that a
coordinated community, focused judicial, and systemic criminal justice
response can improve victim safety and service provision, as well as
offender accountability. JOD emphasizes uniform and consistent
responses to domestic violence offenses, including coordinated victim
advocacy and services; strong offender accountability and oversight;
rigorous research and evaluation components; and centralized technical
assistance. Demonstration sites have developed partnerships with a
variety of public and private entities, including victim advocacy
organizations, local law enforcement agencies, courts, and other social
service providers. The program began in fiscal year 2000, and
demonstration sites are expected to receive funding for 5 years.
Evaluation: Evaluation components; The National Evaluation of the Gang
Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: A process evaluation
began in January 2000. The outcome component of the evaluation began in
October 2002 and is to be completed by October 2005. At the time of our
review, the evaluation grant amount was $2,839,954. Plans call for a
full outcome assessment to be conducted in 2 sites and, because no
appropriate comparison site could be identified, a partial assessment
in the third site. The 2 sites with a full assessment were matched with
comparison sites having similar court caseloads and population
demographics; neither comparison site had a specialized court docket,
enhanced judicial oversight, or a countywide coordinated system for
handling domestic violence cases. Over 12 months, all domestic violence
cases in each site, up to monthly size quotas, will be selected into
the following groups: cases where the offender was found guilty and
sentenced to jail for 6 months or less and probation or probation only,
cases that were dismissed or diverted from prosecution, and cases where
the offender received more than 6 months incarceration. Victims and
offenders in the first group will be interviewed, and in the second
group, victims only will be interviewed. Offender recidivism in both
groups will be tracked for 1 year following the intervention using
police and court records. For the third group, only offender recidivism
will be tracked. In the partial assessment site, subject to data
availability, the plan is to compare a sample of domestic violence
cases in which the offender was placed on probation in the period
before JOD implementation with a sample of cases in which the offender
was placed on probation and scheduled for judicial review in the period
after JOD implementation. Data about incidents, victims, and offenders
are to be obtained from official records, and offender recidivism will
be tracked using police and court records. Overall, short-term outcomes
for the study are planned to include various measures of offender
compliance and victim and offender perceptions of JOD, and long-term
outcomes are planned to include various measures of offender
recidivism, victim well-being, and case processing changes. In
addition, to discern any system level changes due to JOD, aggregate,
annual data on all domestic violence cases for the 2 years prior to and
3 years after JOD implementation in all sites will be collected and
analyzed.
Evaluation: Assessment of evaluation; The National Evaluation of the
Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: The evaluation
plan appears to be ambitious and well designed. A quasi-experimental
design is planned, and data will be collected from multiple sources,
including victims, offenders, and agencies. While lack of sustained
cooperation, uneven response rates, and missing data could become
problems, detailed plans seem to have been made to minimize these
occurrences. The planned approach of selecting cases (choosing equal
numbers of cases consecutively until a monthly quota is reached, over a
12-month period) may be nearly as good as random sampling and takes
into consideration seasonal variation. However, it could introduce
biases, should there be variation as to the time each month when case
selection begins.
Evaluation: Principal investigator; The National Evaluation of the Gang
Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: Indiana University
of Pennsylvania.
Evaluation: Program evaluated; The National Evaluation of the Gang
Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: The purpose of this
study is to test the relative effectiveness of culturally focused
versus conventional batterer counseling for African-American men. It is
based on research indicating that conventional counseling dropout and
partner re-assault rates are higher for African-American men than they
are for white men, and clinical literature in related fields that
recommends culturally focused counseling to improve the effectiveness
of counseling with African-American men. Culturally focused counseling
refers to the counselor recognizing and responding to cultural issues
that emerge in group sessions (including such topics as African-
American men's perceptions of the police, relationships with women,
sense of African-American manhood, past and recent experiences of
violence, and reactions to discrimination and prejudice), and a
curriculum that includes the major cultural issues facing a particular
group of participants. The setting for the evaluation is a counseling
center in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Evaluation: Evaluation components; The National Evaluation of the Gang
Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: The evaluation began
in September 2001, and the expected completion date is February 2005.
At the time of our review, the grant amount was $356,321. A clinical
trial will be conducted to test the effect of culturally focused
counseling on the extent to which African-American men drop out of
counseling, are accused of re-assaults, and are re-arrested for
domestic violence. Plans are for 600 African-American men referred by
the Pittsburgh Domestic Violence Court over a 12-month period to
batterer counseling at the counseling center to be randomly assigned to
either (1) a culturally focused counseling group of only African-
Americans, (2) conventional batterer counseling in an African-American
only group, and (3) conventional counseling in a racially mixed group.
Before assignment, however, the counseling center must recommend the
men for participation in the study. Men included in the study will be
administered a background questionnaire and two tests of culturally
specific attitudes (i.e., racial acculturation and identity) at program
intake. The men's female partners will be interviewed by phone 3
months, 6 months, and 12 months after program intake. These structured
interviews will collect information on the woman's relationship with
the man, the man's behavior, and the woman's help-seeking. Clinical
records of program attendance and police records of re-arrests will be
obtained for each man. Planned analyses are to include (1) verification
of equivalent culturally focused and conventional counseling sub-
samples at intake and during the follow-up; (2) comparison of the
program dropouts, re-assaults, and re-arrests for the three counseling
options at each follow-up interval and cumulatively; and (3) a
predictive model of the re-assault outcome based on characteristics,
cultural attitudes, and situational factors. Additionally, interviews
with a sub-sample of 100 men about their counseling experience are to
be conducted.
Evaluation: Assessment of evaluation; The National Evaluation of the
Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: This is a well-
designed experiment to test the effect of a new approach to provide
counseling to perpetrators of domestic violence. The researchers have
plans to (1) adjust for any selection bias in group assignment and
participant attrition through statistical analysis; (2) prevent
"contamination" from counselors introducing intervention
characteristics to control groups, or the reverse; and (3) monitor the
response rates on the interviews with female partners. The evaluation
is on-going. The most recent progress report we reviewed indicated that
the evaluation is proceeding as planned, with the recruitment of
batterers behind schedule by 1 month, the series of female partner
interviews on schedule and very close to expected response rates, and
the interviews with the sub-sample of batterers about three-quarters
complete. One potential concern we have is that because all men
referred by the domestic violence court to the counseling center may
not be recommended to participate in the study, any bias in
recommending study participants will determine the population to which
the study's results can be generalized.
Evaluation: Principal investigator; The National Evaluation of the Gang
Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: Fund for the City of
New York.
Evaluation: Program evaluated; The National Evaluation of the Gang
Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: Operating since
1998, the Bronx Misdemeanor Domestic Violence Court handles spousal
abuse misdemeanor cases. The court has the power to prescribe various
conditions of discharge for batterers, including participation in group
counseling and/or court monitoring. Given concerns about the
effectiveness of these options, it was decided to test the efficacy of
batterer counseling programs and court monitoring, alone and in
combination with each other. Furthermore, court monitoring was tested
based on the frequency of its administration--either monthly or on a
graduated basis (less monitoring for fewer incidences of abuse). This
was to ascertain whether graduated monitoring might give batterers more
incentive to change.
Evaluation: Evaluation components; The National Evaluation of the Gang
Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: The evaluation began
in September 2001 and is expected to be completed in August 2003. At
the time of our review, this evaluation was funded for $294,129. The
proposed study is an outcome evaluation of 4 different treatment
alternatives for conditional discharge defendants in domestic violence
cases. The treatment options are (1) counseling program and monthly
court monitoring, (2) counseling program and graduated court
monitoring, (3) monthly court monitoring program only, and (4)
graduated court monitoring only. Participants in the evaluation (800
total) are to be assigned randomly to 1 of the 4 treatments at the time
of sentencing, and incidents of new crimes are to be measured 6 and 12
months after sentencing. Official crime records at both intervals, and
interviews with victims at the 12-month interval are the sources of
data. The planned analysis involves looking at the groups as a whole,
and subgroups related to age, criminal history, and current charge.
Outcome measures are (1) completion of the conditional discharge or
imposition of the jail alternative, (2) new arrests for domestic
violence, and (3) new reports from victims of domestic violence
incidents.
Evaluation: Assessment of evaluation; The National Evaluation of the
Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) Program: This is a well-
designed approach to measure the comparative efficacy of combinations
of program counseling and variations in monitoring. However, at the
time of our review, we had some concerns about how well implementation
will proceed. One concern is that if one or more of the treatments is
less effective, it could result in participants spending time in jail,
reducing the possibility of further incidents. This difficulty can be
addressed in the analysis, but neither the proposal nor subsequent
progress reports discuss this or other differential attrition issues.
Also, although the evaluators have a plan to try to ensure good
response rates for the victims' survey, it is uncertain how effective
they will be. Other surveys of similar populations have been
problematic.
[End of table]
Table 9: Well-designed Evaluations That Encountered Implementation
Problems:
Evaluation: Principal investigator; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: Northwestern University.
Evaluation: Program evaluated; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: Chicago's community policing program, known
as Chicago's Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), began in April 1993.
The program reorganizes policing around small geographical areas where
officers assigned to beat teams meet with community residents to
identify and address a broad range of neighborhood problems.
Evaluation: Evaluation components; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: There were 2 evaluation efforts in this
study, 1 examining the prototype project and the second examining
citywide program implementation. The combined evaluations were
completed in August 2001, at a total cost of $2,157,859.; The prototype
evaluation, conducted between April 1993 and September 1994, compared
five areas that implemented CAPS with four areas that did not. Data
from the 1990 Census were used to select four sections of the city that
closely matched the demographics of the five prototype areas. Residents
of all areas were first surveyed in the spring of 1993 regarding the
quality of police service and its impact on neighborhood problems.
Follow-up interviews occurred in either June or September of 1994 (14
to 17 month time lags). Interviews were conducted by telephone in
English and Spanish. The re-interview rate was about 60 percent. A
total of 1,506 people were interviewed both times, an average of 180 in
each prototype area and 150 in each comparison area.; The CAPS citywide
evaluation began after the conclusion of the prototype evaluation in
July 1994. The purpose of this evaluation was to assess how changing
from a traditional policing approach to a community-centered approach
would affect citizens' perceptions of the police, neighborhood problems
and crime rates. The researchers administered annual citywide public
opinion surveys between 1993 and 2001 (excluding 2000). The surveys
covered topics such as police demeanor, responsiveness, and task
performance. Surveys were also administered to officers at CAPS
orientation sessions to obtain, among other things, aggregate
indicators of changes in officers' attitudes toward CAPS. Changes in
levels of recorded crimes were analyzed. Direct observations of police
meetings, surveys of residents, and interviews with community activists
were used to measure community involvement in problem solving and the
capacity of neighborhoods to help themselves.
Evaluation: Assessment of evaluation; An Evaluation of Chicago's
Citywide Community Policing Program: The 1992 crime rates were reported
to be similar between prototype districts and their matched comparison
areas and the baseline demographic measures used to match the two
groups were basically similar. The initial and follow-up response rates
of about 60 percent seem reasonable considering the likelihood of
community mobility in these areas; however, attrition rates differed
for various demographic characteristics, such as home ownership, race,
age, and education, raising some concerns about whether the results are
generalizable to the intended population. The follow-up time (14-17
months) was the maximum period allowed by the planned citywide
implementation of CAPS. A single follow-up survey and the citywide
implementation precluded drawing firm conclusions about longer-term
impacts of the prototype program.; Because CAPS was implemented
throughout the city of Chicago in 1995, the CAPS citywide evaluation
was not able to include appropriate comparison groups and could not
obtain a measure of what would have happened without the benefits of
the program. The authors used a variety of methods to examine the
implementation and outcomes of the CAPS program, and stated that there
was no elaborate research design involved because their focus was on
organizational change. However, because the trends over time from
resident surveys and crime data were presented without controls or
comparison groups and some declines in crime began before the program
was implemented, changes cannot be attributed solely to the program.
Evaluation: Principal investigator; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: Yale University School of Medicine.
Evaluation: Program evaluated; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: The program was an intervention strategy
designed to reduce drug activity and foster family self-sufficiency in
families living in a public housing complex in the city of New Haven,
Conn. The key elements of the intervention were (1) an on-site
comprehensive services model that included both clinical (substance
abuse treatment and family support services) and nonclinical components
(e.g., extensive outreach and community organizing as well as job
training and placement and GED high school equivalency certification)
and (2) high profile police involvement. The goals of the program were
(1) increases in the proportion of residents entering and completing
intervention services and (2) a reduction in substance-related
activities and crime.
Evaluation: Evaluation components; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: The evaluation began in 1998 and was
completed in 2000. The total evaluation funding was $187,412. The
intervention site was a public housing complex composed primarily of
female heads of household tenants and additional family members; the
control site was another public housing complex on the opposite side of
town, chosen for its similarities to the intervention site. The
evaluation design was both process and outcome oriented and involved
the collection of both qualitative and quantitative data. At baseline,
a needs assessment survey was completed (n=175 at the intervention site
and n=80 at the control site), and follow-up surveys with residents
took place at 12 and 18 months post-intervention (no response rates
reported). All heads of household at the sites were the target
population for the surveys. The follow-up surveys, while administered
in the same two sites, did not track the same respondents that were
surveyed at baseline. Survey measures included access to social
services; knowledge and reported use of social services; and residents'
perceptions of the extent of drug and alcohol abuse, drug selling,
violence, safety, and unsupervised youth in the community. The study
also examined crime statistics obtained from the New Haven police
department, at baseline and during the intervention.
Evaluation: Assessment of evaluation; An Evaluation of Chicago's
Citywide Community Policing Program: The study had several limitations,
the first of which is potential selection bias due to pre-existing
differences between the sites, as well as considerable (and possibly
differential) attrition in both groups, with no statistical control for
such differences. Second, respondents may not have been representative
of the populations at the housing sites. No statistical comparisons of
respondents to nonrespondents on selected variables were presented. In
addition, on the baseline survey, the response rates of the
intervention and control sites differed substantially (70 vs. 44
percent, respectively). Overall response rates were not reported for
the follow-up surveys. Furthermore, implementation did not work
smoothly (e.g., the control site received additional unanticipated
attention from the police). Finally, the grantee proposed to track data
on individuals over time (e.g., completion of services), but this goal
was not achieved, in part because of the limited capability of project
staff in the areas of case monitoring, tracking, and data management.
Thus, although the intervention may have produced changes in the
intervention site "environment" over time (aggregate level changes), it
is not clear that the intervention successfully impacted the lives of
individuals and families at the site.
Evaluation: Principal investigator; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: Wayne State University.
Evaluation: Program evaluated; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: The program provides assistance to domestic
violence victims in some police precincts in the city of Detroit. The
domestic violence teams studied included specially trained police
officers, police department advocates, legal advocates, and in one
police precinct, an on-site prosecutor. The advocates assisted victims
by offering information about the legal system, referrals, and safety
planning.
Evaluation: Evaluation components; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: The outcome evaluation began in January of
1998 and the final report was completed in January of 2001. The grant
amount was $153,491. The objectives of the study were to address the
relationships between advocacy and victim safety and between advocacy
and victims' responses to the criminal justice system, using a quasi-
experimental design to compare domestic violence cases originating in
police precincts with and without special police domestic violence
teams that included advocates. The study focused on assistance provided
in 3 police precincts. Precincts not served by in-precinct domestic
violence teams, but resembling the precincts with such teams in terms
of ethnic representation and median income, were selected as
comparisons. Data were collected using police records, county
prosecutor's office records, advocate contact forms, and telephone
interviews with victims. Cases that met Michigan's legal definition of
domestic violence, had adult female victims, and were received in the
selected precincts over a 4-month period in 1998 were eligible for the
study. The cases were first identified by the police department through
police reports and then reviewed for qualification by a member of the
research team. A weekly quota of cases was selected from each precinct.
If the number of qualified cases for a precinct exceeded the quota,
then cases were selected randomly using a random numbers table.
Outcomes included rates of completed prosecution of batterers, rate of
guilty findings against batterers, subsequent violence against victims,
victims' perceptions of safety, and victims' views of advocacy and the
criminal justice process.
Evaluation: Assessment of evaluation; An Evaluation of Chicago's
Citywide Community Policing Program: The study was severely affected by
numerous problems, many of which the researchers acknowledged. First,
the sample selection was based on incomplete or unreliable data, since
police officers in writing reports often did not fully describe
incidents, and precinct staff inconsistently provided complete case
information about incidents to the researchers. Second, evaluators were
not able to secure cooperation from domestic violence advocates and
their supervisors at all service levels in providing reliable reports
on service recipients and the type, number, and length of services.
Additionally, most domestic violence team members were moved out of the
precincts and into a centralized location during the period victims in
the study were receiving services, thereby potentially affecting the
service(s) provided to them. Further, the researchers were uncertain as
to whether women from the comparison precincts received any advocacy
services, thereby potentially contaminating the research results
between the precincts with the domestic violence teams and the
comparison precincts. Finally, low response rates and response bias for
data collected from victims were problems. The overall response rate
for the initial round of telephone interviews was only about 23 percent
and the response rates for follow-up interviews were lower. Response
rates were not provided separately for victims from the precincts with
the domestic violence teams and the comparison precincts. As a result
of the low response rates, the interviewed victims were identified as
being less likely to have experienced severe physical abuse, less
likely to be living with the abuser, and more likely to have a child in
common with the abuser, compared to the victims in the sample who were
not interviewed.
Evaluation: Principal investigator; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: University of Cincinnati.
Evaluation: Program evaluated; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: DOJ's COPS office has worked with police
agencies, the Federal Communications Commission, and the
telecommunications industry to find ways to relieve the substantial
demand on the current 911 emergency number. Many police chiefs and
sheriffs have expressed concern that non-emergency calls represent a
large portion of the 911 overload problem. Four cities have implemented
strategies to decrease non-emergency 911 calls and have agreed to
participate in the research. Those cities, each implementing a
different type of approach, were Baltimore, Md.; Dallas, Tex.; Buffalo,
N.Y.; and Phoenix, Ariz.
Evaluation: Evaluation components; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: A process and outcome evaluation was
conducted between July of 1998 and June of 2000. The grant amount was
$399,919. For the outcome component, the grantee examined whether (1)
the volume of 911 calls declined following the introduction of the non
emergency call system; (2) there was a corresponding decline in radio
dispatches, thus enhancing officer time; and (3) this additional time
was directed to community-oriented policing strategies. The bulk of the
design and analysis focused on Baltimore, with a limited amount of
analysis of outcomes in Dallas and no examination of outcomes in the
other two sites. The study compared rates of 911 calls before
implementation of the new 311 system to rates of 911 and 311 calls
after the system in both cities. In Baltimore, time series analysis was
used to analyze the call data; police officers and sergeants were
surveyed; the flow of 311 and 911 calls to Neighborhood Service Centers
was examined; researchers accompanied police officers during randomly
selected shifts in 3 sectors of Baltimore for 2 weeks; and citizens who
made 311 calls during a certain 1-month time frame were surveyed.
Evaluation: Assessment of evaluation; An Evaluation of Chicago's
Citywide Community Policing Program: The crux of the outcome analysis
relies on the study of pre-and post-311 system comparisons, and the
time series analysis done in Baltimore is sound. The rigor of several
other parts of this study is questionable (e.g., poor response rates to
surveys and short time frames for data from accompanying police
officers on randomly selected shifts). In addition, the choice of sites
that NIJ required the grantee to examine, other than Baltimore, did not
allow for a test of the study's objectives. Although NIJ conducted pre-
solicitation site visits to all 4 sites, at the time of the
solicitation it still did not clearly know whether outcome data would
be available at all the sites. As it turned out, outcome data were not
available in Phoenix and Buffalo. Further, since the 311 system in
Dallas was not implemented with the goal of reducing or changing call
volume, it does not appear to be a good case with which to test the
study's objectives.
Evaluation: Principal investigator; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: University of Nebraska - Omaha.
Evaluation: Program evaluated; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: An Early Warning (EW) system is a data
based police management tool designed to identify officers whose
behavior is problematic, as indicated by high rates of citizen
complaints, use of force incidents, or other evidence of behavior
problems, and to provide some form of intervention, such as counseling
or training to correct that performance. According to the current
study's national survey of local law enforcement agencies (LEA) serving
populations of 50,000 or more, about one-quarter of LEAs surveyed had
an EW system, with another 12 percent indicating that one was planned.
One-half of existing EW systems have been created since 1994.
Evaluation: Evaluation components; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: Begun in 1998, the study was completed in
1999 and included process and outcome components, as well as a national
survey. The total evaluation funding was $174,643. The outcome portion
of the study was composed of case studies of EW systems in 3 large
urban police departments (Miami-Dade, Fla.; Minneapolis, Minn.; and New
Orleans, La.). Sites were selected judgmentally; each had functioning
EW systems in place for a period of 4 or more years and had agreed to
participate in the study.; Both Miami-Dade and Minneapolis case studies
examined official performance records (including citizen complaints in
both sites and use of force reports in Miami-Dade) for officers
identified by the department's EW system, for 2 years prior to and
after departmental intervention, compared to records for officers not
identified. The participant groups included officers hired between 1990
and 1992 and later identified by the EW system (n=28 in Miami-Dade;
n=29 in Minneapolis); the comparison groups included officers hired
during the same period and not identified (n=267 in Miami-Dade; n=78 in
Minneapolis). In New Orleans, official records were not organized in a
way that permitted analysis of performance of officers subject to EW
and a comparison group. The New Orleans case study, therefore, examined
citizen complaint data for a group of officers identified by the EW
system 2 years or more prior to the study, and for whom full
performance data were available for 2 years prior to and 2 years
following intervention (n=27).
Evaluation: Assessment of evaluation; An Evaluation of Chicago's
Citywide Community Policing Program: The study had a number of
limitations, many of them acknowledged by the grantee. First, it is not
possible to disentangle the effect of EW systems per se from the
general climate of rising standards of accountability in all 3 sites.
Second, use of nonequivalent comparison groups (officers identified for
intervention are likely to differ from those not identified), without
statistical adjustments for differences between groups creates
difficulties in presenting outcome results. Only in Minneapolis did the
evaluators explicitly compare changes in performance of the EW group
with changes in performance of the comparison group, again without
presenting tests of statistical significance. Furthermore, the content
of the intervention was not specifically measured, raising questions
about the nature of the intervention that was actually delivered, and
whether it was consistent over time in the 3 sites, or across officers
subject to the intervention. Moreover, it was not possible to determine
which aspects of the intervention were most effective overall (e.g.,
differences in EW selection criteria, intervention services for
officers, and post-intervention monitoring), since the intervention was
reportedly effective in all 3 departments despite differences in the
nature of their EW systems. Also, no data were available to examine
whether the EW systems had a deterrent effect on desirable officer
behavior (e.g., arrests or other officer-initiated activity). Finally,
generalizability of the findings in Miami-Dade and Minneapolis may also
be limited, since those case studies examined cohorts of officers
recruited in the early 1990s, and it is not clear whether officers with
greater or fewer years of police experience in these departments would
respond similarly to EW intervention.
Evaluation: Principal investigator; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: University of Missouri - St. Louis.
Evaluation: Program evaluated; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: The Juvenile Justice Mental Health
Initiative (JJMI) is a collaborative multi-agency demonstration project
funded under an Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
grant, and administered by the St. Louis Mental Health Board, the St.
Louis Family Court, and the Missouri Department of Health. The
initiative provides mental health services to families of youths
referred to the juvenile justice system for delinquency who have
serious emotional disturbances (SED). The initiative involves parents
and families in juvenile justice interventions, providing coordinated
services and sanctions for youths who otherwise might shuttle between
criminal justice and mental health agencies. Two new mental health
programs were established under JJMI. The first, the Child Conduct and
Support Program, was designed for families in which youths under the
age of 14 do not have a history of serious, violent, or chronic
offending. The second, Multi-systemic Therapy (MST), was designed for
families in which youths aged 14 and above have prior serious, violent,
or chronic delinquency referrals.
Evaluation: Evaluation components; An Evaluation of Chicago's Citywide
Community Policing Program: The evaluation began in October 2001 and is
expected to be completed in September 2003. At the time of our review,
the evaluation was funded for $200,000. The study proposed to evaluate
the two mental health programs using a random experimental design.
Youths referred to the Juvenile Court are first screened for SED. Those
who test positive or have prior diagnoses of SED (anxiety, depressed
mood, somatic complaints, suicidal ideation, thought disturbance, or
traumatic experience) are eligible for the JJMI programs. Eligible
youth are randomly assigned to either one of the two treatment programs
(depending on age) or to a control group. The evaluation includes a
comparison of police contact data, court data, self-reported
delinquency, and standardized measures of psychological and parental
functioning. Potentially important demographic and social context
variables, including measures of school involvement and performance,
will be obtained from court records.
Evaluation: Assessment of evaluation; An Evaluation of Chicago's
Citywide Community Policing Program: This is an ongoing, well designed
study. However, as implementation has proceeded, several problems that
may affect the utility of the results have emerged. First, the
researchers proposed to sample a total of 200 youths, with random
assignment expected to result in approximately 100 juveniles in the
treatment and comparison groups. The treatment group turned out to be
much smaller than anticipated, however, because the randomization
protocol and, subsequently, the MST program itself, were discontinued
by the St. Louis Mental Health Board. At the time of termination, only
45 youths had been randomly assigned to the treatment group. The small
number of subjects limits the extent of the analyses that can be
conducted on this population.; The Child Conduct and Support Program
designed to address the mental health needs of youth under the age of
14 without a history of serious offending was never implemented by the
providers contracted to develop the program. Eligible youth, of all
ages, were instead assigned to the MST program. Thus, the evaluation
will not be able to compare the relative effectiveness of programs
specifically designed for younger and older juvenile offenders with
SED.
[End of table]
Table 10: Evaluations with Design Limitations:
Evaluation: Principal investigator; National Evaluation of the Rural
Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program:
COSMOS Corporation.
Evaluation: Program evaluated; National Evaluation of the Rural
Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program:
The National Rural Domestic Violence and Child Victimization
Enforcement Grant program, begun in fiscal year 1996, has funded 92
grants through September 2001 to promote the early identification,
intervention, and prevention of woman battering and child
victimization; increase victim's safety and access to services; enhance
the investigation and prosecution of crimes of domestic violence and
child abuse; and develop innovative, comprehensive strategies for
fostering community awareness and prevention of domestic abuse. The
program seeks to maximize rural resources and capacity by encouraging
greater collaboration between Indian tribal governments, rural local
governments, and public and private rural service organizations.
Evaluation: Evaluation components; National Evaluation of the Rural
Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program:
The evaluation began in October 1998 and was completed in July 2002.
This evaluation was funded at $719,949, and included both process and
outcome components. Initially 10 grantees (comprising 11 percent of the
total number of program grantees) were selected to participate in the
outcome evaluation; 1 was unable to obtain continuation funding and was
dropped from the outcome portion of the study. Two criteria were used
in the selection of grant participants: the "feasibility" of grantees
visited in the process phase of the evaluation (n=16) to conduct an
outcome evaluation; and recommendations from OVW, which were based on
knowledge of grantee program activities and an interest in representing
the range of organizational structures, activities, and targeted groups
served by the grantees. Logic models were developed, as part of the
case study approach, to show the logical or plausible links between a
grantee's activities and desired outcomes. The specified outcome data
were collected from multiple sources, using a variety of methodologies,
during 2-3 day site visits (e.g., multi-year criminal justice, medical,
and shelter statistics were collected from archival records where
available; community stakeholders were interviewed; and grantee and
victim service agency staff participated in focus groups).
Evaluation: Assessment of evaluation; National Evaluation of the Rural
Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program:
This evaluation has several limitations. First, the choice of the 10
outcome sites was skewed toward the technically developed evaluation
sites and was not representative of all Rural Domestic Violence program
grantees, particular project types, or delivery styles. Second, the
lack of comparison groups makes it difficult to exclude the effect of
external factors, such as victim safety and improved access to
services, on perceived change. Furthermore, several so-called short-
term outcome variables were in fact process variables (e.g., number of
clients served, number of services provided, number of workshops
conducted, and service capacity of community agencies). Moreover, it is
not clear how interview and focus group participants were selected.
Finally, pre-and post-survey data were not collected at multiple points
in time to assess change, except at 1 site, where pre-and post-tests
were used to assess increased knowledge of domestic violence among site
staff as a result of receiving training.
Evaluation: Principal investigator; National Evaluation of the Rural
Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program:
Institute for Law and Justice.
Evaluation: Program evaluated; National Evaluation of the Rural
Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program:
The Civil Legal Assistance (CLA) program is one of seven OJP grants
(through OVW) dedicated to enhancing victim safety and ensuring
offender accountability. The CLA program awards grants to nonprofit,
nongovernmental organizations that provide legal services to victims of
domestic violence or that work with victims of domestic violence who
have civil legal needs. The CLA grant program was created by Congress
in 1998. In fiscal year 1998, 54 programs were funded, with an
additional 94 new grantees in fiscal year 1999. Approximately 85-100
new and continuation grants were anticipated in fiscal year 2000.
Evaluation: Evaluation components; National Evaluation of the Rural
Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program:
The study began in November 2000 and was expected to be completed in
October 2003. The proposed evaluation consisted of process and outcome
components and the total evaluation funding at the time of our review
was $800,154. The objective of the outcome evaluation was to determine
the effectiveness of the programs in meeting the needs of the women
served. The researchers proposed to study 8 sites with CLA programs. At
each site at least 75 cases will be tracked to see if there is an
increase in pro se (self) representation in domestic violence
protective order cases, and a total of 240 victims receiving services
will be surveyed (about 30 at each site). Focus groups of service
providers will be used to identify potential program impacts on the
justice system and wider community. Outcomes to be assessed include
change in pro se representation in domestic violence protective order
cases, satisfaction with services, and legal outcomes resulting from
civil assistance.
Evaluation: Assessment of evaluation; National Evaluation of the Rural
Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program:
The evaluation has several limitations. First, NIJ and the grantee
agreed in 2002 not to utilize a comparison group approach whereby data
would be collected from a set of comparison sites, due to concerns that
investment in that approach would limit the amount of information that
could be derived from the process component of the evaluation and from
within-site and cross-site analyses of the selected outcome sites.
Thus, the study will be limited in its ability to isolate and minimize
the potential effects of external factors that could influence the
results of the study, in part because it did not include comparison
groups in the study design. At the time of our review, it was not yet
clear whether sufficient data will be available from the court systems
at each outcome site in order to examine changes in pro se
representation. In addition, since victims would be selected for the
surveys partially on the basis of willingness to be interviewed, it is
not clear how representative the survey respondents at each site will
be and how the researchers will handle response bias. It also appears
that the victim interviews will rely to a great extent on measures that
will primarily consist of subjective, retrospective reports.
Evaluation: Principal investigator; National Evaluation of the Rural
Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program:
Caliber Associates.
Evaluation: Program evaluated; National Evaluation of the Rural
Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program:
The Department of Health and Human Services and DOJ's Office of Justice
Programs are jointly funding 6 demonstration sites for up to 3 years to
improve how 3 systems (dependency courts, child protective services,
and domestic violence service providers) work with their broader
communities to address families with co-occurring domestic violence
(DV) and child maltreatment (CM). Funded sites must agree to implement
key recommendations of the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Courts Judges' publication, "Effective Interventions in Domestic
Violence and Child Maltreatment: Guidelines for Policy and Practice"
(aka, the "Greenbook"). At a minimum, the sites need to implement
changes in policies and procedures regarding screening and assessment;
confidentiality and information sharing; safety; service provision;
advocacy; cross-training; and case collaboration. The goals of the
demonstration are to generate more coordinated, comprehensive, and
consistent responses to families faced with DV and CM, resulting in
increased safety and well-being for women and their children.
Evaluation: Evaluation components; National Evaluation of the Rural
Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program:
The evaluation began in September 2000, and is expected to be completed
around September 2004. At the time of our review, this evaluation was
funded at $2,498,638, for both process and outcome components. The
original evaluation proposal focused on various process elements as
well as the effects of the intervention on perpetrator recidivism and
the safety of women and children. In the second year, the evaluator
realized that no site considered itself to be in the implementation
phase and many of the original outcome indicators for children and
families were not appropriate given the initiative time frame. The
revised design in the funded third year proposal is therefore a
systems-level evaluation. The analytic focus is now on how the 3
systems identify, process, and manage families with co-occurrence of DV
and CM.; A random sample of case records from before and after the
introduction of the intervention will be used to document trends in
identification of co-occurring cases of DV and CM over the course of
the intervention. Stakeholder interviews conducted during site visits
in fall 2001 and later during implementation, and analysis of agency
documents, will be used to measure changes in policies and procedures.
"Network analysis" of responses on the stakeholder interviews will be
performed to measure changes in how key stakeholders work with others
within and across systems. Supervisors and workers will also be asked,
early in the implementation period and at the end of the initiative, to
respond to vignettes describing hypothetical situations involving co-
occurrence of DV and CM to see how they might respond to clients.
Evaluation: Assessment of evaluation; National Evaluation of the Rural
Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program:
This evaluation has several limitations. First, the study objectives
changed substantially from year 1 to year 3. The study is no longer
examining outcomes for individuals, precluding conclusions about
whether the implementation improved the lives of victims of domestic
violence or their children. Second, it is not clear whether the
evaluator will locate appropriate comparison data at this late stage,
and without a comparison group, the study will not be able to determine
(a) whether collaboration between systems improved (or weakened)
because of the intervention or some extraneous factors and (b) whether
collaboration resulted in increased capacity in the 3 systems to
identify the co-occurrence of DV and CM, or whether these kinds of
cases increased for reasons other than collaboration (e.g., perhaps
identification of these cases is improving all over the country).
Questions remain about the extent of data available for examining co-
occurrence of DV and CM at the 6 sites.
Evaluation: Program evaluated; National Evaluation of the Rural
Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program:
Since 1996 NIJ has funded, as part of the CLEFS program, 32 grants
totaling over $2.8 million to law enforcement agencies, correctional
agencies, and organizations representing officers (unions and
membership associations) to support the development of research,
demonstration, and evaluation projects on stress intervention methods.
The stress intervention methods developed and studied have included
stress debriefing and management techniques, peer support services,
referral networks, police chaplaincy services, stress management
training methods, spouse academies, and stress education programs.
While NIJ purports to have developed state-of-practice stress reduction
methods through these efforts, it acknowledges that very little outcome
data have been generated.
Evaluation: Evaluation components; National Evaluation of the Rural
Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program:
The evaluation began in June 2000 and is expected to be completed in
June 2004. At the time of our review, the grant amount was $649,990.
The study proposes to develop and field test a model to allow for the
systematic evaluation of selected program components. The grantee
worked with NIJ to identify the test sites and services to be
evaluated, based on grant application reviews, telephone interviews,
and site visits. Three police departments in Duluth, Minn.; North Miami
Beach, Fla.; and Knoxville, Tenn. were selected. Baseline stress
correlate data were collected during visits to the 3 sites between
January 2002 and March 2002, and baseline officer and spouse/partner
surveys were conducted during the same visits. Outcome data were to be
collected at baseline (prior to actual program implementation), midway
through the implementation, and toward the end of the evaluation. While
the original proposal did not specify exactly what stress correlate or
outcome data were to be collected, the grantee was considering looking
at rates of absenteeism and tardiness, citizen complaints, rule and
regulation violations, disciplinary actions, and premature retirements
and disability pensions, as stress correlates. These were to be
obtained from official agency records. Surveys included questions about
program impacts on physical health, emotional health, job performance,
job satisfaction, job-related stress, and family related stress. The
evaluation also included baseline health screenings. It appears the
evaluation plan has been modified to add supervisor surveys (there were
none at baseline), and to incorporate group data collection efforts
with officers, spouses, supervisors, and administrators.
Evaluation: Assessment of evaluation; National Evaluation of the Rural
Domestic Violence and Child Victimization Enforcement Grant Program:
The study has several limitations. First, the 3 study sites were chosen
on the basis of merits in their proposal to implement a stress
reduction or wellness program for officers, from 4 sites that submitted
applications. There was no attempt to make the chosen sites
representative of other sites with stress reduction programs and police
departments more generally. Second, the study will not make use of
comparison groups consisting of similar agencies that did not implement
stress reduction programs. It is unclear how effects of the
interventions in these 3 sites over time will be disentangled from the
effects of other factors that might occur concurrently. Third, the
grantee will not collect individually identified data, and thus will
only be able to analyze and compare aggregated data across time,
limiting the extent of analysis of program effects that can be
accomplished. Fourth, response rates to the first wave of officer
surveys were quite low in 2 of the 3 sites (16 percent and 27
percent).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Justice:
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs:
Office of the Assistant Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20531:
Laurie E. Ekstrand:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues General Accounting
Office:
441 G Street, N.W. Mail Stop 2440A Washington, DC 20548:
SEP 04 2003:
Dear Ms. Ekstrand:
This letter responds to the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft
report entitled, "JUSTICE OUTCOME EVALUATIONS: Design and
Implementation of Studies Require More NIJ Attention" (GAO-03-1091).
The Office of Justice Programs (OJP) and its component, the National
Institute of Justice (NIJ), share GAO's support for high-quality
evaluations that can inform criminal justice policy and practice. The
GAO's review of 15 NIJ outcome evaluations reveals much about the
complexity of real-world evaluation, the challenges to a successful
outcome evaluation, and the keys to ensuring a highly successful
evaluation.
In the draft report, GAO recommended that NIJ review its ongoing
outcome evaluation grants and develop appropriate strategies and
corrective measures to ensure that methodological design and
implementation problems are overcome. The GAO also recommended that NIJ
continue to assess its evaluation process, including considering the
feasibility of obtaining more information about the availability of
outcome data prior to developing a solicitation for research; requiring
proposals to contain more detailed design specifications; and more
carefully calibrating NIJ monitoring procedures based on the
characteristics of the grant and the knowledge area under
investigation.
The NIJ agrees with GAO's recommendations. As GAO noted, in January
2003 NIJ established an Evaluation Division to, in part, improve the
quality and utility of NIJ's evaluations. The NIJ has also started, and
will continue with, a new strategy of "evaluability assessments." These
are quick, low-cost initial assessments of criminal or juvenile justice
programs to see if the necessary conditions exist to warrant sponsoring
a full-scale outcome evaluation. Also, as part of the grantmaking
process, NIJ is developing new grant "special conditions" that will
require grantees to document all changes in the scope and components of
evaluation designs. For ongoing grants, NIJ is making several changes
in response to GAO's concerns. During Fiscal Year 2004, NIJ plans to
review its grant monitoring procedures for evaluation grants in order
to intensively monitor the larger or more complex grants. The NIJ will
also conduct periodic reviews of its evaluation research portfolio to
assess the progress of
ongoing grants, document any changes in evaluation design that may have
occurred, and reassess the expected benefits of ongoing projects.
A few factual inaccuracies in the draft report have been highlighted in
the attachment to this letter. In addition, there are two points that
GAO makes in the draft report that we believe require highlighting
here.
We strongly agree with GAO that "optimal conditions for the scientific
study of complex social problems almost never exist." (draft report p.
4) The "real-world" conditions with which evaluators must contend often
pose substantial challenges to successfully completing even the best
designed and carefully planned evaluations. As the draft report notes
regarding the six of eleven evaluations that encountered problems,
"some evaluators were unable to carry out a proposed evaluation plan
because the program to be evaluated was not implemented as planned, or
they could not obtain complete or reliable data on outcomes. In some
cases, implementation problems were beyond the evaluators' control, and
resulted from decisions made by agencies providing program services
after the study was underway." (draft report p. 3; emphasis added)
However, GAO did not take this key point into consideration
sufficiently when reaching its conclusions about the feasibility of
attaining "conclusive results." The implication is that through
rigorous design and careful monitoring, conclusive evaluation results
can always be achieved. While we wish it were so, as a practical matter
we cannot share that level of optimism.
Second, GAO's draft report reflects a strong commitment to implementing
rigorously designed evaluations. Randomized control trials can provide
strong evidence of program effects, and effectively control for
spurious factors which, if unchecked, can confound interpretation of
the evaluation results. However, randomized trials are not always
feasible, and sometimes even non-random comparison groups are
unavailable (as GAO notes on p. 40). In these cases, evaluators must
choose from among other designs that have sufficient scientific rigor
while also taking into account numerous factors such as data
availability, cost opportunities for randomization, risk to subjects,
likely effect size of the intervention, and the availability of
appropriate comparison groups. We do not believe that the GAO
sufficiently took this fact into account in its report or recognizes
that these other methods of evaluation are valid means of scientific
endeavor. In the last two decades, the evaluation field and its
theorists have broadened their thinking about what constitutes
"quality" evaluation. Increasingly, prominent leaders in the evaluation
field are urging researchers to choose methods that are appropriate to
the particular evaluation being conducted, and to take into
consideration the context of each evaluation rather than utilizing the
same set of methods and designs for all evaluations - a direct attack
on the experimental design. The GAO report, with its strong emphasis on
experimental and quasi-experimental designs, reflects an important
view, but one that does not reflect current evaluation theory and
practice.
As GAO notes in the draft report, many partner agencies have found NIJ
evaluations a rich source of information to inform and guide criminal
justice programs and policies. The NIJ will strive to demonstrate even
greater value through future outcome evaluations.
The OR appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft report. Our
additional specific comments are enclosed for GAO's consideration.
Sincerely,
Deborah J. Daniels
Assistant Attorney General:
Signed by Deborah J. Daniels:
Enclosure:
cc: Sarah V. Hart, Director National Institute of Justice:
Cynthia J. Schwimer Comptroller, OR:
LeToya A. Johnson Audit Liaison, OR:
Vickie L. Sloan Audit Liasion, DOJ:
OAAG Executive Secretariat Control Number 20031746:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Laurie E. Ekstrand (202) 512-8777:
Evi L. Rezmovic (202) 512-2580:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the above, Tom Jessor, Anthony Hill, Stacy Reinstein,
David Alexander, Michele Fejfar, Douglas Sloane, Shana Wallace, Judy
Pagano, Kenneth Bombara, Scott Farrow, Ann H. Finley, Katherine Davis,
and Leo Barbour made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] U.S. General Accounting Office, Justice Impact Evaluations: One
Byrne Evaluation Was Rigorous; All Reviewed Violence Against Women
Office Evaluations Were Problematic, GAO-02-309 (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
2002); and Drug Courts: Better DOJ Data Collection and Evaluation
Efforts Needed to Measure Impact of Drug Court Program, GAO-02-434
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2002).
[2] Social science research standards are outlined in Donald T.
Campbell and Julian Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental
Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); Thomas D Cook and
Donald T. Campbell, Quasi-experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues
for Field Settings (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990); Carol H. Weiss,
Evaluation Research: Methods for Assessing Program Effectiveness
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972); Edward Suchman,
Evaluation Research: Principles and Practice in Public Service and
Social Action Programs (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1967); and
U.S. General Accounting Office, Designing Evaluations, GAO/PEMD-10.1.4
(Washington, D.C.: May 1991).
[3] Outcome evaluations can be distinguished from process or
implementation evaluations, which are designed to assess the extent to
which a program is operating as intended.
[4] 42 U.S.C. 3721-3723. NIJ was formerly called the National Institute
of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.
[5] P.L. 107-77. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-278, at 88, 108, and 112
(2001).
[6] In 2002, the NIJ Director specified that there be an equal number
of researchers and practitioners on the review panels.
[7] A number of these grants included both process and outcome
components.
[8] Three of the 15 evaluations were funded as cooperative agreements.
[9] Statistically controlling for external factors that may be related
to program outcomes and on which the treatment and comparison groups
differ is usually not necessary when there is random assignment of
participants to treatment and comparison conditions.
[10] The grantee notes that a 1990 analysis of 85 longitudinal studies
reported an average questionnaire completion rate of 72 percent for 19
studies that had a 24-month follow-up period. This is slightly lower
than the 76 percent response rate achieved after 2 years in the Gang
Resistance Education and Training evaluation.
[11] Selection bias refers to biases introduced by selecting different
types of people into the program and comparison groups; differences in
measured outcomes for each group may be a function of preexisting
differences between the groups, rather than the intervention.
Differential attrition refers to unequal loss of participants from the
program and comparison groups during the course of a study, resulting
in groups that are no longer comparable. Both may be a threat to the
validity of conclusions.
[12] Preexisting differences between the program and comparison groups
can be viewed as a design problem. We treat this as an implementation
problem in this section because the proposed design for these
particular studies appeared to us to be reasonable at the time the
funding decision was made. Problems with the comparability of the
groups became apparent only after the studies were well underway, and
often it was too late to control for the effects of such differences on
program outcomes with statistical adjustments.
[13] The treatment programs were to be developed under the funding and
oversight of the St. Louis Mental Health Board and the Missouri
Department of Mental Health.
[14] As a result, juveniles under 14 were randomly assigned to either
the program for juveniles 14 and over, or to the comparison group.
[15] The Evaluation of a Comprehensive Service-Based Intervention
Strategy in Public Housing reported response rates for both the
intervention and comparison sites on a survey at baseline, but did not
report response rates for follow-up surveys conducted 12 and 18 months
after the intervention began.
[16] Civil Legal Assistance provides grants to nonprofit,
nongovernmental organizations that provide legal services to victims of
domestic violence or that work with victims of domestic violence who
have civil legal needs.
[17] NIJ officials told us in August 2003 that the evaluation had been
funded for a fourth year, and that the federal agencies funding this
evaluation (DOJ and the Department of Health and Human Services) were
also considering a fifth year of funding. Four years of funding allows
the evaluation to collect data covering about the first 3 years of
implementation in the sites. However, data collected from stakeholders
at the sites early in the evaluation showed that the sites expected
that it would take 3.5 to 4 years to achieve change in key individual
level outcomes. At the time of our review, there was no information on
whether individual level outcome data would be collected.
[18] Because of our interest in the effectiveness of criminal justice
programs, we limited our review of the usefulness of NIJ outcome
evaluations to evaluations of DOJ programs, or evaluations funded by
DOJ--a total of 5 evaluations. We did not examine 3 other completed NIJ
outcome evaluations focusing on programs funded by agencies other than
DOJ.
[19] Officials with DOJ's Office on Violence Against Women were not
familiar with the findings from the other completed NIJ study focusing
on violence against women, the Victim Advocacy with a Team Approach
evaluation. This evaluation was funded by a transfer of funds to NIJ
for NIJ research and evaluations in the area of violence against women.
NIJ officials stated that Office on Violence Against Women officials
were consulted in the development of the solicitation.
[20] An early warning system is a data based police management tool
designed to identify officers whose behavior is problematic, as
indicated by high rates of citizen complaints, use of force incidents,
or other evidence of behavior problems, and to provide some form of
intervention, such as counseling or training to correct that
performance. The NIJ-managed study consisted of a process and outcome
evaluation of early warning systems in 3 large urban police
departments, as well as a national survey.
[21] Through the Regional Community Policing Institute network, DOJ's
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services assists local law
enforcement agencies with meeting their community policing training
needs.
[22] GAO-02-309.
[23] Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296 sec. 237.
[24] NIJ Web site (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/about.htm).
[25] These analyses compare a program's outputs or outcomes with the
costs (resources expended) to produce them. Cost-effectiveness analysis
assesses the costs of meeting a single goal or objective, and can be
used to identify the least costly alternative to meet that goal. Cost-
benefit analysis aidms to identify all the relevant costs and benefits,
usually expressed in dollar terms.
[26] Earmarked refers to dedicating an appropriation for a particular
purpose. Legislative language may designate any portion of a lump-sum
amount for particular purposes. In fiscal year 2002, congressional
guidance for the use of these funds was provided in conference report
H.R. 107-278. The report specified that up to 10 percent of the funds
for the Bureau of Justice Assistance's Edward Byrne Discretionary Grant
Program be made available for an independent evaluation of the program
(at 88); and up to 10 percent of the funds for the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention's Discretionary Grants for National
Programs and Special Emphasis Programs (at 108) and Safe Schools
Initiative be made available for an independent evaluation of the
program (at 112).
[27] Prior to conducting the evaluability assessments, NIJ conducted an
initial review of the earmarked programs, and eliminated from
consideration those programs that were appearing in legislation for the
first time, in order to focus on those programs that were receiving
continuation funding.
[28] The solicitation deadlines were April 11, 2003, for the Bureau of
Justice Assistance programs and July 15, 2003, for the Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention programs.
[29] A new requirement of the solicitation for proposals is that
applicants report what prior funding they have received from NIJ.
[30] These standards are well defined in scientific literature. See,
for example, Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and
Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally &
Company, 1963); Carol H. Weiss, Evaluation Research: Methods for
Assessing Program Effectiveness (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1972); Edward A. Suchman, Evaluative Research: Principles and
Practice in Public Service & Social Action Programs (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1967); and GAO/PEMD-10.14.
[31] The evaluations varied in the methodologies that were used to
examine program effects. Of the 15 evaluations, 14 did not explicitly
discuss cost/benefit considerations. The evaluation of Breaking the
Cycle estimated cost/benefit ratios at each of the 3 demonstration
sites examined.
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