FBI Transformation
FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities Gao ID: GAO-04-578T March 23, 2004The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks precipitated a shift in how the FBI uses its investigative resources to prevent future terrorist incidents. The attacks led to the FBI's commitment to reorganize and transform itself. Today's testimony discusses the FBI's progress in carrying out its transformation process. Specifically, it addresses FBI's (1) progress in developing a comprehensive transformation plan; (2) efforts to update its strategic plan; (3) development of a strategic human capital plan; (4) information technology management leadership and practices; and (5) realignment of staff resources to priority areas and the impact of the realignments on the FBI's drug and other criminal investigation programs.
We commend the FBI for its progress in some areas of its transformation efforts since we last testified on this subject in June 2003. We believe that commitment from the top, a dedicated implementation team, involvement of employees in the process, and the achievement of key milestones are encouraging signs of progress. However, we continue to encourage the development of a comprehensive transformation plan that would consolidate the crosswalks between the various aspects of transformation. This could help management oversee all aspects of the transformation. The FBI's strategic plan has been completed. Overall we found the plan has important strengths as well as some areas in which improvements could be made. For example, the plan includes key elements of successful strategic plans (i.e. a comprehensive mission statement and results-oriented, longterm goals and objectives.). However, the plan is missing some elements that could have made it more informative. Officials advised us that some of these elements are available elsewhere (i.e. lists of stakeholders and performance measures). The absence of these elements makes the plan less comprehensive and useful. The FBI has also developed a strategic human capital plan that contains many of the principles that we have laid out for an effective human capital system (i.e. the need to fill identified skill gaps by using personnel flexibilities). However, the FBI has yet to hire a human capital officer to manage the implementation of this process and the performance management system for the bulk of FBI personnel remains inadequate to discern meaningful distinctions in performance. The FBI recognizes the importance of information technology (IT) as a transformation enabler, making it an explicit priority in its strategic plan and investing hundreds of millions of dollars in initiatives to expand its systems environment and thereby improve its information analysis and sharing. However, FBI's longstanding approach to managing IT is not fully consistent with the structures and practices of leading organizations. A prime example of the consequences of not employing these structures and practices is the cost and schedule shortfalls being experienced on Trilogy, the centerpiece project to modernize infrastructure and case management applications. Recent FBI proposals, plans, and initiatives indicate that it understands its management challenges and is focused on addressing them. Another key element of the FBI's transformation is the realignment of resources to better focus on the highest priorities--counterterrorism, counterintelligence and cyber investigations. The FBI resources allocated to priority areas continue to increase and now represent its single largest concentration of field agent resources--36 percent of its fiscal year 2004 field agent positions.
GAO-04-578T, FBI Transformation: FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and Address Priorities
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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary,
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:30 a.m.
Tuesday, March 23, 2004:
FBI TRANSFORMATION:
FBI Continues to Make Progress in Its Efforts to Transform and Address
Priorities:
Statement of Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director Homeland Security and Justice
Issues and Randolph C. Hite, Director, Information Technology
Architecture and Systems Issues:
GAO-04-578T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-578T, a report to Subcommittee on Commerce,
Justice, State, and the Judiciary, Committee on Appropriations
Why GAO Did This Study:
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks precipitated a shift in how
the FBI uses its investigative resources to prevent future terrorist
incidents. The attacks led to the FBI‘s commitment to reorganize and
transform itself. Today‘s testimony discusses the FBI‘s progress in
carrying out its transformation process. Specifically, it addresses
FBI‘s (1) progress in developing a comprehensive transformation plan;
(2) efforts to update its strategic plan; (3) development of a
strategic human capital plan; (4) information technology management
leadership and practices; and (5) realignment of staff resources to
priority areas and the impact of the realignments on the FBI‘s drug and
other criminal investigation programs.
What GAO Found:
We commend the FBI for its progress in some areas of its transformation
efforts since we last testified on this subject in June 2003 We believe
that commitment from the top, a dedicated implementation team,
involvement of employees in the process, and the achievement of key
milestones are encouraging signs of progress. However, we continue to
encourage the development of a comprehensive transformation plan that
would consolidate the crosswalks between the various aspects of
transformation. This could help management oversee all aspects of the
transformation.
The FBI‘s strategic plan has been completed. Overall we found the plan
has important strengths as well as some areas in which improvements
could be made. For example, the plan includes key elements of
successful strategic plans (i.e. a comprehensive mission statement and
results-oriented, long-term goals and objectives.). However, the plan
is missing some elements that could have made it more informative.
Officials advised us that some of these elements are available
elsewhere (i.e. lists of stakeholders and performance measures). The
absence of these elements makes the plan less comprehensive and useful.
The FBI has also developed a strategic human capital plan that contains
many of the principles that we have laid out for an effective human
capital system (i.e. the need to fill identified skill gaps by using
personnel flexibilities). However, the FBI has yet to hire a human
capital officer to manage the implementation of this process and the
performance management system for the bulk of FBI personnel remains
inadequate to discern meaningful distinctions in performance.
The FBI recognizes the importance of information technology (IT) as a
transformation enabler, making it an explicit priority in its strategic
plan and investing hundreds of millions of dollars in initiatives to
expand its systems environment and thereby improve its information
analysis and sharing. However, FBI‘s longstanding approach to managing
IT is not fully consistent with the structures and practices of leading
organizations. A prime example of the consequences of not employing
these structures and practices is the cost and schedule shortfalls
being experienced on Trilogy, the centerpiece project to modernize
infrastructure and case management applications. Recent FBI proposals,
plans, and initiatives indicate that it understands its management
challenges and is focused on addressing them.
Another key element of the FBI‘s transformation is the realignment of
resources to better focus on the highest priorities--counterterrorism,
counterintelligence and cyber investigations. The FBI resources
allocated to priority areas continue to increase and now represent its
single largest concentration of field agent resources”36 percent of its
fiscal year 2004 field agent positions.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-578T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Laurie Ekstrand on (202)
512-8777 or ekstrandl@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here today to address this committee regarding
GAO's work assessing the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI)
transformation efforts. As you are well aware, the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks were the most destructive and costly terrorist events
that this country has ever experienced. The event precipitated a shift
in how the FBI uses its investigative resources to prevent future
terrorist incidents and ultimately led to FBI's commitment to
reorganize and transform itself. Today's testimony follows up on our
June 2003 testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary and Related Agencies on the
FBI's transformation efforts.[Footnote 1]
It also draws on continuing work for the same sub-committee, the House
Select Committee on Intelligence and several individual requestors.
We will discuss the FBI's:
* overall progress in transformation,
* efforts to update its strategic plan,
* development of a strategic human capital plan,
* information technology management capabilities, and:
* realignment of staff resources to priority areas and the impact of
the realignments on the FBI's drug and other criminal investigation
programs.
In brief, we commend the FBI for its progress in its transformation
efforts. We believe that commitment from the top, a dedicated
implementation team, involvement of employees, and the development of
strategic and human capital plans are encouraging signs of FBI's
reorganization progress. However, we want to note some activities that
may enhance the value of future planning efforts, reiterate the
importance of developing and tracking measures of progress toward
achieving goals, discuss the history and future of IT efforts, and the
shift in resources from the traditional crime areas to the new priority
areas.
Our testimony today is based on interviews with management and program
officials at FBI headquarters during the last 2 years. We also
interviewed management personnel in FBI field offices;[Footnote 2] and
obtained input from special agents and analysts in FBI field offices
last spring.[Footnote 3] Additionally, to assess the progress that the
FBI has made in its transformation efforts, we reviewed information
from an October 2003 and March 2004 briefing that the FBI provided to
GAO on its transformation efforts and FBI's recent strategic plan and
strategic human capital plan. We compared these documents against GAO's
leading practices in the areas of organizational mergers and
transformations, strategic planning, and strategic human capital
management.
We focused on assessing the FBI's strategic plan for key elements
required by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
(GPRA).[Footnote 4] GPRA provides a set of practices for developing a
useful and informative strategic plan that can be applied to any level
of the federal government to improve the quality and informative value
of strategic plans to Congress, other key stakeholders, and the staff
charged with achieving the agency's strategic goals. To make this
assessment we used criteria we developed for assessing agency strategic
plans under GPRA.[Footnote 5] Our assessment is based on a review of
the FBI's strategic plan with limited information about the process the
FBI undertook to develop the plan. We acknowledge that the FBI may be
addressing these elements in other ways.
We reviewed FBI's strategic plan to see how it addressed six key
elements:
* mission statement,
* long-term goals and objectives,
* relationship between the long-term goals and annual performance
goals,
* approaches or strategies to achieve the goals and objectives,
* key external factors that could affect achievement of goals, and:
* use of program evaluation to establish or revise strategic goals.
Our analysis of the FBI's information technology (IT) management
capabilities is based on our prior work on the FBI's enterprise
architecture efforts and follow-up work to determine recent progress,
information from the Justice Inspector General's work on evaluating the
FBI's IT investment management process, and recent work on the
organizational placement and authority of the FBI's Chief Information
Officer (CIO). We also used our prior research of CIO management
practices of successful organizations and our evaluations of large IT
modernization efforts similar to the Trilogy program. Further, we
conducted follow up work with the FBI's program management office to
determine the cost and schedule overruns for Trilogy.
To address the effect of the FBI's resource realignments on drug and
other traditional law enforcement efforts, we analyzed FBI budgetary,
staffing, and caseload data and interviewed selected FBI, Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), and local law enforcement
officials.[Footnote 6]
We performed our audit work in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
FBI Continues to Make Progress in its Transformation Efforts but Needs
a Comprehensive Transformation Plan to Guide Its Efforts:
In our June 2003 testimony on the FBI's reorganization before the House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary
and Related Agencies, we reported that the FBI had made progress in its
efforts to transform the agency, but that some major challenges
continued[Footnote 7]. We also noted that any changes in the FBI must
be part of, and consistent with, broader, government-wide
transformation efforts that are taking place, especially those
resulting from the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security
and in connection with the intelligence community.
We also noted that to effectively meet the challenges of the post-
September 11, environment, the FBI needed to consider employing key
practices that have consistently been found at the center of successful
transformation efforts.[Footnote 8] These key practices are to:
* ensure that top leadership drives the transformation,
* establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide
the transformation,
* focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the
transformation,
* set implementation goals and a time line to build momentum and show
progress from day one,
* dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation process,
* use the performance management system to define responsibility and
ensure accountability for change,
* establish a communication strategy to create shared expectations and
report related progress,
* involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for
the transformation, and:
* build a world-class organization that continuously seeks to implement
best practices in processes and systems in areas such as information
technology, financial management, acquisition management, and human
capital.
Today, we continue to be encouraged by the progress that the FBI has
made in some areas as it continues its transformation efforts.
Specifically worthy of recognition are the commitment of Director
Mueller and senior-level leadership to the FBI's reorganization; the
FBI's communication of priorities; the implementation of core
reengineering processes to improve business practices and assist in the
bureau's transformation efforts[Footnote 9]; the dedication of an
implementation team to manage the reengineering efforts; the
development of a strategic plan and a human capital plan; the efforts
to involve employees in the strategic planning and reengineering
processes; and the FBI's efforts to realign its activities, processes,
and resources to focus on a key set of principles and priorities.
While the FBI has embedded crosswalks and timelines in their various
transformation plans that relate one plan to another, we still
encourage the development of an overall transformation plan that will
pull all of the pieces together in one document. This document can be
both a management tool to guide all of the efforts, as well as a
communication vehicle for staff to see and understand the goals of the
FBI. It is important to establish and track intermediate and long-term
transformation goals and establish a timeline to pinpoint performance
shortfalls and gaps and suggest midcourse corrections. By demonstrating
progress towards these goals, the organization builds momentum and
demonstrates that real progress is being made. We will continue to
review this issue.
FBI Has Developed a Strategic Plan with a Mission, Strategic Goals, and
Approaches That Reflect Its New Priorities:
When we last testified in June 2003, the FBI was in the process of
compiling the building blocks of a strategic plan. At that time it was
anticipated that the plan would be completed by the start of fiscal
year 2004. Although delayed by about 5 months, the FBI has since
completed its strategic plan.[Footnote 10] FBI officials indicated that
the implementation of two staff reprogrammings and delays in the
appropriation of its fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 budget, as
well as initiatives undertaken to protect the homeland during the war
in Iraq, delayed the completion of the strategic plan.
Overall we found the plan has some important strengths as well as some
areas in which improvements could be made. The strategic plan includes
key elements of successful strategic plans, including a comprehensive
mission statement; results-oriented, long-term goals and objectives;
and approaches to achieve the goals and objectives. The FBI plan
presents 10 strategic goals that appear to cover the FBI's major
functions and operations, are related to the mission, and generally
articulate the results in terms of outcomes the FBI seeks to achieve.
For example, one of the plan's strategic goals is "protect the United
States from terrorist attack;" another goal is "reduce the level of
significant violent crime." The plan also lists strategic objectives
and performance goals for each long-term strategic goal. However, the
performance goals do not appear to be outcomes against which the FBI
will measure progress; rather they appear to describe approaches or be
key efforts that FBI will undertake to achieve its long-term strategic
goals and objectives.
Importantly, the plan acknowledges that the FBI faces competing
priorities and clearly articulates its top 10 priorities, in order of
priority. The strategic plan also frequently discusses the role
partnerships with other law enforcement, intelligence, and homeland
security agencies will play in achieving the plan's goals. The plan
discusses the FBI's approach to building on its internal capacity to
accomplish its mission-critical goals by improving management of human
capital, information technology, and other investigative tools. The
plan also discusses the external factors, such as global and domestic
demographic changes and the communications revolution, which have
driven the development of its strategic goals.
Strategic Plan Could Be Improved by Discussing Other Key Elements:
Although the FBI has addressed several key elements in its strategic
plan, the plan needs more information on other elements of strategic
planning that we have identified as significant to successful
achievement of an organization's mission and goals. FBI officials
indicated that some of these elements are available in other documents
and were not included in the plan for specific reasons. As the FBI
moves forward with its new strategic planning and execution process, it
should consider addressing in its strategic plan the following key
elements:
Involving Key Stakeholders: As we have previously testified, any
changes at the FBI must be part of, and consistent with, broader
governmentwide transformation efforts that are taking place, especially
those resulting from the establishment of the Department of Homeland
Security and in connection with changes in the intelligence community.
Successful organizations we studied based their strategic planning, to
a large extent, on the interests and expectations of their
stakeholders. Federal agency stakeholders include Congress and the
administration, other federal agencies, state and local governments,
third-party service providers, interest groups, agency employees, and,
of course, the American public. Involving customers served by the
organization--such as the users of the FBI's intelligence--is important
as well. The FBI strategic plan does not describe which stakeholders or
customers, were involved or consulted during the plan's development or
the nature of their involvement. Such information would be useful to
understanding the quality of the planning process FBI has undertaken
and the extent to which it reflect the views of key stakeholders and
customers. Consultation provides an important check for an organization
that they are working toward the right goals and using reasonable
approaches to achieve them.
Relationship between Strategic and Annual Goals: Under GPRA, agencies'
long-term strategic goals are to be linked to their annual performance
plans and the day-to-day activities of their managers and staff. OMB
guidance states that a strategic plan should briefly outline (1) the
type, nature, and scope of the performance goals being included in
annual performance plans and (2) how these annual performance goals
relate to the long-term, general goals and their use in helping
determine the achievement of the general goals. Without this linkage,
it may not be possible to determine whether an agency has a clear sense
of how it will assess the progress made toward achieving its intended
results.
It is not clear from the plan how the FBI intends to measure its
progress in achieving the long-term strategic goals and objectives
because the plan's strategic objectives and performance goals are not
phrased as performance measures and the plan does not describe or make
reference to another document that contains annual performance
measures. The plan also lacks a discussion of the systems FBI will have
in place to produce reliable performance and cost data needed to set
goals, evaluate results, and improve performance. According to an FBI
official and documents the FBI provided, the FBI has developed
"performance metrics" for each of its strategic goals.
External and Internal Factors that Could Affect Goal Achievement: While
the plan clearly communicates how its forecast of external drivers
helped to shape the FBI's strategy, the plan does not discuss the
external and internal factors that might interfere with its ability to
accomplish its goals. External factors could include economic,
demographic, social, technological, or environmental factors. Internal
factors could include the culture of the agency, its management
practices, and its business processes. The identification of such
factors would allow FBI to communicate actions it has planned that
could reduce or ameliorate the potential impact of the external
factors. Furthermore, the plan could also include a discussion of the
FBI' s plans to address internal factors within its control that could
affect achievement of strategic goals. The approach the FBI plans to
take to track its success in achieving change within the agency should
be an integral part of FBI's strategy. A clear and well-supported
discussion of the external and internal factors that could affect
performance could provide a basis for proposing legislative or
budgetary changes that the FBI may need to accomplish the FBI's goals.
Role of Program Evaluation in Assessing Achievement of Goals and
Effectiveness of Strategies: Program evaluations can be a potentially
critical source of information for Congress and others in ensuring the
validity and reasonableness of goals and strategies, as well as for
identifying factors likely to affect performance. Program evaluations
typically assess the results, impact, or effects of a program or
policy, but can also assess the implementation and results of programs,
operating policies, and practices. The FBI's strategic plan does not
explicitly discuss the role evaluation played in the development of its
strategic plan or its plans for future evaluations (including scope,
key issues, and time frame), as intended by GPRA. The FBI has
redesigned its program evaluation process and updated the performance
metric for each program. This information could have been, but was not
included in the strategic plan. As discussed elsewhere in this
testimony, the FBI has a series of reengineering efforts under way that
relate to six core processes they are seeking to transform. A
discussion of how these reengineering efforts relate to and support the
achievement of the FBI's strategic goals would be a useful addition to
the FBI's strategic plan.
We believe that an organization's strategic plan is a critical
communication tool and the credibility of the plan can be enhanced by
discussing, even at a summary level, the approach the organization took
in addressing these elements.
FBI Has Involved Employees in the Strategic Planning Process and
Communicated its Priorities:
As noted earlier, employee involvement in strategic planning, and
transformation in general, is a key practice of a successful agency as
it transforms. FBI executive management seems to have recognized this.
Field office managers and field staff we spoke with last year generally
reported being afforded the opportunity to provide input. For example,
field management in the 14 field offices we visited in 2003 reported
that they had been afforded opportunities to provide input into the
FBI's strategic planning process. In addition, 68 percent of the
special agents and 24 of the 34 analysts who completed our
questionnaire in 2003 reported that they had been afforded the
opportunity to provide input to FBI management regarding FBI
strategies, goals, and priorities by, among others, participating in
focus groups or meetings and assisting in the development of the field
offices' annual reports. FBI managers in the field offices we visited
and 87 percent of the special agents and 31 of the 34 analysts who
completed our questionnaire indicated that FBI management had kept them
informed of the FBI's progress in revising its strategic plan to
reflect changed priorities.
FBI management also seems to have been effective in communicating the
agency's top three priorities (i.e., counterterrorism,
counterintelligence, and cyber crime investigations) to the staff. In
addition to the awareness of management staff in FBI headquarters and
field offices, nearly all of the special agents and all of the analysts
who answered our questionnaire indicated that FBI executive management
(i.e., Director Mueller and Deputy Director Gebhardt) had communicated
the FBI's priorities to their field offices. Management and most of the
agents we interviewed in the field were aware of the FBI's top three
priorities.[Footnote 11] Further, over 90 percent of special agents and
28 of the 34 analysts who completed our questionnaire generally or
strongly agreed that their field office had made progress in realigning
its goals to be consistent with the FBI's transformation efforts and
new priorities.
FBI Has Developed a Strategic Human Capital Plan:
In prior testimony, we highlighted the importance of the development of
a strategic human capital plan to the FBI's transformation efforts,
noting that strategic human capital management is the centerpiece of
any management initiative, including any agency transformation effort.
We noted that a strategic human capital plan should flow from the
strategic plan and guide an agency to align its workforce needs, goals,
and objectives with its mission-critical functions. We also noted that
human capital planning should include both integrating human capital
approaches in the development of the organizational plans and aligning
the human capital programs with the program goals. In a September 2003
letter to the FBI director, we specifically recommended that the FBI:
(1) hire a human capital officer to guide the development of a
strategic human capital plan and the implementation of long-term
strategic human capital initiatives and (2) replace its current pass/
fail performance management system with one that makes meaningful
distinctions in employee performance.
Although the FBI has not yet hired a human capital officer, it has
developed a strategic human capital plan. This plan contains many of
the principles that we have laid out for an effective human capital
system.[Footnote 12] For example, it highlights the need for the FBI to
fill identified skill gaps, in such areas as language specialists and
intelligence analysts, by using various personnel flexibilities
including recruiting and retention bonuses.[Footnote 13] Concerning the
hiring of a human capital officer, the FBI has efforts under way to
recruit and hire a qualified candidate.
The FBI said that it recognizes the need to review and revise its
performance management system to be in line with its strategic plan,
including desired outcomes, core values, critical individual
competencies, and agency transformation objectives. It also recognizes
that it needs to ensure that unit and individual performance are linked
to organizational goals. A key initiative that has been undertaken by
the FBI in this regard is the planning of a system for the Senior
Executive Service that is based on, and distinguishes, performance. We
have not reviewed the Senior Executive performance management system,
but it should include expectations to lead and facilitate change and to
collaborate both within and across organizational boundaries are
critical elements as agencies transform themselves.[Footnote 14] As
yet, the performance management system for the bulk of FBI personnel
remains inadequate to identify meaningful distinctions in performance.
The FBI's human capital plan indicates that the FBI is moving in the
direction of addressing this need, and we are encouraged by this.
Clearly, the development of a strategic human capital plan is a
positive step in this direction. However, the FBI, like other
organizations, will face challenges as it implements its human capital
plan. As we have noted before, when implementing new human capital
authorities, how it is done, when it is done, and the basis on which it
is done can make all the difference in whether such efforts are
successful.
Effective Information Technology Management Is Critical to the FBI's
Ability to Successfully Transform:
Information technology can be a valuable tool in helping organizations
transform and better achieve mission goals and objectives. Our research
of leading private and public sector organizations, as well as our past
work at federal departments and agencies, shows that successful
organizations' executives have embraced the central role of IT as an
enabler for enterprise-wide transformation.[Footnote 15] As such they
adopt a corporate, or agencywide, approach to managing IT under the
leadership and control of a senior executive--commonly called a chief
information officer (CIO)--who operates as a full partner with the
organizational leadership team in charting the strategic direction and
making informed IT investment decisions.
In addition to adopting centralized leadership, these leading
organizations also develop and implement institutional or agencywide IT
management controls aimed at leveraging the vast potential of
technology in achieving mission outcomes. These include using a systems
modernization blueprint, commonly referred to as an enterprise
architecture,[Footnote 16] to guide and constrain system investments
and using a portfolio-based approach to IT investment decision making.
We have also observed that without these controls, organizations
increase the risk that system modernization projects (1) will
experience cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls; (2) will not
reduce system redundancy and overlap; and (3) will not increase
interoperability and effective information sharing.
FBI currently relies extensively on the use of IT to execute its
mission responsibilities, and this reliance is expected to grow. For
example, it develops and maintains computerized systems, such as the
Combined DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) Index System to support forensic
examinations, the Digital Collection System to electronically collect
information on known and suspected terrorists and criminals, and the
National Crime Information Center and the Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System to identify criminals. It is also in
the midst of a number of initiatives aimed at (1) extending data
storage and retrieval systems to improve information sharing across
organizational components and (2) expanding its IT infrastructure to
support new software applications. According to FBI estimates, the
bureau manages hundreds of systems and associated networks and
databases at an average annual cost of about $800 million. In addition,
the bureau plans to invest about $255 million and $286 million in
fiscal years 2004 and 2005, respectively, in IT services and systems,
such as the Trilogy project. Trilogy is the bureau's centerpiece
project to (1) replace its system infrastructure (e.g., wide area
network) and (2) consolidate and modernize key investigative case
management applications. The goals of Trilogy include speeding the
transmission of data, linking multiple databases for quick searching,
and improving operational efficiency by replacing paper with electronic
files.
The FBI Director recognizes the importance of IT to transformation, and
as such has made it one of the bureau's top 10 priorities.[Footnote 17]
Consistent with this, the FBI's strategic plan contains explicit IT-
related strategic goals, objectives, and initiatives (near-term and
long-term) to support the collection, analysis, processing, and
dissemination of information. Further, the FBI's newly appointed CIO
understands the bureau's longstanding IT management challenges and is
in the process of defining plans and proposals to effectively execute
the FBI's strategic IT initiatives. Nevertheless, the bureau's
longstanding approach to managing IT is not fully consistent with
leading practices, as has been previously reported by us and others.
The effect of this, for example, can be seen in the cost and schedule
shortfalls being experienced on Trilogy.
FBI Has Not Had Sustained IT Management Leadership with Bureauwide
Authority:
Our research of private and public sector organizations that
effectively manage IT shows that they have adopted an agencywide
approach to managing IT under the sustained leadership of a CIO or
comparable senior executive who has the responsibility and the
authority for managing IT across the agency.[Footnote 18] According to
the research, these executives function as members of the leadership
team and are instrumental in developing a shared vision for the role of
IT in achieving major improvements in business processes and operations
to effectively optimize mission performance. In this capacity, leading
organizations also provide these individuals with the authority they
need to carry out their diverse responsibilities by providing budget
management control and oversight of IT programs and initiatives.
Over the last several years, the FBI has not sustained IT management
leadership. Specifically, the bureau's key leadership and management
positions, including the CIO, have experienced frequent turnover. For
instance, the CIO has changed five times in the past 24 months. The
current CIO, who is also the CIO at the Department of Justice's
Executive Office of the U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA), is temporarily detailed
to the FBI for 6 months and is serving in an acting capacity while also
retaining selected duties at EOUSA . In addition, the IT official
responsible for developing the bureau's enterprise architecture, the
chief architect, has changed five times in the past 16 months. As a
result, development and implementation of key management controls, such
as enterprise architecture, have not benefited from sustained
management attention and leadership and thus have lagged, as described
in sections below.
In addition, the FBI has not provided its CIO with bureauwide IT
management authority and responsibility. Rather, the authority and
responsibility for managing IT is diffused across and vested in the
bureau's divisions. As our research and work at other agencies has
shown, managing IT in this manner results in disparate, stove-piped
environments that are unnecessarily expensive to operate and maintain.
In the FBI's case, it resulted, as reported by Justice's Inspector
General in December 2002,[Footnote 19] in 234 nonintegrated
applications, residing on 187 different servers, each of which had its
own unique databases, unable to share information with other
applications or with other government agencies. According to the acting
CIO, the FBI is considering merging bureauwide authority and
responsibility for IT in the CIO's office with the goal of having this
in place in time to formulate the bureau's fiscal year 2006 budget
request. In our view, this proposal, if properly defined and
implemented, is a good step toward implementing the practices of
leading organizations. However, until it is implemented, we remain
concerned that the bureau will not be positioned to effectively
leverage IT as an bureauwide resource.
FBI Does Not Have an Enterprise Architecture but Is Taking Steps to
Develop One:
As discussed in our framework for assessing and improving enterprise
architecture management,[Footnote 20] an architecture is an essential
tool for effectively and efficiently engineering business operations
(e.g., processes, work locations, and information needs and flows) and
defining, implementing, and evolving IT systems in a way that best
supports these operations. It provides systematically derived and
captured structural descriptions--in useful models, diagrams, tables,
and narrative--of how a given entity operates today and how it plans to
operate in the future, and it includes a road map for transitioning
from today to tomorrow. Managed properly, an enterprise architecture
can clarify and help optimize the interdependencies and
interrelationships among a given entity's business operations and the
underlying systems and technical infrastructure that support these
operations; it can also help share information among units within an
organization and between the organization and external partners. Our
experience with federal agencies has shown that attempting to modernize
systems without having an enterprise architecture often results in
systems that are duplicative, not well integrated, unnecessarily costly
to maintain, and limited in terms of optimizing mission
performance.[Footnote 21]
We reported in September 2003, that the FBI did not have an enterprise
architecture to guide and constrain its ongoing and planned IT
investments.[Footnote 22] We also reported that the necessary
management structures and processes--the management foundation, if you
will--to develop, maintain, or implement an architecture were not in
place. At the time, the bureau was beginning to build this foundation.
For instance, the bureau had designated a chief architect, established
an architecture governance board as its steering committee, and chosen
a framework to guide its architecture development. However, it had yet
to complete critical activities such as ensuring that business partners
are represented on the architecture governance board, establishing a
formal program office, adopting an architecture development
methodology, and defining plans for developing its architecture.
Further, it had not addressed other important activities, including
developing written and approved architecture policy and integrating
architectural alignment, into its IT investment management process. FBI
officials told us then that the architecture was not a top priority and
it had not received adequate resources and management attention.
Consequently, we recommended, among other things, that the FBI director
immediately designate development, maintenance, and implementation of
an enterprise architecture as a bureau priority and manage it as such.
Since our report, the FBI has made architecture development an explicit
imperative in its strategic plan, and it has made progress toward
establishing an effective architecture program. For instance, the FBI
director issued a requirement that all divisions identify a point of
contact that can authoritatively represent their division in the
development of the architecture. In addition, a project management plan
has been drafted that identifies roles and responsibilities and
delineates plans and a set of actions to develop the architecture. The
FBI is also in the process of hiring a contractor to help develop the
architecture. Current plans call for an initial version of the
architecture in June 2004. However, until the enterprise architecture
is developed, the FBI will continue to manage IT without a bureauwide,
authoritative frame of reference to guide and constrain its continuing
and substantial IT investments, putting at risk its ability to
implement modernized systems in a way that minimizes overlap and
duplication and maximizes integration and mission support.
FBI Is Working to Establish Control over IT Resources and Investments:
Federal IT management law provides an important framework for effective
investment management. It requires federal agencies to focus more on
the results they have achieved through IT investments, while
concurrently improving their acquisition processes. It also introduces
more rigor and structure into how agencies are to select and manage IT
projects. In May 2000, GAO issued[Footnote 23] a framework that
encompasses IT investment management best practices based on our
research at successful private and public sector organizations. This
framework identifies processes that are critical for successful IT
investment, such as tracking IT assets, identifying business needs for
projects, selecting among competing project proposals using explicit
investment criteria, and overseeing projects to ensure that commitments
are met.
Using GAO's framework, the Inspector General evaluated the FBI's IT
investment management process in 2002, including a case study of
Trilogy, and concluded that the process at that time was immature and
had hindered the bureau's ability to effectively manage IT.[Footnote
24] Specifically, the Inspector General reported that the bureau lacked
a basic investment management foundation. For instance, the bureau did
not have fully functioning investment boards that were engaged in all
phases of investment management. In addition, the bureau had not yet
developed an IT asset inventory, the first step in tracking and
controlling investments and assets. In a January 2004 follow-on
report,[Footnote 25] the Inspector General credited the bureau with
developing a plan to implement the recommendations and assigning
responsibility to the Project Management Office to execute it, but
noted that the office had not been granted authority to carry out this
task. Project Management Office officials stated that as of February
24, 2004, they had not yet been provided such authority. According to
the acting CIO, the FBI is currently in the process of hiring a
contractor to assist with implementing all IT investment management
processes bureauwide, including addressing remaining Inspector General
recommendations. Until these steps are completed and mature investment
processes are in place, the FBI will remain challenged in its ability
to effectively minimize risks and maximize the returns of investments,
including ensuring projects do not experience cost, schedule, and
performance shortfalls.
Until Effective IT Leadership and Management Controls are Implemented,
Projects Remain at Risk:
As discussed in the previous sections, the FBI has efforts proposed,
planned and under way that, once implemented, are intended to establish
an IT leadership and management controls framework that is consistent
with those used by leading organizations. Until this is accomplished,
however, the bureau will largely be relying on the same management
structures and practices that it used in the past and that produced its
current IT environment and associated challenges. As previously stated,
these practices increase the risk that system modernization projects
will not deliver promised capabilities on time and within budget. A
prime example is Trilogy, the FBI's ongoing effort to, among other
things, modernize its systems infrastructure and investigate case
management applications. It consists of three components:
* Transportation Network Component, which is communications network
infrastructure (e.g., local area networks and wide area networks,
authorization security, and encryption of data transmissions and
storage),
* Information Presentation Component, which is primarily desktop
hardware and software (e.g., scanners, printers, electronic mail, web-
browser), and:
* User Applications Component, which includes the investigative case
management applications [Footnote 26]) that are being consolidated and
modernized. This component is commonly referred to as the Virtual Case
File, which when completed, is to allow agents to have multi-media
capability that will enable them to among other things scan documents
and photos into electronic case files and share the files with other
agents electronically.
To date, the FBI's management of Trilogy has resulted in multiple cost
overruns and schedule delays. The table below details the cost and
schedule shortfalls for each of the three components that comprise
Trilogy. In summary, the FBI established its original project
commitments in November 2000 but revised them in January 2002 after
receiving additional funding ($78 million) to accelerate the project's
completion. About this time, the FBI also revised the Trilogy design to
introduce more functionality and capability than original planned.
Based on the January 2002 commitments, the first two components of
Trilogy were to be completed in July 2002, and the third was to be
completed in December 2003. However, the project's components have
collectively experienced cost overruns and schedule delays totaling
about $120 million and at least 21 months, respectively.
Table 1: Trilogy Cost and Schedule Shortfalls By Component:
Trilogy Component: Transportation Network Component;
November 2000 commitments (date/funding in millions): 5/04[A];
January 2002 commitments (date/funding in millions): 7/02[A];
Variance between November 2000 and January 2002 commitments (schedule
in months/ funding in millions): (22 months)[B];
March 2004 commitments (date/funding in millions): Completed 3/03;
Variance between January 2002 and March 2004 commitments (schedule
in months/funding in millions): 8 months.
Trilogy Component: Transportation Network Component;
November 2000 commitments (date/funding in millions): $238.6[A];
January 2002 commitments (date/funding in millions): $288.1[A];
Variance between November 2000 and January 2002 commitments (schedule
in months/ funding in millions): $49.5;
March 2004 commitments (date/funding in millions): $0.0;
Variance between January 2002 and March 2004 commitments (schedule
in months/funding in millions): [Empty].
Trilogy Component: Information Presentation Component;
November 2000 commitments (date/funding in millions): 5/04[A];
January 2002 commitments (date/funding in millions): 7/02[A];
Variance between November 2000 and January 2002 commitments (schedule
in months/ funding in millions): (22 months)[B];
March 2004 commitments (date/funding in millions): 4/04;
Variance between January 2002 and March 2004 commitments (schedule
in months/funding in millions): 21 months.
Trilogy Component: Information Presentation Component;
November 2000 commitments (date/funding in millions): $238.6[A];
January 2002 commitments (date/funding in millions): $288.1[A];
Variance between November 2000 and January 2002 commitments (schedule
in months/ funding in millions): $49.5;
March 2004 commitments (date/funding in millions): $339.8;
Variance between January 2002 and March 2004 commitments (schedule
in months/funding in millions): $51.7.
Trilogy Component; User Applications Component;
November 2000 commitments (date/funding in millions): 6/04;
January 2002 commitments (date/funding in millions): 12/03;
Variance between November 2000 and January 2002 commitments (schedule
in months/ funding in millions): (6 months)[B];
March 2004 commitments (date/funding in millions): 6/04[C];
Variance between January 2002 and March 2004 commitments (schedule
in months/funding in millions): 6 months.
Trilogy Component; User Applications Component;
November 2000 commitments (date/funding in millions): $119.2;
January 2002 commitments (date/funding in millions): $139.7;
Variance between November 2000 and January 2002 commitments (schedule
in months/ funding in millions): $20.5;
March 2004 commitments (date/funding in millions): $170.0[C];
Variance between January 2002 and March 2004 commitments (schedule
in months/funding in millions): $30.3.
Trilogy Component; Project Management and other funding;
November 2000 commitments (date/funding in millions): $22.0;
January 2002 commitments (date/funding in millions): $30.0;
Variance between November 2000 and January 2002 commitments (schedule
in months/ funding in millions): $8.0;
March 2004 commitments (date/funding in millions): $71.3;
Variance between January 2002 and March 2004 commitments (schedule
in months/funding in millions): $41.3.
Trilogy Component: Total funding;
November 2000 commitments (date/ funding in millions): $379.8;
January 2002 commitments (date/funding in millions): $457.8;
Variance between November 2000 and January 2002 commitments (schedule
in months/ funding in millions): $78.0;
March 2004 commitments (date/funding in millions): $581.1;
Variance between January 2002 and March 2004 commitments (schedule
in months/funding in millions): $123.3.
Source: GAO based on FBI data.
[A] Commitment date and funding amount is for both Transportation
Network Component and Information Presentation Component.
[B] Months the schedule commitment was accelerated.
[C] According to a key Trilogy project official, new schedule and cost
commitments are being developed for the User Applications Component..
[End of table]
These Trilogy shortfalls in meeting cost and schedule commitments can
be in part attributed to the absence of the kind of IT management
controls discussed earlier. Specifically, in its study of the FBI's
investment management processes which included a case study of Trilogy,
the Inspector General cited the lack of an enterprise architecture and
mature IT investment management processes as the cause for missed
Trilogy milestones and uncertainties associated with the remaining
portions of the project. In our view, a major challenge for FBI going
forward will be to effectively manage the risks associated with
developing and acquiring Trilogy and other system modernization
priorities discussed in its strategic plan, while the bureau is
completing and implementing its enterprise architecture and other IT-
related controls and is adopting a more centralized approach to IT
management leadership.
FBI Continues to Realign Staff Resources to Address Counterterrorism-
Related Priorities:
As we pointed out in our June 2003 testimony and our follow-up letter
to the FBI in September 2003, a key element of the FBI's reorganization
and successful transformation is the realignment of resources to better
ensure focus on the highest priorities. Since September 11, the FBI has
permanently realigned a substantial number of its field agents from
traditional criminal investigative programs to work on counterterrorism
and counterintelligence investigations. Additionally, the bureau has
had a continuing need to temporarily redirect special agent and staff
resources from other criminal investigative programs to address higher-
priority needs. Thus, staff continue to be redirected from other
programs such as drug, white collar, and violent crime to address the
counterterrorism-related workload demands. The result of this
redirection is fewer investigations in these traditional crime areas.
We want to make clear that we in no way intend to fault the FBI for the
reassignment of agents from drug enforcement, violent crime, and white
collar crime to higher-priority areas. Indeed, these moves are directly
in line with the agency's priorities and in keeping with the paramount
need to prevent terrorism.[Footnote 27] In 2002, the FBI Director
announced that in keeping with its new priorities, the agency would
move over 500 field agent positions from its drug, violent crime, and
white collar crime programs to counterterrorism. The FBI has
transferred even more agent positions than it originally announced and
has augmented those agents with short-term reassignment of additional
field agents from drug and other law enforcement areas to work on
counterterrorism.[Footnote 28] As figure 1 shows, about 25 percent of
the FBI's field agent positions were allocated to counterterrorism,
counterintelligence, and cyber crime programs in prior to the FBI's
change in priorities. Since that time, as a result of the staff
reprogrammings[Footnote 29] and funding for additional special agent
positions received through various appropriations, the FBI staffing
levels allocated to the counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and
cyber program areas have increased to about 36 percent and now
represent the single largest concentration of FBI resources and the
biggest decrease is in organized crime and drugs.
Figure 1: Increase in Allocation of FBI Field Agent Positions to
Priority Areas[Footnote 30]
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The FBI's staff reprogramming plans, carried out since September 11,
have now permanently shifted 674 field agent positions[Footnote 31]
from the drug, white collar crime, and violent crime program areas to
counterterrorism and counterintelligence. In addition, the FBI
established the Cyber program, which consolidated existing cyber
resources.
Despite the reprogramming of agent positions in fiscal year 2003 and
the additional agent positions received through various supplemental
appropriations since September 11, agents from other program areas
continue to be temporarily redirected to work on leads in the priority
areas, including counterterrorism-related leads.[Footnote 32] This
demonstrates a commitment on the part of the FBI to staff priority
areas.
As figure 2 shows, the average number of field agent workyears charged
to investigating counterterrorism-related matters has continually
outpaced the number of agent positions allocated to field offices for
counterterrorism since September 11.[Footnote 33] The FBI's current
policy is that no counterterrorism leads will go unaddressed even if
addressing them requires a diversion of resources from other criminal
investigative programs such as the drug, violent, and white collar
crime.
Figure 2: Comparative Analyses of FBI Field Agent Non-Supervisory
Positions Allocated and Agent Workyears Charged to Counterterrorism
Matters:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Note: The Time Utilization and Recordkeeping (TURK) system is used by
the FBI to record the proportion of time spent by field agents on
various types of investigative matters such as organized crime, white-
collar crime, and counterterrorism. The FBI uses the TURK system to
track and project the use of field resources. Data derived from the
TURK system are only as valid as the information reported by FBI field
agents.
As we previously reported, as the FBI gains more experience and
continues assessing risk in a post-September 11 environment, it should
gain more expertise in deciding which matters warrant additional
investigation or investment of investigative resources. However, until
the FBI develops a mechanism to systematically analyze the nature of
leads and their output, the FBI will have to continue its substantial
investment of resources on counterterrorism-related matters to err on
the side of safety. We are not intending to imply that, even with more
information from past experience, that all leads should not be
investigated, but more analytical information about leads could help
prioritize them.
Neither the FBI nor we were in a position to determine the right amount
of staff resources needed to address the priority areas. However, the
body of information that might help to make these determinations is
growing. Since the September 11 attacks, the FBI has updated its
counterterrorism threat assessment and has gained additional experience
in staffing priority work. This development, along with an analysis of
the nature of all leads (those that turn out to be significant and
those that do not) and the output from them, could put the bureau in a
better position to assess the actual levels of staff resources that the
agency need in counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber
programs. Of course, any new terrorist incidents would again, upset the
balance and require additional staff in the priority areas.
An FBI counterterrorism manager we spoke with during a recent field
office visit said that to develop a system to determine which terrorist
leads to pursue and which ones to not pursue would be a complex task.
He noted that in the past there would have been some citizen contacts
that the FBI may not have generally pursued, but said that now any
lead, regardless of its nature, is followed up. He observed that
following up on some of these leads have resulted in the arrests and
convictions of terrorists. For example, the FBI manager recounted a
telephone lead from a tour boat operator who reported concerns about a
passenger who was taking photographs of bridges and asking unusual
questions about infrastructure. That lead started an investigation that
led to the arrest of, and criminal charges against, the suspect, who
was alleged to be plotting a terrorist attack.
According to FBI officials, information from leads is collected in a
database that can be searched in a number of ways to help in
investigations. To the extent that more systematic and sophisticated
analysis routines can be developed and applied to these data (or any
expansions of this data set) the FBI may be able to develop richer
information about the relative risk of leads. This information could
help prioritize work and manage scarce resources. While we agree with
the FBI counterterrorism manager we cited above who labeled this a
complex task, the potential value of the output, given that resources
are always limited, seems worth the investment.
Counterterrorism Matters Have Continued to Increase:
The level of effort in counterterrorism is further reflected in the
number of counterterrorism matters that have been opened following
September 11. As figure 3 shows, the number of newly opened
counterterrorism matters has remained significantly above the pre-
September 11 levels, peaking in the second quarter of fiscal year 2003
and dropping somewhat in the most recent quarters.
Figure 3: Number of Counterterrorism Matters Newly Opened, Fiscal Year
2001 through Fiscal Year 2003:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Reallocation of FBI Resources Has Affected the FBI's Drug Enforcement
and Other Traditional Law Enforcement Efforts:
Use of field agent staff resources in other traditional criminal
investigative programs (such as drug enforcement, violent crime, and
white collar crime) has continuously dropped below allocated levels as
agents from these programs have been temporarily reassigned to work on
counterterrorism-related matters. As would be expected, the number of
newly opened drug, violent crime, and white collar crime cases has
fallen in relation to the decline in the number of field agent
positions allocated or assigned to work on these programs.
The change in priorities and the accompanying shift in investigative
resources have affected the FBI's drug program the most. Nearly half of
the FBI field agent drug positions have been permanently reallocated to
priority program areas. Since September 11, about 40 percent of the
positions allocated to FBI field offices' drug program have been
reallocated to counterterrorism and counterintelligence priority
areas. As figure 4 shows, just prior to September 11, about two-thirds
(or 890) of the 1,378 special agent positions allocated to FBI field
offices for drug program matters were direct-funded.[Footnote 34] The
remaining one-third (or 488) of the special agent positions was funded
by the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force program
(OCDETF). As of the first quarter of fiscal year 2004, the number of
direct-funded positions allocated to FBI field offices for the drug
program had decreased over 60 percent, going from 890 to 337. OCDETF-
funded agent positions, which have remained constant, now account for
about 60 percent of the FBI field offices' drug program staff
resources.
Figure 4: Number of Special Agent Positions Allocated to FBI Field
Offices for Drug Work since September 11:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
While this reduction represents a substantial decline in the number of
field agent positions allocated to drug work, in fact, the reduction in
drug enforcement workyears was actually larger than these figures
reflect. Specifically, as needs arose for additional agents to work
counterterrorism leads, field agents assigned to drug program squads
were temporarily reassigned to the priority work. As figure 5 shows, at
the extreme, during the first quarter of fiscal year 2002 (just after
the events of September 11), while 1,378 special agent positions were
allocated to drug work, only about half of these staff resources worked
in the FBI drug program. In mid-fiscal year 2003, the allocated number
of drug agent positions and the average number of field agent workyears
charged to drug matters started to converge toward the new targeted
levels. Since that time, however, the FBI has had to redirect
additional field agents allocated to its drug program to
counterterrorism and other priority areas. As of the second quarter of
fiscal year 2004, about a quarter (225 of 825) of the agents assigned
to the FBI's drug program were actually working in higher-priority
areas. The reduction in drug enforcement resources has reduced both the
number of drug squads in FBI field offices as well as the number of FBI
agents supporting the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)
program initiatives, according to FBI officials.[Footnote 35]
Figure 5: Comparative Analyses of FBI Field Agent Non-Supervisory
Positions Allocated and Agent Workyears Charged to Investigating Drug
Program Matters:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The significant reduction in agent strength in the drug enforcement
area is likely to be an important factor in the smaller number of FBI
drug matters opened in fiscal year 2003 and the first quarter of fiscal
year 2004. As figure 6 shows, the number of newly opened drug matters
went from 2420 in fiscal year 1998 to 950 in fiscal year 2002 and to
587 in fiscal year 2003. The openings for the first quarter of fiscal
year 2004 indicate a rate for the entire year at about fiscal year 2003
levels.
Figure 6: Number of FBI Drug Matters Newly Opened, Fiscal Year 1998
through First Quarter, Fiscal Year 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[A] This figure includes only the first quarter of fiscal year 2004.
[End of figure]
Similarly, as figures 7 and 8 show, the average number of field agent
workyears charged to violent crime and white collar crime matters also
declined below the number of allocated agent workyears as these agents
too have been temporarily redirected to counterterrorism-related
matters.
Figure 7: Comparative Analysis of FBI Field Agent Non-Supervisory
Positions Allocated and Agent Workyears Charged to Investigating
Violent Crime Matters:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 8: Comparative Analysis of FBI Field Non-Supervisory Positions
Allocated and Agent Workyears Charged to Investigating White-Collar
Crime Matters:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As figures 9 and 10 show, the number of newly opened violent crime and
white collar crime matters has declined since September 11.
Figure 9: Number of FBI Violent Crime Matters Newly Opened, Fiscal
Years 1998 through First Quarter Fiscal Year 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 10: Number of FBI White Collar Crime Matters Newly Opened,
Fiscal Years 1998 through First Quarter Fiscal Year 2004:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Conclusions:
The FBI's transformation effort is driven in part by challenges facing
the federal government as a whole to modernize business processes,
information technology, and human capital management. It is also driven
by the need to make organizational changes to meet changes in its
priorities in the post-September 11 environment. This effort will
require a structure for guiding and continuously evaluating incremental
progress of the FBI's transformation. It must also be carried out as
part of, and consistent with, broader government-wide transformation
efforts that are taking place, especially those resulting from the
establishment of DHS and in connection with the intelligence community.
The FBI has made substantial progress, as evidenced by the development
of both a new strategic plan and a strategic human capital plan, as
well as its realignment of staff to better address the new priorities.
Although the new strategic plan and strategic human capital plans
include cross walks to each other, we still believe that an overall
transformation plan is more valuable in managing the transformation
process. The FBI is also making progress in strengthening its
management of IT, including establishing institutional IT management
controls and considering changes to the scope of CIO's authority over
IT spending.
Impacts of the FBI shift in field agent resources on crime programs
including the FBI's drug, white collar, and violent crime programs
should be monitored. Our ongoing work, which we expect to complete
later this year, will provide information on whether other federal and
state resources are replacing lost FBI resources in the traditional
crime areas and on whether reductions in FBI drug program field agents
have had an impact on the price, purity, availability, and use of
illegal drugs.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my
prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions you and
the Subcommittee members may have.
GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
For further information about this statement, please contact Laurie E.
Ekstrand, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on (202) 512-
8777 or at ekstrandl@gao.gov or Charles Michael Johnson, Assistant
Director, Homeland Security and Justice, on (202) 512-7331 or at
johnsoncm@gao.gov. For further information on governmentwide
Information Technology issues, please contact Randolph C. Hite,
Director, Information Technology Architecture and Systems Issues, on
(202) 512-6256 or at hiter@gao.gov. For further information on
governmentwide human capital or transformation issues, please contact
J. Christopher Mihm, Director, Strategic Issues, on (202) 512-6806 or
at mihmj@gao.gov.
Major contributors to this testimony included William Bates, R.
Rochelle Burns, Katherine Chu-Hickman, Orlando Copeland, Elizabeth
Curda, Benjamin Jordan, Deborah Knorr, Jessica Lundberg, Paula Moore,
Gary Mountjoy, Lisa Shibata, Sarah E. Veale, and Angela Watson.
[End of section]
Appendix I: FBI Reengineering Projects Completed and Underway:
Core processes: Strategic planning and execution (6);
Reengineering projects: HQ organizational structure;
Reengineering projects: Strategic planning process;
Reengineering projects: Communication strategy;
Reengineering projects: Executive secretariat;
Reengineering projects: Project management;
Reengineering projects: Inspection process.
Core processes: Capital (human and equipment) (17);
Reengineering projects: Career development/succession planning;
Reengineering projects: Executive development and selection program
(EDSP);
Reengineering projects: File/clerical support;
Reengineering projects: Office of professional responsibility;
Reengineering projects: Training;
Reengineering projects: Hiring and recruiting;
Reengineering projects: Fitness test/height-weight standards;
Reengineering projects: Preparation for legal attaché assignment;
Reengineering projects: Administrative officer position upgrade;
Reengineering projects: Analyst professionalism;
Reengineering projects: Culture/values;
Reengineering projects: Time utililization record keeping system
(TURK);
Reengineering projects: Asset Management;
Reengineering projects: Financial audit streamlining;
Reengineering projects: Management of supplies purchase and
distribution;
Reengineering projects: Field office reorganization;
Reengineering projects: Resident agency consolidation.
Core processes: Information management (4);
Reengineering projects: Trilogy;
Reengineering projects: Top secret/sensitive compartment information
(TS/SCI) local area network;
Reengineering projects: Records management division reorganization;
Reengineering projects: (6): Rapid start/ICON.
Core processes: Investigative programs (6);
Reengineering projects: Counterterrorism strategy;
Reengineering projects: Counterintelligence strategy;
Reengineering projects: Cyber strategy;
Reengineering projects: Criminal investigation division strategy;
Reengineering projects: Manual of Investigative Operations and
Guidelines (MIOG)/Manual of Administrative Operations and Procedures
(MAOP) Project;
Reengineering projects: Foreign intelligence surveillance act.
Core processes: Intelligence (2);
Reengineering projects: Review criminal informant program (CIP) and
asset program issues;
Reengineering projects: Analytical tools for intelligence analysts.
Core processes: Security Management (5);
Reengineering projects: Continuity of operations planning (COOP);
Reengineering projects: FBI headquarters space strategy;
Reengineering projects: Vital records;
Reengineering projects: Security manual pilot project;
Reengineering projects: Repository for Office of Professional Review
(OPR) appeals/security violations.
Source: FBI:
[End of table]
FOOTNOTES
[1] See U.S. General Accounting Office, FBI Reorganization: Progress
Made in Efforts, but Major Challenges Continue, GAO-03-759T
(Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003).
[2] We judgmentally selected field offices with the largest number of
special agent positions to be reallocated either away from drug
enforcement or to the counterterrorism program areas based on the FBI's
May 2002 reallocation plans. As a result, we visited the FBI's Atlanta,
Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, Newark, New York
City, Phoenix, Sacramento, San Antonio, San Francisco, and Washington
field offices in 2003 and the Dallas, Miami, and Washington field
offices in 2004.
[3] We obtained input from 176 special agents and 34 analysts. These
FBI investigative resources were not randomly selected from all agents
and analysts in the 14 offices we visited. In addition, we did not
specifically choose the agents who completed our questionnaire. FBI
field office managers selected agents and analysts to participate in
our inquiry. Consequently, we consider the questionnaire and interview
results to be indicators of the FBI's transformation efforts but they
cannot be generalized to all agents and analysts in these offices or to
the FBI nationwide.
[4] Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993).
[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Agencies' Strategic Plans Under
GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate Congressional Review, GAO/GGD-10.1.16
(Washington, D.C.: May 1, 1997). U.S. General Accounting Office,
Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance
and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996).
[6] We interviewed officials from the National Sheriffs' Association,
National Association of Chiefs of Police, International Association of
Chiefs of Police, and local police agencies located in most of the
cities in which we made FBI field office visits in 2003.
[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, FBI Reorganization: Progress Made
in Efforts to Transform, but Major Challenges Continue GAO-03-759T
(Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003).
[8] For more information, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Results-
Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and
Organizational Transformation GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2,
2003).
[9] The FBI has core-reengineering processes under way in the following
areas: (1) strategic planning and execution, (2) capital (human and
equipment), (3) information management, (4) investigative programs, (5)
intelligence, and (6) security management. There are about 40 business
process-reengineering initiatives under these six core areas. Appendix
I outlines the various initiatives under each core area.
[10] Strategic planning is one of about 40 ongoing reengineering
projects the FBI has to undertaken to address issues related to its
transformation efforts.
[11] Over 80 percent of the special agents and 24 of the 34 analysts
who completed our questionnaire in 2003 ranked counterterrorism,
counterintelligence, and cyber crime investigations as the FBI's first,
second, and third priorities, respectively.
[12] U.S. General Accounting Office A Model of Strategic Human Capital
Management, GAO-02-373SP, Washington, D.C.: (March 2002).
[13] U.S. General Accounting Office Human Capital: Effective Use of
Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies in Managing Their Workforces,
GAO-03-2, Washington, D.C.: (Dec. 6, 2002).
[14] U.S. General Accounting Office, Results-Oriented Cultures: Using
Balanced Expectations to Manage Senior Executive Performance, GAO-02-
966 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2002).
[15] U.S. General Accounting Office, Maximizing the Success of Chief
Information Officers: Learning from Leading Organizations, GAO-01-376G
(Washington, D.C.: February 2001) and U.S. General Accounting Office,
Architect of the Capitol: Management and Accountability Framework
Needed for Organizational Transformation, GAO-03-231 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2003).
[16] An architecture is a set of descriptive models (e.g., diagrams and
tables) that define, in business terms and in technology terms, how an
organization operates today, how it intends to operate in the future,
and how it intends to invest in technology to transition from today's
operational environment to tomorrow's.
[17] For example, see Federal Bureau of Investigation, Statement of
Robert S. Mueller, III, Federal Bureau of Investigation before the
Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives, (Washington, D.C.: June 2002).
[18] For example, see GAO-03-231 and GAO-01-376G.
[19] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General,
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Management of Information Technology
Investments, Report 03-09 (Washington, D.C.: December 2002).
[20] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: A
Framework for Assessing and Improving Enterprise Architecture
Management (Version 1.1), GAO-03-584G (Washington, DC: April 2003).
[21] See for example, U.S. General Accounting Office, DOD Business
Systems Modernization: Improvements to Enterprise Architecture
Development and Implementation Efforts Needed, GAO-03-458,
(Washington, D.C.: February 2003); Information Technology: DLA Should
Strengthen Business Systems Modernization Architecture and Investment
Activities, GAO-01-631 (Washington, D.C.: June 2001); and Information
Technology: INS Needs to Better Manage the Development of Its
Enterprise Architecture, GAO/AIMD-00-212 (Washington, D.C.: August
2000).
[22] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: FBI Needs
an Enterprise Architecture to Guide Its Modernization Activities,
GAO-03-959 (Washington, D.C.: September 2003) and U.S. General
Accounting Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation's Comments on Recent
GAO Report on its Enterprise Architecture Efforts, GAO-04-190R
(Washington, D.C.: November 2003).
[23] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology Investment
Management: A Framework for Assessing and Improving Process Maturity,
Exposure Draft, GAO/AIMD-10.1.23 (Washington, D.C.: May 2000). In March
2004, GAO updated this version: U.S. General Accounting Office,
Information Technology Investment Management: A Framework for Assessing
and Improving Process Maturity, Version 1.1, GAO-04-394G (Washington,
D.C.: March 2004).
[24] Department of the Justice, Office of the Inspector General Report
03-09.
[25] U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Action
Required on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Management of
Information Technology Investments, Audit Report Number 03-09,
(Washington, D.C.: January 2004).
[26] According to the FBI, the existing applications are Integrated
Intelligence Information Application (a database of over 20 million
records supporting collection, analysis and dissemination of
intelligence for national security and counterterrorism
investigations); Criminal Law Enforcement Application (a repository for
storing, searching, and linking investigative data about people,
organizations, locations, vehicles, and communications); Telephone
Application (FBI's central repository supporting collection, analysis,
correlation and processing of telephone records for investigations);
and Automated Case Support (a suite of integrated applications for
managing, storing and searching information and documents for FBI
investigations and administrative cases).
[27] We currently have work under way for the House Appropriations
Subcommittee to assess the impact of the FBI's realignment of resources
away from drug and other traditional criminal programs, including an
assessment of changes in price, purity, and use of illegal drugs. We
expect to report out on this effort later in the year.
[28] The FBI later in fiscal year 2003 initiated another reprogramming
to permanently reallocate about an additional 160 agent positions from
its drug program to one of the priority areas.
[29] The FBI has the authority to reprogram funds (i.e., move funds
between activities within a given account) without notifying the
relevant appropriations committees unless a specific purpose is
prohibited or the amount of the reprogramming exceeds a dollar
threshold ($500,000 or a 10-percent change in funding level, whichever
is less). Any other reprogramming action requires notification of the
relevant appropriations committee 15 days in advance of the
reprogramming.
[30] These percentages differ from those reported in our June 18, 2003
testimony (GAO-03-759T), which were limited to direct funded field
agent positions.
[31] The figure of 674 positions excludes 11 supervisory positions that
were returned to the drug program.
[32] The FBI has certain managerial flexibilities to temporarily
redirect staff resources to address critical needs and threats.
[33] A workyear represents the full-time employment of one worker for 1
year. For this statement, a matter is an allegation that is being or
has been investigated by the FBI.
[34] FBI's drug program workforce is composed of field agent positions
funded through direct FBI appropriations and those supported with
OCDETF funds. The OCDETF Program was established in 1982 to focus
federal, state, and local law enforcement efforts against organized
crime drug-trafficking organizations that pose the most serious threat
to our national interests.
[35] The HIDTA program began in 1990 to provide federal assistance to
help coordinate and enhance federal, state, and local drug enforcement
efforts in areas of major illegal drug production, manufacturing,
distribution, transportation, and use.
