Federal Law Enforcement
Information on Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics Gao ID: GAO-04-411 March 19, 2004The 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act (P.L. 107-273) requires GAO to report on how investigation and arrest statistics are reported and used by federal law enforcement agencies. This report provides information on (1) the guidance and procedures followed by federal law enforcement agencies regarding counting investigations and arrests, (2) how investigation and arrest statistics are used, and (3) whether multiple agencies are counting and reporting the same investigations and arrests. GAO selected six agencies for review: the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the U.S. Marshals Service, the former U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS).
Guidance and procedures for counting investigations, or cases, are generally consistent among the six agencies GAO reviewed. Agencies pursue investigations into crimes that have a nexus to their missions, such as drug trafficking for the DEA, mail theft for USPIS, and illegal aliens for the former INS. Once agents have made the decision to open a case, the cases are to be reviewed and approved by a supervisor, and details of the case are then entered into the agencies' case management tracking systems. GAO also found agency guidance and procedures for counting arrests to be generally consistent among all six agencies. In addition, the agencies required supervisory review of the justifications for the arrests before they were entered into the agencies' data tracking systems and officially counted. In general, agencies use investigation and arrest statistics as indicators of agency work and as output measures in performance plans, budget justifications, and testimonies. In some cases, these data are considered in making promotion, bonus, and award determinations. However, investigation and arrest statistics are not emphasized in any of these activities, but are one of many factors that are considered. ll of the agencies GAO reviewed counted the same investigations and arrests when more than one of them participated in the investigative and arresting activities. This practice seems appropriate because many investigations and arrests would not have occurred without the involvement and cooperation of all the agencies that participated. If agencies were not allowed to count investigations and arrests in which they participated, agencies would be less likely to work together, cases would be much smaller, and the desired disruption of high-level criminal organizations would be hampered. The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and USPIS reviewed a draft of this report and generally agreed with GAO's findings. Technical comments were incorporated as appropriate.
GAO-04-411, Federal Law Enforcement: Information on Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
March 2004:
Federal Law Enforcement:
Information on Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics:
GAO-04-411:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-411, a report to congressional requesters
Why GAO Did This Study:
The 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act
(P.L. 107-273) requires GAO to report on how investigation and arrest
statistics are reported and used by federal law enforcement agencies.
This report provides information on (1) the guidance and procedures
followed by federal law enforcement agencies regarding counting
investigations and arrests, (2) how investigation and arrest statistics
are used, and (3) whether multiple agencies are counting and reporting
the same investigations and arrests. GAO selected six agencies for
review: the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), the U.S. Marshals Service, the former U.S. Customs
Service, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS).
What GAO Found:
Guidance and procedures for counting investigations, or cases, are
generally consistent among the six agencies GAO reviewed. Agencies
pursue investigations into crimes that have a nexus to their missions,
such as drug trafficking for the DEA, mail theft for USPIS, and illegal
aliens for the former INS. Once agents have made the decision to open a
case, the cases are to be reviewed and approved by a supervisor, and
details of the case are then entered into the agencies‘ case management
tracking systems. GAO also found agency guidance and procedures for
counting arrests to be generally consistent among all six agencies. In
addition, the agencies required supervisory review of the
justifications for the arrests before they were entered into the
agencies‘ data tracking systems and officially counted.
In general, agencies use investigation and arrest statistics as
indicators of agency work and as output measures in performance plans,
budget justifications, and testimonies. In some cases, these data are
considered in making promotion, bonus, and award determinations.
However, investigation and arrest statistics are not emphasized in any
of these activities, but are one of many factors that are considered.
All of the agencies GAO reviewed counted the same investigations and
arrests when more than one of them participated in the investigative
and arresting activities. This practice seems appropriate because many
investigations and arrests would not have occurred without the
involvement and cooperation of all the agencies that participated. If
agencies were not allowed to count investigations and arrests in which
they participated, agencies would be less likely to work together,
cases would be much smaller, and the desired disruption of high-level
criminal organizations would be hampered.
The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and USPIS reviewed a
draft of this report and generally agreed with GAO‘s findings.
Technical comments were incorporated as appropriate.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-411.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Paul Jones at (202)
512-8777 or jonesp@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Results:
Concluding Observations:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Drug Enforcement Administration Profile:
Counting Investigations and Arrests:
Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics:
Appendix III: FBI Profile:
Counting Investigations and Arrests:
Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics:
Appendix IV: U.S. Postal Inspection Service Profile:
Counting Investigations and Arrests:
Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics:
Appendix V: U.S. Customs Service Profile:
Counting Investigations and Arrests:
Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics:
Appendix VI: Immigration and Naturalization Service Profile:
Counting Investigations and Arrests:
Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics:
Appendix VII: U.S. Marshals Service Profile:
Counting Investigations and Arrests:
Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics:
Appendix VIII: Drug Trafficking Investigation:
Appendix IX: Child Pornography Investigation:
Appendix X: Counterterrorism Investigation:
Appendix XI: Comments from the U.S. Postal Inspection Service:
Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Staff Acknowledgments:
Figures:
Figure 1: Arrests for Federal Offenses, by Arresting Federal Law
Enforcement Agency:
Figure 2: Investigations Closed--Fiscal Years 1998-2001:
Figure 3: Total Arrests--Fiscal Years 1998-2001:
Figure 4: Investigations Closed--Fiscal Years 1998-2001:
Figure 5: Total Arrests--Fiscal Years 1998-2001:
Figure 6: Investigations Closed--Fiscal Years 1998-2001:
Figure 7: Total Arrests--Fiscal Years 1998-2001:
Figure 8: Cases Closed--Fiscal Years 1998-2001:
Figure 9: Total Arrests--Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001:
Figure 10: Investigations Opened and Closed and Arrests--Fiscal Years
1998-2001:
Figure 11: Warrants Closed by the Marshals Service and by Other
Agencies--Fiscal Years 1998-2002:
Abbreviations:
ASAC: Assistant Special Agent in Charge:
BJS: Bureau of Justice Statistics:
CAR: Case Activity Report:
CAST: Case Status Subsystem:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DSS: Defendant Statistical System:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FMP: Field Management Plans:
ICMS: Investigations Case Management System:
INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service:
ISRAA: Integrated Statistical Reporting and Analysis Application:
ISDBIS: Inspection Service Database Information System:
JTTF: Joint Terrorism Task Force:
PAS: Performance Analysis System:
PTS: Prisoner Tracking System:
SAC: Special Agent in Charge:
SOD: Special Operations Division:
TECS: Treasury Enforcement Communications System:
USPIS: U.S. Postal Inspection Service:
[End of section]
United States General Accounting Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 19, 2004:
The Honorable Orrin G. Hatch:
Chairman:
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Ranking Member:
Committee on the Judiciary:
United States Senate:
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.:
Chairman:
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.:
Ranking Member:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
Congress has expressed interest in issues concerning how federal law
enforcement agencies count investigations and arrests and about how the
pursuit of such statistics may be affecting agencies' priorities and
management and administrative practices. The issues include whether
multiple agencies are counting and reporting the same investigations
and arrests; whether agencies are using duplicative investigation and
arrest statistics to support their requests for more resources; and
whether agencies are using the statistics to support promotions,
bonuses, and other awards for investigative personnel. Staff from your
offices suggested that additional information on the extent of
agencies' reporting of duplicative investigations and arrests would be
helpful to them in making budgetary or policy decisions.
The 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization
Act[Footnote 1] required us to report on how investigation and arrest
statistics are reported and used by federal law enforcement agencies.
After consulting with your offices, we agreed that our objectives for
this report would be to determine (1) what guidance and procedures are
followed by federal law enforcement agencies regarding counting
investigations and arrests, (2) how investigation and arrest statistics
are used, and (3) whether multiple agencies are counting and reporting
the same investigations and arrests.
To address these objectives, we reviewed and analyzed data and
documentation and interviewed officials at six federal agencies that
perform investigations and arrest suspects. The agencies selected were
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and
the U.S. Marshals Service, all from the Department of Justice
(Justice); the U.S. Customs Service (Customs), from the Department of
the Treasury; and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS).[Footnote
2] We selected DEA, FBI, Customs, INS, and the Marshals Service because
these agencies reported the highest number of federal arrests,
according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) Compendium of
Federal Justice Statistics, 2000, the most recent published report
available at the time of our selection. We selected USPIS because it
reported the highest number of federal arrests from non-Justice or non-
Treasury agencies. We also reviewed information related to three joint
investigations involving several of the selected agencies to see how
they counted arrests while participating with other federal law
enforcement agencies.
We conducted our review between March 2003 and February 2004 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Additional details on our scope and methodology may be found in
appendix I. Detailed information on the six agencies' use of
investigation and arrest statistics can be found in appendixes II
through VII. Detailed information about the three investigations can be
found in appendixes VIII through X.
Background:
Investigations and arrests are core functions of all federal law
enforcement agencies. According to BJS, as of June 2000 (the latest
available information), 69 federal agencies employed 88,000 full-time
law enforcement officers.[Footnote 3] Of these, Justice employed more
than half (58 percent) and the Department of the Treasury employed 21
percent. During fiscal year 2001, according to BJS, these two agencies
accounted for the highest percentage of arrests for federal offenses,
with 71 percent made by Justice components and 12 percent by Treasury
components. In addition, state and local agencies made 4 percent of the
arrests, and 7 percent of the arrests were made after the suspects
voluntarily reported to the Marshals Service following a summons. The
remaining 6 percent of the arrests were made by other agencies or were
undesignated in the statistics.
Suspects arrested by federal agencies for federal crimes are
transferred to the custody of the Marshals Service for processing,
transportation,and detention. According to BJS, in 2001 the Marshals
Service received 118,896 suspects from federal law enforcement
agencies, including those the Marshals arrested themselves. Of these
arrests, 28 percent were for drug offenses; 21 percent for immigration
offenses, 16 percent for supervision violations; 14 percent for
property offenses (such as embezzlement, forgery, burglary, and motor
vehicle theft); 8 percent were for public-order offenses;[Footnote 4] 5
percent for weapons offenses; 4 percent for violent offenses; and 3
percent to secure and safeguard a material witness.
Figure 1 shows the number of suspects arrested only for federal
offenses for the agencies we reviewed. Some suspects arrested by
federal agents are transferred to state and local jurisdictions for
prosecution for nonfederal crimes. For example, according to BJS, in
fiscal year 2001 DEA arrested 11,778 suspects for federal offenses who
were booked by the Marshals Service. However, DEA's statistical
reporting system recorded over 35,000 arrests that same year; the
additional suspects were turned over to state and local authorities and
were not booked through the Marshals Service, according to BJS.
Similarly, BJS reported that USPIS arrested 1,226 suspects for federal
offenses who were booked by the Marshals Service in fiscal year 2001,
while USPIS told us that they had made 4,698 federal arrests that same
year.
Figure 1: Arrests for Federal Offenses, by Arresting Federal Law
Enforcement Agency:
[See PDF for image]
Note: BJS statistics only include suspects arrested for federal
offenses who are booked by the Marshals Service. Agencies' arrest
totals are higher than those shown in figure 1.
[End of figure]
Results:
Guidance and Procedures for Counting Investigations and Arrests Are
Generally Consistent among Agencies:
The guidance and procedures for counting investigations, or "cases" as
they are sometimes referred to, are generally consistent among the six
agencies we reviewed.[Footnote 5] Agencies pursue investigations into
crimes that have a nexus to their respective missions, such as drug
trafficking for DEA, mail theft for USPIS, and illegal aliens for INS.
Generally, according to their guidance and procedures, agencies open
cases that result from tips or leads received from confidential
informants or other sources, they may be invited to help in other
agencies' cases, or they may participate in task force investigations.
Once the agents have made the decision to open a case, the cases are to
be reviewed and approved by a supervisor, and details of the case are
then entered into the agencies' case management tracking systems and
counted.
We also found agency guidance and procedures for counting arrests to be
generally consistent among all six agencies. That is, agents must be
directly involved in the arrest, assist other law enforcement personnel
in making the arrest, or provide information that leads to an arrest.
For example, according to DEA's Agents Manual, agents are to count
drug-related arrests only when DEA is directly involved in the arrest.
Similarly, USPIS inspectors are to count arrests when physically
present or providing assistance. According to USPIS's Inspection
Service Manual, inspectors are to count an arrest when:
* an inspector participated personally in making an arrest or
contributed significantly to an investigation resulting in an arrest
made by another law enforcement agency;
* an inspector's investigative efforts with another law enforcement
agency motivate and materially contribute to the identity and arrest of
a person for a postal crime event though the inspector was not present
at the time; or:
* an inspector's investigation of a postal offense develops additional,
significant evidence that is brought to the prosecutor's attention that
leads to prosecution for an additional offense.
The determination of material contribution, as used in the Inspection
Service Manual, is left to the judgment of a supervisor. For example,
according to USPIS officials, if a postal inspector alerted the highway
patrol to an individual suspected of mail theft, or if the inspector
was conducting an ongoing investigation on the suspect and the highway
patrol made the arrest, the arrest would be claimed by USPIS even
though the postal inspectors did not make the physical arrest.
The other agencies in our review used similar criteria for counting
arrests. In addition, the agencies required supervisory review of the
justifications for the arrests before they were entered into the
agencies' data tracking systems and officially counted.
In addition to their guidance and procedures for counting
investigations and arrests, three of the agencies in our review--DEA,
FBI, and USPIS--have an inspection process to, among other things,
review the appropriateness of investigations and arrests that are made.
DEA, for example, told us that its Inspections Division periodically
validates a sample of arrests and screens them for any type of
questionable activity, such as "piggy backing" arrests. According to a
DEA official, piggy backing is when state and local law enforcement
agencies perform the investigative work and a DEA agent goes along for
the arrest, writes it up, and claims credit for the arrest. The
official said that the Inspections Division has consistently found a
very low percentage of questionable arrests, but that a database of
questionable arrests has not been accumulated. The official gave one
example from DEA's New York Field Office, where 2 or 3 questionable
arrests out of over 8,000 were found. The official indicated that
questionable arrests are mostly isolated incidents and are not part of
any systemic problems. The official concluded that if questionable
arrests were found, those arrest statistics would be removed from the
agency database. FBI and USPIS officials said that no questionable
arrests were found during their reviews.
Investigation and Arrest Statistics Are Used for a Variety of Purposes:
Agency officials with whom we spoke told us that investigation and
arrest statistics are used for many purposes, depending on the
circumstances. In general, the officials said that statistics serve as
indicators of agency work and as output measures in performance plans,
budget justifications, testimonies, and for some agencies, are
considered in making promotion, bonus, and award determinations.
Officials at the agencies we reviewed said that investigation and
arrest statistics are not emphasized in any of these activities, but
are one of many factors that are considered when reporting agency
results or when making personnel decisions.
Agencies Reported Investigation and Arrest Statistics in Their Budget
Justifications, Congressional Testimonies, and Other Public Documents:
We found that agencies generally reported investigation and arrest
statistics in their budget justifications, congressional testimonies,
and/or other public documents. These statistics, however, were not the
only criteria used as indicators of agency workload and productivity.
We reviewed FBI budget requests for fiscal years 2003 and 2004, for
example, and found numbers of investigations and arrests listed in the
documents, as well as numbers of indictments and convictions. DEA's
budget requests to Congress also included investigation and arrest
statistics. For example, in its fiscal year 2003 budget request, DEA
reported on an operation that resulted in 38 arrests, and a table in
DEA's fiscal year 2004 budget request entitled "Domestic Enforcement"
showed the number of national/local investigations, investigations
completed, and total investigations.
Conversely, INS did not cite investigation and arrest statistics in its
budget justification documents. Investigation and arrest activities
were discussed, however, in the very broadest terms. For example, in
its 2003 budget justification documentation, INS indicated that it
would initiate high-priority investigations, conduct asset seizures,
and present individuals for prosecution for alien smuggling-related
violations to disrupt the means and methods that facilitate alien
smuggling. And, in its 2002 documentation, INS noted that, as a result
of its efforts, many alien smugglers, fraud organizations, and
facilitators were arrested and presented for prosecution; assets were
seized; and aliens with a nexus to organized crime, violent gangs, drug
trafficking gangs, or who have terrorist-related affiliations, were
apprehended.
Concerning inclusion of arrest statistics in congressional testimony,
DEA's Administrator's testimonies to Congress on the agency's budget
requests often contained references to successful cases that resulted
in arrests. For example, in the fiscal year 2003 budget request, the
Administrator said that an operation resulted in 14 arrests. The
Administrator's testimony for fiscal year 2004 also included similar
examples, such as DEA disrupting 30 drug trafficking organizations and
dismantling 15 others. In addition, in congressional testimony on the
fiscal year 2002 budget request, the FBI Director said that overall,
during fiscal year 2000, FBI investigations contributed to the
indictment of over 19,000 individuals, the conviction of over 21,000
individuals, and the arrest of more than 36,000 individuals.
As an example of using investigation statistics in public documents, on
September 2, 2003, DEA listed on its Web site 37 major operations that
it had been involved in from 1992 to 2003. Many of these listings
detailed major investigations involving joint operations with other
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies that resulted in
disruptions and dismantlement of narcotics trafficking operations and
in numerous arrests. In addition, many of the listings gave credit to
the other participating agencies for their work on the same cases.
Agency officials said, however, that the investigation and arrest
statistics are only one of many factors used as indicators of agency
workload and productivity and are not emphasized in reporting results
of agencies' workload performance. For example, DEA officials told us
that instead of pursuing numbers of investigations and arrests, their
focus is on:
* targeting, disrupting, and dismantling major drug trafficking
organizations;
* working cooperatively and closely with other federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies; and:
* making an impact on reducing the flow of narcotics and dangerous
drugs into the United States.
Numbers of Investigations and Arrests Are Used as Workload Indicators
and, to a Limited Extent, Used in Promotion, Bonus, and Award
Decisions:
Agency officials with whom we spoke told us that investigation and
arrest statistics are used as measures of productivity and indicators
of workload activity, but only to a limited extent in personnel
management activities such as promotions, bonuses, and awards. USPIS
officials, for example, said that investigation and arrest statistics
are only one of many indicators of an individual's performance and are
not required for making promotion and other personnel decisions. The
knowledge, skills, and abilities for promotion do not list "number of
arrests" as a competency. For example criteria for promotion to the
manager level, GS-15, is based on competencies including customer
focus, interpersonal skills, problem identification and analysis/
decision making, strategic leadership, and oral and written
communication.
USPIS officials said that awards and bonuses are usually given for
performances above and beyond normal expectations, not just for making
arrests. An inspector or team, for example, that makes a large number
of arrests as culmination of an investigation could receive an award,
according to the officials.
The other agencies we reviewed generally followed similar criteria on
the use of investigation and arrest statistics in performance
management decisions as that described earlier by the USPIS officials.
For example, INS's promotion criteria considered such factors as job
experience, decision-making, managerial writing, and job simulation.
Multiple Agencies Count the Same Investigations and Arrests in Their
Individual Agency Databases and Reports:
All of the agencies we reviewed counted the same investigations and
arrests when more than one of them participated in the investigative
and arresting activities. In two of the three reviews of joint
investigations that we performed, agencies reported that they each
counted some of the same arrestees involved in the investigations. (See
apps. VIII and IX.) Agency officials told us that they believe that
this practice is appropriate, because in their opinion, many
investigations and arrests would not have occurred without the
involvement and cooperation of all the agencies that participated. If
agencies were not allowed to count investigations and arrests in which
they participated, the officials said that agencies would be less
likely to work together, cases would be much smaller, and the desired
disruption of high-level criminal organizations would be hampered.
In general, the agency press releases and Web sites we reviewed gave
credit to one another when they jointly participated in major
investigations that resulted in a number of arrests. We found several
examples of this practice, but did not find any overall federal
database that would identify joint investigations and arrests that were
conducted by multiple federal law enforcement agencies. Several of the
agencies' internal databases, however, are capable of identifying joint
investigations and arrests, while others could possibly be so modified,
according to agency officials. For example, DEA's statistical database
was able to identify arrests made by DEA unilaterally, as well as those
made jointly with other federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies, as shown in figure 3.
Concluding Observations:
Federal law enforcement agencies are in business to enforce the
nation's law and regulations, investigate the activities of criminal
organizations, and arrest individuals suspected of criminal activity.
Increasingly, federal law enforcement agencies do not pursue these
activities in a vacuum. All involved agencies do count the same
investigations and arrests resulting from joint operations, present
these statistics in their public documents and budget justifications,
and consider their actions justified. There is no central federal
repository of joint investigations and arrests conducted by the
agencies we reviewed. Moreover, not all of the agencies currently
distinguish between unilateral and joint arrests and investigations
within their databases. Making this distinction may help guide Congress
when making budget decisions about these agencies. Also, the agencies
can provide, or if instructed, modify their databases to reflect more
refined information. However, we did not evaluate what cost, if any,
would be associated with requiring agencies to do so.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft copy of this report to Justice, DHS, and USPIS.
Justice and DHS indicated that they had no further comments on our
draft; however, technical clarifications were provided during our exit
meetings. USPIS agreed with our report's overall finding that federal
law enforcement agencies are generally consistent in the way they
report and make use of investigation and arrest statistics. However,
USPIS provided technical comments which we have incorporated, as
appropriate. USPIS's written comments are reproduced in appendix XI.
We are providing copies of this report to the Attorney General, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Postmaster General. We will
also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://
www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions regarding this report, please
contact Darryl W. Dutton at (213) 830-1086 or me at (202) 512-8777. Key
contributors to this report are listed in appendix XII.
Paul L. Jones:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Overall, to address our objectives, we selected six federal agencies
that perform investigations and arrest suspects. The agencies selected
were the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and the U.S. Marshals Service from the Department
of Justice (Justice); the former U.S. Customs Service (Customs) and
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now part of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS);[Footnote 6] and the U.S. Postal
Inspection Service (USPIS). We selected DEA, FBI, Customs, INS, and the
Marshals Service because these agencies reported the highest number of
federal arrests, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS)
Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2000, the most recent data
available at the time of our selection. We selected USPIS because it
reported the highest number of federal arrests from non-Justice or non-
Treasury agencies. In addition, our review focused on fiscal years 1998
through 2001 as mandated by the 21st Century Department of Justice
Appropriations Act.[Footnote 7] Our review focused on agencies'
policies and procedures used to count investigations and arrests, not
on the number of investigations conducted and arrests made. Therefore,
we did not perform reliability assessments of data systems at the
selected agencies.
To identify the guidance and procedures followed by federal law
enforcement agencies regarding counting and reporting investigation and
arrest statistics, we reviewed agency mission statements, policies, and
applicable manuals concerning investigations and arrests. We also
obtained information about agency investigation and arrest statistical
tracking systems -for example, DEA's Case Status Subsystem; FBI's
Integrated Statistical Reporting and Analysis database; and USPIS's
Inspection Service Database Information System. We also obtained (1)
overall statistics of investigations and arrests by federal law
enforcement agencies compiled by BJS and used in its Compendium of
Federal Justice Statistics, for fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2000, and
2001, the latest Compendium available at the time of our review, and
(2) selected Office of Inspector General and internal agency inspection
reports concerning the use of investigation and arrest statistics. We
also interviewed officials from each agency who were responsible for
reporting, compiling, analyzing, and disseminating investigation and
arrest statistics.
To determine how investigation and arrest statistics are used, we
reviewed selected agency budget justifications that were submitted to
the Congress, congressional testimonies used to justify congressional
appropriations, and internal agency manuals and policies for use of
investigation and arrest statistics. We also reviewed guidance on
issues such as promotion, bonus, and award criteria for agents and
interviewed officials who used investigation and arrest statistics in
their administrative and management systems. Our review was performed
primarily at the agencies' headquarters office in Washington, D.C.
However, to obtain the perspective of field staff regarding the use of
investigation and arrest statistics for administrative and management
purposes, we spoke with key DEA, USPIS, Customs, and Marshals Service
staff at their Los Angeles offices.
To determine if multiple agencies are reporting the same investigations
and arrests, we obtained, when available, information from agency
statistical systems - such as DEA's Defendant Statistical System. We
wanted to know whether (1) other law enforcement agencies were involved
in investigations or arrests as part of joint investigations, and (2)
the individual agencies could be distinguished from each other. We
searched for and obtained from congressional testimony and agencies'
Web sites examples of major investigations involving more than one
agency and analyzed selected agency budget justifications (e.g., FBI
and INS) and performance reports to determine how investigation and
arrest statistics were reported to the Congress. We also interviewed
agency officials and obtained documents to explain the reasons for
either counting or not counting investigations and arrests when other
federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies were involved in the
investigations.
We also conducted assessments of three joint investigations to
determine the extent to which agencies were or were not counting the
same arrests: a drug trafficking investigation, a child pornography
investigation, and a counterterrorism investigation. For the drug
trafficking investigation, we searched our selected agencies' Web
sites, where available, for joint operations and found Operation
Marquis on DEA's Web site. Operation Marquis was a DEA-led
investigation that involved the FBI and several other federal law
enforcement agencies. We subsequently asked DEA and FBI for lists of
arrestees from Operation Marquis and matched them to determine whether
both agencies were counting the same arrestees. (See app. VIII for
additional information on Operation Marquis.) For the child pornography
case, we asked Customs whether it had a joint investigation that
included one of the other federal agencies among our selected agencies.
Customs recommended that we use Operation Bayou Blaster, which also
involved USPIS. Again, we asked both Customs and USPIS to provide us
with lists of arrestees associated with Operation Bayou Blaster.
Customs provided us with a list, but USPIS was unable to generate a
list.[Footnote 8] Consequently, we asked USPIS to crosscheck its
database to the list of arrestees provided by Customs. (See app. IX for
additional information on the child pornography investigation.) For the
counterterrorism joint investigation, we discussed a Joint Terrorism
Task Force operation with FBI and INS officials. The FBI and INS
provided us with names of arrestees associated with the operation and
included in agency arrest statistics for comparison purposes. (See app.
X for additional information on the Counterterrorism Joint Task Force
investigation.):
We conducted our work at selected agency headquarters in Washington
D.C., and at DEA, USPIS, Customs, and Marshals Service offices in Los
Angeles, California.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Drug Enforcement Administration Profile:
The Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) mission is to, among other
things,
* enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United
States and:
* investigate and prepare for the prosecution of major violators of
controlled substance laws operating at interstate and international
levels.
To perform its mission, in fiscal year 2003, DEA had a total of 9,629
employees including 4,680 special agents operating in 225 offices in
the United States and in 80 other offices throughout the world. DEA's
budget was $1.5 billion in fiscal year 2003.
Counting Investigations and Arrests:
A DEA investigation is referred to as a "case," and involves targeting
organizations or businesses suspected of illegal narcotics trafficking.
Any given case can include one or multiple organizations or
individuals, but it is counted only as one case.
* DEA's Case Status Subsystem (CAST) is the system used to track cases.
CAST identifies, among other things, the target (e.g., criminal
organization) of the case and whether other agencies are involved. When
an agent has sufficient cause to open a case, he or she enters general
information about the case into CAST, such as the file number, agent's
name, entity under investigation, date opened, and identification
number.
DEA pursues investigations into drug trafficking organizations in
several ways. DEA special agents may open cases that result from tips
or leads received from confidential informants or other sources, may be
invited to help in other agencies' cases, and may participate in
interagency task force investigations. When DEA agents initiate their
own cases, they may also elicit help from other federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies. Agents' cases are approved by a
supervisor and are entered into CAST.
DEA officials told us that their emphasis, instead of pursuing numbers
of investigations and arrests, is on:
* targeting, disrupting,[Footnote 9] and dismantling[Footnote 10] major
drug trafficking organizations;
* working cooperatively and closely with other federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies; and:
* making an impact on reducing the flow of narcotics and dangerous
drugs into the United States.
On September 2, 2003, DEA listed on its Web site 37 major operations
that it had been involved in from 1992 to 2003. Many of these listings
detailed major investigations involving joint operations with other
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies that resulted in
disruptions and dismantlement of narcotics trafficking operations and
in numerous arrests. In addition, many of the listings gave credit to
the other participating agencies for their work on the cases.
DEA provided us with the numbers of cases closed between fiscal years
1998 and 2001, including DEA unilateral cases and those performed
jointly with other law enforcement agencies as shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Investigations Closed--Fiscal Years 1998-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[A] Other is the total of other federal agency referral, unknown, and
missing cases.
[End of figure]
According to DEA's Agents Manual, agents are to claim (i.e., count)
drug-related arrests only when DEA is directly involved in the arrest.
DEA's process for counting and recording arrests also includes having a
supervisory agent review and sign each Form 202, Personal History
Report, used to document personal information on each person arrested.
By signing the form, the DEA supervisor attests that DEA directly
participated in the arrest or, in the case of a foreign arrest,
provided substantial assistance. An Associate Deputy Chief, Office of
Inspections, said that DEA's decision about whether to count an arrest
is contingent on several factors, including a clear nexus to a drug
offense, involvement of a DEA informant or DEA monies, or the physical
presence of DEA agents at the time of the arrest, and/or a significant
role by DEA agents.
DEA's Defendant Statistical System (DSS) tracks the number of arrests
counted by DEA. Each Form 202--there is one Form 202 for each person
arrested--is completed and the information entered into the DSS. An
arrest can only be entered in DSS once. When the Form 202 information
is entered into DSS, duplicate arrests, if any, will be identified and
appropriate divisions will be notified to fix the problems. In
addition, DEA has a manual system, the Drug Enforcement Arrest Log,
which is used as a check against arrests entered into DSS.
As with investigation statistics, DEA was able to provide us with
numbers of unilateral and joint arrests by fiscal year from 1998 to
2001. Figure 3 shows numbers of arrests and agencies that were involved
in the arrests but does not identify the agency(s) making the actual
physical arrest.
Figure 3: Total Arrests--Fiscal Years 1998-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[A] Other is the total of other federal agency referral, unknown, and
missing cases.
[End of figure]
According to an Associate Deputy Chief, Office of Inspections, DEA
conducts on-site inspections about every 3 years in its domestic
offices. As part of the inspection, the division or office is assessed
to determine if it is successfully achieving DEA's objectives and
priorities, including a validation of claimed arrests.
Field Management Plans (FMP) are used in the inspections process. FMPs
describe the priorities set by the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of a
field division to counter the field office's unique drug threats and
delineate the methods for accomplishing the agency's mission and
priorities. The FMP outlines major operations in the field division
that have been completed, the number of major drug trafficking
organizations disrupted or dismantled, and other field division
highlights. The Office of Inspections assesses the field division's
adherence to the FMP and its success in achieving the goals in the FMP.
Case files and the "appropriateness" of arrests are also reviewed.
A DEA Office of Inspections official told us that periodically a sample
of arrests are validated and screened for appropriateness and for any
type of questionable activity, such as "piggy backing" arrests. Piggy
backing is when a state or local law enforcement agency does the
investigative work and DEA goes along for the arrest, writes it up, and
claims credit for the arrest. The official said that Inspections has
consistently found a very low percentage of questionable arrests at the
offices reviewed, but they do not accumulate or maintain a database of
questionable arrests. The official gave one example of the New York
office, where 2 or 3 questionable arrests out of over 8,000 were found.
The official indicated that questionable arrests are mostly isolated
incidents, and are not part of any systemic problems. If questionable
arrests are found, the officials said that the arrest statistics would
be removed from the agency database.
In another example, out of approximately 2,200 arrests made by the Los
Angeles office in 1999, the Office of Inspections found 16 that were
questionable. The Los Angeles SAC said the arrests were questionable
because the agents had not adequately documented DEA's participation in
the arrests to qualify for counting them. The Office of Inspections
finally judged only 3 of the 16 as not being justified. These 3
involved cases where the Highway Patrol found drugs in suspects'
vehicles and called DEA out to establish probable cause to make the
arrest. This is a gray area, according to the SAC, and DEA must show
significant participation in order to claim the arrest. In the 3 cases,
significant participation was not shown, and the arrests were not
allowed, according to the SAC.
The SAC also said that in addition to the periodic Office of Inspection
evaluations, the Los Angeles office conducts its own yearly self-
inspections, including reviews of the appropriateness of claimed
arrests.
DEA officials also told us that it is appropriate for each
participating agency to claim the investigations and arrests that
result from joint operations. The officials said that if only one
agency could claim the investigations and arrests, agencies would not
work together, cases would be much smaller, and the desired outcome of
disrupting major drug trafficking organizations would not happen.
Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics:
Overall, DEA officials said that investigation and arrest statistics
serve as indicators of agency work, to help determine whether or not
something is being accomplished. DEA Domestic Operations officials said
that from a managerial standpoint, DEA's focus is more on who and what
priority target organizations have been disrupted or dismantled.
Statistical data are useful, the Domestic Operations officials said,
because they provide a picture of activity; they are the evidence that
validates the work performed. DEA officials from the Evaluation and
Planning Section said investigations are DEA's top output measure and
provide basic information on workload. For example, if a group of 10
DEA agents and a supervisor had only 7 arrests for a year, management
would want to look at the group to question its level of activity. It
could be that the group was engaged in a very long, complicated wiretap
case, which would not lend itself to many arrests. Arrests, however,
would only be used as an indicator of activity, according to a SAC and
Assistant Special Agents in Charge (ASACs).
Investigation and arrest statistics are not used as performance
indicators in various DEA-related materials. For example, in Department
of Justice Performance Reports,[Footnote 11] we were unable to find any
investigation and arrest statistics related to DEA. DEA, however, did
use numbers of investigations and arrests in its budget justifications
and congressional testimonies. For example, in the fiscal year 2003
budget request, DEA reported on an operation that resulted in 38
arrests. For the fiscal year 2004 budget request, DEA also provided
tables that included numbers of national and local investigations,
investigations completed, and total investigations.
According to a SAC and ASACs, investigation and arrest statistics are
not used for making agent promotion, award, and performance
determinations. The officials said that promotions, awards, and
performance ratings are based on many factors, such as levels of
violator disruption; coordination efforts with interagency task forces;
cooperative activities with other federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies; and furthering DEA's mission. For example, two
GS-14 field office group supervisors told us that statistics,
particularly arrest statistics, do not play an important part in
promotions, bonuses, or other awards.
Promotion criteria used to evaluate agents for promotion to GS-14 and
GS-15, for example, is based on the following competencies, which do
not include investigation and arrest statistics:
* acting as a model,
* gathering information and making judgments/decisions,
* interacting with others,
* monitoring and guiding,
* oral communication, and:
* planning and coordinating.
A DEA Career Board official told us that when looking for the best-
qualified applicant for a GS-14 or GS-15 position, a SAC could consider
investigation and/or arrest statistics. For example, if a reference for
the applicant is contacted, the reference may say that they highly
recommend the applicant because of the applicant's work on a certain
case.
A DEA official in Employee Relations said that awards and/or bonuses
are distributed based on performance or a special act. A special act
could include an agent's involvement on a significant arrest or drug
seizure. An agent's supervisor writes the justification for an award
and/or bonus. The division head and the Chief of Operations at DEA
headquarters review the justification.
DEA Domestic Operations officials said that performance evaluations
that are used as a basis for promotions may well indicate that an agent
"maintained a high level of cases" or "participated in several
significant cases," but performance decisions are not justified based
on sheer numbers alone. The two field office group supervisors also
said that if DEA has successful investigations, arrests will naturally
follow but are not emphasized in promotion, bonus, and other award
decisions. Domestic Operations officials also said that management's
"tone at the top," which is emphasized throughout DEA, is not on how
many people were arrested, but on what drug trafficking organizations
were disrupted and dismantled.
[End of section]
Appendix III: FBI Profile:
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) mission is to:
* uphold the law through the investigation of violations of federal
criminal law;
* protect the United States from foreign intelligence and terrorist
activities; and:
* provide leadership and law enforcement assistance to federal, state,
local, and international agencies.
As of January 31, 2002, approximately 11,000 special agents and 16,000
professional support personnel were located at the FBI's Washington,
D.C., headquarters and in 56 field offices, approximately 400 satellite
offices, 4 specialized field installations, and over 40 foreign liaison
posts. The FBI's budget was $4.6 billion in fiscal year 2003.
Counting Investigations and Arrests:
An FBI investigation is referred to as either preliminary or full
field. Officials of the Inspection Division told us that facts and
circumstances have to rise to a certain level to justify opening either
type of investigation and that the determination is somewhat
judgmental. Full field investigations are initiated when there is
information that raises a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been
committed. If the information received is not deemed sufficient to
predicate the opening of a full field investigation, but is determined
to warrant further inquiry on a limited basis in order to determine the
credibility of an allegation of criminal activity and the need for a
more in-depth investigative effort, a preliminary investigation can be
opened. The more sensitive investigations, such as foreign counter
intelligence, are usually opened as preliminary investigations.
Preliminary investigations can proceed to full field investigations.
The officials told us that the amount of information needed to initiate
an investigation is the same whether the FBI is working alone or is
involved in a joint investigation.
The Automated Case Support database is the FBI's overall case
management system that is used to capture information and data
pertaining to each investigation. An agent initiates an investigation,
either an FBI investigation or a joint investigation, by opening a hard
copy investigative file, using an Investigative Summary Form 302. A
supervisor must then approve the initiation. Information pertaining to
the investigation is subsequently entered into database.
We asked the FBI to provide us with information on investigations
closed in fiscal years 1998-2001. The data provided included
investigations pertaining to drugs, violent crime, white-collar crime,
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber crime. These data are
displayed in figure 4. Finance Division officials were unable to
distinguish between investigations performed solely by the FBI and
those performed jointly with other agencies because this information is
not captured in the database.
Figure 4: Investigations Closed--Fiscal Years 1998-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The FBI counts an arrest when the subject is taken into custody with a
warrant, complaint, or indictment or, if arrested for probable cause,
after the judicial paperwork is obtained. The FBI reports the arrest as
federal, local, or international.
* Federal arrests are those in which FBI agents acting alone or with
other law enforcement officers arrest the subject. The FBI does not
count the arrest if the subject of an FBI investigation is arrested by
another law enforcement agency without any assistance from the FBI.
However, if the arrest is part of an FBI-led task force, the FBI does
count the arrest even if no FBI agent is present.
* Local arrests are those where the FBI supplied information or other
assistance to a local agency that significantly contributed to the
probable cause supporting an arrest warrant for an individual who was
not the subject of an FBI investigation, and FBI agents were not
involved in making the arrests.
* International arrests are those where the FBI supplied information or
other assistance to another country that significantly contributed to
the probable cause supporting an arrest warrant for an individual who
either was or was not the subject of an FBI investigation, and FBI
agents were not involved in making the arrests.
Arrests are reported on the Form FD-515, "Accomplishment Report." This
form captures such information as arrests, convictions, and the various
investigative techniques used in an investigation. The agent prepares
the FD-515; the supervisor reviews and approves the form, thereby
attesting to the arrest as a valid accomplishment. The field office
then enters the information into the Integrated Statistical Reporting
and Analysis Application (ISRAA) database. Arrests, as well as other
accomplishments, are to be entered into the system within 30 days. A
variety of edit checks are performed to help ensure the reliability of
the data input into ISRAA, and each field office completes an annual
audit of the data.
We asked the FBI to provide us with information on arrests in fiscal
years 1998-2001. These data are displayed in figure 5. While the
participation of other agencies is noted on the FD-515, this
information is not entered into ISRAA and, as a result, the FBI could
not distinguish between arrests made solely by the FBI and those made
jointly with other agencies.
Figure 5: Total Arrests--Fiscal Years 1998-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition to the supervisory reviews of investigations and arrests
already noted, supervisory agents are to perform periodic investigative
file reviews on all investigations being worked by their agents. These
reviews occur about every 90 days for investigations led by experienced
agents and about every 30 days for investigations led by less
experienced agents. During these file reviews, supervisors are to
monitor the progress of investigations by reviewing investigative work
completed; verifying compliance with any applicable policies and
procedures, including those pertaining to any arrests that have been
made; and assessing the validity of continuing with the investigation.
FBI officials also told us that field offices' Assistant Special
Agents-in-Charge periodically are to check supervisory file reviews to
ensure the adequacy of the review process.
In addition, the FBI's Inspection Division is responsible for reviewing
FBI field offices and program divisions to ensure compliance with
applicable laws and regulations and the efficient and economical
management of resources. The Inspection Division is to inspect all FBI
units at least once every 3 years. An Inspection Division official told
us that the division's reviews include information pertaining to
arrests and that, if it were determined that an arrest had been
inappropriately counted, action would be taken, including correction of
the data in ISRAA. The officials also said that they had not found
evidence of the inappropriate counting of arrests over the period of
our review, fiscal years 1998-2001.
Inspections Division officials told us that all agencies involved in a
joint investigation count investigations and arrests and that this is a
long-standing and accepted practice that is part of interagency
cooperation. If each agency involved could not count the statistics,
there would be more competition among agencies and less participation
in joint investigations, according to the officials.
Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics:
Investigation and arrest statistics are used as indicators of the FBI's
work for a variety of purposes, including management of field offices.
For example, a field office's numbers for a particular type of crime
might spike upward. Finance Division officials said that if a spike
occurred, a determination would be made about what happened to account
for the spike and changes might be made in how the office performs
investigations or where it focuses its resources. The officials told us
that field offices use numbers of investigations and arrests as part of
justifications for resources, along with other factors such as the type
of crimes investigated by the office and whether there has been
continual growth in the numbers. Numbers alone are not determinative,
however, according to Inspection Division officials. The officials said
that FBI headquarters also looks at trends, where agents are placing
their investigative emphasis, political factors such as what
legislation might be on the horizon, and problems agents are
encountering that might indicate a need for new technology.
Investigation and arrest statistics are also used as performance
indicators in various FBI-related materials. For example, in Department
of Justice Performance Reports,[Footnote 12] the number of terrorism
investigations is reported, along with the number of related
convictions. The FBI has also used numbers of investigations and
arrests, as well as indictments and convictions, in its budget requests
and congressional testimonies. For example, in the fiscal year 2003
request, fiscal years 2000 and 2001 actual numbers of investigations
pending, opened, and closed are given, along with numbers of arrests,
indictments, and convictions. In addition, in congressional testimony
on the fiscal year 2002 budget request, the FBI Director said that
overall, during fiscal year 2000, FBI investigations contributed to the
indictment of over 19,000 individuals, the conviction of over 21,000
individuals, and the arrest of more than 36,000 individuals.
Concerning performance management measures, an official from the
Executive Development and Selection Program told us that certain
numbers of investigations and arrests are not required for promotions,
bonuses, or awards. The official told us that the statistics are used
only as indicators of an agent's performance and that it is necessary
to look at the work behind the statistics. For example, an agent may
have zero arrests but be involved in a complex investigation that has
not yet resulted in arrests. Or, an agent may have a high number of
arrests resulting from relatively simple investigations.
Special agent promotions are scheduled at regular intervals from GS-10
or GS-11 to GS-13 and are contingent upon the satisfactory work record
of the individual. Promotions to GS-14 and GS-15 are competitive, but
the official told us the vacancy announcements are not yet
standardized. Agents applying for promotion must describe how they meet
each of the qualifications listed on the announcement. A new system was
implemented in January 2004 that will emphasize competencies for each
vacancy. The first four competencies will be core competencies and the
last three will be specialized. For example, if the vacancy were in the
counterterrorism unit, experience with counterterrorism would be
listed. When applying for a promotion, an agent will complete a form
and address his or her education and training, pre-FBI experience, FBI
background, and give two examples of how he or she meets each of the
required qualifications.
The official from the Executive Development and Selection Program said
that the quality of work experience, rather than quantity, is
emphasized in the promotion process. There is no baseline for the
number of investigations or arrests that an agent must demonstrate.
There is no place provided on the application for investigation or
arrest statistics, though officials said that an agent could provide
these in the narrative should he or she choose to do so. For example,
an agent could indicate that he or she demonstrated leadership by being
the agent on 25 investigations resulting in 52 convictions; the agent
could also discuss a specific investigation as an example of
leadership.
Agent performance is evaluated annually on seven critical elements
(which do not include investigation and arrest statistics) using a
meets or does not meet expectation system. A narrative justification is
required only if the agent does not meet expectations. The critical
elements include the following:
* investigating, decision making, and analyzing;
* organizing, planning, and coordinating;
* relating with others and providing professional service;
* acquiring, applying, and sharing job knowledge;
* maintaining high professional standards; and:
* communicating orally and in writing.
An officer of the FBI Agents Association confirmed that investigation
and arrest statistics are not used in the performance appraisal
process.
The official from the Executive Development and Selection Program told
us that a noteworthy accomplishment might be used as the basis for a
special award. The FBI uses its awards program to motivate employees to
increase productivity and creativity. To receive an award, an agent
must be shown to have significantly exceeded the requirements of his or
her position. Field offices can give awards differently. One office
might give an award for outstanding performance on one investigation.
Another office might give an award based on sustained success--for
example, continuous, outstanding performance with making arrests or
obtaining convictions.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: U.S. Postal Inspection Service Profile:
The U.S. Postal Inspection Service's (USPIS) mission is to protect the
U.S. Postal Service, its employees, and customers from criminal attack
and to protect the nation's mail system from criminal misuse.
In fiscal year 2003, USPIS had 1,955 Postal Inspectors operating in 18
field divisions in the United States with a budget of $521.7 million.
Counting Investigations and Arrests:
USPIS enforces over 200 federal laws in investigations of crimes that
may adversely affect or fraudulently use the U.S. mail, the postal
system, or postal employees. USPIS cases involve crimes that have a
nexus to the Postal Service. For example, postal-related violations
including mail theft, identity fraud, child exploitation, illegal
drugs, and money laundering are investigated by USPIS.
A USPIS investigation is referred to as a "case." To open a case, an
inspector fills out a request for case, Form 623. A Form 623 must be
approved and signed by a supervisor before a case is opened. The case
is then entered into the Inspection Service Database Information System
(ISDBIS). In the narrative section of Form 623, inspectors at their
discretion may note whether the case is a joint investigation and
whether any other agencies are involved; however, indicating whether a
case is a task force operation or whether other agencies are involved
is optional. A data entry operator will enter this information into the
narrative section of the case in ISDBIS, which cannot currently be
retrieved to identify USPIS cases alone or USPIS as part of a joint
operation.
A USPIS official in the Information Technology Division, however, told
us that USPIS plans to launch a new database, which will be fully
operational in Fall 2004 and will identify cases as joint task force
operations when applicable and the other law enforcement agencies
involved. However, it would still be optional for inspectors to
indicate whether a case is a joint task force operation. The new system
will be able to run reports listing how many cases are joint task force
cases and identify the agencies that are participating. For example, a
report could be generated naming all cases USPIS is working on with the
FBI.
USPIS provided us with numbers of cases closed from fiscal years 1998
to 2001, as shown in figure 6.
Figure 6: Investigations Closed--Fiscal Years 1998-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to USPIS's Inspection Service Manual, inspectors are to claim
(i.e., count) an arrest when:
* an inspector participated personally in making an arrest or
contributed significantly to an investigation resulting in an arrest
made by another law enforcement agency;
* an inspector's investigative efforts with another law enforcement
agency motivate and materially contribute to the identity and arrest of
a person for a postal crime even though the inspector was not present
at the time; or:
* an inspector's investigation of a postal offense develops additional,
significant evidence that is brought to the prosecutor's attention.
The determination of material contribution is left to the supervisor's
judgment. For example, if a postal inspector alerted the highway patrol
to an individual suspected of mail theft, or if the inspector was
conducting an ongoing investigation on the suspect and the highway
patrol made the arrest, the arrest would be claimed by USPIS even
though postal inspectors did not make the physical arrest.
An inspector fills out a Case Activity Report (CAR) to report case
statistics and to summarize significant developments in the case,
including arrests. A supervisor must approve each CAR and the arrests
before entering into ISDBIS. After a CAR is submitted and entered into
ISDBIS by a data entry operator, a Case Summary Report is printed and
sent to the originating inspector to be verified for accuracy. ISDBIS
tracks the number of arrests counted by USPIS. Arrests made as a result
of joint operations are counted the same as those that result from
investigations involving USPIS only. ISDBIS currently cannot sort
arrests made as a result of joint operations and those in which only
USPIS was involved. According to an official in the Information
Technology Division, the new database, scheduled to be implemented
early next year, can separate arrests resulting from joint operations
from those involving USPIS alone.
USPIS provided us with the total number of arrests made from fiscal
years 1998 to 2001 as shown in figure 7.
Figure 7: Total Arrests--Fiscal Years 1998-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Prior to fiscal year 2003, USPIS had an Office of Inspections Division
that had overall responsibility for conducting quality assurance
reviews of field divisions and headquarters groups/divisions. As part
of a USPIS reorganization in fiscal year 2003, the quality assurance
review responsibility was assigned to the Strategic Planning and
Performance Management Group at USPIS headquarters. A USPIS official in
the Strategic Planning and Management Group told us that the group is
to review each field office every 3 years for compliance to USPIS
policies and procedures. In addition, according to a Deputy Chief
Inspector, USPIS field offices are to conduct annual comprehensive
self-assessments and that the contents of case files are to be reviewed
for accuracy during that process. For example, arrests counted and
hours worked on an investigation are two items that are reviewed for
accuracy. The official said that overall, USPIS has found minimal
problems with the accuracy of its case files and has not found any
problems with a specific USPIS field division counting incorrect case
and arrest statistics.
A Deputy Chief Inspector and an Assistant Chief Inspector told us that
double counting investigation and arrest data is acceptable and vital
in showing the results of USPIS efforts. For example, the officials
said that if arrests generated by a joint operation could be claimed by
only one of the involved agencies, turf battles would result. In
addition, one agency may end up "looking better than another." This
would result in law enforcement agencies refusing to work with one
another and there would be no more task forces, according to the
officials. The officials also said that task forces are needed because
cases are often complex in nature, and joining forces with other law
enforcement agencies streamlines, economizes, and makes operations more
efficient.
Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics:
A Deputy Chief Inspector and an Assistant Chief Inspector told us that
Inspectors in Charge of field divisions determine where resources are
needed by several indicators, including case and arrest statistics.
They told us that a "briefing book" is prepared monthly using case and
arrest data from ISDBIS. The briefing book contains an overview of each
functional area (i.e., fraud, dangerous mailings, and child
exploitation) and an analysis on whether USPIS is meeting its goals.
The data in the briefing book are shared with all field offices. The
officials said that looking at indicators and determining where
employees are assigned is a part of their management system.
A Deputy Chief Inspector also told us that investigation and arrest
statistics are used as indicators in performance measurement and
planning. The performance plan provides the basis for performance
agreements, or field division contracts, and an annual performance
report. The performance plan is divided into operational objectives
that support USPIS's strategic goals. Each operational objective has an
indicator(s), which measures how closely USPIS met the objective, and a
target to meet in the upcoming fiscal year. Each field division is
evaluated on its results as measured against its objectives for each
fiscal year; for example:
* Operational objective: Identify and resolve domestic and
international in-transit mail theft.
* Indicators: Major domestic and international airport mail theft
problems resolved (arrests count towards resolving mail theft cases).
* Target: Thirty major domestic and international airport mail theft
problems resolved.
USPIS also issues an annual report of investigations, which is a
document on the fiscal year's activities, to the Postmaster General,
the Postal Service Board of Governors, and postal managers and
employees. The report details USPIS's investigative activities in
criminal areas, such as mail theft and robbery. The number of arrests
and convictions in each criminal area are also listed in the report.
USPIS officials also told us that data on an inspector's numbers of
investigations and arrests are not required for making promotion,
bonus, and award determinations. The knowledge, skills, and abilities
requirements for promotion to the GS-13 and GS-14 levels, for example,
do not list "number of arrests" as a competency. The officials said
that promotion criteria to the manager level, GS-15, is based on
competencies, including:
* customer focus,
* interpersonal skills,
* problem identification and analysis/decision making,
* supervisory/management skills,
* strategic leadership,
* planning and organizing,
* project/program management,
* oral communication,
* written communication,
* ability to work autonomously, and:
* ability to be flexible in diverse situations.
USPIS officials said that awards and bonuses are usually given for
performances above and beyond normal expectations, not just for making
arrests. An inspector or team, for example, that makes a large number
of arrests as culmination of an investigation could receive an award
for the arrests, according to the officials.
Concerning inspector performance measurement, a Deputy Chief Inspector
and an Assistant Chief Inspector said that investigation and arrest
statistics are one of many indicators of an individual's performance.
Performance management focuses on linking an inspector's goals to
national goals, rather than on arrest quotas. Team leaders in the field
are responsible for helping individual inspectors set goals for the
year through creating a performance achievement plan.
A Deputy Chief Inspector told us that case and arrest data are not used
in their budget process. USPIS's budget is historically based--meaning
it is based on the previous year's budget. It is dependent on U.S.
Postal Service finances and is not subject to the congressional
appropriations process.
[End of section]
Appendix V: U.S. Customs Service Profile:
The U.S. Customs Service was responsible for ensuring that all goods
and persons entering and exiting the United States did so legally and
was to, among other things,[Footnote 13]
* assess and collect Customs duties, excise taxes, fees, and penalties
due on imported merchandise;
* interdict and seize contraband, including narcotics and illegal
drugs; and:
* protect American business and labor and intellectual property rights
by enforcing U.S. laws intended to prevent illegal trade practices.
To accomplish its mission, in fiscal year 2002, Customs had a workforce
of over 20,754 employees, 3,031 of which were Special Agent Criminal
Investigators. Customs' budget was $3.6 billion in fiscal year 2002.
Counting Investigations and Arrests:
From fiscal years 1998 to 2001, the terms investigations and cases
meant the same thing and were initiated by special agents working from
information received from various sources, tips, or confidential
informants. Cases could have also been initiated by other federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies requesting assistance or
through joint task force operations. Customs could also have requested
other agencies' assistance on its cases, and most cases did involve
other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, according to
Customs Office of Investigation officials.
Customs officials also said that in fiscal years 1998 to 2001, cases
were entered into the Case Management System within the Treasury
Enforcement Communications System (TECS) when agents, with first line
supervisor's approval, originated them.[Footnote 14] A case number was
created, which included the office identifier (e.g., Los Angeles), the
type of case (e.g., money laundering, narcotics, etc.), and information
on how the case got started and who originated it. Other federal agency
participation was usually mentioned in the case summary, but was not
identified in a separate TECS field used for generating case
statistics, according to the officials.
As shown in figure 8, Customs provided us with the numbers of cases
closed between fiscal years 1998 and 2001.
Figure 8: Cases Closed--Fiscal Years 1998-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to Customs officials, Customs agents could have counted an
arrest if they:
* physically made the arrest;
* assisted in making the arrest; or:
* discovered the violation, but the arrest was made by other law
enforcement officers.
During fiscal years 1998 to 2001, numbers of arrests were captured in
TECS when agents filled out Reports of Investigation and entered the
details into the system. Customs officials said that agents were to
provide details of their participation in the arrests in the case file.
The narrative was to be reviewed and approved by a first line
supervisor before the arrests would be counted. TECS data fields
required agents to record whether they were the arresting officers, and
if a Customs agent was not the arresting officer, then the arresting
officer's name and agency was to be input into the system. Customs
agents would not count as an arrest the stopping or detaining of an
individual for questioning. Numbers of arrests were not formally
audited for questionable claims, and it was up to the first and second
line supervisors to check the integrity of the investigations and
subsequent arrests that were counted. Figure 9 shows numbers of arrests
and agencies that were involved in the arrests.
Figure 9: Total Arrests--Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Customs officials said that TECS data entry systems are to preclude two
or more Customs offices from claiming the same investigations or
arrests, so there was no double counting within Customs. Whether other
agencies counted investigations and arrests that they worked on with
Customs was not clear to the officials, but they assumed that they did,
and rightfully so. The officials said that cooperation and trust in
working together would be destroyed if participating agencies were not
allowed to count investigations and arrests in which they participated.
Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics:
From fiscal years 1998 to 2001, Customs officials told us that
investigation and arrest statistics were used as one way to measure
productivity. The officials said, however, that arrests were only one
element in a number of performance management measures, including
numbers of cases, seizures, indictments, prosecutions, and successful
wiretaps, for example, that were used to gauge an office's or agent's
performance throughout the year. Officials said that numbers of arrests
were reported from the field to headquarters twice a year as one way of
showing what had been accomplished. The statistics were readily
available, according to the officials, but special agents were not told
that they did not have enough arrests or would need to increase the
number of their arrests.
According to Customs Human Resources officials, investigation and
arrest statistics were not used for special agent promotion purposes.
The officials said that promotions up to the journeyman level were
based primarily on the recommendation of first line supervisors. The
journeyman level was to the GS-12 level through 2000, but was raised to
the GS-13 level beginning in 2001.
Before 2000, promotions beyond the journeyman level were competitive
and were based on applicants responding to a series of set questions
regarding the type, complexity, and variety of investigations, not the
quantity of investigations and arrests. The questions were weighted, a
score was generated, and a roster of applicants eligible for promotion
was developed. Beginning in 2000, Customs initiated the SA14 Promotion
Test System. This system was for promotion to the GS 14 level and
included three tests--critical thinking skills, job knowledge, and an
assessment of administrative and planning skills. Once the applicants
had passed these tests, they were further assessed through a structured
interview, which assessed additional leadership skills via situational
questions about how the applicants would handle the various situations.
Customs officials said that promotion to GS-15 is based on a merit
promotion system, which used knowledge, skills, and abilities that were
developed for the specific position.
Also in fiscal years 1998 to 2001, Customs officials said that
investigation and arrest statistics were used to some degree in award
and bonus decisions, but so were other factors, such as successful
court appearances and prosecutions.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Immigration and Naturalization Service Profile:
The Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) primary mission was
to administer and enforce the nation's immigration laws.[Footnote 15]
Among other things, INS activities included:
* determining the admissibility of persons seeking to enter the United
States through an inspections process,
* facilitating entry:
* processing and granting immigration-related benefits,
* patrolling the borders,
* deterring and investigating illegal employment,
* providing information to employers and benefit providers to prevent
illicit employment or benefit receipt, and:
* disrupting and dismantling organizations engaging in document and
benefit fraud and alien smuggling.
In addition, INS apprehended, detained, and removed aliens present in
the United States without lawful status and/or those who have violated
U.S. criminal laws. As individual aliens engaging in criminal activity
and organizations facilitating illegal immigration are often associated
with other criminal activity, INS also played a role in enforcing U.S.
criminal laws. To perform its mission, in fiscal year 2002, INS had a
total of 36,117 employees with a budget of $6.2 billion. The mission
was accomplished through INS's operational offices located on the
border, in the interior, and overseas and through numerous special
facilities (e.g., detention centers, applications processing centers,
and national records repository) throughout the United States.
Counting Investigations and Arrests:
INS's Investigations Division was the enforcement arm of the INS
charged with investigating violation of the criminal and administrative
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act and other related
provisions of the United States Code. For INS, the investigative case
process began with the receipt of a complaint or other lead by the
Investigations Division that provided a "reason to believe" that a
violation of law may have occurred. An investigation could have been
opened as either a preliminary or a full field investigation. In either
case, supervisory approval was required to initiate an investigation.
A preliminary investigation was opened when a lead or allegation was
not sufficient enough to warrant a full investigation. In those
instances, limited investigative activities would have been conducted
solely for the purpose of providing enough additional information on
which to make an informed judgment as to appropriate disposition of the
matter at hand. Preliminary inquiries were ordinarily assigned for a
period not to exceed 30 days. At the end of that period, a decision was
to be made whether to:
* close the investigation without further action,
* extend the inquiry for no more than an additional 30 days, or:
* assign the matter for a full field investigation.
A full field investigation may have been opened on the basis of
sufficient, articulable facts that were in existence at the time of
initial review, developed during the conduct of a preliminary inquiry,
or assigned as a headquarters-designated case.[Footnote 16] Full field
investigations consisted of all investigative or enforcement activities
necessary to bring an investigation to its logical conclusion.
Under INS's Investigations Case Management System (ICMS),[Footnote 17]
a Form G-600 was prepared when an investigation was opened. The G-600
was basically an index card used to track and document the progress or
termination of investigations. Information about the investigation,
such as the case number, date opened, agent assigned, etc., was
initially recorded on the G-600. Additional information would have been
added to the G-600 as the investigation progressed. First line
supervisors maintained the G-600s for the investigations by agents in
their units.
Each investigative unit (e.g., field office, port of entry, or border
patrol office) prepared a detailed monthly report, called an
Investigations Activity Report of Field Operations (G-23 Report). The
G-23 Report was a record of the number of cases opened or completed,
the number of hours worked, and the results of the investigations. The
report was a matrix of rows and columns, with the columns showing the
number of cases received, opened, completed, etc., and the rows showing
the category of cases, for example, trafficking, criminals, or
employers. Hard copies of the G-23 Reports were maintained at the unit
level and required supervisory signature.
At the beginning of each month, the data from the G-23s for the
previous month were keyed into the Performance Analysis System (PAS).
Each office was to close out its monthly statistical reporting on the
last working day of each month. They then had 8 working days to
consolidate the unit workload counts into office level totals and key
the data into PAS. After the eighth day, the PAS system was to be
locked down and no further data entry would have been possible by the
field offices. The data were strictly numbers of activities and did not
identify individual investigations or agents.
As shown in figure 10, INS provided us with the number of
investigations opened and closed for fiscal years 1998 through 2001.
Figure 10: Investigations Opened and Closed and Arrests--Fiscal Years
1998-2001:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
According to INS's manual, The Law of Arrest, Search, and Seizure for
Immigration Officers, an arrest occurred when a reasonable person in
the suspect's position would conclude that he or she was under arrest.
An arrest did not depend solely on whether the officer had announced
that the suspect was under arrest. An arrest was to be supported by
probable cause to believe that the person had committed an offense
against the United States. Probable cause is knowledge or trustworthy
information of facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable,
prudent person to believe that an offense had been committed or was
being committed by the person to be arrested.
An INS officer was authorized to make arrests for both administrative
(civil) and criminal violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
According to INS officials, a Form I-213, Record of Deportable Alien,
was to be completed to record administrative arrests, which were the
bulk of INS arrests. A Form G-166, Report of Investigation was to be
completed when a criminal arrest was made. Supervisory review and
signature at the bottom of the forms verified that the arrest occurred.
Arrests were counted and recorded into the PAS system in the same
manner as the investigations. That is, at the end of each month, a
manual count of the arrest forms would be made and then support staff
would enter the data into PAS.
Officials told us that INS's Office of Internal Audits conducted
reviews of investigation files. Each district office was to be reviewed
about every 3 years. For each district, a representative number of
investigations would be reviewed to determine whether INS policies and
procedures were followed and that all investigative documentation was
complete. While the purpose of these reviews was to ensure that INS
procedures were followed, an INS official said that the review could be
considered as verification that the documentation of the arrests were
valid and proper.
Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics:
INS officials told us that, after the data have been entered into PAS,
INS's Operational Analysis Branch (OAB) printed out a Monthly
Statistics Report, which was distributed to INS upper level management.
OAB also printed a Workload Summary Report on a quarterly basis.
According to INS officials, the reports were an accounting of the work
INS performed and could have been used to assist in making resource
allocations and staffing decisions. The officials said that the data
could also have been reviewed to see if there were any trend indicators
about shifts in criminal activity.
INS Human Resources officials said that INS employee performance
evaluations were not based on investigation and arrest statistics.
Rather, employees were evaluated on how well they performed their jobs.
INS agents were evaluated annually, and their supervisor wrote up
narratives about how well an agent was performing. There were no set
job elements that had to be covered, and the supervisor determined what
should be evaluated and how well the agent was performing.
Concerning promotions, the Human Resources officials said that
promotions up to the journeyman level were based primarily on the
recommendation of first line supervisors. Promotions beyond the
journeyman level were competitive and based on a scored assessment,
which covered the following four critical factors:
* Job experience: This factor was worth 30 percent and described the
assignments the individual had had and other collateral duties.
* Decision making: This factor was worth 30 percent and tested the
individual's decision-making process and problem solving abilities by
asking a series of questions about hypothetical situations.
* In-basket job simulation: This factor was worth 20 percent and tested
the individual's administrative skills in organizing work, setting
priorities, delegating work, etc. Individuals were given 45 minutes to
review a series of documents and then given 45 minutes to answer 50
questions about how to deal with certain events on the basis of the
documents they reviewed.
* Managerial writing: This factor was worth 20 percent and tested the
individual's writing skills and knowledge of proper grammar syntax,
paragraph structure, and report organization.
INS provided, via the Department of Justice, budget requests to
Congress each fiscal year. We reviewed INS's budget requests for fiscal
years 2003 and 2002 to determine the extent, if any, investigation and
arrest statistics were used as justification for increase resources.
Investigation and arrest statistics were not used, in either table or
narrative forms, as a basis for justifying an increase in resources.
Investigation and arrest activities were discussed, however, but in the
very broadest terms, for example:
* "Although an eventual reduction in arrests is a primary indicator of
illegal entry attempts (and therefore deterrence), other critical
indicators include decrease in border related crime, decrease in
recidivism, shifting of illegal activity to non-traditional points of
entry and through non-traditional methods, increase smuggling fees,
increase in property values and commercial and public development along
the border, etc.":
* "INS will initiate high priority investigations, conduct asset
seizures, and present individuals for prosecution for alien smuggling
related violations to disrupt the means and methods that facilitate
alien smuggling.":
* "As a result of INS efforts, many alien smugglers, fraud
organizations, and facilitators were arrested and presented for
prosecution; assets were seized; and aliens with a nexus to organized
crime, violent gangs, drug trafficking gangs, or who have terrorist-
related affiliations, were apprehended.":
[End of section]
Appendix VII: U.S. Marshals Service Profile:
The U.S. Marshals Service's mission is to protect the federal courts
and the judicial system, apprehend federal fugitives, and manage seized
assets. Regarding federal fugitives, the Marshals Service's
responsibilities are to:
* locate and arrest federal fugitives, including prison escapees, bail
jumpers, and parole and probation violators;
* enforce bench warrants issued by federal judges and warrants issued
at the request of other federal agencies; and:
* serve as the "booking agent" for suspects arrested for federal
offenses.
To perform its mission, in fiscal year 2002, the Marshals Service had a
total of 4,134 employees, of which about 2,700 were U.S. Marshals and
Deputy U.S. Marshals. The Marshals Service's budget was $676.5 million
in fiscal year 2002. The Director, Deputy Director, and 94 U.S.
Marshals direct the activities of 95 district offices and personnel
stationed at more than 350 locations throughout the 50 states, Guam,
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
Counting Investigations and Arrests:
For the Marshals Service, an investigation consists of locating and
arresting a federal fugitive. The Marshals Service initiates fugitive
investigations in response to two basic scenarios. In the first, an
individual has already been in the federal criminal justice system and
has subsequently become a fugitive. The fugitive may have failed to
make a court appearance, escaped from custody, or violated the terms of
parole or supervised release. In each of these instances, the court
issues a warrant and the Marshals Service is responsible for
investigating, apprehending, and arresting the fugitive. In the second
scenario, another law enforcement agency has investigated an
individual, the individual has been indicted and a warrant issued, and
the agency requests that the Marshals Service make the apprehension.
Unlike other law enforcement agencies that investigate the commission
of a crime, the Marshals Service investigations primarily consist of
locating (tracking down) and arresting federal fugitives.
The Marshals Service uses its Warrant Information Network to track the
number of fugitive warrants received and closed. The network is a
computer-based automated system that manages records and information
collected during investigations of fugitives. The system can also
provide data for analyses that are used to report information to
Congress or for management purposes, for example, to provide a listing
of active warrants for a specific offense or for a district or
suboffice. Figure 11 shows the number of warrants closed for fiscal
years 1998-2001.
Figure 11: Warrants Closed by the Marshals Service and by Other
Agencies--Fiscal Years 1998-2002:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Marshals Service takes custody of all federal prisoners arrested by
all federal officials empowered to make arrests. The Marshals Service
Prisoner Tracking System (PTS) maintains a record of all suspects
arrested for federal offenses and booked by the Marshals Service. The
Marshals Service claims arrests on its workload statistics if a deputy
marshal actually makes the arrest, based on a federal fugitive warrant.
If another law enforcement agency brings a prisoner to the Marshals
Service for booking, that agency would be recorded as the arresting
agency in the PTS.
When either a deputy marshal or an agent from another federal agency,
such as the DEA, FBI, or Customs Service, presents a federal prisoner
for booking by the Marshals Service, the following procedures are
followed:
* A Marshals Service Form 312 (Prisoner Personal History) is filled
out, and the prisoner is fingerprinted and photographed. The form
contains background information on the prisoner, the charges, case
number, and which agency brought the prisoner in for booking.
* The agent (e.g., DEA) that fills out the Marshals Service Form 312 is
called the lead agent and that agency will be credited with the arrest
in the PTS. Only one agency is listed as the arresting agency even
though many agencies may have participated in a joint operation through
a task force. However, there is a space for indicating whether the case
was a joint operation, but it is not mandatory to fill it out.
* The Form 312 information is entered into the PTS.
Use of Investigation and Arrest Statistics:
Marshals Service officials told us that investigation and arrest
statistics are used as workload measures; for example, to show how many
prisoners were produced for court appearances. With these statistics,
they said that they could show workload projections to justify budget
requests. The officials also said that investigation and arrest
statistics are used to manage programs, set policies, and allocate
funds and positions. For example, on the basis of an assessment of
workload statistics, the number of positions at a particular courthouse
was decreased in fiscal year 2002.
Marshals Service officials also said that investigation and arrest
statistics are not used for making promotion, bonus, or award
decisions. Criteria that are considered for promotions, for example,
include time in grade, technical knowledge, analytical/problem solving
ability, time management, and interpersonal relationships. For higher
grades, management skills--including organization and planning, budget
management, and human resource management--are also considered for
promotions.
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Drug Trafficking Investigation:
We found Operation Marquis on the Drug Enforcement Administration's
(DEA) Web site when we searched for drug trafficking investigations
involving multiple federal law enforcement agencies. The Web site
indicated that Operation Marquis was coordinated by DEA's Special
Operations Division (SOD)--a joint Department of Justice (Justice),
DEA, the Federal Bureaus of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Customs Service
(Customs), and the Internal Revenue Service program--and was conducted
in 1999, 2000, and 2001. Attorneys from Justice's Criminal Division,
and agents and analysts from participating law enforcement agencies
staffed the investigation.
Operation Marquis targeted a Mexico-based drug trafficking organization
responsible for putting tens of millions of dollars worth of cocaine
and marijuana on the streets of at least a dozen U.S. cities. According
to DEA's Web site, over 300 individuals were arrested as a result of
the operation. In addition to arrests, the investigation resulted in
the seizure of 8,645 kilograms of cocaine, 23,096 pounds of marijuana,
50 pounds of methamphetamine, and $13 million in U.S. currency.
On DEA's Web site, several Justice and Customs officials commented on
the success of Operation Marquis, including:
* "These law enforcement activities will have a measurable impact on
drug trafficking across our Southwest Border. The work completed in
this case emphasizes the importance of interagency cooperation in
targeting and investigating drug trafficking organizations."--from an
FBI assistant director.
* "This investigation demonstrates what can be achieved when law
enforcement efforts are coordinated and resources are pooled. Operation
Marquis shut down a sprawling criminal network that plagued communities
throughout the country."--from the then-Acting Customs Commissioner.
We asked DEA and the FBI to provide us with the names of individuals
that they had counted in their arrest statistics for Operation Marquis.
Both agencies independently generated a list of individuals they
counted as having been arrested as part of Operation Marquis.
Specifically, DEA counted 331 arrests and the FBI counted 154 arrests.
After comparing the lists, we were able to match eight names as having
been counted as arrests by each agency.
We also asked DEA and FBI officials whether they had been designated as
the lead or assist agency, how many special agents they had assigned
throughout the investigation and at various times during the progress
of the investigation, and whether their agents were physically present
during the arrests. In addition, we asked if the amount of time their
agents spent on the investigation could be determined.
DEA officials told us that the investigation was initiated through its
SOD and that DEA was the lead agency. DEA told us that there were about
46 lead criminal investigators assigned to Operation Marquis; however,
because their statistical data systems do not record such information,
DEA officials could not tell us whether DEA agents were present at the
arrests counted by DEA. A DEA official, however, did tell us that
agents logged 217,937 work hours on investigations that comprised
Operation Marquis.
FBI Criminal Investigation Division officials also told us that
Operation Marquis was a DEA-initiated investigation and that DEA was
the lead agency. Seven FBI field offices were involved: San Antonio,
Houston, Dallas, Memphis, Charlotte, Kansas City, and Little Rock.
Because their statistical data systems do not record such information,
the FBI officials said that there is no way to determine exactly how
many agents participated in some manner with Operation Marquis.
However, they said SOD investigations typically have two FBI staff
coordinators assigned to an investigation. In addition, each field
office typically assigns one lead agent, who works an investigation
full-time, and possibly a co-case agent, who would work the
investigation part-time. There also could have been several agents in
any given field office working on or assisting with parts of the
investigation on a part-time basis, for example, helping to setup or
monitor a wiretap.
Also, because their statistical data systems do not record information
by operation, FBI officials said that there is no way to tell how many
agents participated in the physical arrest of individuals for Operation
Marquis.. Usually, at least one or two FBI agents make or assist in an
arrest, but the officials could not tell us the role played by their
agents with regard to any of the individual arrests. Moreover, FBI
officials could not tell us how many hours agents spent on the
investigation because agents do not record their time by case number,
but rather by the type of work performed, such as bank robbery:
We asked DEA and FBI officials whether, as a result of the numbers of
arrests, special agents were given awards, promotions, bonuses, etc.
DEA officials said that they did not know how many, if any, agents
received awards, promotions, or bonuses for their work on Operation
Marquis. The FBI Criminal Investigation Division officials said they
knew of no awards, promotions, or bonuses given as a result of
Operation Marquis.
[End of section]
Appendix IX: Child Pornography Investigation:
A U.S. Customs Service (Customs) Special Agent in Lake Charles,
Louisiana, initiated Operation Bayou Blaster on October 1, 1994. The
Customs agent developed a plan to set up an undercover operation that
targeted individuals involved in the sexual exploitation of children
via the Internet. Customs and U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS)
officials told us that a fake child pornography Web site was used to
arrest individuals who ordered material from the Web site. USPIS was
asked to participate by making some of the deliveries of the
pornographic material, but not all.
All operational and undercover activity related to Operation Bayou
Blaster ceased on February 23, 2001. Customs arrested 100 individuals
through the efforts of more than 400 special agents who were involved
at various times over the 6-year duration of the operation.
We asked Customs and USPIS to provide us with the names of individuals
included in agency arrest statistics for Operation Bayou Blaster.
Customs provided us with a list of the 100 individuals that were
arrested, but USPIS was not able to generate a list of arrests that
resulted from Operation Bayou Blaster. However, at our request, USPIS
crosschecked its database with the 100 names provided by Customs. USPIS
was able to match 30 arrestees, who had the same dates of birth, year
arrested, and location arrested, in their database as the Customs list.
USPIS officials noted that USPIS was asked to assist on only 30 of the
deliveries.
We also asked Customs and USPIS officials whether they had been
designated as the lead or assist agency, how many special agents they
had assigned throughout the operation and at various times during the
progress of the operation, whether their agents were physically present
during the arrests, and their roles in the arrests. In addition, we
asked if the amount of time their agents spent on the operation could
be determined.
Customs officials said that Customs was the lead agency for the
operation. They told us that of the over 400 agents involved through
the more than 6 years of the operation, many of them participated in
the arrests. However, because their statistical data systems do not
capture such information, they were unable to tell us whether the
agents were physically present at the arrests, or what exactly were
their roles in the arrests. The officials provided a list showing that
Customs agents had charged over 78,000 hours to this operation.
USPIS officials told us that Customs was the lead agency for the
operation, and USPIS had no lead special agent for Operation Bayou
Blaster. The officials said that Customs calls on USPIS all the time to
assist in the delivery of pornographic materials. A USPIS official said
20 inspectors were involved with the 30 arrests claimed by USPIS;
however, because their statistical data systems do not capture such
information, the official was unable to say whether the inspectors were
physically present at the arrests or what role the inspectors played in
the arrests. The official told us that inspectors logged over 1,700
hours on Operation Bayou Blaster.
We asked Customs and USPIS officials whether, as a result of the
arrests, special agents were given awards, promotions, bonuses, etc. As
far as Customs officials knew, there were no awards, promotions, or
bonuses given to the agents as a result of the Operation. The officials
also said that with the large number of Customs agents involved in the
Operation, it would be difficult to determine whether any awards,
bonuses, or promotions were a direct result of the Operation. USPIS
officials could not tell us if inspector participation in Operation
Bayou Blaster resulted in any awards, bonuses, or promotions.
[End of section]
Appendix X: Counterterrorism Investigation:
We discussed a closed counterterrorism operation with Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
officials. Between October 11, 2001, and April 17, 2002, the Joint
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in New Orleans conducted this operation
based on information that a telephone number associated with one
subject in the United States had been contacted by a pay phone known to
be used by the Taliban/al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Shortly after the operation began, an INS agent assigned to the JTTF
was asked to obtain INS files on six subjects to determine their
immigration status in the United States. It was found that the six
subjects had been released from INS custody while seeking asylum. As a
result of reports of suspicious activity, the INS district director
decided to revoke their paroles and, on January 12, 2002, the six
individuals were taken back into custody while their asylum
applications or appeals were pending. At the conclusion of their cases,
four of the individuals were removed from the country, and, as of
February 6, 2004, two were being held for removal.
We asked the FBI and INS to provide us with the names of individuals
included in agency arrest statistics for this investigation. The FBI
provided us with a list of the six individuals whose arrests were
included in its statistics. INS provided us with a list of the six
individuals, but told us that even though these six individuals were
taken into custody, INS did not include them in agency arrest
statistics because INS had previously arrested these individuals in
1999; these arrests were counted for statistical purposes at that time.
Comparison of the lists of names provided by the FBI and INS revealed
that the six individuals arrested by INS in 1999 and taken back into
custody in 2002, and the six individuals counted as arrests by the FBI
in 2002, were the same six individuals.
While apprehending these individuals, FBI and INS agents encountered
and arrested two other aliens whose immigration documents were no
longer valid. INS counted these two subjects as arrests for,
respectively, a nonimmigrant overstaying his or her visa and illegal
entry into the United States.
We asked FBI and INS officials whether they had been designated as the
lead or assist agency, how many special agents they had assigned
throughout the operation and at various times during the progress of
the operation, and whether their agents were physically present during
the arrests. In addition, we asked if the amount of time their agents
spent on the operation could be determined.
FBI Counterterrorism Division officials told us that both the FBI and
INS initiated the operation, with the FBI taking the lead in the
operation. FBI officials said two FBI agents were assigned full-time
and numerous others helped with such matters as surveillance. The
officials could not tell us how many hours agents spent on the
operation, since agents do not record their time by operation, but
rather by the type of work performed, such as bank robbery.
INS officials also told us that the FBI initiated the operation and
that INS became involved when the FBI asked INS agents on the JTTF for
their assistance. INS officials told us that no INS agents were
specifically assigned to the operation; one of the two INS agents in
the JTTF assisted in this operation. After the apprehensions on January
12, 2002, the INS agent assisted the FBI in the continued operation--
checking the status of other aliens whose names appeared in records,
reviewing INS files, assisting with interviews, etc. INS officials
could not tell us how many hours agents spent on the operation because
agents do not record their time by operation, but rather by the type of
work performed.
FBI Counterterrorism Division officials said that both the FBI and INS
participated in the physical arrest of the six individuals; however,
they could not tell us the exact number of FBI agents present at the
arrests. INS officials also told us the same thing; that both the FBI
and INS participated in the apprehension of the six individuals.
Specifically, seven INS agents, two INS supervisory special agents, and
four INS deportation officers participated in the apprehension,
according to the officials.
We asked FBI and INS officials whether, as a result of the arrests,
special agents were given awards, promotions, bonuses, etc. FBI
Counterterrorism Division officials said two agents received $500
awards for their performance on this operation. INS officials told us
no INS agents received awards for their participation in the operation.
[End of section]
Appendix XI: Comments from the U.S. Postal Inspection Service:
UNITED STATES POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE:
Deputy Chief Inspector:
Headquarters Operations:
March 5, 2004:
Mr. Tim Outlaw:
Analyst-in-Charge:
United States Government Accounting Office:
441 G Street, NW - Room 6Q26
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Outlaw:
Thank you for providing us with a copy of your office's proposed report
entitled Federal Law Enforcement. Information on Use of Investigation
and Arrest Statistics (GAO-04-411). We appreciate the opportunity to
have been a part of your work and agree with your overall findings that
federal law enforcement agencies are generally consistent in the way
they report and make use of investigation and arrest statistics.
We have reviewed the draft report in its entirety and offer the
following comments:
Arrests for Federal Offenses, by Arresting Law Enforcement Agency -
Figure 1:
While we recognize the statistics used in Figure 1 to portray the
number of federal arrests between 1998 - 2002 were obtained through the
Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), and you do state in the report that
agencies" arrest totals are higher than the chart indicates, I am
providing you with a more accurate accounting of federal arrests made
by Postal Inspectors during that time period.
1998: 4,319 Federal Arrests.
1999: 4,530 Federal Arrests.
2000: 4,633 Federal Arrests.
2001: 4,698 Federal Arrests.
2002: 4,927 Federal Arrests.
Guidance and Procedures for Counting Investigations and Arrests Are
Generally Consistent among Agencies - Page 5:
The first of the three bullet items taken from our Inspection Service
Manual (ISM) regarding claimable arrests is inaccurate. That item
should read, "an inspector participated personally in making an arrest
or contributed significantly to an investigation resulting in an arrest
made by another law enforcement agency", not "....made by another USPIS
inspector". The draft report correctly states that item on page 31.
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology - Page 14:
In the middle of the first paragraph, we understand your report is
merely stating the question asked of the Customs Service to identify a
"joint investigation" involving a child pornography case, however, the
impression the reader takes from this is that Operation Bayou Blaster
was, in fact, a "joint investigation". If possible, we would ask that
you insert language stating the Postal Inspection Service does not
consider, nor did it treat, Operation Bayou Blaster as "joint
investigation", thus the reason we were unable to provide you with a
"list of arrestees". Postal Inspectors provided assistance, when
requested by Customs, on a case by case basis. Your explanation of this
so-called "joint investigation" later in the report (Appendix IX: Child
Pornography Investigation, pages 53-54) more accurately describes the
role of the Postal Inspection Service in this Customs Service
investigation.
Again, it was our pleasure to work with your office on this project. If
you have any questions or require further explanation, please contact
Assistant Chief Inspector Lawrence E. Maxwell at (202) 268-5015.
Signed by:
James Rowan, Jr.
Deputy Chief Inspector
Cc: ACI Maxwell:
[End of section]
Appendix XII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Paul Jones (202) 512-8777 Darryl Dutton (213) 830-1086:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to those named above, the following individuals contributed
to this report: Tim Outlaw, Doris Page, Carolyn Ikeda, Alison Heafitz,
Christine Davis, and Amy Bernstein.
FOOTNOTES
[1] P.L. 107-273 (Nov. 2, 2002), section 11026.
[2] On March 1, 2003, functions of several border and security
agencies, including INS and Customs, were transferred into the
Directorate of Border and Transportation Security within the Department
of Homeland Security. As part of this transition, these agency
functions were reorganized into the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. Several primary program areas comprise Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, including customs and immigration investigations.
Because most of the investigation and arrest activity reviewed for this
study occurred prior to Homeland Security's reorganization, for this
report, we will refer to the former Customs and INS agency structures.
[3] Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
November 2003, NCJ 201627.
[4] Public order offenses include offenses concerning tax law, perjury,
and racketeering and extortion.
[5] Some agencies refer to investigations as cases. For this report, we
will use investigations and cases interchangeably.
[6] On March 1, 2003, functions of several border and security
agencies, including Customs and INS, were transferred into the
Directorate of Border and Transportation Security within DHS. As part
of this transition, these agency functions were reorganized into the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Several primary program
areas comprise Immigration and Customs Enforcement, including customs
and immigration investigations. Because most of the investigation and
arrest activity reviewed for this study occurred prior to DHS's
reorganization, for this report, we will refer to the former Customs
and INS agency structures.
[7] P.L. 107-273 (Nov. 2, 2002), section 11026.
[8] USPIS said that it did not consider Operation Bayou Blaster a
"joint" investigation, but provided assistance when requested by
Customs. For this reason, USPIS said it was unable to provide us with a
list of arrestees for this operation.
[9] Disruption occurs when the normal effective operation of an
identified organization is significantly impacted so that it is
temporarily unable to conduct criminal operations for a significant
period of time. The disruption must be the result of an affirmative law
enforcement action, including, but not limited, to the arrest,
indictment, and conviction of the organization's leadership or a
substantial seizure of the organization's assets.
[10] Dismantlement occurs when an identified organization is
eviscerated and no longer capable of operating as a coordinated
criminal enterprise. The dismantlement must be the result of an
affirmative law enforcement action, including, but not limited, to the
arrest, indictment, and conviction of all or most of its principal
leadership.
[11] FY 2001 Performance Report and FY 2002 Revised Final Performance
Plan, FY 2003 Performance Plan; and FY 2002 Performance Report and FY
2003 Revised Final Performance Plan, FY 2004 Performance Plan.
[12] FY 2001 Performance Report, FY 2002 Revised Final Performance
Plan, FY 2003 Performance Plan; and FY 2002 Performance Report, FY 2003
Revised Final Performance Plan, FY 2004 Performance Plan.
[13] On March 1, 2003, the functions of the U.S. Customs Service were
transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. Because most of the
investigation and arrest activity reviewed for this study occurred
before the transfer, for this report, we will refer to the former
Customs structure, policies, and procedures.
[14] An Immigration and Customs Enforcement official said that TECS
would continue to be the case management system within the Department
of Homeland Security for the foreseeable future, at least until 2005
when a new system under development is scheduled for roll out.
[15] On March 1, 2003, the functions of the INS were transferred into
the Department of Homeland Security. Because most of the investigation
and arrest activity reviewed for this study occurred before the
reorganization, for this report, we will refer to the former INS agency
structure.
[16] INS also had a category for "Auxiliary Investigations," which were
investigations done in one district's jurisdiction at the request of
another district. An investigation conducted under this situation must
have met the basic definition of an investigation, and a completed
auxiliary investigation was given the same status and credit as a full
field investigation.
[17] The ICMS was not a computer-based system; it was a hard copy,
manual documentation system. The Criminal Investigations Reporting
System was implemented in INS on October 1, 2002; it is a computer-
based system that replaced the ICMS for the initiating and tracking of
cases.
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