ATF
Thefts of Explosives from State and Local Government Storage Facilities Are Few but May Be Underreported
Gao ID: GAO-06-182T October 31, 2005
More than 5.5 billion pounds of explosives are used each year in the United States by private sector companies and government entities. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has authority to regulate explosives and to license privately owned explosives storage facilities. After the July 2004 theft of several hundred pounds of explosives from a local government storage facility, concerns arose about vulnerability to theft. This testimony provides information about (1) the extent of explosives thefts from state and local government facilities, (2) ATF's authority to regulate and oversee state and local government storage facilities, and (3) security measures in place at selected state and local government storage facilities. This information is based on a report GAO is releasing today on these issues.
Judging from available ATF data, there have been few thefts of explosives from state and local government storage facilities. From January 2002 to February 2005, ATF received 9 reports of thefts or missing explosives from state and local facilities, compared with a total of 205 explosives thefts reported from all sources nationwide during this same period. During the course of the audit, GAO found evidence of 5 thefts from state and local government facilities, 1 of which did not appear in ATF's national database of thefts and missing explosives. Thus, the actual number of thefts occurring at state and local facilities could be higher than that identified by ATF data. ATF has no authority to oversee or inspect state and local government explosives storage facilities. State and local agencies are not required to obtain a license from ATF to use and store explosives, and only licensees--such as private sector explosives storage facilities--are subject to mandatory oversight. Thus, ATF has no means to ensure that state and local facilities comply with federal regulations. Further, ATF does not collect nationwide information on the number and location of state and local storage facilities, nor does the agency know the types and amounts of explosives being stored in these facilities. Because this data collection is a function of the licensing process and state and local facilities are not required to be licensed, no systematic information about these facilities is collected. By comparison, all licensed private sector facilities must submit a variety of information about their facilities--including location and security measures in place--to ATF during the licensing process. ATF also collects information about these facilities during mandatory inspections. At the 18 state and local government storage facilities GAO visited, a variety of security measures were in place, including locked gates, fencing, patrols, and in some cases electronic surveillance. All the facilities' officials told GAO that they conducted routine inventories. But most of the state and local government entities GAO visited were not required to be licensed or inspected by state or local regulatory agencies. GAO identified several instances of possible noncompliance with federal regulations, but these were related primarily to storage safety issues rather than security.
GAO-06-182T, ATF: Thefts of Explosives from State and Local Government Storage Facilities Are Few but May Be Underreported
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Testimony Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 9:00 a.m. PST:
Monday, October 31, 2005:
ATF:
Thefts of Explosives from State and Local Government Storage Facilities
Are Few but May Be Underreported:
Statement of Laurie E. Ekstrand:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
GAO-06-182T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-182T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives:
Why GAO Did This Study:
More than 5.5 billion pounds of explosives are used each year in the
United States by private sector companies and government entities. The
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has authority
to regulate explosives and to license privately owned explosives
storage facilities. After the July 2004 theft of several hundred pounds
of explosives from a local government storage facility, concerns arose
about vulnerability to theft.
This testimony provides information about (1) the extent of explosives
thefts from state and local government facilities, (2) ATF‘s authority
to regulate and oversee state and local government storage facilities,
and (3) security measures in place at selected state and local
government storage facilities. This information is based on a report
GAO is releasing today on these issues.
What GAO Found:
Judging from available ATF data, there have been few thefts of
explosives from state and local government storage facilities. From
January 2002 to February 2005, ATF received 9 reports of thefts or
missing explosives from state and local facilities, compared with a
total of 205 explosives thefts reported from all sources nationwide
during this same period. During the course of the audit, GAO found
evidence of 5 thefts from state and local government facilities, 1 of
which did not appear in ATF‘s national database of thefts and missing
explosives. Thus, the actual number of thefts occurring at state and
local facilities could be higher than that identified by ATF data.
ATF has no authority to oversee or inspect state and local government
explosives storage facilities. State and local agencies are not
required to obtain a license from ATF to use and store explosives, and
only licensees”such as private sector explosives storage facilities”are
subject to mandatory oversight. Thus, ATF has no means to ensure that
state and local facilities comply with federal regulations. Further,
ATF does not collect nationwide information on the number and location
of state and local storage facilities, nor does the agency know the
types and amounts of explosives being stored in these facilities.
Because this data collection is a function of the licensing process and
state and local facilities are not required to be licensed, no
systematic information about these facilities is collected. By
comparison, all licensed private sector facilities must submit a
variety of information about their facilities”including location and
security measures in place”to ATF during the licensing process. ATF
also collects information about these facilities during mandatory
inspections.
At the 18 state and local government storage facilities GAO visited, a
variety of security measures were in place, including locked gates,
fencing, patrols, and in some cases electronic surveillance. All the
facilities‘ officials told GAO that they conducted routine inventories.
But most of the state and local government entities GAO visited were
not required to be licensed or inspected by state or local regulatory
agencies. GAO identified several instances of possible noncompliance
with federal regulations, but these were related primarily to storage
safety issues rather than security.
Explosives Storage Facilities in Pennsylvania and Texas:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Source: GAO.
What GAO Recommends:
In the report released today, GAO is recommending that the Attorney
General direct the ATF Director to clarify explosives incident
reporting regulations to help ensure that all entities storing
explosives, including state and local government agencies, understand
their obligation to report all thefts or missing explosives. The
Department of Justice agreed with GAO‘s recommendation and indicated it
would take steps to implement it.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-182T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Laurie Ekstrand at (202)
512-8777 or ekstrandl@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss security and safety at state
and local government explosives storage facilities. More than 5.5
billion pounds of explosives are used each year in the United States.
These explosives are used by both public sector entities (such as state
and local government agencies) and private sector companies for a
variety of purposes--including mining, construction, avalanche control,
and law enforcement. Under current federal explosives laws and
regulations, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF) is responsible for licensing and regulating explosives
manufacturers, importers, dealers, and users. It is primarily through
this licensing authority that ATF oversees and inspects privately owned
explosives facilities to ensure they comply with federal explosives
storage laws and regulations. However, state and local government
agencies are exempt from ATF licensing requirements.
In August 2004, the subcommittee held a hearing here in California to
investigate the July 2004 theft of several hundred pounds of explosives
from a storage facility being used by local law enforcement agencies.
At that hearing, the subcommittee heard testimony from federal, state,
and local officials regarding the safety and security of publicly
managed explosives storage facilities and the adequacy of federal
authority to regulate and oversee these facilities. Out of concern that
state and local government explosives storage facilities could be
vulnerable to theft, you asked us to study the security and oversight
at these facilities.
My testimony this morning is based on a GAO report[Footnote 1] being
released today in conjunction with this hearing, and will focus on the
following issues:
1. the extent to which state and local government explosives storage
facilities have been vulnerable to theft,
2. the extent to which ATF regulates and oversees state and local
government explosives storage facilities, and:
3. the types of security measures in place at selected state and local
government explosives storage facilities.
We conducted our work on this report from February 2005 to August 2005
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Summary:
Judging from available ATF data, there have been few thefts reported at
state and local government explosives storage facilities. However,
these reported thefts could be understated by an unknown amount. During
the 3-year period from January 2002 to February 2005, ATF received 9
reports of thefts or missing explosives from state and local law
enforcement storage facilities, compared with 205 thefts from all
sources nationwide. Similarly, during a 10-month period (ending
December 2003), there were 76 theft incidents reported nationwide
resulting in a loss of about 6,700 pounds of high explosives and
blasting agents. By comparison, over an entire 10-year period (ending
December 2004), ATF received 14 reports of theft from state and local
law enforcement storage magazines, resulting in reported losses of
about 1,000 pounds of explosive materials. The actual number of state
and local thefts could be higher than indicated by ATF data. While ATF
interprets its theft reporting requirement to mean that state and local
entities, among others, must report explosives thefts, ATF officials
acknowledged that state and local government entities may be unclear as
to whether they are covered under this requirement. Indeed, during our
site visits and other state and local contacts, we found evidence of 5
thefts from state and local government facilities, 1 of which did not
appear in ATF's national database on thefts and missing explosives.
Although state and local government explosives storage facilities must
comply with federal storage regulations, ATF does not have oversight
authority at these facilities. ATF oversight--including the ability to
conduct regulatory inspections--is linked to licensing, and state and
local government entities are not required under federal explosives law
to obtain such a license. ATF does not have specific statutory
authority to conduct regulatory inspections at these storage
facilities. Through its licensing and inspection authority, ATF is able
to collect nationwide information on the number and locations of
private sector storage facilities and the types and amounts of
explosives being stored. Because ATF does not license and inspect state
and local government facilities, no similar information is collected
about them. On the basis of our audit work, we identified three types
of government entities that used and stored explosives: (1) law
enforcement bomb squads, (2) public universities, and (3) state and
local departments of transportation. We were unable to gather
sufficient information about these entities to reliably estimate the
total number of state and local government storage facilities and
magazines nationwide.
During our audit, we visited 14 state and local government entities--13
bomb squads and 1 public university--and observed the security measures
in place at their 18 explosives storage facilities. Regarding physical
security, most facilities had a locked gate to prevent vehicle access
and several had fencing surrounding their storage facilities. Several
storage facilities also had electronic security systems in place--such
as video surveillance. These types of security measures--fences,
vehicle barriers, and electronic monitoring devices--all exceed the
requirements of federal explosives regulations. Officials at all the
entities we visited told us they visually inspected or patrolled the
facilities on a regular basis and conducted routine inventories. Most
facilities were not required to be licensed or inspected by state or
local regulatory agencies. Of the 5 explosives thefts we identified
during our site visits and other contacts, 2 had occurred at state and
local storage facilities we visited, but only 1 of these incidents
appeared in ATF's nationwide theft database.
In our report released today, we recommend that the Attorney General
direct the ATF Director to clarify federal explosives regulations to
ensure that state and local government agencies understand their
obligation to report thefts or missing explosives. The Department of
Justice agreed with our recommendation and indicated it would take
steps to implement it.
Background:
ATF is the chief enforcer of explosives laws and regulations in the
United States and is responsible for licensing and regulating
explosives manufacturers, importers, dealers, and users.[Footnote 2]
ATF is also responsible for regulating most, but not all, explosives
storage facilities. Under federal explosives regulations, a license is
required for persons who manufacture, import, or deal in explosives
and, with some exceptions, for persons who intend to acquire explosives
for use. No license is required solely to operate an explosives storage
facility. State and local government agencies are not required to
obtain an explosives license to use and store explosives. However, all
persons who store explosive materials (including state and local
entities) must conform with applicable ATF storage regulations,
irrespective of whether they are required to obtain an explosives
license for other purposes. According to ATF data, as of February 2005
there were 12,028 federal explosives licensees in the United
States.[Footnote 3] Roughly 7,500 of these had some kind of explosives
storage facility, consisting of 22,791 permanent or mobile storage
magazines.
ATF storage regulations include requirements relating to the safety and
security of explosives storage magazines--that is, any building or
structure (other than an explosives manufacturing building) used for
storage of explosive materials. Regarding safety, the storage
regulations include requirements related to location, construction,
capacity, housekeeping, interior lighting, and magazine repairs, as
well as a requirement that the local fire safety authority be notified
of the location of each storage magazine. Regarding security, the ATF
storage regulations include the following requirements:
* Explosives handling. All explosive materials must be kept in locked
magazines unless they are in the process of manufacture, being
physically handled in the operating process of a licensee or user,
being used, or being transported to a place of storage or use.
Explosives are not to be left unattended when in portable storage
magazines.
* Magazine construction. Storage magazines must be theft-resistant and
must meet specific requirements dealing with such things as mobility,
exterior construction, door hinges and hasps, and locks.
* Magazine inspection. Storage magazines must be inspected at least
every 7 days. This inspection need not be an inventory, but it must be
sufficient to determine if there has been an unauthorized entry or
attempted entry into the magazines, or unauthorized removal of the
magazine contents.
* Magazine inventory. Within the magazine, containers of explosive
materials are to be stored so that marks are visible. Stocks of
explosive materials are to be stored so they can be easily counted and
checked.
Notwithstanding the security requirements described above, ATF storage
regulations do not require explosives storage facilities to have any of
the following physical security features--fences, restricted property
access, exterior lighting, alarm systems, or electronic surveillance.
Also, while ATF licensing regulations require explosives licensees to
conduct a physical inventory at least annually, there is no similar
inventory requirement in the storage regulations applicable to other
persons who store explosives.
Thefts Reported at State and Local Explosives Storage Facilities Are
Few but May Be Underreported:
According to ATF data, the number of reported state and local
government thefts is relatively small when compared with the total
number of thefts that have occurred nationwide. During a recent 3-year
period (January 2002--February 2005), ATF received reports of 205
explosives thefts from all sources nationwide. By comparison, during
this same period, only 9 thefts were reported that involved state and
local government storage facilities--5 involving state and local law
enforcement agencies,[Footnote 4] 3 involving state government entities
(all universities), and 1 involving a county highway department. The
amounts of explosives reported stolen or missing from state and local
government facilities are relatively small when compared with the total
amounts of stolen and missing explosives nationwide. During a recent 10-
month period for which data were available (March 2003 through December
2003), there were a total of 76 theft incidents nationwide reported to
ATF, amounting to a loss of about 3,600 pounds of high explosives,
3,100 pounds of blasting agents, 1,400 detonators, and 2,400 feet of
detonating cord and safety fuse. By comparison, over an entire 10-year
period (January 1995 through December 2004), ATF received only 14
reports of theft from state and local law enforcement storage
magazines. Reported losses in these cases were about 1,000 pounds of
explosive materials, and in 10 of the incidents less than 50 pounds of
explosives was reported stolen or missing.
While the ATF theft data indicate that thefts from state and local
facilities make up only a small part of the overall thefts nationwide,
these reports could be understated by an unknown amount. There are two
federal reporting requirements relating to the theft of explosives. One
is specific to all federal explosives licensees (and permittees) and
requires any theft or loss of explosives to be reported to ATF within
24 hours of discovery. The second reporting requirement generally
requires any other "person" who has knowledge of the theft or loss of
any explosive materials from his stock to report to ATF within 24
hours. Although the term "person" as defined in law and regulation does
not specifically include state and local government agencies,[Footnote
5] ATF has historically interpreted this requirement as applying to
nonlicensed state and local government explosives storage facilities.
However, ATF officials acknowledged that some state and local
government entities could be unsure as to their coverage under the
theft reporting requirements and, as a result, may not know they are
required to report such incidents to ATF. Indeed, during our site
visits and other state and local contacts, we identified five state and
local government entities that had previously experienced a theft or
reported missing explosives--two involving local law enforcement
agencies, two involving state universities, and one involving a state
department of transportation.[Footnote 6] However, one of these five
incidents did not appear in ATF's nationwide database of reported
thefts and missing explosives. Based on these findings, the actual
number of thefts occurring at state and local government storage
facilities nationwide could be more than the number identified by ATF
data.
ATF Lacks Authority to Regulate and Oversee State and Local Explosives
Storage Facilities Nationwide:
There is no ATF oversight mechanism in place to ensure that state and
local government facilities comply with federal explosives regulations.
With respect to private sector entities, ATF's authority to oversee and
inspect explosives storage facilities is primarily a function of its
licensing process. However, state and local government entities are not
required to obtain a federal license to use and store explosives. In
addition, ATF has no specific statutory authority to conduct regulatory
inspections at state and local government storage facilities. Under
certain circumstances, ATF may inspect these facilities--for example,
voluntary inspections when requested by a state and local entity, and
mandatory annual inspections at locations where ATF shares space inside
a state and local storage magazine. Regarding those state and local
government facilities that ATF does not inspect, ATF officials
acknowledged they had no way of knowing the extent to which these
facilities are complying with federal explosives regulations.
ATF officials stated that if the agency were to be required to conduct
mandatory inspections at all state and local government storage
facilities, they would likely need additional resources to conduct
these inspections because they are already challenged to keep up with
inspections that are mandated as part of the explosive licensing
requirements. Under provisions of the Safe Explosives Act, ATF is
generally required to physically inspect a license applicant's storage
facility prior to issuing a federal explosives license--which
effectively means at least one inspection every 3 years. At the same
time, however, ATF inspectors are also responsible for conducting
inspections of federal firearms licensees. The Department of Justice
Inspector General reported that ATF has had to divert resources from
firearms inspections to conduct explosives storage facility inspections
required under the Safe Explosives Act. Despite recent funding
increases for ATF's explosives program, giving ATF additional
responsibility to oversee and inspect state and local government
storage facilities could further tax the agency's inspection resources.
According to ATF officials, because inspection of explosives licensees
is legislatively mandated, the effect of additional state and local
government explosives responsibilities (without related increases in
inspector resources) could be to reduce the number of firearms
inspections that ATF would be able to conduct.
ATF does not collect nationwide information on the number and location
of state and local government explosives storage facilities, nor does
the agency know the types and amounts of explosives being stored in
these facilities. Since data collection is a function of the licensing
process and state and local facilities are not required to be licensed,
no systematic information about these facilities is collected. With
respect to private sector licensees, ATF collects descriptive
information concerning explosive storage facilities as part of the
licensing process. ATF license application forms require applicants to
submit information about their storage capabilities, including specific
information about the type of storage magazine, the location of the
magazine, the type of security in place, the capacity of the magazine,
and the class of explosives that will be stored. ATF also collects
information about licensed private sector storage facilities during
mandatory inspections, through examination of explosives inventory and
sales records and verification that storage facilities meet the
standards of public safety and security as prescribed in the
regulations.
During the course of our audit work, we compiled some data on state and
local government entities that used and stored explosives. At the 13
state and local law enforcement bomb squads we visited, there were 16
storage facilities and 30 storage magazines. According to Federal
Bureau of Investigation data, there are 452 state and local law
enforcement bomb squads nationwide. However, because of the limited
nature of our fieldwork, we cannot estimate the total number of storage
facilities or magazines that might exist at other bomb squad locations.
Moreover, other state and local government entities (such as public
universities and state and local departments of transportation) in
addition to law enforcement bomb squads also have explosives storage
facilities. At the one public university we visited, there were 2
storage facilities and 4 storage magazines. Again, however, because of
the limited nature of our fieldwork, we cannot estimate the total
number of storage facilities and magazines that exist at these other
state and local government entities nationwide.
Security Measures Varied at State and Local Explosives Storage
Facilities We Visited:
We found that security measures varied at the 14 state and local
government entities we visited. Overall, we visited, 2 state bomb
squads, 11 city or county bomb squads (including police departments and
sheriffs' offices), and 1 public university. Four of the 14 state and
local entities had 2 separate storage areas, resulting in a total of 18
explosives storage facilities among the 14 entities. Three of these
storage facilities were located on state property, 7 were located at
city or county police training facilities, 7 were located on other city
or county property, and 1 was located at a metropolitan airport. Eleven
of the 18 explosives storage facilities we visited contained multiple
magazines for the storage of explosives. As a result, these 18
facilities comprised a total of 34 storage magazines. All of the 18
facilities contained a variety of high explosives, including C-4
plastic explosive, detonator cord, TNT, binary (two-part) explosives,
and detonators. Estimates of the amount of explosives being stored
ranged from 10 to 1,000 pounds, with the majority of the entities (9)
indicating they stored 200 pounds or less.
At each of the 14 state and local storage entities we visited, we
observed the types of security measures in place at their explosives
storage facilities. Our criteria for identifying the type of security
measures in place included existing federal explosives storage laws and
regulations (27 C.F.R., Part 555, Subpart K) and security guidelines
issued by the explosives industry (the Institute of Makers of
Explosives). Most of these security measures (fencing, vehicle
barriers, and electronic surveillance, for example) are not currently
required under federal storage regulations. However, we are presenting
this information in order to demonstrate the wide range of security
measures actually in place at the time of our visits.
* Physical security. Thirteen of the 18 storage facilities restricted
vehicle access to the facility grounds by way of a locked exterior
security gate or (in one case) by virtue of being located indoors. Five
of the 13 facilities restricted vehicle access after normal working
hours (nights or nights and weekends). Officials at 7 other facilities
said that vehicle access to the facilities was restricted at all times,
including the 1 indoor facility that was located in the basement of a
municipal building. Six of the 18 storage facilities had an interior
barrier--consisting of a chain-link fence with a locked gate--
immediately surrounding their storage magazines to prevent direct
access by persons on foot. One other facility (the indoor basement
facility), relied on multiple locked doors to prevent access by
unauthorized personnel. Conversely, at 1 facility we visited, the
storage magazine could be reached on foot or by vehicle at any time
because it did not have fencing or vehicle barriers to deter
unauthorized access. In addition to restricted access to storage
facilities, officials at all of the 18 storage facilities we visited
told us that official personnel--either bomb squad or other police
officers--patrolled or inspected the storage facility on a regular
basis. And, at 9 of the 18 storage facilities we visited, officials
said that state or local government employees--police training
personnel, jail or correctional personnel, or other city/county
employees--maintained a 24-hour presence at the facilities.
* Electronic security. Four of the 18 explosives storage facilities had
either an alarm or video monitoring system in place. Two storage
facilities with video surveillance took advantage of existing
monitoring systems already in place at their storage locations--one
located at a county correctional facility and one located inside a
municipal/police building. Officials at 4 storage facilities told us
they had alarm systems planned (funding not yet approved), and
officials at 3 facilities said they had alarm systems pending (funding
approved and awaiting installation). Officials at 2 facilities also
told us they planned to install video monitoring. Regarding the
feasibility of installing electronic monitoring systems, 4 officials
noted that storage facilities are often located in remote areas without
easy access to electricity. Regarding the possibility of new federal
regulations that would require electronic security at storage
magazines, 9 officials told us they would not object as long as it did
not create an undue financial burden.
* Inventory and oversight issues. Officials at all 14 of the entities
we visited told us they performed periodic inventories of the contents
of their explosives storage magazines in order to reconcile the
contents with inventory records. In addition, 9 entities said they had
received inspections of their storage facilities, primarily by ATF. Six
entities told us they received the inspections on a periodic basis,
with another 3 entities having received a onetime inspection. Regarding
oversight by multiple regulatory authorities, one entity had been
inspected by both ATF and a local government authority, while another
entity was inspected on a recurring basis by both ATF and a state
government authority. Five of the 14 entities we visited told us they
were required to obtain a license from state regulatory authorities to
operate their explosives storage facilities. One of these entities was
also required (by the state regulatory authority) to obtain a federal
explosives license issued by ATF. Officials at 13 entities we visited
said they did not object to the possibility of federal licensing or
inspection of their explosives storage facilities. Officials at 3 state
and local entities noted that additional federal oversight was not a
concern as long as they were not held to a higher standard of security
and safety than ATF requires of private industry.
* Thefts and compliance issues. Two of the five thefts we documented
during our site visits and other state and local contacts occurred at
state and local entities we visited. At one storage facility, officials
told us that criminals had once used a cutting torch to illegally gain
entry to an explosives storage magazine. At another storage facility,
officials said that an unauthorized individual had obtained keys to a
storage magazine and taken some of the explosives. In both incidents,
the perpetrators were apprehended and the explosives recovered.
However, one of these incidents did not appear in ATF's nationwide
database of reported thefts and missing explosives. We also observed
storage practices at four facilities that may not be in compliance with
federal explosives regulations. However, these circumstances appeared
to be related to storage safety issues, rather than storage security.
In April 2005, the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board--which
represents more than 450 law enforcement bomb squads nationwide--
initiated a program encouraging bomb squads to request a voluntary ATF
inspection, maintain an accurate explosives inventory, and assess the
adequacy of security at their explosive storage facilities to determine
if additional measures might be required (such as video monitoring,
fencing, and alarms). This is a voluntary program and it is too soon to
tell what effect, if any, it will have towards enhancing security at
state and local law enforcement storage facilities and reducing the
potential for thefts.
Conclusions and Recommendations:
The overall number of state and local government explosives storage
facilities, the types of explosives being stored, and the number of
storage magazines associated with these facilities are currently not
known by ATF. ATF has no authority to oversee state and local
government storage facilities as part of the federal licensing process,
nor does it have specific statutory authority to conduct regulatory
inspections of these facilities. As a result, ATF's ability to monitor
the potential vulnerability of these facilities to theft or assess the
extent to which these facilities are in compliance with federal
explosives storage regulations is limited.
According to ATF's interpretation of federal explosives laws and
regulations, state and local government agencies--including law
enforcement bomb squads and public universities--are required to report
incidents of theft or missing explosives to ATF within 24 hours of an
occurrence. Because this reporting requirement applies to any "person"
who has knowledge of a theft from his stock and the definition of
"person" does not specifically include state and local government
agencies, ATF officials acknowledged that these entities may be unsure
as to whether they are required to report under this requirement. If
state and local government entities are unsure about whether they are
required to report thefts and missing explosives, ATF's ability to
monitor these incidents and take appropriate investigative action may
be compromised by a potential lack of information. Further, the size of
the theft problem, and thus the risk, at state and local government
storage facilities will remain unclear.
To allow ATF to better monitor and respond to incidents of missing or
stolen explosives, the report we are releasing at this hearing
recommends that the Attorney General direct the ATF Director to clarify
the explosives incident reporting regulations to help ensure that all
persons and entities who store explosives, including state and local
government agencies, understand their obligation to report all thefts
or missing explosives to ATF within 24 hours of an occurrence. The
Department of Justice agreed with our recommendation and said it would
take steps to implement it.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may
have.
Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
For information about this testimony, please contact Laurie E.
Ekstrand, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at (202) 512-
8777, or EkstrandL@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this testimony. Other individuals making key contributions to
this testimony include William Crocker, Assistant Director; Philip
Caramia; and Michael Harmond.
FOOTNOTES
[1] GAO, ATF: Thefts of Explosives from State and Local Government
Storage Facilities Are Few but May Be Underreported, GAO-06-92
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 3, 2005).
[2] Licenses are issued to persons who manufacture, import, or sell
explosives, while permits are issued to persons who intend to acquire
and use explosives. Throughout the remainder of this statement,
references to explosives licenses, licensees, or ATF's licensing
authority refer to both explosives licenses and permits.
[3] Including the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands.
[4] One of these was later determined to be the possible result of
training explosives that had been mistakenly discarded.
[5] The term "person" is defined in statute and regulation as "any
individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership,
society, or joint stock company" (see 18 U.S.C. § 841(a); and 27 C.F.R.
§ 555.11).
[6] Two of these five incidents occurred at locations we visited; three
occurred at other locations we identified during the course of our
audit work.