ATF
Thefts of Explosives from State and Local Government Storage Facilities Are Few but May Be Underreported Gao ID: GAO-06-92 October 3, 2005More than 5.5 billion pounds of explosives are used each year in the United States by private sector companies and government entities. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has authority to regulate explosives and to license privately owned explosives storage facilities. After the July 2004 theft of several hundred pounds of explosives from a state and local government storage facility, concerns arose about vulnerability to theft. GAO analyzed (1) the extent of explosives thefts from state and local government facilities, (2) ATF's authority to regulate and oversee state and local government explosives storage facilities, (3) the information ATF collects about state and local government storage facilities, and (4) security oversight measures in place at selected state and local government storage facilities.
Judging from available ATF data, there have been few thefts of explosives from state and local government storage facilities. From January 2002 to February 2005, ATF received only 9 reports of thefts or missing explosives from state and local facilities, compared with a total of 205 explosives thefts reported nationwide during this same period. During the course of our audit, we found evidence of 5 thefts from state and local government facilities, 1 of which did not appear in ATF's national database on thefts and missing explosives. Thus, the actual number of thefts occurring at state and local storage facilities could be higher than that identified by ATF data. ATF has no authority to oversee or inspect all state and local government explosives storage facilities. State and local government agencies are not required to obtain a license from ATF to use and store explosives, and only licensees--such as private sector explosives storage facilities--are subject to mandatory oversight. As a result, ATF has no means to ensure that state and local government facilities are in compliance with federal regulations. While ATF does not collect nationwide information about state and local government explosives storage facilities, information about some of these facilities is collected--for example, when facility operators voluntarily request an ATF inspection. Since January 2002, ATF has conducted 77 voluntary inspections at state and local storage facilities and found no systemic violations. By comparison, all licensed private sector facilities must submit a variety of information about their facility--including location and security measures in place--to ATF during the licensing process. ATF also collects information about these facilities during mandatory inspections. At the 18 state and local government storage facilities we visited, a variety of security measures were in place, including locked gates, fencing, patrols, and in some cases, electronic surveillance. All the facilities' officials told GAO that they conducted routine inventories. But most were not required to be licensed or inspected by state or local regulatory agencies. We identified several instances of possible noncompliance with federal regulations, related primarily to storage safety issues rather than security.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-92, ATF: Thefts of Explosives from State and Local Government Storage Facilities Are Few but May Be Underreported
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2005:
ATF:
Thefts of Explosives from State and Local Government Storage Facilities
Are Few but May Be Underreported:
GAO-06-92:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-92, a report to congressional requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
More than 5.5 billion pounds of explosives are used each year in the
United States by private sector companies and government entities. The
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has authority
to regulate explosives and to license privately owned explosives
storage facilities. After the July 2004 theft of several hundred pounds
of explosives from a state and local government storage facility,
concerns arose about vulnerability to theft.
GAO analyzed (1) the extent of explosives thefts from state and local
government facilities, (2) ATF‘s authority to regulate and oversee
state and local government explosives storage facilities, (3) the
information ATF collects about state and local government storage
facilities, and (4) security oversight measures in place at selected
state and local government storage facilities.
What GAO Found:
Judging from available ATF data, there have been few thefts of
explosives from state and local government storage facilities. From
January 2002 to February 2005, ATF received only 9 reports of thefts or
missing explosives from state and local facilities, compared with a
total of 205 explosives thefts reported nationwide during this same
period. During the course of our audit, we found evidence of 5 thefts
from state and local government facilities, 1 of which did not appear
in ATF‘s national database on thefts and missing explosives. Thus, the
actual number of thefts occurring at state and local storage facilities
could be higher than that identified by ATF data.
ATF has no authority to oversee or inspect all state and local
government explosives storage facilities. State and local government
agencies are not required to obtain a license from ATF to use and store
explosives, and only licensees”such as private sector explosives
storage facilities”are subject to mandatory oversight. As a result, ATF
has no means to ensure that state and local government facilities are
in compliance with federal regulations.
While ATF does not collect nationwide information about state and local
government explosives storage facilities, information about some of
these facilities is collected”for example, when facility operators
voluntarily request an ATF inspection. Since January 2002, ATF has
conducted 77 voluntary inspections at state and local storage
facilities and found no systemic violations. By comparison, all
licensed private sector facilities must submit a variety of information
about their facility”including location and security measures in place”
to ATF during the licensing process. ATF also collects information
about these facilities during mandatory inspections.
At the 18 state and local government storage facilities we visited, a
variety of security measures were in place, including locked gates,
fencing, patrols, and in some cases, electronic surveillance. All the
facilities‘ officials told GAO that they conducted routine inventories.
But most were not required to be licensed or inspected by state or
local regulatory agencies. We identified several instances of possible
noncompliance with federal regulations, related primarily to storage
safety issues rather than security.
Explosives Storage Facility in Pennsylvania:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Attorney General direct the ATF Director to
clarify explosives incident reporting regulations to ensure that all
entities storing explosives, including state and local government
agencies, understand their obligation to report all thefts or missing
explosives. The Department of Justice agreed with GAO‘s recommendation
and indicated it would take steps to implement it.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-92.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Laurie Ekstrand at (202)
512-8777 or ekstrandl@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Limited Data Indicate That Few Thefts May Have Occurred at State and
Local Government Storage Facilities, but the Exact Number Is Uncertain:
ATF Authority to Oversee State and Local Government Explosives Storage
Facilities Is Limited, as Is ATF's Capacity to Absorb Additional
Oversight Responsibilities:
ATF Does Not Collect Nationwide Information about State and Local
Government Storage Facilities, but Does So for Licensed Private Sector
Facilities:
Security Measures Varied at State and Local Explosives Storage
Facilities We Visited:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Tables:
Table 1: Overview of the State and Local Entities We Visited:
Table 2: Types of Physical Security in Place at the 18 Explosives
Storage Facilities We Visited:
Table 3: Inventory and Oversight Activities at the 14 State and Local
Entities Visited:
Table 4: State and Local Entities Visited:
Figures:
Figure 1: Type 1 (Permanent Structure) Explosives Storage Magazines in
Texas and Colorado:
Figure 2: Type 2 (Mobile) Explosives Storage Magazines in Pennsylvania
and Tennessee:
Figure 3: Type 3 (Portable Day-Box) Explosives Storage Magazine in
Pennsylvania:
Figure 4: Pennsylvania Storage Facility with Interior Barrier
Surrounding Type 2 Storage Magazines:
Abbreviations:
ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
OIG: Office of the Inspector General:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 3, 2005:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Tom Lantos:
House of Representatives:
More than 5.5 billion pounds of explosives are used each year in the
United States. These explosives are used by both public sector entities
(such as state and local government agencies) and private sector
companies for a variety of purposes--including mining, construction,
avalanche control, and law enforcement.[Footnote 1] Under current
federal explosives laws and regulations, the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is responsible for licensing and
regulating explosives manufacturers, importers, dealers, and users.
ATF's authority to regulate explosives stems originally from the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 and was expanded further by
enactment of the Safe Explosives Act in 2002.[Footnote 2] It is
primarily through its licensing authority that ATF oversees and
inspects privately owned explosives facilities to ensure they comply
with explosives storage laws and regulations. With regard to government-
owned explosives storage facilities, state and local agencies are also
subject to federal explosives storage laws and regulations, but exempt
from the ATF licensing requirements.[Footnote 3]
In July 2004, several hundred pounds of explosives were stolen from law
enforcement storage magazines at a city/county storage facility in
California. The thieves were subsequently arrested and the explosives
were recovered. Out of concern that state and local government
explosives storage facilities could be vulnerable to theft, you asked
us to provide information regarding the security oversight of these
facilities. For this report, we focused on the following questions:
What is the extent of explosives thefts from state and local government
facilities and how does this compare with the total number of
explosives thefts reported nationwide?
What authority does ATF have to regulate and oversee state and local
government explosives storage facilities and how does this compare with
its authority over private sector storage facilities?
What information does ATF collect regarding the locations and types and
amounts of explosives stored at state and local government explosives
storage facilities and how does this compare with information collected
about private sector storage facilities?
What security oversight measures are in place at selected state and
local government storage facilities to ensure the safe and secure
storage of explosives?
To address these questions, we obtained information from U.S.
government agencies, law enforcement associations, industry groups, and
other experts on explosives. More specifically, to obtain the
perspectives of U.S. government agencies on their efforts to regulate
and oversee state and local government explosives storage facilities,
and to obtain information on the numbers of explosives thefts and law
enforcement bomb squads, we contacted officials from the Department of
Justice (DOJ), ATF, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). To
obtain other public sector and private sector perspectives on the
security oversight of explosives storage facilities, we contacted
associations representing state and local law enforcement agencies and
the explosives industry. To determine what selected states and
localities are doing to provide oversight of explosives storage in
state and local government sector facilities, we met with officials at
14 state and local government entities (13 law enforcement bomb squads
and one public university) in four states--Colorado, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and Texas--and observed their explosives storage facilities.
We selected these four states to obtain a geographic spread (west,
northeast, southeast, and southwest) across the country, based on (1)
the number of explosives licensees and reported explosives thefts, (2)
the number of law enforcement bomb squads, and (3) the location of
universities with mining programs.[Footnote 4] Our criteria for
identifying the type of security oversight measures in place included
existing federal explosives storage laws and regulations and security
guidelines issued by the explosives industry. Because we selected and
visited a limited nonprobability sample of 14 state and local entities
in the four states, the information discussed in this report cannot be
generalized to all state and local government agencies that store
explosives. Additional detail on our scope and methodology is provided
in appendix I.
We conducted our work from February through August 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Judging from available ATF data, there have been few thefts of
explosives from state and local government storage facilities. However,
reports of thefts could be understated by an unknown amount. During the
3-year period from January 2002 to February 2005, ATF received only 9
reports of thefts or missing explosives from state and local government
storage facilities. By comparison, during this same time period there
were a total of 205 explosives thefts reported from all sources
nationwide. There are two federal reporting requirements relating to
the theft of explosives--one is specific to explosives licensees (and
permittees) and the other generally applies to "any person who has
knowledge of the theft or loss of any explosive materials from his
stock." While ATF has interpreted this second reporting requirement as
applying to nonlicensed state and local government explosives storage
facilities, ATF officials acknowledged that state and local government
entities may be unclear as to whether they are covered under this
requirement. Indeed, this lack of clarity issue may have contributed to
our findings: During our audit, we found evidence of five thefts from
state and local government facilities, one of which did not appear in
ATF's national database on thefts and missing explosives. Because of
this, the total number of thefts occurring at state and local
government storage facilities could actually be more than the number
identified by ATF data.
Although federal storage requirements are applicable to state and local
government explosives storage facilities, ATF does not have oversight
authority with respect to these facilities. With respect to private
sector facilities, ATF oversight--including the ability to conduct
regulatory inspections--is linked to the licensing of facilities.
Private sector businesses and organizations that import, manufacture,
or deal in explosives are required to obtain a federal license. As a
requirement of the licensing process, private sector licensees are
generally subject to mandatory ATF oversight inspections of their
explosives storage facilities. State and local government agencies that
use and store explosives are not required under federal explosives law
to obtain a license from ATF. In addition, ATF does not have specific
statutory authority to conduct regulatory inspections at state and
local explosives storage facilities. State and local government storage
facilities are generally not inspected by ATF, unless the facility
operator voluntarily requests such an inspection or shares its storage
magazine with ATF. As a result, ATF has no means to ensure that all
state and local government facilities nationwide are in compliance with
federal storage regulations.
ATF does not collect nationwide information on the number and location
of state and local government storage facilities or the types and
amounts of explosives that are being stored in these facilities. State
and local government agencies are exempt from obtaining a federal
explosives license, and they are not subject to ATF oversight
authority. As a result, ATF has no real way of knowing the precise
number of these facilities or the extent to which their explosives
storage facilities are secure from theft. For a limited number of state
and local government facilities--those that request a voluntary
inspection or where ATF shares a state and local magazine--ATF conducts
inspections that allow it to collect information about such things as
the location and characteristics of these storage facilities. However,
because ATF does not have authority to conduct mandatory inspections of
all state and local government entities, ATF has no means to collect
this type of information nationwide. Although ATF cannot gather
information about state and local government entities, it is able to
collect a variety of information about private sector explosives
licensees, who operate roughly 7,500 storage facilities and nearly
23,000 permanent or mobile storage magazines in the United States.
Information about these storage facilities and the explosives being
stored is required to be submitted to ATF during the licensing
application process. Additional information is collected during the
course of mandatory ATF inspections of licensees. During our audit, we
identified various types of state and local government agencies that
use and store explosives--including law enforcement bomb squads, public
universities, and departments of transportation. However, we did not
gather sufficient information about these entities to reliably estimate
the total number of state and local government storage facilities and
magazines nationwide.
At the 14 state and local entities we visited, we observed a variety of
security measures in place at their 18 storage facilities. Regarding
physical security, most storage facilities had some kind of locked gate
to prevent vehicle access, and several had fencing surrounding their
storage facilities or storage magazines. At each of these facilities,
officials told us they visually inspected or patrolled the facility on
a regular basis. Four storage facilities also had electronic security
systems in place--either monitored alarms or video surveillance--
although one of these was out of service at the time of our visit.
Officials at several other entities said they were actively planning to
implement some form of electronic security or were in the process of
installing a security system in the near future at their storage
facilities. These types of security measures--fences, vehicle barriers
and electronic monitoring devices--all exceed the requirements of
federal explosives regulations. Regarding oversight activities,
officials at all the entities we visited told us they conducted routine
inventories of their storage facilities. Most facilities were not
required to be licensed or inspected by state or local regulatory
agencies, although several officials said they had previously had their
storage facilities inspected by ATF. Two of the 14 entities we visited
had previously reported a loss or experienced a theft of explosives,
but only one of these incidents appeared in ATF's nationwide theft
database.
To allow ATF to better monitor and respond to incidents of missing or
stolen explosives, we are recommending that the Attorney General direct
the ATF Director to clarify the explosives incident reporting
regulations to ensure that all persons and entities who store
explosives, including state and local government agencies, understand
their obligation to report all thefts or missing explosives to ATF
within 24 hours of an occurrence.
We provided a draft of this report to DOJ for its review and comment.
DOJ agreed with our recommendation and also provided technical
comments, which we have incorporated into the report, as appropriate.
Background:
ATF is the chief enforcer of explosives laws and regulations in the
United States and is responsible for licensing and regulating
explosives manufacturers, importers, dealers, and users.[Footnote 5]
ATF is also responsible for regulating most, but not all, explosives
storage facilities. ATF's regulatory authority over explosives stems
from the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.[Footnote 6] This statute
imposed controls over the importation, manufacture, distribution, and
storage of explosives, and was the basis for giving ATF enforcement
responsibilities for these controls.[Footnote 7] The Safe Explosives
Act expanded ATF's authority to generally require licenses for persons
who purchase or receive explosives and background checks on licensees
and their employees who handle explosives.[Footnote 8]
Under federal explosives regulations, a license is required for persons
who manufacture, import, or deal in explosives and, with some
exceptions, for persons who intend to acquire explosives for use. No
license is required solely to operate an explosives storage facility.
However, all persons who store explosive materials (including state and
local agencies) must conform with applicable ATF storage regulations,
irrespective of whether they are required to obtain an explosives
license for other purposes. State and local agencies are not required
to obtain an explosives license to use and store explosives. Similarly,
federal government agencies, the U.S. military, and other federally
owned or operated establishments are exempt from compliance with both
the licensing and the storage regulations. According to ATF data, as of
February 2005 there were 12,028 federal explosives licensees in the
United States.[Footnote 9] Roughly 7,500 of these had some kind of
explosives storage facility, consisting of 22,791 permanent or mobile
storage magazines.
ATF storage regulations include requirements relating to the safety and
security of explosives storage magazines--that is, any building or
structure (other than an explosives manufacturing building) used for
storage of explosive materials. Regarding safety, the storage
regulations include requirements related to location, construction,
capacity, housekeeping, interior lighting, and magazine repairs, as
well as a requirement that the local fire safety authority be notified
of the location of each storage magazine. Regarding security, the ATF
storage regulations include the following requirements:
* Explosives handling. All explosive materials[Footnote 10] must be
kept in locked magazines unless they are in the process of manufacture,
being physically handled in the operating process of a licensee or
user, being used, or being transported to a place of storage or use.
Explosives are not to be left unattended when in portable storage
magazines.
* Magazine construction. Storage magazines must be theft-resistant and
must meet specific requirements dealing with such things as mobility,
exterior construction, door hinges and hasps, and locks.
* Magazine inspection. Storage magazines must be inspected at least
every 7 days. This inspection need not be an inventory, but it must be
sufficient to determine if there has been an unauthorized entry or
attempted entry into the magazines, or unauthorized removal of the
magazine contents.
* Magazine inventory. Within the magazine, containers of explosive
materials are to be stored so that marks are visible. Stocks of
explosive materials are to be stored so they can be easily counted and
checked.
Notwithstanding the security requirements described above, ATF storage
regulations do not require explosives storage facilities to have any of
the following physical security features--fences, restricted property
access, exterior lighting, alarm systems, or electronic surveillance.
Also, while ATF licensing regulations require explosives licensees to
conduct a physical inventory at least annually, there is no similar
inventory requirement in the storage regulations applicable to other
persons who store explosives.
Limited Data Indicate That Few Thefts May Have Occurred at State and
Local Government Storage Facilities, but the Exact Number Is Uncertain:
According to ATF data, the number of reported state and local
government thefts is relatively small when compared with the total
number of thefts that have occurred nationwide. For example, during a
recent 3-year period (January 2002--February 2005), 9 thefts involving
state and local government storage facilities were reported. Of these,
5 involved state and local law enforcement agencies (1 was later
determined to be the possible result of training explosives that had
been mistakenly discarded), 3 others involved state government entities
(all universities), and the remaining incident took place at a county
highway department. Two of the 9 incidents occurred in California
(including last year's theft that was mentioned previously), and no
other state reported more than one incident. By comparison, during this
same period, ATF received reports of 205 explosives thefts nationwide
from all sources. Three states--California, Texas, and Pennsylvania--
accounted for about one-quarter (53) of the total reported thefts
nationwide. According to ATF officials, this may be due to the larger
numbers of explosives licensees and storage magazines located in these
three states.
The amounts of explosives reported stolen or missing from state and
local government facilities in each reported incident of theft are also
relatively small when compared with the total amounts of stolen and
missing explosives nationwide. For example, during a recent 10-month
period for which data were available (March 2003 through December
2003), there were a total of 76 theft incidents nationwide reported to
ATF, amounting to a loss of about 3,600 pounds of high explosives,
3,100 pounds of blasting agents, 1,400 detonators, and 2,400 feet of
detonating cord and safety fuse. By comparison, over an entire 10-year
period (January 1995--December 2004), ATF received only 14 reports of
theft from state and local law enforcement storage magazines. In 10 of
these incidents, less than 50 pounds of explosives was reported stolen
or missing; while in 3 of the incidents, more than 50 pounds was stolen
or missing.[Footnote 11] In 6 of these 14 cases, ATF data indicate that
most or all of the explosives were recovered; in the other 8 cases,
none of the explosives have been recovered.
While the ATF theft data indicate that thefts from state and local
facilities make up only a small part of the overall thefts nationwide,
these reports may be understated by an unknown amount. There are two
federal reporting requirements relating to the theft of explosives. One
is specific to all federal explosives licensees (and permittees) and
requires any licensee to report any theft or loss of explosives to ATF
within 24 hours of discovery. The second reporting requirement
generally requires any other "person" who has knowledge of the theft or
loss of any explosive materials from his stock to report to ATF within
24 hours. Although the term "person" as defined in law and regulation
does not specifically include state and local government
agencies,[Footnote 12] ATF has historically interpreted this
requirement as applying to nonlicensed state and local government
explosives storage facilities. With respect to the second reporting
requirement, according to ATF, the legislative history of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 indicates that Congress believed visibility
over all incidents [emphasis added] of stolen explosives was necessary
to effectively enforce any federal explosives regulatory statute--
primarily because of the special problems presented by stolen explosive
materials and the persons possessing them.
While ATF has interpreted the theft reporting requirement as applying
to state and local government explosives storage facilities, ATF
officials acknowledged that state and local government entities could
be unsure as to their coverage under the theft reporting requirements.
As a result, some state and local government entities may not know they
are required to report such incidents to ATF, and this lack of
information could impair ATF's ability to monitor these incidents and
take appropriate investigative action. Indeed, during our site visits
and other state and local contacts, we identified five state and local
government entities that had previously experienced an incident of
theft or reported missing explosives--two involving local law
enforcement agencies, two involving state universities, and one
involving a state department of transportation.[Footnote 13] However,
one of these five incidents did not appear in ATF's nationwide database
of reported thefts and missing explosives. Based on these findings, the
actual number of thefts occurring at state and local government storage
facilities nationwide could be more than the number identified by ATF
data.
ATF Authority to Oversee State and Local Government Explosives Storage
Facilities Is Limited, as Is ATF's Capacity to Absorb Additional
Oversight Responsibilities:
With certain exceptions (such as for federal agencies), federal
explosives law requires all persons who store explosives to conform to
applicable regulations. However, there is no ATF oversight mechanism in
place to ensure that state and local government facilities have
complied with the regulations. With respect to private sector entities,
ATF's authority to oversee explosives storage facilities is primarily a
function of its licensing process. However, the licensing requirements
described in the law and regulations above do not apply to the
transportation, shipment, receipt, or importation of explosive
materials to any state or its political subdivision (such as a city or
county). That is, government entities, such as state and local law
enforcement agencies, are not required to obtain a federal license to
use and store explosives. In addition, ATF does not have specific
statutory authority to conduct regulatory inspections at state and
local explosives storage facilities. As a result, these facilities are
not subject to mandatory oversight under ATF's licensing authority or
any ATF regulatory inspection authority apart from the licensing
process.
ATF may inspect state and local government storage facilities under
certain circumstances--for example, if the operator of the facility
voluntarily requests ATF to conduct an inspection. Since January 2002,
ATF has conducted 77 voluntary inspections at state and local storage
facilities--34 inspections at facilities that ATF shares with state and
local agencies and 43 inspections at other state and local
facilities.[Footnote 14] These inspections basically involve checking
for compliance with federal storage regulations, including verifying
proper construction of the storage magazine and verifying that the
amount of explosives stored is consistent with the approved table of
distances.[Footnote 15] In addition to conducting voluntary
inspections, ATF also conducts inspections of state and local
explosives storage magazines that are shared by ATF and a state or
local agency. ATF currently shares space in 52 storage magazines,
including 33 that are owned or leased by state and local agencies.
Shared magazines are subject to mandatory inspections by ATF, and the
inspection procedures are basically the same as those described above
for voluntary inspections. According to ATF officials, no significant
or systemic safety or security problems have been found during
inspections of state and local storage magazines. However, regarding
those state and local government facilities that ATF does not inspect,
ATF officials acknowledged they had no way of knowing the extent to
which these facilities are complying with federal storage regulations.
By comparison with state and local government entities, private sector
licensees are subject to mandatory ATF oversight and inspection. Under
provisions of the Safe Explosives Act, ATF is generally required to
physically inspect a license applicant's storage facility prior to
issuing a federal explosives license--which effectively means at least
one inspection every 3 years. This inspection is intended to verify
that the applicant's storage facility complies with federal regulations
regarding safety and security, and the inspection requirement applies
to original license applications, as well as renewals (with certain
exceptions).[Footnote 16] In addition, the regulations allow ATF to
inspect licensees at any time during business hours, for the purpose of
inspecting or examining any records or documents required to be
maintained and any explosive materials kept or stored at the premises.
ATF officials stated that if the agency were to be required to conduct
mandatory inspections of state and local government storage facilities,
they would likely need additional resources to conduct these
inspections because they are already challenged to keep up with
inspections that are mandated as part of the explosives licensing
requirements. One factor that affects ATF's ability to meet inspection
goals is that inspectors have to conduct inspections of licensed
firearms dealers, manufacturers, and importers, as well as explosives
licensees. As noted above, ATF must physically inspect explosives
licensees at least once every 3 years--or about one-third (4,000) of
the roughly 12,000 licensees each year. According to ATF officials,
because license applications and renewals are not evenly distributed
over this 3-year cycle, some years there may actually be more or less
than 4,000 inspections per year. ATF currently has 723 field
inspectors, 620 of whom regularly conduct explosives and firearms
inspections (the others are in supervisory or administrative
positions). About 20 percent of the inspection time is spent on
explosives inspections; the remainder is spent on firearms.
In July 2004, DOJ's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported that
ATF's inspections program was being affected by staffing shortages. The
OIG noted that in response to passage of the Safe Explosives Act, ATF
had to divert resources from firearms inspections to conduct explosives
inspections required under the act. The OIG report further stated that
ATF had calculated (and reported to Congress) that it needed almost
1,800 inspectors--including 540 just for explosives inspections--to
manage its existing inspection workload at that time.[Footnote 17] To
help ATF carry out its explosives responsibilities, the conferees on
the DOJ appropriations act for fiscal year 2005 directed funding
increases in fiscal year 2005 for the hiring of an additional 31
explosives inspectors, for purposes of explosives investigations and
regulatory compliance.[Footnote 18] In addition, the House Committee on
Appropriations has recommended additional funding in ATF's fiscal year
2006 appropriation, for the hiring of another 50 explosives
inspectors.[Footnote 19] Despite these increases, giving ATF additional
responsibility to oversee state and local government storage facilities
could further tax the agency's inspection resources. According to ATF
officials, because of the legislative mandate to physically inspect
explosives licensees, the effect of additional state and local
government explosives responsibilities (without similar increases in
inspector resources) could be to reduce the number of firearms
inspections that ATF could conduct.
ATF Does Not Collect Nationwide Information about State and Local
Government Storage Facilities, but Does So for Licensed Private Sector
Facilities:
According to ATF officials, ATF does not collect nationwide information
on the number and location of state and local government explosives
storage facilities, nor does the agency know the types and amounts of
explosives being stored in these facilities. With respect to private
sector licensees, ATF collects descriptive information concerning
explosive storage facilities as part of the licensing process. However,
state and local government explosive storage facilities are not
required to obtain a license from ATF, and ATF does not have specific
statutory authority to conduct regulatory inspections of such
facilities. As a result, no systematic information about these
facilities is collected. For those state and local government
facilities that ATF does inspect--either voluntary inspections of state
and local magazines or mandatory inspections of shared magazines--some
information is collected by ATF. During these inspections, ATF collects
information about the location of the storage magazines, the types and
amounts of explosives stored, and whether the magazines are in
compliance with federal storage regulations. According to ATF
officials, the information obtained from these inspections--along with
the results from inspections of licensees--are maintained in ATF's N-
Spect nationwide inspection database. While mandatory annual
inspections are required by ATF at each of the 33 state and local
magazines where ATF shares storage space, there have been only 77
voluntary inspections of state and local storage magazines since
January 2002. ATF also has some ability to monitor state and local
storage facilities at locations where ATF maintains its own storage
magazine. ATF headquarters and field offices currently have 118 storage
magazines colocated at facilities with state and local storage
magazines. For these facilities, ATF collects information about the
location of the facility and the inspection status of any state and
local magazines on site.[Footnote 20] Of the 77 voluntary inspections
discussed above, 34 were at these colocated facilities.
By comparison, ATF collects a variety of information about private
sector explosives storage facilities, primarily under its authority to
issue explosives licenses. For example, ATF license application forms
require applicants for an explosives license to submit information
about their storage capabilities. Specific information applicants are
required to submit to ATF includes the type of storage magazine, the
location of the magazine, the type of security in place, the capacity
of the magazine, and the class of explosives that will be stored. ATF
also collects information about private sector storage facilities
during mandatory licensee inspections. As noted previously, prior to
issuing or renewing an explosives license, ATF must generally verify by
on-site inspection that the applicant has a storage facility that meets
the standards of public safety and security against theft as prescribed
in the regulations. Thereafter, ATF may also inspect a licensee at any
time during business hours--including inspection of storage magazines,
examination of explosives inventory and sales records, and verification
of compliance with ATF administrative rules. Because state and local
government storage facilities are exempt from the licensing process
described above, they are not required to submit licensing-related
information about their storage facility to ATF and they are not
subject to licensing-related mandatory ATF inspections. In addition,
ATF does not have specific statutory authority to perform regulatory
oversight inspections of such facilities apart from the licensing
process. As a result, ATF is unable to collect complete nationwide
information about where these facilities are or the types and amount of
explosives they store.
During the course of our audit work, we compiled data on state and
local law enforcement bomb squads that would be likely to use and store
explosives. At the 13 state and local law enforcement bomb squads we
visited, we identified 16 storage facilities and 30 storage magazines.
At these locations, the number of storage facilities ranged from 1 to
2, and the number of storage magazines ranged from 1 to 4. According to
FBI data, there are currently 452 state and local law enforcement bomb
squads nationwide. The total number of state and local government
storage facilities and magazines nationwide, however, encompasses other
entities in addition to law enforcement bomb squads--including other
law enforcement agencies, public universities, and departments of
transportation. The precise number of storage facilities and magazines
at these locations is currently unknown. And because of the limited
nature of our fieldwork, we cannot generalize about the extent of
security and oversight these entities may have at their own explosives
storage facilities.
Security Measures Varied at State and Local Explosives Storage
Facilities We Visited:
We found that security oversight measures varied at the 14 selected
state and local government entities we visited. These 14 entities
maintained a total of 18 storage facilities. With regard to physical
security, 13 of the 18 storage facilities restricted vehicle access to
the storage area. Six of the 18 storage facilities also had a barrier
immediately surrounding the storage containers preventing human access.
Official personnel at all 18 facilities said they patrolled or
inspected the storage facility on a regular basis. Regarding electronic
security, 4 of the 18 facilities had either an alarm or video
monitoring system in place. Inventory and other oversight activities at
all 14 of the state and local entities included regular, periodic
inventories of the contents of their explosives storage facilities. In
addition, a federal, state, or local government authority had performed
inspections for 9 of the 14 entities. State government agencies in
Colorado and Pennsylvania required 5 state and local entities we
visited in these states to obtain licenses to operate their explosives
storage facilities. However, 2 of these 5 entities did not have the
required licenses in place at the time of our visit. Two of the 14
entities had experienced prior thefts or losses from their storage
facilities, and we observed storage practices at four facilities that
may not be in compliance with federal regulations.
The following sections describe our observations of the explosives
storage magazines and types of security measures in place at the 18
state and local storage facilities we visited. Our criteria for
identifying the type of security measures in place included existing
federal explosives storage laws and regulations (27 C.F.R., Part 555,
Subpart K) and security guidelines issued by the explosives industry
(the Institute of Makers of Explosives). Most of these security
measures are not currently required under federal storage regulations
(perimeter fencing, for example). However, we are presenting this
information in order to demonstrate the wide range of security measures
actually in place at the time of our visits.
Explosives Storage Facilities Varied with Regard to Users and Size:
As shown in table 1, the 14 state and local government entities we
visited included 11 city or county bomb squads (including police
departments and sheriffs' offices), 2 state bomb squads, and one public
university. Four of the 14 state and local entities had two separate
storage areas encompassing a total of 18 explosives storage facilities
among the 14 entities. As further shown in table 1, 17 of these
explosives storage facilities were located on state, city, county, or
police property. These included 3 that were located on state property
(such as state law enforcement or state university), 7 that were
located at police training facilities, and 7 that were located on city
or county government-owned property (such as correctional or water
facilities). For example, one local entity we visited in Texas had a
storage facility located on the grounds of a city-owned nature
preserve.
Table 1: Overview of the State and Local Entities We Visited:
State and local entities;
Number: 14.
Agency type:
* State bomb squad;
Number: 2;
Examples: State police and highway patrol.
* City/county bomb squad;
Number: 11;
Examples: Police departments and sheriffs' offices.
* Public university;
Number: 1;
Examples: School with mining engineering curriculum.
Storage facility locations;
Number: 18.
Property type:
* Police training;
Number: 7;
Examples: Academy or other training facility.
* State;
Number: 3;
Examples: University, state law enforcement.
* City/county;
Number: 7;
Examples: Correctional facility, water treatment, nature park.
* Airport;
Number: 1;
Examples: Airport grounds.
Storage magazines;
Number: 34.
Magazine types:
* Type 1 (permanent);
Number: 10;
Examples: 7 aboveground, 3 underground.
* Type 2 (mobile);
Number: 22;
Examples: 19 box-type, 3 trailer-type.
* Type 3 (temporary);
Number: 2;
Examples: 2 day-boxes used for permanent storage.
Source: GAO observation, comments by state and local government
officials, and ATF regulations.
[End of table]
Also, 11 of the 18 explosives storage facilities we visited contained
multiple magazines for the storage of explosives. As a result, the 18
facilities housed a total of 34 magazines divided into various types as
shown in table 1.[Footnote 21] A Pennsylvania storage facility had 4
magazines, which was the largest number among the facilities we
visited. Figures 1 through 3 depict different types of explosives
storage magazines.
Figure 1: Type 1 (Permanent Structure) Explosives Storage Magazines in
Texas and Colorado:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 2: Type 2 (Mobile) Explosives Storage Magazines in Pennsylvania
and Tennessee:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Figure 3: Type 3 (Portable Day-Box) Explosives Storage Magazine in
Pennsylvania:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
All of the 18 facilities contained a variety of high explosives,
including C-4 plastic explosive, TNT, binary explosives, and
detonators. Officials from 13 of the state and local entities provided
us with estimates of the quantities of explosives they were storing,
and they reported amounts ranging from 10 to 1,000 pounds, with the
majority of the entities (9) indicating they had 200 pounds or less.
Different Types of Physical Security Measures at Explosives Storage
Facilities:
At the 18 storage facilities we visited, we looked for the presence of
exterior and interior fencing, other barriers to restrict vehicle or
pedestrian access, and security personnel. Federal explosives storage
regulations do not require any of these physical security attributes;
rather, the regulations generally require theft-resistant magazine
construction (including locks) and weekly inspections of magazines. As
shown in table 2, 13 of the 18 storage facilities restricted vehicle
access to the facility grounds by way of a locked security gate or by
virtue of being an indoor facility. Five of the 13 facilities
restricted vehicle access after normal working hours (nights or nights
and weekends). Officials at 7 other facilities said that vehicle access
to the facilities was restricted at all times, including the indoor
facility in Pennsylvania that was located in the basement of a
municipal building.[Footnote 22] While these outdoor facilities had
barriers to vehicle access via roadway, not all of the facilities were
completely surrounded by fencing or some other perimeter barrier, nor
do federal storage regulations require them to have such a barrier or
fencing.
Table 2: Types of Physical Security in Place at the 18 Explosives
Storage Facilities We Visited:
Exterior barrier around storage facility:
Type of physical security:
* Vehicle access restricted;
Number of storage facilities: 12;
Examples of physical security: Fence gates with electronic or manual
locks.
Type of physical security:
* All access restricted;
Number of storage facilities: 1;
Examples of physical security: Interior storage in basement of
municipal building.
Type of physical security:
* No exterior barrier;
Number of storage facilities: 5.
Extent of access control:
Type of physical security:
* Constant;
Number of storage facilities: 7;
Examples of physical security: 24 hours, 7 days a week.
Type of physical security:
* Certain periods only;
Number of storage facilities: 5;
Examples of physical security: Nights and weekends, or nights only.
Type of physical security:
* No access control;
Number of storage facilities: 5;
Examples of physical security: Accessible at all times by vehicle.
Type of physical security:
* Extent could not be verified;
Number of storage facilities: 1[A].
Interior barrier around storage magazine:
Type of physical security:
* Pedestrian access restricted;
Number of storage facilities: 6;
Examples of physical security: Chain- link fences with locked gates.
Type of physical security:
* All access restricted;
Number of storage facilities: 1;
Examples of physical security: Multiple interior door locks.
Type of physical security:
* No interior barrier;
Number of storage facilities: 11.
Extent of personnel presence:
Type of physical security:
* Regular patrols or inspections;
Number of storage facilities: 18;
Examples of physical security: Bomb squad officers and police officers.
Type of physical security:
* 24-hour on-site;
Number of storage facilities: 9[A];
Examples of physical security: City or county employees.
Source: GAO observation and comments of state and local government
officials.
[A] At 1 facility, we were unable to determine the extent of access
control or whether a 24-hour personnel presence existed.
[End of table]
Also, as shown in table 2, 6 of 18 storage facilities had an interior
barrier immediately surrounding their storage magazines to prevent
direct access by persons on foot. At each of these 6 facilities, the
barriers consisted of a chain-link fence with a locked gate barring
entry by unauthorized personnel (figure 4 reflects one of these
facilities). At 1 other facility (the indoor facility in Pennsylvania),
the storage magazines were in the basement of the municipal building,
and multiple locked doors were used to prevent access by unauthorized
personnel. Conversely, at 1 facility in Texas, the storage magazine
could be reached on foot or by vehicle at any time because it did not
have fencing or vehicle barriers to deter unauthorized access.
Figure 4: Pennsylvania Storage Facility with Interior Barrier
Surrounding Type 2 Storage Magazines:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Officials at all of the 18 storage facilities detailed in table 2 told
us that official personnel patrolled or inspected the storage facility
on a regular basis. For example, bomb squad officers said they
regularly visited the facilities to check on their condition, in
addition to visiting the facilities to retrieve or place explosive
materials in them. In addition to bomb squad personnel, officials at 14
of the 18 facilities said that police officers from local police
departments patrolled the facilities to check for any obvious signs of
problems such as forced entry. However, these police patrols typically
did not include actual entry into the storage magazines to inspect the
explosives themselves.
As further shown in table 2, officials at 9 of the 18 storage
facilities we visited said that state or local government employees
maintained a 24-hour presence at the facilities. Four of these storage
facilities were located on the grounds of police training centers,
where either trainees or facility personnel were present at all times.
Two storage facilities-one each in Tennessee and Texas--were on the
grounds of jail facilities where local correctional personnel worked 24
hours a day, 7 days a week. Two other storage facilities were located
on the grounds of city/county water or sewage treatment plants, and 1
storage facility was located in the basement of a municipal building.
One additional facility in Pennsylvania was located on the grounds of
the police academy, but we were unable to determine whether there was
24-hour, on-site presence at that facility.
Some Explosives Storage Facilities Had Electronic Security Measures:
At the 18 storage facilities we visited, we looked for the presence of
a monitored alarm or video surveillance system. Although no electronic
security is required under federal regulations, 4 of the 18 explosives
storage facilities had either an alarm or a video monitoring system in
place. Specifically, one entity in Texas had 2 facilities with
monitored alarm systems in place, and two entities in Pennsylvania and
Tennessee had video monitoring of their explosives storage facilities.
The Texas entity had alarm systems in place at 2 of its storage
facilities. At 1 facility, two small detonator magazines--while not
alarmed themselves--were located inside a building protected by an
alarm system. At a second facility, the door to an underground storage
magazine was alarmed. Regarding the 2 facilities with video monitoring,
the Tennessee facility--which was located on the grounds of a local
correctional facility--took advantage of a video surveillance system
already in place to monitor prisoners. The Pennsylvania facility with
video monitoring was located inside a municipal building and was part
of that building's overall video security system.
The remaining 14 of the 18 storage facilities did not have video or
alarm systems in place at the time of our visit. Officials at 4
facilities told us they had alarm systems planned (funding not yet
approved), and officials at 3 facilities said they had alarm systems
pending (funding approved and awaiting installation). Officials at 2
facilities also told us they planned to install video monitoring. For
example, 1 facility in Pennsylvania had its video monitoring system
destroyed by lightning and was planning to replace it. However, the
local government authority had yet to approve funding for the
replacement.
Several officials commented on the feasibility of installing alarm or
video monitoring systems at explosives storage facilities. At 4 of the
state and local entities we visited, officials noted that these storage
facilities are often located in remote areas without easy access to
sources of electricity. The officials added that this lack of necessary
electrical infrastructure could be a cost-prohibitive barrier if they
were required to install some form of electronic monitoring at
explosives storage facilities. Regarding the possibility of new storage
regulations that would require an electronic security system at
explosives storage magazines, officials at 9 state and local entities
told us they would not object to such a requirement as long as it did
not create an undue financial burden.
Inventory and Other Oversight Activities Varied at Explosives Storage
Facilities:
At the 14 state and local entities we visited, we looked for the
presence of internal inventory procedures, internal or external
inspections, and licensing of the storage facility by state or local
government agencies . Under federal regulations, only explosives
licensees are required to perform periodic inventories and are subject
to periodic ATF regulatory inspections of their storage facilities;
other persons who store explosives are not. As shown in table 3,
officials at all 14 of the entities we visited told us they performed
periodic inventories of the contents of their explosives storage
facilities. Typically, during these inventories, officials said they
count all the explosives in the storage facility and reconcile them
with inventory records maintained either manually or in a computerized
database.
Table 3: Inventory and Oversight Activities at the 14 State and Local
Entities Visited:
Type of inventory and oversight activity: Internal inventory:
Type of inventory and oversight activity:
* Annual;
Number of state/local entities: 7.
Type of inventory and oversight activity:
* More frequent;
Number of state/local entities: 7;
Examples of inventory and oversight activities: Conducted monthly,
bimonthly, or quarterly.
Type of inventory and oversight activity: External inspections.
Type of inventory and oversight activity:
* ATF only;
Number of state/local entities: 6;
Examples of inventory and oversight activities: All but one conducted
voluntarily.
Type of inventory and oversight activity:
* State or local authority only;
Number of state/local entities: 1;
Examples of inventory and oversight activities: Conducted by state
regulatory authority.
Type of inventory and oversight activity:
* Both ATF and state/local authority;
Number of state/local entities: 2;
Examples of inventory and oversight activities: Periodic by ATF, plus
state/local inspection.
Type of inventory and oversight activity:
* No external inspections;
Number of state/local entities: 5.
Type of inventory and oversight activity: License/permit.
Type of inventory and oversight activity:
* Required and in place;
Number of state/local entities: 3;
Examples of inventory and oversight activities: All issued by state
regulatory authority.
Type of inventory and oversight activity:
* Required and not in place;
Number of state/local entities: 2;
Examples of inventory and oversight activities: Required by state
regulatory authority.
Type of inventory and oversight activity:
* Not required and in place;
Number of state/local entities: 1;
Examples of inventory and oversight activities: Voluntarily obtained by
local police.
Type of inventory and oversight activity:
* Not required and not in place;
Number of state/local entities: 8.
Source: GAO observations and comments of state and local government
officials.
[End of table]
In addition, 9 of the 14 state and local entities said they had
received inspections of their storage facilities, and ATF had conducted
the inspections in all but 1 of these 9 cases. Regarding this 1 case in
Pennsylvania, officials said a state government authority regularly
performed these inspections. With regard to the ATF inspections, state
or local operators of the selected facilities voluntarily requested
these inspections in all but 1 case (as discussed further below).
Of the 9 selected state and local entities that received inspections by
a regulatory authority, 6 entities told us they received them on a
periodic basis, with another 3 entities having received a onetime
inspection (all by ATF). A Pennsylvania entity that said it received
annual inspections from ATF was unique among those we visited because
it had also received a onetime inspection from a local government
authority. This entity was the only one we visited to have any type of
inspection, either onetime or periodic, from a local government
authority. Last, a Colorado entity, another of the 5 receiving periodic
inspections, said it was being inspected on a recurring basis by both
ATF and a state government authority--it was the only entity we visited
that fell into this category.
Also as shown in table 3, 5 of the 14 state and local entities we
visited told us they were required to obtain a license from state
regulatory authorities to operate their explosives storage facilities.
One entity in Colorado had a license to store explosives issued by the
state, and this entity had also obtained a federal explosives license
issued by ATF. Officials at this location told us that the state
required them to obtain the federal license before applying for its
mandatory state license. Indeed, according to ATF officials, state or
local government facilities may apply for a federal explosives license
if it is required by their state regulatory agency. However, once such
a license is issued, these state and local government facilities must
then comply with all the same explosives laws and regulations that are
applicable to licensed private sector facilities.
Officials at the 14 state and local entities we visited commented on
the feasibility of mandatory ATF oversight of their explosives storage
facility. Officials at 13 state and local entities said they did not
object to the possibility of federal licensing or inspection of their
explosives storage facilities. Six state and local entities also said
that they already have close contacts with ATF and would not be
concerned about additional ATF oversight of their storage facilities.
Officials at 3 state and local entities noted that additional federal
oversight was not a concern, as long as they were not held to a higher
standard of security and safety than ATF requires of private industry.
Some Entities Had Experienced Explosives Thefts or Reported Losses:
Two of the 14 state and local entities we visited had previously had a
theft or loss of explosives from one of their storage facilities. At a
storage facility in Texas, officials told us that criminals had once
used a cutting torch to illegally gain entry to an explosives storage
magazine. Some explosives were stolen, but the suspected thieves were
later apprehended and the materials were recovered. At another storage
facility in Colorado, officials said that an unauthorized individual
had obtained keys to an explosives storage magazine and taken some of
the material. As with the previous case, several individuals were
apprehended and the materials were recovered. One of these incidents
(the theft of explosives in Texas) did not appear in ATF's nationwide
database of reported thefts and missing explosives.[Footnote 23]
The law enforcement community has recently taken action to address the
issue of thefts and security at law enforcement explosives storage
facilities. In April 2005, the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory
Board--which represents more than 450 accredited law enforcement bomb
squads nationwide--initiated a program to increase security awareness
at its members' explosives storage facilities. In a letter to its
membership, the advisory board encouraged all bomb squad commanders to
increase diligence regarding explosives storage security. The advisory
board also recommended that all bomb squads request a voluntary ATF
inspection, ensure they maintain an accurate explosives inventory, and
assess the adequacy of security measures in place at their respective
explosive storage facilities to determine whether additional measures
might be required--such as video monitoring, fencing, and alarms. This
is a voluntary program, and it is too soon to tell what effect, if any,
it will have towards enhancing the security at state and local law
enforcement storage facilities and reducing the potential for thefts.
Possible Noncompliance With Regulations at Some Storage Facilities:
At 4 of the 14 state and local entities we visited, we observed various
storage practices that may not be in compliance with federal explosives
regulations. These circumstances appeared to be related to storage
safety issues, rather than storage security. For example, one
explosives storage facility was located in the basement of a municipal
building and utilized small type 3 temporary magazines (known as day-
boxes) for permanent storage of high explosives and detonators. ATF
regulations state that these magazines should be used only for
temporary storage of explosives and may not be left unattended. At
another storage facility, a high explosives storage magazine housed a
small detonator (or "cap") magazine in its interior, although ATF
regulations generally require detonators to be kept separate from other
explosive materials. Another storage facility contained several boxes
of unmarked, 1970s-era plastic explosives (specifically C-4),
possession of which is generally restricted under federal explosives
law when the material in question does not contain a detection agent.
Finally, an official at one storage facility acknowledged that because
of the weight of explosives currently being stored, their storage
magazine was in violation of ATF regulations concerning allowable
distances from other inhabited structures.
Conclusions:
The overall number of state and local government explosives storage
facilities, the types of explosives being stored, and the number of
storage magazines associated with these facilities are currently
unknown. Further, because ATF does not oversee state and local
government storage facilities as part of the federal licensing process
and ATF does not have any other statutory authority to conduct
regulatory inspections of these facilities, ATF's ability to monitor
the potential vulnerability of these facilities to theft or assess the
extent to which these facilities are in compliance with federal
explosives storage regulations is limited. Nevertheless, current
federal explosives law as enacted by Congress does not provide ATF with
specific authority to conduct regulatory oversight with respect to
public sector facilities. And although we did observe possible
noncompliance with the storage regulations at some of the state and
local entities we visited, none of these circumstances appeared to make
the facilities more vulnerable to theft.
According to ATF's interpretation of federal explosives laws and
regulations, state and local government agencies--including law
enforcement bomb squads and public universities--are required to report
incidents of theft or missing explosives to ATF within 24 hours of an
occurrence. However, during the course of our audit work, we identified
five incidents involving theft or missing explosives at state and local
government facilities, one of which had not been reported to ATF.
Because this reporting requirement applies to any "person" who has
knowledge of a theft from his stock and the definition of "person" does
not specifically include state and local government agencies, ATF
officials acknowledged that these entities may be unsure as to whether
they are required to report under this requirement. On the basis of our
limited site visit observations and discussions with state, local, and
ATF officials, we did not identify a specific threat or vulnerability
to theft among state and local government explosive storage facilities.
However, if state and local government entities are unsure about
whether they are required to report thefts and missing explosives,
ATF's ability to monitor these incidents and take appropriate
investigative action may be compromised by a potential lack of
information.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To allow ATF to better monitor and respond to incidents of missing or
stolen explosives, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the
ATF Director to clarify the explosives incident reporting regulations
to ensure that all persons and entities who store explosives, including
state and local government agencies, understand their obligation to
report all thefts or missing explosives to ATF within 24 hours of an
occurrence.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
On September 9, 2005, we provided a draft of this report to the
Attorney General for review and comment.
On September 26, 2005, DOJ advised us that the department had no formal
agency comments and further advised us that DOJ agreed with our
recommendation and would take steps to implement it. ATF provided
technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report, as
appropriate.
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 30 days after the date of the report.
At that time, we will send copies of this report to the House Committee
on Government Reform; House Committee on the Judiciary; House Committee
on Homeland Security; Senate Committee on the Judiciary; Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; the Attorney
General; the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives; appropriate state and local government officials; and other
interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon
request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on
GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or EkstrandL@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were
William Crocker, Assistant Director; David Alexander; Amy Bernstein;
Philip Caramia; Geoffrey Hamilton; and Michael Harmond.
Signed by:
Laurie E. Ekstrand:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
In reviewing the security of state and local government explosives
storage facilities, we focused on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) role in overseeing and regulating these
facilities, including the extent to which ATF's licensing operations
address state and local government facilities and what authority ATF
has to enforce federal explosives law and regulations at state and
local government facilities. In addition, we reviewed the extent to
which ATF collects information about state and local government
facilities, including locations and types and amount of explosives
stored. To determine what states and localities are doing to ensure the
safe and secure storage of explosives, we visited state and local
explosives storage facilities. We also contacted other state and local
government and explosives industry officials.
Interviews and Other Contacts:
To obtain the perspectives of U.S. government agencies on their efforts
to regulate and oversee state and local government explosives storage
facilities, we met with ATF headquarters officials--specifically
individuals from ATF's Office of Enforcement Programs and Services,
Office of Field Operations, Office of Strategic Intelligence and
Information, and Office of the Chief Counsel. We also met with or
obtained information from officials with the Department of Justice's
(DOJ) Office of the Inspector General, as well as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) Bomb Data Center.
To determine what selected states and localities were doing to ensure
the safe and secure storage of explosives in state and local government
facilities, we met with state and local officials in Colorado,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas--specifically 13 state and local
bomb squads and 1 public university. In these four states, we also
contacted other state government agencies, including transportation and
environmental protection agencies and fire marshals. We also contacted
other public university officials in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah.
To obtain additional perspectives of law enforcement and explosives
industry experts on the safety and security of explosives storage
facilities, we contacted representatives from the National Bomb Squad
Commanders Advisory Board, the International Association of Bomb
Technicians and Investigators, the Institute of Makers of Explosives,
the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the National
Sheriffs' Association.
State and Local Site Visits:
To find out what selected states and localities are doing to ensure the
safe and secure storage of explosives in state and local government
facilities, we visited 14 state and local government entities that
stored explosives, as shown in table 4 below. During these site visits,
we met with state and local officials and physically observed their
explosives storage facilities and storage magazines.
Table 4: State and Local Entities Visited:
State: Colorado;
State level: Public university: 1;
City level: Police department: 1.
State: Pennsylvania;
State level: Law enforcement: 1;
City level: Police department: 3.
State: Tennessee;
State level: Law enforcement: 1;
County level: Sheriff's office: 1;
City level: Police department: 2.
State: Texas;
City level: Police department: 3;
City level: Fire department: 1.
State: Total;
State level: Law enforcement: 2;
State level: Public university: 1;
County level: Sheriff's office: 1;
City level: Police department: 9;
City level: Fire department: 1.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
We chose law enforcement bomb squads as the primary focus of our site
visits because (1) we concluded that state and local bomb squads would
be the most likely state and local government agencies to have a need
for explosives storage facilities and (2) there was no other source of
nationwide information on the number and location of state and local
government explosives storage facilities. We selected our state and
local site visits based on the following criteria:
* In selecting which states to visit, we chose those states most likely
to have significant state and local government and private sector
explosives activities. The state selection criteria included (1) the
number of federally licensed private sector explosives companies, (2)
the number of reported explosives thefts,[Footnote 24] and (3) the
number of law enforcement bomb squads.[Footnote 25] Using these
criteria, we then selected a geographic mix of states--specifically one
state in the northeast United States, one in the southeast, one in the
southwest, and one in the west.
* Within each state, we selected state and local bomb squads for our
site visits. These were chosen to represent a mix based on the type of
agency, size of jurisdiction, and geographic location. We selected two
state law enforcement agencies, one county sheriff, nine city police
departments, and one city fire department. These included three
jurisdictions with populations over 1 million, five with populations
between 100,000 and 1 million, three with populations below 100,000,
and two with statewide jurisdictions.
* We also selected one non-law enforcement explosives storage facility
operated by a state university. This facility was selected as typical
of the various state universities with mining-engineering programs and
because it had a significant amount of explosives (over 100 pounds) in
its storage facility.
During our site visits, we used a semistructured interview guide to
conduct interviews with state and local officials and determine the
level of security at their explosives storage facilities. Our criteria
for identifying the types of security measures in place included
existing federal storage laws and regulations (27 C.F.R., Part 555,
Subpart K) and security guidelines issued in 2005 by the explosives
industry (the Institute of Makers of Explosives). Not all of the
security criteria we used are currently requirements under federal
storage regulations (perimeter fencing, for example). We used these
additional criteria to demonstrate the wide range of security measures
actually in place at the time of our visits to these facilities. Also,
while we were not conducting a compliance audit, during our site visits
we observed each storage magazine and noted any instances where
explosives appeared not to be stored in compliance with federal
regulations.
We are not disclosing the names or other identifying information
relating to the individual state and local entities we visited to
ensure that security-related information is not unintentionally
disclosed. Because our review was limited to a nonprobability sample of
14 state and local entities in the four states, the information
discussed in this report is illustrative and cannot be generalized to
all state and local government entities nationwide that store
explosives.
ATF and FBI Data:
ATF provided data related to explosives licensing and inspections, as
well as relevant law, regulations, and procedures dealing with the
storage of explosives. We also obtained data from ATF's Arson and
Explosives National Repository related to incidents of theft and
missing explosives reported to ATF. FBI provided us with a nationwide
list of accredited bomb squads--including number, location, and name of
agency. In addition, FBI provided policies and guidance related to the
bomb squad training and accreditation process.
The information we obtained from ATF (data on explosives licensees,
explosives inspections, and explosives thefts) and FBI (data on the
number and location of bomb squads) was used to provide background
context on the number of private sector and state and local government
explosives storage facilities and to assist us in selecting locations
for our site visits. We interviewed agency officials knowledgeable
about the data, and as a result, we determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We also obtained
data from ATF on incidents of explosive thefts and missing explosives
at state and local government storage facilities. On the basis of our
site visits and other audit work, we determined that these incidents
may be underreported, as discussed earlier in this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] Law enforcement bomb squads, for example, may store explosives for
a number of uses--including destroying recovered explosives,
dismantling explosive devices, and holding explosive materials for
evidence.
[2] Specifically, Title XI of Public Law 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 952
(1970); and Subtitle C of Title XI of Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat.
2135, 2280 (2002), respectively.
[3] An approved storage facility is defined as a place where explosive
materials are stored, consisting of one or more approved storage
magazines. A storage magazine is defined as any building or structure,
other than an explosives manufacturing building, used for storage of
explosive materials.
[4] We are not disclosing the names or other identifying information
relating to the individual state and local entities we visited to
ensure that security-related information is not unintentionally
disclosed.
[5] Licenses are issued to persons who manufacture, import, or sell
explosives, while permits are issued to persons who intend to acquire
and use explosives. Throughout the remainder of this report, references
to explosives licenses, licensees, or ATF's licensing authority refer
to both explosives licenses and permits.
[6] Pub. L. No. 91-452, Title XI, 84 Stat. 922, 952 (1970). The
explosives regulatory functions of ATF are found at 27 C.F.R. Part 555.
[7] Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296,
116 Stat. 2135, 2280), ATF's existing enforcement responsibilities,
including its authority over explosives, were transferred from the
Treasury Department to the new Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives, within the Justice Department. All ATF regulations issued
prior to that time remained in effect.
[8] Subtitle C of Title XI of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
[9] Including licensees in the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands.
[10] As defined in the federal explosives law and regulations at 18
U.S.C. § 841 and 27 C.F.R. § 555.11.
[11] For the remaining incident, no details were available on the
quantity of explosives involved.
[12] The term "person" is defined in statute and regulation as "any
individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership,
society, or joint stock company" (see 18 U.S.C. § 841(a); and 27 C.F.R.
§ 555.11).
[13] Two of these five incidents occurred at locations we visited;
three occurred at other locations we identified during the course of
our audit work.
[14] As discussed later in this report, the total number of state and
local government storage facilities nationwide is currently unknown.
[15] As published in the federal storage regulations, the table of
distances lists the minimum acceptable distances separating explosives
magazines from inhabited buildings, passenger railroads, public
highways, and other explosives magazines.
[16] An exception is made for "limited" licenses which are good for 1
year and allow a limited number of explosives purchases. For new
applicants (and up to two renewals), ATF may verify the safety and
security of the applicant's storage facility by means other than an
inspection.
[17] The OIG disputed these figures, but still estimated ATF needed
about 800 inspectors just for firearms inspections. This is more than
the total number of firearms and explosives inspectors that are
currently on board.
[18] H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-792, at 733 (2004).
[19] H. R. Rep. No. 109-118, at 34 (2005).
[20] Such as whether the state and local magazines have been
voluntarily inspected by ATF.
[21] Title 27, section 555.203, of the Code of Federal Regulations
defines magazine types.
[22] At 1 other storage facility in Pennsylvania, we also observed a
vehicle barrier in place. However, local officials at this facility did
not provide information about whether or not the barrier was in place
at all times.
[23] In addition to the two incidents described above, we also
identified three other thefts at state and local entities during the
course of our audit work. These other three incidents were all reported
to ATF.
[24] Based on explosives licensing data compiled by ATF and explosives
theft incidents reported to ATF, both as of February 2005.
[25] Based on data about state and local law enforcement bomb squads
reported by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in November 2000.
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