Elections
Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists Gao ID: GAO-05-478 June 10, 2005Reports of ineligible persons registering to vote raised concerns about state processes for verifying voter registration lists. States base voter eligibility generally on the voter's age, U.S. citizenship, mental competence, and felon status. Although states run elections, Congress has authority to affect the administration of elections. The Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) sets a deadline for states to have a statewide voter registration list and list verification procedures. For this report, GAO selected seven states (AZ, CA, MI, NY, TX, VA, and WI) to represent a range of characteristics relevant to voter registrations, such as whether a statewide voter list existed prior to HAVA. This report discusses how these states verify voter registration eligibility; the challenges they face in maintaining accurate voter lists; the progress toward implementing HAVA registration requirements; and identifies federal data sources that might be used to help verify voter registration eligibility.
The methods used in seven selected states to verify voter eligibility and ensure accuracy of voter registration lists were varied and include relying on registrant self attestation, return mailings, and checking against lists of felony convictions or deceased individuals. Election officials from the selected states described some challenges that may be resolved when HAVA is fully implemented, such as reducing duplicates within the state. Other challenges--identifying duplicate registrations in other states or having insufficient information to match other data sources with voter registration lists--may continue to be issues. The seven states are in different phases of implementing HAVA statewide voter registration lists and eligibility verification requirements. Arizona implemented its statewide voter list by the January 1, 2004, deadline, and the other six states applied for a January 1, 2006, waiver. Of those six states, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin awarded contracts to develop new voter lists that are designed to address HAVA requirements. Michigan has had a statewide list since 1998, and officials believe it is near HAVA compliant. California election officials are still considering how to meet these HAVA requirements, and in New York, legislation was passed in May 2005 to create the state voter registration lists. Federal data sources have the potential to help state election officials identify registrants who may be convicted felons or non-citizens. While the potential number identified may be small, an election can be decided by a few votes. Regarding felons, U.S. Attorneys are required to notify state election officials of federal felony convictions, but the information was not always easy for election officials to interpret or complete. Federal jury services generally do not now, but might feasibly be able to notify elections officials when potential jurors drawn from local voter registration lists claim to be non-citizens.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-05-478, Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
June 2005:
Elections:
Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections Officials Maintain
Accurate Voter Registration Lists:
GAO-05-478:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-478, a report to congressional requesters:
Why GAO Did This Study:
Reports of ineligible persons registering to vote raised concerns about
state processes for verifying voter registration lists. States base
voter eligibility generally on the voter‘s age, U.S. citizenship,
mental competence, and felon status. Although states run elections,
Congress has authority to affect the administration of elections. The
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) sets a deadline for states to have
a statewide voter registration list and list verification procedures.
For this report, GAO selected seven states (AZ, CA, MI, NY, TX, VA, and
WI) to represent a range of characteristics relevant to voter
registrations, such as whether a statewide voter list existed prior to
HAVA. This report discusses how these states verify voter registration
eligibility; the challenges they face in maintaining accurate voter
lists; the progress toward implementing HAVA registration requirements;
and identifies federal data sources that might be used to help verify
voter registration eligibility.
What GAO Found:
The methods used in seven selected states to verify voter eligibility
and ensure accuracy of voter registration lists were varied and include
relying on registrant self attestation, return mailings, and checking
against lists of felony convictions or deceased individuals. Election
officials from the selected states described some challenges that may
be resolved when HAVA is fully implemented, such as reducing duplicates
within the state. Other challenges”identifying duplicate registrations
in other states or having insufficient information to match other data
sources with voter registration lists”may continue to be issues.
The seven states are in different phases of implementing HAVA statewide
voter registration lists and eligibility verification requirements.
Arizona implemented its statewide voter list by the January 1, 2004,
deadline, and the other six states applied for a January 1, 2006,
waiver. Of those six states, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin awarded
contracts to develop new voter lists that are designed to address HAVA
requirements. Michigan has had a statewide list since 1998, and
officials believe it is near HAVA compliant. California election
officials are still considering how to meet these HAVA requirements,
and in New York, legislation was passed in May 2005 to create the state
voter registration lists.
Federal data sources have the potential to help state election
officials identify registrants who may be convicted felons or non-
citizens. While the potential number identified may be small, an
election can be decided by a few votes. Regarding felons, U.S.
Attorneys are required to notify state election officials of federal
felony convictions, but the information was not always easy for
election officials to interpret or complete. Federal jury services
generally do not now, but might feasibly be able to notify elections
officials when potential jurors drawn from local voter registration
lists claim to be non-citizens.
Federal Juror Qualification Questionnaire:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
To help assure voter lists are accurate, GAO recommends that U.S.
Attorneys provide notices of federal felony conviction in a
standardized format, and that the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts study the feasibility of sharing certain citizenship-related
U.S. district court juror information with state election officials.
Officials at these federal agencies agreed with our recommendations.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-478.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact William O. Jenkins, Jr.,
at (202) 512-8777 or JenkinsWO@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
States Have Taken Steps to Verify Voter Registration Eligibility, but
Methods Vary by State:
Election Officials Identified Challenges to Verify Voter Registration
Eligibility:
The Seven States Are in Different Phases of Implementing HAVA Statewide
Voter Registration Lists and Eligibility Verification Requirements:
Information from Federal Sources Could Assist Election Officials in
Identifying Ineligible Felons and Non-Citizens on Voter Registration
Lists:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Department of Homeland Security Automated Systems That
Include Information on Non-Citizens:
Appendix III: Voter Registration Fraud Allegations Identified at
Selected States and at the Federal Level:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts:
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of Justice:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Seven States' Voter Registration Eligibility Qualifications:
Table 2: Selected Activities to Help Implement HAVA Voter Registration
Requirements in Six States:
Table 3: State Selection Factors:
Figures:
Figure 1: Arizona Draft Voter Registration Application Requiring Proof
of Citizenship:
Figure 2: Virginia and Wisconsin Voter Registration Attestations
Regarding Criminal Status:
Figure 3: Process for Verifying Voter Registration Applicant
Information with SSA:
Figure 4: Federal Jury Qualification Questionnaire Requests Citizenship
Information:
Abbreviations:
AAMVA: American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators:
AOUSC: Administrative Offices of the U.S. Courts:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
DMF: Death Master File:
EAC: Election Assistance Commission:
FEC: Federal Election Commission:
HAVAHelp America Vote Act:
HAVV: Help America Vote Verification program:
INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service:
MVA: motor vehicle agency:
NCOA: National Change of Address:
NVRA: National Voter Registration Act of 1993:
OIG: Office of the Inspector General:
QVF: Qualified Voter File:
SAVE: Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements:
SSA: Social Security Administration:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
June 10, 2005:
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner:
Chairman:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John N. Hostettler:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
Reports of ineligible persons registering to vote raised concerns about
state election administration and processes for verifying voter
registration lists. In managing the voter registration process and
maintaining voter registration lists, state and local election
officials must balance two goals--(1) minimizing the burden on eligible
persons of registering to vote and (2) ensuring that voter lists are
accurate, i.e., limited to those eligible to vote and that eligible
registered voters are not inadvertently removed from the voter
registration lists. This report focuses on the second goal--the efforts
of state and local election officials in seven states to ensure that
voter registration lists are accurate.
In addition to this report, we also plan to issue reports this year on
other specific election issues--voter access to the polls; how the nine
states without Help America Vote Act (HAVA) waivers[Footnote 1] have
implemented voter registration requirements as of January 1, 2004;
electronic voting security; and the Department of Defense's
implementation of the Federal Voting Assistance Program for Overseas
Military Personnel in 2004. These reports respond to congressional
requests made prior to the November 2004 election. In addition, given
concerns raised about the November 2004 election process, we are
undertaking a broader, more comprehensive study of election
administration and processes related to the November 2004 general
election. This more comprehensive study will address activities and
challenges--people, processes, and technology--associated with each
major stage of election administration to include registration,
absentee and early voting; Election Day preparation and activities, and
vote counting and certification, similar to a report we issued in
October 2001.[Footnote 2]
All states set certain eligibility requirements to register and vote.
States establish voter eligibility requirements that generally include
that the voter is at least 18 years of age on the day of the election,
is a citizen of the United States, is mentally competent, and meets
state requirements regarding felon status. Ensuring that only eligible
persons are registered to vote is an ongoing challenge for election
officials and is complicated by factors such as jurisdiction size,
mobility of voters, and community diversity. In larger jurisdictions
the task of identifying and removing registrants who have died can be
substantial. For example according to Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention records, almost 300 persons died in the first week of 2005
in the city of Los Angeles. Communities with large student or military
populations must manage registrants constantly moving in or out of a
jurisdiction, and communities with diverse populations must handle
substantial numbers of new citizens and face language challenges in
communicating voter registration requirements.
After the events surrounding the November 2000 election, HAVA was
enacted.[Footnote 3] It requires states, among other things, to (a)
implement an interactive computerized statewide voter registration
list; (b) perform regular maintenance by comparing the voter list
against state records on felons and deaths; (c) match applicant
information on voter registration lists with information in state motor
vehicle agency's records; and (d) match voter registration applicant
information on voter registration lists with Social Security
Administration (SSA) records, as appropriate.
This report addresses current and planned voter registration processes
in seven selected states for verifying voter registration lists.
Specifically, this report answers the following questions: (1) How do
state election officials verify voter registration eligibility and
ensure voter registration lists are accurate? (2) What challenges do
they face in maintaining accurate voter lists? (3) What progress have
these states made toward meeting HAVA requirements to have voter
registration verification procedures? (4) What federal data sources,
other than those identified in HAVA, might be used to help verify voter
registration eligibility?
To address the first three objectives, we selected a nonprobability
sample of seven states--Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, Texas,
Virginia, and Wisconsin to represent a range of voter-registration
factors. Our selection includes states in various stages of development
of their statewide databases, variations in election administration, a
range in the percent of the population of foreign born, and is
geographically diverse. We also considered other characteristics that
might affect the implementation of HAVA, such as same day registration
in Wisconsin, or New York, with a large population who live in New York
City who may not have driver's licenses for verification. Our goal was
not to target a particular state, but rather to identify a range of
issues facing states in implementing HAVA requirements and assuring
accurate voter registration lists. In these seven states, we
interviewed state election officials and election officials in 14 local
voting jurisdictions--two in each of these states. Additional
information on our scope and methodology is presented in appendix I.
In these seven states, we also interviewed motor vehicle agency
(MVA)[Footnote 4]officials because voters can submit voter registration
applications at MVA offices, and MVAs have a role under HAVA to assist
states with verification of voter registration information. In
addition, we reviewed relevant state voting laws, voter registration
documents, and reports related to voting processes. We interviewed
officials at the SSA and obtained documentation on how they are
addressing SSA's HAVA verification requirements. To identify potential
federal data sources to verify voter registration, we gathered
information from state election and county jury administrators, and
from officials at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the Election Assistance Commission (EAC),
and the Administrative Offices of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), and we
reviewed relevant reports. We also obtained information on voter fraud
allegations from DOJ, from U.S. Attorneys in our selected states and
from state and local election officials and District Attorneys for the
local election jurisdictions we visited. See appendix I for additional
information on our objectives, scope, and methodology. Our work was
done between January 2004 and May 2005 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
State and local election officials we interviewed in the seven states
said they use a combination of methods and information to verify voter
eligibility and ensure the accuracy of voter registration lists. These
included using computer programs that only accept registrants of an
eligible age and those who live at an address within the jurisdiction,
confirmation mailings to registrants, and information from state vital
statistics or court officials on persons who are deceased or have been
convicted of a felony.
HAVA provisions, when fully implemented, should help address some
challenges state election officials face in obtaining timely, accurate,
and complete information to identify ineligible voter registrants, but
other challenges may remain. Having a statewide voter registration list
and matching the list with state vital statistics and felon data, as
required by HAVA provisions, could reduce the number of duplicate
registrations within a state and provide more timely identification of
ineligible registrants. HAVA provisions may not affect other data
challenges, such as identifying registration duplications or deceased
individuals outside the state, or identifying non-citizens.
Progress to meet HAVA requirements in the seven states we visited
varied. One state, Arizona, implemented its statewide voter list by the
January 1, 2004, deadline, and the other six states applied for and
received a waiver to defer their implementation of these provisions
until January 1, 2006. Of those six states, Michigan has a statewide
list that has been operational since 1998 and state officials believe
they are near compliance with HAVA requirements. Texas, Virginia, and
Wisconsin awarded contracts to develop the voter lists intended to
encompass HAVA requirements. California and New York are working toward
meeting the January 2006 deadline, but California is still evaluating
its strategy for creating a statewide database that is HAVA compliant,
and legislation approving the creation of New York's state voter
registration list was not passed until May 2005. The extent to which
states verified applicant information with state motor vehicle agencies
and compared voter lists with state records for deaths and felons
varied in that some had agreements to verify information and some did
not. As of March 2005, six of the states we visited still needed to
sign an agreement with SSA to verify voter registrant information
against Social Security records. The seventh state, Virginia, is not
subject to this HAVA requirement because it is permitted to require
voter registrants to provide their full social security number. This
number can be used with SSA's online verification system.
We identified two federal data sources that have the potential to help
state and local election officials ensure that their voter lists are
accurate. The number of potentially ineligible voter registrants
identified by these two federal sources may be small but could be
important in determining the outcome of a close election.
First, U.S. Attorneys are, by law, to send notice to state election
officials upon conviction of felonies in federal court. State
officials, in turn, are to forward it to local election officials in
the jurisdiction where the convicted offender resides. The law does not
establish a standardized time frame or format for forwarding the
federal felony conviction information. Of the 19 U.S. Attorneys'
offices covering the seven states we visited, 16 reported that the
notices were being sent to election officials but not in a standardized
format and 3 reported that they were implementing or modifying their
processes to provide this information on felony convictions in U.S.
district courts. According to state and local election officials with
whom we spoke in the seven states, federal felony information was not
always provided in a standard format or timely, and the information was
sometimes difficult to interpret, such as the length of the sentence,
or incomplete.
Second, federal jury administrator questionnaires identify individuals
who claim to be non-citizens when asked to serve as a juror in federal
district court.[Footnote 5] The federal district courts are not
required to provide election officials with this information, but 1 of
the 14 federal district courts we surveyed does so. One source that the
federal district courts use to draw the potential jurors' names is
local voter registration lists that should only contain names of
citizens. Federal jury administrators were mixed in their opinions on
the feasibility of providing this information, some citing staff
resource constraints.
To assist state election officials in maintaining accurate voter
registration lists, we are recommending that U.S. Attorneys provide
information on felony convictions in U.S. district courts in a more
standardized format to make it easier for election officials to
interpret the conviction information, such as the length of the
sentence, and help ensure that information is complete and timely. We
also recommend that the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts[Footnote 6] study the feasibility of sharing certain citizenship-
related U.S. district court juror information with state election
officials.
We provided a draft of this report to DOJ and AOUSC for review and
comment. In their responses, officials at both DOJ and AOUSC
acknowledged the importance of maintaining accurate voter registration
lists, and agreed with our report recommendations. Sections of the
report were also provided to other federal agencies and states we
visited to confirm the accuracy of the information. Clarifications and
specific technical comments on the draft were incorporated as
appropriate into the final report.
Background:
The constitutional framework for elections contemplates both state and
federal roles. States are responsible for the administration of both
their own elections and federal elections. States regulate various
aspects of the elections process, including, for example, ballot
access, registration procedures, absentee voting requirements,
establishment of polling places, provision of election day workers, and
counting and certifying the vote. The states in turn incur the costs
associated with these activities. Although the states are responsible
for running elections, Congress has authority to affect the
administration of elections. Congress' authority to regulate elections
depends upon the type of election. With regard to federal elections,
Congress has constitutional authority over both congressional and
presidential elections. In addition, with respect to federal, state,
and local elections, a number of constitutional amendments authorize
Congress to enforce prohibitions against specific discriminatory acts.
Congress has passed legislation regarding the administration of
elections, both for federal elections and in certain cases at the state
level. Most recently HAVA was enacted in 2002. HAVA established, among
other things: (1) a program to provide funds to states to replace punch
card or lever voting systems used in federal elections, (2) the EAC to
assist in the administration of federal elections and to otherwise
provide assistance with the administration of certain federal election
laws and programs, and (3) certain minimum election administration
standards for states and units of local government with responsibility
for the administration of federal elections. The act fixed enforcement
authority on the Attorney General to bring a civil action against any
state or jurisdiction as may be necessary to carry out the specified
uniform and nondiscriminatory election technology and administration
requirements under HAVA.[Footnote 7]
Regarding the administration of elections, HAVA created federal
mandates, staggered deadlines for implementing these mandates, and
authorized about $3.86 billion over several fiscal years in election
reform appropriations. HAVA required that states create plans detailing
how they will meet the requirements and guidelines of the act. Among
the requirements, section 303 mandated a computerized statewide voter
registration list to serve as the official voter registration list for
conducting elections for federal office in each state. States and
territories were to implement a computerized statewide voter
registration database by January 1, 2004. States could apply to the EAC
by January 1, 2004, for a waiver of the effective date until January 1,
2006. Nine states and one territory--Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Minnesota, South Carolina, South Dakota, West Virginia, and
Guam--did not apply for a waiver.
Section 303 also requires states to perform list maintenance on a
regular basis by removing ineligible voters from the voter registration
list. States are to coordinate the computerized list with state agency
records on felony status and death. In addition, states are required to
verify voter registration information. For federal elections, a voter
registration application may not be processed or accepted by a state
unless it contains the applicant's driver's license number, the last 4
digits of the social security number if there is no driver's license
number, or the state must create a unique identification number if the
voter has neither number. Certain state laws allow voter registration
applications to require the applicant to provide their full social
security numbers on applications.[Footnote 8] Voter registration
information is to be matched with motor vehicle records or social
security records, depending on the information provided by the
applicant. The state motor vehicle authority must enter into an
agreement with SSA to verify the applicant information when the last 4
digits of the social security number are provided rather than a
driver's license or state identification number. SSA must develop
methods to verify the accuracy of information provided and whether the
name, date of birth, and the last 4 digits of a social security number
match SSA records, including whether the individual is deceased.
HAVA is not the first federal legislation affecting the administration
of elections. The National Voter Registration Act of 1993
(NVRA),[Footnote 9] for example, was enacted to establish registration
procedures designed to "increase the number of eligible citizens who
register to vote in elections for Federal office—," "protect the
integrity of the electoral process—" and "ensure that accurate and
current voter registration lists are maintained." NVRA contains
provisions regarding what information is sought on the voter
registration application for federal elections. To enable state
election officials to assess the eligibility of the applicant and to
administer voter registration and other parts of the election process,
the act requires that the voter registration application include a
statement about each eligibility requirement to be able to vote,
specifically including citizenship. It further requires an attestation
that the applicant meets each such requirement to vote and requires the
signature of the applicant under penalty of perjury.
In addition, NVRA created requirements for how states maintain voter
registration lists for federal elections. The act requires states to
keep such voter registration lists accurate and current, such as
identifying persons who have become ineligible due to death or change
of residence to outside the jurisdiction. At the same time, the act
requires list maintenance programs to incorporate specific safeguards,
for example, that they be uniform, non-discriminatory, and in
compliance with the Voting Rights Act. The removal of registrants for
non-voting or for having moved can only be done after meeting certain
requirements provided in the act. The act also allows for removal of
registrants from registration lists at their own request, when a
registrant has been convicted of a disqualifying crime, or by reason of
mental incapacity where such removals are allowed by state law.
Voter registration qualifications based on age, citizenship, criminal
status, mental competence, and residence were established in all seven
states we reviewed, except for Michigan, which does not have a mental
competency requirement. Table 1 summarizes the eligibility
qualifications in the selected states.
Table 1: Seven States' Voter Registration Eligibility Qualifications:
AZ;
Age: At least 18 years old on or before the next general election;
Citizenship: U.S. citizen;
Felon status[A]: Felony conviction will generally prohibit a person
from being eligible to register or trigger the cancellation of the
felon's pre-existing registration. 1[ST] time felons otherwise eligible
may reregister when discharged, or probation is complete. With more
than 1 felony conviction after an absolute discharge, a felon must have
a judge reinstate voting rights;
Mental competence: Not be currently declared an incapacitated person by
a court of law;
Reside in election jurisdiction: State resident in county at least 29
days before election.
CA;
Age: At least 18 years of age at the time of the next election;
Citizenship: U.S. citizen;
Felon status[A]: A person in prison or on parole for the conviction of
a felony is not entitled to register and cancellation of the felon's
pre-existing registration will be triggered. Once the sentence is
complete, including parole, a felon who is otherwise eligible may
reregister. Voting rights may also be restored by the governor;
Mental competence: Not currently judged mentally incompetent by a court
of law;
Reside in election jurisdiction: California resident and registered at
least 15 days prior to an election.
MI;
Age: At least 18 years old by the next election;
Citizenship: U.S. citizen;
Felon status[A]: Persons confined in jail after conviction and
sentencing are not eligible to register or vote. Prior to trial or
conviction and sentence, persons confined in jail may register at their
prior address. Upon release, person who is otherwise eligible may
register or reregister.[B];
Mental competence: Not a state eligibility disqualification;
Reside in election jurisdiction: Michigan resident and at least a 30-
day resident of the city or township, by election day.
NY;
Age: At least 18 years old by the date of the election;
Citizenship: U.S. citizen;
Felon status[A]: Felony conviction will generally prohibit a person
from being eligible to register or trigger the cancellation of a pre-
existing registration. Felons who are otherwise eligible may register
or reregister after a pardon or restoration of rights by the governor
of the state where such conviction took place (or the President for
federal felony conviction), completing the maximum sentence of
imprisonment, or when they are discharged from parole;
Mental competence: Not currently judged incompetent by order of a court
of competent judicial authority;
Reside in election jurisdiction: A resident of the state and of the
county, city, or village for at least 30 days before an election.
TX;
Age: At least 17 years and 10 months old to register and must be 18 to
vote;
Citizenship: U.S. citizen;
Felon status[A]: Felony conviction will generally prohibit a person
from being eligible to register or trigger the cancellation of a pre-
existing registration. Felons who are otherwise eligible may reregister
when their sentence has been fully discharged or have been pardoned or
otherwise released from the resulting disability to vote;
Mental competence: Have not been declared incompetent by final judgment
of a court of law;
Reside in election jurisdiction: Be a resident of the county in which
the application for registration is made.
VA;
Age: At least 18 years old by the next general election;
Citizenship: U.S. citizen;
Felon status[A]: Felony conviction will generally prohibit a person
from being eligible to register or trigger the cancellation of a pre-
existing registration. Felons who are otherwise eligible may qualify to
register or reregister if their civil rights have been restored by the
governor or other appropriate authority;
Mental competence: Not currently declared mentally incompetent by a
court of law;
Reside in election jurisdiction: A resident of VA and of the precinct
in which he/she wants to vote and registered no later than 29 days
before the general election.
WI;
Age: At least 18 years old;
Citizenship: U.S. citizen;
Felon status[A]: Persons convicted of a felony are disqualified from
voting. Voting rights are restored upon completion of the term of
imprisonment, probation, or parole, or through a pardon;
Mental competence: Not have been found by a court to be incapable of
understanding the objective of the electoral process;
Reside in election jurisdiction: A resident in an election district or
ward of the state for at least 10 days before an election.
Source: GAO summary of information verified by states.
[A] This table may not reflect the full range of possible measures
available under state law. Other measures, such as reversals, set-
asides, or pardons may be available under specific state laws to
restore civil rights for convicted felons. In addition, this table does
not reflect other non-felony convictions, such as bribery, that may
serve to disenfranchise an individual under state laws.
[B] This provision of Michigan law applies not just to convicted felons
who are confined in a jail but to all persons who are confined in a
jail as a result of non-felony offenses for which they have been
convicted and sentenced.
[End of table]
Registering more than once is explicitly addressed in some state laws.
For example, under Virginia law, the intentional registration to vote
at more than one residence address at the same time, whether such
registrations are within Virginia or in Virginia and any other state or
U.S. territory, is prohibited.[Footnote 10] In New York, it is illegal
to register or attempt to register as an elector in more than one
election district for the same election, or more than once in the same
election district.[Footnote 11] While federal law does not explicitly
prohibit being registered to vote more than once, such as in more than
one state, various federal laws could apply to certain types of
wrongful activities that might result in such multiple registrations
related to a federal election. For example, knowingly or willfully
providing false information (e.g., name, address, or period of
residence) to establish eligibility to register to vote with respect to
a federal election is prohibited.[Footnote 12]
Voters are not now required to register in all jurisdictions in
Wisconsin. Currently, only municipalities with a population of 5,000 or
more are required to register voters.[Footnote 13] About 75 percent of
the voting age population lives in the municipalities that have some
form of voter registration. Voters may also register in Wisconsin on
Election Day at the polling place. Under "same-day registration"
potential voters are required to complete a registration form that
includes a certification as to their eligibility[Footnote 14], and
present an acceptable proof of residency. The municipal clerk for a
jurisdiction is responsible for verifying that each person allowed to
vote was properly registered, and sends a postcard confirming
registration to the person, or a 1st class letter if the registration
cannot be confirmed. If the letter is undelivered or an improper
address was provided, municipal clerks are to notify the district
attorney.[Footnote 15] In jurisdictions without registration, the
voting officials enter the full name and address of voters on a poll
list in the order they voted.
States Have Taken Steps to Verify Voter Registration Eligibility, but
Methods Vary by State:
State and local election officials in the seven states we reviewed
reported that specific steps are taken to verify eligibility when an
applicant applies to register and that voter registration lists are
also reviewed periodically to identify registrants who may no longer be
eligible, such as those who have moved, have been convicted of a
felony, or are deceased. Officials in the seven states use a
combination of methods, including computer programming, return
mailings, and information from state vital statistics to identify
registrants who should be removed from voter rolls. Self-attestation is
included in every voter registration application in the seven states we
visited but varies by the terms used and format of the attestation. All
voter registration application forms in the seven states we visited
asked applicants to certify with their signature that the information
provided is correct and true. The forms ask the applicant to attest to
their age, citizenship, and residency. The format asking for additional
information varied in the seven states.
Verification of age:
To determine eligibility based on age, all states we reviewed, except
Texas, required applicants to declare, swear, affirm, or attest on the
voter registration application that they meet state age requirements.
In addition, officials in Arizona, Texas, Virginia, and New York City
said that their voter registration computer system is programmed to
calculate the age of the applicant, based on the date of birth the
registrant provides, and reject applications of individuals who will be
younger than 18 years of age on the day of the next election.
Michigan's computer system accepts registrations from voters who are at
least 17-½ years of age; however, the names will not appear on a
precinct list until the voter has reached the age of 18. In addition,
Arizona and Michigan election officials match their voter registration
applications against the state motor vehicle agency's records to verify
the information.
California's MVA procedure manual instructs clerks to "flag" voter
registration applications for election officials if they have concerns
about a voter registration applicant's age. According to the MVA
manual, if the birth date on the voter registration form does not agree
with the birth date on documentation, clerks are to note "BD" on the
voter registration form so election officials will know to verify the
birth date. However, neither of the local election officials we spoke
with in this state recalled having an application flagged by the MVA
for closer review of an applicant's age. None of the officials in other
states (excluding Wisconsin, which is not currently subject to the NVRA
requirement to register voters at motor vehicle agencies because of
certain NVRA exemption provisions for states allowing voters to
register on Election Day) reported having a policy for motor vehicle
agency clerks to share eligibility concerns.
Verification of citizenship:
All election officials we spoke with told us that non-citizens are not
permitted to vote in elections, including non-federal
elections.[Footnote 16] Citizenship eligibility was based on applicant
self-attestation in all seven states, with application blocks that must
be checked by the applicant specifically affirming U.S. citizenship.
Five of the states require applicants to swear, affirm, or attest that
they are U.S. citizens in addition to checking the block. In Texas
applicants affirmed that they understood giving false information is
perjury and a crime under state and federal law. In Wisconsin,
applicants are to certify that they meet all the voter registration
requirements, and, according to Wisconsin state law, the municipal
clerk or board of election commissioners may require naturalized
applicants to show their naturalization certificates. New York State
election officials said that their state law entitles any voter to
challenge a person's right to vote if they think that voter is not a
citizen.
As with age, California's MVA procedure manual instructs clerks to
"flag" voter registration applications if citizenship status is in
question by writing "US" on the corner of the form. According to the
manual, when immigration documents provided to a MVA staff do not
confirm citizenship, the staff is to remind the customer of the voter
registration eligibility requirements. If the customer still desires to
submit a voter registration application, the staff places the notation
on the form. No other state that we visited has this provision. Many of
the motor vehicle officials we spoke with stated a view that it was up
to state election officials to determine a registrant's eligibility to
vote, not the motor vehicle agency, and that all applications are
forwarded to election officials.
In Arizona, a ballot initiative passed in November 2004 that will
require proof of citizenship to register to vote (and identification
upon voting). The registration requirement does not apply to those who
are currently registered, or when a registrant changes their
registration address within a single county. Arizona's Secretary of
State, as of March 4, 2005, was determining which forms of
identification will be acceptable as proof. According to Arizona draft
procedures released for public comment, acceptable identification
included:
* a copy of a birth certificate that verifies citizenship,
* a copy of pertinent passport pages of a U.S. passport,
* a copy of naturalization documents,
* selected Bureau of Indian affairs documents, and:
* Arizona driver's license or non operating license issued after
October 1, 1996, or the equivalent government document from another
state if the agency indicates on the applicant's driver license or
nonoperating license that the person has provided satisfactory proof of
U.S. citizenship.
Figure 1 shows sections of the draft proposed application requiring
citizenship information that was made available for public comment.
According to local election officials in one Arizona jurisdiction, mail
applications will not be processed without citizenship documentation.
The applicants will be sent a letter asking for documentation, and the
letter will include a list of documents that are acceptable as proof of
citizenship.
Figure 1: Arizona Draft Voter Registration Application Requiring Proof
of Citizenship:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Some local election jurisdictions receive information from county jury
administrators to help identify potential non-citizens on voter
registration lists. County jury pools are drawn from a variety of
sources, which may include voter registration lists. In five of the
states we visited, county jury administrators use voter registration
lists, and potential jurors are asked to indicate citizenship status on
jury service screening questionnaires. In 4 of the 10 local
jurisdictions in those five states, election officials said they
receive notification from county jury administrators when a potential
juror claimed to be a non-citizen as a justification for being excused
from jury duty. None of the local election officials said that they
receive notifications from federal jury administrators.
In addition to the state or local election jurisdiction efforts to help
ensure registrants are eligible based on citizenship, Federal Election
Commission (FEC)[Footnote 17] officials noted that some federal
measures have been adopted to discourage non-citizens from registering
to vote. Measures include:
* possible deportation, under immigration laws, for knowingly making a
false statement about citizenship status to register;
* the NVRA requirement that applications list eligibility requirements
(including citizenship);
* the prohibition in federal law on governmental use of a voter
registration card for a federal election as proof of U.S. citizenship;
and:
* the HAVA requirement that a statement identifying eligibility
requirements, including citizenship, be included on voter registration
applications.
Nevertheless, the FEC officials noted that non-citizens may be
encouraged to register to vote because the I-9 form used to provide
proof of employment eligibility and its implementing
regulations[Footnote 18] includes, among other documents, the voter
registration card as an acceptable document for employment identity
purposes.
Verification of criminal status:
In six of the seven states we visited, the eligibility of applicants,
in terms of criminal status, was based on the self-certification signed
by registration applicants. In Arizona, Texas, and Virginia, the
application includes language specifically certifying eligibility based
on criminal status. In New York and Wisconsin, applicants certify to a
general statement that they meet all the requirements to register for
their state, which includes a restriction based on criminal status.
California uses both specific and general attestations. Michigan
applicants do not attest to their criminal status, but voting is
prohibited only for those serving time in prison or jail. According to
election officials, they do not accept voter registrations or absentee
ballots from prison addresses. Examples of the at testation language
used on voter registration applications are presented in figure 2.
Figure 2: Virginia and Wisconsin Voter Registration Attestations
Regarding Criminal Status:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Officials in Arizona, California, New York, Texas, and Virginia said
they receive state court information on felony convictions to remove
voter registrants no longer eligible to vote based on a criminal
conviction. Court information on felons in these states was provided to
election officials in different formats and at different intervals. The
data came in either paper or electronic format depending on the
location. State election officials in two states said that the format
varied by county within their states. Election officials in the five
states reported receiving information at different intervals, such as
weekly, monthly, intermittently, or biannually.
State election officials in six of the seven states and 9 of the 14
local election officials said that they received information on federal
felony convictions. Most election officials said the information was
received on a sporadic or intermittent basis, in a paper format.
Michigan election officials do not receive information from state
courts on felony convictions. Officials there told us that state felony
conviction information was not needed because they only restrict the
right to vote while the person is incarcerated. Local election
officials in Wisconsin said they do not receive state felony conviction
information. The Wisconsin state election official said that felon
records are diffused and difficult to compare with voter lists.
Wisconsin plans to create a statewide database that will consolidate
criminal records from 17 different correctional databases, the state
election official said. However, the system will not be available by
the January 1, 2006, HAVA deadline, according to the state election
official.
The laws in five of the states we visited (California, New York, Texas,
Wisconsin, and Arizona), for first-time felony convictions, allow
felons to gain eligibility to vote when a felony sentence is completed-
-which can include time on probation, parole, payment of fines, or
supervision related to the conviction. States do not require proof that
the non-incarcerated segments of a sentence be completed, according to
all of the officials we spoke with and state regulations we reviewed in
those states.
Verification of mental competence:
Six of the seven states we visited have a state law that disqualifies
persons legally declared to be mentally incompetent or incapacitated
from registering to vote and cancels the voter's registration upon such
adjudication. Michigan's constitution has provided that the legislature
may, by law, exclude persons from voting because of mental
incompetence, but no such law has been enacted. Wisconsin limits
disqualifications based on mental incompetence to those where a court
specifically determines that the registrant is incapable of
understanding the objective of the electoral process. State and local
election officials in Arizona, California, New York, Texas, and
Virginia reported that courts notify registrars periodically when
adjudications on mental incompetence are made. Two rural jurisdictions
reported that family members or caretakers sometimes notify the
registrar of mental competency adjudications. In one Texas
jurisdiction, the election official said that the court sends a notice
to the county elections office, which in turn sends a letter to the
voter confirming the voter's removal from the registration list.
Verification of residency:
Officials we spoke with in the seven states said that in addition to
initially checking that an applicant resides in the jurisdiction
(either by using an automated address file or manually checking), they
also use a variety of sources to periodically verify their voter lists
for registrants who may have moved. The National Change of Address
(NCOA) list[Footnote 19] is used by Virginia state officials on a
yearly basis and used in at least one of the local election
jurisdictions we visited in Arizona, California, New York, and
Virginia. How often the national list was checked varied, but of the
eight jurisdictions using this source, five said they checked on an
annual basis. Twice a year, New York county election officials send
their voter lists to state officials for comparison with the NCOA list,
according to a state election official. Election officials in every
state said returned mail was used, either at the state or local
election level--some on a daily basis, others intermittently, annually,
or before a major election. Ensuring that registrants live in an
election jurisdiction is generally a task for local election officials
but can be part of a statewide system, as in Michigan, where the voter
registration system electronically assigns the voter's jurisdiction
based on the address provided by the registrant. Residency is further
verified by the mailing of a non-forwardable voter identification card
to each new registrant in Michigan.[Footnote 20]
Identification of duplicate registrations:
For duplicate registrations, election officials said that existing
voter lists are checked by election officials before adding a new
registrant or are checked periodically. In the case of Arizona,
Michigan, and Virginia, the statewide voter registration system enables
jurisdictions to identify duplicates statewide. California and Texas
state election officials said they compare local jurisdiction records
and will notify local officials of potential duplicates. New York and
Wisconsin primarily check for duplicates within the election
jurisdiction. Some officials also reported periodically checking
against other data sources, noted below. Officials reported using
varying combinations of name, address, and other identifying
information collected on the application to identify existing
registrations, such as social security number in Virginia. In Michigan,
election officials demonstrated how the states voter registration file
has computer software with a search capability to identify similar
names as potential duplicates. These similar names are researched
manually to determine whether they are actually duplicates.
The data sources state and local election officials reported checking
to identify duplications and ensure that registrants reside in the
election district varied in terms of what information was used, and the
frequency of use. Sources included:
* National Change of Address List,
* return mailings of non-deliverable mail,
* individuals reporting an address change,
* notice from other election jurisdictions or state election officials
of a change, and:
* a check against state MVA records.
Identification of deceased registrants:
State vital statistics offices in six of the seven states reported that
they provide data periodically--from weekly to quarterly--to election
officials to identify registrants who have died. In addition to state
vital statistics, state and local officials said they use various
sources of data to identify deceased voter registrants on their
registration lists. Data sources included:
* county Vital Statistics Office records,
* newspaper obituaries, and:
* miscellaneous sources, such as family members, city vital statistics
offices, funeral homes, the U. S. Postal Service, probate courts, and
MVAs.
Wisconsin local and state election officials said that state vital
statistics are not currently used to identify deceased registrants.
Local election officials said they review obituaries to identify
deceased persons.
Election Officials Identified Challenges to Verify Voter Registration
Eligibility:
Ensuring that voter lists are accurate is a task that has challenged
election officials across the country for some time and was also a
concern of election officials in the seven states we visited. Officials
in one jurisdiction characterized voter registration lists as dynamic
and constantly changing. In larger jurisdictions the task of
identifying and removing registrants who died can be substantial; for
example, according to Center for Disease Controls and Prevention
records, almost 300 persons died in the first week of 2005 in the city
of Los Angeles. If verification information is available to officials
at all, then quality considerations become a factor, such as the
timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of the data. Some challenges
faced by election officials, particularly identifying duplicates in
other jurisdictions within the state, may be reduced with the
implementation of the HAVA-required statewide, computerized voter
registration lists; but the data availability and quality
considerations may continue to be issues.
FEC reports have documented problems in maintaining accurate voter
registration lists. The reports are mandated by Congress to document
the impact of NVRA provisions, including provisions to ensure that
voter lists are accurate by removing those who are no longer
eligible.[Footnote 21] The number of states identifying problems has
diminished since the NVRA was first implemented. The FEC reported in
1998 that officials in 26 states reported problems including duplicate
registrations, inaccurate information for matching, and the difficulty
of removing names without confirmation.[Footnote 22] The number of
states identifying voter list maintenance challenges to FEC dropped
from 26 in 1998 to 6 states in the 2001-2002 report, with the most
commonly reported change being that states implemented or enhanced
their computerized voter registration lists.
Some of the concerns highlighted below remain problems for election
officials and may not be addressed by a statewide voter list. Based on
a national survey of local election officials, we reported in
2001[Footnote 23] on the challenge of continually updating and deleting
information from voter registration lists, and the concerns of election
officials in obtaining accurate and timely information to keep voter
lists accurate.
Voter registration list maintenance challenges that were identified by
officials in the seven states we visited, and in the prior reports are
described below.
* Deceased Persons: The timeliness of death data was a concern
identified by state level election officials in all but Wisconsin and
Arizona and by local election officials in three of the jurisdictions
we visited.[Footnote 24] Concerns echoed many of the same issues raised
in earlier reports. For example, Texas officials said that the health
data they receive identifying deaths is about 3 to 4 months old,
resulting in some deceased voters remaining on the voter registration
list possibly through an election period. Another concern raised by a
local Michigan official was the lack of birth dates on some state death
records, resulting in difficulty identifying which voter of several
with the same name actually passed away. Identifying deaths occurring
outside of the state was a problem raised by election officials at the
state and local levels in New York, and by local officials in one
Arizona jurisdiction. Local New York officials said that when residents
spend part of the year in other parts of the country and pass away
there, they may not get a record of death in a timely manner. The 1998
FEC report highlighted this as an issue, noting the problem of
identifying residents who die outside of the state or local
jurisdiction because they may not be identified in vital statistics
reports they receive.[Footnote 25]
* Citizenship: The concern for election officials we spoke with
regarding a registrant's eligibility based on citizenship was the
reliance on self-attestation. As stated by the FEC, the challenge for
states is to develop procedures that maintain the integrity of the
election process without penalizing the majority of applicants, who are
law abiding citizens.[Footnote 26] Two types of standard sources of
identification, such as a driver's license, state identification or
social security numbers are not useful because neither are evidence of
citizenship. Other sources, such as a passport or birth certificate
more clearly indicate citizenship. However, these sources may not be
available, or conveniently at hand for all who would like to register
to vote, according to a review by election officials in
Philadelphia.[Footnote 27]
* Criminal Information: Criminal information is often incomplete, not
timely, or difficult to decipher. One state official and six local
election officials we visited stated concerns about the timeliness or
accuracy of the criminal information they receive for removing
ineligible persons from the voter registration list. For example, New
York officials said that the birth date on conviction notifications was
sometimes not included, which meant there could be multiple matches on
the same name. Wisconsin officials do not receive data from state
courts on felony convictions, the state and local officials in one
jurisdiction said. Lack of complete information is a concern that has
been raised in jurisdictions outside the ones we visited. For example,
a recent audit of the voter list in the City of St. Louis reported
identifying over 900 possible voting felons on the City's voters list
that were not identified by city election officials, primarily because
the information they had to identify the felons was
incomplete.[Footnote 28]Auditors reported that a primary reason so many
were not removed was that election officials only received conviction
reports from the local court and not from other sources, such as the
state or county. Other officials we interviewed stated that the
information they did receive on felony convictions, particularly from
federal sources, was not useful because it was old, had limited
matching criteria, or was in different formats and hard to decipher.
In addition to a need for more complete or useful information on
convictions, it may be difficult for election officials to determine
when a convicted felon is eligible to reregister. In five of the seven
states we visited, and many others around the country, [Footnote 29]
felons may reregister after serving their sentence, which could include
parole or probation if applicable under that state's law. Arizona (for
one felony conviction), California, New York, Texas, and Wisconsin
officials cancel a voter's registration based on court notification of
a felony conviction, but officials noted that they relied on an
applicant's attestation of eligibility to reregister because no
verification is required to document the completion of a felon's
sentence. Arizona (for persons convicted of two or more felonies) and
Virginia require that felons have their rights restored before they can
register to vote--by a judge in Arizona after more than one felony
conviction and by the Governor in Virginia. Arizona does not require
proof of restoration. Virginia's application asks specifically if
voting rights have been restored and the date when they were restored.
Arizona officials said they looked into the feasibility of the court
system notifying the Secretary of State when someone was released from
prison, completed probation, and paid any fine or restitution. However,
all three events are not clearly defined according to these Arizona
officials, and no workable solution was found. Michigan restores voting
rights upon release from incarceration.
* Duplicate Registrant: Officials in 7 of the 21 state and local
election jurisdictions we spoke with had some concern with the
timeliness or accuracy of the data they receive to identify duplicate
registrants or verify registrants reside within the jurisdiction. The
matching and validation of names are complex and made more so when
considering aliases and name changes, as are matches such as "Margie L.
Smith" with "Margaret Smith" according to a Wisconsin study.[Footnote
30] The study estimated that even a 1 percent error rate on a match
validating names, driver license numbers, etc., could generate tens of
thousands of bad matches. Officials from several states that do not
have a statewide database noted that there was no way to identify
duplicates outside their jurisdiction. New York state election
officials said there is currently no way to systematically clear
duplicates in the state. Officials rely on voters to identify if they
have registered elsewhere. This problem was documented in the review of
the City of St. Louis voter registration list, where auditors reported
identifying about 13,600 potential duplicates on voter lists in other
election jurisdictions in Missouri.[Footnote 31] Followup would be
needed to determine which registrations were actual duplicates.
None of the officials we spoke with reported that they check for voter
registration duplication in other states. Texas state election
officials said they only received information from other states when
the other state's application asks where the person was previously
registered, the person completes that portion of the form, and the
information is forwarded to Texas. Texas does not forward information
on new applicants from other states because the Texas application only
asks for prior city and county in Texas. Local election officials in
Arizona, Michigan, and Texas said they sometimes get reports of
registrants relocating from other states. According to an EAC
Commissioner in April 2005 (also the Chair for the EAC) making
statewide voter registration systems compatible would be extremely
costly, and HAVA does not address interactivity among states.[Footnote
32]
* Residency of Registrants: Election officials we contacted identified
a number of challenges to ensuring voter registrants reside within an
election jurisdiction, including matching problems based on missing
information or variation in how an address is listed, no street numbers
in rural areas, new streets, redistricting, or untimely forwarding of
new addresses. Officials in one local Arizona jurisdiction said
residency issues are complex because not all the properties in the
county have addresses. In one Wisconsin jurisdiction, election
officials said they may not get notice for 4 or 5 months that a
registrant within their jurisdiction has moved to another jurisdiction
and, therefore, no longer meets the residency requirement (during this
time the voter could also be registered twice). Michigan officials are
considering using a Geographic Information System to improve their
ability to identify and map eligible addresses for specific
jurisdictions. Election officials reported to the FEC in 1998 and 2002
that the process required for removing registrants who have moved from
the jurisdiction was a problem, for example, citing the cost of
confirmation mailings and people not providing forwarding
addresses.[Footnote 33] Furthermore, some state officials surveyed for
our 2001 report stated that matches with the Postal Service's NCOA or
information from state motor vehicle agencies had potential drawbacks,
such as the verification costs or incomplete information. For example,
the NCOA files may not identify registrants who have moved if the voter
did not submit a change of address form. In addition, according to some
of these state officials, the names of ineligible registrants remained
on the list because officials could not obtain verification required to
remove them.
Four local election officials believed that self-certification is
sufficient because of the penalties for falsely registering, or did not
believe that ineligible voters were of concern. State and local
election officials who we interviewed said that they have had few voter
registration fraud[Footnote 34] allegations pertaining to eligibility
requirements. Many of the jurisdictions we visited said that they have
reported instances of voter registration fraud allegations to
appropriate agencies for investigation. We contacted District Attorneys
covering election jurisdictions in the seven states, and they reported
that they prosecuted some cases related to ineligible registrants or
voter fraud. For example, in California, a state with an investigative
unit dedicated to voter fraud issues, 15 cases of the 108 allegations
for fraudulent voter registration opened from January 2001 to May 2004
were sent to the District Attorney for prosecution. Of the 15 cases,
the outcome had been determined in 11 cases (6 cases declined for
prosecution, 5 were prosecuted and the individuals were convicted). In
four cases, the outcome is yet to be determined. See appendix III for
additional information on allegations of voter registration fraud.
HAVA requirements for having a statewide voter registration list and
matching with other state databases are expected to improve the
accuracy of voter lists, particularly for identifying duplicates in
other jurisdictions within the state. Election officials we spoke with
for our 2001 report and those we spoke with recently for this report
stated that statewide voter lists helped in solving some accuracy
problems. Michigan officials stated that when its statewide database
was first created in 1998, over 600,000 duplicate voter registration
records were eliminated. Arizona local officials said that their
concerns about the timeliness and accuracy were less, now that state
election officials managed the process through the statewide voter
list. For example, state Vital Statistics data are received more
frequently so that registrants who have died can be more quickly
removed. For some jurisdictions, such as those in Wisconsin that do not
receive death or felony information, the HAVA requirements to match the
statewide voter list with state records on felons and death are to
provide information not now available for removing ineligible
registrants.
Some concerns, such as timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of the
data used to match against voter lists, may continue to be issues, even
after the HAVA requirements are fully implemented. For example, the
1998 FEC report noted that states making good faith attempts to remove
from the registry the names of persons no longer eligible to vote
(e.g., deceased persons, ineligible felons, and those who have moved)
are stymied when they receive inaccurate, incomplete, or out-of-date
information. These concerns might continue with the voter registration
lists as, for example, Virginia officials stated that there is a 3-
month delay in receiving vital statistics data on deceased persons
because that is how long it takes for processing. Virginia officials
also identified a need for state standards for the exchange of
information from state to state regarding voters who move from one
state to another.
Even in states with a statewide system for comparison, duplicate
registrations can be added. As one local Michigan election official
stated, if the system does not recognize that the registrant is already
on the registration list, a new voter record is created. For example,
Micky Jones and J. William Jones, Jr., might not be recognized as the
same individual. A 2003 audit by the Michigan Office of the Auditor
General identified approximately 24,000 potential duplicates in the
state voter registration list, and about 10,000 registered voters with
inaccurate birth dates. State agency officials attributed the
duplicates as registrations that remain to be verified as the result of
inaccurate or incomplete data received during the conversion of records
to the state voter list in 1998, and the federal and state requirements
that must be followed before records can be removed. Further, officials
noted that tens of thousands of duplicates from voters moving within
Michigan have been prevented by the voter registration system.
The Seven States Are in Different Phases of Implementing HAVA Statewide
Voter Registration Lists and Eligibility Verification Requirements:
In the seven states we visited, progress varied in carrying out HAVA
requirements to (1) implement a computerized statewide voter
registration list; (2) verify voter application information with state
MVA or SSA records and (3) match the voter list with state records on
deaths and felony convictions. Six of the seven states (except Arizona)
applied for a waiver of these requirements until January 1, 2006. The
six states that applied for a waiver said they plan to meet the 2006
requirements deadline; however, their progress varies.
Computerized Voter Registration List Completion Closer in Some States
Than Others:
Arizona, which did not request a waiver, implemented a statewide voter
list which became operational in December 2003, prior to the HAVA
January 1, 2004, deadline. Of the six states visited that requested a
waiver until 2006, Michigan had a statewide voter registration
database, called the Qualified Voter File (QVF) that has been
operational since 1998. According to a state election official,
Michigan has about 90 percent of the changes in place to meet HAVA
requirements. Still remaining is a change to match QVF data to SSA
data. Contracts have been awarded for development of statewide
computerized voter registration lists in Texas, Virginia, and
Wisconsin, with completion by the January 1, 2006, deadline as part of
the contracts. Virginia currently has a statewide database but is
replacing it to be fully compliant with all state and federal laws
governing voter registration and elections, according to the request
for proposals for the new system. States are eligible to receive
federal payments to meet HAVA requirements (which may be used to
develop or modify a statewide voter registration list) after complying
with certain requirements, such as filing a state plan and
appropriating funds to match up to 5 percent of the federal funding the
state would receive. Table 2 details selected activities that the six
states are to implement related to the statewide voter registration
list.
Table 2: Selected Activities to Help Implement HAVA Voter Registration
Requirements in Six States:
States we reviewed that requested waiver from HAVA 2004 database
deadline: CA;
EAC approved HAVA state plan in fiscal year 2004: Yes;
State authorized "matching" funds to receive HAVA funding: Yes;
State issued request for proposal to develop computerized list: To be
determined;
State awarded contract (date of contract): To be determined.
States we reviewed that requested waiver from HAVA 2004 database
deadline: MI;
EAC approved HAVA state plan in fiscal year 2004: Yes;
State authorized "matching" funds to receive HAVA funding: Yes;
State issued request for proposal to develop computerized list: Not
applicable (there will be no request for proposal);
State awarded contract (date of contract): Not applicable.
States we reviewed that requested waiver from HAVA 2004 database
deadline: NY;
EAC approved HAVA state plan in fiscal year 2004: Yes;
State authorized "matching" funds to receive HAVA funding: Yes;
State issued request for proposal to develop computerized list: No;
State awarded contract (date of contract): No.
States we reviewed that requested waiver from HAVA 2004 database
deadline: TX;
EAC approved HAVA state plan in fiscal year 2004: Yes;
State authorized "matching" funds to receive HAVA funding: Yes;
State issued request for proposal to develop computerized list: Yes;
State awarded contract (date of contract): Yes (Oct. 2004).
States we reviewed that requested waiver from HAVA 2004 database
deadline: VA;
EAC approved HAVA state plan in fiscal year 2004: Yes;
State authorized "matching" funds to receive HAVA funding: Yes;
State issued request for proposal to develop computerized list: Yes;
State awarded contract (date of contract): Yes (Mar. 2004).
States we reviewed that requested waiver from HAVA 2004 database
deadline: WI;
EAC approved HAVA state plan in fiscal year 2004: Yes;
State authorized "matching" funds to receive HAVA funding: Yes;
State issued request for proposal to develop computerized list: Yes;
State awarded contract (date of contract): Yes (Nov. 2004).
Source: GAO analysis.
[End of table]
The contracts in Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin have been designed to
help the states implement functions specified under HAVA for creating a
unified statewide voter list, as well as other functions. For example,
Virginia's contract for a new system supports the conduct of elections
as well as voter registration functions. Texas' voter registration
database is to include additional capabilities that can create jury
summons, jury lists, and track jurors and jury payments. Wisconsin's
contract includes poll worker management requirements, including for
example, poll worker training information, certification level, and
attendance.
California may not meet the HAVA voter registration list deadline,
according to the California State Auditor. A December 2004 state audit
concluded that California is at risk of failing to meet certain HAVA
requirements, for example, to provide a fully functioning statewide
voter registration database by the HAVA deadline, and questioned the
use of some HAVA funds.[Footnote 35] Based on the state report, the EAC
initiated a special audit in January 2005 to investigate potential
misuse of HAVA funds in California.
California's Final HAVA Plan[Footnote 36] identified a need to modify
the existing statewide database or establish a new database to be in
compliance with HAVA. The state issued a request for information in
July 2004 to gather information on alternatives to replace the current
statewide list "Calvoter" with a system that meets HAVA requirements.
In late April 2005, the plan was to modify the Calvoter system rather
than replace it. However, according to the state's new HAVA
Coordinator, as of May 11, 2005, the new Secretary of State is
revisiting the earlier HAVA plans and evaluating the approach they will
take in meeting HAVA compliance. The administrator said they realize
there is a January 1, 2006, deadline, and the statewide database is a
priority.
In New York, legislation directing the creation of a statewide voter
list was signed May 3, 2005. The next step, according to a state
election office official, is to obtain consultant services to develop a
request for proposal for a contractor to create the statewide voter
list. The state board of elections is to establish rules and
regulations needed for compliance by July 1, 2005. While state
officials will give their best effort to meeting the January 1, 2006,
deadline, it will be difficult, the official said. According to the
legislation, New York's voter list will be created by combining the
existing voter lists maintained by each local board of election into a
single integrated list, and the state will update it regularly.
Progress to Verify Voter Applications with MVA Has Been Made in Most of
the Seven States We Visited, but Verification Has Not yet Taken Place
with SSA:
HAVA requires that voter registration applicants for federal elections
provide an identification number that can be matched with other records
for verification.[Footnote 37] Applicants are to be asked for their
state driver's license or state identification number obtained through
state MVAs, or (if an applicant does not provide either state number)
the last 4 digits of their social security number for this purpose. An
eligible applicant who does not have a state driver's license, state
identification card, or a social security card can still register to
vote. In those cases, election officials are required to assign the
registrant a unique identification number. Of the six states we
reviewed that requested waivers, several have moved forward in
arranging for verification of voter registration applicants with state
MVA records. Election and MVA officials in Arizona, Michigan, and New
York have agreements for voter registration applications to be verified
with motor vehicle agency records. In Michigan, because both functions
are under the Secretary of State, the agreement is between units within
the Secretary of State's office and has been in place since 1997.
Arizona election officials and the state MVA agreed in June 2002 to
verify information from voter registration applicants. Depending on how
the Arizona county decides to proceed, the entire voter list or just
information on new applicants is to be sent to the Secretary of State
and matched with MVA records on a daily basis. The match is sent back
to each county to resolve any discrepancies. Each record is to be given
a code indicating the type of follow-up needed, if any, for that voter
registrant.
In fall 2004, election officials said that New York began matching
voter registration applications under an interim process where counties
send the information for verification to the MVA. According to these
officials, when the statewide list is in operation the matching will be
done by state officials, but the results will be sent to local election
officials for resolving any discrepancies, as is the case now under the
interim process. California's HAVA Administrator said the connectivity
of the statewide database with other state agency records was part of
the strategy being considered by the Secretary of State.
Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin included matching with motor vehicle
agency records as part of their database development contracts. Texas
defines the validation of voter driver's license numbers by the MVA as
a key feature of their new system. Virginia's contract requires
matching voter applicant information with the MVA records on a real-
time basis. The MVA is 1 of 10 agencies that the Virginia system is to
interface with. Wisconsin's voter registration system contract requires
the contractor to prepare a document describing the interface strategy
for matching the voter registration list with other state agencies'
data.
HAVA requires that MVAs enter into an agreement with SSA to match
selected voter registrant information with SSA records when a voter
registration applicant provides their 4-digit social security number
for verification purposes. Of the seven states we reviewed, Virginia is
not subject to this HAVA requirement because of a HAVA exemption for
certain states such as Virginia that require applicants to provide
their full social security number on their voter registration
application, and the state can decide to use SSA's online verification
system.[Footnote 38] None of the remaining six states have signed
agreements with the SSA to verify voter applicant information. An
Arizona motor vehicle agency official said that they expect the
agreement with SSA will be signed in June 2005,[Footnote 39] and the
remaining five states requested a waiver from this requirement until
January 2006. A Social Security administrator reported that, as of
February 2005, only Iowa and Idaho had signed agreements.
To implement the HAVA verification requirement, SSA developed a new
program using only 4 digits. This program--called the Help America Vote
Verification program (HAVV)--receives voter registration "transactions"
through an arrangement with the American Association of Motor Vehicle
Administrators (AAMVA). All requests from states for voter registration
verification are electronically sent to AAMVA, which then sends them to
SSA.[Footnote 40] For each transaction, SSA compares a voter
registration applicant's name, date of birth, and last 4-digit social
security number against SSA records. SSA records have a "death
indicator" if SSA has been notified that the person with that social
security number is deceased. Based on the match, a result code is
assigned for the transaction, and the result is returned to AAMVA,
which forwards results to state motor vehicle agencies who, in turn,
provide the results to election officials. Only one of the codes
indicates a one-to-one match between the voter registrant information
and SSA records. However, six other codes may be generated for the
registrant indicating some combination of multiple matches with the
registrant or that the matching records indicate at least one of the
matches is deceased. Figure 3 graphically describes the HAVV process.
Figure 3: Process for Verifying Voter Registration Applicant
Information with SSA:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
SSA stated that there were too many variables to predict the number of
SSA verifications that might be processed, but based on the numbers in
Iowa, the only state to use HAVV as of February 2005, about 1 percent
of applicants provided the 4-digit number. The HAVV verification
service is for new voter registration applicants, not for voters
already on state voter registration rolls. Of the 7,231 voter
registration transactions sent to SSA by Iowa in 2004 for verification,
4,631 (64 percent) were returned as "one unique match-no death
indicator present," and another 14 transactions were "one unique match-
-death indicator." No unique match was found for the remaining 2,586
transactions, according to SSA records. According to SSA, agency
records and verification procedures are normally based on using the
full 9-digit social security number. When that number is paired with
specific individual information, the result is a unique match. With
only the last 4 digits of the social security number, the match results
may not be unique. Iowa officials said that the biggest problem they
are facing is that SSA is not specifying what voter information was not
matching, (i.e., was the mismatch in name, date of birth, or 4-digit
social security number). Without this information they are not able to
efficiently resolve the non-matching problems. An SSA official said
that the HAVV system is not able to provide this detail.
Most state election officials we spoke with were still determining the
process they would follow when a voter registration sent to SSA (or to
their MVA) for verification was returned with something other than one
live match (e.g., several live matches or a death indicator for the
match). In Iowa, the only state to have used the SSA verification
system as of February 2005, officials said they first tried reentering
the data with variations of the name and date of birth (i.e., Bill for
William) and ensuring numbers that can be mistaken are correct. Iowa
officials said that they send a letter to registrants asking them to
clarify or come in and reregister. Arizona and Wisconsin said that a
matching protocol still needed to be worked out, but any inconsistent
or questionable matches would be resolved by local election officials.
AAMVA officials and some of its members identified the variation in
names as a factor in finding no match with SSA records. For example,
the Virginia MVA representative said that when the MVA matched its
entire driver's license database with SSA using the full social
security number, most of the 3 percent of mismatches were women who had
registered using their married name but had not changed their name with
the SSA.
SSA is to be reimbursed by the states and territories required to
verify voter applicants with SSA for certain HAVV costs, which could
include, for example development, start-up, and maintenance, as well as
for voter registration applicant verifications.[Footnote 41] HAVV
development and start-up costs estimated by SSA are approximately $1.3
million, and yearly maintenance is estimated to be about $200,000.
Development and ongoing costs are divided among the entities based on
the proportionate share of national HAVA funds received by the state or
territory. For verification, SSA's current fee is $0.0062 per record.
In addition, a fee for AAMVA services is to be added by AAMVA. SSA
estimated HAVV development reimbursement costs for Arizona, California,
Michigan, New York, and Wisconsin to be approximately $25,000,
$163,000, $49,000, $95,000, and $27,000, respectively. (States that
collect full social security number for voter registration, including
Virginia, are exempt from HAVV costs because they may take advantage of
existing verification programs.)
Some States Already Meet HAVA Requirement to Match Registration List
with State Records on Deceased Persons and Felons:
Election officials in four of the states we visited--Arizona, Michigan,
New York, and Texas--foresaw no need to change their processes to meet
HAVA requirements regarding identifying registrants who are
deceased.[Footnote 42] State officials in all of these states but
Wisconsin reported receiving State Vital Statistics information on
deceased individuals for matching against voter lists. Arizona reported
that the State Department of Health Services provides monthly death
data via computer-to-computer match of records to the statewide voter
database. Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, and Texas state
officials said the vital statistics information is forwarded to each
jurisdiction for verification. Virginia officials said that, once the
new database is in place, there will be an automated interface with
state vital statistics and with the SSA Death Master File (DMF).
Jurisdictions in Michigan receive information on deceased individuals
from the county and state vital statistics offices.
In California and Wisconsin, officials reported that the match of state
death records with the state voter registration list would be addressed
when their statewide database was complete. California is still
determining its strategy for database matching, according to a state
official. Wisconsin's request for proposal states that information from
the state vital statistics office will be integrated using a system the
state recently implemented for integrating state databases, but the
details are to be defined with input from the vendor selected to
develop the voter registration database.
To identify ineligible registrants based on felon status, New York and
Texas election officials said they already compare voter registration
records and state information on felons. Michigan election officials
said that they are in compliance because voting is restricted only for
those who are incarcerated. Arizona election officials said they
receive some felony information in a paper format now and are working
with the Arizona State Supreme Court to obtain information on felonies
electronically on a weekly basis. Similarly, Virginia has an electronic
matching component in its statewide voter registration database
contract. Wisconsin officials told us that records of felony
convictions are diffused among 17 different correctional databases with
some in paper form. A state official said that the state has plans to
create a single state prison database that would be matched against the
state voter registration list, but the database might not be complete
by January 1, 2006. An election official in California said that the
connectivity of state databases with a state voter list is part of what
is currently being considered in planning for the state list.
Information from Federal Sources Could Assist Election Officials in
Identifying Ineligible Felons and Non-Citizens on Voter Registration
Lists:
Some federal data sources may help election officials identify
ineligible registrants. Although the number of ineligible registrants
may be small, identifying these ineligible voters may be important when
an election is close. To assist in identifying ineligible felons,
federal law requires U.S. Attorneys to notify state election officials
of felony convictions in district courts. In the district courts
serving the seven states we visited, 16 U.S. Attorney offices report
sending notices to election officials and 3 offices reported that they
were implementing or modifying their processes to provide this
information on felony convictions in U.S. district courts. According to
state and local election officials with whom we spoke in the seven
states, federal felony information was not always provided in a
standard format and the information was sometimes difficult to
interpret, untimely, or incomplete. A second source to identify
ineligible voter registrants could be the federal jury administrators.
Although not required to share information with election officials, the
jury administrators could help identify potential voter registrants who
are non-citizens on the basis of information potential jurors provide
when identifying themselves as non-citizens on their jury service
questionnaire. Other federal data sources--DHS databases and SSA's
Death Master File--might identify additional ineligible voter
registrants; however, the potential is limited because of difficulties
such as matching information from these sources with voter registrant
information.
U.S. Attorneys Are Required to Provide Information on Felons Convicted
in Federal Court to Election Officials but Have Not Done So
Consistently:
Under federal law,[Footnote 43] U.S. Attorneys are required to give
written notice of felony convictions in federal district courts to the
chief state election official of the offender's state of residence upon
conviction of the offender. The law also requires the state election
officials to notify the election officials of the local jurisdiction in
which an offender resides of federal felony convictions. In the year
ending March 31, 2004, 74,642 criminal defendants were convicted and
sentenced in U.S. district courts. According to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, of the 69,023 federal offenders for whom sentencing data
were available, 59,554 were sentenced to prison in fiscal year 2003.
The U.S. Attorney notification to state officials is required to
include:
* the name of the offender,
* the offender's age and residence address,
* the date of entry of the judgment,
* a description of the offenses of which the offender was convicted,
and:
* the sentence imposed by the court.
EOUSA provided us information on how 19 U.S. Attorneys' offices in the
seven states we visited were implementing the law, which became
effective in 1993. Sixteen of the offices reported that they were
sending notices of certain felony convictions in U.S. district courts
to state election officials. Officials in three U.S. Attorneys' offices
reported that they were implementing or modifying their processes to
provide this information on felony convictions in U.S. district courts.
According to an EOUSA official, one U.S. Attorneys' office expects to
have a fully functioning notification system in place in the future but
no specific time frame was provided. A second U.S. Attorneys' office is
instituting a policy to consistently provide conviction data, according
to EOUSA. In the third U.S. Attorneys' office, EOUSA said the support
staff person assigned to each felony case will e-mail required
information to the state election official. This U.S. Attorneys' office
reported to EOUSA that it has modified the criminal case intake form to
include the defendant's state of residence to help ensure that the
information is available upon conviction. The same office also reported
that it is now working on new quality control procedures for case
management data. When completed, a list of felons is to be created and
felony conviction notices are to be sent to state election officials.
In all of the above cases no timeframe for implementation was provided.
The law does not require standardized formats or time frames for
reporting the federal felony conviction data. In the 16 U.S. Attorneys'
offices that reported sending notices to state election officials, when
the information was sent varied, for example monthly, bi-weekly (when
there are a significant number of convictions to report), bi-monthly,
quarterly, several times a year, upon receipt of the judgment and
commitment order, and 6 months from the date of sentencing or later if
the case is on appeal, according to these U.S. Attorney's office
officials. What information was sent to election officials also varied
(the judgment and commitment order or the judgment and commitment order
with a notification letter) as did the process. For example:
* The designated paralegal prepares a monthly printout of the required
information, which is forwarded to the responsible assistant U.S.
Attorney to produce and send the information to the appropriate state
officials.
* The supervisory legal assistant collects judgment and commitment
orders and mails them to the appropriate state agency.
* The judgment and commitment order is copied and then routed to the
first assistant U.S. Attorney, who reviews the order and then sends it
to the secretary to the U.S. Attorney. The secretary forwards the
judgment and commitment order directly to the election board of the
secretary of state.
* The judgment and commitment orders are collated by month of
imposition, sorted for approximately 6 months, and then compared to the
appellate docket to determine whether a defendant has appealed. If the
defendant has appealed, the judgment and commitment order is retained
and periodically checked to determine the outcome of the appeal. If
there is no appeal or when the appellate process is completed, the
judgment and commitment order is sent to the state election authority
for the state the defendant claims as his or her last residence.
State and local election officials in 7 of the 14 jurisdictions we
visited told us that they had concerns about the timeliness or accuracy
of the federal felony conviction notices they received. Election
officials told us that notices are not easy for them to use, such as
determining the length of sentence. They also said birth dates on
records were sometimes missing, which can lead to multiple matches on
the same name.
Federal Jury Administrators in the U.S. District Courts Have
Information about Non-Citizens Taken from Voter Registration Lists That
Could Be Shared with Election Officials:
Jurors must be U.S. citizens to serve on a jury in U.S. district court.
The federal jury administrators we surveyed by phone in all 14 U.S.
court districts that cover the local election jurisdictions we visited
asked about citizenship status on questionnaires sent to prospective
jurors.[Footnote 44] Figure 4 provides an example of a juror
qualification questionnaire from the Eastern District of Virginia.
Figure 4: Federal Jury Qualification Questionnaire Requests Citizenship
Information:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
All of the jury administrators[Footnote 45] for the U.S. district
courts told us they use voter registration lists to draw names for the
jury pool. Ten of the 14 district court administrators said they use
only voter registration lists, while the other 4 use voter lists in
conjunction with other sources.[Footnote 46]
According to officials of the AOUSC, it would be under penalty of
perjury to deliberately make false statements about citizenship on the
questionnaire, although the extent to which the matter is pursued is up
to each U.S. district court. Generally, districts we surveyed did not
verify claims of non-citizenship; however, two districts verified
prospective juror claims of non-citizenship. The Eastern District of
Virginia called prospective jurors to gather verbal confirmation of
citizenship status and the Eastern District of Michigan requires that
immigration documentation be provided to verify non-citizen status.
AOUSC officials and federal jury administrators we spoke with generally
did not have exact data on the number of people called for jury service
that responded that they were non-citizens. Consequently, no
information was available from federal jury administrators in six U.S.
district courts, but federal jury administrators in eight U.S. district
courts provided either exact numbers or estimates. Of the eight
district courts, four federal jury administrators said no one had been
disqualified from jury service because they were not U.S. citizens. In
the other four district courts:
* a federal jury administrator in one U.S. district court estimated
that 1 to 3 percent of the people out of a jury pool of 30,000 over 2
years (about 300 to 900 people) said they were not U.S. citizens;
* a federal jury administrator in a second U.S. district court
estimated that less than 1 percent of the people out of a jury pool of
35,000 names each month (less than 350 people) said they were not U.S.
citizens;
* a federal jury administrator in a third U.S. district court estimated
that about 150 people out of a jury pool of 95,000 names over 2 years
said they were not U.S. citizens;
and:
* a federal jury administrator in a fourth U.S. district court
estimated that annually about 5 people typically claimed non-
citizenship in a jury pool of about 50,000 individuals.
Of the 14 U.S. district courts contacted, only the jury administrator
for the Eastern District of Virginia provided feedback to voter
registration authorities if a prospective juror claimed not to be a
U.S. citizen. Of the 13 U.S. district courts that do not currently
provide feedback, none planned to do so in the future. However, the
federal jury administrators' opinions on the feasibility of providing
this form of feedback were mixed. For example, 7 of the 11 district
officials who commented on feasibility indicated that providing
feedback to election officials regarding non-citizens is currently
possible while 4 other federal jury administrators claimed the
responsibility would be difficult due to staffing resource constraints.
According to an AOUSC official, there is no Judicial
Conference[Footnote 47] policy that instructs the courts to notify
election officials when it is determined that a potential juror is not
a U.S. citizen.
At the county level, some county jury administrators share information
with election officials about people who ask to be excused from jury
service because they are not U.S. citizens. Jurors for county courts
are also drawn from a variety of sources, sometimes including voter
registration lists. Other sources county officials cited for their jury
pools included state drivers' licenses, state identification cards,
social services department information, employment department
information, and state tax rolls. Similar to federal district courts,
county jury administrators determine if a person qualifies for jury
service based on citizenship by specifically asking on a form if the
person is a citizen. Jury officials in three county court jurisdictions
in New York and Texas require people who claim non-citizenship to
furnish proof in the form of immigration documents. One of those
jurisdictions will allow a notarized statement in lieu of immigration
papers, and another jurisdiction would accept a letter from an
immigration attorney.
Of the 10 locations we visited where county jury
administrators[Footnote 48] draw the names of potential jurors from a
pool that includes names taken from voter registration lists, five
county jury administrators said they provided feedback to election
officials when a potential juror claimed not to be a citizen as a
reason to be excused from jury duty. With respect to county jury
administrators who use more than one source for their jury pool, one
county jury administrator said that she could not determine if the
potential juror was drawn from the voter registration list or the other
sources used for selection, and therefore could not provide feedback.
However, a county jury administrator for another county court in the
same state that also used multiple sources for the jury pool said they
provide feedback to election officials on all people who claim non-
citizenship as a reason to be excused from jury duty.
In one local election jurisdiction that receives feedback from county
jury administrators, election officials estimated that they have
removed about 500 people who were self-identified as non-citizens
during jury selection from the voter registration lists since 2000.
This jurisdiction had 889,000 registrants in 2004. For example, during
2003, the county jury administrator for this jurisdiction had 1,693
people ask to be excused from jury duty because they were not citizens.
Of those, election officials sent letters requesting documentation of
citizenship to 413 people. As a result of the process, they removed 83
people who were identified as non-citizens from the voter registration
lists. Other examples include:
* A county jury administrator for one county court estimated they
annually refer to election officials about 2,000 names of jurors who
identified themselves as non-citizens to be excused from jury duty. The
election officials in this jurisdiction said that they remove about 400
to 500 names a year from the voter registration list because the
registrants are not citizens (out of between 3 and 4 million
registrants).
* In another county court, a county jury administrator estimated that,
annually, about 5 people at most who were drawn from the voter
registration lists (which includes about 130,000 registrants in
November 2004) claim non-citizenship as a reason to be excused from
jury duty.
In one jurisdiction, election officials receiving jury service
information commented that they must follow up on each referral, and
sometimes people may have wrongly claimed non-citizenship in order to
be excused from jury duty. Election officials will generally mail a
notification to the registrant asking them to verify the information to
remain on the voter registration list. Those who do not reply are
removed. Non-response on the part of a registrant does not necessarily
mean that they are not citizens.
DHS Databases Contain Selected Information on Non-Citizens, but the
Usefulness May Be Limited:
Federal law provides a statutory framework that requires non-citizens
entering or residing in the United States to provide certain
identification information. This information was historically provided
to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which when
abolished, had its functions transferred to various components within
DHS on March 1, 2003. DHS maintains multiple databases containing
information on non-citizens within its component agencies: the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Service, the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Appendix II
shows examples of the databases identified by DHS officials.
DHS officials said that the usefulness of their information to identify
non-citizens on voter registration lists may be limited because of
system constraints for commonly used data matching identifiers (such as
name, birth date, address, social security number, and alien number)
that are needed for a match and the need for law enforcement to verify
the information. For example, the matching of databases may not always
be reliable because matching on names alone may produce multiple
matches on the same name, depending on whether there is middle initial,
middle name, or simply the same common name. As an example of
restrictions on usage for data matching identifiers, DHS officials said
that address information on non-citizens in some DHS databases, which
these officials believe is important for voter registration, was not
always reliable in the databases because it was self-reported
information and would require verification. We recently reported on the
limited usefulness of self-reported address information by non-citizens
in some DHS databases.[Footnote 49] We reported that 16 of 17
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents interviewed did not use the
change of address data in one of the DHS databases to help locate the
non-citizens as part of their investigations because the agents said
that the change of address information, which is self-reported data, is
often unreliable.
We identified two instances where DHS databases were used to help
identify non-citizens for voter eligibility purposes. In the first
instance, in the late 1990s, DHS officials noted that a match was
performed between information on non-citizens in then INS files and
voter registration records at the request of a House Committee that
oversaw the results of a California congressional election being
contested. The data-matching effort sometimes produced multiple name
matches in INS databases for a single name from the voter registration
list. For example, in documentation of the California matching effort,
1 name from the voter registration list matched with 44 names in the
INS databases. According to DHS officials, the effort to investigate
those matches was extremely labor intensive and required immigration
officials to manually pull non-citizen records from around the world to
determine the identity of the individual from the match. DHS officials
said the initial matching of the database was unreliable because of the
lack of common data identifiers, usually only name and date of birth,
and the accuracy of those identifiers. Common names were especially
problematic in producing multiple matches on the same name. Address
information, which DHS officials believe is important for voter
registration, was not always reliable in the databases on non-citizens,
as mentioned previously.
In the second instance, California state election officials said that
they tried a database-sharing pilot program with INS in the mid-1990s
to investigate allegations of ineligible voters. At the time, the state
election officials said that INS officials advised them that their data
might not be reliable for their purposes. In a letter to the House
Chairman regarding the matching of voter registration information and
INS data, the INS Commissioner wrote that the data sharing was by names
and date of birth, and there would be no match if the person's name on
the state voter registration rolls is different that what it is in the
INS system. In addition, the INS Commissioner wrote that a match does
not necessarily mean the person is not eligible to vote. According to
California state election officials, their experience confirmed that
indeed the reliability of the data was poor for their purposes and that
they could not use them.
While matching of voter registration lists with DHS databases could be
problematic, the California Secretary of State's office has been
exploring the possibility of using the DHS Systematic Alien
Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program to pursue specific
allegations of voter ineligibility. The SAVE Program was developed to
allow federal, state, and local government agencies to obtain
information they need on immigration status in order to determine an
applicant's or recipient's eligibility for many public benefits. The
SAVE Program also administers an employment verification pilot program,
in cooperation with SSA, to help employers verify the work
authorization of their newly hired employees. As proposed by the
California Secretary of State, the use of SAVE would involve querying
individual voter names on the basis of specific allegations or
challenges that a registered voter was a non-citizen. This proposal
does not involve matching entire voter registration lists with DHS
databases.
SAVE is more inclusive than other databases (containing over 60 million
alien records) and could provide election officials the means to
identify some non-citizens; however, according to DHS officials, it has
limitations. For example, DHS officials said that the SAVE Program is
set up to query information based on the number on the alien's Arrival
and Departure Record form (I-94) or an alien's DHS assigned "A" number.
It is a web-based system, and records are normally queried one at a
time, although processing multiple records using the SAVE program is
possible. Because voter registration is limited to U.S. citizens, voter
registration records would not contain alien or form I-94 numbers. The
SAVE Program can be queried by a social security number, name, and date
of birth if the alien's "A" number or I-94 number are unknown. However,
DHS officials emphasized that the system is alien-number-driven. Also,
DHS officials opined that using the SAVE Program would require
additional verification of the person's identity, either automated or
manual, as a precautionary measure before removing a person from a
voter registration list based on a match.
To facilitate investigations of alleged non-citizens having registered
to vote, the California Secretary of State's Office has proposed
accessing the SAVE Program. An official in the State's Election Fraud
Investigation Unit saw this as a time-and effort-saving tool. Rather
than contacting a DHS agent to obtain information and waiting for a
response that, according to this official, sometimes could be months in
coming, the unit could make direct queries through the SAVE Program.
DHS has provided the California Secretary of State with a memorandum of
understanding to allow this process to proceed, but as of February
2005, California officials said that the Secretary of State had not
signed the memorandum.
Use of SSA Database to Identify Deceased Registrants Has Matching and
Timeliness Limitations:
The DMF consolidates death records across the country and potentially
could be used by election officials to identify voters on their
registration lists that died in another state.[Footnote 50] While about
2.7 million people die in the United States each year and about 2
million are SSA beneficiaries, matching difficulties and the timeliness
and completeness of the data may lessen DMF's usefulness to election
officials.
Matching voter registration records with DMF records requires that the
sets of records contain at least some of the same identifiers for an
individual. The social security number is the primary way to identify a
unique individual in SSA's databases, but only seven states allow the
full social security number to be collected for voter registration
purposes. One of the states we visited (Virginia) collects the 9-digit
social security number as part of the voter registration application,
and election officials there said that they plan to use the DMF for
verification when the statewide, computerized voter registration list
has been developed. Even without the full social security number,
matching can still be done with other identifiers in the DMF, such as
name, date of birth, or address, but problems, such as people using
different names for voter registration than on social security records,
currency of addresses, and the number of people on a national basis
with similar names, may make matching difficult. One study[Footnote 51]
of the DMF suggested that without a correct social security number,
researchers would need to consult other sources of mortality
information.
Timeliness and completeness may also lessen the usefulness of the DMF
for identifying deceased voter registrants. According to a 2001 SSA
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report, some states had been
taking over 200 days to report.[Footnote 52] SSA officials told us that
the information is untimely for a number of reasons, such as manual
recordkeeping or outdated computer systems at the state level. Under
SSA's ongoing Electronic Death Registration initiative, SSA plans to
receive death reports within 5 days of death. SSA estimates the
initiative will be complete in 2012, but recent federal legislation may
provide grants for computerizing state records that could affect SSA's
ability to meet the completion date sooner. In addition to timeliness
considerations, a 2003 OIG report stated that the completeness of the
DMF is not consistent, citing research indicating younger deceased
persons were less likely to be included.[Footnote 53] The OIG report
further stated that the DMF does not contain every decease social
security number holder and also includes individuals who are not
actually deceased.
Conclusions:
State and local election officials face many challenges in maintaining
accurate voter registration records. Because voter registration lists
are dynamic and constantly changing, officials turn to a variety of
sources to identify registrants who may be ineligible to vote. HAVA
included provisions directed at maintaining accurate voter registration
lists that included, among other things, requirements for states to
develop a computerized, interactive statewide voter registration list
and to match that list against other state databases and records.
However, after provisions are implemented, states will continue to face
challenges to maintain accurate voter registration lists and verifying
voter eligibility, particularly identifying out-of-state registration
duplicates and deceased registrants. Thus, the effect of HAVA's voter
registration reform initiatives is yet to be determined.
Election officials we contacted in seven selected states noted that
they experienced specific problems verifying voter registration
application information related to felony convictions and citizenship
status. We found two federal information sources that could provide
election officials information on federal felony convictions or
citizenship status requirements. The number of potentially ineligible
voter registrants identified by these two federal sources may be small
but could be important in determining the outcome of a close election.
One, the U.S. Attorneys, is already required to provide state election
officials with information about felony convictions, but the
information could be provided in a more standardized format to ensure
that the information is easier for election officials to interpret and
more complete and timely.
The second information source that could help identify potential
ineligible voters is federal jury administrators. Although not required
to share information with election officials, the jury administrators
could help identify potential voter registrants who are non-citizens on
the basis of information potential jurors provide when identifying
themselves as non-citizens on their jury service questionnaire.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To assist state election officials in identifying individuals on voter
registration lists who may be ineligible to vote because of their felon
or non-citizen status, we are recommending the following two actions:
We recommend that the Attorney General direct the U.S. Attorneys to
provide information on felony convictions in U.S. district courts in a
more standardized format to make it easier for election officials to
interpret the conviction information, such as the length of the
sentence, and to help ensure information on felons is complete and
timely.
We recommend that the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
determine the feasibility and steps necessary to implement a
requirement that U.S. district court jury administrators provide notice
to state election officials of potential jurors who identify themselves
as non-citizens on their jury qualification questionnaire.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to DOJ and AOUSC for review and
comment. The Director of EOUSA in her comments agreed with our
recommendation. She acknowledged that maintaining accurate voter lists
is an important goal and that an EOUSA working group has been tasked to
develop a standardized process for the 94 U.S. Attorneys' Offices to
send felony conviction information in the best format for use by state
election officials. AOUSC's Director agreed with our recommendation and
stated that this matter would be brought to the attention of district
courts. Despite resource shortages in the federal courts and the fact
that most juror are screened by local and state courts, the AOUSC
Director acknowledged the public interest in ensuring that non-citizens
are not afforded the privilege of voting. Written comments from AOUSC
and DOJ are included in appendices IV and V. Sections of the report
were also provided to SSA, DHS, and states we visited to confirm the
accuracy of the information. Technical comments from the federal
agencies and states that we reviewed were incorporated, as appropriate,
in the report.
As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it
until 30 days from the date of this letter. We then plan to provide
copies of this report to the Attorney General, Department of Justice;
Director, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts; Ranking Minority
Members, House Committee on the Judiciary and Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security and Claims; Chairman and Ranking Minority
Member, Senate Committee Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs;
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Government
Reform; Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Rules
and Administration; and Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House
Committee on House Administration. Copies of this report will also be
made available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me on (202) 512-8777 or at jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff contributing to this
report are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
William O. Jenkins, Jr.:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Our objectives were to describe: (1) the processes in selected states
to verify that voter registration applicants met state eligibility
criteria and to help ensure that voter registration lists are accurate;
(2) the challenges officials face in maintaining voter lists; (3) the
implementation status of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) voter
registration verification procedures in selected states; and (4)
potential data sources for verifying voter registration eligibility.
We selected the following states using a non-probability sample:
Arizona, California, Michigan, New York, Texas, Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Our selection of states took into consideration several
voter registration-related factors. We sought to select states that
represented differences in terms of the stage of development of their
statewide databases and had unique characteristics that might affect
the implementation of HAVA. For example, Wisconsin has same day
registration; Arizona has on-line voter registration; Michigan has a
reputation as a model for registration practices; and New York State
may have to rely on social security number verification procedures more
than other states because it has a large population who live in New
York City and may not have driver's licenses for verification. We also
selected states to provide geographic diversity and variation in
election administration--some administer elections at the county level
and others at lower levels such as city or townships. States also
varied in the size of the immigrant populations, of interest because of
the citizenship requirement for voter registration. Our goal was not to
target a particular state, but rather to identify a range of issues
facing states in implementing HAVA requirements and assuring accurate
voter registration lists. Information from these seven states is not
generalizable to all states. Table 3 describes characteristics in each
state.
Table 3: State Selection Factors:
State: Arizona;
Voter registration-related characteristics:
* No statewide database prior to HAVA;
* Did not request a waiver from HAVA database and verification
requirements deadline of January 1, 2004;
* Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 12.8;
* Voter registration administered at county level;
* Has implemented an on- line voter registration process.
State: California;
Voter registration-related characteristics:
* Statewide database prior to HAVA that is compiled from local election
lists. Local jurisdictions can access entire list;
* Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004;
* Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 26.2;
* Voter registration administered at county level.
State: Michigan;
Voter registration-related characteristics:
* Unified statewide database;
* Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004;
* Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 5.3;
* Voter registration administered at township, city, and village level;
* Secretary of State responsible for election and motor vehicle
licensing functions.
State: New York;
Voter registration-related characteristics:
* No statewide database prior to HAVA;
* Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004;
* Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 20.4;
* Voter registration administered at county level;
* Expected higher use of social security records for registrant
verification due to fewer drivers in New York City.
State: Texas;
Voter registration-related characteristics:
* Statewide database prior to HAVA that is compiled from local election
lists. Local jurisdictions do not have access to entire list;
* Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004;
* Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 13.9;
* Voter registration administered at county level.
State: Virginia;
Voter registration-related characteristics:
* Unified statewide database;
* Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004;
* Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 8.1;
* Voter registration administered at county level;
* May use 9-digit social security number for voter registration
verification (rather than 4 digits outlined by HAVA).
State: Wisconsin;
Voter registration-related characteristics:
* No statewide database prior to HAVA. Some jurisdictions currently do
not maintain voter registration rolls;
* Requested a waiver from HAVA database and verification requirements
deadline of January 1, 2004;
* Census 2000 percent of population foreign born: 3.6;
* Voter registration administered at municipal level;
* Allows Election Day voter registration.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Within each state, we selected two local jurisdictions using a
nonprobability sample. Our selection criteria included population size,
the proximity of the locations to our site visits with state election
officials, suggestions by state election officials, and proximity to a
motor vehicle office. Local jurisdictions included:
* Mariposa County, Arizona;
* Gila County, Arizona;
* Los Angeles County, California;
* Yolo County, California;
* Detroit, Michigan;
* Delta Township, Michigan;
* New York City, New York;
* Rensselaer County, New York;
* Bexar County, Texas;
* Webb County, Texas;
* Arlington County, Virginia;
* Albemarle County, Virginia;
* Madison, Wisconsin; and:
* Franklin City, Wisconsin.
To describe state voter registration processes and challenges
(objectives 1 and 2), we conducted semi-structured on-site interviews
with state and local election officials, and supplemented the
interviews with phone and email updates. We are relying on testimonial
evidence because most states (all but Arizona in our sample) obtained
an extension for implementing HAVA and, therefore, data were not
available to assess the status of implementation. Our interviews
included questions on registration processes, any voter registration
fraud allegations, and discussion of challenges identified by officials
in maintaining voter roll accuracy. Because so many voter registrations
originate with applications from motor vehicle agencies, interviews
were conducted with motor vehicle agency officials in the same
jurisdictions regarding their voter registration procedures. In
Michigan, where we spoke only with Secretary of State officials, the
Secretary of State's office is responsible for elections and driver's
licenses. We also reviewed current HAVA plans, relevant reports, and
documents related to the voter registration process in seven states.
State level election officials were provided an opportunity to verify
the accuracy of information regarding their particular state. All but
one state responded.
In addition to asking state election officials about allegations of
voter registration fraud, we interviewed Department of Justice (DOJ)
Criminal Division officials, and obtained a list of election fraud
active matters from 2002-2004, filed by U.S. Attorneys and Public
Integrity section attorneys (the section that handles election issues
within DOJ). We also contacted U.S. Attorneys responsible for the
states we reviewed for any additional cases handled locally by those
offices. We contacted District Attorneys in the counties for the local
election districts we visited and asked for information regarding
actions related to ineligible voter registration. We also asked state
and local election officials if they had referred any reported
incidents of voter registration fraud or irregularities to county,
state, or federal officials since January 2003. District attorney and
state and local election official reports of fraud related to voter
registration were based on the recall of the officials, except in
California, where the state fraud unit routinely catalogs allegations
and their disposition.
To describe the HAVA implementation status in the seven states
(objective 3), we reviewed HAVA plans to develop a statewide voter
registration database and to verify voter registration lists against
motor vehicle agency and Social Security Administration records. We
also included questions on the status of the database and verification
procedures in the semi-structured interviews with state and local
election, and state motor vehicle officials. We interviewed and
obtained documents from the Social Security Administration on how that
agency was addressing HAVA verification requirements.
To identify potential data sources for verifying voter registration
eligibility (objective 4), we reviewed and summarized sources currently
used for verification in the selected states and localities, and
discussed potential verification sources with state and local election
officials.
We then gathered additional information on the forwarding of federal
felony convictions to state election officials from the Executive
Office for U.S. Attorneys. We requested information from the 19 U.S.
Attorney Offices corresponding to the seven selected states--Arizona,
California, Michigan, New York, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin--we
visited. The 19 U.S. Attorneys' Offices were the District of Arizona,
the Central District of California, the Eastern District of California,
the Northern District of California, the Southern District of
California, the Eastern District of Michigan, the Western District of
Michigan, the Eastern District of New York, the Northern District of
New York, the Southern District of New York, the Western District of
New York, the Eastern District of Texas, the Northern District of
Texas, the Southern District of Texas, the Western District of Texas,
the Eastern District of Virginia, the Western District of Virginia, the
Eastern District of Wisconsin, and the Western District of Wisconsin.
We contacted federal jury administrators by phone in the 14 U.S. court
districts that covered those same local election jurisdictions and
requested information on reporting between federal jury administrators
and election officials. The 14 district courts were: District of
Arizona, Central District of California, Eastern District of
California, Eastern District of Michigan, Western District of Michigan,
Eastern District of New York, Southern District of New York, Northern
District of New York, Southern District of Texas, Western District of
Texas, Eastern District of Virginia, Western District of Virginia,
Eastern District of Wisconsin, and Western District of Wisconsin.
We also contacted 14 county court jurisdictions by phone that covered
the same election jurisdictions and requested information on reporting
between county jury administrators and election officials. The 14 local
courts were: Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County; Gila County
Superior Court; Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County;
Superior Court of California, Yolo County; Third Judicial Circuit Court
of Michigan; Eaton County Courts; New York County Courts; Rensselaer
County Courts; Texas Office of Court Administration, Bexar County;
Texas Office of Court Administration, Webb County; 17th Judicial
District of Virginia; 16th Judicial Circuit of Virginia; Dane County
Courts; and Milwaukee County Courthouse.
We requested information on data regarding citizenship from officials
in the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services. We also reviewed selected federal and local
agency reports with relevant information.
Our work was performed between January 2004 and May 2005 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Department of Homeland Security Automated Systems That
Include Information on Non-Citizens:
Name: Asylum Pre-screening System; Description: The Asylum Pre-
screening System provides case tracking for asylum pre-screening
credible fear claims that are presented during the expedited removal
process.
Name: Computer-Linked Application Management Information System,
Version 3;
Description: The Computer-Linked Application Management Information
System, Version 3, is a high-speed transaction processing system with
client server and mainframe components. It is designed to support the
processing (receipt, adjudication, and notification) pertaining to all
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service benefits applications and
petitions, except naturalization (see Computer Linked Application
Information System, Version 4 ). Pertinent information is uploaded to
the Central Index System.
Name: Computer Linked Application Information System, Version 4;
Description: The Computer Linked Application Information System,
Version 4, is a nationally-deployed Client-Server, workflow-driven case
management system that supports the processing of naturalization
applications. Pertinent information is uploaded to the Central Index
System.
Name: Central Index System;
Description: The Central Index System provides automated information on
individuals of interest and identifies the location of an alien's
hardcopy A-file. It also provides information for federal and state
entitlement programs and is a single centralized source of data for
many mission functions. Data is routinely captured in the Central Index
System via daily data uploads from the Computer-Linked Application
Management Information System, Versions 3 and 4.
Name: Employment Authorization Document System;
Description: The Employment Authorization Document System is an
antiquated stand-alone personal computer system used to capture data at
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service field offices. In combination
with Polaroid camera pictures, it generates a standardized
identification document issued to aliens who are authorized to be
temporarily employed in the U.S. Data is electronically consolidated
from the stand-alone devices throughout each workweek and uploaded to
the Computer-Linked Application Management Information System, Version
3, and subsequently to the Central Index System (see above) for
nationwide terminal inquiry access.
Name: Marriage Fraud Amendment Act System;
Description: A centralized, mainframe case tracking system that
supports the adjudication of petitions covered by the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendment Act of 1986.
Name: Refugee, Asylum & Parole System;
Description: A centralized mainframe system that provides full case
tracking and management capability for asylum casework.
Name: Reengineered Naturalization Application Casework System;
Description: A centralized, mainframe system reengineered from the
Naturalization Application Case-processing System. It no longer takes
new naturalization applications (see Computer Linked Application
Information System, Version 4), but continues to process applications
for citizenship (N600), and applications for duplicate certificates
(N565).
Name: Deportable Alien Control System;
Description: One nationwide database of deportation and detention
information that operates on computer hardware owned by the federal
government and is accessible through the network of user terminal
across the country. It automates many of the clerical docket control
functions associated with the arrest, detention, and deportation of
illegal aliens.
Name: The Juvenile Alien Management System;
Description: This database tracked juvenile aliens in the removal
process. This system is no longer used and supported. Juvenile case
tracked in the Juvenile Alien Management System had been recorded in
DACS.
Name: Student and Exchange Visitor Information System;
Description: An internet-based system that provides tracking and
monitoring functionality, with access to accurate and current
information on nonimmigrant students and exchange visitors and their
dependents and the approved schools and designated programs sponsor in
the United States that host these individuals.
Name: The Student and School System;
Description: With the implementation of the Student and Exchange
Visitor Information System , this database previously utilized by
legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service fell into disuse. The
data in this system has not been updated since the Student and Exchange
Visitor Information System came online. The Student and School System
was official retired on September 30, 2004, and is no longer available.
Name: Arrival and Departure Information System;
Description: The Arrival and Departure Information System provides a
Department of Homeland Security intranet accessible web-based browser
application that correlates information from multiple sources to show
the person's travel history, current immigration status, and overstay
information. The Arrival and Departure Information System currently
receives, filters, processes, matches and stores biographic and
biometric border crossing information for all non-citizens, air and sea
travelers entering and departing the United States and status update
information for aliens within the United States.
Name: Non-Immigrant Information System;
Description: An online, automated central repository of information
designed to track and maintain the status of all foreign visitors and
immigrants. This system provides information on arrivals and
departures, to support the controlled admission of non-immigrants to
the United States through ports of entry and to track non-immigrant
departures for identifying information.
Name: Enforcement Case Tracking System;
Description: An automated system that supports the Border and
Transportation Security in the accomplishment of its law enforcement
mission. The Enforcement Case Tracking System comprises numerous
modules for specific processing needs--needs such as identifying,
apprehending, detaining, and removing aliens illegally in the United
States, filing administrative and criminal charges against aliens who
commit illegal acts; and seizing contraband associated with illegal
alien activity.
Name: United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology[A];
Description: An automated system that collects, maintains, and shares
information, including biometric identifiers, on selected foreign
nationals who travel to the United States.[A] Among other things, the
program is designed to identify foreign nationals who (1) have
overstayed or violated the terms of their visit; (2) can receive,
extend, or adjust their immigration status; or (3) should be
apprehended or detained by law enforcement officials. On January 5,
2004, Department of Homeland Security began operating the first stage
of its planned United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology at 115 air and 14 sea ports of entry.
Name: Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE);
Description: An automated system responsible for administering programs
involving customer access to information contained in the Department of
Homeland Security's Verification Information System database. The
Verification Information System database is a nationally accessible
database of selected immigration status information on over 60 million
records. The SAVE Program enables federal, state, and local government
agencies to obtain immigration status they need in order to determine
an applicant's or recipient's eligibility for many public benefits. The
SAVE Program also administers, in cooperation with SSA, employment
verification pilot programs that enable employers to quickly and easily
verify the work authorization of their newly hired employees.
Source: GAO summary of Department of Homeland Security information
provided by United States Citizenship and Immigration Service,
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, and Customs and Border Protection
officials.
[A] For more information on this program, see GAO, Homeland Security:
First Phase of Visitor and Immigration Status Program Operating, but
Improvements Needed, GAO-04-586 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2004).
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Voter Registration Fraud Allegations Identified at
Selected States and at the Federal Level:
In California, the only state with an investigative unit dedicated to
voter fraud issues, 15 cases of the 108 allegations for fraudulent
voter registration opened from January 2001 to May 2004 were sent to
the District Attorney for prosecution. Of the 15 cases, the outcome had
been determined in 11 cases (6 cases declined for prosecution; 5 were
prosecuted and the individuals were convicted). In four cases, the
outcome is yet to be determined. Similarly, the California
investigative unit opened for investigation 29 allegations of non-
citizens either registering or voting, 1 case of a non-citizen voting
was sent to a District Attorney for prosecution, but the District
Attorney declined it. At the federal level, DOJ attorneys initiated at
least 61 election fraud investigations or matters (an alleged possible
criminal occurrence that still has to be investigated) from 2000 to
2003. Of those cases, 15 involved voter registration or ineligible
voters:
Election officials in seven of the locations we visited reported that
they have referred reported instances of voter registration fraud
allegations to appropriate agencies, such as the District Attorney and
the U.S. Attorney for investigation. Election officials referred
allegations of voter registration fraud such as the following to the
appropriate agencies for investigation:
* A Texas local jurisdiction referred to the State Board of Elections
an allegation that state officials investigated where 27 people were
registered at one address. The investigation revealed that the location
was an orphanage, and the registrants were resident workers.
* Texas local jurisdictions reported referring to their local District
Attorney instances of (1) an individual trying to register using the
names of 42 deceased individuals, (2) the receipt of many voter
registration applications from the same address, and (3) a non-citizen
who incorrectly believed she could vote in a school board election if
she was a property owner.
* One Arizona local jurisdiction reported that between 1997 and 2003,
23 cases had been prosecuted by local District Attorneys or the U.S.
Attorney for election-related violations and petition forgeries. Eleven
of the 23 cases were for petition forgery.
* Local jurisdictions in California and Michigan each reported
instances of voter registration drive irregularities such as altering
or falsifying registration forms. Election officials in California
referred the matter to the Secretary of State's office for
investigation and Michigan officials referred the matter to the local
county prosecutor.
* One New York jurisdiction reported referring an allegation made by an
ex-spouse to the U.S. Attorney that the former spouse was not a
citizen.
* One Arizona local jurisdiction official referred to the District
Attorney an instance of a person trying to vote before being officially
sworn in as a U.S. citizen.
In deciding to investigate allegations of voter registration fraud
given the competing demands for investigative and prosecutorial
resources, local and federal prosecutors reported they take various
factors into consideration. District Attorneys in jurisdictions we
visited gave various reasons for not pursuing allegations. One District
Attorney reported that they were unable to investigate the allegations
of voter registration fraud because they could not compel a person to
provide proof of citizenship based only on an allegation. A District
Attorney in another jurisdiction reported that registration allegations
are not pursued because they are victimless and non-violent crimes.
Another District Attorney said that registration issues are not one of
the county's priorities.
District Attorneys in the local jurisdictions we visited reported
initiating matters or cases since January 1, 2004, pertaining to
ineligible persons registering to vote. Three jurisdictions reported
prosecuting one case each, two reported having matters still under
investigation, and two reported that they did not prosecute the matter.
Within the Department of Justice, the U.S. Attorneys and the Public
Integrity Section (PIN) are responsible for enforcing federal criminal
laws applicable to federal election fraud offenses, among other things.
PIN is also responsible for overseeing the U.S. Attorneys'
investigations and prosecution of federal election fraud. A senior PIN
official said the decision to pursue an allegation depends on a number
of factors. When an allegation is received, it is evaluated in terms of
factors such as quality of the witnesses, quality of evidence,
historical problems in the area, resources, coordinating with state
Attorney General's office priorities, and the priority of election
crimes within the responsibilities of the Department of Justice. U.S.
Attorneys and PIN attorneys initiated at least 61 election fraud
matters, or investigations, related to election years 2000 through
2003. Most of the 61 matters related to elections held in 2002.
(Matters were initiated in 28 states and 1 U.S. territory and ranged
from 1 to 7 matters per state/territory over the 4-year period.) Of
these election fraud matters, 15 related to voter registration or
ineligible voters. According to PIN, many of the 61 matters resulted in
indictments and subsequent convictions. A PIN official told us that 43
voter registration matters are currently under investigation and
another 7 have been closed related to the November 2004 federal
election. According to the Criminal Division, the information provided
by PIN does not include all election fraud investigations that the U.S.
Attorneys have initiated because (1) U.S. Attorneys are not required to
consult with PIN for preliminary investigations as opposed to grand
jury investigations, which require consultations; (2) PIN did not track
election fraud investigations prior to October 2002; and (3) election
fraud investigations are sometimes initiated under non-election
statutes.
In addition to the PIN election fraud matters, we asked the 19 U.S.
Attorney Offices that cover the seven states we visited the number of
fraud matters or investigations they had in 2003 and 2004 relating to
ineligible voter registration. Five offices reported investigating
allegations. Three offices reported that among them there were four
ongoing investigations. One office reported that they investigated a
matter, but no prosecution arose from the investigation. Another office
reported that they declined to prosecute a number of investigations
(number not tracked) that involved aliens who registered to vote.
Rather than prosecute, they allowed administrative procedures regarding
deportation to occur.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts:
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURTS:
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20544:
LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM: Director:
CLARENCE A. LEE, JR.: Associate Director:
May 31, 2005:
Mr. William O. Jenkins:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW, Room 6482:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Jenkins:
Thank you for the opportunity to to review and comment on the draft
report entitled "Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local
Elections Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists" (GAO-05-
478).
We appreciate the public interest in ensuring that those who are not
citizens and are ineligible to vote are not afforded that privilege. As
the report indicates, the vast majority of potential jurors are
screened in the state and local courts rather than in federal courts,
and thus it is through their own court systems' juror pools that these
courts are likely to identify registered voters who are not citizens.
Nevertheless, despite resource shortages in the federal courts, as
recommended, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts will bring
this matter to the attention of the district courts and encourage them
to identify and report to appropriate election officials instances when
person identify themselves to the federal courts as non-citizens
through the juror qualification process.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Leonidas Ralph Mecham:
Director:
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of Justice:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Executive Office for United States Attorneys:
Office of the Director:
RFK Main Justice Building, Room 2261:
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW:
Washington, DC 20530:
(202) 510-1121
Mr. William O. Jenkins, Jr.:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G. Street, NW, Room 6482:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Jenkins:
This letter provides comments from the Executive Office for United
States Attorneys (EOUSA) on the Government Accountability Office's
(GAO) report regarding the maintenance of accurate voter registration
lists. We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments for
publication in the final report.
Maintaining accurate voter registration lists is an important goal. The
United States Attorneys take seriously their obligations under Section
8(g) of the National Voter Registration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(g),
to provide felony conviction data and other information to appropriate
state election officials. While your report correctly notes that the
law does not require any standardized format or time frame for
providing the conviction information, your report also notes that the
sampling of United States Attorneys' Offices that were surveyed
utilized a variety of data formats and time frames to provide
conviction data to election officials. Each of the 94 United States
Attorneys' Offices is unique, and they range in size from twenty to 350
lawyers. Therefore, it is not surprising that different offices may use
different administrative procedures to comply with this obligation.
However, we understand that some data formats may be more accessible to
state election officials than others, and we appreciate that finding
the best format to provide this data to state election officials is
important. As a result, EOUSA has tasked a working group to develop a
standardized process for the 94 United States Attorneys' Offices to
provide complete and timely information to state election officials in
order to ensure accurate voter registration lists.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft report. If you
have any questions regarding the above, please contact David L. Smith,
Legislative Counsel, Counsel to the Director's Staff, at (202) 514-
2121.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Mary Beth Buchanan:
Director:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
William O. Jenkins, Jr., (202) 512-8777:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact mentioned above, Orin B. Atwater, Carla
Brown, Grace Coleman, Michele Fejfar, Daniel Garcia, Richard Griswold,
Geoffrey Hamilton, Monica Kelly, Jean McSween, Jean Orland, Emmy Rhine,
Sandra Sokol, and Linda Watson contributed to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] While HAVA established a deadline of January 1, 2004, for states to
have a statewide voter registration list and verification procedures,
it also provided that states could request a waiver to extend the
deadline to January 1, 2006. Nine states did not request a waiver, 40
states and the District of Columbia did request and receive waivers,
and 1 state (North Dakota) is not covered by the HAVA requirement
because it does not have a voter registration requirement for
individuals voting in federal elections.
[2] GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across
the Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).
[3] Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002).
[4] States may refer to their motor vehicle agencies by different
names. For purposes of this report, we will generically refer to them
as "motor vehicle agencies."
[5] Potential jurors for a U.S. district court are chosen by federal
jury administrators in each of the 94 district courts from a jury pool
generated by random selection of citizens' names from lists of
registered voters, or combined lists of voters and people with drivers'
licenses, in the judicial districts. The potential jurors complete
questionnaires to help determine whether they are qualified to serve on
a jury. U.S. citizenship is a qualification to be a juror.
[6] The AOUSC is the administrative arm of the federal judiciary. The
agency provides service to the federal courts in three essential areas:
administrative support, program management, and policy development.
[7] These sections relate to voting system standards (section 301),
provisional voting and voting information requirements (section 302),
computerized statewide voter registration list requirements, and
requirements for voters who register by mail (section 303).
[8] Seven states--Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Mexico, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia--require full social security numbers
on applications for voter registration. HAVA provides that for states
using full social security numbers on applications in accordance with
section 7 of the Privacy Act of 1974, the HAVA voter registration
verification requirements are optional.
[9] Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993).
[10] Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-1004.
[11] NY CLS Elec. § 17-104.
[12] 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c).
[13] Changes made in 2003 to Wisconsin's election laws will require
voter registration in every municipality, regardless of size. This
registration requirement first applies to the 2006 spring primary
election.
[14] Wisconsin has voters self-certify as follows: "I (name) hereby
certify that to the best of my knowledge, I am a qualified elector,
having resided at (address) for at least 10 days immediately preceding
this election, and that I am not disqualified on any grounds from
voting, and I have not voted, at this election." In addition to
Wisconsin, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Wyoming allow
same day registration.
[15] The Wisconsin Joint Legislative Audit Committee has an ongoing
audit of voter address verifications based on allegations of
inappropriate election procedures in Milwaukee to verify same day voter
registration eligibility in the November 2004 election. According to
Joint Legislative Audit Committee official, the report is due for
completion by the fall of 2005.
[16] New York state election officials said that until 2003, when the
administration of school elections was transferred to the New York City
Department of Education, non-citizens with a student in a New York City
school were allowed to vote in school board elections.
[17] Prior to HAVA, the FEC's Office of Election Administration was the
federal focal point for election administration issues. This office was
transferred to the EAC as part of HAVA.
[18] 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2-Verification of Employment Eligibility.
[19] The U.S. Post Office National Change of Address list is compiled
from change of address forms filed by individuals who have moved and
want their mail forwarded to their new address.
[20] In Michigan, the address for a state identification card or
license and voter registration must be the same. These files are linked
to automatically update each file of the addresses changes.
[21] Section 9 of the NVRA requires the FEC to report to Congress by
June 30 of each odd-numbered year. A Report to the 108th Congress: The
Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the
Administration of Elections for Federal Office, 2001-2002, is the most
recent report. HAVA transferred responsibility for the report to the
EAC.
[22] NVRA covers 44 states and the District of Columbia, according to
DOJ. In the 1998 FEC survey, 43 of the 45 responded. The report was
silent regarding whether similar issues existed beyond the 26 states'
reporting problems.
[23] GAO, Elections: Perspectives on Activities and Challenges across
the Nation, GAO-02-3 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2001).
[24] Officials were asked in general terms about data considerations.
We did not determine if the same issues existed in other jurisdictions
if it was not mentioned.
[25] Implementing the NVRA: A Report to State and Local Election
Officials on Problems and Solutions Discovered 1995-1996., Federal
Election Commission, March 1998, pp.5 -19.
[26] Federal Election Commission March 1998, pp 5 - 25.
[27] Administration of Voter Registration, Qualification of Applicants
and Registrants Verification of Citizenship, March 2001, City
Commissioner's Office, Philadelphia County.
[28] Board of Election Commissioners, City of St. Louis., Office of the
State Auditor of Missouri, May 26, 2004. Potential felons on the City
of St. Louis voter list were identified by matching the voter list with
convictions outside the City, based on matches of name, date of birth,
and full or partial SSN where available. Auditors noted that each
instance had to be investigated thoroughly before taking legal action
or removing registrants from the voter list.
[29] Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States. The
Sentencing Project, April 2005, identifies 35 states where felons may
reregister after the completion of their sentence.
[30] Project Charter: Statewide Voter Registration System prepared for
the Wisconsin State Election Board, May 15, 2003, by Virchow Krause and
Company.
[31] Office of the State Auditor of Missouri, May 26, 2004.
[32] EAC Commissioner and Chair Gracia Hillman, speaking at the
Commission on Federal Election Reform hearing held on April 18, 2005,
at American University, Washington, D.C.
[33] Federal Election Commission, March 1998, pp.5 - 43; Federal
Election Commission, 2001-2002, pp.19 - 20.
[34] Election fraud is conduct that corrupts the electoral processes
for (1) registering voters; (2) obtaining, marking, or tabulating
ballots; or (3) canvassing and certifying election results. Types of
fraudulent conduct include, among others, voting by ineligibles, voting
more than once, voter impersonation, intentional disruption of polling
process either physically or by corrupting tabulating software, or
destroying ballots or voter registrations.
[35] Office of the Secretary of State: Clear and Appropriate Direction
Is Lacking in Its Implementation of the Federal Help America Vote Act,
California State Auditor, December 2004, report number 2004-139.
[36] My Vote Counts, California's Plan for Voting in the 21st Century,.
Secretary of State, September 2003.
[37] HAVA section 303 (a)(5)(A). Section 303 (a)(5)(B) requires state
election officials to verify the accuracy of the voter registration
application information by matching it with the state motor vehicle
agency database records.
[38] Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee,
and Virginia require full social security numbers on voter registration
applications and the state MVAs have existing agreements with SSA for
verifying against SSA records using the complete number. The agreements
would need to be modified to reflect use for voter registration
verification purposes.
[39] An Arizona Department of Transportation official said the agency
computer programmers needed to implement the Memorandum of
Understanding and are working on other projects that they expect will
be available in June 2005.
[40] With the exception of the covered U.S. territories, such as Guam
and Puerto Rico, that do not have connections with AAMVA.
[41] 42 U.S.C. § 405(r).
[42] HAVA requires the state to coordinate the computerized list with
state agency records on felony status and death.
[43] 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(g). This provision was enacted into law in
1993 in section 8 of the National Voter Registration Act.
[44] County courts commonly used the term jury services to describe the
officials responsible for jury selection, whereas U.S. district courts
generally used the term jury administrators to describe the officials
responsible for the juries, according to AOUSC officials. For the
purposes of the report, we will use the term county jury administrators
for county jurisdictions and federal jury administrators for the
federal court system.
[45] Potential jurors for a U.S. district court are chosen by jury
administrators in each of the 94 district courts from a jury pool
generated by random selection of citizens' names from lists of
registered voters, or combined lists of voters and people with drivers'
licenses, in the judicial districts. The potential jurors complete
questionnaires to help determine whether they are qualified to serve on
a jury. U.S. citizenship is a qualification to be a juror.
[46] Of the remaining courts, three use both voter registration lists
and MVA records. One uses voter registration, MVA, and state
identification records. Officials in each of the four federal district
courts that use more than one source for selecting jurors stated that
they can identify from which source(s) a name is drawn. As currently
configured, the jury pool lists do not specify sources, therefore, to
determine whether a name was taken from a particular source, such as
the voter registration list, would require manually comparing the jury
pool list to each source.
[47] The fundamental purpose of the Judicial Conference is to make
policy with regard to the administration of the U.S. courts. The
Director of AOUSC implements the policies of the Judicial Conference as
part of the performance of his duties as the administrative officer of
the courts of the United States.
[48] Jury services officials in the other four court jurisdictions in
two states--Michigan and Wisconsin--said that the jury pool is drawn
only from their state's department of motor vehicles driver's licenses
and state identification cards, and they do not use voter registration
lists.
[49] GAO, Alien Registration: Usefulness of a Nonimmigrant Alien Annual
Address Reporting Requirement Is Questionable, GAO-05-2004 (Washington,
D.C.: January 2005).
[50] The DMF contains over 76 million records of deceased individuals
enrolled in the U.S. Social Security program. For an individual, the
DMF record can contain the person's social security number, name, date
of birth, date of death, state or county and zip code of last payment
residence, and zip code for the lump sum payment, if the information is
available.
[51] Use of the Social Security Administration Death Master File for
Ascertainment of Mortality Status Population Health Metrics: 2004;
2:2,. March 5, 2004.
[52] Effectiveness of the Social Security Administration's Death
Termination Process (A-09-02-22023), September 2001. State and federal
sources supply some death information to SSA, but most deaths are
reported to SSA by friends, relatives, and funeral homes.
[53] The Social Security Administration's Efforts to Process Death
Reports and Improve its Death Master File, January 2003, Office of the
Inspector General, Social Security Administration.
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