Illegal Immigration
Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995; Border Patrol's Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated. Gao ID: GAO-06-770 August 15, 2006Reports in recent years have indicated that increasing numbers of migrants attempting to enter the United States illegally die while crossing the southwest border. The Border Patrol implemented the Border Safety Initiative (BSI) in 1998 with the intention of reducing injuries and preventing deaths among migrants that attempt to cross the border illegally. GAO assessed: (1) Trends in the numbers, locations, causes, and characteristics of border-crossing deaths. (2) Differences among the Border Patrol sectors in implementing the BSI methodology. (3) The extent to which existing data allow for an evaluation of the effectiveness of the BSI and other efforts to prevent border-crossing deaths.
GAO's analysis of data from the BSI, the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS), and studies of state vital registries shows consistent trends in the numbers, locations, causes, and characteristics of migrant border-crossing deaths that occurred along the southwest border between 1985 and 2005. Since 1995, the number of border-crossing deaths increased and by 2005 had more than doubled. This increase in deaths occurred despite the fact that, according to published estimates, there was not a corresponding increase in the number of illegal entries. Further, GAO's analysis also shows that more than three-fourths of the doubling in deaths along the southwest border since 1995 can be attributed to increases in deaths occurring in the Arizona desert. Differences among the BSI sector coordinators in collecting and recording data on border-crossing deaths may have resulted in the BSI data understating the number of deaths in some regions. Despite these differences, our analysis of the BSI data shows trends that are consistent with trends identified in the NCHS and state vital registry data. However, the Border Patrol needs to continue to improve its methods for collecting data in order to accurately record deaths as changes occur in the locations where migrants attempt to cross the border--and consequently where migrants die. Improved data collection would allow the Border Patrol to continue to use the data for making accurate planning and resource allocation decisions. Comprehensive evaluations of the BSI and other efforts by the Border Patrol to prevent border-crossing deaths are challenged by data and measurement limitations. However, the Border Patrol has not addressed these limitations to sufficiently support its assertions about the effectiveness of some of its efforts to reduce border-crossing deaths. For instance, it has not used multivariate statistical methods to control for the influences of measurable variables that could affect deaths, such as changes in the number of migrants attempting to cross the border.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-06-770, Illegal Immigration: Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995; Border Patrol's Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated.
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to the Honorable Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate:
August 2006:
Illegal Immigration:
Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995; Border Patrol's Efforts
to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated:
GAO-06-770:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-06-770, a report to the Honorable Bill Frist,
Majority Leader, United States Senate
Why GAO Did This Study:
Reports in recent years have indicated that increasing numbers of
migrants attempting to enter the United States illegally die while
crossing the southwest border. The Border Patrol implemented the Border
Safety Initiative (BSI) in 1998 with the intention of reducing injuries
and preventing deaths among migrants that attempt to cross the border
illegally.
GAO assessed: (1) Trends in the numbers, locations, causes, and
characteristics of border-crossing deaths. (2) Differences among the
Border Patrol sectors in implementing the BSI methodology. (3) The
extent to which existing data allow for an evaluation of the
effectiveness of the BSI and other efforts to prevent border-crossing
deaths.
What GAO Found:
GAO‘s analysis of data from the BSI, the National Center for Health
Statistics (NCHS), and studies of state vital registries shows
consistent trends in the numbers, locations, causes, and
characteristics of migrant border-crossing deaths that occurred along
the southwest border between 1985 and 2005. Since 1995, the number of
border-crossing deaths increased and by 2005 had more than doubled.
This increase in deaths occurred despite the fact that, according to
published estimates, there was not a corresponding increase in the
number of illegal entries. Further, GAO‘s analysis also shows that more
than three-fourths of the doubling in deaths along the southwest border
since 1995 can be attributed to increases in deaths occurring in the
Arizona desert.
Differences among the BSI sector coordinators in collecting and
recording data on border-crossing deaths may have resulted in the BSI
data understating the number of deaths in some regions. Despite these
differences, our analysis of the BSI data shows trends that are
consistent with trends identified in the NCHS and state vital registry
data. However, the Border Patrol needs to continue to improve its
methods for collecting data in order to accurately record deaths as
changes occur in the locations where migrants attempt to cross the
border”and consequently where migrants die. Improved data collection
would allow the Border Patrol to continue to use the data for making
accurate planning and resource allocation decisions.
Comprehensive evaluations of the BSI and other efforts by the Border
Patrol to prevent border-crossing deaths are challenged by data and
measurement limitations. However, the Border Patrol has not addressed
these limitations to sufficiently support its assertions about the
effectiveness of some of its efforts to reduce border-crossing deaths.
For instance, it has not used multivariate statistical methods to
control for the influences of measurable variables that could affect
deaths, such as changes in the number of migrants attempting to cross
the border.
Figure: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths, 1985 through 2005:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO analysis of BSI and NCHS data; findings from the Center for
Immigration Research, University of Houston.
[End of Figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) ensure that BSI sector coordinators follow consistent protocols
for collecting migrant death data from local authorities and that CBP
assess the feasibility of using multivariate statistical approaches to
enhance estimates of the impacts of its initiatives. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) concurred with GAO‘s findings and outlined
plans for addressing both recommendations. DHS and the Department of
Health and Human Services also provided technical comments, which were
incorporated as appropriate.
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-770].
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Laurie Ekstrand at (202)
512-2758 or ekstrandl@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
BSI and NCHS Data Show That, Since the Late 1990s, Increases in Deaths
along the Southwest Border Were Accounted for by Increases in Deaths in
the Tucson Sector:
The Border Patrol's Approach to Tracking and Recording Deaths Has Not
Been Implemented Consistently across Sectors:
Evaluating the Effectiveness of the BSI and Other Border Patrol Efforts
to Reduce Border-Crossing Deaths Presents Measurement Challenges:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Methods to Determine the Reliability of Sources of Data on Border-
Crossing Deaths:
Methods Used to Identify Trends in Federal Data on the Numbers,
Locations, Causes, and Characteristics of Border-Crossing Deaths:
Methods to Determine the Extent to Which the BSI Can Be Evaluated:
Appendix II: Deaths by Sector:
Appendix III: Causes of Death:
Appendix IV: Causes of Death for U.S. Residents and Migrants within the
BSI Target Zone:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Number of Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths Occurring in Pima
County, Arizona, as Reported by Various Sources, 2002 through 2005:
Table 2: Estimated Undocumented Entries, Apprehensions, and Deaths:
Table 3: The Residual Method for Estimating the Number of Unauthorized
Migrants:
Figures:
Figure 1: Border Patrol Sectors and the BSI Target Zone along the
United States-Mexico Border:
Figure 2: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone, 1985
through 2005:
Figure 3: Percentage of All Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI
Target Zone Occurring within the Tucson Sector, 1985 through 2005:
Figure 4: Percentage of All Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI
Target Zone Due to Heat Exposure, 1985 through 2005:
Figure 5: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths, by Cause of Death, NCHS Data,
1990 through 2003:
Figure 6: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths and Apprehensions in the BSI
Target Zone Occurring within the Tucson Sector, Fiscal Years 1998
through 2005:
Figure 7: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths and Apprehensions in the BSI
Target Zone Occurring within All Sectors except Tucson, Fiscal Years
1998 through 2005:
Figure 8: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the San Diego Sector, 1985 through 2005:
Figure 9: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the El Centro Sector, 1985 through 2005:
Figure 10: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the Yuma Sector, 1985 through 2005:
Figure 11: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the Tucson Sector, 1985 through 2005:
Figure 12: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the El Paso Sector, 1985 through 2005:
Figure 13: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the Marfa Sector, 1985 through 2005:
Figure 14: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the Del Rio Sector, 1985 through 2005:
Figure 15: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the Laredo Sector, 1985 through 2005:
Figure 16: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the Rio Grande Valley Sector, 1985 through 2005:
Figure 17: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths, by Cause of Death, CIR
Findings, 1985 through 1998:
Figure 18: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths, by Cause of Death, BSI Data,
1998 through 2005:
Figure 19: Percentage Distribution of Deaths among U.S. Residents and
Migrant Border-Crossers, by Cause of Death, All Years Combined, 1990
through 2003:
Abbreviations:
ABCI: Arizona Border Control Initiative:
BORSTAR: Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue:
BSI: Border Safety Initiative:
BSITS: Border Safety Initiative Tracking System:
CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:
CIR: Center for Immigration Research, University of Houston:
CPS: Current Population Survey:
ICD: International Classification of Diseases:
INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service:
IRP: Interior Repatriation Program:
LRP: Lateral Repatriation Program:
NCHS: National Center for Health Statistics:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 15, 2006:
The Honorable Bill Frist:
Majority Leader:
United States Senate:
Dear Senator Frist:
Reports by GAO and others in recent years have indicated that
increasing numbers of migrants attempting to illegally enter the United
States die while crossing the southwest border in remote, desert areas
or in other areas with particularly rugged and dangerous terrain. The
U.S. Border Patrol implemented the Border Safety Initiative (BSI) in
June 1998 with the intention of enforcing border security, educating
and informing migrants of the dangers involved in crossing the border
illegally, and carrying out search and rescue operations to help
migrants in life-threatening situations. Additionally, the Border
Patrol implemented the Arizona Border Control Initiative (ABCI) and the
Interior Repatriation Program (IRP), efforts that also include
components designed to reduce migrant deaths. As part of the BSI's
mission, the Border Patrol established a methodology that outlines
procedures to identify, track, and record data on migrant border-
crossing deaths and rescues. The BSI methodology defines border-
crossing deaths as those occurring in furtherance of an illegal entry
and includes guidelines for recording those deaths occurring within its
target zone--an area consisting of 45 counties on or near the southwest
border with Mexico.[Footnote 1] These 45 counties are within an area
that includes 9 of the 20 Border Patrol sectors responsible for
enforcing U.S. borders and securing official ports of entry (see fig.
1). According to BSI reports, since fiscal year 1998, there has been an
upward trend in the number of migrant border-crossing deaths annually,
from 266 in 1998 to 472 in 2005, with some fluctuations over time.
In light of concerns about reported increases in border-crossing deaths
and interest in the BSI's approach to tracking and reducing these
incidents, you asked us to analyze federal data on border-crossing
deaths as well as available data on the Border Patrol's efforts to
reduce such deaths. Specifically, for this report, we assessed: (1) How
do the Border Patrol's data on trends in the numbers, locations,
causes, and characteristics of border-crossing deaths compare to other
sources of data on these types of deaths? (2) What differences, if any,
are there in how the Border Patrol has implemented the BSI methodology
across its sectors? (3) To what extent do existing data allow for an
evaluation of the effectiveness of the BSI and other Border Patrol
efforts to prevent border-crossing deaths?
You also asked us to compare deaths among migrants to deaths in the
general U.S. population living within the BSI target zone. We compared
each group's share of deaths for the causes of death most commonly
associated with border-crossing (see app. IV).
To address our objectives, we analyzed data on migrant border-crossing
deaths that occurred between 1990 and 2005 within the BSI target zone-
-which includes 45 counties on or near the border in California,
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. We analyzed data on border-crossing
deaths recorded by the Border Patrol in the Border Safety Initiative
Tracking System (BSITS) for fiscal years 1998 through 2005. We also
analyzed data from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS)
mortality files from the National Vital Statistics System for the years
1990 through 2003, the most recent year for which NCHS data were
available at the time we did our work. The NCHS data contain
information from death certificates for all deaths occurring within the
United States, regardless of the cause of death. Because death
certificates do not explicitly identify deaths as border-crossing
deaths, we used information about place of birth, residence, and cause
of death to identify likely incidents of migrant deaths. These
estimates may either under or over count actual border-crossing deaths,
depending on a number of factors (see app. I for additional
discussion). We assessed the reliability of both sources of data and
determined that they were sufficiently reliable for our purposes of
describing trends in deaths over time and across locations. We then
supplemented our analysis of these data by reviewing data on transient
migrant deaths reported in studies by the University of Houston's
Center for Immigration Research (CIR) that used state vital registry
data to estimate the number of border-crossing deaths among migrants
for the years 1985 through 1998.[Footnote 2] Because both the NCHS and
state vital registry data are collected independently of the Border
Patrol's efforts to collect BSI data, we used them to corroborate or
refute the trends that were identified in our analysis of the BSI data.
(For details regarding our methods for analyzing the data, see app. I.)
In addition to the data analysis, we reviewed the written BSI
methodology for tracking and recording deaths in the BSITS database,
and we interviewed Border Patrol officials at Department of Homeland
Security headquarters in Washington, D.C., as well as officials in the
nine southwest Border Patrol sectors, about issues related to migrant
border-crossing deaths and the BSI. We also reviewed the methods for
collecting data on border-crossing deaths used by county coroners and
medical examiners that track these deaths and reviewed the studies on
migrant border-crossing deaths conducted by CIR[Footnote 3], as well as
a study by researchers at the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC).[Footnote 4] Finally, we interviewed journalists,
officials from various advocacy groups, and state and local health
officials in Arizona, New Mexico, and California.
We conducted our work between August 2005 and June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Our analysis of the BSI and NCHS data shows that both datasets reflect
similar trends in the numbers, locations, causes, and characteristics
of migrant border-crossing deaths between 1990 and 2005. These trends
are consistent with the trends identified in the studies by CIR that
used state-level vital registry data to document migrant border-
crossing deaths between 1985 and 1998. From the late 1980s through the
early 1990s, the number of border-crossing deaths declined. Then, from
the late 1990s through 2005, the number of deaths approximately
doubled. For example, our analysis of the BSI data shows that the
annual number of border-crossing deaths increased from 241 in 1999 to a
total of 472 deaths recorded in 2005. Further, the majority of the
increase in deaths during this period occurred within the Border
Patrol's Tucson Sector--which includes much of the Arizona desert. Our
analysis of the NCHS data indicates that, between 1990 and 2003, more
than three-fourths of the rise in migrant border-crossing deaths along
the southwest border can be attributed to an increase in deaths in the
Tucson Sector. Over this period, deaths due to exposure, especially
heat-related exposure, increased substantially, while deaths from
traffic fatalities and homicide declined. This pattern represents a
major shift in the causes of migrant border-crossing deaths, as traffic
fatalities were the leading cause of migrant border-crossing deaths
during the early 1990s, while from the late 1990s onward, heat exposure
was the leading cause of death. The increase in deaths due to heat
exposure over the last 15 years is consistent with our previous report
that found evidence that migrant traffic shifted from urban areas like
San Diego and El Paso into the desert following the implementation of
the Southwest Border Strategy in 1994. Our analysis indicates little
change over time in the ages of border-crossing decedents, and while
the majority of decedents are male, the percentage of female decedents
has more than doubled from 1998 to 2005.
Differences in the extent to which the Border Patrol's established
methodology for tracking and recording deaths has been implemented
consistently across its sectors may have led to the BSI data
understating the total number of border-crossing deaths occurring
within any given year. For example, although the BSI methodology
instructs BSI sector coordinators--agents responsible for managing BSI
operations within each of the nine Border Patrol sectors along the
southwest border--to maintain regular contact with local officials such
as county coroners and medical examiners in order to obtain information
on any border-crossing deaths where the Border Patrol was not involved,
we found differences among the sectors in the nature and frequency of
the contacts made. Additionally, methods for coordinating with local
officials have not yet been formalized in some sectors. These sectors
are in locations in which relatively few border-crossing deaths occur,
and as a result, the informal communication patterns may have had
little impact on the total numbers of deaths recorded in the BSI data
thus far. However, these trends have the potential to change in the
future, as they did in the Tucson Sector between 1998 and 2005.
According to our analysis of the BSI data, the number of deaths in the
Tucson Sector increased from 11 in 1998 to 216 in 2005. Irregular
communication, as well as variation in the nature and frequency of
contacts with local officials, may lead to inconsistencies in tracking
and recording deaths over time and across sectors and could ultimately
result in the Border Patrol's data on border-crossing deaths being
incomplete. Such incomplete data may in turn affect the Border Patrol's
ability to understand the scale of the problem in each sector and
affect the agency's ability to make key decisions about where and how
to deploy BSI resources across the southwest border.
Measurement challenges and data limitations inhibit a comprehensive
evaluation of the BSI's efforts to prevent border-crossing deaths.
Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence to support the Border
Patrol's assertions that related efforts such as the ABCI and IRP
reduced migrant deaths between 2003 and 2004. The effectiveness of the
Border Patrol's efforts to prevent deaths cannot simply be measured by
examining changes in the number of migrant deaths following the
introduction of a prevention effort, as other factors may also affect
the number of deaths. For example, changes in the number of migrants
attempting to cross the border, variations in the locations where
migrants attempt to cross, fluctuations in weather patterns, and
changes in Border Patrol enforcement activities may all affect the
number of border-crossing deaths in any given year. The effects of such
factors on the number of migrant deaths need to be taken into account
when assessing the impact of the BSI and related efforts. In addition,
evaluating the BSI's efforts to prevent deaths is further limited by
the extent to which the Border Patrol can accurately measure the hours
and resources dedicated exclusively to the BSI and other prevention
activities. As the Border Patrol is primarily an enforcement agency,
search and rescue activities often occur simultaneously with
enforcement activities, thus making it difficult to separate the
resources dedicated to each type of activity. The Border Patrol's
assertions that its prevention efforts have resulted in a reduction in
migrant deaths have not taken such factors into account. In the absence
of using multivariate statistical methods that control for the
influences of other measurable factors, the effectiveness of these
programs' impact on border-crossing deaths cannot be demonstrated.
In order to improve the implementation of the BSI methodology and the
accuracy of the data on migrant border-crossing deaths in any given
year, we recommend that the Commissioner of Customs and Border
Protection take steps to ensure that BSI sector coordinators follow a
consistent protocol for collecting and recording information about
border-crossing deaths and that all coordinators follow established
procedures for maintaining and documenting regular contacts with local
authorities.
In order to better demonstrate the effectiveness of the Border Patrol's
efforts to reduce migrant deaths, we recommend that the Commissioner of
Customs and Border Protection assess the feasibility and cost-
effectiveness of using multivariate statistical approaches to enhance
estimates of the impacts of its initiatives.
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland
Security, Health and Human Services, Justice, and State for review and
comment. On July 20, 2006, we received written comments on the draft
report from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which are
reproduced in full in appendix V. DHS concurred with our findings and
outlined plans to address both of the recommendations. In its letter,
DHS noted that because the Office of Border Patrol is an enforcement
agency, Border Patrol agents exercise daily border safety functions in
the course of carrying out their priority mission and that apprehending
illegal aliens before they come into distress diminishes the risk
involved with illegally crossing into the United States. We agree with
this statement; one of the confounding issues to measuring the outcomes
of border safety initiatives is that border enforcement and border
safety are interconnected. DHS and the Department of Health and Human
Services also provided a number of technical comments and
clarifications, which were incorporated into the report as appropriate.
The Departments of Justice and State did not have comments on the
draft.
Background:
In 1994, the Attorney General announced plans for the Southwest Border
Strategy, an enforcement initiative designed to strengthen enforcement
of the nation's immigration laws and to shut down the traditional
corridors for the flow of illegal immigration along the southwest
border. The strategy called for the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS)[Footnote 5] to incrementally increase
control of the border in four phases with the goal of making it
increasingly difficult and costly for migrants to attempt illegal entry
so that fewer individuals would try. The strategy called for adding
resources along the southwest border by first concentrating personnel
and technology in those sectors with the highest levels of illegal
immigration activity (as measured by apprehensions) and by then moving
to the areas with the least activity. Additional Border Patrol
resources were initially allocated in the San Diego, California, and El
Paso, Texas, sectors. The strategy assumed that as the urban areas were
controlled, the migrant traffic would shift to more remote areas where
the Border Patrol would be able to more easily detect and apprehend
migrants entering illegally. The strategy also assumed that natural
barriers including rivers, such as the Rio Grande in Texas, the
mountains east of San Diego, and the desert in Arizona would act as
deterrents to illegal entry (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Border Patrol Sectors and the BSI Target Zone along the
United States-Mexico Border:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO; U.S. Border Patrol.
Notes: Solid lines are used where state and sector boundaries overlap.
The Rio Grande River flows south through New Mexico, along the border
between Texas and Mexico, and into the Gulf of Mexico.
[End of figure]
As we reported in 2001, INS' analysis of apprehensions data indicated
that the increased enforcement efforts in the San Diego and El Paso
sectors that began in 1994 ultimately resulted in the redirection of
migrant flows to eastern California and the Sonoran Desert of
Arizona.[Footnote 6] However, INS did not anticipate the sizable number
of migrants that would continue to attempt to enter the United States
through this harsh terrain. Studies of migrant deaths along the
southwest border at the time concluded that, while migrants had always
faced danger crossing the border and many died before INS began the
Southwest Border Strategy, following the implementation of the
strategy, there was an increase in border-crossing deaths resulting
from exposure to either extreme heat or cold.
The Border Patrol Implemented the Border Safety Initiative in June
1998:
In response to concerns about the number of migrants who are injured or
die while attempting to cross the border, the INS implemented the
Border Safety Initiative (BSI) and a number of related programs
beginning in June 1998. These initiatives were implemented in
conjunction with the Border Patrol's ongoing enforcement efforts; the
Border Patrol views the BSI and related efforts to prevent deaths as
complementary to its primary mission of enforcing the law and securing
the border. The primary objectives of the BSI are to reduce injuries
among migrants and to prevent migrant deaths in the southwest border
region. Many migrants suffer severe dehydration and heat exhaustion as
a result of attempting to cross the desert where temperatures can
exceed 115 degrees in the summer. Agents provide assistance to migrants
who are stranded and may supply food, water, and medical care to
migrants who become injured or lost in the course of attempting to
cross the border.
As part of the BSI's efforts to prevent migrant deaths, several of the
Border Patrol sectors in the BSI target zone have rescue beacons
installed in those areas of the desert considered to be especially
dangerous for migrants attempting to cross the border. Each beacon has
a button that migrants can push to activate a sensor, thus alerting
nearby Border Patrol agents that they are in need of help. Each sector
also has a number of specialized search and rescue units known as
Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue (BORSTAR) teams. BORSTAR
agents have specialized training in a number of areas including medical
skills, technical rescue, navigation, communication, swiftwater rescue,
and air operations in order to prepare them to carry out emergency
search and rescue operations. BORSTAR units conduct search and rescue
operations as part of the Border Patrol's ongoing efforts to enforce
and secure the border. As of October 2005, the Border Patrol had
deployed 164 BORSTAR agents within its nine Border Patrol sectors along
the southwest border.
The Interior Repatriation Program (IRP) and Lateral Repatriation
Program (LRP) are additional initiatives designed by the Border Patrol
to prevent deaths and to discourage migrants from crossing the border
in dangerous areas of the desert. The IRP was implemented in 2004 in
conjunction with the Mexican government with the goal of removing
migrants from those areas considered to be smuggling corridors in an
effort to break the cycle of illegal immigration among those migrants
who make repeated attempts to cross the border following apprehension.
The program transports migrants who are apprehended in the Tucson and
Yuma Sectors, and who volunteer for the program, to their hometowns in
the interior of Mexico, rather than deporting them to points along the
Arizona border where they may be more likely to attempt to cross again.
Similarly, the LRP was implemented when the United States was unable to
negotiate an agreement to return migrants to the interior of Mexico
with the Mexican government in September 2003. Migrants apprehended in
Arizona were instead transported to ports of entry in Texas in an
effort to discourage them from attempting multiple crossings in the
desert.
In response to the escalating problems with illegal immigration in
Arizona, the Border Patrol also implemented the Arizona Border Control
Initiative (ABCI) in 2004 as a multi-disciplinary initiative with the
goal of coordinating federal, state, and local authorities to control
the Arizona border. The ABCI strategy focused on confronting illegal
immigration along the western part of the Arizona desert before it
reached the United States. Components of the program included a media
campaign warning migrants of the dangers associated with crossing the
border and increased infrastructure and manpower along the Arizona
border. While not intended primarily as a safety initiative, the
enhanced infrastructure and increased manpower associated with the ABCI
also allowed Border Patrol officers to better track and rescue migrants
and to prevent deaths. Additional components of the program include
roving patrols, camp details, and air support, and included increased
assistance with highway patrols from state, local, and tribal
authorities.
The Border Patrol has also implemented a number of additional efforts
to discourage migrants from attempting to cross the border as part of
the BSI's prevention component. Prevention efforts have included
broadcasting public service announcements in Mexico about the risks
involved in hiring smugglers and posting signs in high-risk areas to
warn potential crossers of the dangers at the border. Because many
migrants attempting to enter the United States illegally may not carry
identification, the BSI also attempts to identify those who have died
while crossing the border. Border Patrol officers work in conjunction
with Mexican Consulates in the region in order to identify migrants who
may have been reported missing by friends or family.
In 2000, the BSI also began formally tracking and recording data on
migrant rescues and deaths through the establishment of a database
known as the Border Safety Initiative Tracking System (BSITS). BSI data
are used by the Border Patrol for tracking numbers and locations of
deaths and rescues, identifying trends and high-risk areas, allocating
resources for BSI projects, and measuring the effectiveness of various
programs and projects that are related to the BSI. The database
includes information such as cause and location of death as well as the
decedent's gender and nationality. In order to ensure consistent
tracking and recording of incidents along the southwest border, the BSI
has developed a formal, written methodology that outlines the roles and
responsibilities of each BSI sector coordinator in collecting and
recording data on migrant deaths and rescues. The methodology also
outlines definitions for the types of incidents that should be recorded
in the BSITS database. The methodology defines a BSI-related death as a
death involving an undocumented migrant in furtherance of illegal entry
within the BSI target zone, or deaths occurring outside the target zone
when the Border Patrol was directly involved. The methodology includes
detailed instructions regarding the time frame for reporting incidents,
protocols for entering and updating information recorded in BSITS, and
guidelines for coding incidents using appropriate rescue and cause of
death categories. In order to ensure that all migrant border-crossing
deaths in the target zone are reported, the methodology also specifies
that BSI sector coordinators should establish contact with local
medical examiners or county coroners as well as Mexican Consulates in
the region about those deaths where the Border Patrol was not involved
in order to record the deaths in the BSITS database.
Various Groups Track and Record Border-Crossing Deaths Using Different
Methodologies That Can Lead to Differing Counts of Deaths:
A number of groups in addition to the Border Patrol have also attempted
to track incidents of border-crossing deaths. Advocacy groups, media
outlets, medical examiners' offices in some border counties,
researchers at the CDC, and the Mexican government are among the
organizations that have collected and reported data on border-crossing
deaths, but each uses a different methodology to count and record
deaths. All agree that a border-crossing death involves a migrant who
dies in the course of attempting to cross illegally into the United
States. However, each may operationalize the definition differently and
rely on a variety of sources of information for making determinations
about which deaths to include in their counts. For example, the
"Victoria 19"--an incident in which 19 migrants who were smuggled in
the back of a tractor-trailer were all found to have suffocated near
Victoria, Texas, in 2002--would not be included in the Border Patrol's
counts of migrant border-crossing deaths because it occurred outside
the BSI target zone and there was no direct Border Patrol involvement
in the case.[Footnote 7] By contrast, some advocacy groups that track
and record border-crossing deaths include the Victoria 19 in their
totals. Because the incident involved migrants who were in transit
across the border into the United States, they consider it a border-
crossing death, even though it occurred outside the Border Patrol's
identified BSI target zone.
In making decisions about whether or not to count the death of an
unidentified person as a border-crossing death, Border Patrol officials
and others may rely on professional judgment of circumstantial
evidence. This may also result in differing counts of deaths from one
group to the next. For example, data on border-crossing deaths
maintained by the Pima County Medical Examiner's office for the Tucson
area have been cited by the media in news reports. Some cases of border-
crossing deaths may involve unidentified bodies that were discovered in
the desert; these cases can often include skeletal remains or
decomposed bodies. In determining whether to count these incidents as
border-crossing deaths, the Pima County Medical Examiner's office uses
information about where a body is found--for example, along a known
migrant corridor--as well as other circumstantial evidence such as the
decedent's clothing or personal effects that may indicate a country of
origin. The Pima County Medical Examiner's office reported that it
records all cases of migrant deaths including a few cases involving
migrants who die of natural causes such as heart attacks or
appendicitis, noting that, if there is evidence that the person died
while in transit between Mexico and the United States, the office will
count it as a border-crossing death regardless of the cause. However,
the Pima County Medical Examiner's office places some limitations on
which cases it records as border-crossing deaths. For example, the
office attempts to exclude any cases involving illegal immigrants who
had established residency in the United States from its counts of
border-crossing deaths in order to distinguish deaths occurring among
illegal immigrants who had been living and working in the United States
for some time from migrants who died in the course of attempting to
cross the border.
Using another method to measure migrant border-crossing deaths,
researchers at the CDC designed a study to track and record migrant
border-crossing deaths occurring in U.S. border counties in Arizona,
New Mexico, and Texas between 2002 and 2003.[Footnote 8] They requested
that medical examiners in these states provide them with information
about cases that met a number of standardized criteria. The researchers
then reviewed the death certificates and other information about these
cases in order to describe trends in border-crossing deaths. They asked
medical examiners to include only those cases involving decedents who
were found in one of several selected U.S. counties along the U.S.
border with Mexico, whose immigration status was determined to be
unauthorized, and who were determined to have died during transit from
Mexico into the United States within 30 days of their arrival in the
country. According to their methodology, an unauthorized decedent was
identified based upon one or more of the following criteria: a person
who was identified as not being a legal resident or an authorized
entrant into the United States, a person who was identified as a
resident of another country based upon reports by family, friends, or
officials, or a person who was identified as being a resident of
another country based upon analysis of circumstantial evidence found
with the decedent. Such circumstantial evidence included tattoos, items
found on or near the body, personal items found in bags, clothes, and
documents including birth and marriage certificates. Decedents were not
included in the study if they were known to have resided illegally in
the United States for more than a month before their death, if they
were determined not to have died while crossing the border, or if they
had died after being treated in a U.S. border hospital.
Table 1 illustrates the counts recorded by some of the groups
attempting to track and record border-crossing deaths in Pima County,
Arizona, between 2002 and 2005.
Table 1: Number of Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths Occurring in Pima
County, Arizona, as Reported by Various Sources, 2002 through 2005:
Source: Sapkota, et al;
Year: 2002: 139;
Year: 2003: 131;
Year: 2004: [A];
Year: 2005: [A].
Source: Pima County Medical Examiner;
Year: 2002: 139;
Year: 2003: 131;
Year: 2004: 130;
Year: 2005: 155.
Source: BSI data;
Year: 2002: 95;
Year: 2003: 75;
Year: 2004: 84;
Year: 2005: 154.
Sources: GAO analysis of data in Sapkota, et al., 2006 and of BSI data;
Pima County Medical Examiner data.
[A] The Sapkota, et al., study was limited to deaths occurring during
2002 and 2003; hence, figures for these years are not available.
[End of table]
BSI and NCHS Data Show That, Since the Late 1990s, Increases in Deaths
along the Southwest Border Were Accounted for by Increases in Deaths in
the Tucson Sector:
Our analysis of the BSI and NCHS data shows consistent trends in the
numbers, locations, causes, and characteristics of deaths over time.
Consistent with reported trends in prior studies of border-crossing
deaths, our analysis of both data sources shows an increase in the
overall numbers of deaths occurring along the southwest border between
1998 and 2005 following a decline between 1990 and 1994. Our analysis
of the NCHS data shows that the number of deaths doubled from the mid-
1990s through 2003, and our analysis of the BSI data shows that the
majority of the increase in deaths that occurred between 1998 and 2005
was concentrated within the Border Patrol's Tucson Sector. Consistent
with the increase in Tucson, the number of border-crossing deaths due
to heat exposure also steadily increased beginning in 1998. While the
majority of deaths have occurred among men, according to our analysis
of the BSI data, deaths among women increased from 9 percent of all
deaths in 1998 to 21 percent of all deaths in 2005.[Footnote 9]
Further, increases in deaths among women in the Tucson Sector accounted
for the majority of the overall increase in deaths among women in all
sectors. The increase in the number of deaths in the Tucson Sector
between 1998 and 2005 occurred despite the fact that the number of
apprehensions of illegal immigrants recorded by the Border Patrol in
the Tucson Sector had declined following a peak in 2000. To the extent
that apprehensions are correlated with the number of attempted
crossings, the increase in deaths in the Tucson Sector indicates that
the desert is a particularly difficult region for migrants attempting
illegal entry.
BSI and NCHS Data Show Consistent Trends in Numbers, Locations, and
Causes of Death:
Our analysis of the BSI data as well as our analysis of the NCHS data
reveals trends that are consistent with trends identified in previous
studies by CIR examining the numbers, locations, and causes of border-
crossing deaths over time. All three sources of data show that trends
in migrant deaths follow a somewhat U-shaped curve as deaths within the
BSI target zone increased beginning in the mid-1990s following a period
of decline between 1990 and 1994 (see fig. 2). We used NCHS data--which
are based on death certificates filed by local coroners and medical
examiners throughout the country and include records of all deaths that
occur within the United States, regardless of the decedent's country of
origin--as an independent data source to corroborate trends identified
in the BSI data.[Footnote 10] Additionally, the trends in the NCHS data
between 1990 and 1998 are also consistent with the trends in border-
crossing deaths reported by Karl Eschbach and his colleagues at the
Center for Immigration Research in their analysis of state-level vital
registry data. Differences in the total numbers of deaths in the NCHS
and CIR data arise from the differences in the methodologies used by
each.[Footnote 11] Our analysis of the NCHS data shows that deaths
declined in the San Diego and El Centro Sectors between 1990 and 1994
and that over this period, deaths from traffic fatalities and homicide
also declined. This pattern represents a major shift in the causes of
migrant border-crossing deaths, as traffic fatalities were the leading
cause of migrant border-crossing deaths during the early 1990s, while
from the late 1990s onward, heat exposure was the leading cause of
death. Additionally, according to our analysis of the NCHS data,
homicides decreased from 24 percent of all deaths in 1990 to 9 percent
in 2003. Our analysis of the BSI data also shows that heat exposure was
the leading cause of death from 1998 to 2005. The increase in deaths
due to heat exposure over the last 15 years is consistent with our
previous report that found evidence that migrant traffic shifted from
urban areas like San Diego and El Paso into the desert following the
implementation of the Southwest Border Strategy in 1994.[Footnote 12]
Figure 2: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone, 1985
through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of BSI and NCHS data; CIR findings, as reported in
Reyes, et al., 2002, 68.
Notes: BSI data are arrayed on a fiscal year basis, while NCHS data and
CIR findings are on a calendar year basis. Annual totals for CIR
findings are based on cause of death counts as reported in Reyes, et
al., 2002, 68. CIR findings include data from 55 counties.
[End of figure]
Our analysis of the BSI data shows that the total number of border-
crossing deaths increased from 254 in 1998 to 334 in 2003 and then
increased to 472 in 2005.[Footnote 13] Similarly, our analysis of the
NCHS data shows that the number of deaths increased from 219 in 1998 to
365 in 2003. Corresponding with the increases in deaths that occurred
between 1998 and 2005, border-crossing deaths also became increasingly
concentrated within the Tucson Sector--a region that corresponds with
Arizona's portion of the Sonoran Desert. For example, our analysis of
the BSI data shows that the Tucson Sector's share of all border-
crossing deaths increased tenfold, from 4.3 percent of all deaths in
1998 to 45.8 percent in 2005 (see fig. 3), so that by 2005, of the 472
deaths that occurred across all nine southwest sectors, 216 occurred
within the Tucson Sector. Our analysis of the NCHS data shows a similar
trend, in that the Tucson Sector's share of border-crossing deaths
increased at least threefold between 1998 and 2003. The total number of
deaths in the eight other Border Patrol sectors remained relatively
constant over this period.[Footnote 14]
Figure 3: Percentage of All Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI
Target Zone Occurring within the Tucson Sector, 1985 through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of BSI and NCHS data; CIR findings, as reported by
Reyes, et al., 2002, 24-61.
Notes: BSI data are arrayed on a fiscal year basis, while NCHS data and
CIR findings are on a calendar year basis. CIR findings exclude deaths
from unknown causes.
[End of figure]
Further, the increase in deaths occurring within the Tucson Sector
accounted for the majority of the increase in deaths along the
southwest border. For example, our analysis of the NCHS data indicates
that the increase in deaths in the Tucson Sector from 1990 to 2003
accounted for more than 78 percent of the total increase in border-
crossing deaths along the entire southwest border. Across all sectors
during these years, the total number of border-crossing deaths
increased by 195, and of that increase, 153 deaths occurred in the
Tucson Sector. Our analysis of the BSI data shows a similar result:
between 1998 and 2005, deaths across all sectors increased by 218, and
the Tucson Sector accounted for 205--or 94 percent--of the increase.
The increase in deaths in the Tucson Sector is also consistent with the
shifting of migrant traffic from urban areas in San Diego and El Paso
into the desert following the implementation of the Southwest Border
Strategy. The increase in deaths in the Tucson Sector occurred after
the number of deaths occurring within the San Diego Sector declined,
beginning in the early 1990s (see fig. 8 in app. II). In 1990, the San
Diego Sector accounted for over one-third of all border-crossing
deaths. By 2003, the San Diego Sector accounted for only 8 percent of
all deaths.
While much of the migrant traffic appears to have shifted to sectors
east of San Diego like Tucson, a similar shift does not appear to have
occurred in the sectors east of El Paso. Border Patrol officials have
noted that there are few population centers on the Mexican side of the
border in those regions that might serve as a starting point for
migrants intending to cross. Similarly, on the U.S. side of the border,
sectors like Marfa in western Texas are more sparsely populated. Border
Patrol officials have speculated that fewer migrants attempt to cross
in these areas because they largely consist of small towns and
communities. Consequently, migrants may have to walk longer distances
to reach a population center and may face an increased risk of being
apprehended as a result of being noticed by the local population or
Border Patrol agents.
As the number of deaths occurring within the desert in and around the
Tucson Sector increased, so too did the number of deaths due to heat
exposure. While there has been an overall increase in the number of
heat exposure deaths between 1994 and 2005, there have been some
fluctuations between years. These fluctuations may be due to factors
such as temperature changes from one year to the next as higher desert
temperatures in some summers may result in an increase in migrant
deaths. Our analysis of both the BSI and NCHS data shows increases in
the total percentage of border-crossing deaths due to heat exposure
over time. For example, by 2001, heat exposure deaths in the BSI data
accounted for more than one-third of all deaths. Our analysis of the
NCHS data also shows that by 2001 heat exposure deaths accounted for
more than 30 percent of all border-crossing deaths, an increase from
about 4 percent in 1990 (see fig. 4).
Figure 4: Percentage of All Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI
Target Zone Due to Heat Exposure, 1985 through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of BSI and NCHS data; CIR findings, as reported in
Reyes, et al., 2002 68.
Notes: BSI data are arrayed on a fiscal year basis, while NCHS data and
CIR findings are on a calendar year basis. CIR findings include data
from 55 counties and deaths from all environmental causes, such as heat
exposure and hypothermia.
[End of figure]
As the number of deaths due to heat exposure increased, the number of
deaths due to traffic-related fatalities, homicide, and drowning either
remained relatively constant or declined (see fig. 5).[Footnote 15] For
example, our analysis of the NCHS data shows that traffic fatalities
declined from more than half of all border-crossing deaths in the early
1990s to less than 30 percent of deaths by 2003. Our analysis of the
BSI data shows similar trends, with deaths due to exposure increasing
from 107 to 185 while deaths due to motor vehicle accidents,
homicide,[Footnote 16] and drowning decreased slightly from 109 to 103
between 1998 and 2005.[Footnote 17] Our analysis of the NCHS data also
shows that homicides have also declined slightly, accounting for 41
border-crossing deaths in 1990, and 33 deaths in 2003. Despite the
decline in homicides, Border Patrol officials have noted an increase in
border-related violence among smugglers and migrants including assault
and robbery, though officials stated that few incidents have resulted
in deaths thus far.
Figure 5: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths, by Cause of Death, NCHS Data,
1990 through 2003:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of NCHS data.
[End of figure]
Risk Associated with Border Crossing Appears to Have Increased in
Recent Years:
The risk associated with attempting to cross the border illegally also
appears to have increased between 1998 and 2004. While the number of
migrant border-crossing deaths approximately doubled over this period,
estimates of undocumented migration into the United States--whether
based on U.S. census data or based on the number of Border Patrol
apprehensions of migrants attempting illegal entries--do not show a
corresponding increase. For example, estimates of illegal entries into
the United States indicate that from 1998 through 2004, the estimated
number of such entries has declined by 16 percent. Similarly, the
number of apprehensions of persons attempting illegal entry has
declined by 25 percent over this same period. At the same time, our
analysis of the BSI data shows that the number of border-crossing
deaths increased by about 29 percent from 254 in 1998 to 328 in 2004.
(See app. I for a discussion of our methodology.) An examination of the
increase in the number of deaths in relation to declines in the
estimated number of illegal entries suggests that the risk associated
with crossing the border has increased in recent years.
This apparent increase in risk associated with attempting to cross the
border illegally also appears to be concentrated in the Tucson Sector.
The increase in the number of border-crossing deaths from 1998 through
2005 was generally independent of changes in the number of
apprehensions of migrants attempting illegal entries within the sector,
especially during the decline in apprehensions that occurred between
2000 and 2002 (see fig. 6). In other sectors, the number of
apprehensions generally correlated with the number of deaths: as
apprehensions increased, deaths show a corresponding increase, and
conversely, as apprehensions declined, deaths generally also declined,
although the amount of change in deaths and apprehensions between years
differed (see fig. 7).
Figure 6: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths and Apprehensions in the BSI
Target Zone Occurring within the Tucson Sector, Fiscal Years 1998
through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of BSI and U.S. Border Patrol data.
Note: Data are for fiscal years beginning October 1.
[End of figure]
Figure 7: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths and Apprehensions in the BSI
Target Zone Occurring within All Sectors except Tucson, Fiscal Years
1998 through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of BSI and U.S. Border Patrol data.
Note: Data are for fiscal years beginning October 1.
[End of figure]
While there are limitations to using the number of apprehensions as a
measure of attempted illegal entries into the United States, we
previously reported that changes in apprehensions can provide some
evidence of shifting illegal migration patterns.[Footnote 18] However,
to the extent that apprehensions can be used as an indication of
attempted illegal entries into the United States, unlike other
estimates of illegal entries, these data have the advantage of being
sector-specific and, therefore, allow for comparisons between sectors
in estimating attempted illegal entries and deaths. In the Tucson
Sector, apprehensions increased from 1998 to 2000 and then generally
declined from 2000 to 2005, with some year-to-year fluctuations. While
apprehensions generally declined, the number of border-crossing deaths
in the Tucson sector continued to increase over the same period. To the
extent that an increased number of apprehensions generally can be
assumed to represent an increased number of migrants attempting illegal
entry, the inverse relationship between apprehensions and deaths in
Tucson suggests that deaths have increased despite the fact that there
has not been a corresponding increase in the number of people
attempting to cross in that sector.
The reasons for this phenomenon are unclear. There are a number of
factors that may make the desert in and around Tucson a particularly
dangerous region for migrants to navigate, including the difficulty of
the terrain, extreme summer temperatures, and the increased use of
smugglers in the sector. While there is evidence that increasing
numbers of migrants have employed smugglers to help them cross the
border illegally across all nine southwest Border Patrol sectors in
recent years, smuggling may be especially dangerous in the Tucson
Sector. Border Patrol officials reported that migrants who are unable
to keep up with smugglers may be left behind in extreme desert
temperatures without sufficient food or water. Alternatively, the
inverse relationship between apprehensions and deaths in the Tucson
Sector could arise if apprehending migrants has become more difficult
in Tucson than in other sectors. This could result from a number of
factors such as changes in the number of agents assigned to patrol the
sector or the number of migrants who are able to evade apprehension by
attempting to cross in particularly remote areas of the sector.
While the Majority of Border-Crossing Deaths Occur among Men, the
Increase in Deaths among Women Occurred Largely in the Tucson Sector:
According to our analysis of the NCHS data, males comprised more than
78 percent of the border-crossing deaths occurring between 1990 and
2003, and persons between 15 and 44 years of age comprised 79 percent
of all deaths. The trends over time in these respective shares of
deaths were relatively constant with some minor, year-to-year
fluctuations. Our analysis of the BSI data shows similar trends between
1998 and 2005, with males accounting for 83 percent of all deaths, and
persons between the ages of 15 and 44 comprising 88 percent of all
deaths. This was true across all sectors with trends remaining
relatively constant across years. While deaths among women were
consistently much lower than men, there was an increase in the overall
number of female deaths that occurred between 1998 and 2005--the number
of female deaths increased from 22 to 90, or from 9 percent to 21
percent of all deaths. Our analysis of the BSI data shows that, between
1998 and 2005, the increase in deaths among females in the Tucson
Sector accounted for 57 percent of the total increase in deaths among
women across all sectors. Similarly, our analysis of the NCHS data
shows that from 1990 to 2003, the increase in deaths among females in
the Tucson Sector accounted for 96 percent of the total increase in
deaths among women across all sectors.[Footnote 19]
The Border Patrol's Approach to Tracking and Recording Deaths Has Not
Been Implemented Consistently across Sectors:
The BSI's methodology for collecting data on border-crossing deaths
provides a framework for gathering and recording data on the number of
migrant deaths that occur in each sector. While the Border Patrol has
taken steps to improve the collection of its data over time,
differences remain among the nine BSI sector coordinators in how each
has implemented the methodology, and these differences could result in
incomplete counts of border-crossing deaths in any given year.
Additionally, because of inherent uncertainties associated with
determining whether some migrant deaths are border-crossing deaths, an
exact count of all deaths may not be possible to obtain.
Differences in the Implementation of the BSI Methodology across Sectors
May Result in Incomplete Counts of Border-Crossing Deaths:
The BSI methodology specifies that each sector coordinator should track
all migrant deaths occurring within the sector, including those deaths
that may have first come to the attention of local authorities by
obtaining and sharing information with county coroners or medical
examiners. However, BSI sector coordinators have the latitude to decide
how to implement this outreach. Some coordinators reported regularly
scheduled contact with local authorities, while others stated that
communication was informal and infrequent. Some coordinators also
reported that the nature and methods for communicating with local
authorities had changed from one year to the next. For example, local
medical officials in one county where a relatively large number of
deaths occurred reported that Border Patrol officials in the Tucson
Sector only began contacting them in 2005 to request information on
border-crossing deaths. As a result, the BSI data prior to that year
may not have included records of those border-crossing deaths that were
discovered by local authorities but that did not come to the attention
of Border Patrol officials. To the extent that they may not include
data on all border-crossing deaths recorded by local officials, the BSI
data may represent an undercount of the total number of border-crossing
deaths in that sector. These undercounts may affect the Border Patrol's
ability to understand the scale of the problem in each sector and also
impact its ability to continue to make accurate resource allocations
along the southwest border.
Since January 2005, the National BSI Coordinator has taken steps to
further clarify the methods that sector coordinators should use to
collaborate with local officials in collecting BSI data. However, the
revised BSI methodology does not specify the frequency with which
sector coordinators are to conduct this outreach nor does it outline
the methods that coordinators should use to share information about
migrant deaths with county coroners or local medical examiners. While
all coordinators reported some degree of contact with local
authorities, communication remains informal in some sectors. As a
result, Border Patrol officials in these sectors may not learn about
all cases of migrant deaths, particularly in smaller counties where
border-crossing deaths occur with less frequency. Border Patrol
officials in those sectors reporting informal or infrequent
communication stated that they did not believe that these omissions
would likely have a significant impact on the total number of deaths
recorded in the BSITS database. While our analysis of the NCHS data
confirms these sectors have had relatively few deaths in recent years,
those trends have the potential to change in the future. For example,
our analysis of the BSI data shows only 11 deaths in the Tucson Sector
in 1998. However, as migration shifted from the San Diego Sector to the
Tucson Sector following the implementation of the Southwest Border
Strategy, the number of deaths in Tucson increased significantly. By
2005, Tucson accounted for nearly half of all deaths recorded across
all nine sectors, with a total of 216 deaths. Since the current BSI
methodology gives each sector coordinator the latitude to determine how
to approach communication with local authorities about border-crossing
deaths, differences between sectors in implementing the BSI methodology
may ultimately affect the Border Patrol's counts of border-crossing
deaths in the future. In addition, the nature and frequency of each
sector's contact with local officials could potentially change each
time a new sector coordinator is assigned.
Identifying Border-Crossing Deaths May Be Difficult in Some Cases:
Another factor that may affect the extent to which the Border Patrol
records the precise number of border-crossing deaths is the uncertainty
that arises in those cases involving bodies discovered in the desert or
other remote areas. In some of these instances both Border Patrol
agents and local medical examiners must use their professional judgment
in determining whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
classify a decedent as a migrant who died while in furtherance of an
illegal entry. Both Border Patrol officials and local medical examiners
with whom we spoke reported relying on such evidence as the type of
clothing worn by the decedent, whether or not the person was carrying
water jugs (as evidence that the person intended to travel some
distance on foot), as well as any personal documents or identification
that might indicate country of origin. Border Patrol officials and
others also reported that, in many cases where the decedent had no
identification or only skeletal remains were found, they may conclude
that the decedent was a migrant attempting illegal entry because the
remains were found in a remote area that was a known migrant-crossing
corridor.
Further, determining when a migrant has arrived at his or her
destination and is no longer in furtherance of an illegal entry can
involve making judgments about the length of time a decedent was in the
United States at the time of death. In most cases of border-crossing
deaths, when decedents are found on known border-crossing trails or the
deaths were reported by other migrants attempting illegal entry, such
determinations can be made with some degree of certainty. However, in
other circumstances, the determination about how long a migrant had
been in the United States may be more difficult. For example, Border
Patrol officials reported cases of migrants who worked on a farm for a
period of a few weeks or even a month after arriving in the United
States--to earn funds to complete their migration--only to die while en
route to their final destination. Also, in cases involving skeletal
remains, the determination regarding whether to record the case as a
border-crossing death may be more difficult. Border Patrol officials
and others generally reported that they rarely encountered ambiguous
cases where there was little or no circumstantial evidence that
provided some indication that the decedent was a migrant who died while
trying to cross the border. However, all reported that, in the absence
of being able to confirm the decedent's identity, they must use their
best judgment to make an informed decision about whether the death
should be considered a border-crossing death. Finally, the fact that a
number of bodies may remain undiscovered in the desert also raises
doubts about the accuracy of counts of migrant deaths. While local
medical officials who track border-crossing deaths reported that they
do not believe that there are a large number of undiscovered bodies
that would add significantly to counts of border-crossing deaths, the
total number of bodies that have not been found is ultimately unknown.
Evaluating the Effectiveness of the BSI and Other Border Patrol Efforts
to Reduce Border-Crossing Deaths Presents Measurement Challenges:
A number of measurement challenges and data limitations inhibit a
comprehensive evaluation of federal efforts to prevent border-crossing
deaths. In particular, because multiple factors may affect the numbers
and locations of migrant deaths, the effectiveness of the Border
Patrol's efforts to prevent such deaths cannot be measured only by
changes in the number of deaths over time. Factors such as the number
of people attempting to cross the border in any given year, weather
conditions, and the use of smugglers may all affect the number and
location of migrant deaths from one year to the next. Similarly, clear
cause and effect relationships between migrant crossings, the Border
Patrol's enforcement efforts, and prevention initiatives such as the
BSI are difficult to determine. A decline in deaths might incorrectly
be associated with BSI activity. Some migrants may be deterred by the
Border Patrol's enforcement efforts and not attempt to cross at all,
while others may attempt to cross in more dangerous areas in an effort
to avoid apprehension. In addition, because Border Patrol agents
typically carry out search and rescue activities related to the BSI at
the same time they carry out enforcement and apprehension functions, it
is difficult to isolate the impact that prevention efforts may have had
on the number of deaths.
A Number of Factors Would Need to Be Considered in Order to Assess
Cause and Effect Relationships between Migrant Crossings, Border
Enforcement, the BSI, and Related Efforts:
Because multiple factors beyond the efforts of the BSI may potentially
affect the number of border-crossing deaths in any given year, the
influence of each would need to be taken into account and measured in
relation to the number of migrant deaths in order to accurately assess
the impact of the BSI. Measuring the effectiveness of the BSI in
reducing border-crossing deaths would require a comparison of changes
in the number of migrant deaths with changes in other causal factors--
such as the Border Patrol's enforcement efforts, the number of migrants
attempting to cross the border illegally, and weather conditions, as
well as changes in how and where the BSI is implemented over time.
Without correcting for these factors, cause and effect relationships
are difficult to determine. For example, changes in the Border Patrol's
enforcement efforts might lead to shifts in the locations where
migrants attempt to cross. If migrants attempt to cross in more
dangerous areas of the desert in order to avoid detection, this may
lead to an increase in the number of deaths. In this scenario, the BSI
may in fact have prevented deaths through its search and rescue
operations, even though the number of deaths rose as a result of more
migrants crossing in the harsh desert terrain. Alternatively, increased
enforcement efforts may result in migrants being apprehended before
they are in danger or in need of rescue. Similarly, a number of factors
may also affect the number of migrants that attempt to cross the
border. For example, the dynamics of how many people attempt to cross
the border each year may be driven by the relative strength of the U.S.
labor market in relation to the Mexican labor market. In addition, the
number of migrants that make repeated attempts to cross the border
until they are successful may also change over time. Previous research
suggests that increased enforcement and harsh conditions have made
crossing the border more difficult; consequently, many migrants now pay
smugglers to help them cross.[Footnote 20] The increased difficulty and
expense in crossing may also result in fewer migrants making repeated
attempts to cross the border. Additionally, those who succeed in
crossing may choose to stay permanently in the United States rather
than crossing back and forth for seasonal employment as was the case in
years past.
The Border Patrol Does Not Maintain Detailed Data on BSI Operations:
If detailed data were available on the extent of the BSI's efforts by
sector, it would be possible to more clearly isolate the program's
effects on trends in deaths, while controlling for other factors that
may affect deaths such as increased enforcement efforts or weather
fluctuations. However, the Border Patrol does not maintain detailed
data on where the BSI was used over time that would be needed to
conduct such an evaluation. Specifically, the Border Patrol does not
maintain historical data on the number of hours agents dedicated
exclusively to BSI activities or historical data on apprehensions made
by those agents who were operating in their search and rescue capacity
at the time of apprehension. These data would provide necessary
information about where the BSI was used over time and allow for more
precise measurements of the BSI's implementation across sectors.
Because the Border Patrol's primary function is enforcement, agents
typically carry out search and rescue operations simultaneously with
ongoing enforcement activities. As a result, the extent to which the
Border Patrol can isolate and record the number of line hours and
resources dedicated exclusively to BSI-related activities is limited.
The Impact of Additional Border Patrol Programs in Reducing Migrant
Deaths Has Not Been Demonstrated:
Border Patrol has claimed that the Interior Repatriation Program (IRP)
resulted in a decrease in migrant deaths and that the decrease in
deaths was due, in part, to a lower recidivism rate among program
participants when compared with those migrants who did not participate
in the program.[Footnote 21] Border Patrol's claims that the IRP
contributed to reductions in deaths were based upon a decline in the
number of exposure deaths recorded in the BSI data between 2003 and
2004. However, this simple correlation does not constitute sufficient
evidence of a causal effect of the IRP on deaths. First, because
participation in the program is voluntary, it is not possible to
determine the program's impact on recidivism rates and deaths with
certainty. Those migrants who choose to be repatriated to their
hometowns in the interior of Mexico may be less motivated to attempt
reentry than those who elect not to participate in the program, instead
choosing to be returned to an entry point along the border. These
migrants may opt out of the program specifically because they intend to
try to cross the border again in the hopes of avoiding detection on
their next attempt. Further, in the second year of the IRP, the number
of deaths increased. If changes in the number of deaths were again used
as the only indication of the program's effectiveness, the implication
could be that the IRP caused a corresponding increase in deaths between
2004 and 2005. However, as we previously discussed, multiple factors in
addition to the Border Patrol's efforts may affect the number of deaths
in any given year. For example, increased temperatures in the summer of
2005 may have contributed to an increase in deaths when compared with
the number of deaths recorded for the same time frame in 2004.
A recent House of Representatives Appropriations Committee report
suggests that the Arizona Border Control Initiative (ABCI) was
responsible for 27 fewer deaths in the Tucson Sector between March 16,
2004, and September 30, 2004--a 26-percent reduction in such deaths
when compared with the same location and time frame in 2003 prior to
the ABCI's implementation.[Footnote 22] However, as we previously
discussed, a number of other factors such as changes in desert
temperatures may also affect the number of deaths from one year to the
next. Like the Border Patrol's conclusions about the IRP, measuring
changes in the number of deaths between 2004 and 2005, without
considering other factors, could imply that the program resulted in an
increase in deaths in 2005. Border Patrol officials acknowledged that
attributing reductions in exposure deaths to the ABCI and IRP in 2004
was an overly simplistic correlation and that many factors in addition
to enforcement operations may contribute to the number of deaths in any
given year. Officials pointed to the fact that, in 2005, BORSTAR
patrols began targeting illegal immigration corridors that were
experiencing high death rates. They reported that one result of
BORSTAR's operations was that rescues of migrants in distress
significantly increased. However, officials also reported that, because
BORSTAR agents were operating in high-risk areas, they may have
discovered more bodies in the course of their patrols, also
contributing to an increase in Border Patrol's total counts of deaths.
Additionally, Border Patrol officials recognized that their data
collection methodologies may also affect conclusions about the cause
and effect relationships between their efforts and migrant deaths.
Officials stated that, because they improved their methodology for
collecting data on deaths starting in 2005, deaths recorded by local
coroners that were not routinely included in their 2004 counts may have
also contributed to an increase in the number of deaths they reported
for the Tucson Sector in 2005.
Conclusions:
Although the BSI data have some limitations and may undercount the
exact number of border-crossing deaths, the overall trends shown in the
data are corroborated by trends in both the NCHS data as well as the
state-level vital registry data reported by CIR. The consistency in
trends identified in all three sources of data, as well as our
assessment of the BSI methodology, indicates that the BSI data can be
used to provide valuable information on trends in the numbers,
locations, causes, and characteristics of migrant border-crossing
deaths over time. These trends are particularly important for better
understanding the scale of the problem of migrant deaths and can
provide useful information for making key resource allocation
decisions.
Although our analysis of the BSI data shows trends in border-crossing
deaths that are consistent with trends derived from other, independent
sources of data, we also note that not all BSI sector coordinators
consistently implemented the BSI methodology, and these differences can
contribute to incomplete counts of deaths. Some sectors have only
informal and infrequent communication with local authorities, while
others have regularly scheduled contacts with local medical examiners
or coroners about migrant deaths that may have occurred in the sector.
Because both the NCHS and BSI data indicate that the problem of migrant
border-crossing deaths has been growing in recent years, it is
important to continue to improve the available data about these deaths
by refining methods for tracking and recording deaths, including
procedures for communicating with local authorities in order to share
information about all potential cases of border-crossing deaths that
occur within the BSI target zone. The inconsistencies in the
implementation of the BSI methodology highlight opportunities to
improve the quality of the Border Patrol's data on border-crossing
deaths. Although there have been relatively few deaths in the two
sectors in which BSI coordinators use informal methods to contact local
authorities, these trends have the potential to change. If patterns of
undocumented migration were to shift, as occurred in the Tucson Sector
between 1998 and 2005, these informal methods for contacting local
officials could result in larger numbers of unreported deaths.
Similarly, since BSI sector coordinators currently have the latitude to
determine how they approach communication with local officials,
personnel changes could also result in changes in how each sector
implements the BSI methodology from one year to the next and
consequently affect counts of deaths.
Finally, the Border Patrol and others should be cautious about
believing assertions about the effectiveness of its prevention efforts,
given the difficulties involved in measuring the effects of such
efforts. Claims about cause and effect relationships are limited by the
fact that multiple factors affect the number of migrant border-crossing
deaths from one year to the next. While we recognize that the Border
Patrol's ability to measure BSI activities separately from ongoing
enforcement functions may be limited, unless explicit controls are
introduced to take into account the effects of these factors, the
effectiveness of prevention efforts cannot be demonstrated.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
In order to improve the consistency across Border Patrol sectors in the
implementation of the BSI methodology and the completeness of data on
deaths in any given year, we recommend that the Commissioner of Customs
and Border Protection take steps to ensure that BSI sector coordinators
follow a consistent protocol for collecting and recording information
about border-crossing deaths and that all coordinators follow
established procedures for maintaining and documenting regular contacts
with local authorities to obtain timely information about all border-
crossing deaths within the BSI target zone.
In order to better demonstrate the effectiveness of the Border Patrol's
efforts to reduce migrant deaths, we recommend that the Commissioner of
Customs and Border Protection assess the feasibility and cost-
effectiveness of using multivariate statistical approaches to enhance
estimates of impacts of the initiatives.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30
days from the date of the report. At that time, we will then provide
copies of the report to other interested Congressional parties, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, the Secretary of State, and the Assistant Attorney General
for Administration for the Department of Justice, and will make copies
available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be
available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [Hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-2758 or ekstrandl@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions
to this report are listed in appendix VI.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Laurie E. Ekstrand:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
This appendix describes our scope and methodology used in responding to
the three objectives addressed in this report: (1) How do the Border
Patrol's data on trends in the numbers, locations, causes, and
characteristics of border-crossing deaths compare to other sources of
data on these types of deaths? (2) What differences, if any, are there
in how the Border Patrol has implemented the BSI methodology across its
sectors? (3) To what extent do existing data allow for an evaluation of
the effectiveness of the BSI and other Border Patrol efforts to prevent
border-crossing deaths?
Overview of Our Approach and Methodology:
To address our objectives, we obtained and analyzed data for the years
1990 through 2005 from the two sources of federal data on border-
crossing deaths--BSI data from the Border Safety Initiative Tracking
System (BSITS) and mortality data collected by the National Center for
Health Statistics (NCHS) as part of the national vital statistics
system. We analyzed data on border-crossing deaths occurring in the
United States within the Border Patrol's identified BSI target zone--45
counties within 9 Border Patrol sectors on or near the southwest border
with Mexico. Prior to analyzing the data, we assessed the reliability
of each data source and found the data to be sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of our report. We analyzed both sets of data in order to
arrive at several estimates of the number of border-crossing deaths
that have occurred annually from 1990 to 2005 and to draw conclusions
about the strengths and weaknesses of each estimate. To understand what
each of the federal sources of data reveals about the trends associated
with the numbers, locations, causes, and characteristics of deaths
along the border, we compared each of the two datasets over time. We
examined common trends that were reflected in both datasets including
increases or decreases in the total numbers of deaths, changes in the
locations of deaths, and demographics of decedents in order to draw
conclusions about overall patterns that may have occurred over time. In
addition, we compared trends in each of the two datasets to data
generated by Karl Eschbach and his colleagues at the University of
Houston's Center for Immigration Research (CIR) who used state-level
vital registry data to generate estimates of border-crossing deaths
between 1985 and 1998. To understand how deaths among migrants compare
to deaths in the general U.S. population living within the BSI target
zone, we compared each group's share of the causes of death most
commonly associated with border-crossing. Finally, to determine the
extent to which existing data allow for an evaluation of the BSI and
other federal efforts to prevent deaths, we interviewed Border Patrol
officials about any established performance measures and reviewed
available information from the Border Patrol on program outputs and
outcomes, including the extent to which the Border Patrol collects
information about the resources dedicated to the BSI such as the number
of agent hours spent on BSI-related activities or the time agents
dedicate to search and rescue operations. We also reviewed previous
efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of the BSI and related federal
efforts to reduce deaths.
We conducted our work between August 2005 and June 2006 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Methods to Determine the Reliability of Sources of Data on Border-
Crossing Deaths:
We assessed the reliability of BSI and NCHS data and reviewed the
methods used by CIR for identifying cases of border-crossing deaths in
the state vital registry data.
BSI Data:
BSITS is a client-server database that serves as a central repository
for collecting, managing, and disseminating migrant incident data in
support of the BSI including the volume and types of rescues and the
number and types of migrant deaths that occur in each of the nine
Southwest Border Patrol sectors. Specifically, BSITS records the number
of deaths and rescues, followed by type, disposition, location (through
GPS coordinates), and information on the subject or victim. In order to
ensure data integrity, BSITS tracks record creation at the sector and
user level. The BSI does not allow records created outside the user's
sector to be modified in BSITS. The system is monitored by a system
security administrator who monitors all user login and usage in order
to maintain a security audit trail. Access permissions to the system
are managed by the system security administrator through a security
management tool, and users may only log into the system using a secure
user ID and password, which is stored in encrypted binary format.
Additionally, BSITS is subject to a number of requirements that have
been established for all sensitive DHS automated data processing
systems: it is required to develop internal security procedures to
restrict access of critical data items to only those access types
required by users; to develop audit procedures to meet control,
reporting, and retention period requirements for operational and
management reports; to allow for application audit trails to
dynamically audit retrieval access to designated critical data; to use
standard tables for requesting or validating data fields; to verify
processes for additions, deletions, or upgrades of critical data; and
to be able to identify all audit information by user identification,
network terminal identification, date, time, and data accessed or
changed.
The Border Patrol provided us an electronic spreadsheet consisting of
one record, or entry, per incident in the BSITS database for all
incidents, including both rescues and deaths, recorded in the system
from the program's inception in 1998 through December 21. 2005. In
order to protect the confidentiality of the information, the Border
Patrol omitted names from the data. In order to accurately interpret
the data, we reviewed definition tables provided by Border Patrol for
each of the variables in the database, system administration manuals,
and a copy of the query used to produce the data for our request. After
completing preliminary analysis of the data, we asked the Border Patrol
to confirm the number of subjects on which data was provided, to
clarify the meaning and values of several key fields in the database,
and to provide additional information about any missing or out of range
values. To further assess the reliability of the BSI data, we reviewed
the written BSI methodology for tracking and recording deaths for logic
and consistency and interviewed Border Patrol officials in Washington,
D.C., as well as each of the nine BSI sector coordinators in the field
who have responsibility for implementing the methodology and inputting
data into BSITS. To determine the extent to which the methodology has
been implemented consistently across sectors and over time, we asked
officials about established methodologies for tracking and recording
deaths in BSITS, any changes to those methodologies that may have
occurred over time, and any methods Border Patrol officials have used
at both the national and local level to assess whether the BSI
methodology has been implemented fully and consistently across sectors.
NCHS Data:
NCHS collects and disseminates information on national vital statistics
through the National Vital Statistics System. The data are collected
through contracts between NCHS and vital registration systems operated
in the various jurisdictions responsible for the registration of vital
events including births, deaths, marriages, divorces, and fetal deaths.
The authority for the registration of these events resides individually
with each of the 50 states, 2 cities (Washington, D.C., and New York,
N.Y.) and 5 territories (Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam,
American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands).
The death certificate is the source for state and national mortality
statistics, and NCHS provides standard forms for the collection of the
data and model procedures to ensure the uniform registration of deaths.
NCHS also produces training and instructional material as well as an
automated mortality medical data system for coding and classifying
cause of death information from death certificates. The NCHS data
include records of all death certificates filed in the United States
regardless of the decedent's country of origin. In order to assure the
objectivity of its statistical and analytic information products, i.e.,
that they are accurate, reliable, and unbiased, NCHS obtains these data
through accepted statistical theory and practice. NCHS statistical and
analytic information products are derived using generally acceptable
statistical practices and methodologies, which enable responsible
statisticians and analysts outside NCHS to replicate the NCHS
statistical methods and obtain results consistent with those obtained
by NCHS. NCHS assures the security of its statistical and analytic
information products through the enforcement of rigorous controls that
protect against unauthorized access to the data, revision or corruption
of the data, or unauthorized use of the data. Some of the major
controls used at NCHS include access control, user authentication,
encryption, access monitoring, provision of unalterable electronic
content, and audit trails. Dissemination of data also follows generally
recognized guidelines in terms of defining acceptable standards
regarding minimum response rates, maximum standard errors, cell size
suppression, quality of coding, and other processing operations. NCHS
also maintains staff expertise in areas such as concept development,
survey planning and design (including questionnaire development and
testing), data collection, data processing and editing, data analysis,
evaluation procedures, and methods of dissemination.
We based our data request to NCHS on several key fields in the death
certificate including residence, birthplace, and cause of death in
order to identify likely cases of border-crossing deaths. The CDC
Medical Examiners and Coroner Handbook on Death Registration provides
detailed instructions on the registration of deaths and guidance on
completing the U.S. Standard Certificate of Death. According to the
handbook, the residence of a decedent (state, county, city, and street
address) is the place where the decedent's household is located, the
place where the decedent actually resided, or where the decedent lived
and slept most of the time. If the decedent was not a resident of the
United States, the country of residence should be entered into the
residence field of the death certificate. If the decedent's residence
is not known, "unknown" is entered into the residence field. The
guidance also specifies that, for decedents who were not born in the
United States, the country of birth should be entered into the death
certificate, regardless of whether the person was a U.S. citizen at the
time of death. CDC's specifications further state that the underlying
cause of death listed on the death certificate should be the disease or
injury that initiated the chain of events that led directly and
inevitably to death. The underlying cause of death is defined as "the
disease or injury which initiated the train of morbid events leading
directly to death, or the circumstances of the accident or violence
which produced the fatal injury." Reported causes of death are then
translated into codes through a classification structure outlined in
the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) developed by the
World Health Organization. The ICD is used to classify diseases and
other health problems recorded on many types of health and vital
records including death certificates and hospital records. In 1999, a
revision of the ICD was implemented. The International Statistical
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, Tenth Revision
(ICD-10), established revised codes for classifying mortality data and
revised rules for selecting the underlying cause of death. ICD-10
replaced classification codes and rules outlined in the previous
version of the manual, the International Classification of Diseases,
Ninth Revision (ICD-9). The codes outlined in the 9the revision (ICD-9)
apply to all deaths registered between 1979 and 1998, while the 10the
revision (ICD-10) applies to all deaths from 1999 to the present.
In order to identify migrant deaths recorded in the NCHS main mortality
file--which contains records of all deaths occurring in the United
States--we requested that NCHS provide us with aggregate, county-level
data on migrant border-crossing deaths by applying a set of
specifications to the data in the main mortality file.[Footnote 23] Our
specifications included the following: (1) a death must have occurred
within 1 of the 45 counties in the BSI target zone; (2) the death must
have occurred in years beginning with 1990 and going through 2003, the
most recent year for which NCHS data were available at the time we did
our work; and (3) deaths must be limited to decedents who were foreign
born, had a place of residence outside the United States at the time of
death, and died from one of the causes of death that we associated with
border-crossing deaths. We provided NCHS a list of causes of death from
the codes contained in the ICD codes--which, as described above, are
used to classify the underlying cause of death reported on the death
certificate by public health officials such as medical examiners and
county coroners--and asked that NCHS officials select those cases that
matched one of the underlying causes of death on our list. By
requesting data over the period from 1990 to 2003, we identified both
ICD-9 and ICD-10 codes. We selected cause of death codes that were
associated with migrant border-crossing deaths used in the CIR studies,
the causes of migrant deaths identified by the Border Patrol, as well
as causes most commonly used by county medical examiners, advocacy
groups, and academic researchers. These include dehydration, heat
exposure, drowning, cold exposure, homicide, and traffic accidents
among others. Our data specifications also requested that NCHS provide
us with separate counts of decedents with unknown places of birth. NCHS
provided separate datasets for each year. The datasets also contained
counts of migrant deaths by age group and gender. After receiving the
data from NCHS, we reviewed the programming code as well as the
statistical output in order to verify that the results matched our
initial specifications.
Because the place of residence listed on the death certificate is not
necessarily the same as the decedent's home state, voting residence,
mailing residence, or legal residence, our counts of border-crossing
deaths may include some decedents who were either legal visitors or
legal residents of the United States but who were residing in another
country when they legally crossed the border and subsequently died.
Additionally, NCHS officials reported that if a body is discovered and
the body is unable to be identified, the person may be assumed to be a
U.S. resident. As a result, our counts may have excluded unidentified
migrants who were presumed to be U.S. residents by public health
officials completing the death certificate. Similarly, we requested
that NCHS only provide data on those cases where the underlying cause
of death was a death commonly associated with border-crossing. Focusing
on the underlying cause of death could result in undercounts of border-
crossing deaths; cases could be missed if the commonly associated
causes are not reported when appropriate or if they are reported
incorrectly out of sequence. For example, heat exhaustion may
precipitate a heart attack. If heat exhaustion is not reported at all
or if it is not reported correctly as the cause of the heart attack,
then the heart attack would be coded as the underlying cause, and the
case would be excluded because the NCHS data did not include heart
attacks in the list of commonly associated causes of border-crossing
deaths. Alternatively, the NCHS data could also represent an overcount
of deaths if cause of death categories were defined too broadly and
resulted in the inclusion of deaths that were not directly related to
border-crossing.
In order to determine the reliability of the NCHS data for identifying
trends in deaths, we interviewed NCHS officials responsible for
maintaining vital registry mortality data and reviewed published NCHS
guidance on the completion of death certificates. We conducted
interviews with NCHS researchers, academic experts, and county medical
examiners familiar with the vital registry data about the data's
strengths and limitations for accurately capturing data on border-
crossing deaths. We also reviewed NCHS documentation about the methods
for collecting and analyzing death certificate data in preparing the
main mortality files.
CIR Data:
In order to understand the methods and data compiled by CIR, we
conducted interviews with Karl Eschbach, the lead author of the
studies,[Footnote 24] about his methods for collecting and analyzing
the data and also conducted a GAO internal review of CIR methods.
Methods Used to Identify Trends in Federal Data on the Numbers,
Locations, Causes, and Characteristics of Border-Crossing Deaths:
We analyzed specific data elements in the BSI data that were relevant
to our analysis of border-crossing deaths. These included the number of
deaths, the types or causes of death--such as exposure to heat/cold,
motor vehicle accidents, drowning, and others--the location of deaths
including the county, sector, and GPS coordinates, and demographic
information on the decedent including age, gender, and country of
origin. We imported the data from the spreadsheet provided by the
Border Patrol into a statistical software package and analyzed counts
of BSI-related deaths by year, sector, and cause of death for fiscal
years 1998 through 2005. Based on discussions with Border Patrol
officials and the criteria outlined in Border Patrol's 2005 BSI
Methodology Manual, we identified border-crossing deaths as those
deaths occurring within the 45 counties in the BSI target zone and only
included those entries designated by Border Patrol as migrants who were
in furtherance of an illegal entry at the time of death. We also
analyzed counts for characteristics of decedents including gender and
age.
Our analysis of the BSI data is based only on those deaths included in
BSITS as of December 21, 2005. We selected cases from fiscal year 1998
through fiscal year 2005 in which border-crossing deaths were recorded
as having occurred within one of the 45 counties in the BSI target zone
while the decedent was in the furtherance of an illegal entry into the
United States. Our methodology is consistent with the BSI definition of
a border-crossing death, but it differs from the methodology that
Border Patrol uses to calculate the total number of border-crossing
deaths that occur each year. According to Border Patrol officials, the
Border Patrol generates its reported annual death totals by selecting
those cases recorded in the BSITS database that occurred within any one
of the Border Patrol stations located within the BSI target zone or
outside of the target zone if Border Patrol was directly involved in
the incident. In our analysis of the BSI data, we only included deaths
occurring within one of the 45 BSI counties and did not select deaths
that may have occurred outside of the target zone. As a result, our
total counts may not match the total numbers reported by the Border
Patrol. Additionally, our sector-level counts of border-crossing deaths
may also differ from Border Patrol's. Border Patrol classifies deaths
into sectors based on the Border Patrol station that recorded the
death. Using the criteria outlined in the 2005 BSI Methodology Manual,
we instead used data regarding the county in which the death occurred
to classify deaths into sectors. Furthermore, 3 of the 45 counties in
the BSI target zone straddle the dividing line between two different
Border Patrol sectors. In these cases, our analysis may have identified
deaths in these counties as occurring in one sector, while the Border
Patrol's reports may have counted the deaths as occurring in another
sector. These differences in methods of classification primarily affect
reported totals for the El Centro and Yuma sectors.
Methods Used to Compare Border-Crossing Deaths to Deaths in the General
Population:
To understand how the distributions of causes of migrant border-
crossing deaths compare to the general population, we analyzed relevant
BSI and NCHS data on the numbers and causes of death. From NCHS we
requested aggregate, county-level datasets for the years from 1990
through 2003 of the number of U.S. residents who died each year in the
45 counties in the BSI target zone and the numbers who died from the
causes of death we used to identify border-crossing deaths. We followed
procedures similar to those we followed in requesting and obtaining the
NCHS data on migrant deaths. We also compared counts of U.S. resident
deaths by year, sector, and county, including the total numbers and
causes of death with migrant border-crossing deaths between 1990 and
2003.
Assessing Change in Risk Associated with Attempted Illegal Entries:
To assess whether the apparent risk associated with migrant border-
crossing deaths has changed over time, we compared data on border-
crossing deaths to data on the estimated number of illegal entries
reported in a published study by Jeffrey Passel at the Pew Hispanic
Center[Footnote 25] as well as to data on the number of apprehensions
recorded by Border Patrol. Passel's estimates are based upon the
residual methodology. We used data on apprehensions that the Border
Patrol provided us. We calculated the percentage change over the period
from 1998 through 2004 in the estimated number of undocumented entries,
the number of apprehensions, and the number of border-crossing deaths,
and we compared these percentage changes to determine if the change in
the number of deaths over this period exceeded the change in the
estimated number of undocumented entries and the number of
apprehensions (see table 2).
Table 2: Estimated Undocumented Entries, Apprehensions, and Deaths:
Year: 1998;
Estimated number of undocumented entries: Total: 668,000;
Estimated number of undocumented entries: Mexico: 507,000;
Number of apprehensions along the southwest border: 1,516,680;
Number of BSI deaths: 254.
Year: 1999;
Estimated number of undocumented entries: Total: 656,000;
Estimated number of undocumented entries: Mexico: 496,000;
Number of apprehensions along the southwest border: 1,537,000;
Number of BSI deaths: 241.
Year: 2000;
Estimated number of undocumented entries: Total: 667,000;
Estimated number of undocumented entries: Mexico: 530,000;
Number of apprehensions along the southwest border: 1,643,679;
Number of BSI deaths: 372.
Year: 2001;
Estimated number of undocumented entries: Total: 549,000;
Estimated number of undocumented entries: Mexico: 437,000;
Number of apprehensions along the southwest border: 1,235,717;
Number of BSI deaths: 328.
Year: 2002;
Estimated number of undocumented entries: Total: 450,000;
Estimated number of undocumented entries: Mexico: 378,000;
Number of apprehensions along the southwest border: 929,809;
Number of BSI deaths: 322.
Year: 2003;
Estimated number of undocumented entries: Total: 451,000;
Estimated number of undocumented entries: Mexico: 369,000;
Number of apprehensions along the southwest border: 905,065;
Number of BSI deaths: 334.
Year: 2004;
Estimated number of undocumented entries: Total: 562,000;
Estimated number of undocumented entries: Mexico: 459,000;
Number of apprehensions along the southwest border: 1,139,282;
Number of BSI deaths: 328.
Year: Percent change from 1998 to 2004;
Estimated number of undocumented entries: Total: -15.9%;
Estimated number of undocumented entries: Mexico: -9.5%;
Number of apprehensions along the southwest border: -24.9%;
Number of BSI deaths: 29.1%.
Sources: Passel and Suro, 2005; U.S. Border Patrol; and GAO analysis of
BSI data.
[End of table]
Review of Models Used to Estimate the Number of Migrants Attempting to
Cross the Border:
Because data are not available on the actual number of migrants that
illegally attempt to cross the border in any given year, we used
estimates of the number of border-crossers or undocumented migrants
that enter the United States each year. We previously reported on some
of the data limitations involved in estimating the illegal immigrant
population as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the available
methods for estimating the flow of illegal migrants across the
border.[Footnote 26] We reviewed a number of models that have been
developed in recent years by researchers and academic experts working
in the arena of immigration issues. We conducted an analysis of each
model and assessed the methods used by each in order to draw a
conclusion about the most reliable estimates of illegal entries.
Residual Method:
Robert Warren and Jeffrey Passel employ a method for estimating the
number of unauthorized migrants using both data from the decennial
Census and counts from alternate government sources, such as
DHS.[Footnote 27] This method counts the number of foreign born
individuals in the United States, as enumerated in the Census or the
Current Population Survey (CPS), and then subtracts the number who have
become naturalized or who are legal resident aliens,[Footnote 28] which
was obtained from the alternate government source. The difference
should be the number of undocumented aliens. Because this method
involves subtraction, it is sometimes called the "residual method."
Table 3: The Residual Method for Estimating the Number of Unauthorized
Migrants:
Estimated number of undocumented aliens counted in the census = Foreign
born population counted in the census - Estimated naturalized U.S.
citizens in the United States - Estimated legally resident aliens in
the United States.
Source: Warren and Passel, 1987.
[End of table]
Using a method similar to this one, Passel estimated that there were
10.3 million unauthorized migrants in the United States in 2004. Using
annual applications of this method, he estimated that between 400,000
and 700,000 unauthorized migrants have entered the United States each
year since 1992.
A drawback to using this methodology for measuring the number of
unauthorized migrants at risk for border-crossing deaths is that Census
Bureau data, such as the CPS, only count migrants who have been in the
United States for a sufficient amount of time for government census
takers to locate them. Migrants who only come to the United States for
a short period of time and then return to their home country would be
less likely to be included in this count. Further, this methodology
cannot be used to measure different rates of crossing by sector since
the migrants may live in different areas from where they crossed the
border. Ultimately, this method would not only count those individuals
who crossed the border illegally, but also those individuals whose
status changed from authorized to unauthorized, due to a visa expiring,
for example.
Apprehensions Data:
An alternate method for estimating the total number of illegal border
crossings is to calculate entries based on the number of apprehensions
recorded by the Border Patrol. From 1994 through 2004, Border Patrol
records indicate that between 0.9 and 1.7 million migrants were
apprehended in the nine southwest Border Patrol sectors each year,
peaking in 2000. However, apprehensions are partially determined by the
level of Border Patrol enforcement activity. Therefore, even if the
level of migration remained the same, the number of apprehensions might
fluctuate if the level of enforcement changes. More specifically,
apprehensions are not a direct measure of successful undocumented
migration, but rather they are an indication of unsuccessful
undocumented migration.
Unlike the residual method, because the Border Patrol maintains records
of apprehensions by sector, this method can be used to estimate entries
by sector. Border Patrol data indicate that, from 1992 to the present,
there was a large shift in apprehensions from the San Diego Sector to
the Tucson Sector.
In addition, the number of apprehensions is not the same as the number
of apprehended migrants, since many migrants attempt to cross the
border a number of times until they are able to cross successfully.
Katharine M. Donato reports survey evidence that shows that many
migrants will continue to attempt to cross the border until they are
able to get through undetected.[Footnote 29]
Repeated Trials:
Another method for estimating undocumented migration uses the number of
people who have been apprehended previously to translate apprehensions
into an estimate of the number of undocumented migrants crossing into
the country. A version of this method is employed by Thomas J.
Espenshade in his 1995 study examining the use of INS data to measure
the flow of undocumented migration.[Footnote 30] Espenshade shows that
the ratio of apprehensions and undocumented flow is equal to the odds
of being apprehended on any given attempt to enter the United States
illegally. It follows then that the flow of undocumented migrants can
be calculated by dividing the number of apprehensions by those odds.
Espenshade estimates that the estimated gross volume of undocumented
migration generally exceeded the level of apprehensions by 2.2 in the
period between 1977 and 1988. While this factor varies over time,
Espenshade concludes that the two series track each other well, as the
linear correlation between them is 0.90.
However, there are some questions about using Espenshade's model to
estimate the current number of illegal crossings. For one, the specific
factor may be different today; Espenshade's figures are based on
calculations over an 11-year period, beginning almost 30 years ago. As
noted previously, the geographic pattern of migration was much
different then, with a larger number of crossings occurring in the San
Diego area, whereas today a more significant number of crossings occur
in the desert area of Arizona. Moreover, Gordon Hanson and Antonio
Spilimbergo have empirically demonstrated that as the level of border
security increases, a greater number of unauthorized migrants will be
apprehended.[Footnote 31] Either of these factors--a differential
pattern of crossing or an increased level of Border Patrol enforcement-
-may affect the ability of the Border Patrol to apprehend migrants,
thus affecting the extent to which Espenshade's estimate of 2.2
crossings per apprehension can be accurately applied to current
circumstances.
In addition, a key assumption of Espenshade's model is that migrants
will attempt to enter repeatedly until they are successful, even if all
entries were attempted within a single month. However, the plausibility
of this assumption is unclear; for example, it may not be reasonable to
assume that a migrant will attempt to cross the border as many as 7
times in a given month. Additionally, there are a number of other
factors that may make the assumption even less plausible today than it
was in the period of Espenshade's study. Border Patrol apprehension
data indicate that increasing numbers of migrants are attempting to
cross in the Tucson Sector. However, due to high temperatures and
rugged terrain, the desert is often more difficult for migrants to
navigate than urban areas. As a result, increasing numbers of migrants
hire smugglers, or "coyotes," to help them cross. This is a large
expense, and it is not clear that the coyotes refund the money if the
crossing is not successful. In addition, the Border Patrol has started
returning migrants to the interior of Mexico through the IRP in order
to deter repeat attempts. Given the amount of time it might take a
migrant to travel from the interior of the country back to the border,
it seems likely that a migrant would be able to make fewer attempted
crossings within a single month.
Methods to Determine the Extent to Which the BSI Can Be Evaluated:
In order to determine the extent to which existing data allow for an
evaluation of the effectiveness of the BSI and related Border Patrol
efforts, we interviewed Border Patrol officials in Washington, D.C.,
about how they measure the BSI including any information on established
performance goals and measures. We requested any available information
on BSI resources, personnel, and equipment in order to determine the
extent to which the Border Patrol tracks and records information on
resources in relation to established performance goals and measures. We
also reviewed a number of other federal data sources on the Border
Patrol's program goals and outcome measures including documents
published by the Office of Management and Budget and CBP's annual
budget submission. We reviewed and analyzed available information from
the Border Patrol on program outcomes including a study on the BSI
conducted in July 2004 that examined the efforts of the BSI to reduce
the overall number of migrant deaths, the effectiveness of individual
components of the BSI to deter crossings, and the effect of specially
trained BORSTAR units, as well as the Lateral Repatriation Program, on
the number of deaths.
The Border Safety Initiative: Evaluation, Assessment, and
Recommendations:
In an effort to better measure the impact of the BSI, the Border Patrol
commissioned researchers at Rutgers University to evaluate the efforts
of the program.[Footnote 32] As one of its objectives, the study
examined the effectiveness of specialized BORSTAR agents in reducing
migrant deaths when compared with Border Patrol line agents. BORSTAR
agents are often deployed to high-threat areas or areas more likely to
have deaths and rescues. Rather than attempt to estimate the effect of
the BORSTAR agents on the number of deaths in a sector where they are
deployed, the study estimates the effect of an agent's BORSTAR training
on whether an intervention results in a death or a rescue of a migrant.
The researchers applied a multivariate logistic regression that
corrects for the migrant's age, gender, and the number of accompanying
migrants. Using existing data provided by the Border Patrol, they found
that the probability of a death is 88 percent less when a BORSTAR agent
responds, as opposed to a non-BORSTAR Border Patrol agent.
The study's findings present an argument for BORSTAR's effectiveness.
If BORSTAR agents have training that allows them to better treat
injuries, it follows that more rescued migrants will survive. However,
it is unclear whether findings from this analysis can be used as an
evaluation of the BSI as a whole without additional research. BORSTAR
agents are only one component of the BSI with a total of 164 BORSTAR
agents deployed in the 9 sectors along the southwest border as of
October 2005. In order to understand the effectiveness of the program
as a whole, it would be necessary to examine the impact of other
components of the program including the use of rescue beacons, the
impact of the media campaign to discourage migrants from attempting to
cross the border illegally, and the effectiveness of other non-BORSTAR
Border Patrol agents that may rescue migrants in need of assistance.
2005 Report on the Interior Repatriation Program:
In 2005, the Border Patrol issued a report on the outcomes of the
Interior Repatriation Program (IRP), an effort initiated as part of the
ABCI. The Border Patrol reports that the IRP was intended to break the
ties between migrants attempting to cross the border and the smuggling
organizations that move people across the border. Program participants
are migrants who are apprehended while attempting to illegally cross
the border; the IRP offers them the option to be voluntarily
repatriated to their hometown, rather than being returned to a land
port of entry along the border where they might be more likely to
attempt to cross again. The program claimed a number of successes
including a decrease in the total number of exposure related deaths
between 2003 and 2004 in Arizona, as well as a lower recidivism rate
among program participants. However, exposure related deaths in the
Tucson and Yuma Sectors actually increased between 2004 and 2005. While
the Border Patrol claims that the IRP was responsible for reducing the
number of deaths in Arizona between 2003 and 2004, they do not
similarly tie the increase in deaths between 2004 and 2005 to the
program. Rather, Border Patrol officials point out that increased
desert temperatures and improved data collection methods may have
contributed to the increase in recorded deaths. Similarly, they state
that increased numbers of deployed BORSTAR agents may have increased
the likelihood that agents would find deceased migrants in the course
of their patrols. Factors discussed in this report point out that
changes in the number of deaths alone cannot serve as a reliable
indicator for the success of the BSI or the IRP. As the Border Patrol
correctly notes, any number of factors beyond the efforts of the Border
Patrol may affect the number of deaths from one year to the next. Just
as the increase in recorded deaths between 2004 and 2005 may have been
affected by any one of a number of factors including increased
temperatures, increased patrols, or improved data collection, the
decline in deaths between 2003 and 2004 may have also been affected by
a number of factors independent of the IRP. Similarly, the report
points to the decreased recidivism rate among program participants,
noting that the reentry rate was lower among program participants than
illegal aliens that were returned to land border ports of entry.
However, currently participation in the IRP is voluntary, and those
migrants who elect to participate may be less likely to attempt to
cross the border again. Conversely, those migrants who intend to
continue to attempt to cross until they are successful may be less
likely to participate in the IRP.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Deaths by Sector:
Figure 8: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the San Diego Sector, 1985 through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of BSI and NCHS data; CIR findings, as reported in
Eschbach, et al., 2001, 24-61.
[End of figure]
Figure 9: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the El Centro Sector, 1985 through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of BSI and NCHS data; CIR findings, as reported in
Eschbach, et al., 2001, 24-61.
[End of figure]
Figure 10: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the Yuma Sector, 1985 through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of BSI and NCHS data; CIR findings, as reported in
Eschbach, et al., 2001, 24-61.
[End of figure]
Figure 11: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the Tucson Sector, 1985 through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of BSI and NCHS data; CIR findings, as reported in
Eschbach, et al., 2001, 24-61.
[End of figure]
Figure 12: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the El Paso Sector, 1985 through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of BSI and NCHS data; CIR findings, as reported in
Eschbach, et al., 2001, 24-61.
[End of figure]
Figure 13: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the Marfa Sector, 1985 through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of BSI and NCHS data; CIR findings, as reported in
Eschbach, et al., 2001, 24-61.
[End of figure]
Figure 14: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the Del Rio Sector, 1985 through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of BSI and NCHS data; CIR findings, as reported in
Eschbach, et al., 2001, 24-61.
[End of figure]
Figure 15: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the Laredo Sector, 1985 through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of BSI and NCHS data; CIR findings, as reported in
Eschbach, et al., 2001, 24-61.
[End of figure]
Figure 16: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths in the BSI Target Zone
Occurring within the Rio Grande Valley Sector, 1985 through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of BSI and NCHS data; CIR findings, as reported in
Eschbach, et al., 2001, 24-61.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Causes of Death:
Figure 17: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths, by Cause of Death, CIR
Findings, 1985 through 1998:
[See PDF for image]
Source: CIR findings, as reported in Reyes, et al., 2002, 68.
Notes: Number of deaths based on cause of death counts as reported in
Reyes, et al., 2002, 68. CIR findings include data from 55 counties.
Environmental causes include heat-related causes, hypothermia, and
other environmental conditions. See figure 5 for causes of death
according to our analysis of NCHS data.
[End of figure]
Figure 18: Migrant Border-Crossing Deaths, by Cause of Death, BSI Data,
1998 through 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of BSI data.
Notes: Other deaths include homicide, suicide, and Border Patrol
shootings. All traffic-related fatalities include motor vehicle
accidents and pedestrian deaths from vehicular traffic. See figure 5
for causes of death according to our analysis of NCHS data.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Causes of Death for U.S. Residents and Migrants within the
BSI Target Zone:
Figure 19: Percentage Distribution of Deaths among U.S. Residents and
Migrant Border-Crossers, by Cause of Death, All Years Combined, 1990
through 2003:
[See PDF for Image]
Source: GAO analysis of NCHS data.
Notes: Our analysis of the NCHS data shows that between 64,000 and
87,100 U.S. residents died annually from any cause of death in the
counties in the BSI target zone over the period from 1990 through 2003.
Of these, nearly 5 percent died from the causes of death that are
commonly associated with border-crossing deaths, such as exposure to
heat, traffic accidents, environmental causes, and homicide.
[End of Figure]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
July 20, 2006:
Ms. Laurie Ekstrand:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Ekstrand:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO's) draft report entitled Border-Crossing
Deaths: Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995 and Border Patrol's Evaluations
of Its Safety Initiatives Need Improving (GAO-06-770). Technical
comments have been provided under separate cover.
The Department appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the
draft report. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) concurs with
the overall substance and findings of the draft report but must note
that the Office of Border Patrol (OBP) is an enforcement agency. Border
Patrol Agents exercise daily border safety functions by virtue of
carrying out their mission of securing our nation's borders. Therefore,
apprehending illegal aliens before they come into distress diminishes
the risk involved with illegally crossing into the United States.
Additionally, through well-resourced enforcement, the border area will
be secure and should assist in reducing border deaths.
CBP concurs with the recommendations outlined in the report and is
taking action to address these issues, as described below:
Recommendation 1: GAO recommends that the Commissioner of CBP take
steps to ensure that sector coordinators follow a consistent protocol
for collecting and recording information about border-crossing deaths
and that all coordinators follow established procedures for maintaining
and documenting regular contacts with local authorities to obtain
timely information about all border-crossing deaths within the Border
Safety Initiative (BSI) target zone.
Response: CBP concurs with this recommendation. OBP ill schedule BSI
assessments at each sector to evaluate the protocols for collecting
migrant death data from local authorities and ensure that all sectors
are complying with the BSI Methodology. OBP expects to implement this
recommendation by January 31, 2007.
Recommendation 2: GAO recommends that the Commissioner of CBP assess
the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of using multivariate
statistical approaches to enhance estimates of impacts of its
initiatives.
Response: CBP concurs with this recommendation. OBP has established a
workgroup to develop performance measures to ensure the effectiveness
of the BSI and other efforts in preventing border-crossing deaths. The
first working group session was held on July 19, 2006 to identify
potential performance measures and develop an implementation plan. OBP
expects to implement this recommendation by January:
session was held on July lop an implementation plan. 1, 2007.
CBP appreciates the opportunity to work with the auditors in'
constructing a balanced and accurate document. We place great value in
resolving the issues discussed in this review which reiterates the
importance of establishing regular liaison with our law enforcement
partners, Government of Mexico officials, and county medical examiners.
Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this draft report and
we look forward to working with you on future homeland security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Laurie E. Ekstrand (202) 512-2758:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, William J. Sabol, Samantha
Goodman, Benjamin Bolitzer, Chad M. Gorman, David Alexander, Amy
Bernstein, Frances Cook, Ignacio Yanes, Jerry Seigler, Christopher
Ferencik, and Stephen Rossman made key contributions to this report.
FOOTNOTES
[1] We refer to this area as the BSI target zone.
[2] Karl Eschbach, et al., "Causes and Trends in Migrant Deaths along
the U.S.-Mexican Border, 1985-1998," Working Paper No. WPS 01-4. Center
for Immigration Research, University of Houston, Houston, Tex., 2001.
Karl Eschbach, et al., "Deaths During Undocumented Migration: Trends
and Policy Implications in the New Era of Homeland Security," In
Defense of the Alien, Vol. 26, 2003, 37-52. We also reviewed CIR
findings as reported in Belinda I. Reyes, et al., "Holding the Line?
The Effect of the Recent Border Build-up on Unauthorized Immigration,"
Public Policy Institute of California, San Francisco, Calif., 2002, 68.
[3] Eschbach, et al., 2001 and Eschbach, et al., 2003.
[4] Sanjeeb Sapkota, et al., "Unauthorized Border Crossing and Migrant
Deaths: Arizona, New Mexico and El Paso, Tex., 2002-2003," American
Journal of Public Health, July 2006.
[5] Following the creation of DHS in 2003, the former INS was 1 of 22
federal agencies brought together within DHS. INS functions related to
border security were assumed by U.S. Customs and Border Protection
under the newly created DHS.
[6] GAO, INS' Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues
Remain after Seven Years, GAO-01-842 (Washington, D.C.: August 2001).
[7] Victoria, Texas, lies within Victoria County, which is within the
Border Patrol's Rio Grande Valley Sector. However, it is not 1 of the
45 counties that comprise the BSI target zone.
[8] Sapkota, et al., 2006.
[9] Our analysis of NCHS data shows that deaths among women increased
from 12 percent of all deaths in 1998 to 26 percent of all deaths in
2003, the most recent year for which data are available.
[10] Our counts differ from Border Patrol reports due to differences in
methodology. See app. I for details about our methodology.
[11] Our analysis of the NCHS data includes deaths in the 45 counties
that make up the BSI target zone, while CIR's analysis includes a total
of 55 counties on or near the southwest border with Mexico. Additional
differences between the two data sources include the codes used to
identify common causes of migrant deaths. See app. 1 and Eschbach, et
al., 2003, for additional discussion.
[12] GAO-01-842.
[13] Border Patrol reported a total of 291 deaths during the first 9
months of fiscal year 2006 (October 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006).
Our analysis of the BSI data for the first 9 months of fiscal year 2005
(October 1, 2004, through June 30, 2005) shows a total of 241 deaths.
[14] For the number of deaths in each sector, see figs. 8 through 16 in
app. II.
[15] See app. III for causes of death according to BSI data and the CIR
findings.
[16] This figure also includes deaths from suicide and Border Patrol
shootings.
[17] These totals do not reflect unknown cases recorded by the Border
Patrol that may include skeletal remains for which the cause of death
could not be determined. Our analysis of the data shows that unknown
causes of death as recorded in BSITS have increased from 11 percent in
1998 to 36 percent in 2005.
[18] For a discussion of limitations, see GAO, Illegal Aliens: Despite
Data Limitations, Current Methods Provide Better Population Estimates,
GAO/PEMD-93-25 (Washington, D.C.: August 1993). For a discussion of
apprehensions as evidence for shifting migration patterns, see GAO-01-
842.
[19] Children appear to only represent a small share of deaths along
the border. Our analysis of the BSI data shows that persons under the
age of 15 comprised less than 2 percent of all deaths from 1998 to
2005. This was true across all sectors with trends remaining relatively
constant from year to year. Our analysis of the NCHS data shows that
persons under the age of 15 comprised about 3 percent of all deaths
from 1990 to 2003.
[20] Roberto Corando and Pia M. Orrenius, "The Effect of Illegal
Immigration and Border Enforcement on Border Crime Rates," Research
Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2003.
[21] U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Interior Repatriation Program
2005 After Action Report, (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2005).
[22] H.R. Rep. No. 109-079, at 29 (2005).
[23] NCHS mortality data provided by Robert Anderson, Chief, Mortality
Statistics Branch, Division of Vital Statistics, and Jiaquan Xu, NCHS/
CDC.
[24] Eschbach, et al., 2001 and Eschbach, et al., 2003.
[25] Jeffrey S. Passel and Roberto Suro, "Rise, Peak, and Decline:
Trends in U.S. Immigration 1992-2004," Pew Hispanic Center (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 27, 2005).
[26] GAO/PEMD-93-25.
[27] Robert Warren and Jeffrey S. Passel, "A Count of the Uncountable:
Estimates of Undocumented Aliens Counted in the 1980 United States
Census," Demography, Vol. 24, No. 3, August 1987.
[28] Legal resident aliens include permanent resident aliens, students,
refugees, and other aliens who would be considered residents by U.S.
census rules.
[29] Katharine M. Donato, et al., "Stemming the Tide? Assessing the
Deterrent Effects of the Immigration and Control Act," Demography, Vol.
29, No. 2, May 1992.
[30] Thomas J. Espenshade, "Using INS Border Apprehension Data to
Measure the Flow of Undocumented Migrants Crossing the U.S.-Mexico
Frontier," International Migration Review, Vol. 29, No. 2. 1995.
[31] Gordon Hansen and Antonio Spilimbergo, "Illegal Immigration,
Border Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at
the U.S.-Mexico Border," The American Economic Review, December 1999.
[32] Ronald V. Clarke and Rob T. Guerette, The Border Safety
Initiative: Evaluation, Assessment and Recommendations for Strategic
Action, Phase 1 Report, July 2004.
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