Homeland Security
Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers Gao ID: GAO-08-35 October 30, 2007In general, a fusion center is a collaborative effort to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. Recognizing that fusion centers are a mechanism for information sharing, the federal government--including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), which has primary responsibility for governmentwide information sharing and is located in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence--is taking steps to partner with fusion centers. In response to Congressional request, GAO examined (1) the status and characteristics of fusion centers and (2) to what extent federal efforts help alleviate challenges the centers identified. GAO reviewed center-related documents and conducted interviews with officials from DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE, and conducted semistructured interviews with 58 state and local fusion centers. The results are not generalizable to the universe of fusion centers. Data are not available on the total number of local fusion centers.
Most states and many local governments have established fusion centers to address gaps in information sharing. Fusion centers across the country vary in their stages of development--from operational to early in the planning stages. Officials in 43 of the centers GAO contacted described their centers as operational, and 34 of these centers had opened since January 2004. Law enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of investigation, are the lead or managing agencies in the majority of the operational centers GAO contacted; however, the centers varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies. Nearly all of the operational fusion centers GAO contacted had federal personnel assigned to them. For example, DHS has assigned personnel to 17, and the FBI has assigned personnel to about three quarters of the operational centers GAO contacted. DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address challenges fusion center officials identified. DHS and DOJ have provided many fusion centers access to their information systems, but fusion center officials cited challenges accessing and managing multiple information systems. Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for state and local personnel and set timeliness goals. However, officials cited challenges obtaining and using security clearances. Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers contacted reported facing challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 fusion centers reported challenges with funding, some of which affected these centers' sustainability. The officials said that these issues made it difficult to plan for the future and created concerns about the fusion centers' ability to sustain their capability for the long-term. To support fusion centers, both DHS and the FBI have assigned personnel to the centers. To help address funding issues, DHS has made several changes to address restrictions on the use of federal grants funds. These individual agency efforts help address some of the challenges with personnel and funding. However, the federal government has not clearly articulated the long-term role it expects to play in sustaining fusion centers. It is critical for center management to know whether to expect continued federal resources, such as personnel and grant funding, since the federal government, through the information sharing environment, expects to rely on a nationwide network of centers to facilitate information sharing with state and local governments. Finally, DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken steps to develop guidance and provide technical assistance to fusion centers, for instance, by issuing guidelines for establishing and operating centers. However, officials at 31 of the 58 centers said they had challenges training their personnel, and officials at 11 centers expressed a need for the federal government to establish standards for training fusion center analysts to help ensure that analysts have similar skills. DHS and DOJ have initiated a technical assistance program for fusion centers. They have also developed a set of baseline capabilities, but the document was still in draft as of September and had not been issued.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-35, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2007:
Homeland Security:
Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by
State and Local Information Fusion Centers:
Homeland Security:
GAO-08-35:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-35, a report to congressional committees.
Why GAO Did This Study:
In general, a fusion center is a collaborative effort to detect,
prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.
Recognizing that fusion centers are a mechanism for information
sharing, the federal government”including the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Program
Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), which has
primary responsibility for governmentwide information sharing and is
located in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence”is
taking steps to partner with fusion centers.
In response to your request, GAO examined (1) the status and
characteristics of fusion centers and (2) to what extent federal
efforts help alleviate challenges the centers identified. GAO reviewed
center-related documents and conducted interviews with officials from
DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE, and conducted semistructured interviews with
58 state and local fusion centers. The results are not generalizable to
the universe of fusion centers. Data are not available on the total
number of local fusion centers.
What GAO Found:
Most states and many local governments have established fusion centers
to address gaps in information sharing. Fusion centers across the
country vary in their stages of development”from operational to early
in the planning stages. Officials in 43 of the centers GAO contacted
described their centers as operational, and 34 of these centers had
opened since January 2004. Law enforcement entities, such as state
police or state bureaus of investigation, are the lead or managing
agencies in the majority of the operational centers GAO contacted;
however, the centers varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with
other agencies. Nearly all of the operational fusion centers GAO
contacted had federal personnel assigned to them. For example, DHS has
assigned personnel to 17, and the FBI has assigned personnel to about
three quarters of the operational centers GAO contacted.
DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address
challenges fusion center officials identified. DHS and DOJ have
provided many fusion centers access to their information systems, but
fusion center officials cited challenges accessing and managing
multiple information systems. Both DHS and the FBI have provided
security clearances for state and local personnel and set timeliness
goals. However, officials cited challenges obtaining and using security
clearances. Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers contacted reported
facing challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54
fusion centers reported challenges with funding, some of which affected
these centers‘ sustainability. The officials said that these issues
made it difficult to plan for the future and created concerns about the
fusion centers‘ ability to sustain their capability for the long-term.
To support fusion centers, both DHS and the FBI have assigned personnel
to the centers. To help address funding issues, DHS has made several
changes to address restrictions on the use of federal grants funds.
These individual agency efforts help address some of the challenges
with personnel and funding. However, the federal government has not
clearly articulated the long-term role it expects to play in sustaining
fusion centers. It is critical for center management to know whether to
expect continued federal resources, such as personnel and grant
funding, since the federal government, through the information sharing
environment, expects to rely on a nationwide network of centers to
facilitate information sharing with state and local governments.
Finally, DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken steps to develop guidance
and provide technical assistance to fusion centers, for instance, by
issuing guidelines for establishing and operating centers. However,
officials at 31 of the 58 centers said they had challenges training
their personnel, and officials at 11 centers expressed a need for the
federal government to establish standards for training fusion center
analysts to help ensure that analysts have similar skills. DHS and DOJ
have initiated a technical assistance program for fusion centers. They
have also developed a set of baseline capabilities, but the document
was still in draft as of September and had not been issued.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is recommending that the federal government determine and
articulate its long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to
provide resources to help ensure their sustainability. DHS and PM-ISE
reviewed a report draft and agreed with our recommendation.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://wwww.GAO-08-35].
For more information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 or
larencee@gao.gov.
[End of Section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
State and Local Fusion Centers Vary in Their Stages of Development and
Characteristics:
Federal Agencies' Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help to Address
Some Reported Challenges and Provide Further Assistance:
Conclusions:
Recommendations:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Operational Fusion Centers:
Appendix III: Fusion Centers in the Planning and Early Stages of
Development:
Appendix IV: Summary of State and Local Fusion Centers GAO Contacted:
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Networks and Systems to Which State and Local Fusion Centers
May Have Access:
Table 2: DHS Grant Funds Allocated for Fusion-Related Activities,
Fiscal Year 2004 through 2006:
Table 3: Examples of Technical Assistance Services Provided Jointly by
DHS and DOJ for the Fusion Process:
Table 4: Selected Characteristics of Operational Fusion Centers We
Contacted, as of September 2007:
Table 5: Selected Characteristics of Fusion Centers in the Planning and
Early Stages of Development We Contacted, as of September 2007:
Figures:
Figure 1: Reported Stage of Development for Fusion Centers We
Contacted, as of September 2007:
Figure 2: Number of Fusion Centers Opened, by Year, Since September
2001:
Abbreviations:
ACS: Automated Case Support:
AcTIC: Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center:
AMBER: America's Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response:
ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms:
BJA: Bureau of Justice Assistance:
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
CFC: Commonwealth Fusion Center:
CIAC: Colorado Information Analysis Center:
CPIC: Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center:
CRS: Congressional Research Service:
CTC: Counterterrorism Center:
CTIC: Connecticut Intelligence Center:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DIAC: Delaware Information Analysis Center:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
EPICEl: Paso Intelligence Center:
FAMS: Federal Air Marshal Service:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FBINET: Federal Bureau of Investigation Network:
FDLE: Florida Department of Law Enforcement:
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:
FIG: Field Intelligence Group Fin:
CEN: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network:
FPS: Federal Protective Service:
GISAC: Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center:
HIDTA: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area:
HSDN: Homeland Security Data Network:
HSGP: Homeland Security Grant Program:
HSIN: Homeland Security Information Network:
I&A: Office of Intelligence and Analysis:
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
ICEFISHX: Intelligence Communications Enterprise for Information
Sharing and Exchange:
IDW: Investigative Data Warehouse:
IIFC: Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center:
INTERPOL: International Criminal Police Organization:
ISAAC: Information Sharing and Analysis Center:
ISE: Information Sharing Environment:
ITACG: Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group:
JRIC: Joint Regional Intelligence Center:
JTTF: Joint Terrorism Task Force:
KIFC: Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center:
KSTIC: Kansas Threat Integration Center:
LAPD: Los Angeles Police Department:
La-SAFE: Louisiana State Analysis and Fusion Exchange:
LEO: Law Enforcement Online:
LETPP: Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program:
MATIC: Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center:
MCAC: Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center:
MIOC: Michigan Intelligence and Operations Center:
MN-JAC: Minnesota Joint Analysis Center:
MSAIC: Mississippi Analysis & Information Center:
MWFC: Metropolitan Washington Fusion Center:
NCIC: National Criminal Information Center:
NPD: National Preparedness Directorate:
NDIC: National Drug Intelligence Center:
NFCCG: National Fusion Center Coordination Group:
NLETS: International Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing
Network:
NMASIC: New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center:
NTFC: North Central Texas Fusion Center:
NYPD: New York Police Department:
NYSIC: New York State Intelligence Center:
PaCIC: Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center:
PM-ISE: Program Manager for the ISE:
RISS: Regional Information Sharing System:
RISS ATIX: Regional Information Sharing System Automated Trusted
Information Exchange:
RISSNET: Regional Information Sharing System:
Secure Intranet:
ROIC: Regional Operations Intelligence Center:
RTTAC: Regional Terrorism Threat Analysis Center:
SAIC: Strategic Analysis and Information Center:
SBI: State Bureau of Investigation:
SCIEX: South Carolina Information Exchange:
SCIF: Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility:
SCION: Sensitive Compartmental Information Operational Network:
SEVIS: Student and Exchange Visitor Information System:
SHSP: State Homeland Security Program:
SIPRNet: Secret Internet Protocol Router Network:
STAC: Southeastern Wisconsin Terrorism Alert Center:
STIC: Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center:
STTAC: State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center:
TEW: Terrorism Early Warning:
TITAN: Terrorism Intelligence and Threat Assessment Network:
TLO: Terrorism Liaison Officer:
TRIC: Tennessee Regional Information Center:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
TS/SCI: Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information:
UASI: Urban Areas Security Initiative:
WAJAC: Washington Joint Analytical Center:
WSIC: Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 30, 2007:
Congressional Requesters:
A breakdown in information sharing was a major factor contributing to
the failure to prevent the attacks of September 11, 2001, according to
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(the 9/11 Commission). Since then, most states and some local
governments have, largely on their own initiative, established fusion
centers to address gaps in homeland security, terrorism, and law
enforcement information sharing by the federal government and to
provide a conduit of this information within the state. Indeed,
developing a fusion center was a high priority of state homeland
security directors, according to a 2006 National Governors Association
survey. Although fusion centers vary because they were primarily
established to meet state and local needs, a fusion center is generally
"a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources,
expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing
their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal
and terrorist activity."[Footnote 1] Fusion centers may include a range
of federal, state, and local entities and collect and analyze
information related to homeland security, terrorism, and law
enforcement.
With information-sharing weaknesses recognized as a major contributing
factor to the nation's lack of preparedness for the 9/11 attacks, a
number of information-sharing initiatives were mandated by the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act). The Homeland Security
Act, for example, requires that the President prescribe and implement
procedures under which federal agencies can share relevant and
appropriate homeland security information with other federal agencies
and with appropriate state and local personnel, such as law enforcement
agencies and first responders.[Footnote 2] The President assigned most
responsibilities for executing this requirement to the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security in July 2003. The Intelligence Reform
Act, as amended in August 2007 by the Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act), mandates a more
extensive information-sharing regime that requires the President to
take action to facilitate the sharing of terrorism and homeland
security information by establishing an Information Sharing Environment
(ISE) that is to combine policies, procedures, and technologies that
link people, systems, and information among all appropriate federal,
state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector.[Footnote 3]
This act also requires, among other things, that the President appoint
a program manager to oversee development and implementation of the ISE,
which the President did in April 2005.
Recognizing that state and local fusion centers represent a critical
source of local information about potential threats and a mechanism for
providing terrorism-related information and intelligence from federal
sources, the Program Manager for the ISE (PM-ISE),[Footnote 4] the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) are taking steps to partner with and leverage fusion centers as
part of the overall information sharing environment. The PM-ISE issued
an implementation plan in November 2006 that incorporated
presidentially approved recommendations for federal, state, local, and
private sector information sharing and largely relied on efforts under
way by DHS and DOJ with respect to fusion centers. Recognizing that the
collaboration between fusion centers and with the federal government
marks a tremendous increase in the nation's overall analytic capacity
that can be used to combat terrorism, the plan envisions that the
federal government will work to leverage and promote fusion center
initiatives to facilitate effective nationwide terrorism-related
information sharing, with fusion centers becoming the focal point of
this sharing. Under the plan, DHS and DOJ are to work with states to
designate a primary fusion center to serve as the statewide or regional
hub to interface with the federal government and through which to
coordinate the gathering, processing, analyzing, and disseminating of
terrorism-related information. DHS and DOJ are to assume the
responsibility for technical assistance and training to support the
establishment and operation of the fusion centers. Finally, according
to PM-ISE officials, the plan envisions that in order to receive grant
funding, each designated fusion center must develop a coordinated
approach with any other fusion centers in the state and will eventually
achieve a baseline level of capability and ensure compliance with all
applicable privacy laws and standards. Both DHS and DOJ have
established program offices to oversee their relationships with fusion
centers.
In addition, the 9/11 Commission Act contains several provisions
related to fusion centers.[Footnote 5] For example, the act requires
the Secretary of DHS, in consultation with the Attorney General, the PM-
ISE, and others to establish a state, local, and regional fusion center
initiative within DHS to establish partnerships with state, local, and
regional fusion centers that will, among other things, provide
operational and intelligence advice and assistance, as well as
management assistance, and facilitate close communication and
coordination between fusion centers and DHS. In addition, the
initiative is to provide training to fusion centers and encourage the
centers to participate in terrorism-threat-related exercises conducted
by DHS.
In response to your request to describe state and local fusion centers
and federal efforts underway to support them, this report answers the
following two questions:
* What are the stages of development and characteristics of state and
local fusion centers?
* To what extent do efforts under way by the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ help
to address some of the challenges identified by fusion centers?
To answer these questions, we reviewed relevant directives, plans, and
documents and interviewed officials--including many of those from the
PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ--who are involved with those entities' efforts to
support fusion centers. In addition, we spoke with officials from 11
organizations conducting research on state and local information
sharing, including officials at the Congressional Research Service
(CRS) who released a report in July 2007 on fusion centers.[Footnote 6]
We also conducted semistructured telephone interviews with the director
(or his or her designee) of every state fusion center, the District of
Columbia fusion center, and eight local fusion centers to obtain
information about the centers' characteristics, challenges encountered,
and support received from DHS and DOJ.[Footnote 7] Our selection
criteria for the local fusion centers included their relationships with
the state fusion center, stage of development, and geographic
diversity. Where a fusion center was in the planning stages, we spoke
with officials involved in the planning and establishment of the
center, such as directors of homeland security offices. From February
through May 2007, we spoke with officials from all 50 states, the
District of Columbia, and 8 local jurisdictions. While we did contact
officials in all state fusion centers, we did not contact officials in
all local fusion centers; therefore our results are not generalizable
to the universe of fusion centers. Data were not available to determine
the total number of local fusion centers.
To describe the challenges fusion centers encountered in establishing
and operating, we asked officials during our semistructured telephone
interviews whether they encountered challenges in 10 different
categories and, if so, the extent to which the category was a challenge
both at establishment and, for operational centers, in day-to-day
operations. These categories included federal partnerships, personnel,
guidance, training, funding, access to information, and security
clearances. Fusion center officials provided open-ended, descriptive
responses of challenges faced by their centers. On the basis of a
content analysis of fusion center officials' responses, we identified,
categorized, and counted similar challenges. Fusion center officials
may not have indicated that they encountered all the challenges
discussed in the report. In addition, individual fusion center
officials may have identified multiple challenges in a given category,
for example funding.
We also obtained and summarized descriptive information from the fusion
centers including structure, organization, personnel, and information
technology systems used. Finally, to obtain detailed information about
centers' operations and challenges encountered, we conducted site
visits to fusion centers in Atlanta, Georgia; Phoenix, Arizona;
Richmond, Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; West Trenton, New Jersey; and
New York, New York. Our selection criteria for these centers included
their stage of development, extent of federal partnerships, and
geographic representation. Appendix I provides further details on our
objectives, scope, and methodology. We performed our work from August
2006 through September 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
Results in Brief:
Established by state and local governments generally to improve
information sharing and to prevent terrorism or other threats, fusion
centers across the country are in varying stages of development--from
operational to early in the planning stages. Officials in 43 of the 58
fusion centers we contacted described their centers as operational as
of September 2007.[Footnote 8] Thirty-four of the operational centers
are relatively new, having been opened since January 2004, while 9
centers opened within the couple of years after the attacks of
September 11. The majority had missions and scopes of operations that
included more than just counterterrorism-related activities, such as
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating criminal as well as terrorism-
related information. Adopting a broader focus helped provide
information about all threats and, in the opinion of some fusion center
officials, increased the center's sustainability, for instance, by
including additional stakeholders. Law enforcement entities, such as
state police or state bureaus of investigation, are the lead or
managing agencies in the majority of the operational centers we
contacted. However, the centers varied in their staff sizes and
partnerships with other agencies. At least 34 of the 43 operational
fusion centers we contacted had federal personnel assigned to them. For
example, officials in 17 of the operational centers we contacted
reported that they had DHS intelligence officers, and officials in
about three quarters of the operational centers told us that they had
FBI special agents or intelligence analysts assigned to their centers.
Many fusion centers reported having access to DHS's and DOJ's
unclassified networks or systems, such as 40 with access to the
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and 39 with access to Law
Enforcement Online (LEO).[Footnote 9] In addition, 16 of the 43 centers
said they had or were in the process of obtaining access to DHS's
classified network, and 23 reported they had or were in the process of
obtaining access to the FBI's classified systems. Products disseminated
and services provided also vary. For instance, some centers provide
investigative support for law enforcement officers.
DHS and DOJ, recognizing the importance of fusion centers in
information sharing, have efforts under way that begin to address
challenges fusion center officials identified in establishing and
operating their centers, such as accessing information, obtaining
security clearances, obtaining and retaining personnel, obtaining
funding, and finding sufficient guidance and training.
* As we have highlighted, DHS and DOJ have provided many fusion centers
access to their information systems, but fusion center officials cited
challenges accessing and managing multiple information systems. For
example, officials at 31 of the 58 centers we contacted reported
challenges obtaining access to federal information systems or networks.
DHS and the FBI have taken some steps to address this challenge, such
as assisting with needed system security requirements that are a
prerequisite to obtaining access. Officials at 30 of the fusion centers
also found the multiple systems or heavy volume of often redundant
information a challenge to manage. Officials from the PM-ISE's office
said they are collaborating with agencies, including DHS and DOJ, on an
effort to review existing federal information systems and users' needs
to determine opportunities to streamline system access. However, it is
too early to tell whether these efforts will address the challenges
reported by fusion centers.
* Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for state and
local personnel and have set goals to reduce the length of time it
takes to obtain a clearance. DHS and the FBI have also provided centers
with information about the security clearance process and time frames
in an effort to clarify the time needed to process requests. However,
obtaining and using security clearances represented a challenge for 44
of the 58 fusion centers we contacted. For instance, officials at 32 of
the centers cited difficulties with the length of time it takes to
receive a security clearance from DHS or the FBI. Further, while law
and executive order provide that a security clearance granted by one
federal agency should generally be accepted by other agencies,[Footnote
10] officials in 19 of the centers encountered difficulties with
federal agencies, particularly DHS and the FBI, accepting each others'
clearances. DHS and DOJ officials said that they were not aware of
fusion centers encountering recent challenges with reciprocity of
security clearances. However, they said that there were complications
in the clearance process, for example, multiple federal agencies carry
out their own processes without central coordination.
* Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted reported facing
challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 fusion
centers reported challenges with obtaining and maintaining funding when
establishing and operating their centers, challenges which some of
these officials also said affected their centers' sustainability. For
example, officials in 37 centers said they encountered challenges with
federal, state, and local agencies not being able to detail personnel
to their fusion center, particularly in the face of resource
constraints. Fusion centers rely on such details as a means of staffing
the centers and enhancing information sharing with other state and
local agencies. To support fusion centers, as of September 2007, DHS
had assigned intelligence officers to 17 of the operational fusion
centers we contacted, and the FBI had assigned personnel to about three
quarters of the fusion centers we contacted. In terms of funding,
officials in 35 of the 58 centers encountered challenges with the
complexity of the federal grant process or uncertain or declining
federal funding, and officials from 28 of the 58 centers reported
having difficulty obtaining state or local funding. They said that
these issues created confusion for their centers over the steps needed
to secure federal funds, made it difficult to plan for the future, and
created concerns about the fusion centers' abilities to sustain their
capabilities for the long-term. Additionally, fusion center officials
identified challenges with restrictions on the use of federal grant
funds, and DHS has made several changes to help address these
challenges by taking steps to ease the grant process and by adjusting
some of the restrictions on the timing and use of grant funds. While
these funds are helpful, fusion center officials were concerned about
the extent of federal support they could expect over the long term. The
federal government, through the ISE, has stated that it expects to rely
on a nationwide network of fusion centers as the cornerstone of
information sharing with state and local governments, but ISE plans or
guidance to date do not articulate the long-term role the federal
government expects to play in sustaining these centers, especially in
relation to the role of their state or local jurisdictions. It is
critical for center management to know whether to expect continued
federal resources--such as grant funds, facility support, personnel,
and information systems--over the long term. While the federal
government generally cannot commit future resources, articulating the
extent to which it plans to help support these centers in the long term
is important for fusion center management in its planning efforts and
for sustaining the network.
* DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken steps to develop guidance and
provide technical assistance to fusion centers to address their
challenges in the areas of guidance and training. For instance, in
August 2006, DHS and DOJ issued jointly developed Fusion Center
Guidelines that outline 18 recommended elements for establishing and
operating fusion centers--for example, ensuring appropriate security
measures are in place for facility, data, and personnel. Officials in
48 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted said that they found the
Guidelines generally good or useful, although officials at 19 fusion
centers said they lacked guidance on specific policies and procedures
on information sharing or lacked national standards and guidelines on
training or qualifications for analysts. Furthermore, officials at 31
of the fusion centers we contacted said they had challenges training
their personnel, and officials at 11 centers expressed a need for the
federal government to establish standards for training fusion center
analysts to help ensure that analysts have similar skills. DHS and DOJ
have initiated a technical assistance service program for fusion
centers and, along with the PM-ISE, sponsored regional and national
conferences and are developing a baseline capabilities document to
provide more specific guidelines for fusion centers. However, as of
September 2007, the baseline capabilities document was still in draft
form and had not been issued.
To help address concerns about sustaining centers, we are recommending
that the federal government determine and articulate its long-term
fusion center role and whether it expects to provide resources to
centers to help ensure their sustainability as part of the nationwide
network of fusion centers.
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security, the Acting Attorney General, and
the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment or their
designees. In commenting on drafts of the report, DHS and the PM-ISE
agreed with our recommendation, and DOJ had no comments on the draft.
Further, DHS commented that it, along with its federal partners, is
reviewing strategies to sustain fusion centers as part of the work plan
of the National Fusion Center Coordination Group. This group plans to
present these strategies to the federal departments before the end of
the year.
Background:
DHS's Role in Fusion Centers:
As part of its mission and in accordance with the Homeland Security
Act, DHS has responsibility for coordinating efforts to share homeland
security information across all levels of government, including
federal, state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector.
Specifically with respect to fusion centers, DHS envisions creating
partnerships with state and local centers to improve information flow
between DHS and the centers and to improve their effectiveness as a
whole. As such, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) was
designated in June 2006 by the Secretary as the executive agent to
manage a program to accomplish DHS's state and local fusion center
mission. The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis approved
the establishment of the State and Local Program Office (SLPO) under
the direction of a Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary to implement
this mission. Specifically, the office is responsible for deploying DHS
personnel with operational and intelligence skills to state and local
fusion centers to facilitate coordination and the flow of information
between DHS and the center, provide expertise in intelligence analysis
and reporting, coordinate with local DHS and FBI components, and
provide DHS with local situational awareness and access to fusion
center information. As part of this effort, DHS is conducting needs
assessments at fusion centers to review their status and determine what
resources, such as personnel, system access, and security, are needed.
As of September 2007, DHS had conducted 25 fusion center needs
assessments. The SLPO also coordinates the granting of DHS security
clearances for personnel located in fusion centers and the deployment
of DHS classified and unclassified systems for use in the fusion
center.
The Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) awards funds to states,
territories, and urban areas to enhance their ability to prepare for,
prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks and other major disasters.
HSGP consists of five separate programs, three of which can be used by
states and local jurisdictions, at their discretion, for fusion center-
related funding. The State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) supports
the implementation of the State Homeland Security Strategies to address
the identified planning, equipment, training, and exercise needs for
preventing acts of terrorism. The Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention
Program (LETPP) provides resources to law enforcement and public safety
communities to support critical terrorism prevention activities. Each
state receives a minimum allocation under SHSP and LETPP and additional
funds are allocated based on the analyses of risk and anticipated
effectiveness. The Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program
addresses the unique planning, equipment, training, and exercise needs
of high-threat, high-density urban areas and assists them in building
an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, protect against,
respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. UASI funds are
allocated on the basis of risk and anticipated effectiveness to about
45 candidate areas. The fiscal year 2007 HSGP grant guidance specified
the establishment and enhancement of state and local fusion centers as
a prevention priority, making them a priority for LETPP. DHS's Federal
Emergency Management Agency National Preparedness Directorate (FEMA/
NPD) manages the grant process and allocates these funds to state and
local entities.[Footnote 11]
FBI's Role in Fusion Centers:
The FBI serves as the primary investigative unit of DOJ, and its
mission includes investigating serious federal crimes, protecting the
nation from terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, and assisting
federal, state, and municipal law enforcement agencies. Following the
attacks on September 11, 2001, the FBI shifted its primary mission to
focus on counterterrorism; that is, detecting and preventing future
attacks. The FBI primarily conducts its counterterrorism investigations
through its Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), which are multi-agency
task forces that generally contain state and local officials. As of
September 2007, there were JTTFs in 101 locations, including one in
each of the FBI's 56 field offices. Since 2003, each of the 56 field
offices has also established a Field Intelligence Group (FIG) to serve
as the centralized intelligence component responsible for the
management, execution, and coordination of intelligence functions.
Recognizing that fusion centers are becoming focal points for the
sharing of homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement
information among federal, state, and local governments, the FBI has
directed that its field offices, through their FIGs, become involved in
the fusion centers in order to enhance the FBI's ability to accomplish
its mission and "stay ahead of the threat." In June 2006, the FBI's
National Security Branch directed each field office to assess its own
information sharing environment and, when appropriate, detail a FIG
special agent and intelligence analyst to the leading fusion center
within its territory. The FBI's Directorate of Intelligence established
an Interagency Integration Unit in January 2007 to provide headquarters
oversight of FBI field offices' relationships with fusion centers.
While the FBI's role in and support of individual fusion centers varies
depending on the interaction between the particular center and the FBI
field office, FBI efforts to support centers include assigning FBI
special agents and intelligence analysts to fusion centers, providing
office space or rent for fusion center facilities, providing security
clearances, conducting security certification of facilities, and
providing direct or facilitated access to the FBI. FBI personnel
assigned to fusion centers are to provide an effective two-way flow of
information between the fusion center and the FBI; participate as an
investigative or analytical partner uncovering, understanding,
reporting, and responding to threats; and ensure the timely flow of
information between the fusion center and the local JTTF and FIG.
Role of the Program Manager of the Information Sharing Environment in
Fusion Centers:
Established under the Intelligence Reform Act, the PM-ISE is charged
with developing and overseeing implementation of the ISE, which
consists of the policies, processes, and technologies that enable the
sharing of terrorism information among local, state, tribal, federal,
and private sector entities as well as foreign partners, and, as such,
released an ISE Implementation Plan in November 2006. Recognizing that
the collaboration between fusion centers and with the federal
government marks a tremendous increase in the nation's overall analytic
capacity that can be used to combat terrorism, the plan--integrating
presidentially approved recommendations for federal, state, local, and
private sector terrorism-related information sharing--calls for the
federal government to promote the establishment of a nationwide
integrated network of state and local fusion centers to facilitate
effective terrorism information sharing. The plan outlines several
actions on the part of the federal government, largely through DHS and
DOJ, to support fusion centers, including providing technical
assistance and training to support the establishment and operation of
centers.
In addition, the PM-ISE has established a National Fusion Center
Coordination Group (NFCCG), led by DHS and DOJ, to identify federal
resources to support the development of a national, integrated network
of fusion centers. The NFCCG is to ensure that designated fusion
centers achieve a baseline level of capability and comply with all
applicable federal laws and policies regarding the protection of
information and privacy and other legal rights of individuals. The
NFCCG also is to ensure coordination between federal entities
interacting with these fusion centers and has been tasked to develop
recommendations regarding funding options relating to their
establishment. However, to date, the efforts of the NFCCG have not
included delineating whether such assistance is for the short-term
establishment or long-term sustainability of fusion centers. In
addition, the PM-ISE, in consultation with the Information Sharing
Council--the forum for top information sharing officials from
departments and agencies with activities that may include terrorism-
related information--has also established a Senior-Level Interagency
Advisory Group that oversees the NFCCG as part of its overall
responsibility to monitor and ensure the implementation of the ISE.
DHS's and DOJ's Networks and Systems for Sharing Information That
Fusion Centers May Access:
We reported in April 2007 that DHS and DOJ have 17 major networks and 4
system applications that they use to support their homeland security
missions, including sharing information with state and local entities
such as fusion centers.[Footnote 12] In addition, state and local
governments have similar information technology initiatives to carry
out their homeland security missions. Table 1 provides information on
the primary networks and systems used by fusion centers.
Table 1: Networks and Systems to Which State and Local Fusion Centers
May Have Access:
System or network: Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN);
Owner: DHS;
Sensitivity level: Sensitive but unclassified;
Brief summary of selected functions:
* Serves as DHS's primary nationwide information- sharing tool for
transporting sensitive but unclassified information;
* Composed of over 35 communities of interest such as emergency
management, law enforcement, counterterrorism, individual states, and
private sector communities. Each community of interest has Web pages
that are tailored for the community and contain general and community-
specific news articles, links, and contact information;
Types of information shared:
* DHS' primary system for sharing terrorism and related information;
* Supplies suspicious incident and pre-incident information, 24x7
situational awareness, and analyses of terrorist threats, tactics, and
weapons.
System or network: Federal Protective Service (FPS) Secure Portal
System;
Owner: DHS;
Sensitivity level: Sensitive but unclassified;
Brief summary of selected functions:
* Supports secure communications and collaboration across the law
enforcement community;
Types of information shared:
* Manages information to help ensure the safety and security of federal
buildings, protection officers, and visitors.
System or network: Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN);
Owner: DHS;
Sensitivity level: Secret;
Brief summary of selected functions:
* Secret-level classified communications network system with which
government agencies are able to share information and collaborate in
order to detect, deter, and mitigate threats to the homeland at the
Secret level;
* Provides state and local governments with their own area to post and
manage collateral-level information for access by their federal law
enforcement and intelligence community partners;
Types of information shared:
* Transmits homeland security data in support of activities including
intelligence, investigations, and inspections that are classified at
the Secret level.
System or network: Federal Bureau of Investigation Network (FBINET);
Owner: FBI;
Sensitivity level: Secret;
Brief summary of selected functions:
* Serves as a global area network used for communicating Secret
information;
* Operated, maintained, and access controlled by the FBI;
Types of information shared:
* Communicates Secret information, including investigative case files
and intelligence pertaining to national security.
System or network: Law Enforcement Online (LEO);
Owner: DOJ;
Sensitivity level: Sensitive but unclassified;
Brief summary of selected functions:
* Serves as a real-time on-line controlled-access communications and
information-sharing data repository;
* Supports an Internet-accessible focal point for electronic sensitive
but unclassified communication and information sharing with federal,
state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies;
Types of information shared:
* Contains information about, among other things, antiterrorism,
intelligence, law enforcement, and criminal justice.
System or network: Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Secure
Intranet (RISSNET);
Owner: State and local officials of the RISS program[A] with funding
through a DOJ grant;
Sensitivity level: Sensitive but unclassified;
Brief summary of selected functions:
* Serves as a secure network for law enforcement agencies throughout
the United States and other countries;
* Offers services such as secure e- mail, document libraries,
intelligence databases, bulletin boards, a chat tool, and Web pages
that contain general and community-specific news articles, links, and
contact information;
Types of information shared:
* Provides a secure criminal intelligence network for communications
and information sharing by local, state, tribal, and federal law
enforcement agencies;
* Beyond its collaboration tools, also provides users with access to
other law enforcement resources such as analytical criminal data-
visualization tools and criminal intelligence databases.
System or network: Regional Information Sharing Systems Automated
Trusted Information Exchange (RISS ATIX);
Owner: State and local officials of the RISS program with funding
through a DOJ grant;
Sensitivity level: Sensitive but unclassified;
Brief summary of selected functions:
* Offers services similar to RISSNET to agencies beyond the law
enforcement community, including executives and officials from
governmental and nongovernmental agencies and organizations that have
public safety responsibilities;
* Partitioned into 39 communities of interest such as critical
infrastructure, emergency management, public health, and government
officials. Services offered through its Web pages are tailored for each
community of interest and contain community-specific news articles,
links, and contact information;
Types of information shared:
* Users can post timely threat information, documents, images, and
information related to terrorism and homeland security, as well as
receive DHS information, advisories, and warnings.
Source: GAO-07-455 and GAO analysis of DHS and DOJ information.
[A] Operated and managed by state and local officials, RISS was
established in 1974 as a nationwide initiative to share criminal
intelligence among stakeholders in law enforcement, first responders,
and the private sector and to coordinate efforts against crime that
operate across jurisdictional lines. The program consists of six
regional information analysis centers that offer services to RISS
members in their regions, including information sharing and research,
analytical products, case investigation support, funding, equipment
loans, and training.
[End of table]
State and Local Fusion Centers Vary in Their Stages of Development and
Characteristics:
Established by state and local governments to improve information
sharing among federal, state, and local entities and to prevent
terrorism or other threats, fusion centers across the country vary in
their stages of development--from operational to early in the planning
stages. Those centers that are operational vary in many of their
characteristics, but generally have missions that are broader than
counterterrorism, have multiple agencies represented--including federal
partners--in their centers, and have access to a number of networks and
systems that provide homeland security and law enforcement-related
information.
Fusion Centers Have Been Established in Most States:
Since September 2001, almost all states and several local governments
have established or are in the process of establishing a fusion center.
Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted described their
centers as operational as of September 2007. Specifically, officials in
35 states, the District of Columbia, and 7 local jurisdictions we
contacted described their fusion center as operational, officials in 14
states and 1 local jurisdiction considered their centers to be in the
planning or early stages of development, and 1 state did not have or
plan to have a fusion center, as shown in figure 1. In 6 states we
contacted, there was more than one fusion center established.
Figure 1: Reported Stage of Development for Fusion Centers We
Contacted, as of September 2007:
This figure is an illustration showing reported stage of development
for fusion centers contacted, as of September 2007:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of Information provided by fusion center
officials; Map, Map Resources.
[End of figure]
Officials cited a variety of reasons why their state or local
jurisdiction established a fusion center. To improve information
sharing--related to homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement-
-among federal, state, and local entities and to prevent terrorism or
threats after the attacks of September 11 were the most frequently
cited reasons. For example, officials in one state said that their
state was "mentioned 59 times in the 9/11 Commission Report, the
majority of which were not complimentary," and as a result established
a 24-hour-per-day and 7-day-per-week intelligence and information
analysis center to serve as the central hub to facilitate the
collection, analysis, and dissemination of crime and terrorism-related
information. Several officials cited the need to enhance information
sharing within their own jurisdictions across disciplines and levels of
government as the reason why their jurisdiction established a center.
While most officials from fusion centers that were in the planning or
early stages of development stated that they were establishing a fusion
center in general to enhance information sharing or protect against
future threats, officials in a few centers also noted that their
jurisdictions were discussing or establishing fusion centers because of
available DHS grant funding or their perception that DHS was requiring
states to establish a center. Appendixes II and III provide basic
information about operational fusion centers and fusion centers in the
planning and early stages of development, respectively. Appendix IV
provides a state-by-state summary of state and local areas' efforts to
establish and operate fusion centers.
Operational Fusion Centers and Their Characteristics:
Officials in operational fusion centers provided varying explanations
for their centers' stage of development. Officials in 16 of the 43
operational fusion centers said that their fusion centers were at an
"intermediate" stage of development, that is, the centers had limited
operations and functionality. For instance, several of these officials
said that while they had many operational components (such as policies
and procedures, analytical personnel, or technical access to systems
and networks) in place, at least one of these components was still in
the process of being developed or finalized. For example, officials in
one fusion center said that its analysts have completed training and
are producing products, but the center is still in the final stages of
reconstructing its facility and establishing access to systems and
networks. Officials in 21of the 43 operational fusion centers
considered their fusion centers to be "developed," that is, fully
operational and fully functional. For example, an official in one
center said that the fusion center has analysts from DHS, FBI, and
state and local entities; operates at the Top Secret level; and has a
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF).[Footnote 13]
Additionally, several officials also stated that even though their
centers were developed, the centers would continue to expand and
evolve. Officials in the remaining six fusion centers considered their
centers to have more than limited operations and functionality but not
yet be fully operational. For example, one official said that the
center would like to develop its strategic component, for example
related to risk assessments. Another official stated that his center
would like to expand its operations but does not have enough personnel.
Thirty-four of the operational centers are relatively new, having been
opened since January 2004, while 9 centers opened in the couple of
years after September 11, as shown in figure 2.
Figure 2: Number of Fusion Centers Opened, by Year, Since September
2001:
This figure is a bar chart showing number of fusion centers opened, by
year, since September 2001. The X axis is the number of operational
fusion centers, and the Y axis is the year opened:
Year opened: 2001;
Number of operational fusion centers: 2.
Year opened: 2002;
Number of operational fusion centers: 1.
Year opened: 2003;
Number of operational fusion centers: 6.
Year opened: 2004;
Number of operational fusion centers: 7.
Year opened: 2005;
Number of operational fusion centers: 12.
Year opened: 2006;
Number of operational fusion centers: 10.
Year opened: 2007;
Number of operational fusion centers: 5.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis, information from fusion centers.
[End of figure]
Consistent with the purpose of a fusion center, as defined by the
Fusion Center Guidelines, officials in 41 of the 43 operational centers
we contacted said that their centers' scopes of operations were broader
than solely focusing on counterterrorism. For example, officials in 22
of the 43 operational centers described their centers' scopes of
operations as all crimes or all crimes and counterterrorism, and
officials in 19 operational centers said that their scopes of
operations included all hazards. There were subtle distinctions in
officials' descriptions of an all-crimes scope; however, they generally
either said that their center focused on all "serious" crimes, such as
violent crimes or felonies, or specified that the center focused on
those crimes that may be linked to terrorist activity. Officials who
described their centers as including an all-hazards focus provided
different explanations of this scope, including colocation with the
state's emergency operations center or partnerships with emergency
management organizations or first responders. One official referred to
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita as reasons why the center had an all-
hazards scope of operation.
Officials provided two primary explanations for why their fusion
centers have adopted a broader focus than counterterrorism. The first
explanation was because of the nexus, or link, of many crimes to
terrorist-related activity. For example, officials at one fusion center
said that they have an all-crimes focus because terrorism can be funded
through a number of criminal acts, such as drugs, while another said
that collecting information on all crimes often leads to terrorist or
threat information because typically if there is terrorist-related
activity there are other crimes involved as well. The second reason why
officials said that their fusion centers had a broader focus than
counterterrorism was in order to include additional stakeholders or to
provide a sustainable service. For example, one official said that
because the state is rural with only two metropolitan areas and many
small communities, the center needed to have a broader focus than
terrorism to obtain participation from local law enforcement. Officials
in another center said that their center opened in the months after
September 2001, so it focused on homeland security and terrorism, but
since then has evolved to include an all-hazards focus as it has
established partnerships with agencies outside of law enforcement. An
official in another center said that while counterterrorism is the
primary mission of the center, in the past year the center has included
an all-crimes element since on average the center only receives three
terrorism-related tips a day, and as a result, it is difficult to
convince agencies to detail a staff person to the center for this
mission alone.
The majority of the operational fusion centers we contacted were
primarily led by law enforcement entities, such as state police or
state bureaus of investigation. Some of these centers were established
as partnerships between state or local law enforcement entities and the
FBI, and others were established as partnerships with the state
homeland security offices. While all of the operational fusion centers
we contacted had more than one agency represented in the centers, the
staff size and agencies represented varied. For example, three centers
we contacted had fewer than five people on their staff representing
fewer than five agencies. Whereas, 2 of the centers we contacted had
over 80 people staffed to the center, representing about 20 agencies.
In its fusion center report, CRS determined that the average number of
full-time staff at about 27 persons.[Footnote 14] In addition to law
enforcement agencies, such as state police or highway patrol, county
sheriffs, and city police departments, 29 of the 43 operational centers
we contacted had personnel assigned to their centers from the state's
National Guard,[Footnote 15] and some centers' also included emergency
management, fire, corrections, or transportation partners.
At least 34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we contacted had
federal personnel assigned to their centers. Officials in about three
quarters of the centers we contacted reported that the FBI has assigned
personnel, including intelligence analysts and special agents, to their
centers. Most had one or two full-time intelligence analysts or special
agents at their center. Additionally, 12 of the 43 operational centers
we contacted were colocated in an FBI field office or with an FBI task
force, such as a JTTF or a FIG, allowing the center's personnel access
to FBI systems and networks. Also, officials in 17 of the 43
operational centers reported that DHS's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis had assigned intelligence officers to their centers. These
officers are assigned to fusion centers on a full-time basis and are
responsible for, among other things, facilitating the flow of
information between the center and DHS, providing expertise in
intelligence analysis and reporting, and providing DHS with local
situational information and access. Finally, officials in 19 of the 43
operational centers reported that they had other DHS and DOJ components
represented in their centers including personnel from U.S. Customs and
Border Protection; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE);
United States Secret Service; United States Coast Guard; Transportation
Security Administration; United States Attorneys Office; Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA);
or the United States Marshals Service.
As we have previously highlighted, operational fusion centers we
contacted reported having access to a variety of networks and systems
for collecting homeland security, terrorism-related, and law
enforcement information. For example, as of September 2007, 40 and 39
of the 43 operational fusion centers we contacted told us they had
access to DHS's and FBI's unclassified networks, such as HSIN and LEO,
respectively. Further, about half of the operational centers also said
that they had access to one of the RISS networks. In addition, 16 of
the 43 operational centers we contacted reported that they had access
or had plans to obtain access to HSDN, and 23 indicated that they had
access or were in the process of obtaining access to FBINet or FBI's
other classified networks. Further, 3 centers also reported having
access to FBI's Top Secret network.[Footnote 16] Additionally, several
operational fusion centers reported having access to other classified
and unclassified federal systems and networks providing defense,
financial, drug, and immigration-related information, including the
Department of Defense's Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
(SIPRNet),[Footnote 17] Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(FinCEN),[Footnote 18] El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC),[Footnote 19]
and the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
(SEVIS).[Footnote 20]
Thus far, products disseminated and services provided also vary. Fusion
centers reported issuing a variety of products, such as daily and
weekly bulletins on general criminal or intelligence information and
intelligence assessments that, in general, provide in-depth reporting
on an emerging threat, group, or crime. For example, one center's
weekly bulletin contained sections on domestic and international
terrorism, cold case investigations, missing persons, officer safety,
and items of interest to law enforcement.
Some centers provide investigative support for law enforcement
officers. For example, one fusion center reported that it provided
response within 20 minutes to requests for information from law
enforcement officers who were conducting traffic stops or responding to
major crime scenes. Further, several of the centers in our review were
organized into two sections--an operational section that manages and
processes the information flowing into the center and an analytical
section responsible for analyzing the information and disseminating
products.
Fusion Centers in the Planning and Early Stages of Development and
Their Characteristics:
Officials in 7 states and one local jurisdiction said that their fusion
centers were in the early stages of development and officials in 7
states said that they were in the planning stage. For example, one
official said that the center is developing memorandums of
understanding for agency representation at and support of the center,
working to get the center's secure space certified, and placing
equipment and furniture. Officials from another state said that they
had appointed an officer-in-charge and are in the process of acquiring
additional staff members but had not acquired access to federal
networks and systems. Officials in 6 of the 15 centers said that their
centers had already opened or were expected to open by the end of 2007.
Efforts to establish a fusion center are being led by homeland security
offices, law enforcement entities, and in some states, by a partnership
of two or more state agencies. As with operational centers, these
centers planned to include all crimes and all hazards scopes of
operations. While most of these centers were being newly established, a
few were in the process of transitioning from existing law enforcement
intelligence units or criminal intelligence centers. For example, an
official in one center said the fusion center is in the planning stages
and is transitioning from an intelligence center, which was established
prior to the 2002 Winter Olympics. One state, Wyoming, was planning to
partner with an adjacent state instead of building a physical fusion
center.
Federal Agencies' Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help to Address
Some Reported Challenges and Provide Further Assistance:
In light of the importance of fusion centers in facilitating
information sharing among levels of government, DHS and DOJ have
several efforts under way that begin to address challenges that fusion
center officials identified in establishing and operating their
centers.[Footnote 21] DHS and DOJ have made efforts to provide fusion
centers access to federal information systems, but some fusion center
officials cited challenges accessing relevant, actionable information
and managing multiple information systems. As a result, these center
officials said that their ability to receive and share information with
those who need it may be limited. Additionally, both DHS and the FBI
have provided clearances to state and local officials, but some fusion
center officials told us they had encountered challenges obtaining and
using security clearances, which interfered with their ability to
obtain classified information. Further, notwithstanding DHS and FBI
efforts to deploy personnel to fusion centers and DHS's grant funding
to support their establishment and enhancement, fusion center officials
noted challenges obtaining personnel and ensuring sufficient funding to
sustain the centers. Finally, DHS and DOJ have taken steps to develop
guidance and provide technical assistance and training, but fusion
center officials cited the need for clearer and more specific guidance
in a variety of areas to help address operational challenges.
DHS, FBI, and the PM-ISE Have Some Actions Under Way to Address
Challenges Some Fusion Center Officials Cited with Accessing and
Managing Multiple Information Systems:
As described earlier, DHS and FBI have provided access to their primary
unclassified systems (HSIN and LEO) to many of the 43 operational
fusion centers we contacted. Further, DHS and DOJ have outlined plans
to provide access to their primary classified networks, HSDN and
FBINET, to state and local fusion centers that have federal personnel
at the center. However, officials in 31 of the 58 fusion centers we
contacted told us that they had difficulty obtaining access to federal
information networks or systems. For example, officials in some centers
cited challenges with DHS and FBI not providing fusion center personnel
with direct access to their classified systems. In these centers,
fusion center personnel must rely on federal personnel who are assigned
to the center or other state personnel assigned to FBI task forces to
access these systems, obtain the relevant information and share it with
them. Further, officials in 12 of 58 fusion centers reported challenges
meeting system security requirements or establishing technical
capabilities necessary to access information systems. For example,
officials cited challenges with the cost and logistics of setting up a
secure room or installing the requisite hardware to access the
information systems.
DHS and FBI have taken steps to address these logistical challenges to
providing access to classified systems. For example, as part of its
needs assessment process, DHS reviews the fusion centers' security
status and assesses its adequacy in light of DHS's intention to assign
personnel and information systems in the center. The FBI has provided
fusion centers access to classified systems through JTTF members and
has colocated with some fusion centers in FBI space. Finally, several
FBI field offices have coordinated with fusion centers to rent or build
and certify facilities or secure rooms for those centers located
outside of FBI-controlled space. For example according to FBI field
offices, it is paying estimated costs of about $40,000 and $50,000
respectively to provide secure facilities in two fusion centers.
While officials in many fusion centers cited challenges obtaining
access to systems, primarily classified systems, officials in 30 of the
58 fusion centers we contacted told us that the high volume of
information or the existence of multiple systems with often redundant
information was challenging to manage. More specifically, officials in
18 fusion centers said that they had difficulty with what they
perceived to be the high volume of information their center receives,
variously describing the flow of information as "overwhelming,"
"information overload," and "excessive." For example, officials said
that center personnel must sort through the large amount of
information, much of which is not relevant to the center, to find
information that is useful or important to them. Additionally,
officials in 18 fusion centers found the lack of integration among
these multiple, competing, or duplicative information systems
challenging, or said that they wanted a single mechanism or system
through which to receive or send information. Finally, officials in 11
centers said that the redundancy of information from these multiple
sources posed a challenge. For instance, an official said that the
center receives volumes of information that contain redundancies from
DHS and the FBI. CRS also reported that one of the most consistent and
constant issues raised by fusion center officials relates to the
plethora of competing federal information-sharing systems, including,
but not limited to, DHS and DOJ systems such as HSIN, HSDN, LEO, and
RISS.[Footnote 22]
DHS/DOJ's current joint guidance on operating fusion centers--the
Fusion Center Guidelines--does not delineate the primary systems to
which fusion centers should have access or provide guidance to centers
about how to manage multiple systems with potentially redundant
information. For example, the guidance recommends that fusion centers
obtain access to a variety of databases and systems and provides a list
of 17 available system and network resources that provide homeland
security, terrorism-related, or law enforcement information, including
the LEO, RISS, and HSIN, but do not identify which of the 17 available
systems are critical to sharing information with federal counterparts.
In addition, we have previously reported on the redundancies and lack
of coordination among DHS's HSIN and other systems. For example, we
found in April 2007 that in developing HSIN, DHS did not work with the
two key state and local initiatives comprising major portions of the
RISS program, thereby putting itself at risk that HSIN duplicated state
and local capabilities.[Footnote 23] In that report, we recommended
that DHS identify existing and planned information-sharing initiatives
and assess whether there are opportunities for DHS to avoid duplication
of effort. In response, DHS initiated efforts to accomplish this goal-
-such as creating a bridge between the RISS and HSIN systems to allow
reports to flow back and forth between these two systems--though it is
currently too early to determine the effect of these efforts.
The PM-ISE also reported that in consultation with the Information
Sharing Council, it has been coordinating the efforts of a working
group intended to address the issue of duplicative or redundant
information systems that handle sensitive but unclassified
information.[Footnote 24] Officials from the PM-ISE stated that this
group has completed a review of the most commonly used systems, such as
LEO, RISS, and HSIN. According to the officials, the review included an
examination of the services provided by the systems and the needs of
the systems' users to identify any potential areas to streamline system
access. The review is in accordance with recommendations that fusion
centers made during the National Fusion Center Conference in March
2007.[Footnote 25] Specifically, fusion centers recommended the federal
government explore using a single sign-on or search capability, which
would facilitate accessing multiple systems. Further, in our
interviews, officials in 23 of the 58 fusion centers said that DHS and
DOJ, to facilitate the implementation of a national network of fusion
centers, should streamline existing systems or develop a unified
platform or mechanism for information sharing with fusion centers. In
addition, PM-ISE officials said that they, along with DHS and DOJ and
other federal agencies, were taking steps to improve the quality and
flow of information through the development of an Interagency Threat
Assessment Coordination Group (ITACG). As part of the National
Counterterrorism Center,[Footnote 26] this group will provide advice,
counsel, and subject-matter expertise to the intelligence community
regarding the types of terrorism-related information needed by state,
local, and tribal governments and how these entities use that terrorism-
related information to fulfill their counterterrorism responsibilities.
In doing so, ITACG will enable the timely production by the National
Counterterrorism Center of clear, relevant, and federally coordinated
terrorism-related information products intended for dissemination to
state, local, and tribal officials. As of September 2007, ITACG has
achieved an initial operational capability, according to PM-ISE
officials. Additionally, the 9/11 Commission Act, enacted in August
2007, made the ITACG a statutorily mandated body.[Footnote 27]
DHS and FBI Provide Clearances to Fusion Center Officials and Have Set
Timeliness Goals for Doing So, but Officials Cited Some Challenges
Obtaining and Using Clearances:
Both DHS and the FBI have provided clearances for numerous state and
local personnel and have set goals to shorten the length of time it
takes to obtain a security clearance. DHS and the FBI provide
clearances at the Secret level for state and local officials with a
need-to-know national security information classified at the
Confidential or Secret level, and the FBI, when necessary, also
provides clearances at the Top Secret level to state and local
officials with a need-to-know national security information classified
at this level and who need unescorted access in FBI
facilities.[Footnote 28] For instance, to date DHS reported that it had
provided security clearances, typically granted at the Secret level,
for 1,291 state and local personnel--not necessarily personnel in
fusion centers.[Footnote 29] The FBI, in fiscal year 2007, reported
that as of April it had provided 520 security clearances, typically
granted at the Top Secret level, to state and local fusion center
personnel.[Footnote 30] Further, CRS reported that on average, as of
July 2007, each fusion center appeared to have 14 staff with Secret
clearances and 6 staff with Top Secret clearances.[Footnote 31]
However, officials in 21 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted reported
difficulties obtaining the clearances necessary to access different
levels of classified materials.
DHS and FBI also have provided centers with information for state and
local personnel about the security clearance process, stating that
processing time for individual security clearances can vary depending
on complexity. For example, DHS set a goal of 90 days to complete a
Secret clearance, and FBI set a goal of 45 to 60 days to complete a
Secret clearance and 6 to 9 months to complete a Top Secret
clearance.[Footnote 32] Yet, officials in 32 of the 58 fusion centers
at the time we contacted them reported difficulties with the length of
time it takes to receive a security clearance from DHS or the FBI. For
example, in one center that receives security clearances from both DHS
and the FBI, officials said that it was taking 6 to 9 months for a
Secret clearance and 1 year to 1½ years for a Top Secret clearance.
While some fusion center officials acknowledged that the process (and
the associated length of time) was necessary--to perform the requisite
background checks to ensure that clearances are only given to
individuals who meet the requirements--others said it was detrimental
to the fusion center because newly hired or newly promoted analysts
were unable to work without the clearances to perform their duties. To
address timeliness concerns, the FBI has taken steps to reduce the
turnaround time for clearances. According to the FBI, Top Secret
security clearances granted by the FBI to state and local personnel in
March 2007 took an average of 63 days to complete, down from an average
of 116 days in fiscal year 2006. The FBI is also implementing both
short-term solutions--including prioritization of background
investigations for state, local, and tribal officials and the
electronic submission of fingerprints--and long-term solutions, such as
training fusion center security officers to conduct preliminary
background checks, according to a May 2007 FBI Interagency Integration
Unit review of security clearances. Indeed, officials at one fusion
center told us that when the center was opening in 2003, it took
approximately 2 years to obtain a clearance, but in January 2007, it
took only 3 months to obtain a security clearance for new personnel.
While law and executive order provide that a security clearance granted
by one federal agency should generally be accepted by other agencies,
officials in 19 fusion centers we contacted said they faced challenges
with federal agencies, particularly DHS and the FBI, accepting each
others' clearances. This reported lack of reciprocity could hinder the
centers' ability to access facilities, computer systems, and
information from multiple agencies. For example, an official at one
fusion center who holds an FBI security clearance said he was unable to
access other federal agencies' facilities. An official at another
fusion center said that DHS did not accept clearances that had been
issued by the FBI to fusion center personnel and therefore would not
provide access to information technology or intelligence.
DHS and DOJ officials said that they were not aware of fusion centers
encountering recent challenges with reciprocity of security clearances,
but they said that there were complications in the clearance process.
For example, a DHS official said that multiple federal agencies carry
out their own clearance processes and grant clearances without central
coordination.[Footnote 33] For example, both DHS and the FBI could each
be conducting a separate security clearance investigation and
determining eligibility for access to classified information on the
same individual. An FBI official also explained that some agencies and
some parts of the Department of Defense do require a polygraph
examination to obtain a clearance and some do not, so reciprocity among
those agencies with different standards may be an issue. Indeed, the
DHS official acknowledged that, overall, federal agencies do not have a
consolidated system for granting and handling security clearances and
said that currently there are not sufficient federal efforts to develop
such a system.
Fusion Center Officials We Contacted Cited Challenges with Personnel
and Funding; DHS and FBI Are Helping to Address These Issues to Some
Extent but Have Not Defined Plans for Long-Term Support:
Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted reported facing
several challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54
of the centers reported encountering funding challenges when
establishing and operating their centers, challenges which some of
these officials also indicated affected their centers' sustainability.
Although many of these reported challenges were attributed to
difficulties at the state and local level, DHS and FBI have efforts
under way to help support fusion centers by providing some personnel
and grant funding.
Obtaining and Retaining Qualified Personnel Was Reported as a Challenge
for Many Centers:
Officials in 37 of the 58 centers we contacted said they had difficulty
with state, local, and federal agencies assigning personnel to the
center--one means of staffing the centers--primarily as a result of
resource constraints. Most (27 of the 37) of these officials identified
challenges with state and local agencies rather than with federal
agencies contributing personnel. For instance, an official at one
fusion center said that, because of limited resources in state and
local agencies, it is challenging to convince these agencies to
contribute personnel to the center because they view doing so as a loss
of resources. In addition, officials in 8 of the 58 centers we
contacted said that they had difficulty with state and local agencies
contributing personnel to their centers specifically because the state
and local agencies had to continue to fund the salaries of personnel
assigned to the fusion centers from their own budgets. Similarly, CRS
reported that there are many cases in which local law enforcement
agencies appear unconvinced of the value of fusion centers--and by
their cost/benefit analysis, it does not benefit their agencies to
detail personnel to the center.[Footnote 34] In terms of federal
personnel, officials in 11 of the 58 fusion centers said that they
encountered challenges with federal agencies not contributing personnel
to their centers.
In addition, officials in 20 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted said
that they faced challenges finding, attracting, and retaining qualified
personnel. Specifically, officials from 12 of these centers said that
they had difficulty finding qualified personnel. For instance, an
official from one fusion center said that finding personnel with the
expertise to understand the concept behind the development of the
center and to use the tools to build the center was challenging, while
an official at another fusion center acknowledged that there was a very
limited number of qualified candidates in the state from which to hire
personnel. Additionally, officials in eight centers reported that
retention was a challenge because of competition with other entities,
particularly higher-paying federal agencies and private sector
companies. In some cases, such as for those analysts hired by the FBI,
the official said that the federal salaries are almost twice what the
center could afford to pay. An official at another fusion center
expressed concern that, if fusion centers do not find a way to offer
state and local analysts a career path comparable to that offered by
the federal agencies, fusion centers will see a plateau in the quality
of available analysts.
DHS and FBI Have Deployed Personnel to Fusion Centers:
To support fusion centers and facilitate information sharing, DHS and
FBI have each assigned federal personnel to centers. As of September
2007, DHS had deployed intelligence officers to 17 of the 43
operational fusion centers we contacted, and was in the process of
staffing 6 additional centers we contacted. The FBI had assigned
personnel to about three quarters of the operational fusion centers we
contacted. Additionally, DHS was in the process of staffing 2 local
fusion centers we did not contact, and the FBI had assigned personnel
to 7 local fusion centers that were not included in our review.
In terms of the future, DHS plans to place intelligence officers in as
many as 35 fusion centers by the end of fiscal year 2008. DHS has not
determined to what extent it will provide additional staff to centers
after the first round of assessments and placements are completed. For
its part, FBI officials noted in January 2007 that the FBI process and
criteria for staffing personnel to fusion centers remains ongoing.
Because of the variety of fusion centers, the FBI--through its field
office leaders--conducts its staffing efforts on a case-by-base basis
using criteria such as whether the fusion center has a facility,
connectivity to state and local systems, and personnel from multiple
agencies.
Fusion Center Officials Cited Challenges with the Federal Grant
Process, Obtaining Sustainable Funding, and Federal Grant Restrictions:
Officials in 35 of the 58 centers we contacted cited a variety of
challenges with the federal grant process, including its complexity,
and challenges related to uncertain federal funding or declining
federal funding, challenges that led to overall concerns about the
sustainability of the centers. For example, officials in 16 of the 58
fusion centers we contacted said that they faced challenges with the
federal grant process, including unclear and changing grant guidance
and a lack of understanding of how federal funding decisions are made.
One official said that the fusion center did not perceive a link
between the work performed at the center and the level of federal
funding received, and hence, he did not understand how DHS made its
funding decisions for fusion centers. The official added that it is
important for local units of government to better understand these
issues to help them understand the need to provide funding for fusion
centers. Further, officials in 22 of the fusion centers said that they
encountered challenges related to the sustainability of federal
funding, such as the potential for, or actual, declining federal
funding, which created concerns for the officials about their centers'
ability to sustain capability for the long term. Officials at another
fusion center said that they are concerned that they will establish a
fusion center with DHS funding only to have the funding end in the
future and the center close because the region is unable to support it.
When asked about key factors for sustaining their centers, officials in
41 of the 58 fusion centers indicated funding, and several specified a
sustainable source or mechanism for that funding.
Officials in 40 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted identified
challenges with finding adequate funding for specific components of
their centers' operations--in particular personnel, training, and
facilities--and officials in 24 of those 40 centers related these
challenges to restrictions and requirements of federal grant funding.
Specifically, officials in 21 fusion centers we contacted said that
obtaining adequate funding for personnel was difficult, and officials
in 17 fusion centers found federal time limits on the use of DHS grant
funds for personnel[Footnote 35] challenging--challenges that they said
could affect the sustainability of their centers. For example, one
official at another fusion center said that the 2-year time limit on
the use of DHS grant funds for personnel makes retaining the personnel
challenging because state and local agencies may lack the resources to
continue funding the positions, which could hinder the fusion center's
ability to continue to operate. Officials in eight of the fusion
centers expressed concerns about maintaining their personnel levels,
particularly if federal funding declines. For instance, one fusion
center official said that a state police official did not want to fund
analysts with federal grant funds because of a concern that, if the
federal grant funds end, the center will lose qualified personnel who
will take away their knowledge base. Furthermore, officials in 17 of
the 58 fusion centers we contacted found complying with the DHS grant
requirement for training newly hired analysts (that they attend
training within 6 months or have previous analytical experience) or the
funding costs associated with training challenging.[Footnote 36] For
example, one fusion center official said that the center found
limitations on the particular training the grant funds can be used for
to be challenging.[Footnote 37] In addition, officials in 14 of the
centers said that they had difficulty funding training costs, such as
when using the funds for training conflicted with buying equipment or
other tangible goods. Finally, officials in 14 fusion centers said that
funding their facilities poses a challenge, particularly because of DHS
restrictions on the use of grant funds for construction and
renovation.[Footnote 38] For example, officials in eight fusion centers
said that the DHS grant restrictions on construction and renovation
have made it challenging to meet security requirements for their
facilities, build a secure room, or build or renovate their facilities.
Officials in 17 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted said that
competition for funding with state and local entities was challenging,
particularly as a result of the pass-through requirement associated
with DHS grant funding in which the state must make no less than 80
percent of the total grant available to local units of
government.[Footnote 39] For example, one fusion center official said
that it is very difficult for state-run fusion centers to cover costs
such as hiring analysts and completing renovations to their physical
space out of the 20 percent of the DHS grant funds they are eligible to
receive after the state complies with the pass-through requirement.
Other officials noted that, even after the state has complied with the
pass-through requirement, fusion centers must still compete with other
state and local entities for the remaining DHS funding. For instance,
one fusion center official said that the state emergency management
agency wants to dedicate DHS funds to priorities other than the fusion
center, such as the purchase of new fire-fighting equipment. CRS also
reported that the 80 percent funding requirement was cited continually
by fusion center officials as a major hurdle in channeling homeland
security funds toward statewide fusion center efforts.[Footnote 40]
Officials in 28 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted told us that they
also had difficulty obtaining state or local funding for a variety of
other reasons, including state or local budgetary constraints;
challenges with convincing state officials, for example, in disciplines
other than law enforcement, to provide funding to support the fusion
center; and managing state and local officials who thought the federal
government should be responsible for funding fusion centers. Further, 5
of these fusion center officials expressed concerns about their
centers' long-term sustainability without state or local funding. For
example, one official said that federal funding for the center will
eventually end and the state will need to provide funding to support
the fusion center, but the state currently has no plan for providing
that support. However, an official at another fusion center expressed
concern that federal funding could cause states to lose autonomy over
their centers, and the centers would become federal fusion centers
located in a state rather than the state fusion centers originally
envisioned.
DHS Has Provided Grant Funding for Fusion-Related Activities and Made
Some Changes to Grants for Fusion Centers:
DHS homeland security grant programs, such as SHSP, LETPP, and UASI,
have provided funding to state and local entities for data collection,
analysis, fusion, and information-sharing projects, and DHS has
adjusted the programs for fusion centers. Table 2 shows that from
fiscal years 2004 through 2006, DHS allocated almost $131 million to
states and local areas from these programs for what DHS defined as
fusion-related activities.[Footnote 41]
Table 2: DHS Grant Funds Allocated for Fusion-Related Activities,
Fiscal Year 2004 through 2006:
Fiscal year: 2004;
Funding allocated: $ 29,974,650.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Funding allocated: 57,456,112.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Funding allocated: 43,103,624.
Fiscal year: Total;
Funding allocated: $130,534,386.
Source: DHS.
[End of table]
Further, according to DHS, 49 states and 37 local jurisdictions
submitted grant investment justifications in fiscal year 2007 in
support of information-sharing and dissemination efforts, with requests
for funding totaling nearly $180 million, though exact funding amounts
had not been determined as of August 2007. Exact funding amounts for
fusion centers will be determined on the basis of the prioritization
and allocation of funds by states. For fiscal year 2007, DHS included
language in its grant guidelines emphasizing fusion center activities
and explicitly made establishing and enhancing fusion centers a
priority for the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program.[Footnote
42] However, these grant programs are not specifically targeted at or
limited to fusion centers. As a result, funding provided to states may
not necessarily reach a particular fusion center because, as a DHS
official noted, states are free to reprioritize their use of grant
funds after submitting their grant justifications to DHS and receiving
allocated funds. Thus, fusion centers cannot be certain that they will
receive funds to sustain fusion center activities from year to year or
over the long term.
Over time, DHS has also made several changes to help address challenges
identified by fusion centers by focusing homeland security grants on
fusion-related activities, by taking steps to ease the grant process,
and by adjusting some of the restrictions on the timing and use of
grant funds. For example, DHS expanded grant funding in fiscal year
2006 in the area of allowable costs for information sharing and
collaborative efforts. Funds could be used by states to develop and
enhance their fusion centers, particularly by hiring contract or
government employees as intelligence analysts; purchasing information
technology hardware, software and communications equipment; hiring
consultants to make recommendations on fusion center development; or by
leasing office space for use by a fusion center. In addition, DHS
continued to make Homeland Security Grant Program adjustments in fiscal
year 2007 based on outreach to grant program stakeholders. For example,
DHS gave potential applicants more time to complete the grant
application process and the period for performance under HSGP grants
increased from 2 years to 3 years.
DHS and DOJ Have Provided Guidance, Technical Assistance, and Training
to Fusion Centers:
DHS and DOJ have collaborated to provide guidance and technical
assistance to fusion centers and, along with the PM-ISE, have sponsored
regional and national conferences, in part to determine the needs of
fusion centers. For example, DHS and DOJ jointly issued their most
recent Fusion Center Guidelines in August 2006 that outline 18
recommended elements for establishing and operating fusion
centers.[Footnote 43] The Guidelines were intended as a way to ensure
state and local fusion centers could be established and operated
consistently and were developed to help fusion center administrators
create policies, manage resources, and evaluate fusion center services.
Officials in 48 of the 58 fusion centers told us that the Guidelines
were generally good and useful. However, officials in 20 of the 58
fusion centers we contacted found the available federal guidance
lacking in specificity, conflicting, confusing, or difficult to
implement in their individual centers. For example, some of these
officials said that the Guidelines were broad and did not provide
guidance on specific issues relevant to operating a fusion center, such
as how to connect the multiple information-sharing systems or set up
their physical space. In addition, officials in 19 of the 58 fusion
centers we contacted said that they lacked guidance on specific
information-sharing policies and procedures, such as sharing or
handling sensitive or classified information or privacy and civil
liberties issues. For example, officials in some fusion centers we
contacted said that they lacked guidance on sharing and handling
classified information, and officials in five fusion centers said the
lack of guidance on privacy and civil liberties issues is a concern
when sharing or storing information. To illustrate, officials at one
fusion center said that the absence of an encompassing guideline to use
as a standard makes it difficult to manage information sharing across
levels of government and among states because of the variations in
state and federal privacy laws and regulations. For instance, federal
regulation provides that certain information on individuals may not be
retained for longer than 5 years, whereas the center's state
requirement provides that information may not be retained for longer
than 1 year.[Footnote 44]
FEMA/NPD, DOJ's Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA),[Footnote 45] and
the FBI have partnered to provide a program of technical assistance
services for fusion centers to facilitate information sharing.[Footnote
46] As shown in table 3, many of the technical services provided under
this program provide an overview or general information, and the
technical assistance efforts focus on giving the state or local area
the basic tools they need to successfully establish and operate a
fusion center, such as helping to create a governance board, assisting
with the development of a fusion process of implementation plan, and
providing the basics of fusion center operations. As of September 2007,
there have been 35 service deliveries to 19 fusion centers, according
to FEMA/NPD and BJA officials.
Table 3: Examples of Technical Assistance Services Provided Jointly by
DHS and DOJ for the Fusion Process:
Services provided: Fusion process orientation;
Description: Provides an overview of the fusion process and facilitates
the development of a strategic fusion center process/center development
plan.
Services provided: Fusion center governance structure and authority;
Description: Assists in the development of a comprehensive governance
structure to include legal foundation and steering/subcommittee
structure.
Services provided: Fusion center concept of operations development;
Description: Organizes the development of the core document used to
synchronize current operations and plan future operations.
Services provided: Fusion center privacy policy development;
Description: Assists with the development of a privacy policy to ensure
that constitutional rights, civil liberties, and civil rights are
protected while allowing the fusion center to achieve its mission
objectives.
Services provided: Fusion center administration and management;
Description: Supports the design of a strategic framework to structure
the management of personnel and organize assets provided by
participating entities.
Services provided: State and local antiterrorism training;
Description: Provides specialized awareness orientation regarding
terrorism interdiction, investigation, and prevention for law
enforcement executives, command personnel, intelligence officers,
investigators, analytical personnel, training directors, and
prosecutors.
Services provided: Criminal intelligence for the chief executive;
Description: Provides an overview regarding the importance of and
responsibilities associated with developing intelligence capabilities
within law enforcement agencies.
Source: BJA.
[End of table]
DHS and DOJ have numerous efforts to provide training to fusion
centers. Also, DHS offers over 90 courses from 45 training partners and
is working to increase the availability of training under Homeland
Security Grant Program funding. According to FEMA/NPD officials, DHS
recently approved for funding three courses, two of which involve
analyst training. DHS and BJA provide a number of training services
under their joint technical assistance program, and the FBI provides
ongoing training for fusion centers through its field offices. However,
officials in 21 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted said that the
availability of adequate training for mission-related issues, such as
training on intelligence analysis was a challenge. Further, officials
in 11 fusion centers we contacted, most of whom were in fusion centers
that had been in operation for more than 2 years, said that they lacked
national standards or guidelines for analyst training or
qualifications. For example, one fusion center official said that no
one federal agency has taken responsibility for determining a single,
standardized training agenda--including content and length of time--for
both new and experienced analysts. Officials in another fusion center
said that the center had difficulty creating a training program for its
analysts because of the lack of a coordinated, trusted set of training
guidelines. Two other officials said that they would like to see a
federal baseline for appropriate and necessary training for analysts
with a certification attached to its completion or a standardized
course of analyst training to ensure that analysts are trained in the
same way nationwide. They said that this would help fusion center
analysts better communicate and be more likely to share information
with analysts in other centers.
DHS and FBI officials noted some challenges with designating a single
training curriculum for fusion center analysts because agencies and
training groups differ on what should constitute the minimum baseline.
To remedy this, the NFCCG has developed and documented minimum baseline
capabilities for state and major urban area fusion centers, and as of
September 2007 was in the process of evaluating the current level of
capability of designated state and major urban area fusion centers. The
minimum baseline capabilities require fusion centers to develop a
training plan to ensure their personnel are knowledgeable of fusion
center operations, policies, and procedures, including training on the
intelligence and fusion processes, analytic processes and writing
skills, security policy and protocols, and the fusion center mission
and goals. However, it is too soon to determine the extent to which the
baseline document sets out minimum training standards for fusion center
analysts that would address the challenges fusion centers reported to
us.
Conclusions:
Although state and local governments created fusion centers to fill
their information needs, the centers have attracted the attention of
the federal government as it works to improve information sharing with
state, local, and tribal entities in accordance with the Homeland
Security and Intelligence Reform Acts, as amended. Indeed, recognizing
that the collaboration between fusion centers and the federal
government marks a tremendous increase in the nation's overall analytic
capacity that can be used to combat terrorism, the PM-ISE's
implementation plan envisions that the federal government will work to
promote fusion center initiatives to facilitate information sharing and
designates fusion centers as the focus of sharing with state, local,
and tribal governments. Given the federal interest in fusion centers
and the fusion centers' interest in supporting such a national network,
it is important that the federal government continue to provide fusion
centers with added value as an incentive to facilitate such a network.
To date, DHS's and DOJ's efforts to assist fusion centers, such as
providing access to information systems, security clearances,
personnel, funding, and guidance have begun to address a number of the
challenges fusion center directors identified to us. However, it is
also important for fusion center management to understand the federal
government's longer-term role with respect to these centers. Many
fusion center officials were uncertain about the level of future
resources and the sustainability of federal support. Although the
federal government cannot make promises regarding future resources,
decisions could be made and articulated to fusion centers regarding
whether the federal government views its role with respect to providing
resources--such as grant funding, facilities, personnel, and
information-sharing systems--to fusion centers as short term for start-
up resources or longer term for operational needs. The National Fusion
Center Coordination Group (NFCCG) is already tasked with identifying
grant funding, technical assistance, and training to support fusion
centers. However, to date, the efforts of the NFCCG have not included
delineating whether such assistance is for the short-term establishment
or for the long-term sustainability of fusion centers. The NFCCG,
through the PM-ISE and the Information Sharing Council, would be in the
best position to articulate whether fusion centers can expect to
continue to receive this support over the longer term.
Recommendation:
To improve efforts to create a national network of fusion centers, we
recommend that the NFCCG, through the Information Sharing Council and
the PM-ISE, determine and articulate the federal government's role in,
and whether it expects to provide resources to, fusion centers over the
long-term to help ensure their sustainability. Particular emphasis
should be placed on how best to sustain those fusion center functions
that support a national information sharing capability as critical
nodes of the ISE.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of
Homeland Security, the Acting Attorney General, and the Program Manager
for the Information Sharing Environment or their designees. In
commenting on drafts of the report, DHS and the PM-ISE concurred with
our recommendation that the federal government should determine its
long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to provide
resources to centers to help ensure their sustainability. DOJ had no
comments on the draft. Further, DHS commented that it, along with its
federal partners, is reviewing strategies to sustain fusion centers as
part of the work plan of the National Fusion Center Coordination Group.
This group plans on presenting these strategies to the federal
departments before the end of the year.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. We will then send copies of this report to the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Acting Attorney
General, the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment,
selected congressional committees, and other interested parties. In
addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact information
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Eileen R. Larence:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Jane Harman:
Chair:
The Honorable David G. Reichert:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk
Assessment:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Mark Pryor:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on State, Local and Private Sector Preparedness and
Integration:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal
Workforce and the District of Columbia:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
The objectives of our review were to (1) describe the stages of
development and characteristics of state and local fusion centers and
(2) identify to what extent efforts under way by the Program Manager
for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) help to
address some of the challenges identified by fusion centers.
To describe the stages of development and characteristics of state and
local fusion centers, we conducted semistructured telephone interviews
with the director (or his or her designee) of every state fusion
center, the District of Columbia fusion center, and eight local fusion
centers. We defined "local fusion center" to include centers
established by major urban areas, counties, cities, and intrastate
regions. Our selection criteria for local fusion centers included their
relationships with the state fusion center, stage of development, and
geographic diversity. Fusion center officials we spoke with included
state and local police officials, agents in state bureaus of
investigation, state homeland security directors, and directors in
state public safety departments. Where a fusion center was in the
planning stages, we spoke with officials involved in planning and
establishing the center, such as directors of state homeland security
offices. We asked fusion center officials about the status and
characteristics of the fusion centers, including their stages of
development, reasons for establishing, scopes of operations, and the
types of funding the centers received. We relied on the centers' own
definitions of themselves as fusion centers and did not evaluate their
status, characteristics, or operations. From February through May, we
spoke with officials from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and
8 local jurisdictions. While we did contact officials in all state
fusion centers, we did not contact officials in all local fusion
centers; therefore our results are not generalizable to the universe of
fusion centers. Data were not available to determine the total number
of local fusion centers.
We also obtained and summarized descriptive information from the fusion
centers including structure, organization, personnel, and information
technology systems used. We provided the summaries to the fusion
centers for a review of accuracy. However, we did not independently
verify all of the information provided to us. We also interviewed
officials from 11 agencies conducting research on state and local
information sharing, including RAND, the Police Executive Research
Forum, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the
Congressional Research Service (CRS), which released a report in July
2007 on fusion centers.[Footnote 47] Finally, to obtain detailed
information about centers' operations, we conducted site visits to
fusion centers in Atlanta, Georgia; Phoenix, Arizona; Richmond,
Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; West Trenton, New Jersey; and New York,
New York. Our selection criteria for these centers included their
stages of development, extent of federal partnerships, and geographic
representation.
To identify to what extent efforts under way by the PM-ISE, DHS, and
DOJ help to address some of the challenges identified by fusion
centers, we analyzed fusion center responses to our semistructured
telephone interviews, reviewed applicable documents, and interviewed
officials at the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ, as well as several organizations
conducting research about fusion centers. Specifically, to describe the
challenges fusion centers encountered in establishing themselves and
operating, we asked officials during our semistructured telephone
interviews whether they had encountered challenges in 10 different
categories and, if so, the extent to which the category was a challenge
both at establishment and, for operational centers, in day-to-day
operations. These categories included federal partnerships, personnel,
guidance, training, funding, access to information, and security
clearances. Fusion center officials provided open-ended, descriptive
responses of challenges faced by their centers. On the basis of a
content analysis of fusion center officials' responses, we identified,
categorized, and counted similar challenges. Fusion center officials
may not have indicated that they encountered all the challenges
discussed in the report. In addition, individual fusion center
officials may have identified multiple challenges in a given category,
for example funding. We also reviewed CRS's July 2007 report to obtain
information on fusion center challenges.
In addition, to determine to what extent efforts under way by the PM-
ISE, DHS, and DOJ help to address some of the challenges identified by
fusion centers, we reviewed applicable federal laws, executive orders,
directives, briefings, testimonies, plans, reports, and documents to
identify efforts of the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ to address challenges
identified by fusion centers. We interviewed officials at the PM-ISE's
office, DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency National Preparedness Directorate,[Footnote
48] the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and DOJ's Bureau of
Justice Assistance and discussed efforts under way to address
challenges identified by fusion centers. We also asked fusion center
officials in our semistructured telephone interviews to describe the
support they had received and were interested in receiving from DHS and
the FBI.
We performed our work from August 2006 through September 2007 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Operational Fusion Centers:
Table 4 presents information about operational fusion centers as
reported to us by fusion center officials during semistructured
interviews, as of September 2007. During these interviews, we asked
officials to characterize their fusion centers as being in one of the
following stages: planning, early development, intermediate (limited
operations and functionality), or developed (fully operational and
fully functional).
Table 4: Selected Characteristics of Operational Fusion Centers We
Contacted, as of September 2007:
State: Arizona;
Name of fusion center: Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center
(AcTIC);
Stage of development: Intermediate;
Lead agency: Arizona Department of Public Safety and the FBI;
Scope of operations: All crimes;
Start date: October 2004.
State: California;
Name of fusion center: State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center
(STTAC);
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: Partnership of the California Governor's Office of
Homeland Security, California Department of Justice, and the California
Highway Patrol;
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism;
Start date: December 2005.
State: California;
Name of fusion center: Los Angeles, Joint Regional Intelligence Center
(JRIC);
Stage of development: Intermediate;
Lead agency: Joint effort of the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los
Angeles County Sheriff's Department, and the FBI;
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism;
Start date: July 2006.
State: California;
Name of fusion center: Sacramento, Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment
Center (RTTAC);
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: Sacramento County Sheriff's Department;
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism;
Start date: November 2004.
State: Colorado;
Name of fusion center: Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC);
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: Colorado State Patrol;
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards;
Start date: October 2004.
State: Connecticut;
Name of fusion center: Connecticut Intelligence Center (CTIC);
Stage of development: Intermediate;
Lead agency: Connecticut State Police and the FBI;
Scope of operations: All crimes;
Start date: April 2005.
State: Delaware;
Name of fusion center: Delaware Information Analysis Center (DIAC);
Stage of development: Intermediate;
Lead agency: Delaware State Police;
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards;
Start date: December 2005.
State: Florida;
Name of fusion center: Florida Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: Florida Department of Law Enforcement;
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards;
Start date: January 2007.
State: Georgia;
Name of fusion center: Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(GISAC);
Stage of development: Between intermediate and developed;
Lead agency: Component of the Georgia Office of Homeland Security;
Scope of operations: All hazards and counterterrorism;
Start date: October 2001.
State: Illinois;
Name of fusion center: Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center
(CPIC);
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: Chicago Police Department;
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism;
Start date: April 2007.
State: Illinois;
Name of fusion center: Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center
(STIC);
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: Illinois State Police;
Scope of operations: All crimes;
Start date: May 2003.
State: Indiana;
Name of fusion center: Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center (IIFC);
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: Indiana Department of Homeland Security;
Scope of operations: All crimes;
Start date: December 2006.
State: Iowa;
Name of fusion center: Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Between intermediate and developed;
Lead agency: Iowa Department of Public Safety;
Scope of operations: All crimes;
Start date: December 2004.
State: Kansas;
Name of fusion center: Kansas Threat Integration Center (KSTIC);
Stage of development: Between intermediate and developed;
Lead agency: Joint operation of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation,
Kansas National Guard, and the Kansas Highway Patrol;
Scope of operations: Counterterrorism;
Start date: June 2004.
State: Kentucky;
Name of fusion center: Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center (KIFC);
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: Kentucky Office of Homeland Security;
Scope of operations: All crimes;
Start date: December 2005.
State: Louisiana;
Name of fusion center: Louisiana State Analysis and Fusion Exchange (La-
SAFE);
Stage of development: Intermediate;
Lead agency: Louisiana State Police;
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards;
Start date: October 2004.
State: Maryland;
Name of fusion center: Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center
(MCAC);
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: Overseen by the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Executive
Committee;
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism;
Start date: November 2003.
State: Massachusetts;
Name of fusion center: Commonwealth Fusion Center (CFC);
Stage of development: Intermediate;
Lead agency: Massachusetts State Police;
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism;
Start date: October 2004.
State: Michigan;
Name of fusion center: Michigan Intelligence and Operations Center
(MIOC);
Stage of development: Intermediate;
Lead agency: Michigan State Police;
Scope of operations: All crimes;
Start date: December 2006.
State: Minnesota;
Name of fusion center: Minnesota Joint Analysis Center (MN-JAC);
Stage of development: Intermediate;
Lead agency: Partnership of FBI, Department of Public Safety, and local
police departments;
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards;
Start date: May 2005.
State: Missouri;
Name of fusion center: Missouri Information Analysis Center;
Stage of development: Between intermediate and developed;
Lead agency: Missouri State Highway Patrol;
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards;
Start date: December 2005.
State: Montana;
Name of fusion center: Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center (MATIC);
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: Administered by the Montana Department of Justice Division
of Criminal Investigation;
Scope of operations: All crimes;
Start date: Spring of 2003.
State: New Jersey;
Name of fusion center: Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC);
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: New Jersey State Police;
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards;
Start date: January 2005.
State: New Mexico;
Intermediate;
New Mexico Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management;
All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism;
September 2007;
New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center (NMASIC).
State: New York;
Name of fusion center: New York Police Department (NYPD) Intelligence
Division;
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: NYPD;
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism;
Start date: March 2002.
State: New York;
Name of fusion center: Rockland County Intelligence Center;
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: Rockland County law enforcement;
Scope of operations: All crimes;
Start date: 1995, however focus shifted after 9/11.
State: New York;
Name of fusion center: New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC);
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: New York State Police;
Scope of operations: All crimes;
Start date: August 2003.
State: North Carolina;
Name of fusion center: North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (ISAAC);
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation;
Scope of operations: Homeland security, gangs, drugs;
Start date: May 2006.
State: North Dakota;
Name of fusion center: North Dakota Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Intermediate;
Lead agency: Joint effort of the North Dakota Bureau of Criminal
Investigation, North Dakota Highway Patrol, North Dakota Division of
Homeland Security, and North Dakota National Guard;
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism;
Start date: September 2003.
State: Ohio;
Name of fusion center: Strategic Analysis and Information Center
(SAIC);
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: Ohio Division of Homeland Security;
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism;
Start date: January 2005.
State: Oregon;
Developed;
Oregon Department of Justice;
All crimes (all threats);
June 2007;
Terrorism Intelligence and Threat Assessment Network (TITAN) Fusion
Center.
State: Rhode Island;
Name of fusion center: Rhode Island Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Intermediate;
Lead agency: Rhode Island State Police;
Scope of operations: Counterterrorism;
Start date: March 2006.
State: South Carolina;
Name of fusion center: South Carolina Information Exchange (SCIEx);
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: South Carolina Law Enforcement Division;
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards;
Start date: March 2005.
State: South Dakota;
Name of fusion center: South Dakota Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Intermediate;
Lead agency: South Dakota Office of Homeland Security and the South
Dakota Highway Patrol;
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards;
Start date: June 2006.
State: Tennessee;
Between intermediate and developed;
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and Tennessee Department of
Safety/Office of Homeland Security;
All crimes;
May 2007;
Tennessee Regional Information Center (TRIC).
State: Texas;
Name of fusion center: North Central Texas Fusion Center (NTFC);
Stage of development: Between intermediate and developed;
Lead agency: Collin County Department of Homeland Security;
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards;
Start date: February 2006.
State: Texas;
Name of fusion center: Texas Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Intermediate;
Lead agency: Criminal Law Enforcement Division and the Governor's
Office of Homeland Security in the Texas Department of Public Safety;
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards;
Start date: July 2005.
State: Vermont;
Name of fusion center: Vermont Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: Vermont State Police;
Scope of operations: All crimes;
Start date: August 2005.
State: Virginia;
Name of fusion center: Virginia Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: Virginia State Police and Virginia Department of Emergency
Management;
Scope of operations: All hazards and counterterrorism;
Start date: February 2005.
State: Washington;
Name of fusion center: Washington Joint Analytical Center (WAJAC);
Stage of development: Intermediate;
Lead agency: Joint effort between the Washington State Patrol and the
FBI;
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism;
Start date: 2003.
State: Washington, D.C;
Name of fusion center: Metropolitan Washington Fusion Center (MWFC);
Stage of development: Intermediate;
Lead agency: Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department;
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards;
Start date: Spring of 2006.
State: Wisconsin;
Name of fusion center: Southeastern Wisconsin Terrorism Alert Center
(STAC);
Stage of development: Intermediate;
Lead agency: Milwaukee Police Department;
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism;
Start date: October 2006.
State: Wisconsin;
Name of fusion center: Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center (WSIC);
Stage of development: Developed;
Lead agency: Wisconsin Department of Justice, Division of Criminal
Investigation;
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, all events;
Start date: March 2006.
Source: Fusion center officials.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Fusion Centers in the Planning and Early Stages of
Development:
Table 5 presents information about fusion centers in the planning and
early stages of development, as reported to us by fusion center
officials during semistructured interviews as of September 2007. During
these interviews, we asked officials to characterize their fusion
centers as being in one of the following stages: planning, early
development, intermediate (limited operations and functionality), or
developed (fully operational and fully functional).
Table 5: Selected Characteristics of Fusion Centers in the Planning and
Early Stages of Development We Contacted, as of September 2007:
State: Alabama;
Name of fusion center: Alabama Information Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Planning stage;
Lead agency: Alabama Department of Homeland Security;
Scope of operations: All crimes;
Planned opening: The officials said that the center is expected to open
in the fall of 2007.
State: Alaska;
Name of fusion center: Alaska Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Planning stage;
Lead agency: Alaska Department of Public Safety and Alaska Division of
Homeland Security and Emergency Management;
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, all source;
Planned opening: The officials did not provide a specific date.
State: Arkansas;
Name of fusion center: Arkansas Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Early stage of development;
Lead agency: Arkansas State Police;
Scope of operations: All crimes (all threats);
Planned opening: The officials said that the center may be able to
begin limited operations by the winter of 2007.
State: Hawaii;
Name of fusion center: Hawaii Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Planning stage;
Lead agency: To be determined;
Scope of operations: All hazards;
Planned opening: The officials did not provide a specific date.
State: Maine;
Name of fusion center: Maine Intelligence and Analysis Center;
Stage of development: Early stage of development;
Lead agency: Maine Emergency Management Agency and the Maine State
Police;
Scope of operations: Counterterrorism;
Planned opening: The officials said that the center opened in December
2006.
State: Michigan;
Name of fusion center: Detroit and Southeastern Michigan Regional
Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Early stage of development;
Lead agency: City of Detroit Homeland Security and Emergency
Management;
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism;
Planned opening: The officials said that the center will be fully
operational in January 2008.
State: Mississippi;
Name of fusion center: Mississippi Analysis & Information Center;
Stage of development: Early stage of development;
Lead agency: Mississippi Office of Homeland Security and Mississippi
Department of Public Safety;
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and all threats;
Planned opening: The official said that the fusion center is expected
to open at the end of September 2007.
State: Nebraska;
Name of fusion center: Nebraska Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Planning stage;
Lead agency: Nebraska State Patrol;
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards, including terrorism;
Planned opening: The officials said that the fusion center is expected
to open in the fall of 2007.
State: Nevada;
Name of fusion center: Nevada Analytical and Information Center;
Stage of development: Planning stage;
Lead agency: Nevada Department of Public Safety;
Scope of operations: All crimes (all threats);
Planned opening: The official did not provide a specific date.
State: New Hampshire;
Name of fusion center: New Hampshire Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Early stage of development;
Lead agency: New Hampshire Department of Safety Division of State
Police;
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards;
Planned opening: The official said the fusion center is planning to
open in 2008.
State: Oklahoma;
Name of fusion center: Oklahoma Information Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Early stage of development;
Lead agency: Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation;
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards;
Planned opening: The official said the fusion center is expected to
open in early 2008.
State: Pennsylvania;
Name of fusion center: Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center;
Stage of development: Early stage of development;
Lead agency: Pennsylvania State Police;
Scope of operations: All crimes;
Planned opening: The official said the center opened in July 2003.
However, the official said he considers the center in the early stage
of development as a fusion center but developed as a criminal
intelligence center.
State: Utah;
Name of fusion center: Utah Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Planning stage;
Lead agency: Utah Department of Public Safety;
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards;
Planned opening: The official did not provide a specific date.
State: West Virginia;
Name of fusion center: West Virginia Fusion Center;
Stage of development: Planning stage;
Lead agency: Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety, Division
of Homeland Security;
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism;
Planned opening: The official did not provide a specific date.
State: Wyoming;
Name of fusion center: [Empty];
Stage of development: Partnership is between planning and early stage
of development;
Lead agency: Wyoming Office of Homeland Security;
Scope of operations: Counterterrorism;
Planned opening: The officials said that Wyoming is planning to partner
with Colorado.
Source: Fusion center officials.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Summary of State and Local Fusion Centers GAO Contacted:
Following is a summary of the status and selected characteristics of
the state and local fusion centers we contacted between February and
May 2007.[Footnote 49] The summaries are primarily based on documents
provided to us by fusion centers and interviews we conducted with
fusion center officials.[Footnote 50] Specifically, we obtained and
summarized documentation about the centers that covered a variety of
topics including mission; lead agency; staffing; federal, state, and
local entities represented; and types of services performed and
products disseminated. During semistructured interviews with officials,
we asked about the stage of development of the fusion center, reasons
for establishing the center, and the scope of operations (e.g.,
counterterrorism). In some instances we augmented the information
provided to us by fusion center officials with publicly available
information about the fusion center or information provided to us by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the FBI. We sent the
summaries to the fusion centers for a review of accuracy as of
September 2007. However, we did not independently verify all of the
information provided to us.
Alabama:
The Alabama Department of Homeland Security is in the final planning
stage of establishing the Alabama Information Fusion Center. The center
intends to use information not normally considered crime-related to
prevent terrorist activity, but it will also adopt an all-crimes scope
of operations. The fusion center has appointed an officer in charge and
is in the process of acquiring additional staff members. However, the
center is not yet fully operational. The executive order that will
establish the office has been submitted to the Governor for approval,
and it is expected that the fusion center will open for business in the
fall of 2007.
Alaska:
The Alaska Fusion Center is in the advanced planning stage with the
major concentration being on defining the missions, developing the
governance, and outlining potential products and services. The fusion
center will be a combined effort of the Alaska Department of Public
Safety and the Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management. While they do not have a physical fusion center, planning
officials have partnerships established with the FBI, other federal and
state law enforcement, the U.S. Attorney's Office, the U.S. Coast
Guard, the military, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA). Through these partnerships, the member agencies already share
information and coordinate activities. The officials said that they are
considering the advantages of a joint, permanently staffed facility. If
feasible and advantageous, they will plan to build or move into an
available facility in the future.
The Alaska Fusion Center will have an all-crimes, all-hazards, and all-
source scope of operations. As a result of Public Safety and Homeland
Security and Emergency Management involvement in developing the fusion
center, the center will have both law enforcement and emergency
management components. All-source includes law enforcement as well as
economic information and infrastructure issues. The center will have
three focus areas: day-to-day compilation, distillation, and
distribution of information products; analyses and assessments of
patterns and trends in the risks, threats, and hazards facing Alaska;
and serving as an operational planning group serving all agencies when
a threat emerges or a disaster occurs. The center has access to DHS's
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), Department of Justice's
Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and the Department of Defense's Secret
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet).
Arizona:
The Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (AcTIC) opened in
October 2004 as a cross-jurisdictional partnership among local, state,
and federal law enforcement; first responders; and emergency
management. Mandated by the Governor's Arizona Homeland Security plan,
AcTIC's mission is to protect the citizens and critical infrastructures
of Arizona by enhancing intelligence and domestic preparedness
operations for all local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.
Mission execution will be guided by the understanding that the key to
effectiveness is the development of information among participants to
the fullest extent permitted by law or agency policy. AcTIC has an all-
crimes focus and both an analytical and investigative scope of
operations.
AcTIC is run jointly by the FBI and the Arizona Department of Public
Safety. There are 24 state, local, and federal agencies represented in
the center. Among them are the Arizona Department of Public Safety;
Arizona Department of Homeland Security; Arizona National Guard;
Arizona Motor Vehicle Department; Arizona Department of Liquor License
& Control; a number of county and city fire and law enforcement
departments; the Rocky Mountain Information Network; the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF); U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE); the Department of State; DHS's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A); and the FBI. AcTIC is colocated in the
same building with the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and
Field Intelligence Group (FIG). These FBI groups are located in a
separate suite and operate at the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented
Information (TS/SCI) level. In addition, AcTIC has collaborated with
Arizona State University-West Campus to create an internship program.
Overall, there are about 240 personnel in AcTIC, including
investigators, analysts, and support personnel. Most AcTIC personnel
receive Secret clearances from the FBI. AcTIC is overseen by a
Management Board that consists of the leader of every agency
represented in the center and a governor-appointed Oversight Committee
that provides guidance to the center.
Within AcTIC, there is a Watch Center that is the central location for
all information coming into the AcTIC. In addition, the facility houses
the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) squad, the HAZMAT/Weapons of Mass
Destruction unit, a computer forensics laboratory, the Criminal
Investigations Research Unit, Geographical Information Systems, and the
Violent Criminal Apprehension Program.
AcTIC concentrates on an all-crimes focus for gathering information,
which is collected from a variety of Web sites; federal, state, and
local databases and networks; the media; and unclassified intelligence
bulletins. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to
the center include LEO Special Interest Groups, HSIN-Intel, HSIN-Intel
Arizona, and HSDN. AcTIC has direct connectivity to FBI classified
systems and networks. However, those AcTIC personnel with Top Secret
clearances must enter the JTTF suite and access an FBI system. AcTIC
has access to, among others, Regional Information Sharing System (RISS)
Automated Trusted Information Exchange (ATIX), SIPRNet, the National
Criminal Information Center (NCIC), International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL), Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN),
and El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). In total AcTIC has over 100 law
enforcement and public source databases available to it. AcTIC produces
biweekly intelligence briefings, advisories, citizens' bulletins,
information collection requirement bulletins, information bulletins,
intelligence bulletins, and threat assessments. These products are
primarily created for law enforcement entities and specific community
partners, but some are for the public (e.g., advisories and citizens'
bulletins). The products are typically disseminated via e-mail, Web
site postings to LEO or HSIN, or faxes on occasion.
Arkansas:
The Arkansas State Police is in the early stage of development of the
Arkansas Fusion Center. The focus of the Arkansas Fusion Center will
initially be all crimes and all threats, although the intent is to
incorporate an all-hazards element in the future. Currently, the center
has commitments from the following federal, state, and local agencies
to assign between 12 to 13 full-time personnel to the center: FBI,
Arkansas Highway Police, Arkansas Crime Information Center, Arkansas
National Guard, Arkansas Department of Corrections, Arkansas Department
of Health, Arkansas State Police, Arkansas Game and Fish Commission,
the Arkansas Association of Chiefs of Police, and the Arkansas
Sheriff's Association. The officials said that they expect to receive
funding in the fall of 2007, and that the center may be able to begin
limited operations by the winter of 2007.
California:
In addition to the State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (STTAC),
California has established four regional fusion centers known as
Regional Terrorism Threat Analysis Centers (RTTACs) that are located in
San Diego, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Sacramento and correspond to
the FBI's four field office regions. The mission of the RTTACs is to
collect, fuse, and analyze information related to terrorism from local
law enforcement, fire departments, and public health and private sector
entities. Each RTTAC is uniquely organized, but each is closely linked
with local sheriffs. We contacted the STTAC, the Los Angeles RTTAC,
known as the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC), and the
Sacramento RTTAC.
State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center:
Former Governor Gray Davis and Attorney General Bill Lockyer created
the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center on September 25, 2001,
and in December 2005 the center was transformed into the State
Terrorism Threat Assessment Center. STTAC is a joint partnership of the
Governor's Office of Homeland Security, California Department of
Justice, and the California Highway Patrol. The mission of STTAC is to
serve as a joint operation among the parties with the function of
receiving, analyzing, and maintaining relevant intelligence information
obtained from various federal, state, local, and tribal sources, and
disseminating counterterrorism intelligence information in appropriate
formats to individuals and entities in California for the purpose of
protecting California's citizens, property, and infrastructure from
terrorist acts. STTAC's core mission is serving as California's central
all-crimes and counterterrorism criminal intelligence center. STTAC is
also to perform warning functions with the California State Warning
Center in the Office of Emergency Services.
STTAC operates in close cooperation with the Office of Homeland
Security, California Highway Patrol, Office of Emergency Services, the
four RTTACs, and federal agencies including DHS and FBI. STTAC's
authorized staff level is 44, and the staff is composed primarily of
California Department of Justice and Office of Homeland Security
analysts and investigators. There are also representatives from the
California Highway Patrol and the state National Guard. STTAC does not
have DHS or FBI staff assigned directly to it. However, DHS has
provided one senior intelligence officer who resides at the Sacramento
RTTAC and supports STTAC and another officer who resides at the Los
Angeles JRIC. The FBI provides support to STTAC upon request and has
assigned personnel to all of the California RTTACs. An Executive
Management Board consisting of leaders from the partner agencies
provides strategic oversight of STTAC.
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion
center include HSIN (e.g., the Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism, and
Intel portals), LEO, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) portal, and
the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force portal,[Footnote 51] as well
as several California law enforcement and justice information and
intelligence systems and commercially available databases.
STTAC provides intelligence support to all state agencies and
disseminates situational awareness products. For instance, it supports
regional intelligence analysis and criminal investigations by supplying
the RTTACs analytical support, field investigations, and intelligence
assessments and reports, among other things. STTAC produces a variety
of intelligence products including, but not limited to, the following:
advisories that provide a brief description of a local tactical issue,
suspect, event, or situation that may be of immediate concern to law
enforcement or key policy makers; intelligence bulletins that provide a
strategic in-depth review of a particular terrorist group, event, or
public safety issue affecting the state; alerts that are issued when
there is a specific, validated, and verified threat; special reports
that provide extensive overviews of a particular group or issue and
contain background information, methods and geographical areas of
operation, violence potential, conclusions, and recommendations for
interdicting the activity; and threat assessments.
Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center:
The Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) opened in
July 2006. However, according to Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department and FBI officials, the three founding agencies of JRIC--the
Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, FBI Los Angeles, and the Los Angeles
Police Department (LAPD)--came together and realized that the region
needed a center to address counterterrorism and critical infrastructure
protection missions after the events of 9/11. The County Sheriff, the
Chief of LAPD, and the Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI Los
Angeles Field Office jointly decided to develop the center to cover the
seven counties in the Los Angeles/southern California area. JRIC
brought together the FBI's FIG, LAPD's Major Crimes Division, and the
Sheriff Department's Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) group.[Footnote 52]
JRIC has an all-crimes and counterterrorism scope of operations.
Specifically, JRIC collects information using an all-crimes approach,
converts the information into operational and strategic intelligence,
and disseminates the intelligence to prevent terrorist attacks and
combat crime in the Central District of California. Its mission is
intelligence intake, fusion, and analysis, with an emphasis on
terrorist threat intelligence; providing timely, regionally focused,
and actionable information to consumers and producing assessments; and
identifying trends, patterns and terrorist tactics, techniques and
procedures; and sponsoring training opportunities.
In addition to JRIC's founding agencies, cooperating agencies in JRIC
include DHS I&A, the U.S. Attorney's Office, Governor's Office of
Homeland Security, and California Department of Justice. DHS I&A has
assigned an intelligence officer to JRIC, and the center includes about
30 full-time personnel representing 14 agencies. JRIC personnel receive
Secret or Top Secret clearances from the FBI. TLOs connect law
enforcement and public safety partners in the seven-county region to
JRIC by collecting, assessing, and passing on information,
intelligence, tips, and leads to the center and then distributing
advisories, bulletins, assessments, and requests for information to
their home agencies.
JRIC collects information from national reporting; leads and tips from
the FBI, LAPD, the Sheriff's Department and the TLOs; and from private
sector outreach. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible
to JRIC include LEO; every HSIN portal (e.g., Intelligence, Law
Enforcement, Emergency Management); the classified Homeland Security
Data Network (HSDN); and all of the system and databases available in
the FBI's FBINet/Trilogy system. The center also has access to the
FBI's Top Secret network, the Sensitive Compartmental Information
Operational Network (SCION) through a facility located on the same
floor as JRIC.[Footnote 53] JRIC disseminates information to, among
others, JTTFs, California Office of Homeland Security, DHS and LEO
portals, law enforcement and public safety partners, affected
municipality and critical infrastructure owners, and the originator of
the information (in the form of feedback). JRIC also produces daily and
weekly reports.
Sacramento Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center:
The Sacramento RTTAC was established primarily to bring analysts from
different state, local, and federal agencies together to work on
terrorism-related issues. The center has been located in its current
building, which has a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
(SCIF), and operating at its current level of functionality, at the TS/
SCI level, since November 2006. Prior to that, the center operated at a
Law Enforcement Sensitive level for about 2 years in a different
facility. RTTAC has an all-crimes and counterterrorism scope of
operations and handles all of the critical asset management and threat
assessment capabilities in its area of responsibility.
Participating agencies include the National Guard, FBI, U.S. Attorney's
Office, ICE, and representatives from fire, law enforcement, and public
health disciplines. DHS I&A has assigned an intelligence officer, and
the FBI has assigned two analysts and one intelligence research
specialist, and recently added a JTTF threat squad to the RTTAC team to
vet tips and leads. In addition, there are other state and local
analysts in the center. The FBI also provides RTTAC personnel with TS/
SCI security clearances. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks
accessible to the fusion center include LEO, HSIN, HSIN-
Counterterrorism portal, HSDN, as well as FBI systems, such as the
Automated Case Support (ACS) system and SCION. The RTTAC also has
access to SIPRNet, among other federal and state systems and networks.
Colorado:
The Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) became operational in
October 2004 under the direction of the Colorado Bureau of
Investigation. The Colorado State Patrol took over operation and
management of CIAC in March 2005, and it moved into its new facility in
April 2005. CIAC was originally opened to support and respond to
credible threats during the elections in 2004, but has since evolved to
have an all-crimes and all-hazards scope of operation. Its mission is
to provide an integrated, multidiscipline information-sharing network
to collect, analyze, and disseminate information to stakeholders in a
timely manner in order to protect the citizens and critical
infrastructure of Colorado. CIAC has no investigative power but does
have the ability to collect, analyze, and vet information for
authenticity. When additional investigation is necessary, CIAC sends
information to the DHS, the FBI's FIG, and to local law enforcement.
CIAC is staffed full-time by the Colorado State Patrol, the National
Guard, the Department of Revenue, and the FBI. There are part-time
participants in CIAC from the Colorado Departments of Agriculture,
Public Health, Corrections, Education, and the Colorado Springs Police
Department, as well as from the U.S. Marshals Service. The University
of Denver also provides interns to CIAC. DHS I&A has conducted a needs
assessment of CIAC. However, at the time of our review, it had not
placed an intelligence analyst in the center. CIAC has access to a
regional DHS protective security advisor.[Footnote 54]
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to CIAC include
HSIN, LEO, and the FPS portal. In addition, the center has access to,
among others, Rocky Mountain Information Network, U.S. Northern
Command, and SIPRNET, which is accessed through the FBI. CIAC produces
several types of bulletins and summaries, including For Official Use
Only and Law Enforcement Sensitive versions of a monthly summary of
reported incidents, daily reports, officer safety bulletins, and early
warning and special reports. These products are e-mailed to a number of
recipients, including members of the critical infrastructure sectors.
Products are also distributed directly to law enforcement officers via
in-car mobile data computers. The monthly summaries are produced with
the FBI FIG and also cover incidents in Wyoming, and some of the
special reports are produced jointly with the FBI and the U.S. Northern
Command.
Connecticut:
The Connecticut Intelligence Center (CTIC) opened in April 2005 as the
centralized point of information sharing for the state. CTIC is a multi-
agency operation representing various jurisdictions that serves to
collect, analyze, and disseminate criminal and terrorism-related
intelligence to all law enforcement agencies in the state. CTIC has an
all-crimes scope of operations and endeavors to identify emerging
threats or crime trends.
Colocated with an FBI field office and jointly led by the FBI and the
Connecticut State Police, CTIC's 12-member staff includes
representatives from the FBI, the U.S. Coast Guard, the state
department of corrections, State Police, and local law enforcement
agencies. DHS I&A placed an intelligence officer in the center in
September 2007. FBI personnel serve in both supervisory and analytical
roles in CTIC. For example, CTIC Operations Supervisor is also the FBI
FIG supervisor. Day-to-day operations are managed by an FBI Supervisory
Special Agent and supported by two Intelligence Coordinators, one from
the state police and one from the FBI. The FBI also provides Top Secret
clearances to CTIC personnel.
The state is divided into five regions, each of which is represented in
CTIC by a Regional Intelligence Liaison Officers. The officers are
appointed by the corresponding Connecticut Police Chiefs Association
and represent local law enforcement agencies in the center. The
officers maintain full-time positions at CTIC and serve a recommended
minimum of 2 years after obtaining a Top Secret clearance. CTIC offers
a stipend for each municipality that places an officer in the center.
The officers serve as the communication link between CTIC and a network
of Intelligence Liaison Officers who are specially trained officers who
represent local departments within each region. The Intelligence
Liaison Officers are responsible for providing information to CTIC and
for providing statewide and jurisdictional-specific information from
CTIC to their respective agencies. CTIC has an Advisory Board that
meets quarterly and defines strategy and policy for the center. CTIC
also has partnerships with the private sector through Connecticut
Infragard.[Footnote 55]
CTIC takes an all-crimes approach to information collection and has
access to a number of state and federal systems and networks. DHS and
DOJ information systems or networks accessible to CTIC include HSIN,
LEO, and ACS, Guardian, and Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW) through
the FBI. In addition, CTIC has access to the New England State Police
Information Network, which is part of RISSNet, and SIPRNet. CTIC
produces a variety of intelligence products, including weekly bulletins
on criminal activities; weekly intelligence bulletins; intelligence
assessments, which provide in-depth reporting on an emerging threat,
group, or crime; and intelligence information reports. Their primary
customers are the law enforcement officers, emergency managers, and the
private sector in the state and Northeast region.
Delaware:
After the September 11, 2001, attacks, Delaware officials identified a
need to establish a conduit for information flow, both to and from the
federal government and local entities and in and out of Delaware. Led
by the Delaware State Police, the Delaware Information Analysis Center
(DIAC) was subsequently opened in December 2005. DIAC, through a
multijurisdictional and multidiscipline effort, is committed to
providing a coordinated, professional, and all-hazards approach in
preventing, disrupting, and defeating criminal and terrorist activity
while safeguarding individuals' constitutional guarantees.
Specifically, using an all-crimes and all-hazards approach, DIAC will
collect, analyze, and disseminate criminal intelligence; conduct crime
analysis; provide officer and public safety alerts to all disciplines;
and disseminate critical infrastructure information to those persons in
law enforcement, government, and the private sector who have both a
right and need to know, with the objective of protecting the citizens,
infrastructure, and key assets of the state.
Partners from other state agencies include Public Health, Department of
Technology and Information, Department of Corrections, Transportation,
Division of Revenue, and Natural Resources, as well as the Delaware
Volunteer Firemen's Association and all other law enforcement entities
in the state, including local and federal agencies. At the time of our
review, DIAC staff included six full-time analysts and two Delaware
National Guard analysts, as well as three personnel assigned to
critical infrastructure protection. DIAC also has two Delaware State
Police commissioned officers assigned in administrative roles. Two of
the six state police analysts have Top Secret clearances that were
granted by the FBI. At the time of our review, there were no DHS or FBI
personnel represented in DIAC.
Analysts produce a variety of products, including a weekly intelligence
report for law enforcement and a weekly infrastructure bulletin for
private sector partners as well as situational reports and homeland
security and situational alerts. Tactical alerts and reports on
multijurisdictional criminal activity are supplied to Delaware law
enforcement agencies in many forms such as officer safety warnings,
warnings and indicators of terrorist events, site-specific critical
infrastructure and asset alerts, and informational bulletins and
assessments. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to
the fusion center include HSIN, LEO, and FPS portal. In addition, DIAC
has access to information from High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
(HIDTA) and the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, which are
private sector critical infrastructure protection sharing centers. Both
information and intelligence are collected from and disseminated to
other state fusion centers, DHS, the FBI, the U.S. Coast Guard, local
law enforcement, the private sector, the Delaware National Guard, Dover
Air Force Base, other state agencies, and the Information Sharing and
Analysis Centers.
District of Columbia:
After a planning stage that began in 2005, the Metropolitan Washington
Fusion Center (MWFC) opened in the spring of 2006 to provide local
governments and agencies with an approach and capability for networked
information sharing. Led by the Metropolitan Police Department, MWFC
has multiple agencies and disciplines represented and serves the
National Capital Region.
MWFC has a 24/7 command center that provides a constant flow of
information and looks at that information for patterns of activity
alongside the crime analysis unit. MWFC is an all-crimes center, but
also has an all-hazards function as it follows the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, in particular focusing on the large
number of national monuments located within the Washington metropolitan
area. The all-hazards function is supported by partnerships with the
Department of Health, which helps with responding to health issues such
as pandemics and natural disasters, and the Washington, D.C., National
Guard, which helps with the analysis of patterns and response to
events. It is also coordinated with the MWFC's Emergency Management
Agency functions. An official said that MWFC did not want to focus only
on crime because important threat information and information that
leads analysts to detect suspicious patterns occurs in many other areas
as well. In addition, it was also important to MWFC to adopt the dual
all-crimes, all-hazards focus because the fusion center wanted to give
a number of partner agencies "a seat at the table" to increase support
of the center. An official also noted that the MWFC has created a
Fusion Center Regional Programmatic Workgroup to develop a regional
strategy, product development, and charter, and to form a solid,
cohesive, common operating picture for the region.
The FBI and DHS I&A have assigned personnel to MWFC. At the time of our
review, the fusion center was located in secure space provided by the
FBI. However, according to the official, the center is planning to move
into D.C. government space within 30 months. DHS and DOJ information
systems or networks accessible to the fusion center include LEO and
FBINet. The center will be a RISS node through the Middle Atlantic-
Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network and is in the
review process with DHS to receive HSDN.
Florida:
The Florida Fusion Center is a component of the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement's (FDLE) Office of Statewide Intelligence. According to
FDLE officials, the Office of Statewide Intelligence was created in
1996 with the primary mission "to provide FDLE leadership with
sufficient information so that they (sic) may make informed decisions
on the deployment of resources." The office is responsible for the
coordination of FDLE's intelligence efforts and analysis and
dissemination of intelligence and crime data information. The office
has always had an all-crimes approach that was reflective of FDLE's
investigative strategy and focus areas. This approach was enhanced with
the addition of a domestic security mission after 9/11. Under the
coordination of FDLE, seven regional domestic security task forces were
created, along with an analytical unit within the Office of Statewide
Intelligence to enhance domestic security and counterterrorism
investigative efforts. Each task force is cochaired by an FDLE Special
Agent in Charge and a sheriff from the region. The task forces include
multidisciplinary partners from education, fire rescue, health,
communications, law enforcement, and emergency management. These
disciplines are also reflected in the composition of the fusion center.
The Florida Fusion Center was established in January 2007 with a
mission to protect the citizens, visitors, resources, and critical
infrastructure of Florida by enhancing information sharing,
intelligence capabilities, and preparedness operations for all local,
state, and federal agencies in accordance with Florida's Domestic
Security Strategy. The fusion center will serve as the state node and
will provide connectivity and intelligence sharing amongst Florida's
regional fusion centers. The center consists of approximately 45 FDLE
members, federal agencies, state multidisciplinary partners, and
includes outreach to private sector entities. FDLE members who are part
of the fusion center have assignments to various squads within the
Office of Statewide Intelligence, to include counterterrorism
intelligence, financial crime analysis, critical infrastructure, and a
24/7 situational awareness unit, the Florida investigative support
squad. FFC also has full-time analysts from DHS I&A and the FBI working
at the center, as well as representation from the U.S. Attorney's
Office. The center will add a full-time analyst from the Florida
National Guard in October 2007.
State agencies and departments that have committed to participate as
members of the Fusion Center Executive Policy Board and have designated
an intelligence liaison officer or analyst to the fusion center
include: Agriculture; Business and Professional Regulation;
Corrections; Education; Emergency Management; Environmental Protection;
Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission; Financial Services; Health;
Highway Safety; FDLE; Transportation; and the National Guard.
DHS and DOJ systems and networks the center has access to include LEO,
HSIN, HSIN-Intel, HSIN-Florida, and HSDN.
Georgia:
The Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC) was
established in October 2001 and falls under the responsibility and
management of the Georgia Office of Homeland Security. The initial
focus of GISAC was to address terrorism and the information gap among
federal, state, and local law enforcement in providing homeland
security intelligence. Its mission is to serve as the focal point for
collection, analysis, and dissemination of information on threats or
attacks of a terrorist nature within and against the State of Georgia,
its citizens, or infrastructure.
GISAC is one of the three components of the Georgia Office of Homeland
Security and is divided into four sections--law enforcement, criminal
intelligence, fire services/hazmat, and emergency management. GISAC has
a staff of 27, the majority of whom are personnel from the Georgia
Bureau of Investigation. Other state agencies with assigned personnel
at the center include the Georgia Emergency Management Agency, Georgia
State Patrol, Georgia Department of Corrections, and Georgia National
Guard. The Georgia Sheriffs' Association, Georgia Fire Chiefs
Association, and Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police have each
assigned one person to the center. DHS I&A has assigned two staff to
GISAC; one Southeast region representative and one intelligence
officer. There are no FBI personnel assigned directly to GISAC.
However, there are two GISAC personnel assigned to the JTTF, and all
analysts have access to the FBI FIG, whereby they have access to FBI
systems. GISAC is also located in the same building as the FBI field
office with its JTTF and FIG.
GISAC produces a variety of products, including an open source report
weekly, which is posted on the Office of Homeland Security-Georgia
Emergency Management Agency Web site and distributed electronically; a
monthly intelligence report that is For Official Use Only and
distributed electronically; alerts and notices, which are produced on
an as-needed basis; a monthly outbreak and surveillance report from the
Georgia Department of Health; and an Georgia Bureau of Investigation-
produced joint GISAC/FBI multipage monthly bulletin that contains GISAC
statistics combined with FBI information. DHS and DOJ systems and
networks to which GISAC has access include HSIN, HSDN, and LEO. In
addition, GISAC analysts are able to access FBI systems, such as E-
Guardian, IDW, and ACS.
Hawaii:
According to a State of Hawaii Department of Defense official, for the
past 2 years officials from civil defense and state law enforcement
have discussed the possibility of establishing a fusion center in
Hawaii. Specifically, they have discussed establishing an intelligence
unit under state and local law enforcement control to complement the
FBI's JTTF in Honolulu. A state fusion center would provide
intelligence and analysis to all disciplines, especially law
enforcement. Planning officials are not seeking a center that is only
focused on the prevention and disruption of terrorism, but one that
would complement other departments, agencies, and task forces within
the context of all hazards. The official noted that the establishment
of a fusion center in Hawaii depends on the adequacy and allocation of
Homeland Security grant funds in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. According
to the official, Hawaii's fiscal year 2007 allocation will not support
the current investment strategy for a fusion center. The official said
that they will have to wait until fiscal year 2008 or find an
alternative funding strategy.
Idaho:
Idaho does not have and is not planning to establish a physical fusion
center. However, according to the directors of the Bureau of Homeland
Security and Idaho State Police, the state has a "virtual fusion
process." The fusion process grew out of monthly information-sharing
meetings prior to September 11 that were held by the Idaho Bureau of
Hazardous Materials with other federal, state, and local officials in
Idaho. In October 2001, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of
Idaho offered to serve as the cornerstone of an information-sharing
effort. A member of the U.S. Attorney's Office, who is also a member of
the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council,[Footnote 56] provides the
overarching structure for the fusion process by facilitating
connections between federal sources of intelligence in Idaho and state
and local law enforcement. This individual holds meetings several times
a year, provides information and analyses to consumers by way of the
Internet and coordinates with the two JTTFs in the area. Participants
in the fusion process also use HSIN.
The officials articulated several reasons why they are not planning to
establish a fusion center, including the state's commitment to support
the efforts of the U.S. Attorney's Office to conduct threat analyses
and share information, political concerns about the role of the
government in information sharing, local agencies' lack of interest in
participating in a fusion center because they perceive the centers to
be intelligence-gathering entities, and local communities do not want
law enforcement to be involved in gathering intelligence, the state's
low risk for international terrorism, and difficulties staffing a
center because state and local agencies would not have the capacity to
provide personnel to work in a fusion center.
Illinois:
There are two fusion centers in Illinois, the Statewide Terrorism and
Intelligence Center (STIC) and the Chicago Crime Prevention and
Information Center (CPIC).
Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center:
Led by the Illinois State Police, the Statewide Terrorism and
Intelligence Center (STIC) was established in May 2003 with the mission
to provide timely, effective, and actionable intelligence information
to local, state, and federal law enforcement and private sector
partners in order to enhance public safety, facilitate communication
between agencies, and provide support in the fight against terrorism
and criminal activity. STIC is an all-crimes fusion center that is
colocated with the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, with which it
works closely during disasters. When STIC was established, it absorbed
the state police intelligence unit, which focused on general crimes
(e.g., violent crimes, narcotics, sex offenders), because, in part, the
planners wanted to combine all of the silos of information needed to
prevent criminal and terrorist activity.
STIC is organized into two sections: a terrorism section, which staffs
the 24/7 watch, and the field support section, which has a criminal
intelligence unit with specialists working on drugs, violent crimes,
motor vehicle theft, and sex offenses. The Illinois State Police and
the Illinois National Guard provide nearly all of the personnel,
including 7 sworn officers, 18 terrorism research specialists, 4
narcotics analysts, 3 other crime/violent crime analysts, 1 senior
terrorism lead analyst, 1 firearms analyst, 2 motor vehicle theft
analysts, 6 Internet crime analysts, 1 America's Missing: Broadcast
Emergency Response (AMBER) Alert analyst, and 2 office assistants. The
FBI has assigned two analysts to work terrorism-related cases, the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) has assigned one analyst to work
narcotics cases, and DHS I&A has assigned one analyst to work on
homeland security issues. The Illinois Terrorism Task Force, which is
composed of representatives from state and local agencies involved in
emergency planning in the event of a critical incident, provides
support to the Illinois State Police and approves the funding for STIC.
STIC also has partnerships with the private sector. For example, the
Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and its Public-Private Liaison
Committee, along with STIC, initiated the Infrastructure Security
Awareness program in September 2004. The program was designed to share
critical and sensitive non-law-enforcement information in a timely
manner with corporate security executives as well as provide a forum
for information exchange among private security professionals. This
program enables STIC to provide threat information to major
corporations and to receive reports of suspicious activity. STIC
provides information to private security partners by using HSIN, which
allows for the exchange of data, text messages, meeting dates, and the
building of specialized tools to meet various applications through a
secure Internet connection.
STIC's terrorism research specialists collect, analyze, and disseminate
terrorism-related intelligence data; complete in-depth threat
assessments; and identify predictive, incident-based indicators of
potential terrorist activities within the state. The specialists have
access to various state and federal law enforcement intelligence
databases, public records databases, and financial databases. DHS and
DOJ information systems or networks accessible to STIC include HSIN,
JRIES, LEO, RISSNET, R-DEX, and the FPS portal as well as FinCEN and
HIDTA. The officials said that they will have access to FBI and DHS
classified systems when their SCIF, for which the FBI is funding the
construction, is completed.
STIC provides a variety of services to support officers in the field,
including a 20-minute workup on requests from officers conducting
traffic stops and responding to major crime scenes, lead management and
development, on-scene analytical services, and statewide deconfliction
to all law enforcement agencies by using the HIDTA nationwide network.
STIC recently adopted the Internet Crimes Analysis Unit, which takes
calls from the public regarding fraud, sexual predators, terrorism, and
other issues and also administers the AMBER Alert program.
Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center:
The Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC), led by the
Chicago Police Department, opened in April 2007 with the mission "to
enhance partnerships which foster a connection between every facet of
the law enforcement community. CPIC will afford the men and women, who
are dedicated to protecting the public and addressing violence, with
all available intelligence resources, and communications capabilities."
CPIC's goal is to be the clearinghouse of information that is fused and
delivered to stakeholders. CPIC has an all-crimes and counterterrorism
focus. The Chicago Police Department is involved in the fusion process
as it relates to violent crime, and the department has an in-house
counterterrorism section.
In addition to Chicago Police Department officers, the FBI has assigned
three analysts to the CPIC. The center also has personnel from ICE,
ATF, HIDTA (5 days a week), Chicago's Metrarail, the Cook County
Sheriff's Department, the Illinois State Police, and 35 suburban police
departments. CPIC is in the process of establishing a transportation
"desk" staffed with Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
Amtrak, Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), and local agency personnel.
DHS I&A has conducted a needs assessment. However, at the time of our
review, it had not placed an intelligence analyst in the center.
CPIC is tactically oriented and designed to provide direct, near-real-
time support to law enforcement personnel on the street. It provides,
among other things, real-time violent crime detection monitoring and
response, continual assessment of available resources for the purpose
of possible redeployment of manpower, instantaneous major incident
notification, analysis and identification of retaliatory violence and
automated construction of enforcement missions to thwart retaliatory
violence, crime pattern identification, and immediate access to in-
depth background data on persons of investigative interest. DHS and DOJ
systems and networks accessible to CPIC include HSIN, HSDN, FPS Portal,
LEO, FBI's ACS and IDW, as well as NCIC, FinCEN, RISSNET, RISS ATIX,
INTERPOL, International Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing
Network (NLETS), EPIC, National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC),
Treasury Enforcement Communications System, and numerous other state
and local systems and data sources. CPIC also recently added a
satellite tracking system that traces stolen bank funds and the
offender.
CPIC focuses on producing products to assist police officers on the
street. A primary product is the District Intelligence Bulletin System,
which is a Web-based application that uses multiple data sources to
provide officers with a law enforcement road map. It provides officers
with calls for service, wanted persons, most recent shootings/
homicides, and additional intelligence in a succinct format. All of
this information is automatically updated on a continuous basis
throughout the day and is accessible by deployed patrol officers. It
allows an officer to review information by district and deployment
area. CPIC also publishes a daily intelligence briefing, which is
designed to give officers a more detailed overview of potential threats
based on international, national, and local events, and a weekly
version for the private sector.
Indiana:
The Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center (IIFC), which opened in December
2006, was established with the mission to collect, evaluate, analyze,
and disseminate information and intelligence data regarding criminal
and terrorist activity in the State of Indiana while following Fair
Information Practices to ensure the rights and privacy of citizens. In
addition to collecting information on all crimes, IIFC will
specifically collect information as it relates to terrorism and its
impact on Indiana. IIFC has an all-crimes approach, acting as an
intelligence group for the state. However, there is a terrorism nexus
to the fusion center's work.
IIFC is operated by the Indiana Department of Homeland Security and has
been staffed as a task force entity with federal and state partners.
Indiana state agency, department, and association partners in IIFC are:
Homeland Security, National Guard, State Excise Police, Natural
Resources, Association of Chiefs of Police, Gaming Commission Division
of Gaming Agents, Indiana State Police, Corrections, Sheriff's
Association, Marion County Sheriff's Department, and the Indiana Campus
Law Enforcement Association. Federal partners in IIFC include the FBI,
and the U.S. Attorneys for the Northern and Southern Districts of
Indiana. The FBI has assigned two FIG analysts to IIFC. DHS I&A has
conducted a needs assessment of IIFC. However, at the time of our
review, it had not yet placed an intelligence analyst in the center. A
12-member executive committee oversees IIFC's activities.
The center is a 24/7 intelligence operations center that works in
conjunction with statewide law enforcement liaisons, providing for
intelligence-led policing throughout the state. IIFC operates a 1-800
tip line and an IIFC e-mail box and produces a bulletin three times a
week. DHS and DOJ systems and networks that IIFC has access to include
HSIN-Intel, HSDN, RISS, FPS portal, LEO, as well as SIPRNet, RISS,
NCIC, and EPIC. The FBI has built a Top Secret secure room within IIFC,
and also provided access to the ACS and Guardian systems in the secure
space.
Iowa:
The Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center was established in December 2004
with the mission to enable the State of Iowa to proactively direct core
resources with its partners to avert or meet current, emerging, and
future public safety and homeland security threats. Following the
attacks of September 11, Iowa established a Homeland Security Advisory
Council to enhance the state's capability to implement the Iowa
Homeland Security Initiative. In the spring of 2002, the council's
Information and Intelligence Sharing Task force was formed to make
recommendations for sharing intelligence and information, and among
other things, it recommended the establishment of a fusion center.
Built on the backbone of the Iowa Law Enforcement Intelligence Network,
the Intelligence Fusion System consists of the fusion center, six
regional fusion offices, and a number of partner agencies and
organizations. The fusion center is led by the Iowa Department of
Public Safety and serves as a centralized information collection,
analysis, and dissemination point. It is staffed with 18 full-time
analysts (16 of whom are state funded), 11 investigator/collectors, and
5 support staff. Nearly all are Iowa Department of Public Safety
personnel. However, there is an Iowa National Guard analyst assigned to
the center, and the Midwest HIDTA provides funding for one intelligence
analyst in the center. Although no federal agencies have assigned
personnel to the fusion center yet, the center conducts regular
meetings with the FBI's FIG and JTTF, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and
the DHS Protective Security Advisor. The fusion center has placed one
Department of Public Safety agent full-time at the JTTF and conducts
regular and as-needed coordination and information-sharing meetings
with the state Homeland Security Advisor, the Iowa Homeland Security
and Emergency Management Division, the Iowa Department of Agriculture
and Land Stewardship, and the Iowa Department of Public Health, among
others. The six regional fusion offices are strategically located
across the state. A fusion center agent is assigned to each regional
office and is partnered with two to four local officials at each site.
Fusion system personnel also regularly participate in meetings of the
local InfraGard chapter. In addition, the Department of Public Safety
is part of the Safeguard Iowa Partnership, which is a voluntary
coalition of business and government leaders who combine their efforts
to prevent, protect from, respond to, and recover from catastrophic
events. The Safeguard Iowa Partnership was formally launched in January
2007.
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion
center include LEO and HSIN (law enforcement and counterterrorism
portals), as well as RISSNET. HSIN-Secret has been deployed to the
State Emergency Operations Center, but DHS has not deployed the system
to the fusion center. Fusion center personnel who are JTTF members are
granted Top Secret clearances and can access FBI systems at the JTTF
office.
Kansas:
The Adjutant General of Kansas, Kansas Bureau of Investigation, and
Kansas Highway Patrol formed the Kansas Threat Integration Center
(KSTIC) in June 2004 with the mission to assist Kansas law enforcement
and other related agencies in their mission to protect the citizens and
critical infrastructures within Kansas through enhanced gathering,
analysis, and dissemination of criminal and terrorist intelligence
information. KSTIC focuses on the development, gathering, analyzing,
and dissemination of criminal and terrorist threat information in order
to protect citizens, property, and infrastructure in Kansas.
Additionally, KSTIC works to increase threat awareness among law
enforcement, other governmental agencies, and private infrastructure
providers in the state. KSTIC's scope of operations is primarily
focused on terrorist/extremist activities with a secondary all-crimes
scope of operations that comes into play when criminal acts serve as a
prelude to terrorist or extremist activities. It is not an all-hazards
facility, but KSTIC is colocated with the Kansas Division of Emergency
Management and therefore has access to its resources.
KSTIC is a joint operation of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation,
National Guard, and Highway Patrol. An Executive Board, consisting of
one member from each agency, provides oversight and the KBI
representative is responsible for the day-to-day operations of KSTIC.
There are three full-time staff--a Kansas Bureau of Investigation
senior special agent, an investigator from the Highway Patrol, and a
National Guard Captain--however, KSTIC can use Kansas Bureau of
Investigation analysts for assistance as needed. Personnel hold TS/SCI
clearances. KSTIC is in the process of hiring two to four analysts
depending on funding availability. While KSTIC has no federal partners,
it interfaces with state FBI JTTFs on a regular basis and is discussing
the possibility of colocating with the JTTF.
KSTIC accesses sensitive but unclassified bulletins and reports and
open source information to report on terrorist/extremist threats to
Kansas in particular and the Midwest in general. Additionally, KSTIC
receives tip and other information directly from citizens and state law
enforcement. KSTIC uses access to classified systems to identify and
monitor potential threats to Kansas. DHS and DOJ information systems or
networks accessible to KSTIC include HSIN, HSIN-Secret, LEO, FPS
portal, as well as SIPRNet and FinCEN. KSTIC personnel also have full
access to the FBI's various databases (i.e., Guardian and IDW) at an
FBI field office or JTTF location. Through the National Guard, the
KSTIC is planning to construct a SCIF, which when completed will
provide space for approximately 15 personnel as well as secure
connectivity to a variety of Top Secret and other systems.
KSTIC produces intelligence/information bulletins for state and
regional law enforcement. All information disseminated is sensitive but
unclassified, with the exception of the periodic open source bulletins
published for dissemination to a public/infrastructure distribution
list. Bulletins are posted on several secure sites, such as LEO and FPS
Web sites, as well as distributed via statewide teletype and e-mail.
The distribution list includes state, local, and federal agencies in
Kansas as well as other agencies around the country.
Kentucky:
The Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center (KIFC) opened in December 2005
as an all-crimes fusion center. The fusion center focuses on all
crimes, rather than those with a nexus to terrorism, primarily to
obtain buy-in from local agencies. KIFC was established with support
from the Kentucky Office of Homeland Security; the Kentucky State
Police, which transferred its intelligence center to KIFC; and the
Kentucky Transportation Cabinet, which provides KIFC its facility.
Other agencies in the fusion center include ATF, the Kentucky
Department of Corrections, Kentucky Department of Military Affairs,
Kentucky Vehicle Enforcement, and the Lexington Metro Police. The FBI
has assigned one full-time FIG analyst to the center. KIFC does not
have any DHS personnel assigned to the center.
The fusion center provides all-crimes and terrorism intelligence
analytical services; supports the JTTF with counterterrorism
investigators; assists all federal, state, and local law enforcement
with requests for information on suspects; assists law enforcement in
the location of subjects, suspect vehicle registration, and suspect
driver's license photo and data; provides link analysis charts such as
association links, communication links, and event flow; serves as the
conduit for law enforcement's request for information from other state
fusion centers; provides access to HSIN-KY, the state Web site for law
enforcement information sharing; and serves as a repository for the
state's identified critical infrastructures. Some KIFC components are
operational 24/7, such as the law enforcement communication and the
transportation component.
KIFC receives statewide all-crimes tips through a toll-free hotline and
through Web site submission and has law enforcement radio and data
communications capability through Kentucky State Police Communications,
which is located in the fusion center. DHS and DOJ information systems
or networks accessible to the fusion center include HSIN and LEO, as
well as RISS/Regional Organized Crime Information Center. The official
said that KIFC does not have the capacity to receive classified
information because the facility has no secure room or SCIF.
Louisiana:
Established in October 2004, the Louisiana State Analysis & Fusion
Exchange (La-SAFE), which is led by the Louisiana State Police, evolved
from existing state police analytical units. The state police
Investigative Support Section has been in place since the late 1960s
and early 1970s, with an intelligence collection and analysis unit that
was developed primarily to handle organized crime. As the investigative
and intelligence needs of the police shifted over time, so too did the
mission of the intelligence component, expanding from organized crime
to gangs, drug trafficking, and, post-September 11, homeland security.
The police intelligence unit was engaged in all-crimes collection of
intelligence to support all criminal investigations. La-SAFE has
adopted an all-crimes/all-hazards scope of operations.
The mission of La-SAFE is to (1) promote a collaborative environment
for governmental and corporate partners to work together in providing
timely information for use in providing public safety and promoting
national security against terrorist and other criminal threats; (2)
actively work to collect and analyze information from various sources
to provide those responsible for protecting state resources with
information that is pertinent in decision-making processes, allows for
the maximizing of resources, and improves the ability to efficiently
protect the citizens of Louisiana in matters of infrastructure
protection and against organized criminal activity; and (3) evaluate
all information provided and ensure that the information La-SAFE
retains and utilizes is directly related to legitimate law enforcement
purposes and has been legally obtained. La-SAFE will not interfere with
the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights and privileges of
individuals.
La-SAFE is staffed by 3 commissioned personnel and 20 analysts with
experience in case support, information production, and information
sharing in the areas of organized crime and terrorism. Louisiana State
Police, the Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness, Louisiana National Guard, East Baton Rouge
Parish Sheriff's Office, DHS I&A, and FBI have assigned full-time
analysts to La-SAFE. The center recently established a relationship
with the U.S. Coast Guard.
La-SAFE produces a variety of information and intelligence products,
including general information bulletins (e.g., notices on general
crimes or intelligence); daily incident briefs (i.e., daily reports of
incidents reported to the center from a variety of sources); a weekly
homeland defense bulletin covering homeland security issues around the
world; and a summary of monthly regional crime information called the
Intelligator.
DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to La-SAFE include HSIN,
LEO, and the U.S. Coast Guard's Homeport. Louisiana has a state HSIN
portal, HSIN-LA, that provides a secure capability to share information
and collaborate with public and private sector partners. It allows
users to report suspicious activities to the fusion center for review
and action. There are currently over 800 participants representing law
enforcement, first responders, and critical infrastructure with access
to HSIN-LA. Information currently being shared within HSIN-LA includes
safety bulletins, intelligence reports, training opportunities,
information-sharing meetings, and requests for information.
Maine:
The Maine Intelligence and Analysis Center is a collaborative effort
between the Maine State Police and the Maine Emergency Management
Agency to share resources, expertise, and information to maximize
homeland security efforts and to detect and assist in the deterrence of
terrorist activity. Maine has had a traditional state police criminal
intelligence unit for 30 years, but the state's background in
counterintelligence was limited to traditional criminal enterprises.
The Governor decided after September 11 that the state needed a
counterintelligence unit that was homeland-security driven to deliver
information to the Governor. The center was formally established by an
executive order that was effective December 2006. The Maine
Intelligence and Analysis Center is in the early stages of development
and at the time of our review was not yet fully functional. For
example, the center has physical space and personnel, has developed
standard operating procedures, and is in the process of conducting
outreach with state and local entities.
The center's mission is to support the Maine State Police and the Maine
Emergency Management Agency in their respective roles of public safety
protector and homeland security incident manager for the citizens of
the State of Maine. The center is to be a clearinghouse of and central
repository for intelligence and information related to Maine's homeland
security and any terrorist-related activity that may threaten the lives
and safety of the citizens of the United States and the State of Maine.
Its scope of operations is counterterrorism. However, the center plans
to expand its focus in the future to include an all-crimes approach.
The Maine Intelligence and Analysis Center has one intelligence analyst
and one homeland security specialist, along with a backbone of four
analysts from the Maine State Patrol Criminal Intelligence Unit. An
official indicated that the center will absorb the Criminal
Intelligence Unit in the near future forming a single unit. While there
are no federal personnel assigned to the center, it has partnered with
FBI's JTTF, the U.S. Attorney's Office Anti-Terror Section, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), TSA, U.S. Coast Guard, ICE, Maine
National Guard, other state and local law enforcement agencies with
intelligence sections, and the Maine Anti-Terror Intelligence Network,
which is organized by the U.S. Attorney's Office to facilitate
interaction between partner agencies' analysts. The center is overseen
by an Advisory Board consisting of three members who meet at least
twice annually.
The center conducts research and analysis to provide actionable
intelligence for field units and policy makers, and provides quick
(i.e., within 15 minutes) response to queries from the field to allow
officers to take action within constitutionally reasonable time frames.
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion
center include LEO and HSIN, as well as RISS ATIX, RISS, FinCEN,
INTERPOL, EPIC, and NLETS. The center also has access to a variety of
state and commercial information systems and databases. Products
include notices, bulletins, briefing information, reports, and
assessments that cover day-to-day events, warnings, and officer safety
issues. First responders, law enforcement, emergency managers,
civilians, and the private sector (e.g., utilities, chemicals, food
supply, and technology) are among the center's customers.
Maryland:
The Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC) is operated by the
Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Executive Committee and is governed by
a charter that was developed with input from the FBI and approved by
the Executive Committee. MCAC began operations in November 2003 in
response to the events of September 11 and the need for ways for the
FBI and local agencies to disseminate terrorist-related information.
MCAC has an all-crimes and counterterrorism scope of operations and
consists of representatives of 24 agencies who staff the center,
including the FBI, DHS, U.S. Army, U.S. Coast Guard, and Maryland state
and local organizations. DHS I&A has assigned one analyst, and the FBI
has seven analysts, one special agent, and one supervisory special
agent assigned to MCAC.
MCAC, which operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, is organized into
two sections, the Watch Section and the Strategic Analysis Section. The
Watch Section provides support to federal, state, and local agencies by
receiving and processing information, monitoring intelligence
resources, coordinating with Maryland law enforcement, and
disseminating intelligence information. The Watch Section primarily
consists of representatives from Maryland police and sheriffs, along
with representation from the U.S. Army and the Maryland National Guard.
As information enters MCAC, it is passed through the Watch Section,
which either passes that information on to federal or state entities or
the Strategic Analysis Section or enters it into federal and state
databases, such as the FBI's Guardian. The Strategic Analysis Section
receives, processes, analyzes, and disseminates information. MCAC has
12 analysts, and the section is staffed by representatives from various
organizations, including the Maryland State Police, FBI, U.S. Coast
Guard, and the Maryland National Guard.
Information enters MCAC through a variety of ways, including tips from
the general public or law enforcement, as well as from the National
Guard or emergency response personnel. Information is received via a
tip line or e-mail. DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to MCAC
include HSIN, HSDN, LEO, FBINet, SCION, as well as RISS/Middle Atlantic-
Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network, SIPRNET, NCIC,
INTERPOL, EPIC, and NLETS, among others. MCAC provides a daily report
to every police chief in the state as well as other state fusion
centers and any other organization that is on its distribution list.
Entities such as the Maryland JTTF, Terrorism Screening Center, and
National Counterterrorism Center receive information from MCAC.
Terrorism-related law enforcement information is also shared and
entered into the FBI's Guardian database. Products include a daily
watch report, which is a brief summary of tips and requests for
information received by the Watch Section over the previous 24-hour
period, and intelligence bulletins, which are intelligence/law
enforcement-related information disseminated to law enforcement and
homeland security personnel by fax, teletype, or e-mail, and may also
be posted to LEO or RISS. Other products include threat assessments,
covering, for example, threats to military-recruiting stations, propane
cylinders, agroterrorism, or gang activity.
Massachusetts:
The Commonwealth Fusion Center (CFC) was established in October 2004 on
the foundations of the State Homeland Security Strategy and an
executive order designating it the state's principal center for
information collection and dissemination. Its mission is to collect and
analyze information from all available sources to produce and
disseminate actionable intelligence to stakeholders for strategic and
tactical decision making in order to identify, disrupt, or deter
domestic and international terrorism as well as criminal activity. CFC
takes an all-threats, all-crimes approach and has both criminal and
counterterrorism analytical support roles. The center focuses on
precursor crimes--such as organized crimes, which can be indicators of
terrorism. CFC also supports the state's Emergency Management Agency,
which is responsible for handling all hazards.
CFC works with various federal and state and agencies including FBI,
ICE, U.S. Coast Guard, HIDTA, Secret Service, TSA, ATF, the United
States Marshals Service, U.S. Attorney's Office, the Massachusetts
Emergency Management Agency, Massachusetts Department of Fire Services,
Department of Public Health, Department of Corrections, and the
National Guard. There are 15 analysts assigned to CFC, the majority of
who are Massachusetts State Police employees. However, officials said
that four of these analysts are assigned to other duties, such as the
Crime Reporting Unit or security officer, or are otherwise engaged. The
Department of Corrections and the Army National Guard have also each
assigned an analyst to CFC. All analysts and most sworn members of CFC
have Secret clearances, and a few sworn members have Top Secret
clearances. The FBI has assigned both an intelligence analyst and
special agent to CFC. DHS has assigned an intelligence officer to the
center.
CFC also possesses an investigative component through the Massachusetts
State Police Criminal Intelligence Section that provides 5 state
troopers and the Massachusetts JTTF, which has 11 state troopers in
Boston and Springfield, for a total of 16 investigators assigned to
CFC. CFC also has a railroad representative and is involved in public/
private outreach through Project Sentinel, which is a program targeting
businesses likely to identify precursor terrorist activity. CFC also
has personnel assigned to the Boston Regional Intelligence Center,
which is the regional intelligence center for the Boston/Cambridge
Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) region and is led by the Boston
Police Department.
CFC analysts produce information and intelligence briefings and
assessments and provide support to the statewide assessment of critical
infrastructure. Past products include an overview of gang activity in
the state, an assessment on prison radicalization in the state, a
report on trafficking and possible links to terrorism, a report on the
stock market and possible indicators of terrorism, and an overview of
white supremacist activity in the state. CFC also uses Geographic
Information Systems to develop products and provide data to law
enforcement and critical infrastructure stakeholders. DHS and DOJ
unclassified systems and networks accessible to CFC include HSIN and
LEO, and CFC also has access to FBI and DHS classified systems on site.
Briefings and assessments are posted on CFC secure Web site, HSIN-MA,
which also provides a document library and information-sharing
capability to Massachusetts' law enforcement, public safety, and
critical infrastructure sectors. CFC has developed e-mail lists and
extensive contact lists for state, local, and federal law enforcement
partners, military stakeholders, fire services, transportation, and
other critical infrastructure sectors.
Michigan:
There are two fusion centers in Michigan, the statewide Michigan
Intelligence and Operations Center (MIOC) and the Detroit and
Southeastern Michigan Regional (Detroit UASI) Fusion Center.
Michigan Intelligence and Operations Center:
Led by the Michigan State Police, MIOC opened in December 2006 and went
to a 24/7 operation in January 2007. The center was built on the
preexisting foundation of the Michigan State Police Intelligence and
Operations sections. MIOC's mission is to collect, evaluate, collate,
and analyze criminal justice-related information and intelligence and,
as appropriate, disseminate this information and intelligence to the
proper public safety agencies so that any threat of terrorism will be
successfully identified and addressed. Additionally, MIOC will provide
criminal justice information to appropriate law enforcement agencies to
aid in the successful prosecution of individuals involved in criminal
behavior. MIOC has an all-crimes, all-threats scope of operations with
a focus on the prevention of terrorism.
MIOC is divided into two components: (1) the operational, 24/7 portion
where all tips, requests for information, and initial information flow
into MIOC, and (2) the intelligence portion, where information is
processed, analyzed, disseminated, and reviewed. MIOC's 45-person staff
includes operational, intelligence, and administrative personnel, most
of whom are Michigan State Police personnel. There are 26 intelligence
personnel (detectives and analysts) and 13 operational personnel
(officers and dispatchers). Included in the intelligence personnel are
five analysts assigned by the National Guard, one responsible for
narcotics and four responsible for HSIN-Intel and critical
infrastructure protection at a statewide level. The state Department of
Corrections has assigned a person 2 days per week, and the Michigan
State University Police Department has assigned a full-time inspector.
The FBI has assigned one analyst and one special agent to MIOC. Three
Michigan State Police detectives are also assigned to the JTTF. DHS I&A
has conducted a needs assessment of MIOC and posted the position for an
analyst. However, at the time of our review an analyst an analyst had
not yet been assigned to the center. Additionally, MIOC is expecting
the assignment of a U.S. Coast Guard intelligence lieutenant and a DEA
analyst. MIOC has established an internship program with the Michigan
State University Criminal Justice Program. MIOC's 14-member advisory
board, which includes representatives from state and federal entities,
civil rights groups, the Detroit UASI Fusion Center, and state law
enforcement associations, provides advice and counsel to MIOC.
MIOC collects and disseminates information regarding criminal
investigations of all natures and serves as a direct case support for
various investigations. Its personnel are divided into the four
priority areas of international terrorism, domestic terrorism,
organized crime, and smuggling. DHS and DOJ information systems or
networks accessible to MIOC include HSIN, LEO, and HSDN, as well as
RISS/MAGLOCLEN. MIOC is planning to have access to SIPRNET, ACS, and
Guardian, for members of those agencies residing at MIOC. MIOC
disseminates information via briefings and bulletins (weekly and
special) to law enforcement, responds to requests for information,
prepares intelligence analysis reports, provides case support, operates
a Tip Line, provides support services (such as K-9, underwater
recovery, hazmat, forensic artists, and emergency support team), and
posts its products on sites such as LEO, HSIN-Law Enforcement, and
MAGLOCLEN. Non-law-enforcement homeland security and critical
infrastructure protection partners receive information through postings
on HSIN-Michigan.
Detroit and Southeastern Michigan Regional Fusion Center:
The Detroit and Southeastern Michigan Regional (Detroit UASI) Fusion
Center is in the early stages of development. Led by the Detroit
Homeland Security and Emergency Management, there are seven regional
partners in the urban area that are planning the center, including
Wayne County, the City of Detroit, and five other surrounding counties.
The vision for the fusion center is to identify, monitor, and provide
analysis on all terrorism, all crimes, and all hazards in the Southeast
Michigan Region in support of law enforcement, public safety, and the
private sector's prevention, preparedness, and response activities. The
center will focus on prevention and protection by serving as a conduit
to local police officers and emergency managers in the field and will
follow up on tips, conduct a watch function, and provide "foresight on
emerging situations."
The fusion center is in the first phase of planning, which is expected
to culminate in the center being fully operational in January 2008. At
the time of our review, planning officials were in the process of
establishing partnerships, selecting and training analysts, and
planning to move into the center's new facility, which will be
colocated with the Michigan HIDTA. Federal partners identified include
ICE, CBP, TSA, Secret Service, U.S. Coast Guard, FBI, Federal Bureau of
Prisons, U.S. Attorney's Office, and HIDTA. The center did not have
access to DHS and DOJ systems, but would obtain access to FBI systems
once it was colocated with the HIDTA. Additionally, the fusion center
plans to work with MIOC to leverage technology purchases and utilize
similar policies and standard operating procedures.
Minnesota:
The Minnesota Joint Analysis Center (MN-JAC) opened in May 2005 as a
partnership of the Department of Public Safety, the FBI, and several
local police departments. Its mission is the collection, management,
and distribution of strategic and tactical information and the
development and implementation of useful and meaningful information
products and training, focusing on all crimes and all hazards within
and affecting Minnesota. MN-JAC has an all-crimes and all-hazards scope
of operations. However, the center is not a law enforcement or
investigative agency because of restrictions imposed by state
law.[Footnote 57] As the center works to determine its position
relative to the existing laws, it serves primarily to coordinate among
FBI and DHS and state and local agencies. One of the ways MN-JAC
accomplishes its information-sharing function is through the
development and maintenance of its information-sharing Web portal, the
Intelligence Communications Enterprise for Information Sharing and
Exchange (ICEFISHX).[Footnote 58]
MN-JAC has 10 employees, 2 of whom are provided by the state, and the
remainder from local law enforcement agencies and the National Guard.
MN-JAC does not have an FBI analyst staffed to its center. However, MN-
JAC and the FBI's field office are colocated in the same building, and
MN-JAC personnel have access to the FBI's systems and networks. DHS I&A
has conducted a needs assessment of MN-JAC. However, at the time of our
review, it had not yet placed an intelligence analyst in the center.
DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to MN-JAC include HSIN,
HSIN-Law Enforcement, FPS portal, LEO, ACS, the FBI Intelligence
Information Reports Dissemination System,[Footnote 59] as well as
SIPRNet. The center also has access to HSIN-Secret. However, the system
is accessible only at the state's Emergency Operations Center. MN-JAC
produces two weekly briefs, one for all subscribers that covers
critical infrastructure and one for law enforcement agencies that is
law enforcement sensitive, as well as situation analyses of incidents
and threats and special threat assessments.
Mississippi:
The Mississippi Office of Homeland Security and Mississippi Department
of Public Safety are in the early stages of developing a state fusion
center. The Mississippi Analysis & Information Center (MSAIC) is
expected to open its door at the end of September 2007 and become
operational at that time. Currently, planning officials are developing
memorandums of understanding for agency representation at and support
of the center, certifying the center's secure space, and placing
equipment and furniture.
The fusion center will have a broad scope of operations--focusing on
all crimes, all hazards, and all threats--in order to support the needs
of the state and to help with the sustainability of the center. For
instance, the official said that with an all-crimes scope of
operations, the fusion center could give something back to local law
enforcement entities, many of which have limited resources and access
to information. In terms of all hazards, the fusion center is to
support the state strategy to aid in prevention and deterrence and will
be colocated with the state emergency management agency.
Missouri:
The Missouri Information Analysis Center was established in December
2005 with the mission to provide a public safety partnership,
consisting of local, state, and federal agencies, as well as the public
sector and private entities, that will collect, evaluate, analyze, and
disseminate information and intelligence to the agencies tasked with
homeland security responsibilities in a timely, effective, and secure
manner. The main goal of the center is to serve as the fastest means
for sharing information during hazards, along with the ability to
acquire and disseminate information throughout the state. The center
was initially established with analysts who were transferred from the
Missouri Highway Patrol Criminal Intelligence and Analysis Unit. The
center, which is led by the Missouri Highway Patrol, has an all-crimes
and all-hazards focus, which was established in part as a result of the
center's partnerships. The center is a member of the RISS project and
is partners with the Missouri Department of Public Safety, the Missouri
Emergency Management Administration, and the Missouri National Guard,
the latter two with which it is colocated.
In addition to its director, the Missouri Information Analysis Center
has 21 other personnel, including an assistant director and an
intelligence network manager, 8 full-time criminal intelligence
analysts, and 10 part-time intelligence intake analysts. The Missouri
Gaming Commission has also dedicated a full-time intelligence analyst
to the center. Investigators are assigned to cases out of the Highway
Patrol's Division of Drug and Crime Control as needed. The center also
provides local law enforcement the opportunity to assign analysts and
officers to it for internships. The center works closely with the JTTFs
and FIGs in the state and, according to officials, is close to
completing its secure room for two FBI special agents currently working
in the center. The center also works with the Business Executives for
National Security, which has representation from the majority of the
private corporations within the state as well as individuals interested
in assisting homeland security, and has a 13-member oversight board
that is composed of state, local, and federal representatives.
The Missouri Information Analysis Center collects and disseminates
information involving all crimes, all threats, and all hazards. The
information can be tips, leads, law enforcement reports, and open
source reports as well as information provided from the federal level.
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion
center include HSIN, HSIN-Secret, JRIES, RISSNet, RDEx, and LEO, as
well as the Midwest HIDTA Safety Net. Analysts conduct numerous
services, including, but not limited to, responding to intelligence and
criminal activity inquiries from local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies and prosecuting attorneys; performing various
analyses to evaluate patterns of criminal activity; compiling and
disseminating intelligence booklets containing data on subjects in
question for criminal activity to case investigation officers and
prosecutors; developing reports, threat assessments, bulletins,
summaries, and other publications on relevant criminal activity trends;
serving as liaison for the statewide intelligence database; providing
strategic analytical services, development, and training at the state
level to support the Midwest HIDTA; maintaining close liaison with the
Midwest HIDTA; and developing various standardized statistical reports
involving criminal and terrorist threat assessments.
Montana:
The Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center (MATIC) developed from the
intelligence unit of the Montana Department of Justice, Division of
Criminal Investigation. After the attacks of September 11, the unit
relocated to a Department of Military Affairs facility and colocated
with the JTTF. The unit opened its fusion center incarnation, MATIC, in
the spring of 2003 with the mission to collect, store, analyze, and
disseminate information on crimes, both real and suspected, to the law
enforcement community and government officials concerning dangerous
drugs, fraud, organized crime, terrorism and other criminal activity
for the purposes of decision making, public safety, and proactive law
enforcement. The center has an all-crimes scope of operations.
MATIC, administered by the Division of Criminal Investigation, is a
joint venture of the division and the Department of Corrections,
Department of Military Affairs, and the Rocky Mountain Information
Network. There are eight full-time employees, five of whom are Division
of Criminal Investigation employees. The Department of Corrections,
Department of Military Affairs, and the Rocky Mountain Information
Network each provide one full-time employee. The FBI has assigned one
analyst to MATIC, and all MATIC analysts are also considered assigned
to the JTTF.
DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to MATIC analysts include
HSIN, LEO, NCIC, and FBI classified systems located in the JTTF, as
well as the RISS/Rocky Mountain Information Network, FinCEN, and
INTERPOL. MATIC analysts provide case support to all Montana law
enforcement and assist investigators in identifying evidence, suspects,
and trends in their investigation. Each analyst assigned to MATIC has
one or more portfolios for which he or she is responsible; the
portfolios include drugs, outlaw motorcycle gangs, corrections, general
crime, left wing, right wing, northern border, critical infrastructure,
and international terrorism. Analysts review new organizations active
within the state, ongoing or potential criminal activity, trends or
activity around the country that could affect Montana, and trends or
activity in Montana that could affect other parts of the United States
or Canada. MATIC produces a daily brief for Montana that covers three
topic areas--international terrorism/border issues, domestic terrorism,
and general crime--and is disseminated on RISS and on the MATIC Web
portal. MATIC also responds to specific requests for information,
manages the critical infrastructure program, conducts training sessions
for law enforcement, and maintains a Web portal to assist in the secure
sharing of information among law enforcement. About 180 local, state,
tribal, and federal agencies access MATIC information on its Web
portal.
Nebraska:
The Nebraska State Patrol is in the planning stage of establishing the
Nebraska Fusion Center. The Nebraska State Patrol is setting up the
command structure for the center, has reorganized and placed staff into
positions, and, according to an official, is awaiting DHS funding to
hire a consultant to help develop a blueprint for the center. The
official also noted that funding will allow purchase of software
necessary to fuse their intelligence databases together. The center's
timeline has the center scheduled to open in the fall of 2007. The
fusion center is to be all-crimes, all-hazards, including terrorism.
Nebraska State Patrol officials said that the center will collect as
much intelligence information as it can, whether related to crime,
drugs, threats, terrorism, or other hazards, and then combine it and
share it with the necessary agencies. The fusion center will be the
lead intelligence-sharing component in the state and provide a seamless
flow of information to assess potential risks to the state.
The fusion center is planning to initially invite FBI, DEA, and ICE at
the federal level; the Nebraska Emergency Management Agency, Department
of Health and Human Services, and Department of Roads at the state
level; and the Omaha Police Department, the TEW in the Omaha area, and
the Lincoln Police Department at the local level. The center also plans
to partner with key elements of the private sector since the center
plans to develop infrastructure protection plans. The officials expect
that many information systems will be in place, including LEO and RISS/
Mid-States Organized Crime Information Center, and the center is
planning to disseminate an intelligence update either daily or weekly.
Nevada:
The Nevada Department of Public Safety is in the planning stages of
establishing the Nevada Analytical and Information Center. The center
is planning to have an all-crimes and all-threats focus, which would
include major crimes (such as burglary rings, fraud, rape, or
homicides) and terrorism. The state fusion center will look at crimes
at the state level and will share information with federal and local
law enforcement agencies to identify crime trends and patterns. The
center will also have an all-hazards mission and plans to include fire
departments and public health entities as stakeholders.
The center will be responsible for 15 of the 17 counties in the state,
excluding Clark and Washoe Counties, which will be covered by separate
centers operated by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and
the Washoe County Sheriff's Office.
New Hampshire:
The New Hampshire Department of Safety Division of State Police is in
the early stages of establishing the New Hampshire Fusion Center. They
are in the process of developing the fusion center as a separate entity
from several existing intelligence units within the state. For example,
after the events of September 11 the State Police created a terrorism
intelligence unit, in addition to a criminal intelligence unit that
focuses on narcotics and organized crime. The fusion center is planning
to open in 2008.
The New Hampshire Fusion Center will focus on all crimes and all
hazards. The state chose to adopt an all-crimes focus both because
terrorism is funded by and associated with many other crimes (such as
drug trafficking, credit card fraud, and identity theft). The New
Hampshire State Police intelligence unit has a full-time member
assigned to it and coordinates with the FBI JTTF. Also, the State
Police sustain interoperability with the FBI because four of its
members have FBI clearances. The fusion center will be housed within
the New Hampshire Department of Safety, which includes the State
Police, the Division of Motor Vehicles, and the Bureau of Emergency
Communication (911), and the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management. The fusion center has access to LEO and RISS systems.
New Jersey:
The Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC) was established in
January 2005 and moved into its current facility in October 2006. ROIC
is a 24-hour a day all-crimes, all-hazards, all-threats, all-the-time
watch command and analysis center. The New Jersey State Police is the
executive agency of ROIC and administers the general personnel, policy,
and management functions. The center's mission is to collect, analyze,
and disseminate intelligence to participating law enforcement entities;
evaluate intelligence for reliability and validity; provide
intelligence support to tactical and strategic planning; evaluate
intelligence in the Statewide Intelligence Management System; and
disseminate terrorism-related activity and information to the FBI,
among others. ROIC is also the home of the State Emergency Operations
Center, the State Office of Emergency Management, and the State Police
Emergency Management Section Offices.
ROIC has personnel assigned (including 13 analysts) from the FBI, DHS,
ATF, ICE, FAMS, and the U.S. Coast Guard, in addition to personnel from
the State Police, New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and
Preparedness, and the Department of Transportation. ROIC is seeking
representation from the departments of Corrections, Parole, Health and
Senior Services; Environmental Protection; and Military and Veteran
Affairs. ROIC is overseen by a Governance Committee, chaired by the
director of ROIC, that consists of representatives from state and
federal entities and law enforcement associations who meet quarterly to
discuss ROIC policies and other related matters. ROIC is seeking to
develop additional relationships with private sector organizations--
such as the American Society of Industrial Security, the Princeton Area
Security Group, the Bankers and Brokers Group, and the All Hazards
Consortium--to further the mission of the intelligence analysis element
of ROIC.
ROIC consists of three components: (1) an analysis component,
responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence
information entered into the Statewide Intelligence Management System
by local, county, state, and federal law enforcement; (2) the
operations component, which will control the actions of State Police
operational and support personnel and serve as a liaison to federal
agencies, other state entities, and county or municipal agencies on
operational matters; and (3) a call center component, which will
provide the center with situational awareness intelligence about
emergency situations.
DHS and DOJ systems and networks to which ROIC has access include LEO,
HSIN, HSIN-Secret, and ACS, as well as SIPRNet. ROIC is scheduled to
have HSDN installed in late September 2007. ROIC disseminates officer
safety information, bulletins, and any other information deemed to be
of value to the law enforcement or homeland security community. The
State Police provide operational support to the law enforcement
community on canine support for bomb and drug detection, bomb
technicians, medevac helicopter support, and marine services.
New Mexico:
The New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center (NMASIC) will serve as
New Mexico's primary intelligence collection, analysis, and
dissemination point for all homeland security intelligence matters,
which will include intelligence support for counterterrorism
operations, intelligence support for counter-human smuggling
operations, critical infrastructure threat assessments, intelligence
training, and terrorism and counterterrorism awareness training.
According to officials in the New Mexico Governor's Office of Homeland
Security and Emergency Management, NMASIC was established to provide
the Governor and State Homeland Security Advisor with the capability to
receive information and intelligence from a number of sources and fuse
that information and intelligence together to create a common
intelligence and threat picture, upon which they, and other senior
officials, can make long-term policy decisions. NMASIC was also
established to provide tactical intelligence support to local, tribal,
and state agencies in New Mexico.
NMASIC will accomplish this mission by developing and sustaining five
key projects and programs: a statewide integrated intelligence program,
a statewide information sharing environment, intelligence product
development and production management, collection requirements and
collection management, and a state law enforcement operational
component.
NMASIC's analytical functions will include a collection management
analyst, an international terrorism/Islamic extremist analyst, a single-
issue extremist analyst, a militia/white supremacists analyst, a border
security analyst, and a critical infrastructure analyst. Once fully
staffed, NMASIC will provide tactical and strategic intelligence
support to agencies in New Mexico. Participating agencies and
disciplines include the Governor's Office of Homeland Security,
Department of Public Safety/New Mexico State Police, local law
enforcement, local fire departments, local emergency management, Pueblo
Public Safety Organizations, FPS, TSA, DHS I&A, Department of Energy,
Department of State, the FBI, HIDTA, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation.
New York:
In addition to the state fusion center--the New York State Intelligence
Center (NYSIC)--there are other local area centers in New York,
including those operated by the New York City Police Department
Intelligence Division and Rockland County.
New York State Intelligence Center:
The New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) was established in
August 2003 as a multijurisdictional intelligence and investigative
center composed of representatives from state, federal, and local law
enforcement, criminal justice, and intelligence agencies. Its mission
is to advance the effectiveness and efficiency of New York State law
enforcement operations and services by acting as a centralized and
comprehensive criminal intelligence resource. NYSIC, which is led by
the New York State Police, operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
NYSIC combines the duties of an intelligence center and fusion center
to enhance collaboration among New York state law enforcement agencies
and law enforcement agencies nationwide. Using an all-crimes approach,
the NYSIC collects, analyzes, evaluates, and disseminates information
and intelligence to identify emerging patterns and trends, investigate
current criminal activities, and prevent future criminal acts.
NYSIC opened the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) in May 2004, and this
component is responsible for intelligence and information sharing in
all areas outside New York City. The mission of NYSIC-CTC is to provide
law enforcement agencies throughout New York state with timely and
useful intelligence to assist in the prevention, detection, and
deterrence of terrorism. NYSIC-CTC provides a centralized contact point
for the reporting of suspicious activity from both civilians and law
enforcement. NYSIC-CTC vets information and directs it to the
appropriate federal, state, or local law enforcement agency for
investigation.
NYSIC has 18 agencies represented in the facility, with over 80 people
in the center. Federal entities with personnel in NYSIC include the FBI
(three intelligence analysts and one special agent); DEA (one
intelligence analyst); the U.S Attorney's Office (one part-time
intelligence research specialist); DHS I &A (one senior intelligence
analyst); ICE (one senior special agent); CBP (one special agent
expected); and the Social Security Administration (one special agent).
The New York State Police provides the majority of NYSIC's personnel,
with 44 investigators and 20 analysts assigned. In addition, the New
York State Department of Motor Vehicles, Division of Parole, Department
of Correctional Services, Department of Insurance, Office of Homeland
Security, and National Guard have provided personnel and services to
NYSIC. Among the local entities providing personnel, liaison, and
services to NYSIC are the New York City Police Department, New York
City Metropolitan Transit Authority Police Department, Rensselaer
County Sheriff's Office, and the Town of Colonie Police Department. The
Executive Committee on Counter Terrorism, consisting of state police
executives, the Director of the State Office of Homeland Security,
commissioners of various state agencies, representatives from police
chiefs and sheriffs, and the Office of the Governor, serves as an
Advisory Board to NYSIC.
NYSIC collects information including tips from law enforcement, the
private sectors, and the public via crime and terrorism tip hotlines.
NYSIC also receives reports from federal, state, local, and tribal law
enforcement entities. Federal information includes threat assessments,
CBP reporting, and DHS daily reporting. DHS and DOJ information systems
or networks accessible to the fusion center include HSIN (Unclassified
and Secret), HSDN, FPS portal, LEO, as well as FinCEN and Treasury
Enforcement Communications System. Some NYSIC personnel--CTC personnel
with Top Secret clearances--have full access to FBI systems (e.g., ACS,
IDW, and Guardian). Reporting from state, local, and tribal agencies
includes investigative and intelligence submissions, suspicious
incidents, public safety and public health information, and
infrastructure information. NYSIC also collects information from open
sources. The types of services performed and products disseminated
include counterterrorism and criminal intelligence analysis and
reporting, situational awareness reporting, situation reports on
emerging incidents, investigative support, and outreach and training.
NYSIC conducts critical infrastructure and outreach and awareness in
conjunction with New York Office of Homeland Security.
NYPD Intelligence Division:
The NYPD Intelligence Division opened its Intelligence Center in March
2002. The center has both an all-crimes and counterterrorism focus, for
example, focusing on traditional crimes (e.g., guns, gangs, and drugs)
as well as having one group of intelligence analysts who analyze
information for ties to terrorism. Analysts look at global trends and
patterns for applicability to New York City. Personnel have access to
among others, all FBI systems, LEO, and HSIN.
Rockland County Intelligence Center:
The Rockland County Intelligence Center has been in existence since
1995. However, according to its director, the center changed focus
after September 2001. The mission of the center is to provide
intelligence to law enforcement agencies based upon the collection,
evaluation, and analysis of information that can identify criminal
activity. The center takes an all-crimes approach and is involved in
any crime that occurs within the county.
The center is composed of sworn officers from Rockland County law
enforcement agencies who are assigned specialized desks, such as street
gangs, burglary/robbery, terrorism, and traditional organized crime. In
addition, the FBI assigned a special agent on a full-time basis to the
center. DHS and DOJ networks and systems to which the center has access
include HSIN and LEO, as well as HIDTA and RISS/Mid-Atlantic Great
Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network.
North Carolina:
The North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAAC)
opened in May 2006 and is overseen by the North Carolina State Bureau
of Investigation's (SBI) Intelligence and Technical Services Section
within the state Department of Justice. The mission of ISAAC is to
serve as the focal point for the collection, analysis, and
dissemination of terrorism and criminal information relating to threats
and attacks within North Carolina. ISAAC will enhance and facilitate
the collection of information from local, state, and federal resources
and analyze that information so that it will benefit homeland security
and criminal interdiction programs at all levels. Specifically, ISAAC
develops and evaluates information about persons or organizations
engaged in criminal activity, including homeland security, gang
activity, and drug activity.
ISAAC partners include the U.S. Attorney's Office, the FBI, SBI, the
State Highway Patrol, National Guard, Association of Chiefs of Police,
Sheriff's Association, Division of Public Health, Department of
Agriculture, Department of Corrections, Alcohol Law Enforcement,
Emergency Management, and the Governor's Crime Commission. Partners
take what ISAAC refers to as "a global approach to a state response."
The ISAAC team consists of investigators and analysts from SBI, the
Raleigh Police Department, Wake County Sheriff's Office, State Highway
Patrol, state Alcohol Law Enforcement, National Guard, U.S. Attorney's
Office, and the FBI. Specifically, the FBI assigned a full-time analyst
and a part-time special agent to ISAAC. ISAAC investigators actively
investigate leads and tips and work jointly with the JTTFs throughout
the state. DHS I&A has conducted a needs assessment of the ISAAC.
However, at the time of our review, it had not yet placed an
intelligence officer in the center.
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion
center include HSIN, LEO, as well as FinCEN, Regional Organized Crime
Information Center, RISSNET, EPIC, INTERPOL, as well as a variety of
state information. The FBI analyst has access to FBI classified
systems, and the FBI has cleared all sworn and analytical personnel
assigned to the fusion center. ISAAC produces a variety of products,
including an open source report; Suspicious Activity Reports; and a
monthly information bulletin with articles of interest, a special
events calendar, tips and leads summary, and products and services of
ISAAC. ISAAC also supports special events, maintains a tips and leads
database, and conducts community outreach. For instance, ISAAC has
developed relationships with several Muslim organizations.
North Dakota:
The North Dakota Fusion Center was established in September 2003 with
support from the North Dakota Division of Homeland Security and the
North Dakota National Guard. In January 2004, the North Dakota Bureau
of Criminal Investigation and the North Dakota Highway Patrol assigned
a special agent and a captain, respectively, to the center. The fusion
center takes an all-crimes and all-hazards approach to terrorism. As
such, it collects and disseminates all-hazard and all-crime information
with possible links to terrorism. The fusion center is staffed with
personnel from the Bureau of Criminal Investigation, North Dakota
Division of Homeland Security, North Dakota National Guard, and North
Dakota Highway Patrol. The fusion center consists of law enforcement,
intelligence analysts (both domestic and international), operations and
planning, and critical infrastructure personnel and is divided into
three sections--law enforcement, operations, and intelligence--that
work together. While there are no FBI personnel assigned to the center,
fusion center law enforcement personnel are JTTF members.
The North Dakota Fusion Center provides training and terrorism
investigative support; conducts critical infrastructure assessments;
and disseminates products including a monthly newsletter to law
enforcement and homeland security stakeholders, and summaries to
military stakeholders. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks
accessible to the fusion center include HSIN, HSIN-Secret, and FBI's
ACS, as well as RISS, RISS ATIX, INTERPOL, FinCEN, and INFRAGARD. The
fusion center is located in a secure National Guard facility.
Ohio:
After the September 11 attacks, Ohio established the Ohio Strategic
Task Force, a working group of state cabinet-level positions, to
develop a strategic plan that included the formation of a fusion
center. In January 2005, the Ohio Homeland Security Division's
Strategic Analysis and Information Center (SAIC) began initial
operations with a base group composed of state National Guard, State
Highway Patrol, Emergency Management, and Homeland Security personnel.
According to an SAIC official, legislation subsequently widened the
foundation and basis for the center. In December 2005, SAIC moved to
its second phase of development and implemented a work-week-style
operation, acquired personnel, conducted additional training in
intelligence analysis, and bought additional software to handle
information acquisition. SAIC's third phase of development is projected
to begin in the fall/winter of 2007 and will include an evening second
shift. SAIC maintains a 10-hour-a-day, 5-day-a-week schedule with 24-
hour radio and telephone coverage through the Highway Patrol. The
center serves as a secure one-stop shop that collects, filters,
analyzes, and disseminates terrorism-related information. SAIC has a
counterterrorism and all-crimes scope of operations.
The center has seven full-time employees with a number of agencies
represented on a part-time rotational basis. State entities represented
include the Department of Agriculture, Attorney General's Office,
Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, Emergency Medical
Services, Environmental Protection Agency, Fire Marshal, Department of
Health, Highway Patrol, Homeland Security, National Guard, Department
of Public Safety, Department of Transportation, the Ohio Association of
Chiefs of Police, and the Fire Chief's Association. There are also a
number of city and county agencies represented on a part-time basis.
The FBI has assigned a full-time analyst and a special agent to the
center. DHS has assigned a full-time intelligence analyst to the
center. Other federal partners in SAIC include ATF, TSA, U.S. Coast
Guard, and the U.S. Attorney's Office.
SAIC's Investigation Unit is composed of law enforcement personnel from
multiple agencies and includes commissioned officers from local, state,
and federal agencies as well as intelligence analysts. The unit's
primary mission is the detection of persons engaged in terrorist
activities. This unit receives information from law enforcement
agencies, crime reports, and field interrogation contacts as well as
direct reports from both the public and law enforcement via a telephone
tip line and Internet Web applications. DHS and DOJ systems and
networks accessible to SAIC include HSIN and LEO. SAIC has HSDN
installed in its secure room, but the system is not currently
operational pending certification of the secure space. The FBI's
classified systems are accessible by the FBI analyst assigned to SAIC,
and preparations are underway to build a secure room to house FBINet.
The Investigation Unit conducts preliminary investigations of
information and either processes the complaint, lead, or tip internally
or forwards the complaint, lead, or tip to the JTTF or law enforcement
agency with primary jurisdiction.
Oklahoma:
The Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation, in collaboration with other
state and local entities, is in the early stages of developing the
Oklahoma Information Fusion Center.[Footnote 60] Specifically, it has
obtained funding, developed an implementation plan, and identified 10
positions for which it will be hiring. The official opening of the
center is expected in early 2008.
There were two primary reasons for the establishment of the center.
First was to help in the prevention of future attacks, and second was
to serve as a hub to facilitate information and intelligence sharing
with law enforcement officers in the field. The purpose of the fusion
center will be to screen the information, determine whether it is
pertinent to Oklahoma, and consolidate the information. As such, the
proposed mission statement for the center is to serve as the focal
point for the collection, assessment, analysis, and dissemination of
terrorism intelligence and other criminal activity information relating
to Oklahoma. The scope of operations for the center will be both all-
crimes and all-hazards.
The Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation is to act as the host agency
for the fusion center, serving as the focal point for all fusion center
activities, housing the fusion center within its headquarters, and
providing most of the center's analysts and agents. The fusion center
will include nine Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation analysts. In
addition, the center plans to include analysts from the Oklahoma Office
of Homeland Security, the FBI FIG, and the Oklahoma National Guard.
There are also six Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation agents who
will play a support role to the center.
The Oklahoma Information Fusion Center will collect information on all
crimes in accordance with 28 CFR, part 23. Fusion center personnel are
expected to perform intelligence analysis on all investigative reports
and informational reports provided to the center. Personnel can provide
investigative support through the use of intelligence products such as
charts, timelines, intelligence summary reports, and many other
products. Center personnel also have direct access to numerous
databases that can be used to support investigative activities as well
as intelligence investigations. DHS and DOJ systems to which the fusion
center has access include LEO, HSIN, as well as RISSNet, FinCEN, and
VICAP.
Oregon:
Oregon's Terrorism Intelligence and Threat Assessment Network (TITAN)
Fusion Center opened in June 2007. Its primary mission is information
sharing and coordination of terrorism intelligence among Oregon's 220
law enforcement entities. In addition, the coordination and passing of
terrorism-related information to the FBI is a primary function for the
center. The center will also support an all-crimes approach to
identifying terrorism-related activity, including criminal activities
in areas such as money laundering, counterfeiting and piracy, and human
and weapons smuggling.
The center is administered by the Oregon Department of Justice and has
representatives from the FBI, ATF, Internal Revenue Service, the Oregon
HIDTA program, Oregon State Police, and the Oregon Military Department.
TITAN Fusion Center is located in the same building as an FBI's
resident agency.
The Terrorism Intelligence and Threat Assessment Network is Oregon's
terrorism liaison officer program. This program began in May 2004 and
has since grown to include 53 members who represent 35 agencies. The
primary mission of the program is information sharing between the
fusion center and first responders. The fusion center is the
clearinghouse and information hub within the state. Intelligence is
collected, collated, analyzed, and then disseminated as briefings,
intelligence, and officer safety bulletins and alerts.
Pennsylvania:
The Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center (PaCIC) was established
in July of 2003 to serve as the primary conduit through which law
enforcement officers in Pennsylvania can submit information and receive
actionable intelligence for the benefit of their decision makers.
PaCIC, which is a component of the Pennsylvania State Police, is an all-
crimes analysis center. However, the center is planning to diversify
and focus on all hazards in the future. According to its director,
PaCIC is a developed criminal intelligence center. However, in terms of
a fusion center, it is still in the early stages of development.
PaCIC is staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. PaCIC's 32-member staff
includes Pennsylvania State Police intelligence analysts, research
analysts, officers, and an information technology specialist. PaCIC
also contains a watch-center component of enlisted supervisors designed
to maintain situational awareness. A representative of the state
Department of Corrections works in the center on a part-time basis and
provides direct access to corrections intelligence. There are currently
no federal entities represented in PaCIC. However, DHS representation
is being planned with the eventual expansion into an all-crimes and all-
hazards fusion center. FBI security modifications to the center are
under way, and FBI representation is anticipated by November 2007.
PaCIC has access to HSIN and disseminates products including daily
reports, strategic assessments, intelligence alerts, information
briefs, and threat assessments. The center also operates a drug tip
line and a terrorism tip line.
Rhode Island:
The Rhode Island Fusion Center was established in March 2006 and is a
component of the Rhode Island State Police. In establishing the center,
the state recognized the importance of the fusion center concept for
state and local information sharing. The fusion center is colocated
with an FBI field office and thus focuses primarily on
counterterrorism. However, the center also serves as a resource for the
local police agencies in the state.
The fusion center has three personnel--one investigator and two
analysts. The FBI is the fusion center's only federal partner, although
the director said that he works with ICE on a regular basis. The fusion
center works closely with the JTTF, to which there are also State
Police officers assigned. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks
accessible to the fusion center include HSIN, LEO, FPS portal, and
FBI's ACS system and Guardian. The FBI also facilitates all of the
center's security clearances and provides the center's facility, which
is colocated with the JTTF, free of charge.
South Carolina:
In South Carolina, the Chief of the State Law Enforcement Division is
the state Director of Homeland Security and the state representative to
DHS. In July 2004, the Chief of the Division approved the development
of a fusion center and the South Carolina Information Exchange (SCIEx)
was established in March 2005. SCIEx has an all-crimes scope of
operations and has devoted its resources to combating all nature of
criminal activity. Its mission is to prevent and deter acts of
terrorism and criminal activity, and to promote homeland security and
public safety through intelligence fusion and information sharing with
all sectors of South Carolina society. SCIEx also handles reports of
suspicious activity and includes a component that deals with
"situations as they develop," including a response to emergent hazards.
Further, SCIEx goals focus on providing real-time response and timely
assistance to local law enforcement agencies, developing actionable
intelligence and analysis to predict and prevent homeland security
threats, and using intelligence-led policing and other products to
facilitate the prevention and interdiction of criminal and terrorist
activities.
SCIEx's 14-person staff includes agents and analysts from the State Law
Enforcement Division; the National Guard; Department of Heath and
Environmental Control; Department of Corrections; Department of
Probation, Pardon, and Parole; and the FBI, which assigned one FIG
analyst. DHS I&A has conducted a needs assessment of SCIEx. However, at
the time of our review, it had not yet placed an intelligence analyst
in the center. The center is organized into an 8/5 watch (with a 24/7
on-call duty roster); a collection, analysis, and production unit;
AMBER alert and missing persons coordinators; and liaisons to JTTF and
Project SeaHawk.[Footnote 61]
SCIEx analysts collect information from a variety of sources including
federal intelligence and law enforcement agency reports, incident
reports, and other first responder reports and graphics to produce
daily bulletins, targeted advisories, and intelligence assessments. DHS
and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion center
include HSIN/JRIES, LEO, EPIC, and VICAP, as well as RISSNET, Interpol,
and FinCEN. HSIN-Secret is available to personnel if they travel to the
Emergency Operations Center, which is located in a different facility
than SCIEx. Additionally, the FBI funded the development of a secure
room at SCIEx, and once the room is completed, SCIEx will also gain
access to FBI systems. SCIEx also uses a variety of analytical tools
such as Geographic Information System and crime mapping to enhance its
analytic products.
South Dakota:
The South Dakota Fusion Center was established in June 2006 with the
mission to protect the citizens by ensuring the resiliency of critical
infrastructure operations throughout South Dakota by enhancing and
coordinating counterterrorism intelligence and other investigative
support efforts among private sector and local, state, tribal, and
federal stakeholders. The principal role of the fusion center is to
compile, analyze, and disseminate criminal and terrorist information
and intelligence and other information to support efforts to
anticipate, identify, prevent, and/or monitor criminal and terrorist
activity. The center has an all-hazards and all-crimes scope of
operations and focuses on all criminal activity, not just those with a
nexus to terrorism. The all-hazards focus comes from the center's
coordination with the state Office of Emergency Management.
The center is staffed by the South Dakota Office of Homeland Security
and the South Dakota Highway Patrol and receives oversight from the
State Homeland Security Senior Advisory Committee. The center has one
full-time staff person and two part-time personnel from the Office of
Homeland Security. There were no federal entities represented in the
fusion center. However, officials said that they coordinate with the
local JTTF, the HIDTA, and other drug and fugitive task forces.
The fusion center gathers information about all-hazard, all-crimes
incidents and disseminates it to first responders, surrounding states,
and the federal government. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks
accessible to the fusion center include HSIN, LEO, as well as RISS/Mid-
States Organized Crime Information Center, ICEFISHX, and Law
Enforcement Intelligence Network, which are operated by fusion centers
in Minnesota and Iowa.
Tennessee:
The state center for Tennessee, the Tennessee Regional Information
Center (TRIC), opened in May 2007, with the mission to lead a team
effort of local, state, and federal law enforcement in cooperation with
the citizens of the state of Tennessee for the timely receipt,
analysis, and dissemination of terrorism and criminal activity
information relating to Tennessee. TRIC provides a central location for
the collection and analysis of classified, law enforcement sensitive,
and open source information; provides a continuous flow of information
and intelligence to the law enforcement community; and provides
assistance to law enforcement agencies in criminal investigation
matters. TRIC has an all-crimes scope of operations that includes
crimes such as traditional organized crime, narcotics, gangs,
fugitives, missing children, sex offenders, and Medicaid/Medicare
fraud. TRIC also has a terrorism/national security focus that includes
international and domestic terrorism, foreign counterintelligence, and
other national security issues (such as Avian Flu).
Led by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and the Tennessee
Department of Safety/Office of Homeland Security, TRIC's 31-person
staff includes analysts from these two entities, as well as the
Department of Corrections, the National Guard, and the FBI FIG. Other
partner agencies include the Highway Patrol, the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, HIDTA, the U.S. Attorney's Office, ATF, and the Regional
Organized Crime Information Center, as well as a growing connectivity
to the state's local law enforcement agencies. TRIC provides support to
all agencies within the state, reviews and analyzes data for crime
trend patterns and criminal activity with a potential nexus to
terrorism, disseminates information through regular bulletins and
special advisories, develops threat assessments and executive news
briefs, performs requests for information as needed, and produces
suspicious incident report analysis. The public can provide tips and
information to TRIC through its Web site and via a toll-free telephone
number. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to TRIC
include HSIN and LEO, as well as RISS and the Regional Organized Crime
Information Center. Fusion center operations work in concert with other
ongoing Tennessee Bureau of Investigation programs, including AMBER
Alerts, sex offender registry, and the aviation unit.
Texas:
In addition to the statewide Texas Fusion Center, there are regional
fusion centers including the North Central Texas Fusion Center.
Texas Fusion Center:
After September 11, Governor Rick Perry created a task force to study
homeland security matters, and the task force identified communication
and coordination as predominant themes. Subsequently, the Texas
Legislature passed a bill that created a communications center to serve
as the focal point for planning, coordinating, and integrating
government communications regarding the state's homeland defense
strategy. This center, then known as the Texas Security Alert and
Analysis Center, opened in July 2003. The center functioned as a call
center to allow the public and law enforcement to report suspicious
activities. In July 2005, the center was expanded and renamed the Texas
Fusion Center, which acts as a tactical intelligence center for law
enforcement that is open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and helps
coordinate multi-agency border control activities. The fusion center
has an all-crimes and all-hazards scope of operations in order to
disrupt organizations that are using criminal activities to further
terrorist activities. The center gathers information from the public
and law enforcement, analyzes it, and provides it to JTTFs. The fusion
center also focuses on border security, narcoterrorism, and criminal
gangs. The all-hazards scope of operations was adopted in the aftermath
of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The center works in conjunction with,
and is located in, the State Operation Center, in order to create an
all-hazards response capability.
The Texas Fusion Center has dual oversight by the Criminal Law
Enforcement Division and the Governor's Office of Homeland Security at
the Texas Department of Public Safety. It is staffed by Department of
Public Safety officers and analysts. The FBI assigned a part-time
analyst to the center.
The Texas Fusion Center is the central facility for collecting,
analyzing, and disseminating intelligence information related to
terrorist activities. The center is designed to handle and respond to
telephone inquiries from law enforcement and the general public, in
addition to having access to several information systems. The Texas
Fusion Center monitors HSIN, LEO, and JRIES and has access to FBI
systems, though only through the part-time analyst assigned to the
center. The center also uses a variety of state systems and databases,
including the Texas Data Exchange, which is a comprehensive information-
sharing portal that allows criminal justice agencies to exchange jail
and records management systems data, and provides system access to a
variety of state databases.
North Central Texas Fusion Center:
The North Central Texas Fusion Center (NTFC) became operational in
February 2006, after a 2½-year planning process. The planners
recognized the fusion center needed a different mission from those
already being conducted by the North Texas HIDTA and FBI FIG, so NTFC
adopted an all-crimes and all-hazards scope of operations.
Specifically, NTFC works to prevent or minimize the impacts of natural,
intentional, and accidental hazards/disasters through information
sharing across jurisdictions and across disciplines. The center also
supports emergency response, field personnel, and investigations.
Stakeholders include those in homeland security, law enforcement,
public health, fire, emergency management, and state and federal
government such as the Texas Fusion Center, Texas National Guard, and
DHS. DHS I&A has assigned an intelligence analyst to the center.
The center provides intelligence support to regional task forces, State
of Texas initiatives, and local police department homicide and criminal
investigations and also assesses regional threats. Users from 42
regional jurisdictions and agencies covering five major disciplines,
including law enforcement, health, fire, emergency management, and
intelligence, receive bulletins and alert information. Reports and
alerts are also distributed via e-mail to the stakeholders. Most of the
reports are all-hazard and all-discipline focused and look at trends,
observations, and predictive elements primarily in support of
prevention and preparedness. DHS and DOJ systems and networks
accessible to NTFC include HSIN, LEO, and HSDN, in addition to a
variety of other state and open source information databases.
Utah:
The Utah Fusion Center is in the planning stage and is transitioning
from an intelligence center--the Utah Criminal Intelligence Center--
which was established prior to the 2002 Winter Olympics. Led by the
Utah Department of Public Safety, the fusion center is in the process
of developing operations guidelines and memorandums of understanding
and consulting with DHS's Office of Grants and Training. The Utah
Fusion Center will adopt an all-crimes and all-hazards scope of
operations to move beyond law enforcement and broaden the center's
focus to include homeland security and public safety.
The fusion center was established to enhance the ability to share
information across disciplines beyond law enforcement and levels of
government. The fusion center, as was the criminal intelligence center,
is colocated with the local FBI JTTF and will employ criminal
researchers and investigators. The center works closely with the FBI
JTTF and the local DHS representative, partnerships that were developed
with the establishment of the precursor intelligence center in 2002.
The FBI provides Top Secret clearances, and most of the staff members
have had Top Secret security clearances since the 2002 Winter Olympics.
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion
center include HSIN, LEO, FBI classified systems, as well as RISS/Rocky
Mountain Information Network.
Vermont:
The Vermont Fusion Center, which is managed by the Vermont State
Police, was established in August 2005 in order to further the national
homeland security mission in response to the terrorist attacks on
September 11. The fusion center, which is colocated with ICE's Law
Enforcement Support Center (LESC),[Footnote 62] is a partnership of the
Vermont Department of Homeland Security, Vermont State Police Criminal
Intelligence Unit, ICE, Vermont National Guard Counter Drug Program,
and the U.S. Coast Guard. Each entity provides personnel to the center.
The fusion center serves as Vermont's clearinghouse to analyze and
assess information received from law enforcement and disseminate
information from a single location. The goals of the Vermont Fusion
Center include providing timely, accurate, and actionable information
to the state, national, and international law enforcement communities;
identifying parallel investigations, reducing duplication, and
increasing officer safety (deconfliction); and providing strategic
analysis, to include crime mapping for all types of criminal activity,
particularly related to illegal narcotics, money laundering crimes,
identity theft, crimes that support terrorism, and other major crimes.
The center has an all-crimes scope of operations reflecting the
multiple sectors, including public safety and law enforcement, that
have come together to form the fusion center.
The center provides major criminal case assistance, such as fugitive
tracking, phone searches, liaison with federal and Canadian agencies,
analytical reports, and utilization of federal capabilities such as
cellular telephone triangulation, mail covers, passport information,
and border lookouts. The center also disseminates notifications,
alerts, indicators, and warnings to Vermont law enforcement. DHS and
DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion center
include HSIN, Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, U.S.
Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology System, National
Security Entry-Exit Registration System, FPS portal, U.S. Coast Guard
Homeport, LEO, VICAP, EPIC, NCIC, as well as RISS/New England Police
Information Network, NLETS, INTERPOL, HIDTA, FinCEN, and Treasury
Enforcement Communications System. The center also has access to a
number of state and commercial systems and databases, and to the
Canadian Border Information / Intel Center.
Virginia:
The Virginia Fusion Center was established in February 2005 after being
mandated by legislation[Footnote 63] and moved into a new facility in
November 2005. Operated by the Virginia State Police, in cooperation
with the Virginia Department of Emergency Management, the primary
mission of the center is to fuse together resources from local, state,
and federal agencies and private industries to facilitate information
collection, analysis, and sharing in order to deter and prevent
criminal and terrorist attacks. The secondary mission of the center is,
in support of the Virginia Emergency Operations Center (with which it
is colocated), to centralize information and resources to provide
coordinated and effective response in the event of an attack. The
center has an all-hazards and counterterrorism scope of operations.
The Virginia Fusion Center has partnerships established with state,
local, and federal law enforcement agencies, including ATF and the U.S.
Secret Service; DHS's Homeland Security Operation Center; FBI JTTFs in
the state of Virginia; the private sector; Fire and Emergency Medical
Services; the military, including the Army and the U.S. Coast Guard;
the National Capitol Regional Intelligence Center; other state
intelligence centers; as well as the public. There are over 20 people
in the center--17 analysts, 5 special agents, and other management and
administrative personnel. The analysts are primarily from the Virginia
State Police and the Department of Emergency Management. The National
Guard has also assigned an analyst. DHS has detailed one intelligence
analyst, and the FBI has assigned one reports officer to the center.
The DHS Protective Security Advisor has a desk in the center as well.
Several center employees are detailed to other organizations; for
example, the Virginia State Police have five agents assigned to JTTFs
in the state.
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion
center include HSIN, HSIN-Intel, HSDN, LEO, and JRIES, as well as the
RISS/Regional Organized Crime Information Center. The FBI reports
officer in the center can access FBI classified systems. The fusion
center shares all-hazards information and intelligence, tactical
information, raw information, and finished intelligence products with a
variety of clients. These products include daily terrorism intelligence
briefings that could be produced at Law Enforcement Sensitive, For
Official Use Only, and open source levels and are e-mailed to all law
enforcement and military contacts and posted to a bulletin;
intelligence bulletins that describe emerging trends or upcoming
events; threat assessments for events; and information reports on
pertinent information that has not been fully analyzed. Virginia Fusion
Center analysts also produce special projects or reports, provide case
support, follow up on calls, and respond to requests for information.
The center has established a variety of performance measures, including
quarterly surveys disseminated to its users and activity reports (e.g.,
daily, weekly, quarterly, and yearly). All personnel also have core
responsibilities and competencies.
Washington:
The Washington Joint Analytical Center (WAJAC) started as a small
project in 2003 to facilitate information sharing within the state and
with the federal government and has gradually evolved. WAJAC, which is
a joint effort between the Washington State Patrol and the FBI, has an
all-crimes, all-hazards, and counterterrorism scope of operations to
support the state and local law enforcement community. This approach
allows WAJAC intelligence analysts and investigators the ability to
fully evaluate information for trends, emerging crime problems, and
their possible connections to terrorism. WAJAC has recently included an
all-hazards focus and has started looking at natural disasters and
public health epidemics.
WAJAC personnel include representatives from the Washington State
Patrol, King County Sheriff's Office, Bellevue Police Department,
Seattle Police Department, the Washington Military Department (National
Guard), ICE, and TSA. There are no FBI personnel assigned directly to
WAJAC; however, WAJAC is colocated in an FBI field office and WAJAC
analysts work side by side with the FIG in the field office. DHS I&A
has conducted a needs assessment of WAJAC, and, according to DHS, had
assigned an intelligence analyst to the center.
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion
center include HSIN, LEO, ICE and TSA systems; all FBI systems; as well
as access to systems of each partner agency in WAJAC. WAJAC personnel
receive all of their clearances, at the Top Secret level through the
FBI. WAJAC produces a variety of weekly intelligence briefings,
bulletins, and assessments in conjunction with the FIG. These products
are e-mailed to law enforcement agencies, other government agencies,
private sector security officers, and military units.
West Virginia:
The Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety's Homeland
Security Division is in the planning stage of establishing the West
Virginia Fusion Center. The planning team for the development of the
fusion center consists of multiple agencies and stakeholders with
leadership from the Homeland Security Advisor. The West Virginia Fusion
Center is to operate under the direct control of the Homeland Security
Advisor and the State Administrative Agency. A governance committee, to
be chaired by the State Administrative Agency with representatives from
the Northern and Southern Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils, state
police, National Guard, health care, higher education, the private
sector, and the interoperability coordinator will be responsible for
providing guidance and policy. At the time of our review, the West
Virginia Fusion Center was beginning its phased opening and bringing in
personnel from the National Guard and the state police.
The vision for the fusion center is to prevent, deter, and disrupt
terrorism and criminal activity, enabling a safe and secure environment
for the citizens of West Virginia. The fusion center will adopt an all-
crimes, all-hazards, and counterterrorism scope of operations but plans
to tailor each depending on the stakeholders in the center. For
example, the West Virginia Public Broadcasting System will be
represented in the fusion center to help gather and manage information.
However, if there is an evacuation event, it will also disseminate the
information directly to the public as public service announcements
through television and radio stations.
Wisconsin:
There are two fusion centers in Wisconsin: the Wisconsin Statewide
Intelligence Center (WSIC) and the Milwaukee-based Southeastern
Terrorism Alert Center (STAC).
Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center:
Led by the Wisconsin Department of Justice Division of Criminal
Investigation, the Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center (WSIC)
became operational in March 2006 as the central information and
intelligence-gathering entity for the state of Wisconsin and acts as
the clearinghouse for information and intelligence coming from local
and county agencies. WSIC's mission includes managing intelligence
gathering efforts and passing information to appropriate agencies and
the JTTF; interfacing with the Emergency Operations Center and Joint
Operations Center during critical incidents or as requested; producing
general weekly law enforcement bulletins and daily intelligence
briefings for the Governor, top law enforcement officials, and partner
agency heads, among others; supporting the Division of Criminal
Investigation technology assets in the field; and providing statewide
major case support and analytical services. Though counterterrorism is
the primary concern of WSIC, the center operates with an all-crimes,
all-hazards, all-events approach directed by the state Homeland
Security Council, which wanted the center to be the intelligence voice
for the state and to help the state in a comprehensive way.
WSIC is staffed by eight full-time personnel, five of whom are Division
of Criminal Investigation personnel. There are also two National Guard
analysts, a special investigator from the Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources, and one FBI analyst at the center. DHS I&A has
conducted a needs assessment of WSIC. However, at the time of our
review it had not yet placed an intelligence analyst in the center.
WSIC also supports the STAC by providing three Division of Criminal
Investigation personnel to the center. WSIC is overseen by a Governance
Board made up of federal, state, and local representatives.
WSIC analysts provide short-or long-term assistance to agencies by
using analytical tools and systems to clarify and visualize case
investigations, tailoring the analytical support to the requesting
agency's needs. WSIC analysts work in a variety of areas and
initiatives, including counterterrorism and domestic security, gang
intelligence, identity theft, and the Highway Drug Interdiction Program
with the Wisconsin State Patrol. DHS and DOJ networks and systems
accessible to WSIC include HSIN, LEO, and NCIC, as well as RISSNET and
a statewide law enforcement network that enables law enforcement
officers to submit intelligence or requests for assistance to WSIC, and
it provides law enforcement with WSIC bulletins and alerts, staff
contact information, officer safety information, and resource links.
WSIC provides a variety of products and services that include weekly
law enforcement bulletins for every agency in the state containing
sections on domestic and international terrorism, cold case
investigations, missing persons, officer safety, and items of interest
to law enforcement. Additionally, WSIC prepares a daily Command Staff
Intelligence Briefing for the Governor, the Attorney General, the
Adjutant General, and top law enforcement officials across the state
that is primarily focused on issues within the previous 24 hours. WSIC
also broadcasts statewide Alert Bulletins when it receives time-
sensitive information, handles major criminal case analytical support,
provides assistance on electronic surveillance, and conducts training
events across the state and region.
Southeastern Wisconsin Terrorism Alert Center:
The Southeastern Wisconsin Terrorism Alert Center (STAC) is a
counterterrorism, all-crimes, all-hazards intelligence organization
made up of law enforcement, fire service, homeland security, military,
DOJ, FBI, emergency management, and health department members. STAC
officials said they were exposed to the TEW concept from Los Angeles
and saw a need for establishing a TEW in their urban area in 2005 to
improve information sharing. STAC was built on the TEW foundation as a
satellite of WSIC. STAC began operating when its analysts were hired in
October 2006. However, the officials said that they are still getting
the physical location established and are in the final stages of
reconstruction and establishing the facility.
The mission of STAC is to protect the citizens, critical
infrastructure, and key resources of southeastern Wisconsin by
promoting intelligence-led policing, supporting criminal investigative
efforts, and enhancing the domestic preparedness of first responders,
all levels of government, and its partners in the private sector.
STAC staff will eventually include 10 full-and part-time officers,
detectives, and analysts from the Milwaukee Police Department, Office
of the Sheriff of Milwaukee County, one DCI analyst, and one Milwaukee
Fire Department analyst. The FBI has assigned a full-time intelligence
analyst and a part-time special agent. A governance board provides
oversight for the center. STAC is in the process of developing a TLO
program, which is a network of police, fire department, public health,
and private sector partners that collect and share information related
to terrorism threats. STAC TLO coordinators will be responsible for
analyzing available sources of terrorist threat information and
preparing versions for distribution to the first responder agencies
within their regions.
STAC has also conducted some initial critical infrastructure
assessments and published alerts, threat assessments, and intelligence
information bulletins with information for first responders about local
threats, terrorism trends, and counterterrorism training and offers
training information for critical incident preparation. DHS and DOJ
systems or networks accessible to STAC include LEO, HSIN, and RISS.
STAC does not have classified FBI systems in its facility. However, the
FBI analyst at STAC has access to them. The FBI also provides STAC
personnel with their security clearances, most at the Secret level, and
one at the Top Secret level.
Wyoming:
Wyoming does not have and is not planning to establish a physical
fusion center. However, the Office of Homeland Security is working with
Colorado officials to develop a plan for Wyoming to become an "adjunct"
to CIAC. The officials stated that Wyoming, which has a population of
only around 400,000 people and operates its law enforcement agencies
with a total of only 1,600 officers, does not have the threat or the
necessity for a full-fledged fusion center, much less the funding or
personnel to support such a center. In addition, the Wyoming Office of
Homeland Security is supported by the FBI's JTTF in Wyoming that
provides assistance such as helping with analytical review of
information.
Wyoming officials said that they have taken several steps to facilitate
the development of a partnership with Colorado's CIAC, including
putting in place a technical system to augment the communications
capability of Wyoming's law enforcement agencies to transmit
intelligence and information with CIAC. Wyoming officials intend to
develop memorandums of understanding with CIAC to cover a regional area
including both Colorado and Wyoming. In addition, Wyoming will furnish
personnel for CIAC. The officials characterized the development of the
partnership as between the planning and early stages of development and
said that Wyoming and CIAC will have their partnership operational
approximately in the fall of 2007. However, a Wyoming official noted
that the state's fiscal year 2007 funding did not designate any funding
to continue with the fusion initiative. The official said that the
fusion center initiative is critical to efforts to thwart terrorism,
and the state intends to continue its partnership with CIAC and attempt
to obtain future grant funding.
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Eileen R. Larence (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Susan H. Quinlan, Assistant
Director; Michael Blinde; Katherine Davis; George Erhart; Jill Evancho;
Mary Catherine Hult; Julian King; Tom Lombardi; and Jay Smale made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Fusion Center
Guidelines, Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a
New Era, Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Fusion Centers at
the Local, State, and Federal Levels--Law Enforcement Intelligence,
Public Safety, and the Private Sector (August 2006).
[2] See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 892, 116 Stat. 2135, 2253-55 (2002).
[3] See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1016, 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-70 (2004),
amended by Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 504, 121 Stat. 266, 313-17 (2007).
[4] On June 2, 2005, the President issued a memorandum placing the PM-
ISE and its staff within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
[5] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. at 317-24 (adding section
210A to subtitle A, title II of the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No.
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135).
[6] See Congressional Research Service, Fusion Centers: Issues and
Options for Congress, RL34070 (Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2007).
[7] For purposes of this report, we use "local fusion center" to refer
to centers established by major urban areas, counties, cities, and
intrastate regions.
[8] We contacted all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 local
areas; however, one state did not plan a fusion center. For that
reason, we have responses from 58 fusion centers--43 operational and 15
in the planning or early stages of development.
[9] HSIN serves as DHS's primary nationwide information-sharing tool
for communicating sensitive but unclassified homeland security
information. LEO serves as a real-time on-line controlled-access
communications and information-sharing data repository for sensitive
but unclassified information about, among other things, antiterrorism,
intelligence, law enforcement, and criminal justice.
[10] National Security Directive 63, issued by President Bush in 1991,
provides that investigations satisfying the scope and standards
specified in the directive are transferable between agencies and shall
be deemed to meet the investigative standards for access to collateral
Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information. Executive Order
12968, issued by President Clinton in 1995, provides that background
investigation determinations of access to classified information are to
be mutually and reciprocally accepted by all agencies. Additionally,
section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform Act, enacted in December 2004,
requires that all security clearance background investigations and
determinations completed by an authorized agency be accepted by all
agencies.
[11] Effective April 2007, the functions performed by the former DHS
Office of Grants and Training were transferred to FEMA as part of a
realignment of major national preparedness functions required by the
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. See Pub. L. No.
109-295, §§ 611, 614, 120 Stat. 1355, 1395-1411.
[12] GAO, Information Technology: Numerous Federal Networks Used to
Support Homeland Security Need to Be Better Coordinated with Key State
and Local Information-Sharing Initiatives, GAO-07-455 (Washington,
D.C.: Apr. 16, 2007).
[13] A SCIF is a facility providing formal access controls and is used
to hold information concerning or derived from intelligence sources,
methods, or analytical processes. A SCIF is different from a secure
room, which is a room or office that is secured to control the flow of
personnel into the area that is not built to the same structural
specifications as a SCIF.
[14] CRS, RL34070, July 2007.
[15] Overseen by the National Guard Bureau, a joint bureau of the
departments of the Army and Air Force, the National Guard has a dual
federal and state mission. When National Guard units are not under
federal control, the governor can activate National Guard personnel to
"state active duty" in response to a natural or man-made disaster or
for homeland defense missions.
[16] This network, the Sensitive Compartmental Information Operational
Network, is used to transport top secret counterterrorism data,
including intelligence and warning information.
[17] SIPRNet is the Department of Defense's largest interoperable
command and control data network.
[18] FinCEN is operated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury and
concentrates on suspicious financial activities and currency
transaction amounts over $10,000; the program covers both domestic and
international financial activity.
[19] EPIC concentrates on drug movements and immigration violations and
provides access to a wide range of intelligence including information
from DEA and ICE.
[20] SEVIS, operated by ICE, includes information to track and monitor
schools and programs, students, exchange visitors and their dependents
throughout the duration of approved participation within the U.S.
education system.
[21] We present information about challenges encountered by 58 fusion
centers--those in all stages of development--as they were establishing
and operating their centers. Fusion centers may have encountered more
than one challenge related to a particular area, for example, related
to guidance and training.
[22] CRS, RL34070, July 2007.
[23] GAO-07-455.
[24] The Information Sharing Council was established pursuant to
section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform Act to advise the President and
the PM-ISE on developing policies, procedures, guidelines, roles, and
standards necessary to establish, implement, and maintain the ISE, as
well as to ensure coordination among federal departments and agencies
participating in the ISE.
[25] During the conference, fusion center officials attended regionally
based workshops, during which they made recommendations to the federal
government on a variety of information sharing issues.
[26] The National Counterterrorism Center is a partnership of
intelligence agencies that analyze and disseminate national
intelligence data, among other things.
[27] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 521, 121 Stat. at 328-32 (adding section
210D to subtitle A, title II of the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No.
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135).
[28] To obtain security clearances from DHS and the FBI, applicants
must, among other things, undergo a mandatory background investigation,
the scope of which varies with the level of clearance being sought, and
be determined eligible for the clearance.
[29] These are all clearance requests coming from the state Homeland
Security Advisor.
[30] Additionally, according to the FBI, there are 110 security
clearances in a pending status which means that the personnel have been
processed by the FBI for security clearances and are in varying stages
of the clearance process but have not yet reached final adjudication.
The estimated cost to the FBI associated with obtaining a Top Secret
clearance for state and local fusion center personnel is about $7,200
per person.
[31] CRS, RL34070, July 2007.
[32] In April 2004, we reported on the timeliness of the FBI clearance
process and found that about 92 percent of the applications the FBI
received for Top Secret security clearances since September 11, 2001,
were processed within the FBI's stated time frame goals. In contrast,
the majority of Secret applications (about 74 percent) were not
processed within the FBI's time frame goals. However, during the last
half of 2003, the FBI nearly doubled its success rate for completing
Secret security clearance applications within its time frame goals. See
GAO, Security Clearances: FBI Has Enhanced Its Process for State and
Local Law Enforcement Officials, GAO-04-596 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30,
2004). Amendments to the Homeland Security Act provide that the DHS
Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis shall ensure that each
official or intelligence analyst assigned to a fusion center under §
210A of the Act has the appropriate security clearance to contribute
effectively to the mission of the fusion center and may request that
security clearance processing be expedited for each such officer or
intelligence analyst (and may use available funds for such purpose).
See Pub. L. No. 110-53 § 511, 121 Stat. at 320.
[33] Several federal agencies conduct background investigations
necessary to grant clearances for individuals with a need to know
classified information. For example, the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) conducts the clearance process for most federal agencies, while
the FBI conducts its own security clearance process.
[34] CRS, RL34070, July 2007.
[35] According to the fiscal year 2007 DHS HSGP Guidance, UASI and
LETPP funds could be used to hire new staff or contractor positions to
serve as intelligence analysts to enable information and intelligence
sharing capabilities. Costs associated with hiring new intelligence
analysts are allowable only for 2 years, after which states and urban
areas may be responsible for supporting the costs to sustain those
intelligence analysts.
[36] The grant guidance says that in order to be hired as an
intelligence analyst personnel must either (1) successfully complete
training to ensure baseline proficiency in intelligence analysis and
production within 6 months of being hired or (2) have previously served
as an intelligence analyst for a minimum of 2 years either in a federal
intelligence agency, the military, or state or local law enforcement
intelligence unit.
[37] According to the fiscal year 2007 DHS HSGP Guidance, DHS HSGP
funds may be used to develop a state homeland security training
program, including training provided by DHS's FEMA/NPD, as well as
training not it does not provide, such as state or federal sponsored
courses coordinated and approved by the State Administering Agency or
their designated training point of contact that fall within DHS's
mission to prepare state and local personnel to prevent, protect
against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism or catastrophic
events.
[38] According to the fiscal year 2007 DHS HSGP Guidance, use of HSGP
funds for construction and renovation is generally prohibited. However,
project construction and renovation not exceeding $1 million is
allowable, as deemed necessary by a DHS Assistant Secretary, under the
SHSP, UASI, and LETPP programs. These program funds may be used for
construction and renovation projects only when those projects
specifically address enhanced security at critical infrastructure
facilities. Construction or renovation to guard facilities, and any
other construction or renovation efforts that change or expand the
footprint of a facility or structure, including security enhancements
to improve perimeter security, are considered to constitute
construction or renovation, and must follow an approval process and be
approved by DHS prior to the use of any funds for construction or
renovation.
[39] According to the fiscal year 2007 DHS HSGP Guidance, this pass-
through requirement applies to funding received through the SHSP, the
UASI, and LETPP.
[40] CRS, RL34070, July 2007.
[41] Project types identified by DHS as "fusion center funded
activities" included: establishment/enhancement of a terrorism
intelligence/early warning system, center, or task force;
establishment/enhancement of a public-private emergency preparedness
program; development/enhancement of homeland security/emergency
management organization and structure; enhancement of capability to
support international border and waterway security; enhancement of
capabilities to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
and explosive events; establishment/enhancement of regional response
teams; assessment of the vulnerability of and/or harden/protect
critical infrastructure and key assets; Transit Security Grant Programs
for bus, ferry, and rail; and enhancement of citizen awareness of
emergency preparedness, prevention, and response measures.
[42] Fiscal year 2007 HSGP funding also focuses on establishing a
baseline level of capability in all state and urban area fusion centers
and establishes some requirements for fusion centers receiving DHS
funds to achieve that goal. DHS requires that fusion centers already
possess or prioritize their efforts and expenditures to a variety of
baseline capabilities in areas such as management and governance,
collection, analysis, and dissemination.
[43] The Fusion Center Guidelines, developed as a collaborative effort
between DOJ's Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global)
and DHS's Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC), were first issued
in 2005 to help resolve interoperability and communication issues with
centers at the state, regional, and federal levels and to provide
guidance in relation to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of
terrorism-related intelligence. In 2006, the Guidelines were expanded
to integrate public safety and private sector entities. Both Global and
the HSAC include state, local, tribal, and private sector officials
that provide advice and counsel to the Attorney General and the
Secretary of Homeland Security. HSAC also includes members of academia
and Global also includes federal and international representatives.
[44] Fusion centers may be required to manage information in accordance
with 28 C.F.R. part 23, which contains implementing standards for
operating federally funded multijurisdictional intelligence systems
operating under Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street
Act of 1968, as amended. Under this regulation, all multi-
jurisdictional law enforcement information management systems funded in
part by federal grants must follow guidelines for the collection,
storage, and purging of information. Furthermore, information stored in
such systems must be "reviewed and validated for continuing compliance
with system submission criteria before the expiration of its retention
period, which in no event shall be longer than five (5) years." Receipt
and dissemination of such information is based on a "need to know" and
"right to know," which under the regulation are standards to be defined
by the organizational unit operating the particular system.
[45] BJA is a DOJ component responsible for supporting local, state,
and tribal efforts to achieve safer communities. In fulfilling its
mission, BJA provides grants for programs and for training and
technical assistance to combat violent and drug-related crime and help
improve the criminal justice system.
[46] DHS's FEMA/NPD and BJA coordinated with I&A, the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, FBI, and the state and local
community, including Global, in this effort and provide these technical
assistance services to fusion centers at no cost. In addition, the
technical assistance program provides online resources, such as the
National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center, which contains a
resource information databank used to share policies, techniques, and
lessons learned, and the Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program
Resource Center, which contains existing fusion center templates,
manuals, policy documents, memoranda of understanding, and concept of
operations documents.
[47] See CRS, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, RL34070
(Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2007).
[48] Effective April 2007, the functions performed by the former DHS
Office of Grants and Training were transferred to FEMA as part of a
realignment of major national preparedness functions required by the
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006.
[49] We relied on the centers' own definitions of themselves as fusion
centers and did not evaluate their status, characteristics, or
operations.
[50] For purposes of this report, "fusion center officials" includes
the directors, commanders, or special agents in charge of the centers
(or their designees). In states where a fusion center is not
operational, we spoke with officials who were responsible for the
planning or establishment of the fusion center.
[51] A Web portal is generally a site that offers several resources or
services, such as search engines, news articles, forums, or other
tools. HSIN contains a series of Web-based portals that are organized
in various community groups, for example, law enforcement, emergency
management, or users from a specific state.
[52] TEWs are multilateral, multidisciplinary groups designed to
provide local responders information on current threats and offer
decision-making information to community leaders.
[53] SCION is used to transport Top Secret counterterrorism data,
including intelligence and warning information.
[54] DHS protective security advisors have experience related to
vulnerability reduction and physical security and many have law
enforcement or military backgrounds. The advisors have responsibility
for assisting in identifying high-priority facilities, providing the
local community with information on threats and best practices, and
coordinating training and facility visits.
[55] InfraGard is an information-sharing and analysis effort between,
at a minimum, the FBI and the private sector that serves the interests
and combines the knowledge base of a wide range of members. It is an
association of businesses, academic institutions, state and local law
enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to sharing
information and intelligence to prevent hostile acts on the nation and
its interests. InfraGard chapters are geographically linked with FBI
field office territories, and each chapter has an FBI special agent
coordinator assigned to it who works closely with program managers in
FBI headquarters.
[56] The Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council in the U.S. Attorney's Office
for the District of Idaho was created after September 11 and is
composed of representatives from federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies. The Idaho ATAC coordinates antiterrorism
initiatives, initiates training programs, and facilitates information
sharing.
[57] In Minnesota, all government data collected, created, received,
maintained, or disseminated by a government entity shall be public
unless classified by statute or temporary classification pursuant to
state or federal law.
[58] ICEFISHX is a partnership among Minnesota, North Dakota, and South
Dakota law enforcement agencies. It is an internet-based intelligence-
sharing initiative and alert network designed to collect and
disseminate information relating to terrorist operations and other
criminal activities to law enforcement, government agencies, and the
private sector within the tristate area. ICEFISHX collects suspicious
activities reports. There are close to 1,700 subscribers from law
enforcement and non-law enforcement organizations on ICEFISHX. Private
sector security officers are also subscribers to the network. There is
also a Resource Library on the Web site, with documents posted for
subscriber use. The FBI supports ICEFISHX.
[59] The FBI Intelligence Information Reports Dissemination System is a
Web-based software application that allows access to the FBI's intranet
to create and disseminate standardized intelligence information
reports.
[60] A Fusion Center Working Group consisting of representatives of the
Oklahoma Office of Homeland Security, State Bureau of Investigation,
Military Department, Department of Public Safety, FBI, Oklahoma City
Police Department, and the Tulsa Police Department is coordinating to
design the Fusion Center.
[61] The Charleston Harbor Operations Center, better known as Project
SeaHawk, was created as a unique benchmark project to enhance the
protection, security, and infrastructure of seaports nationally.
Administered by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of South
Carolina, Project SeaHawk is focused on the Port of Charleston, South
Carolina. It has created a unified intelligence operations center that
includes all federal, state, and local agencies having responsibility
for any aspect of port security and protection.
[62] LESC provides information to local, state, and federal law
enforcement agencies on the immigrant status and identity information
on aliens suspected, arrested, or convicted of criminal activity. LESC
is a 24-hour-a-day/ 7-day-a-week/365-days-a-year center operated by
ICE.
[63] According to Virginia State Police officials, prior to the events
of September 11, they had a criminal intelligence center. But, after
that, they realized that the state and local law enforcement officials
needed an avenue to get timely and accurate information from the
federal government, and so the concept of a fusion center was
initiated.
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