Maritime Security
Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers Gao ID: GAO-08-141 December 10, 2007U. S. energy needs rest heavily on ship-based imports. Tankers bring 55 percent of the nation's crude oil supply, as well as liquefied gases and refined products like jet fuel. This supply chain is potentially vulnerable in many places here and abroad, as borne out by several successful overseas attacks on ships and facilities. GAO's review addressed (1) the types of threats to tankers and the potential consequences of a successful attack, (2) measures taken to protect tankers and challenges federal agencies face in making these actions effective, and (3) plans in place for responding to a successful attack and potential challenges stakeholders face in responding. GAO's review spanned several foreign and domestic ports, and multiple steps to analyze data and gather opinions from agencies and stakeholders.
The supply chain faces three main types of threats--suicide attacks such as explosive-laden boats, "standoff" attacks with weapons launched from a distance, and armed assaults. Highly combustible commodities such as liquefied gases have the potential to catch fire or, in a more unlikely scenario, explode, posing a threat to public safety. Attacks could also have environmental consequences, and attacks that disrupt the supply chain could have a severe economic impact. Much is occurring, internationally and domestically, to protect tankers and facilities, but significant challenges remain. Overseas, despite international agreements calling for certain protective steps, substantial disparities exist in implementation. The United States faces limitations in helping to increase compliance, as well as limitations in ensuring safe passage on vulnerable transport routes. Domestically, units of the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for maritime security, report insufficient resources to meet its own self imposed security standards, such as escorting ships carrying liquefied natural gas. Some units' workloads are likely to grow as new liquefied natural gas facilities are added. Coast Guard headquarters has not developed plans for shifting resources among units. Multiple attack response plans are in place to address an attack, but stakeholders face three main challenges in making them work. First, plans for responding to a spill and to a terrorist threat are generally separate from each other, and ports have rarely exercised these plans simultaneously to see if they work effectively together. Second, ports generally lack plans for dealing with economic issues, such as prioritizing the movement of vessels after a port reopens. The President's maritime security strategy calls for such plans. Third, some ports report difficulty in securing response resources to carry out planned actions. Federal port security grants have generally been directed at preventing attacks, not responding to them, but a more comprehensive risk-based approach is being developed. Decisions about the need for more response capabilities are hindered, however, by a lack of performance measures tying resource needs to effectiveness in response.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-08-141, Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers
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Commodity Tankers' which was released on January 10, 2008.
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office: GAO:
December 2007:
Maritime Security:
Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and
Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers:
GAO-08-141:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-141, a report to Congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
U. S. energy needs rest heavily on ship-based imports. Tankers bring 55
percent of the nation‘s crude oil supply, as well as liquefied gases
and refined products like jet fuel. This supply chain is potentially
vulnerable in many places here and abroad, as borne out by several
successful overseas attacks on ships and facilities. GAO‘s review
addressed (1) the types of threats to tankers and the potential
consequences of a successful attack, (2) measures taken to protect
tankers and challenges federal agencies face in making these actions
effective, and (3) plans in place for responding to a successful attack
and potential challenges stakeholders face in responding. GAO‘s review
spanned several foreign and domestic ports, and multiple steps to
analyze data and gather opinions from agencies and stakeholders.
What GAO Found:
The supply chain faces three main types of threats”suicide attacks such
as explosive-laden boats, ’standoff“ attacks with weapons launched from
a distance, and armed assaults. Highly combustible commodities such as
liquefied gases have the potential to catch fire or, in a more unlikely
scenario, explode, posing a threat to public safety. Attacks could also
have environmental consequences, and attacks that disrupt the supply
chain could have a severe economic impact.
Much is occurring, internationally and domestically, to protect tankers
and facilities, but significant challenges remain. Overseas, despite
international agreements calling for certain protective steps,
substantial disparities exist in implementation. The United States
faces limitations in helping to increase compliance, as well as
limitations in ensuring safe passage on vulnerable transport routes.
Domestically, units of the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for
maritime security, report insufficient resources to meet its own self
imposed security standards, such as escorting ships carrying liquefied
natural gas. Some units‘ workloads are likely to grow as new liquefied
natural gas facilities are added. Coast Guard headquarters has not
developed plans for shifting resources among units.
Multiple attack response plans are in place to address an attack, but
stakeholders face three main challenges in making them work. First,
plans for responding to a spill and to a terrorist threat are generally
separate from each other, and ports have rarely exercised these plans
simultaneously to see if they work effectively together. Second, ports
generally lack plans for dealing with economic issues, such as
prioritizing the movement of vessels after a port reopens. The
President‘s maritime security strategy calls for such plans. Third,
some ports report difficulty in securing response resources to carry
out planned actions. Federal port security grants have generally been
directed at preventing attacks, not responding to them, but a more
comprehensive risk-based approach is being developed. Decisions about
the need for more response capabilities are hindered, however, by a
lack of performance measures tying resource needs to effectiveness in
response.
Figure: Tanker Limburg after Terrorist Attack near Yemen:
[See PDF for image]
This is a photograph of the tanker Limburg after terrorist attack near
Yemen.
Source: AFP.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that cognizant agencies (1) plan for meeting a growing
security workload for protecting liquefied natural gas shipments, (2)
help ensure that ports plan for dealing with economic consequences of
an attack, (3) integrate terrorism and spill response plans at the
national and (4) local level, and (5) work to develop performance
measures for emergency response. The agencies generally agreed with our
recommendations, but the Department of Homeland Security took the
final recommendation under advisement.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-141]. For more information, contact
Stephen Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov or Mark
Gaffigan at 202-512-3841 or gaffiganm@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Energy Commodity Shipments Face Varied Threats, and a Successful Attack
Could Have Substantial Consequences:
Although Stakeholders Are Taking Protective Measures, Implementation
Challenges Pose Difficulty Both Abroad and at Home:
Stakeholders Have Developed Spill and Terrorism Response Plans but Face
Several Challenges in Integrating Them:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Selected Energy Commodities Transported by Tanker into
United States:
Appendix III: Recent High-Profile Terrorism Incidents against Tankers
and Energy Infrastructure:
Appendix IV: Assessing and Managing Risks Using a Risk Management
Approach:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Federal Bureau of Investigation:
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: Selected International Stakeholders with Maritime Security
Activities:
Table 2: Selected Domestic Stakeholders with Maritime Security
Activities:
Table 3: Federal and Port-level Plans and Agreements Governing Response
to Spills on Water and Terrorist Attacks:
Table 4: High-Profile Terrorism Incidents against Tankers and Energy
Infrastructure by Target and Attack Method since 2002:
Figures:
Figure 1: Oil Tanker at Al-Basrah Offshore Oil Terminal, Persian Gulf:
Figure 2: Tanker with Insert of Double Hull:
Figure 3: Top Exporters of Petroleum to the United States in 2005
(Millions of barrels per day):
Figure 4: Top Exporters of Natural Gas to United States in 2005
(Millions of cubic feet per day):
Figure 5: Regional Significance of Petroleum Commodities:
Figure 6: Oil Flows and Strategic Shipping Chokepoints:
Figure 7: Tanker Limburg after Terrorist Attack near Yemen:
Figure 8: Tanker Approaching an Iraqi Oil Loading Terminal as U.S.
Warship Patrols Nearby:
Figure 9: U.S. Warship Engaging Suspected Pirate Vessel near Somalia:
Figure 10: Safety and Security Escort for LNG Tanker:
Figure 11: Coast Guard Enforcing Security Zone around Moored LNG Tanker:
Figure 12: Location of Operating, Planned, and Proposed LNG Marine
Terminals by U.S. Coast Guard District:
Figure 13: Relationship of Spill and Terrorism Response Plans and
Agreements:
Figure 14: Incident Response Sequence When an Attack Occurs Resulting
in a Spill:
Figure 15: Potential Actions Taken to Respond to an Attack on an Energy
Commodity Tanker:
Figure 16: Firefighters Preparing for a Maritime Terrorism Training
Exercise:
Figure 17: Examples of Marine Firefighting Response:
Figure 18: Firefighters Training to Combat an Aviation Fuel Fire:
Figure 19: Risk Management Framework:
Abbreviations:
ACP: Area Contingency Plan:
AMSC: Area Maritime Security Committee:
AMSP: Area Maritime Security Plan:
BLEVE: boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
CDC: certain dangerous cargo:
COTP: Captain of the Port:
CSF: Critical Skill Factor:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
ICS: incident command system:
IMO: International Maritime Organization:
ISPS: International Ship and Port Facility Code:
LNG: liquefied natural gas:
LOOP: Louisiana Offshore Oil Port:
LPG: liquefied petroleum gas:
MARSEC: Maritime Security Condition System:
MIRP: Maritime Incident Recovery Plan:
MLA: Maritime Liaison Agent:
MOTR: Marine Operational Threat Response Plan:
MTR: Maritime Transportation Response:
MTSA: Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002:
NCP: National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan:
NIMS: National Incident Management System:
NRP: National Response Plan:
NSFCC: National Strike Force Coordination Center:
ONS: Operation Neptune Shield:
OPA 90: Oil Pollution Act of 1990:
SAFE Port Act: Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006:
SONS: Spill of National Significance:
USCG: United States Coast Guard:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548:
December 10, 2007:
The Honorable John D. Dingell:
Chairman:
The Honorable Joe Barton:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter King:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Edward J. Markey:
House of Representatives:
This is a public version of a report we issued in March 2007 that
contained Sensitive Security Information related to the transportation
of energy commodities by tanker. Specific details regarding the nature
of security conditions and operations at specific ports, and specific
findings related to response plans and results of exercises that are
sensitive were removed. We worked with the cognizant agencies to ensure
that this version would not contain Sensitive Security Information. No
additional audit work was performed for the completion of this version.
The conclusions and recommendations of our March 2007 report remain
generally unchanged.
The United States economy is dependent on oil, gas, and other energy
commodities that are transported from overseas by ship.[Footnote 1] For
example, in 2005, approximately 55 percent of the nation's crude oil
supply--one of the main sources of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel,
heating oil, and many other petroleum products--and approximately 3
percent of the natural gas supply, was imported by tanker. Daily ship-
based imports of crude oil averaged about 8.5 million barrels, or the
equivalent of about four supertankers arriving at U.S. terminals each
day.[Footnote 2] In addition to crude oil, the United States also
imports highly combustible liquid energy products, such as gasoline,
jet fuel, and liquefied gases, such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
and liquefied natural gas (LNG).[Footnote 3] Natural gas is converted
to LNG by cooling it to minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit, at which point it
becomes a liquid. In its liquid form, natural gas reduces to more than
1/600th of its volume as a gas, making it feasible to transport over
long distances. Daily ship-based imports of LNG now average about 1.7
billion cubic feet, or the equivalent of two LNG tankers arriving at a
U.S. port every 3 days. This already extensive reliance on imported
energy commodities is expected to increase--and for LNG, to grow
substantially. The Energy Information Administration forecasts that by
2015, the amount of crude oil imported into the United States will
increase by nearly 4 percent, while the amount of imported LNG will
grow more than 400 percent.
Transporting these often hazardous commodities by sea involves a global
supply chain with many players. For energy commodities imported by the
United States, this supply chain has three main activities: loading it
aboard a ship at a foreign facility, shipping it across oceans and
waterways, and unloading it at a facility in this country. Waterborne
shipments originate at facilities in a variety of countries--for crude
oil, primarily in Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Nigeria, and for
LNG, primarily in Algeria and Trinidad and Tobago.[Footnote 4] Overseas
facilities where tankers are loaded are owned by the private sector,
governments, or combinations of the two. Foreign governments play a
substantial role in overseeing the security of energy export
operations. Shipment of these commodities likewise involves vessels
owned by many different companies, as well as transportation routes
across international waters that no government controls. In 2006, there
were approximately 3,550 registered crude oil tankers of 300 gross tons
or more, along with 200 registered LNG tankers. Most of these vessels
are registered in countries other than the United States, which means
the United States has limited oversight authority over these vessels'
crews or condition until they enter U.S. waters. Once the crude oil or
LNG tanker arrives in the United States, it is unloaded at terminals
that may be on the Atlantic, Gulf, or Pacific coasts. LNG is currently
unloaded at one of five locations.[Footnote 5] As demand for natural
gas grows, the number of domestic LNG unloading locations is expected
to increase. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which must
approve each onshore LNG terminal siting and construction application,
has already approved 11 additional terminals, and dozens more have been
proposed.[Footnote 6]
This supply chain, while critical, is also vulnerable to disruption by
terrorists. Port facilities are inherently vulnerable, because they
must provide access by land and sea and because they are sprawling
installations, often close to population centers. Likewise, the ships
that transport these products are vulnerable because they travel on
direct routes that are known in advance and, for part of their journey,
they may have to travel through waters that do not allow them to
maneuver away from possible attacks. Since so many different players
are involved, terrorists have room to probe the supply chain for the
weakest link. Despite an often heavy security presence, terrorists have
attempted--and in some cases carried out--several attacks on this
supply chain since September 11, 2001. To date, these attacks have
included attempts to damage tankers or disrupt loading operations in or
near overseas ports. For example, in 2004 terrorists coordinated an
attack against two offshore oil terminals in Iraq where tankers were
loading, and in 2002 terrorists conducted a suicide boat attack against
the French supertanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen.
Much of the international framework for protecting this supply chain
and preventing pollution from vessels is laid out in international
conventions. The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS)
Code was adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) by the Conference of Contracting Governments to the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
[Footnote 7] In accordance with the SOLAS Convention as amended in
2002, the code establishes requirements for contracting governments of
countries where ports are located, contracting governments of countries
where ships are registered, operators of port facilities, and operators
of vessels traveling on the high seas.[Footnote 8] Individual nations
can set higher standards for facilities on their soil and for vessels
registered in that country. The United States has chosen to set higher
standards, largely through the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002 (MTSA).[Footnote 9] Enacted after the September 11, 2001, attacks,
MTSA places much of the responsibility for coordinating and overseeing
security efforts with the federal government--and more specifically
with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its agencies, such
as the U.S. Coast Guard. Another international agreement developed
under IMO auspices is the International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships, which entered into force in 1983 and was
intended to prevent pollution of the marine environment by ships from
operational or accidental causes. Included in its provisions was
pollution by oil, chemicals, and harmful substances. In the United
States, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90)
following the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill.[Footnote 10] OPA 90
addressed prevention, response, and compensation for oil pollution from
vessels and facilities in U.S. waters and the shoreline. OPA 90 greatly
increased federal oversight of maritime oil transportation by setting
new requirements for vessel construction and crew licensing and
manning, mandating contingency planning, enhancing federal response
capability, broadening enforcement authority, and increasing
penalties.[Footnote 11]
In setting U.S. policy with regard to homeland security, both Congress
and the Administration have endorsed making decisions on the basis of
risk--that is, on identifying critical infrastructure, determining what
is most at risk, and applying sound measures designed to make cost-
effective use of resources and funding. As groups such as the 9/11
Commission have pointed out, no amount of money can totally insulate
seaports from attack by a well-funded and determined enemy. Managing on
the basis of risk acknowledges the trade-offs inherent in deciding how
finite resources should be spent.
Federal actions to prevent attacks against the energy supply chain
involve coordination with the many players involved, including foreign
governments; foreign and domestic corporations that own and operate the
ships that carry energy commodities; companies that import, refine, and
market petroleum and liquefied gases; and a host of state and local
governmental agencies. At the state and local levels, fire and police
departments would be the first responders, with support from emergency
management, environmental, and transportation departments. Private
sector agencies, such as oil or gas facility terminal operators, vessel
management companies, and oil spill response organizations, would also
be involved. Finally, multiple federal agencies would also respond. In
particular, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) would have primary responsibility for leading the
response effort.
To help evaluate how secure the maritime energy supply chain is and how
the United States would respond in the event of a terrorist attack, you
asked us to review security and safety efforts taken to date.[Footnote
12] This report addresses three questions:
* What are the types of terrorist threats to tankers carrying energy
commodities and the potential consequences of a successful attack?
* What measures are being taken to protect these tankers, and what
challenges do federal agencies face in making these actions effective?
* If a terrorist attack succeeds despite these protective measures,
what plans are in place to respond and what are the potential
challenges in responding to an attack?
To address these objectives, we conducted a wide range of activities
overseas and in the United States. Overseas, we met with officials from
the IMO, foreign government security agencies, vessel and facility
operators, international industry associations, vessel and cargo
insurers, and risk management companies. We conducted our overseas work
primarily in five countries, which we selected for specific reasons
related to their role in the supply chain, the sophistication of their
security procedures, or the presence of key stakeholders. In the United
States, we met with officials in many federal departments and agencies,
including the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, State, Energy,
Transportation, and Justice; the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission;
and the Environmental Protection Agency. We met with a variety of state
and local government officials dealing with homeland security,
emergency response, and law enforcement, as well as with operators of
oil cleanup organizations, petroleum tankers, liquefied gas carriers,
and their attendant unloading facilities. We also visited field units
of the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, the FBI, and a
nonprobability sample of petroleum and liquefied gas import and export
facilities.[Footnote 13] In these visits we observed security practices
firsthand, and conducted interviews with officials. We obtained and
reviewed studies on the consequences of an attack, obtained additional
views from experts, and specifically convened a panel of academic and
industry experts to determine the potential consequences of an incident
involving LNG.[Footnote 14] We analyzed databases, progress reports,
regulations, and guidance documents we obtained from the Coast Guard
and Federal Energy Regulatory Administration. We obtained necessary
information from the Coast Guard to review the reliability of the
information contained in the databases used in this report. Appendix I
contains a more detailed discussion of our methodology. We conducted
our work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards from April 2005 through February 2007.
Results in Brief:
Attacks overseas show that tankers face several major types of threats
that, if carried out domestically, could have serious consequences.
Overseas, terrorists have demonstrated the ability to carry out at
least three main types of threats. First--and overall of greatest
concern to officials we spoke with--is a suicide attack, such as the
2002 suicide boat attack on the tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen.
This attack killed 1 person, injured 17, and spilled 90,000 barrels of
oil. A second major type of threat, known as a "standoff attack," uses
a rocket or other weapon launched at a sufficient distance to allow the
attackers to evade defensive fire. A third type of threat is an armed
assault. For example, well-armed bands have used small boats to attack
tankers, loading facilities, and oil workers. Many other types of
potential attacks exist, such as internal crew conspiracies and
collisions with other vessels piloted by terrorists. To date, no such
attacks have occurred on tankers in U.S. waters or on loading
facilities in U.S. ports, and intelligence officials report there is
currently no specific credible threat to tankers or terminals on the
domestic front. Nonetheless, these successful attacks abroad, the
expressed desire by terrorists to target U.S. economic interests, and
the potential outcome of a terrorist attack on a tanker have led
Congress and the Administration to conclude that protective efforts are
warranted. A successful attack on an energy commodity tanker could have
substantial public safety, environmental, and economic consequences.
Public safety and environmental consequences of an attack vary by
commodity. For instance, highly combustible commodities like LNG and
LPG have the potential to catch fire, or in a more unlikely scenario--
if they are trapped in a confined space such as under a dock--explode,
posing a threat to public safety. Crude oil and heavy petroleum
products remain in the environment after they are spilled and must be
removed, potentially causing significant environmental damage. Finally,
the economic consequences of a major attack could include a temporary
price spike reflecting fears of further attacks, and supply disruptions
associated with delays of shipments if major transit routes, key
facilities, or key ports are closed. The loss of one cargo of an energy
commodity might not have a significant, sustained price impact.
However, if an attack results in port closures for multiple days or
weeks, price responses and higher costs could mean losses in economic
welfare to consumers, businesses, and government amounting to billions
of dollars.
Much is being done, both internationally and domestically, to protect
energy commodity tankers and their attendant facilities from attack,
but notwithstanding these actions, significant challenges may still
leave tankers and facilities at risk. Internationally, many foreign
governments and facility operators are taking such actions as improving
physical security at facilities and conducting offshore patrols. For
example, port facilities report compliance with ISPS Code requirements,
tanker operators report strengthening their security posture while
loading and at sea, and the Coast Guard visits foreign exporting ports
to assess the effectiveness of the anti-terrorism measures in place.
Navies of various countries, including the United States, are also
patrolling threatened waters, such as the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of
Aden, due to attacks on ships, including tankers, and port facilities.
International stakeholders face challenges, however, in implementing
this security framework. Our visits to overseas facilities showed that
some port facilities had put extensive security measures in place,
while at other facilities, we found such problems as unattended gates
and downed fences. Although facilities may report they are complying
with the ISPS Code, there is no mechanism currently in place to verify
compliance, and Coast Guard activities abroad are limited by and
dependent on conditions set by host nations, including the locations
the Coast Guard can visit. For tankers in transit in international
waters, the primary challenge involves patrolling the lengthy travel
routes and frequent danger spots with a limited number of naval
vessels. Because of the challenges and limitations faced
internationally, security efforts taken domestically carry increased
importance. Here, federal agencies such as the Coast Guard and Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) have taken a variety of steps to protect
the energy supply chain. Both agencies monitor arriving ships and
crews, and the Coast Guard also conducts security activities, such as
pre-entry security boardings, escorts, and patrols. The prioritization
of the Coast Guard's security activities is based upon its established
risk-based decision-making processes. These activities are often
reinforced by local law enforcement units that, in some cases, receive
financial support from facility operators. Despite these domestic
efforts, challenges persist. Coast Guard records document that at some
ports, a lack of resources has hindered some Coast Guard units from
meeting their self-imposed requirements for security activities, such
as escorts and boardings. To better align security requirements with
its resources, the Coast Guard recently revised some of its security
standards, such as those for protecting vessels carrying a number of
hazardous liquids and liquefied gases. Although the Coast Guard
reported that it based this action on the consequences of an attack, it
could not provide us any analyses that covered all commodities
involved. As a result, it is unclear if security requirements were
reduced for the commodities with the lowest associated risk. The Coast
Guard is currently performing such an analysis. In the future, the
Coast Guard faces additional challenges at some domestic ports, where
workload demands are likely to rise substantially as new LNG facilities
come on line and LNG shipments increase. These increased demands could
cause the Coast Guard to continue to be unable to meet the standards it
has set for keeping U.S. ports secure.
Should a terrorist attack succeed despite the protective measures in
place, the United States and designated ports have developed plans for
responding but could face several challenges in implementing these
plans effectively. Specifically, ports face challenges in integrating
both national-and port-level spill and terrorism response plans,
mitigating economic consequences, and obtaining necessary resources to
respond. Regarding the plans, at the national level, the National
Response Plan lays out the broad parameters of the federal role, both
in spill response (that is, taking steps to contain a spill and
mitigate its environmental damage, regardless of how it occurred) and
in terrorism response (that is, for the attack, taking security-related
actions and conducting an investigation). The plan designates the Coast
Guard as the primary agency for spill response on water and the FBI as
the primary agency for terrorism response, and it calls on the two
agencies to coordinate their responses if the incident involves an
attack on energy commodity tankers. Other federal plans and agreements
also come into play, each with information about coordinating responses
among the various agencies involved or taking specific action. At the
port level, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002, Coast Guard's Captain of the Port
is to establish separate plans for spill and terrorism responses,
working with local agencies, which are subsequently approved by Coast
Guard districts. For both types of response plans, the agencies may
include port authorities, fire departments, and facilities in the port.
Some stakeholders, such as private oil spill response organizations,
participate only in spill response planning, while other stakeholders,
such as police departments, participate mainly in terrorism response
planning. While national-and port-level plans exist, federal agencies
and ports could face challenges in using them effectively.[Footnote 15]
First, the separate spill and terrorism response plans should be
integrated for responding to an attack on an energy commodities tanker.
At the federal level, the Coast Guard and the FBI should ensure that
they have a detailed operational plan to integrate the spill and
terrorism response sections of the National Response Plan. Port
stakeholders should integrate spill and terrorism response plans to
address response coordination. The Coast Guard has recommended joint
exercises when feasible to test stakeholders' spill and terrorism
response plans. Second, the President's strategy for maritime security
recommends that ports develop plans to mitigate the economic
consequences of an attack, such as determining priorities for allowing
vessels to enter or leave the port after it reopens. While such plans
could be developed under the leadership of the Coast Guard's Captain of
the Port at the port level, there was no national-level guidance about
what economic mitigation plans should contain at the time of our
review. Finally, some ports we visited may not have the resources
needed to promptly respond to an attack. For instance, some local
firefighters said that they may not be able to effectively respond to
marine fires because they do not have enough fire boats or are not
sufficiently trained for shipboard firefighting. Port officials also
said they lacked resources for improving emergency response
capabilities. According to DHS officials, federal grant funding for
response activities may become more available as DHS moves toward a
more comprehensive risk-based process for allocating grant funds.
However, DHS may not be able to effectively allocate grants on the
basis of reducing risk because it does not have performance measures
showing how much of a given resource is needed to conduct a response.
Without such performance measures, the federal government cannot
effectively set priorities for acquiring needed response resources.
We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security and
the Attorney General designed to build on efforts already under way and
make these efforts more effective. For protecting against threats, we
recommend developing a national resource allocation plan for meeting
security requirements posed by proposed expansion in the number of LNG
facilities and shipments. For responding to actual attacks, these
recommendations include ensuring that a detailed operational plan has
been developed that integrates the different spill and terrorism
response sections of the National Response Plan, as well as ensuring
the integration of local spill and terrorism planning and exercises at
ports that receive energy commodities; developing national-level
guidance that ports can use for mitigating economic consequences,
particularly in the case of port closures; and developing specific
performance measures for determining the resources needed to
effectively respond to attacks on tankers carrying energy commodities.
The responsible agencies generally agreed with our recommendations.
DHS, however, stated it was taking the final recommendation (on
performance measures) under advisement.
Background:
Many Stakeholders Are Involved in Securing the Maritime Energy Supply
Chain:
Numerous international and domestic organizations play a role in the
security of maritime energy commodities. The list of stakeholders
outside the United States is quite diverse. They include international
organizations, governments of nations where tankers load or where
tankers are registered, and owners and operators of tankers or
facilities (see table 1).
Table 1: Selected International Stakeholders with Maritime Security
Activities:
Agency, International organizations: International Maritime
Organization (IMO); IMO is an organization responsible for regulating
international shipping with 167 governments as members;
Selected mission-related activities: Develops and maintains a
comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping; Develops international
standards for port and vessel security.
Agency, International organizations: International Maritime Bureau; The
International Maritime Bureau is a division of the International
Chamber of Commerce that works to suppress piracy around the world;
Selected mission-related activities: The International Maritime
Bureau's Piracy Reporting Center broadcasts a daily bulletin of piracy
attacks directly to ships at sea; Provides piracy updates and
comprehensive reports on a regular basis; Reports piracy incidents to
law enforcement authorities.
Agency, International organizations: Intertanko; Intertanko is an
association of independent tanker owners and operators;
Selected mission-related activities: Intertanko maintains a database
that includes reports of security conditions at ports of call
throughout the world.
Agency, International organizations: BIMCO; The Baltic and
International Maritime Council (BIMCO) represents over 65 percent of
world's tanker fleet;
Selected mission-related activities: BIMCO coordinates with
international organizations, governments, and members to improve port
and ship security, address piracy and stowaway problems, and secure an
adequate supply of well-trained seafarers.
Agency, Overseas governmental agencies: ISPS designated authorities;
Government agencies responsible for implementing ISPS requirements. In
the United States the authority is the United States Coast Guard;
Selected mission-related activities: Set security levels at a country's
ports; Review vessel and facility security plans and oversees
compliance with these plans.
Agency, International private sector: Overseas port facility operators;
Selected mission-related activities: Implement facility security plans
that meet local port security standards.
Agency, International private sector: Vessel owners and operators;
Selected mission-related activities: Implement vessel security plans
that meet ISPS Code and flag state security standards.
Agency, International private sector: Lloyd's Market Association;
Support and research organization for Lloyd's insurance underwriters;
Selected mission-related activities: Lists area endangered by war,
strikes, terrorism, and related perils--areas for which underwriters
can charge higher premiums for vessels.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
On the domestic side, the U.S. Coast Guard is the lead federal agency
and is responsible for a wide array of maritime safety and security
activities. Other U.S. government agencies support the Coast Guard's
maritime security mission by addressing a wide range of issues that
affect the flow of cargo and people into the United States. State and
local governments and the private sector also have responsibilities to
secure domestic ports. Table 2 lists key federal agencies and other
stakeholders on the domestic side, together with examples of the kinds
of maritime security activities performed.
Table 2: Selected Domestic Stakeholders with Maritime Security
Activities:
Stakeholders, Federal government: Department of Homeland Security: U.S.
Coast Guard;
Selected mission-related activities: Conducts vessel escorts, boardings
of selected vessels, and security patrols of key port areas; Ensures
vessels in U.S. waters comply with domestic (MTSA) and international
(ISPS Code) maritime security standards; Reviews U.S. vessel and
facility security plans and oversees compliance with these plans; Meets
with foreign governments and visits foreign port facilities to observe
security conditions.
Stakeholders, Federal government: Department of Homeland Security:
Customs and Border Protection (CBP);
Selected mission-related activities: Screens vessel, crew, passenger,
and cargo information prior to vessel arrival in the United States;
Boards all vessels that arrive from foreign ports to review personnel
and cargo documentation. Ensures that all have appropriate documents to
gain access to the United States; If concerns about crew or cargo
exist, takes action to deny entrance to the United States.
Stakeholders, Federal government: Department of Justice: Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI);
Selected mission-related activities: FBI Maritime Liaison Agents,
stationed at key ports in the United States, help disseminate maritime
intelligence to port stakeholders; Leads Joint Terrorism Task Forces;
Has lead role in investigating maritime terrorism incidents.
Stakeholders, Federal government: Department of Defense: U.S. Navy;
Selected mission-related activities: Provides support to Department of
Homeland Security as requested for maritime homeland security
operations; Maintains a credible maritime interdiction capability to
deal with identified hostile ships at any location when authorized to
do so; Builds relationships with partner nations' navies to enhance
cooperation and information sharing.
Stakeholders, Federal government: Department of State: Bureau of
Consular Affairs - Visa Services;
Selected mission-related activities: Reviews visa applications and
issues nonimmigrant visas for crew members, including recognizing
falsified documents on visa applications.
Stakeholders, Federal government: State and local governments: Law
enforcement agencies;
Selected mission-related activities: Conduct land-based patrols of port
facilities; If agency operates a marine unit, support Coast Guard role
through water patrols and possibly escorts.
Stakeholders, Federal government: Private sector: Facility operators;
Selected mission-related activities: Develop and implement facility
security plans that meet MTSA standards.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
All of these international and domestic stakeholders help to ensure the
safety and security of a global supply chain that brings energy
commodities to the United States. This supply chain spans the globe and
reaches many regions of the world. Each day, the United States imports
many different energy commodities from overseas suppliers in Africa,
Europe, the Middle East, and North and South America. Excluding Canada,
which supplies petroleum and natural gas to the United States via
pipeline, the vast majority of these varied imports arrive by tanker.
Tankers Transport Energy Commodities around the World:
The various types of energy commodities require different handling
methods, and as a result, various kinds of tankers have been built to
accommodate them. An LNG carrier is designed for transporting LNG at
minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit, when gas liquefies and shrinks
drastically in volume. The cargo is transported in special tanks
insulated to minimize evaporation. LNG carriers are up to 1,000 feet
long and have a draft (depth below the water line) of 40 feet when
fully loaded. The global LNG fleet is expected to double from 200 in
2006 to over 400 by 2010. According to industry reports, the existing
fleet has completed more than 33,000 voyages without a substantial
spill. Oil tankers are more numerous and vary greatly in size. Tankers
transporting crude oil from the Middle East generally consist of Very
Large Crude Carriers, which typically carry more than 2 million barrels
of oil per voyage.[Footnote 16] These ships are over 1,000 feet long,
nearly 200 feet wide, and have a draft of over 65 feet.[Footnote 17]
Figure 1 shows a typical Very Large Crude Carrier. These ships are too
big for most U.S. ports and must transfer their loads to smaller
tankers (a process called lightering) or unload at an offshore
terminal. At present, the United States has only one such offshore
terminal--the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP).[Footnote 18] Most
tankers transporting cargos from the Caribbean and South America, by
contrast, are smaller than Very Large Crude Carriers and can enter U.S.
ports directly.
Figure 1: Oil Tanker at Al-Basrah Offshore Oil Terminal, Persian Gulf:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of an oil tanker at Al-Basrah Offshore Oil Terminal, Persian
Gulf.
[End of figure]
There are generally two enforcement systems aimed at ensuring that
these vessels are in compliance with applicable regulations, laws, and
conventions: flag state control and port state control. The flag state
is the country in which the vessel is registered. Flag state control
can extend anywhere in the world where the vessel operates. For
example, a flag state's requirements set the standards for the
operation and maintenance of all vessels flying that flag. If the flag
state is a contracting government to the SOLAS Convention, these
standards are required to be at least as stringent as those included in
the ISPS Code. The port state is the country where the port is located.
Port state control is the process by which a nation exercises its
authority over foreign-flagged vessels operating in waters subject to
its jurisdiction. It is intended to ensure that vessels comply with all
domestic requirements for ensuring safety of the port, environment, and
personnel. Thus, when a foreign-flagged oil tanker enters a U.S. port,
the U.S. port state control program, administered by the U.S. Coast
Guard, becomes the primary means of marine safety enforcement. For
example, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires that all tankers built
after 1994 coming to the United States must have double hulls--that is,
a two-layered hull to help prevent spills resulting from a collision or
grounding (see fig. 2).[Footnote 19]
Figure 2: Tanker with Insert of Double Hull:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of a tanker with insert of a double
hull. The double hull encompasses the cargo area. All tankers built
after 1994 must have double hulls in order to enter U.S. ports. The
double hull (shown here in a cross-section view) prevents spills if the
outer hull is breached.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Energy Commodities Originate in a Variety of Locations:
According to the Energy Information Administration, the United States
consumes more than 20 million barrels of petroleum every day.[Footnote
20] Of that amount, over 65 percent comes from foreign sources. The top
suppliers of crude oil and petroleum products to the United States in
2005 were Canada, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and Nigeria--each
supplying over 1 million barrels of petroleum per day (see fig. 3).
Iraq, Algeria, Angola, Russia, and the United Kingdom are also major
energy suppliers with daily imports to the United States of up to
500,000 barrels per day. These top 10 energy suppliers accounted for
approximately 75 percent of all U.S. petroleum imports in 2005. All
petroleum imports to the United States from those countries arrive on
tankers, except those from Canada.
Figure 3: Top Exporters of Petroleum to the United States in 2005
(Millions of barrels per day):
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph that illustrates the top exporters
of petroleum to the United States in 2005 (millions of barrels per
day). The vertical axis of the graph represents petroleum imports, 2005
(millions of barrels per day) and the horizontal axis of the graph
represents countries. The following data is depicted:
Exporter: Canada;
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 2.18;
Exporter: Mexico;
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 1.66.
Exporter: Saudi Arabia;
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 1.54.
Exporter: Venezuela;
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 1.53.
Exporter: Nigeria;
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 1.17.
Exporter: Iraq;
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 0.53.
Exporter: Algeria;
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 0.48.
Exporter: Angola;
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 0.47.
Exporter: Russia;
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 0.41.
Exporter: United Kingdom;
petroleum imports, 2005 (millions of barrels per day): 0.40.
Source: Energy Information Administration.
[End of figure]
Imports are a growing portion of the natural gas supply in the United
States. With consumption of natural gas growing faster than domestic
production, imports of natural gas will almost certainly continue to
rise, according to the Energy Information Administration. Today, Canada
is the primary supplier of natural gas to the United States and all of
natural gas imports from Canada are carried by pipeline.[Footnote 21]
Approximately 3 percent of all natural gas imports to the United States
is LNG. Trinidad and Tobago is the single largest supplier of LNG to
the United States, supplying 70 percent of all LNG imported into this
country (see fig. 4). Other LNG suppliers in 2005 included Algeria,
Egypt, Malaysia, Nigeria, Qatar, and Oman.
Figure 4: Top Exporters of Natural Gas to United States in 2005
(Millions of cubic feet per day):
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph that illustrates the top exporters
of natural gas to the United States in 2005 (millions of cubic feet per
day). The vertical axis of the graph represents natural gas imports,
2005 (millions of cubic feet per day) and the horizontal axis of the
graph represents countries. The following data is depicted:
Exporter: Canada;
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 10,138.
Exporter: Trinidad;
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 1,203.
Exporter: Algeria;
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 266.
Exporter: Egypt;
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 199.
Exporter: Mexico;
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 26.
Exporter: Malaysia;
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 24.
Exporter: Nigeria;
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 22.
Exporter: Qatar;
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 8.
Exporter: Oman;
natural gas imports (millions of cubic feet per day): 7.
Source: Energy Information Administration.
[End of figure]
Key Domestic Ports Handle Vast Majority of Energy Imports:
The United States imports about 65 percent of its crude oil and
petroleum products as well as about 3 percent of its natural gas
needs.[Footnote 22] As shown in figure 5, certain energy commodities
are imported into particular regions of the country. Appendix II
provides detailed descriptions of U.S. energy commodity imports
transported by tanker. For example, in 2004:
* Ports along the Gulf Coast imported 62 percent of the crude oil
imported to the United States.
* Ports along the East Coast imported 95 percent of the gasoline and 75
percent of the LNG.
* Ports along the West Coast imported 60 percent of all jet fuel.
Figure 5: Regional Significance of Petroleum Commodities:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the regional significance of
petroleum commodities. The figure is a map of the continental United
States, and depicts the following data:
West Coast ports:
Jet Fuels: 60%.
Gulf Coast ports:
Crude Oil: 62%;
LPG: 39%.
East Coast ports:
Gasoline: 95%;
Residential fuel oil: 78%;
LNG: 75%.
Source: GAO analysis of Energy Information Administration data.
[End of figure]
Characteristics of Maritime Supply Chain Make It Vulnerable to
Terrorist Attack:
The global maritime environment through which the energy supply chain
operates is constrained by physical geography and influenced by
regional political dynamics. The physical geography of the continents,
for example, forces shipping lanes to pass through certain narrow
channels, or chokepoints. There are approximately 200 such locations,
but only a handful are of strategic importance for the global energy
supply (see fig. 6). A chokepoint by definition tends to be shallow and
narrow, resulting in impaired navigation and congestion from other
tankers, cargo ships, and other smaller vessels, which can impede the
free and efficient flow of goods. Moreover, several key chokepoints are
surrounded by more than one sovereign nation, resulting in a complex
security environment within a constrained physical space. Managing
security in this environment requires significant coordination among
these countries to successfully manage the security in these locations.
According to the Energy Information Administration, chokepoints are
susceptible to pirate attacks and shipping accidents in their narrow
channels. In addition, chokepoints can be blocked, mined, or rendered
inaccessible by foreign naval forces, with potentially devastating
consequences for the flow of oil and goods around the world and into
the United States.
Figure 6: Oil Flows and Strategic Shipping Chokepoints:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the oil flows and strategic shipping
chokepoints across the globe. The figure is a world map that
illustrates the position of shipping lanes across the globe and the
flow in terms of millions of barrels per day, with various size lines
indicating flows in the amounts of 15 million, 10 million, 3 million,
and 1 million barrels per day. The following chokepoints are specific
depicted:
Chokepoint: Straight of Hormus;
millions of barrels per day: 16.5.
Chokepoint: Straight of Malacca;
millions of barrels per day: 11.7.
Chokepoint: Suez Canal and Sumed Pipeline;
millions of barrels per day: 3.8.
Chokepoint: Bosporus;
millions of barrels per day: 3.1.
Chokepoint: Bab el-Mandeb;
millions of barrels per day: 3.0.
Chokepoint: Panama Canal;
millions of barrels per day: 0.5.
Source: GAO analysis of Energy Information Administration (2004) data.
[End of figure]
The Straits of Hormuz and Malacca are two critical maritime shipping
chokepoints that tankers pass through regularly. The Strait of Hormuz,
which connects the oil fields of the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman
and the Indian Ocean, is the most important chokepoint in the world in
terms of the global energy supply, with about 20 percent of the world
oil supply, including 17 percent of U.S. petroleum imports passing
through it. Tankers with oil from the Persian Gulf must navigate
through this chokepoint in order to access the principal international
shipping lanes toward the United States. Another chokepoint, the Strait
of Malacca, links the Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean (and oil coming
from the Middle East) with the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean
(and major consuming markets in Asia). The Strait of Malacca is located
among Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore and about 600 vessels pass
through it each day. Piracy and political instability in the region,
especially in Indonesia, are issues of concern for shipping operations
in the strait. The Energy Information Administration identified other
important maritime chokepoints, including the Bab el-Mandab passage
from the Arabian Sea, the Panama Canal connecting the Pacific and
Atlantic Oceans, the Suez Canal connecting the Red Sea to the
Mediterranean Sea, and the Bosporus Straits linking the Black Sea to
the Mediterranean Sea.
Besides facing vulnerabilities while in transit, vessels can be
vulnerable while moored at facilities where they are receiving or
unloading their cargoes, and the energy-related infrastructure located
in ports can also be vulnerable to attack. Vessels transiting into and
out of ports and their attendant infrastructure can be vulnerable in a
number of ways. During transit into and out of port, these vessels
travel slowly, which increases their exposure. Tankers follow
timetables that are easy to track in advance and they follow a fixed
set of maritime routes. Once tankers arrive in this country, they must
wait offshore for pilots to navigate the ship channels into many of the
nation's ports.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, increased national
attention has been focused on the potential vulnerability of the
nation's 361 major seaports to terrorist attack. According to the
National Strategy for Maritime Security, the infrastructure and systems
that span the maritime domain have increasingly become both targets of
and potential conveyances for dangerous and illicit
activities.[Footnote 23] GAO has previously reported that ports are
vulnerable because they are sprawling, interwoven with complex
transportation networks, close to crowded metropolitan areas, and
easily accessible.[Footnote 24] Ports and their maritime approaches,
including waterways and coastal areas, facilitate freedom of movement
and the flow of goods while allowing people, cargo, and vessels to
transit with relative anonymity. Some energy terminals are located in
open seas where they are accessible by water or air, while others are
located in metropolitan areas, along key shipping channels, or near
pristine environmental sanctuaries where they may be accessible by
water, air, or land.
Addressing Tanker Security Vulnerabilities Involves Setting Risks in
the Context of Other Security and Nonsecurity Priorities:
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there was
widespread acknowledgement that numerous and substantial gaps existed
in homeland security. There is also widespread acknowledgment, however,
that resources for closing these gaps are limited and must compete with
other national priorities. It is improbable that any security framework
can successfully anticipate and thwart every type of potential
terrorist threat that highly motivated, well-skilled, and adequately
funded terrorist groups could perpetrate. While security efforts
clearly matter, various groups like the 9/11 Commission have emphasized
that total security cannot be bought no matter how much is spent on it.
In short, the nation cannot afford to protect everything against all
threats, even within the relatively narrow context of tanker security.
Choices are clearly involved--including decisions about the relative
vulnerability posed by attacks on energy commodity tankers as compared
with attacks in other forms, such as air safety or security in crowded
urban centers.
In this context, risk management has become a widely endorsed strategy
for helping policymakers make decisions about allocating finite
resources in such circumstances.[Footnote 25] It emphasizes the
importance of assigning available resources to address the greatest
risks, along with selecting those strategies that make the most
efficient and effective use of resources. Risk management has received
widespread support from Congress, the President, and the Secretary of
Homeland Security as a tool that can help set priorities and inform
decisions about mitigating risks.[Footnote 26]
Energy Commodity Shipments Face Varied Threats, and a Successful Attack
Could Have Substantial Consequences:
Even though intelligence sources have reported that there are currently
no specific credible threats to energy tankers in U.S. waters or their
attendant facilities on U.S. soil, attacks overseas show that tankers
face several major types of threats, and if a threat were to be
successfully carried out domestically, it could have serious
consequences. Overseas, terrorists have demonstrated the ability to
carry out at least three types of threats.[Footnote 27] First, and of
greatest concern, according to officials we spoke with, is a suicide
attack against a tanker or attendant facility. Second is a standoff
missile attack using a rocket or some other weapon launched from a
distance. Third is an armed assault by terrorists or armed bands while
a tanker is moored or in transit. There are additional types of
threats, including internal crew conspiracies and collisions with a
vessel piloted by terrorists. While attacks have so far occurred only
overseas, two Coast Guard admirals testified before Congress that
malicious maritime incursions into U.S. waters, such as immigrant or
drug smuggling, occur regularly. If an attack on a commodity tanker
were successful in U.S. waters or while docked at a U.S. unloading
facility, substantial public safety, environmental, and economic
consequences could result. Public safety and environmental consequences
of an attack vary by commodity. For instance, LNG and LPG are highly
combustible and pose a risk to public safety of fire or--in a more
unlikely scenario in which they are in a confined space--explosion. The
environmental impact, however, of LNG and LPG spills would be minimal
since they dissipate in a short period of time. Crude oil and heavy
petroleum products remain in the environment after they are spilled and
must be removed, potentially causing significant environmental damage.
Potential economic consequences of an attack include psychological
market responses as well as significant delays and possible shortages
if major transit routes, key facilities, or ports are closed.
No Credible Specific Threat of Attack at U.S. Ports to Date, but Events
Overseas Indicate Reasons for Concern:
According to U.S. government intelligence sources, there have been no
specific credible terrorist threats to tankers in U.S. waters or their
unloading facilities on U.S. soil in the wake of the September 11
attacks. Nonetheless, several events overseas and intelligence reports
indicate ongoing concern about the potential for an attack against
tankers or energy facilities.
* Heightened security threat levels in response to potential threats.
The Coast Guard has raised the Maritime Security (MARSEC) level from
Level 1 to Level 2 on several occasions in response to nonspecific
threats based on intelligence or other warnings to the maritime
sector.[Footnote 28] In the past, the Coast Guard has raised the MARSEC
level due to general threats.
* Other intelligence indicating ports are targets under consideration.
Security officials in the U.S. government are concerned about the
possibility of a terrorist attack in a U.S. port in the future. For
example, captured terrorist training manuals cite seaports as targets
and instruct trainees to use covert means to obtain surveillance
information for use in attack planning. Terrorist leaders have also
stated their intent to attack infrastructure targets within the United
States, including seaports, in an effort to cause physical and economic
damage, and inflict mass casualties.
* Continued policy priority for port security. Four years after passage
of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Congress remained
sufficiently concerned about maritime security to again increase
security efforts under the Security and Accountability Act for Every
(SAFE) Port Act of 2006.[Footnote 29] This law (1) required the
Department of Homeland Security to conduct terrorist watch list checks
of newly hired port employees, (2) provided authority for risk-based
funding through security grants to harden U.S. ports against terrorist
attacks and enhance capabilities to respond to attacks and resume
operations, and (3) required the Department of Homeland Security to
develop protocols for resuming trade after a transportation security
incident.
Officials Are Concerned about Three Primary Types of Threats:
Our discussions with officials of various agencies and our review of
reports and other published documentation indicate that the following
three types of attacks on tankers or attendant facilities are
considered to be the most likely.
Suicide Attacks:
In the maritime domain, suicide attacks have been carried out using a
small, explosive-laden boat or vehicle that the attacker rams into a
tanker or energy facility. The intent of such an attack is maximum
damage to human or physical targets without concern for the life of the
attacker. Previous attack history underscores terrorist intentions and
capability to use small boat attacks. Moreover, intelligence experts
say that the suicide boat attack uses a proven, simple strategy that
has caused significant loss of life and significant damage to
commercial and military vessels.
Several suicide attacks have been carried out against tankers and
energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf region. They have taken place
in restricted waterways where a ship's ability to maneuver or engage
the attackers is hampered or when a ship has stopped or moored. For
example:
* In April 2004 terrorists attacked the Al-Basrah and Khawr Al'Amaya
offshore oil terminals in Iraq using vessels packed with explosives.
Several oil tankers were either docked at or in the vicinity of the
offshore terminals during the attack. Even though the speedboats
detonated prematurely and missed striking the oil tankers and the
offshore terminals, another small craft near the Khawr Al'Amaya
terminal exploded when coalition forces attempted to intercept it,
killing two U.S. Navy sailors and a U.S. Coast Guardsman. According to
a recent study on maritime terrorism, the coordinated attack appears to
have been part of an overall terrorist strategy to destabilize Iraq,
and both terminals were shut down for 2 days, resulting in lost revenue
of nearly $40 million.[Footnote 30]
* Another suicide attack occurred in October 2002 when terrorists
rammed the French supertanker Limburg as it slowed for a pilot to
approach the Ash Shihr Terminal off the coast of Yemen. (See fig. 7.)
The resulting explosion breached the Limburg's double hull and ignited
stored oil on board the vessel. An estimated 90,000 barrels of oil were
spilled, 1 crewman was killed, and 17 were injured.
* In addition to maritime suicide attacks, terrorists have also
targeted energy facilities on land. In February 2006, for example,
terrorists attempted to drive vehicles packed with explosives through
the gates of a major oil-processing facility in Saudi Arabia's eastern
province. Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack, which killed
two Saudi guards and represented the first direct assault on a Saudi
oil production facility.
Figure 7: Tanker Limburg after Terrorist Attack near Yemen:
[See PDF for image]
This is a photograph of the tanker Limburg after a terrorist attack
near Yemen.
Source: AFP.
[End of figure]
Standoff Attacks:
A second type of threat against tankers and attendant maritime
infrastructure is a standoff missile attack using a rocket, mortar, or
rocket-propelled grenade launched from a sufficient distance to evade
defensive fire. Standoff missile attacks have been aimed at military
ships in ports in the Persian Gulf, but these kinds of attacks also
represent a serious type of threat against tankers. Terrorists launched
such an attack using Katyusha rockets in 2005, narrowly missing two
U.S. naval ships moored at a Jordanian port. Compared to suicide
attacks, standoff attacks are easier to execute, but are less likely to
be as effective, according to intelligence experts. The range, size,
and accuracy of explosive projectiles used in such an attack could vary
considerably.
Armed Assaults:
Armed assaults, particularly at critical shipping chokepoints,
represent a third major type of threat to tankers along the energy
supply chain, according to the International Maritime Bureau. These
attacks on tankers and energy infrastructure have taken place where
maritime security is lacking and they have been carried out in most
cases by pirates seeking to gain control of the ship for financial
gain, including petty theft and kidnapping of crew for ransom.[Footnote
31] Pirate attacks against tankers and cargo ships have taken place in
numerous locations, including off the coast of Somalia, in the Gulf of
Guinea and Persian Gulf, and along the Strait of Malacca. According to
officials at the International Maritime Bureau, oil tankers account for
about one-quarter of all pirate attacks. Pirate groups armed with
automatic weapons have seized tankers in the Strait of Malacca and off
the coast of Somalia. For example, in March 2006 pirates armed with
automatic weapons hijacked a tanker off the coast of Somalia and
demanded ransom payments for the release of the ship and its crew.
Also, attacks on offshore oil facilities have become commonplace in
Nigeria, where local rebel groups claim to be fighting the Nigerian
government over control of oil revenue. While no attacks on
international oil tankers off the coast of Nigeria have occurred to
date, militant groups in the area have threatened to escalate the
conflict by attacking ships.
Other Types of Threats Are Considered Less Likely:
There are other types of threats besides the three above, but
assessments we reviewed and officials we met with indicated these other
scenarios were less likely to occur. Two examples cited were the
following:
* Crew conspiracies. Coast Guard intelligence reports suggest a
hypothetical possibility that crew members (or persons posing as crew
members) could conspire to commandeer a tanker with the intent of using
the vessel as a weapon or disrupting maritime commerce. Vessel
operators and industry groups do not consider this to be a serious
threat, especially given the technical complexity of modern gas
carriers and large oil tankers and the extensive vetting process for
crew on these kinds of vessels. Crew conspiracy could also result in
situations where oil tankers or gas carriers could be used to transport
terrorists. Intelligence officials estimate that the number of overall
stowaways on all vessels entering U.S. ports was expected to average 30
per month in 2005. There have been cases of stowaways with suspected
terrorist connections on board U.S.-bound vessels since 2000.
* Collisions. One scenario related to armed assaults involves pirates
or terrorists hijacking a large ship and ramming it into a tanker, an
energy facility, or critical infrastructure such as a bridge. Although
such scenarios require gaining control of a ship, terrorists'
successful takeover of aircraft in the September 11 attacks demonstrate
that such plans could be feasible. To date, there have been no known
cases of terrorists intentionally using a vessel as a weapon, but there
have been some close calls in pirate-prone areas. Security experts
point to an example in 2003 in which a group of pirates gained control
of the chemical tanker Dewi Madrim in the Strait of Malacca. Once at
the tanker's helm, the pirates altered the ship's speed, disabled
communications, and steered the ship for over 1 hour before escaping
with equipment and technical documents.
Intelligence Reviews Indicate Threats Are Likely to Persist:
Reports we reviewed and assessments we received indicate that the
threat of seaborne terrorist attack on maritime energy tankers and
infrastructure is likely to persist. The information we reviewed and
discussions we had with agency officials indicate the greatest degree
of concern remains overseas. For example, in October 2006 it was
reported that there were threats against Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura oil
terminal, which is the world's biggest offshore oil facility, as well
as a refinery in Bahrain. As part of its mission in the area, the U.S.
Navy, together with coalition forces, continues to patrol areas
containing critical maritime energy infrastructure to ensure their
security, and works with regional navies in the Persian Gulf to improve
their ability to enforce maritime security. In addition, Coast Guard
maritime threat assessments we reviewed consider the threat of
terrorists attacking vessels outside U.S. territorial waters to be
significant. According to these reports, future maritime terrorist
attacks are most likely to occur in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea,
Mediterranean Sea, and Southeast Asia.
Domestically, intelligence reports and other assessments continue to
disclose incidents that demonstrate the need for continued concern
about potential terrorist threats. For example, two Coast Guard
admirals testified that the nation is subject to an estimated four
malicious maritime incursions around the country each week.[Footnote
32] These incursions represent opportunities to infiltrate homeland
security and could cause widespread human, economic, and environmental
damage in our nation's maritime points of entry. Most of these
incursions to date have involved vessels bringing illegal immigrants,
drugs, or other contraband into the country.
Possible Consequences of an Attack Include Public Safety,
Environmental, and Economic Impacts:
A successful attack on an energy commodity tanker could have
substantial public safety, environmental, and economic consequences.
Public safety and environmental consequences vary by commodity. LNG and
LPG are highly combustible and pose a risk to public safety of fire and
explosions, but their environmental impact would be minimal since they
dissipate in a short period of time. Crude oil and heavy petroleum
products do not dissipate quickly and must be removed from the water,
posing a greater environmental than public safety risk. Economic
consequences of an attack could be substantial, not so much because of
the loss of a tanker or its cargo, but because of the greater shock to
the economy, particularly if major transit routes, key facilities, or
ports are closed. Price spikes that reflect fears or expectations about
the price and supply of energy commodities could also be significant.
Public Safety and Environmental Consequences Vary by Commodity:
LNG and LPG spills pose primarily a public safety hazard to structures
and people because of the potential for fires and explosions. These
gaseous energy commodities are transported as liquids either by cooling
or by pressurizing the gas. If spilled, they will return to their
gaseous state, causing vapor to form above the spill. It is these
vapors that will burn. Further, the vapors will drift away from the
site of the spill if not immediately ignited by a source such as an
open flame or strong static charge. Once ignited, the fire will travel
back through the vapors toward the initial spill site and, if fuel
remains, continue to burn near the tanker.
One of the key elements of how a fire will affect the public is the
amount of heat that is radiated away from the fire. The amount of heat
radiated away from a fire is related to how smoky the fire burns--fires
with a great deal of smoke radiate much less heat because the dark
smoke absorbs the radiation. LNG and LPG vapor fires burn very cleanly,
with little smoke, and thus emit more heat than light petroleum product
or crude oil fires.
Besides the danger of fire, there is also a danger of explosions if LNG
or LPG vapors are ignited in a confined area, such as under a dock. If
the attack on a tanker occurred in a congested port area, an explosion
could damage infrastructure or harm people located nearby. In addition
to potential explosions of confined vapors, a particular type of
explosion--called a boiling-liquid-expanding-vapor explosion--can occur
on tankers that carry pressurized cargoes, such as some LPG
tankers.[Footnote 33] In these tankers, the individual tanks carrying
the LPG may rupture violently if they are compromised by heat or
explosion. Since LNG is not transported in pressurized tanks, this type
of explosion is not likely to occur.
Finally, people who come in contact with spilled refrigerated liquefied
gases could be burned due to the cryogenic (freeze) nature of the
liquid. LNG and LPG are both transported internationally in
refrigerated tankers that keep the gas so cold that it retains a liquid
form. A spill of either LNG or LPG could expose people close to the
spill to the cold liquid and cause cryogenic burns or frostbite. This
is not likely to affect the public, but could affect the crew on the
tanker or other people located close to the tanker.
LNG and LPG spills pose little threat to the environment because they
almost entirely vaporize in a matter of minutes or hours and disperse
into the atmosphere. If an LNG or LPG spill were ignited, there could
be localized impacts on wildlife near the fire, but few other
environmental effects.
Spills of light petroleum products, such as gasoline, diesel, and jet
fuel, can have both public safety and environmental consequences. Light
petroleum products produce flammable vapors when they are spilled.
These vapors can be ignited and could result in large, damaging fires.
Further, the vapors could drift away from the site of the spill if not
immediately ignited by a source such as an open flame or strong static
charge. Once ignited, the fire will travel back through the vapors
toward the initial spill site and, if fuel remains, continue to burn
near the tanker. Besides the danger of fire, there is also a danger of
explosions if light petroleum product vapors are ignited in a confined
area, such as under a dock. If the attack on a tanker occurred in a
congested port area, an explosion could damage infrastructure or harm
people located nearby.
Spills of light petroleum products have varying environmental impacts,
depending on conditions. Light petroleum products evaporate--almost all
of the spill can evaporate in a few hours or up to a day. Consequently,
light petroleum products generally do not persist in the environment
for long unless the spill is churned by significant wave action. In
that case, such products can mix with water and will linger in the
environment for much longer periods of time. A 1996 spill highlighted
the damage that can occur when a light distillate oil is spilled in
heavy wave conditions, resulting in much of the oil mixing with water
rather than evaporating. In this case, a tank barge carrying home
heating oil was grounded in the middle of a storm near Point Judith,
Rhode Island, spilling approximately 20,000 barrels of heating oil. An
estimated 80 percent of the release was mixed into the water, with only
about 12 percent evaporating and about 10 percent staying on the
surface of the water.[Footnote 34] The spill affected animals and
plants living on the sea bed, with an estimated mortality of 9 million
lobsters, 19.4 million clams, 7.6 million rock and hermit crabs, and
4.2 million fish. The oil spill resulted in a fishing closure for about
250 square miles in Block Island Sound for a period of 5 months.
Spills of crude oil and heavy petroleum products could result in
significant environmental consequences. Since these types of spills do
not readily evaporate, they can linger in the environment.
Environmental cleanup of crude oil and heavy petroleum product spills
can take several years and in some cases cost billions of dollars.
According to ExxonMobil, the company spent $2.2 billion on the Exxon
Valdez cleanup. Crude oil and heavy petroleum products can mix with
water, particularly in the presence of waves, causing small drops of
water to be trapped inside the spilled oil. This is called an emulsion
and can hamper cleanup by making the spilled oil difficult to skim off
the water. This will greatly increase the volume of the spill, since
the water trapped within the oil also has to be removed. In addition,
residual oils are sometimes more dense than water, allowing them to
sink and contaminate bottom sediments. Finally, crude oil and heavy
petroleum products can coat birds and marine mammals, both smothering
the organisms and exposing them to them to hypothermia as their
feathers and fur lose the ability to insulate.
While crude oil and heavy petroleum products evaporate, they produce
few flammable vapors. For instance, less than half of a crude oil spill
and 10 percent of heavy petroleum product spills will evaporate into
vapors that could burn or explode. While fire always raises concerns
about public safety, the smaller volume of vapors available to burn
would result in small fires that are less likely to endanger the public.
Blockage of Key Transit Routes, Key Facilities, or Ports Could Cost
Billions:
Although the Exxon Valdez accident demonstrates that even one spill can
create substantial environmental cost, an attack that affects only a
single tanker is unlikely to have significant consequences on the
overall economy, other than a relative short-term market price
increase. One tanker carries a small percentage of the total daily
demand for a commodity. As mentioned above, Very Large Crude Carriers
typically carry more than 2 million barrels of oil per voyage, which is
about 10 percent of U.S. daily oil consumption. In most cases, the
relatively small volume in an individual tanker could be replaced with
other imports or from domestic storage. Two examples show the
relatively small effect on supply if the broader supply network is not
substantially affected:
* The approximately 240,000 barrels of oil released into Prince William
Sound by the Exxon Valdez represented about 20 minutes of total U.S.
oil consumption in 1989. The spill's actual disruption was somewhat
greater: According to the Department of Energy, the incident actually
resulted in an oil supply disruption of 13 million barrels of oil over
13 days, because the spill restricted tanker transport in Prince
William Sound and the volume of oil piped from the Alaskan North Slope
also had to be reduced. Still, even this 13 million barrel disruption
represented only about 18 hours of total national consumption.[Footnote
35]
* More recently, an approximately 6,300-barrel oil spill in November
2004 significantly reduced tanker traffic on a stretch of the Delaware
River for more than a week. As a result, a nearby refinery had to
reduce production of refined products because of reduced crude oil
availability. The oil spill also threatened to contaminate the water
intake system of a nuclear power plant along the river, which was
temporarily shut down. Despite these reductions in energy supply,
gasoline prices actually dropped in the days after the oil spill.
The loss of a tanker carrying crude oil or heavy petroleum commodities
will pose additional economic costs for ship replacement and
environmental cleanup. Tankers can cost about $150 million, and the
lost cargo could cost over $100 million dollars more. The Delaware
River oil spill cleanup cost about $175 million over the course of 1
year. As the $2.2 billion Exxon Valdez spill cleanup illustrates, a
larger spill or a spill in a more sensitive ecological zone could cost
much more.
A much more significant impact could occur if an attack on a tanker
resulted in the closure of a port, damage to a key facility, or long
interruption of a key transit route. A successful attack while a tanker
was docked, for example, could result in damage to a key facility. Even
if a port were not closed altogether, the Coast Guard could increase
the MARSEC level at one or more ports or industries to MARSEC 3--the
highest level. The Coast Guard noted in the Federal Register that
MARSEC Level 3 will involve significant restriction of maritime
operations that could result in the temporary closure of individual
facilities, ports, and waterways, in either a region or the entire
nation. Depending on the nature of the specific threat, this highest
level of maritime security may have a considerable impact on the
stakeholders in the affected ports or maritime areas. The ability to
estimate the costs to business and government for even a short period
at MARSEC Level 3 is difficult to do with any level of accuracy or
analytical confidence due to the infinite range of threats and
scenarios that could trigger MARSEC Level 3. The Coast Guard also noted
that the length and the duration of the increased security level to
MARSEC Level 3 will be entirely dependent on the scope of
transportation security incidents or disasters that have already
occurred. The Coast Guard expects MARSEC Level 3 to increase the direct
costs to businesses attributable to increased personnel or modified
operations, and it also expects indirect costs to society of the
"ripple effects" associated with sustained port closures would greatly
outweigh the direct costs to individual businesses.
The scale of these effects can perhaps be seen in several hypothetical
examples, both international and domestic.
* Strait of Hormuz. Each day, tankers transport 20 percent of global
daily oil consumption--about 17 million barrels of oil--through the
Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway that connects the Persian Gulf
with the Arabian Sea. While there are some limited alternatives for
exporting oil from the Persian Gulf without going through the strait,
these alternatives could not make entirely for the amount of oil lost
by closure of the strait. While the United States and other oil-
importing countries have reserves of crude oil that they could use to
mitigate the loss of supply from the Persian Gulf, oil could not be
withdrawn fast enough to entirely make up the lost volumes. For
example, while the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve has 688 million
barrels of oil, the send-out capacity of the reserves is only 4.4
million barrels per day. Other countries face similar constraints.
Additionally, if closure of Hormuz lasted for an extended period of
time, strategic reserves could run out or become so low as to be unable
to mitigate any additional petroleum supply disruptions.
* Northeast United States. An attack on a key port in the northeastern
United States, such as Boston, could result in energy commodity
shortages or price spikes. For instance, the LNG facility near Boston
(in Everett, Massachusetts), is the only facility importing liquefied
natural gas in the Northeast. LNG is very important to the Northeast
during heating season because natural gas movement into the Northeast
is constrained during the winter because existing pipelines to New
England are fully utilized. A report prepared by the Power Planning
Committee of the New England Governor's Conference, Inc., concluded
that if LNG from the Everett facility and satellite operations
elsewhere in the region is not available on a peak winter day, the
region could have insufficient gas supply to meet the needs of all
customers for space heating and some key electric generators. An attack
that damages the Everett LNG facility during a cold winter could result
in natural gas shortages or price spikes.
* LOOP. A loss of import capacity at the LOOP could increase the price
of crude oil and refined products. LOOP is a key energy facility--a
terminal in the Gulf of Mexico that, according to DOE, accounts for
more than 10 percent of total U.S. crude oil imports. LOOP and its
storage terminals are connected to more than 50 percent of the refining
capacity in the United States. LOOP is also the only facility in the
United States that can receive tankers of the ultra-large and very
large types. Counteracting the impact of losing LOOP could involve
release of oil from the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve and lightering
in other U.S. ports.[Footnote 36]
While we did not find any studies on the economic consequences of
closures to energy facilities at ports, other broader reviews of port
closures identified possible loses in the billions of dollars. One
study of the 2002 West Coast port shutdown, a 11-day closure of all
West Coast ports due to a labor dispute, developed estimates (based on
models) for the costs of the shutdown based on the losses in income by
U.S. workers, consumers, and producers based on trade flow, ability to
ship goods, and the inclination of consumers and industries to
substitute for other, available goods[Footnote 37]. The study found
that for a shutdown lasting 4 weeks (which was longer than the actual
11-day shutdown) total loses to the U.S. economy would be about $4.7
billion, with industrial consumers bearing the majority of that burden.
[Footnote 38]
Other studies have attempted to model the economic impact of terrorist
attacks on ports. For example, one study examined the potential effects
of a 15-day port closure at Los Angeles-Long Beach due to a
radiological bomb. It concluded that such a closure would result in
regional impacts of $138 million in lost economic output and 1,258
person-years of lost employment.[Footnote 39] The study also analyzed
the potential effects of a simultaneous attack on key bridges in the
port area. The study assumed such an attack would cause a longer port
closure and limited truck access to the port for 120 days, and under
that scenario, it estimated the national economic impact at $34 billion
and 212,000 person-years of employment lost. This analysis did not
consider the potential mitigating effects of other modes of
transportation for moving goods out of the port (i.e., using rail
instead of trucks), or potential trade diversion to other ports during
the crisis.
Economic Consequences from the Psychological Market Reaction to an
Attack Could Be Severe:
Finally, psychological ramifications of an attack could affect prices
and supply. Researchers have noted that psychological market reactions
to the consequences of an event may cause individuals and firms to
change their decision-making processes, potentially causing
consequences to ripple outward from the incident itself. If the
incident affects key facilities, indirect effects could be magnified
and also include businesses that are unable to operate both in the port
and elsewhere if they are dependent on goods that move through the
port. There is also the potential for unemployment of indirectly
affected businesses.
The movement of gasoline prices after the Exxon Valdez spill is an
illustration. Although the actual disruption in supply was relatively
small, the oil spill sent shock waves through oil markets, particularly
those most dependent on oil from the Alaskan North Slope along the West
Coast. In the first week after the oil spill, spot market prices of
unleaded regular gasoline increased $0.50 from $0.68 per gallon to
$1.18 per gallon, a 74 percent increase due to fears of an extended
closure of oil from the Alaskan North Slope. In the following weeks,
however, prices began to decrease, hitting $0.99 on April 7 (2 weeks
after the spill) and $0.82 on April 14 (3 weeks after the spill). Thus
as markets realized that the supply shortage would be short lived,
prices dropped sharply. The Department of Energy concluded in its
analysis of the incident that the temporary loss of Alaskan North Slope
supplies resulted in a perception of tight oil markets rather than a
significant change in fundamental supply and demand factors.[Footnote
40]
Although Stakeholders Are Taking Protective Measures, Implementation
Challenges Pose Difficulty Both Abroad and at Home:
Many efforts are under way, both internationally and domestically, to
protect energy commodity tankers and their attendant facilities, but
significant challenges to the success of these efforts may limit the
effectiveness of these actions. These challenges are evident in
protecting the loading and transit of tanker shipments. In these
settings, a broad range of international stakeholders is involved,
including IMO, foreign governments, vessel and facility operators, and
U.S. government agencies. To help protect the international maritime
supply chain, signatory governments are responsible for implementing
the requirements of IMO's ISPS Code into law, many facility and vessel
operators have taken steps to implement ISPS Code requirements, various
industry organizations have reported security conditions in ports
around the world to better inform their members, and the U.S. Coast
Guard and Navy have also established their presence overseas.
Challenges are evident, however, when examining how this framework has
been implemented to date. Our limited reviews at foreign facilities
showed wide disparity in the quality and extent of security. The Coast
Guard is limited in the degree to which it can bring about improvements
abroad when security is substandard, in part because its activities are
limited by conditions set by host nations. The Navy takes actions that
help to prevent attacks on tankers in transit, but is limited in the
areas where it can patrol. In U.S. ports and waterways, a wide array of
stakeholders is taking steps to protect arriving vessels, but
challenges persist here as well. Key participants include the Coast
Guard, CBP, and local law enforcement agencies. In some locations,
however, the Coast Guard has had difficulty meeting its own self-
imposed requirements for security activity. The completion of new LNG
facilities planned for a number of ports could further exacerbate the
Coast Guard's ability to meet current requirements with its current
resources.
In Spite of the Widespread Adoption of the ISPS Code, the Primary
Challenge Overseas Involves Overcoming Disparities in Security at
Different Locations:
The ISPS Code lays out the international regime for securing port
facilities and commercial vessels. Signatory governments of port and
flag states are responsible for ensuring compliance with the ISPS Code
at port facilities and vessels under their jurisdiction. Port states
enter the compliance status of their facilities directly into an IMO
database. While the ISPS Code was adopted under the auspices of IMO,
IMO officials told us they have no way of knowing if a country's port
facilities are truly in compliance. IMO merely reports information
submitted by member governments and does not verify its accuracy.
Additionally, there is no other internationally recognized mechanism
for third party review to verify actual compliance at port facilities.
Without third party compliance review, it is extremely difficult to
determine if ports are secure against terrorism.
Within some countries, the actual security measures can vary greatly
from port facility to port facility, as indicated both by our own
visits to foreign facilities and our discussions with agency and
shipping officials. For example,
* In one country we visited, we observed varying degrees of
implementation of measures to control access at different port
facilities. One facility we visited had security cameras, fences,
guards checking perimeter security, and identification checks for
access control. Here, we were challenged by guards regularly as we
passed through gates, even though facility officials were escorting us.
At another facility, however, someone came to the guard station only
when our escort signaled for him to come over, and fences were
collapsed in some places and had holes in others.
* Vessel operators we met with also described differences in security
at different ports where they load. These operators said they use many
sources of intelligence to determine their security stance when
entering a port. Some operators said they can call on the knowledge of
their own intelligence sources in port states, including contacts with
intelligence agencies. Members of Intertanko, an international industry
organization, can access its database of port security conditions, a
database made up of reports from vessel operators that experience these
conditions when they stop at various ports. In this database, operators
reported that some ports security conditions are substantially worse
than would be expected for an ISPS Code-compliant facility. In such
cases, they reported taking steps that went beyond ISPS requirements,
such as keeping ships at security postures beyond those called for by
the port state's declared security level.
The United States is attempting to deal with facility security lapses
and inconsistent security conditions in some overseas ports with
overseas efforts of its own. Because of congressional concern over the
effectiveness of antiterrorism measures in place at foreign ports, the
Coast Guard has implemented the International Port Security Program,
which was designed in part to assess and help improve the security at
foreign ports. This program reviews port states' implementation of port
facility security measures using established security standards,
particularly the ISPS Code. According to the Coast Guard, the ISPS Code
is the benchmark against which the effectiveness of a country's anti-
terrorism measures will be assessed. The program also reviews the
country's implementation of ship security provisions of the ISPS Code
to help decide what actions to take in reviewing that country's vessels
when they call in U.S. ports. Visits are conducted by Coast Guard
personnel operating out of the Netherlands, Japan, Singapore, and the
United States. According to program guidance, the Coast Guard officers
making these visits are to exchange information with officials of the
host country, visit port facilities, and share best practices.
The Coast Guard faces a number of challenges, however, in operating
this program. The locations to be visited are negotiated with the host
country; thus the Coast Guard team making the visit could be precluded
from seeing locations that were not in compliance. Coast Guard
officials said International Port Security Program officers typically
make up to three visits to a country, each lasting about a week. Their
assessments are thus based on conditions observed when their visits
occur. We are currently conducting a separate review of the Coast
Guard's international programs, and the report we issue will include a
more complete review of the effectiveness of its International Port
Security Program.
U.S. Military Presence Overseas Aimed at Helping Deter Maritime
Terrorist Attacks:
In certain locations, the Navy and Coast Guard have also taken more
direct action to protect oil terminals--most notably in Iraq. The Navy
has set security zones (zones where unauthorized vessels will be fired
upon) around Iraqi oil terminals and stationed warships and patrol
boats around the terminals (see fig. 8). The Navy has also stationed
security personnel on the terminal platforms.
Figure 8: Tanker Approaching an Iraqi Oil Loading Terminal as U.S.
Warship Patrols Nearby:
[See PDF for image]
This is a photograph of a tanker approaching an Iraqi oil loading
terminal as U.S. warship patrols nearby.
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
State Department Officials Review Crew Member Visa Applications
Overseas to Prevent Entry of Terrorists:
An additional protective measure taken overseas is the effort of State
Department (State) officials to help ensure that terrorists cannot gain
entry to the United States by working as seafarers on tankers or other
vessels. State Department regulations eliminated crew list visas and
required all crew members seeking to enter the United States to apply
for individual crew visas.[Footnote 41] These visas are usually
presented at U.S. ports of entry, but they can only be obtained abroad.
Applicants must make appointments with State Department officials
located at embassies and consulates and be interviewed. They must
submit background information, fingerprints, and sufficient
documentation to show they are employed by a shipping company. This
information is then checked against a State Department database that
contains records provided by numerous agencies and includes information
on persons with visa refusals, immigration violations, criminal
histories, and terrorism concerns. We reported in September 2005 steps
State has taken since September 11, 2001, to improve the visa process
as an antiterrorism tool as well as some of the additional actions that
we believed State could take to further strengthen the
process.[Footnote 42] According to the State Department, it has
corrective actions under way that it believes will address the
recommendations.
While Vessels Are in Transit, the Primary Challenge Involves Patrolling
the Vast Distances Involved:
Many countries help to protect energy commodity tankers by patrolling
the sea transit routes. For example, Combined Task Force 150, which as
of December 2006 included navies of the United States, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom, conducted operations
in the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, and Red
Sea to secure the waterways and prevent piracy and terrorism (see fig.
9).[Footnote 43] Naval and coast guard forces of Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Singapore patrol the Strait of Malacca, a major choke point in the
shipment of energy commodities. Improvements in security in the strait
led to its removal from a list of areas in which Lloyds vessel insurers
could raise premiums due to severe security risks. To protect their
ships in areas of known danger, tanker operators said they are also
modifying their normal practices. For example, tanker operators told us
that they have directed their vessels to travel much further off the
shore of Somalia than they would ordinarily. Near Somalia, the
International Maritime Bureau recommended in 2005 that commercial
vessels stay 200 miles away from the coast, and the U.S. Maritime
Administration and Coast Guard issued similar guidance for U.S.-flagged
vessels. In piracy-prone waters, such as the Strait of Malacca, actions
include sailing with all lights on, using extra lookouts, and equipping
crews with fire hoses to prevent or repel boarders.
Figure 9: U.S. Warship Engaging Suspected Pirate Vessel near Somalia:
[See PDF for image]
This is a photograph of a U.S. warship engaging a suspected pirate
vessel near Somalia.
Source: U.S. Navy.
[End of figure]
While these actions have had some success in securing transit routes,
the vast areas to be patrolled and the small number of ships available
present the military forces of the world with great challenges in
protecting the sea lanes. For example, a multinational task force of
military vessels that patrols the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of
Aden, and northwestern Indian Ocean is made up of about 15 ships. The
navies of regional countries also patrol near their shores, but in
areas such as the Horn of Africa this multinational task force is the
only major presence. Because tankers travel so frequently and so few
naval ships are available to be on station, naval protection cannot be
offered for all those who travel in these waters.
Besides patrolling the waters, tracking the movement of tankers is
another way to monitor them. A recently passed IMO requirement calls
for most commercial vessels, including tankers, to begin transmitting
identification and location information on or before December 31, 2008,
to SOLAS contracting governments under certain specified circumstances.
This will allow the vessels to be tracked over the course of their
voyages. Under this requirement, information on the ship's identity,
location, date, and time of the position will be made available to the
ship's flag state, the ship's destination port state, and any coastal
state within 1,000 miles of the ship's route. For ships approaching the
United States, an extensive tracking program is already in place. The
Coast Guard currently tracks ships as they approach the U.S. coastline
and is developing programs for longer-range tracking.[Footnote 44]
In U.S. Waterways and Ports, the Primary Challenge Involves Coping with
Limited Resources and a Growing Security Workload:
Domestically, many agencies and other stakeholders have taken steps to
develop and implement plans for helping ensure the security of maritime
energy commodity shipments. The Coast Guard's primary challenge is
utilizing its limited resources to meet its security workload. Since
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Coast Guard field units
have seen a substantial increase in their security workload.[Footnote
45] Coast Guard field units at some ports have not always been able to
meet their maritime security activity requirements. Moreover, the Coast
Guard's resource demands are expected to grow as more facilities for
importing LNG come on line, increasing the number of shipments
requiring Coast Guard protection.
The efforts to provide security over energy commodity shipments
arriving at U.S. waterways and port facilities involve a wide range of
federal and local agencies as well as owners and operators of the
facilities that receive the shipments. Much of the framework for port
security is contained in MTSA. DHS, which is the main agency
responsible for homeland security responsibilities contained in MTSA,
has assigned most of the responsibilities to the Coast Guard.[Footnote
46] To carry out this responsibility, as well as the nation's port
state oversight of foreign-flagged vessels, the Coast Guard's efforts
range from boarding ships and escorting those shipments of greatest
concern to patrolling port waters and overseeing the security actions
undertaken by vessel and facility operators. CBP has the lead role in
ensuring that only authorized persons onboard tankers come ashore when
calling on U.S. ports and that no contraband is smuggled into the
United States using the tankers.[Footnote 47] MTSA requires regular
vulnerability assessments of port facilities, and facility owners and
operators are required to develop and update regularly a plan for
meeting basic security requirements. Facility security plans and
updates to them are to be reviewed and approved by DHS.
Security Requirements Vary by Commodity:
Particularly for the Coast Guard, the security activities vary greatly
depending on the type of energy commodity being carried by tankers. Two
energy commodities, LNG and LPG, are on the list of what the Coast
Guard has traditionally called Certain Dangerous Cargo (CDC).[Footnote
48] Coast Guard guidance requires its field units to take certain
actions to protect LNG and LPG tankers in key port areas, which include
high-population areas or areas with critical infrastructure, such as
bridges or refineries.[Footnote 49] Beyond protecting LNG and LPG
shipments in these key port areas, Coast Guard field units are required
to implement security activities commensurate with the extent of
critical infrastructure, extent of high-profile vessel traffic
transiting through key port areas, and availability of support of non-
Coast Guard entities, such as state and local law enforcement agencies.
According to senior Coast Guard field officials with LNG security
responsibilities, LNG tanker transits have received the greatest
attention of the two, due in large part to the much greater size of LNG
tankers, the amount of hazardous cargo they are carrying, and the
public perception of the danger of LNG shipments. Many of these
security measures are now being implemented at existing LNG ports
around the country. The security measures address two phases of LNG
operations, including (1) the transit of an underway tanker through a
port and (2) the period when a tanker is moored at a receiving terminal.
Figure 10: Safety and Security Escort for LNG Tanker:
[See PDF for image]
This is a photograph of a safety and security escort for a LNG tanker.
Source: Distrigas of Massachusetts, copyright 2006.
[End of figure]
Figure 11: Coast Guard Enforcing Security Zone around Moored LNG Tanker:
[See PDF for image]
This is a photograph of the Coast Guard enforcing a security zone
around a moored LNG tanker.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Coast Guard security activity requirements are less stringent for oil
tankers or tankers carrying many other petroleum-based products, such
as gasoline or crude oil, because they are not identified in the CDC
list of hazardous marine cargo as posing the greatest human safety
risks. However, field units do have discretion to take additional
actions to protect oil tankers and associated waterside loading
facilities that are determined to pose security concerns.
State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies Play a Major Role in the
Protection of Tankers and Facilities:
At many ports we visited or contacted, Coast Guard field units are
receiving assistance from state and local law enforcement agencies for
help in conducting port security operations.[Footnote 50] These
partnerships with state and local law enforcement agencies have been
encouraged by Coast Guard headquarters. Coast Guard officials said the
support has been particularly valuable in protecting LNG carriers. For
example, field units at two of the four ports with onshore LNG
importing facilities reported using regular escort support from state
or local law enforcement agencies.
In addition to state and local law enforcement agencies, facility
operators play a significant role in protecting against terrorist
threats. For those key energy ports we visited, the Coast Guard
reported that the waterfront energy facilities in those ports were
taking actions to comply with the requirements the Coast Guard
established pursuant to MTSA. Of the 19 domestic waterside petroleum
facilities we visited, all were reported by the Coast Guard to be in
compliance with MTSA regulations. Examples of steps taken include key-
card access systems, closed-circuit television cameras and sensors
along fencing, hardened perimeter fencing, and reinforced gates at most
access control points. Facility operators told us they conduct regular
security drills involving emergency and terrorism scenarios and they
regularly share pertinent security information with other participants
of the Area Maritime Security Committees.[Footnote 51] In some cases we
observed steps that go beyond MTSA requirements, such as using radio
frequency identification cards that can track the location of all
persons on facility property.
The Coast Guard Faces Challenges Meeting Internal Security Guidance:
Coast Guard records show that its field units in several of the energy-
related ports we reviewed have been unable to accomplish many of the
port security responsibilities called for in Coast Guard guidance.
According to the data we obtained and our discussions with field unit
officials, resource shortfalls were the primary reasons for not meeting
these responsibilities.
The Coast Guard's Near-Term Efforts to Align Requirements with Field
Unit Capacity Have Limitations:
We have noted in earlier work that the Coast Guard is ahead of many
agencies in the degree to which it has developed a sound framework for
managing its workload on the basis of risk.[Footnote 52] When carried
out effectively, risk management offers a way to make informed
decisions about how best to use limited resources. In the Coast Guard's
case, its actions involve a balancing act both in deciding how best to
meet its various security and nonsecurity missions agencywide, but also
in weighing the pros and cons of investing additional resources in
energy commodity tanker protection versus the wider range of other port
activities that require protection. The Coast Guard uses the
requirements laid out in its guidance to establish a port-specific
security approach in which the workload varies based on such factors as
the proximity of population centers to the port area, the extent of
critical infrastructure at the port, the extent of high-profile vessel
traffic transiting through key port areas, and the availability of
support from other entities.
Given that the resource levels of some field units have limited their
ability to achieve Coast Guard security standards, the Coast Guard has
attempted to realign its security requirements to more closely match
available resource levels. Coast Guard headquarters officials meet on
an annual basis to review new risk assessments and current Coast Guard
capacity to mitigate risk. The Coast Guard also receives
recommendations from field unit commanders for introducing tactical
efficiencies into security requirements. Over the past several years,
the Coast Guard has revised its operational security guidance in two
main ways:
* Revising the standards for the amount of activity required for
conducting some security activities. In August 2006 the Coast Guard
substantially reduced the types of CDC-carrying vessels that must be
escorted. The Coast Guard developed a subset list of the CDC
commodities--called Especially Hazardous Cargo--it determined as posing
the greatest safety and security risks. This list included both LNG and
LPG, meaning that the activities required to protect them remain
unchanged. However, for CDC commodities not included on the Especially
Hazardous Cargo list, such as vinyl chloride, escort requirements were
eliminated during normal threat conditions--MARSEC I.[Footnote 53] In
all, requirements were reduced for about 20 different CDC commodities
carried in bulk. The August 2006 list of Especially Hazardous Cargo
consisted of seven hazardous liquid gas or liquid commodities:
acrylonitrile, ammonium nitrate, ammonium nitrate/fuel oil, anhydrous
ammonia, chlorine, LNG, and LPG.
* Providing greater operational flexibility for Area Commanders when
resource constraints may limit the ability to meet requirements. The
Coast Guard has introduced new tactical options that Area Commanders
may utilize, in some cases, to accomplish resource intensive security
activities.
The Coast Guard's methodology used to develop the Especially Hazardous
Cargo has two substantial shortcomings, however. Our specific concerns
are as follows:
* Lack of thoroughness. To identify the highest risk CDC commodities,
senior Coast Guard headquarters officials told us they reviewed
available consequence analysis assessments that had been conducted by
the Coast Guard's Special Technical Assessment Program and also
reviewed a 2004 consequence analysis of LNG by Sandia National
Laboratories.[Footnote 54] They said they also incorporated the views
of persons with expertise in CDC commodities, including Coast Guard
field officials. However, the Coast Guard did not perform consequence
assessments on many CDC commodities by the time it created the
Especially Hazardous Cargo list, and as of January 1, 2007, it still
had not done so.
* No systematic comparative analysis was conducted to identify and
prioritize the highest-consequence commodities. Coast Guard
headquarters officials acknowledged they did not conduct a relative
risk assessment of the CDC commodities. Rather, officials told us they
relied on the collective best judgment of Coast Guard experts from
field units and headquarters that had significant experience dealing
with various transportable energy and chemical commodities. By
conducting a relative risk analysis of all CDC commodities, the Coast
Guard would have had available more definitive input for determining
which CDC vessels posed the greatest risks necessitating additional
mitigation measures, which in this case would be an escort.
The Coast Guard is taking action to address the methodological
limitations we note. Shortly after the Coast Guard released the
Especially Hazardous Cargo list, we shared our concerns with Coast
Guard officials. The Coast Guard has since begun efforts to broaden its
studies of potential consequences to include a wide range of hazardous
commodities. It contracted with the American Bureau of Shipping to
perform a comparative analysis of the consequences of an attack on
vessels carrying all commodities on the CDC list, including LNG and
LPG. The product of this analysis is to be a ranking of the relative
consequences of each of the CDC commodities. This study is scheduled to
be completed in spring 2007. Coast Guard headquarters officials told us
that following this analysis, and subject to available funding and
other considerations, they may consider adding other commodities to the
comparative analysis, such as gasoline and jet fuel.
Going beyond the consequence analyses of hazardous commodities, the
Coast Guard has also developed a tool to compare the overall relative
risk scores of different terrorist attacks at the nation's ports. Field
units are developing risk scenarios for potential targets at their
ports and possible attack types that could be used against those
targets. Using the Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model, the units
are to analyze the different risk scenarios in relation to three key
elements of risk: reported threat of different types of attack,
vulnerability of the targets (incorporating different protective
actions taken by security stakeholders), and consequences of a
successful attack (including human health, economic, and
environmental).[Footnote 55] Each risk scenario is to receive a score.
These risk scores are to be comparable within and between ports so that
they can be used in risk management decisions both locally and
nationally.
Additional LNG Facilities Set to Come On Line Will Likely Pose
Additional Challenges for Meeting Mission Requirements:
In the longer term, plans for adding additional LNG facilities may
require the Coast Guard to reassess its workload yet again. Currently
the Coast Guard is faced with providing security for vessels arriving
at four domestic onshore LNG import facilities, but the number of LNG
tankers bringing shipments to these facilities will increase
considerably because of expansions that are planned or under
way.[Footnote 56] In addition, industry analysts expect approximately
12 more LNG facilities will be built over the next decade (see fig.
12). Consequently, Coast Guard field units will likely be required to
significantly expand their security workloads to conduct new LNG
security missions.
Figure 12: Location of Operating, Planned, and Proposed LNG Marine
Terminals by U.S. Coast Guard District:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the location of operating, planned,
and proposed LNG Marine Terminals by U.S. Coast Guard District. The
figure is a map of the United States with symbols indicating locations
within each district. The following data is depicted:
District: First;
Operating LNG import terminal: 1;
Operating LNG export terminal: 0;
Planned LNG import terminal: 1;
Proposed LNG import terminal: 5.
District: Fifth;
Operating LNG import terminal: 1;
Operating LNG export terminal: 0;
Planned LNG import terminal: 1;
Proposed LNG import terminal: 1.
District: Seventh;
Operating LNG import terminal: 1;
Operating LNG export terminal: 0;
Planned LNG import terminal: 0;
Proposed LNG import terminal: 1.
District: Eighth;
Operating LNG import terminal: 2;
Operating LNG export terminal: 0;
Planned LNG import terminal: 11;
Proposed LNG import terminal: 4.
District: Eleventh;
Operating LNG import terminal: 0;
Operating LNG export terminal: 0;
Planned LNG import terminal: 0;
Proposed LNG import terminal: 4.
District: Thirteenth;
Operating LNG import terminal: 0;
Operating LNG export terminal: 0;
Planned LNG import terminal: 0;
Proposed LNG import terminal: 2.
District: Seventeenth;
Operating LNG import terminal: 0;
Operating LNG export terminal: 1;
Planned LNG import terminal: 0;
Proposed LNG import terminal: 0.
Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and GAO.
[End of figure]
Recognizing this coming increase in demand on security resources at LNG
ports, Coast Guard field units have been planning strategies to help
meet this demand. We found evidence that, in their planning efforts,
Coast Guard field units and affected locations are seeking assistance
from a wide range of stakeholders and sources. In particular,
stakeholders mentioned the following:
* Manpower from state and local law enforcement. Several field units
plan to rely on state and local agencies to conduct a considerable
share of the new LNG workloads. While state and local law enforcement
agencies have generally agreed to participate in LNG security
operations, such support was largely contingent upon their receiving
funding to cover their own resource gaps. According to the Coast Guard,
at some ports, law enforcement agencies required funding to cover new
capital investments, such as additional patrol boats, as well as
operational costs such as funding for additional manpower or fuel for
the new boats.
* Financial help from facility operators. At some of the proposed LNG
ports we reviewed, facility operators were also planning to contribute
considerable financial resources to help fund new LNG security
operations. In doing so, these companies planned to fund both
operational and capital enhancement costs for state and local law
enforcement agencies that had agreed in concept to support Coast Guard
LNG security missions. At two ports where the Coast Guard had approved
security arrangements for new LNG facilities, state and local law
enforcement agencies had already developed, or were planning to
develop, a cost-sharing agreement with the facilities. For example, at
one port, a potential LNG facility operator made a commitment to fund
most of the capital enhancements and operational costs of the state and
local law enforcement agencies involved, including two patrol boats for
state agencies, two tugboats, and communications equipment. Facility
operators told us they were motivated to provide resources because they
understood that doing so was essential to ensuring final approval of
the LNG facilities. Some facility operators also told us that the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 required them to develop resource cost-
sharing agreements to offset state and local government resources used
specifically for the new LNG facilities.[Footnote 57]
* Financial help through federal grants. State and local law
enforcement agencies also reported that they were relying, in part, on
federal grants to obtain additional resources. Of the 15 state and
local law enforcement agencies we contacted, 9 agencies reported
applying for Port Security Grants or Urban Area Security Initiative
grants. Law enforcement agency officials told us they planned to fund
capital enhancements with this grant funding. Among those items
officials planned to fund with their grants were new patrol boats,
construction of a new boathouse and piers, helicopters, and security
cameras to be placed along an LNG transit route.
While port security grants and resource sharing agreements are expected
to address at least part of the resource needs of the Coast Guard's law
enforcement partners, the Coast Guard is likely to require additional
resources to fulfill its own new security responsibilities. To date,
however, field units have made little progress in obtaining additional
resources. Additionally, because federal law prohibits the Coast Guard
from receiving resources for its own use from private sector companies,
the Coast Guard cannot use resource-sharing partnerships to help fill
its own resource needs. Consequently, Coast Guard headquarters
officials told us they recognize that despite the efforts of Captains
of the Port to develop local solutions to new security demands, some
field units will continue to lack the resources necessary to meet their
increasing LNG security workloads.
Coast Guard headquarters officials told us they were considering two
general options to provide field units with the necessary resources to
carry out their new LNG security workloads. These two options are as
follows:
* Redistribute resources to units with new LNG activity. Coast Guard
officials told us they are considering shifting resources from ports
with surplus resources to ports with new or expanded LNG facilities.
Coast Guard headquarters officials told us, however, that they have not
yet determined which ports would, or even could, provide these excess
resources. Coast Guard's Atlantic area--where most of the new LNG
activity is expected--has ordered districts and field units to report
any excess resource capacity. Guided by risk management, Coast Guard
headquarters may redistribute any available excess capacity to ports
with new LNG security workloads. The earliest that the Coast Guard
could reprogram assets from within the Atlantic Area is fiscal year
2009.
* Request new resources via budget proposals. Coast Guard officials
also reported that they may request additional funding through the
annual budget process to support the acquisition of additional boats
and personnel to conduct vessel escorts and infrastructure patrols and
the training of additional personnel.
As of January 1, 2007, Coast Guard headquarters officials told us they
had not yet developed a plan--or blueprint--for how to proceed with
these two options for addressing new LNG security resource demands. The
decisions about how to proceed may involve difficult choices, because
shifting resources to this growing need could involve trimming
resources now tasked to other homeland security duties or traditional
non-homeland security missions, and because seeking more resources
involves asking Coast Guard decision makers to weigh important, but
competing, priorities. A national plan that identifies the Coast
Guard's nationwide LNG resource needs and identifies milestones and
funding needs for meeting those needs can help the Coast Guard manage
its limited resources and communicate resource needs to Congress. It is
important to complete this plan and address in it key elements and
issues so that it is both comprehensive and useful to decision makers
who must make difficult policy and budget choices.
Stakeholders Have Developed Spill and Terrorism Response Plans but Face
Several Challenges in Integrating Them:
To mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack on a tanker carrying
energy commodities, the United States has multiple plans that address
actions to be taken at the national, port, facility, and vessel levels.
To translate these plans into effective response actions, stakeholders
could face at least three main challenges. First, if an attack were to
occur, the stakeholders would need to integrate current, separate plans
for the two types of responses necessary for mitigating the
consequences of an attack--spill and terrorism responses. Second, port-
level plans to mitigate the potentially substantial economic
consequences of an attack, such as plans that set priorities for the
movement of vessels after a port reopens, could be useful. Third,
stakeholders may need to obtain resources to ensure that they can carry
out the plans. At the port level, this challenge may extend to response
equipment, training, and communications equipment. To date, federal
grants for port security have been directed mostly to prevention rather
than response, but now DHS is moving toward a more comprehensive risk-
based decision-making process for allocating grant funds. At the time
of our review, DHS did not have performance measures for determining
how to allocate resources to ensure ports can effectively respond to an
energy commodities spill caused by terrorism.
Planning for Spill Response Is Largely Separate from Planning for
Terrorism Response:
The planning framework for responding to spills and terrorism incidents
is extensive, involving multiple federal plans and memorandums of
understanding, port-specific plans, as well as plans for individual
facilities and vessels. As figure 13 shows, at the national level these
plans are carried out under the general framework of the National
Response Plan (NRP) but are developed into two separate lines of
effort--one for spill response, the other for terrorism response.
Figure 13: Relationship of Spill and Terrorism Response Plans and
Agreements:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a schematic illustration of the relationship of spill
and terrorism response plans and agreements. There are two levels of
response, national level and port level. The illustration depicts the
following relationships:
National Response Plan (main plan):
Includes the following, oil spill related:
* National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan
(NCP);
* Emergency Support Function #10 (subplan);
Includes the following, terrorism related:
* Terrorism related: Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and
Investigation Annex (subplan).
National level, Oil Spill related: Emergency Support Function #10
(subplan);
Relates directly to: National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan (NCP).
National level, Terrorism related: Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement
and Investigation Annex (subplan);
National level, National Incident Management System (main plan):
Relates directly to:
* Emergency Support Function #10;
* National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan
(NCP);
* Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex.
National level, National Strategy for Maritime Security (main plan),
Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan (subplan):
Relates directly to:
* National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan
(NCP);
* Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex.
National level and Port level, Memorandums of Understanding (main
plan):
Relates directly to:
* National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan
(NCP);
* Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex (subplan);
* Area Contingency Plan, oil spill related (port level);
* Area Maritime Security plan, terrorism related (port level).
Port level, Area Contingency Plan, oil spill related:
Relates directly to:
* Vessel Response Plan, oil spill related;
* Facility Response Plan, oil spill related;
* National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan
(NCP)(national level).
Port level, Area Maritime Security plan, terrorism related:
Relates directly to:
* Vessel Security Plan, terrorism related;
* Facility Security Plan, terrorism related.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
The NRP designates the Coast Guard as the primary agency for spill
response on water and the FBI as the primary agency for terrorism
response, and it calls on the two agencies to coordinate their
responses if the terrorist attack involves energy commodities. For this
type of incident, FBI officials stated, crime scene investigation and
preservation would take place at the same time as the environmental
response activities that would be initiated to contain the likely
spill. In this situation, the NRP notes that spill responders will
provide assistance, investigative support, and intelligence analysis
for oil and hazardous materials response in coordination with the law
enforcement and criminal investigation activities of the FBI.
As the figure shows, beneath the NRP, spill responses are coordinated
by the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan
(NCP), while terrorism responses are coordinated by the Terrorism
Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex.[Footnote 58] Also at
the federal level, various other federal plans and agreements, such as
the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the Marine Operational
Threat Response Plan (MOTR), and interagency memorandums of agreement
also help guide the response. The spill and terrorism responses
continue into port-level planning, where the key guidance for spill
responses is found in a port's Area Contingency Plan (ACP) and the key
guidance for terrorism responses is found in the port's Area Maritime
Security Plan (AMSP). Table 3 provides a brief description of the
various plans and agreements found in figure 13.
Table 3: Federal and Port-level Plans and Agreements Governing Response
to Spills on Water and Terrorist Attacks:
Plans and agreements, Federal plans and agreements: National Response
Plan (NRP);
Description: As the umbrella plan for federal response, it provides a
structure for plans at the national and local levels. It also
incorporates interagency plans for responding to spills and terrorist
attacks. If a terrorist attack results in an energy commodity spill,
calls for the Coast Guard and FBI to coordinate their response efforts,
with the FBI as lead agency.
Plans and agreements, Federal plans and agreements: Emergency Support
Function #10: National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan (NCP);
Description: Lays out planning and operational activities at the
federal and port levels for spills, and designates the Coast Guard as
the lead federal agency for spills on water. The Coast Guard has
entered into agreements to coordinate spill response activities with at
least 16 federal departments and agencies, (e.g., the Department of
Defense may provide assistance through its Supervisor of Salvage and
Diving).
Plans and agreements, Federal plans and agreements: Terrorism Incident
Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex;
Description: Provides guidance for how federal agencies are to
coordinate with state and local responders. References federal
terrorism response policies, priorities (with public safety receiving
top priority), and tasks to be performed in responding to an attack,
such as setting up interagency command and communications groups.
Identifies the FBI as responsible for coordinating and conducting all
federal law enforcement and criminal investigation activities after a
terrorist attack.
Plans and agreements, Federal plans and agreements: National Strategy
for Maritime Security;
Description: Designed to integrate and synchronize existing department-
level strategies to ensure their effective and efficient
implementation, as well as align all federal government maritime
security programs and initiatives into a comprehensive and cohesive
national effort.
Plans and agreements, Federal plans and agreements: Maritime
Operational Threat Response Plan (MOTR);
Description: Aids coordination of U.S. government response to threats
against the United States and its interests in the maritime domain by
establishing roles and responsibilities for government response.
Plans and agreements, Federal plans and agreements: National Incident
Management System (NIMS);
Description: Used by the NRP as the framework for standard incident
command and management processes, protocols, and procedures for federal
responses to any incident, including terrorism, and outlines
coordination steps.
Plans and agreements, Federal plans and agreements: Memorandums of
understanding (MOU);
Description: 1979: Agreement between the Coast Guard and FBI, aimed at
ensuring coordinated efforts, eliminating delays in response time, and
ensuring continued development of procedures and contingency plans;
2002: Agreement between the Coast Guard, Department of Justice, and
other members of the National Response Team, aimed at facilitating
coordination of criminal investigations, enforcement, and environmental
response activities.[A].
Plans and agreements, Port-level plans: Area Contingency Plan (ACP);
Description: Describes what needs to be protected in the event of an
emergency and how to protect it, what resources are available to
respond, and the desired outcomes from the spill response.
Plans and agreements, Port-level plans: Facility Response Plan (FRP);
Description: Describes how the facility will respond to, contain, and
clean up a spill.
Plans and agreements, Port-level plans: Vessel Response Plan (VRP);
Description: Describes how the vessel will respond to, contain, and
clean up a spill.
Plans and agreements, Port-level plans: Area Maritime Security Plan
(AMSP);
Description: Describes how port stakeholders will deter a terrorist
attack or other transportation security incident, or secure the port in
the event such an attack occurs.
Plans and agreements, Port-level plans: Facility Security Plan (FSP);
Description: Describes how the facility will prevent an incident and
secure the facility when an attack occurs at the facility or on a
vessel docked at the facility.
Plans and agreements, Port-level plans: Vessel Security Plan (VSP);
Description: Describes how the vessel will prevent an incident and
secure the vessel when an attack occurs on the vessel.
Source: GAO's analysis of federal and port-level plans and agreements.
[A] The U.S. National Response Team (NRT) is an organization of 16
federal departments and agencies responsible for coordinating emergency
preparedness and response to oil and hazardous substance pollution
incidents. The NRT is a planning and coordinating body under the
National Contingency Plan and provides national-level policy guidance
prior to an incident.
[End of table]
At the federal level, in addition to the plans and agreements governing
spill and terrorism responses in table 3, other guidance and
requirements related to economic recovery include the following:
* The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (MIRP)--a supporting plan
for the National Strategy for Maritime Security--contains procedures
for managing the economic consequences and recovery of maritime
infrastructure after a transportation security incident, such as a
terrorist attack. The MIRP provides strategic-level guidance for
national, regional, and local decisionmakers to set priorities for
restoring the flow of domestic cargo. The plan recommends that the
Captain of the Port consider key shipping channels and waterways for
homeland security; military traffic; and commercial operations; key
landside transportation infrastructure, such as tunnels and bridges;
and other infrastructure key to maintaining continuity of operations in
the port.
* The SAFE Port Act of 2006 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security
to develop protocols for the resumption of trade after a transportation
security incident, such as a terrorist attack.[Footnote 59] The
protocols must include a plan to redeploy resources and personnel as
necessary to reestablish the flow of trade, and appropriate factors for
establishing prioritization of vessels and cargo that are critical for
response and recovery, including factors related to public health,
national security, and economic need.
At the port level, under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Captain of the Port is to
establish both spill and terrorism response plans.[Footnote 60] In
doing so, the Captain of the Port must identify local public and
private port stakeholders who will develop and revise separate plans
for marine spills of oil and hazardous materials (ACP) and for
terrorism response (AMSP). Both plans call for coordinated
implementation with other plans, such as the response and security
plans developed by specific facilities or vessels. Local stakeholders
are organized into two separate groups: an area committee for spill
response (Area Committee), which develops the ACP, and an area
committee for terrorism response (Area Maritime Security Committee),
which develops the AMSP--both committees are chaired by the Captain of
the Port. Some stakeholders, such as port authorities, fire
departments, and facilities in the port, may be part of both
committees, while others may be part of only one committee. For
example, oil spill response organizations are likely to be involved
only with spill response planning.
If an energy commodity tanker was attacked while moving through a U.S.
port or while docked, a range of response activities would need to
occur to address the consequences. Figure 14 illustrates how incident
response would potentially take place following an attack and a
subsequent spill.
Figure 14: Incident Response Sequence When an Attack Occurs Resulting
in a Spill:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of the incident response sequence when
an attack occurs resulting in a spill. The following sequence is
depicted:
1) Terrorist attack on tanker occurs;
2) Initial incident response for public safety;
3) Incident command established:
4) Investigation needed? Crime scene investigation & preservation;
5) Initial spill response activities to contain spill;
6) Spill & port recovery activities.
Numbers 3, 4, and 5 are included in the realm of simultaneous activity.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
As figure 14 shows, incident response includes three separate but
overlapping activities, as reported by port stakeholders:
* Initial incident response for public safety and establishment of the
incident command site. Because energy commodity tankers carry flammable
and/or hazardous materials, the first responders are likely to be area
fire and police departments; receiving facility personnel may also
respond. The first concern is always public safety, and therefore the
fire department would begin rescuing victims and addressing the
probable fire. Law enforcement agencies would secure the perimeter of
the scene to prevent potential follow-on attacks as well as to prevent
the public from moving too close to the attack location--both to
protect the public and to maintain the crime scene for subsequent
investigation. Initial responders would also establish a multi-agency
incident command site near the location of the vessel, where all
responding agencies with jurisdictional responsibilities for spill and
terrorism response would congregate to manage the operations.
* Crime scene preservation and investigation, and initial spill
response activities. As public safety operations continue, law
enforcement agencies would determine whether terrorism had caused the
spill, and if so, would conduct an investigation at the same time that
life safety operations are continuing and spill response operations are
beginning. Investigations would involve crime scene and perimeter
control, determining if additional devices may be present and disposing
of them, and apprehending suspects. Spill operations would initially
involve the laying of a containment boom to protect the surrounding
environment from contamination caused by the spill. Law enforcement and
spill response organizations will need to coordinate their activities
because actions to mitigate environmental consequences can potentially
damage crime scene evidence.
* Spill and port recovery activities. Once the resulting spill is
contained, incident commanders would determine their next steps,
depending on conditions. Spill recovery may include intentionally
burning contained oil, allowing the commodity to evaporate, using
chemicals to disperse the spill, or using mechanical recovery to skim
the oil out of the water. If a terrorist attack had occurred, the crime
scene investigation would have to be conducted before the port could be
fully restored for cargo and passenger ships.
According to FBI officials, the FBI would work with the Coast Guard to
get access to the incident site as soon as possible to obtain all crime
scene evidence possible, without interfering with the response.
These complex activities would be carried out by many different
federal, state, and local agencies. Figure 15 illustrates one possible
scenario for spill and terrorism response actions and shows some of the
agencies that might carry out these actions.
Figure 15: Potential Actions Taken to Respond to an Attack on an Energy
Commodity Tanker:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of potential actions taken to respond to
an attack on an Energy Commodity Tanker. The following potential
actions are depicted:
Fireboats: Provide marine firefighting and spray fire retardant foam to
smother fire.
Tethered tugs: Tugs use fireproof cable to control tanker movement and
spray fire retardant foam.
Law enforcement (LE)/FBI: FBI investigates attack and collects
evidence, and LE secures scene perimeter.
Coast Guard: USCG leads response to on-water energy commodity spill and
secures perimeter.
OSRO boats: OSRO boats respond to contain the spill and recover the
commodity if possible.
Oil spill boom: Floating boom is laid to contain the spill to mitigate
environmental damage.
Land-based firefighters: Firefighters respond from shore and/or are
transferred to vessel on fire by fireboats/tugs.
Land-based law enforcement: Police secure shore-side perimeter for
public safety and security.
Mobile incident command: Serves as site of incident command post for
responding agencies and organizations.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Federal Agencies and Local Ports Could Face Challenges in Integrating
Spill and Terrorism Response Plans, Planning for Economic Response, and
Obtaining Needed Resources:
In the event of a terrorist attack on an energy commodity tanker,
federal agencies and port communities could face challenges in
integrating their spill and terrorism response plans. Ports could face
two additional challenges: planning for economic response activities
and obtaining the necessary resources to respond to a terrorist attack
on an energy commodity tanker.
Federal Agencies and Ports Could Face Challenges in Integrating Spill
and Terrorism Response Plans:
As we have noted in prior reports, a fundamental goal of emergency
preparation and response is the ability to respond to emergency
incidents of any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated,
and effective efforts that reduce the loss of life and property and set
the stage for recovery. In our September 2006 report on the preparation
for and response to Hurricane Katrina, we stated that fundamental to
effective preparation and response are (1) clearly defined, clearly
communicated, and clearly understood legal authorities,
responsibilities, and roles at the federal, state, and local level, and
(2) identification and development of the capabilities needed to mount
a well-coordinated, effective response to reduce the loss of life and
property and set the stage for recovery. Providing these fundamentals
requires effective planning and coordination, including detailed
operational plans, and robust training and exercises in which needed
capabilities are realistically tested, assessed, and problems
identified and addressed.[Footnote 61] With regard to potential attacks
on energy commodity tankers in U.S. ports, the ports could face
challenges if roles and responsibilities have not been clearly defined,
communicated, and understood and if needed capabilities have not been
fully identified and appropriately tested. The National Preparedness
Goal uses 15 scenarios to identify 37 capabilities and the associated
critical tasks needed to respond to incidents of national significance--
those that go beyond the state and local levels and require a
coordinated federal response. However, the scenarios used to identify
these capabilities do not specifically encompass the capabilities
needed for responding to attacks on oil, gas, or other tankers in
American ports.
The NRP calls upon the Coast Guard and the FBI to coordinate their
response in the event of a terrorist attack on an oil or hazardous
materials tanker. However, the agencies cannot be assured that their
joint response, concurrently implementing the numerous existing plans,
will be effective unless they have developed a detailed operational
plan that integrates their spill and terrorism responses and have
tested these responses in joint exercises. According to headquarters
and field office Coast Guard and FBI officials, coordination would be
managed through the use of the unified command structure in the
National Incident Management System and the other general coordination
mechanisms in the NRP and the MOTR. However, the unified command
structure and the NRP are generally not specific in explaining how they
will be made operational following an attack. As we have recently
reported, the implementation of the NRP following Hurricane Katrina
identified concerns with coordination within and between federal
government entities using the plan.[Footnote 62] We recommended the
development of detailed operational plans for the NRP and its
annexes.[Footnote 63]
In addition to having operational plans, agencies should conduct joint
exercises that simulate an attack and the agencies' responses.[Footnote
64] Without such exercises, it would be questionable whether joint
Coast Guard and FBI activities would proceed as planned. Simulation
exercises help determine the strengths and weaknesses of various plans
and the ability of multiple agencies or communities to respond to an
emergency incident. According to DHS's Homeland Security Exercise and
Evaluation Program, well-designed and executed exercises are the most
effective means of (1) testing and validating policies, plans,
procedures, training, equipment, and interagency agreements; (2)
clarifying and training personnel in roles and responsibilities; (3)
improving interagency coordination and communications; (4) identifying
gaps in resources; (5) improving individual performance; and (6)
identifying opportunities for improvement.
The value of joint simulation exercises in uncovering problems has been
demonstrated in the results of the largest national, state, and local
interagency terrorism response exercise ever conducted. This exercise--
called TOPOFF 3--was conducted in April 2005 and included explosions
and hazardous materials releases in multiple locations around the
nation (none of which were on the water). According to the Coast Guard
after-action report for one of the sites, the FBI (1) never fully
integrated into and accepted the unified command called for under NIMS,
(2) did not appropriately staff the incident command post with its
representatives, (3) maintained distinctions between hazardous
materials release response and terrorism investigation actions, and (4)
kept management of the investigation separate from the incident
management overseen by the unified command. According to the after-
action report, "concurrent management of both the investigation and all
other response functions would have increased the effectiveness and
efficiency of the response effort." The report also recommended the
continuation of multiagency training and exercises to test interagency
coordination efforts.
The need for joint spill and terrorism response exercises has been
discussed, but exercises have not been conducted, at the national
level. Specifically, planning discussions for the 2004 Spill of
National Significance (SONS) exercise identified the need to clarify
how the FBI fits into spill response activities when the possibility of
terrorism is present, but the exercise did not test integrating the
FBI's and other agencies' response.[Footnote 65] However, both Coast
Guard guidance and the Department of Justice's Inspector General have
supported the need to combine spill and terrorism response exercises.
Specifically:
* Coast Guard guidance recommends combining terrorism response
exercises with other exercises, such as spill response. OPA 90 and MTSA
implementing regulations require similar schedules for exercises of
spill and terrorism response plans, and the integration of these
exercises could improve response performance and complete required
multiple response exercise mandates at one time, according to Coast
Guard officials.
* The Department of Justice's Inspector General in 2006 called for more
joint exercises between the Coast Guard and the FBI in high-risk ports
to, among other things, resolve potential role and incident command
conflicts in the event of a maritime terrorism incident.[Footnote 66]
The Inspector General's report emphasized the interaction of Coast
Guard and FBI security units, but these recommendations are equally
applicable for integrated exercises to respond to a spill caused by a
terrorist attack. Once public safety is addressed, the Coast Guard and
FBI have different priorities for their jurisdictional
responsibilities--spill containment and cleanup and crime scene
preservation and investigation, respectively. At the time of our
review, FBI officials told us they knew of no upcoming joint planned
exercises. FBI headquarters officials have not issued guidance to field
office agents on integrating spill and terrorism responses activities
within a single exercise.
Coast Guard officials told us that the MOTR is intended to delineate
Coast Guard and FBI roles in responding to an attack. FBI headquarters
officials told us that their participation in several MOTR conference
calls demonstrated that coordination among MOTR agencies is effective.
These telephone discussions may improve overall coordination, but
exercises for joint spill and terrorism responses should be conducted
as often as appropriate.[Footnote 67]
At the port level, effectively integrating spill and terrorism
emergency responses requires all plans to operate in unison-
-the port spill response plan (ACP) and the port terrorism response
plan (AMSP), as well as facility and vessel response plans. As figure
13 shows, there is no direct operational link between the ACP and the
AMSP.
Without a direct link, spill responders may not have the information
they need to respond to a spill caused by a terrorist attack. While the
AMSP has served as the terrorism response plan for ports since July
2004, it contains sensitive security information and is therefore only
available to those individuals who are considered to have a "need to
know." As a result, nonsecurity personnel, such oil spill cleanup
responders, may not have access to these plans during an emergency. For
example, only 3 of the 13 ports we visited had ACPs that addressed
terrorism response within the spill plan by incorporating terrorism
incident annexes or other plans. Consequently, the ACPs may need to
have explicit sections for responding to terrorism.[Footnote 68]
The general lack of integration in the plans carries over to the
separate spill and terrorism response communities at the port level. As
previously discussed, individual members on these committees may not
know all the members of the other committee, but a terrorist attack on
a tanker would require them to respond simultaneously. We identified
only a few examples of joint committee meetings that enabled members to
interact. For example, Coast Guard officials told us that, since
September 11, 2001, the Captain of the Port at one location has
facilitated meetings between spill response providers and local offices
of emergency management and federal and local law enforcement agencies
in order to improve response coordination among all entities. They
stated that if the spill and terrorism response communities were
formally joined, response integration and efficiency would improve. In
addition, at another location, Coast Guard officials noted, the local
area training and exercise workgroup contains members of both the spill
and terrorism response committees in order to consolidate training and
exercises. Finally, in an attempt to improve communication, the FBI
established Maritime Liaison Agents (MLA) at the ports so that all
stakeholders would know the local agent in the event of an
incident.[Footnote 69] At some ports we visited the spill responders
knew who the FBI agent was and at other ports they said they did not.
USCG guidance states that local port operators, municipalities, and
public safety agencies are expected to provide and maintain adequate
disaster response capabilities in their ports, with capability
requirements likely to vary from port to port depending on size,
commodities received, environmental considerations, relation to
population, etc. Recognizing the variability of capability
requirements, the USCG has developed Critical Success Factors (CSF) for
spill response that drive a "Best Possible Response"--that is, a set of
general goals to achieve when conducting a comprehensive and effective
response. Six particular CSF are to be considered when developing ACPs,
including (1) no public or responder injuries, illness or deaths; (2)
sensitive areas protected; (3) resource damage minimized; (4)
infrastructure damage minimized; (5) economic impact minimized; and (6)
highly coordinated law enforcement and emergency management operations.
Joint exercises can maximize the ability of a given port to carry out a
"best response" in the event of an attack on a tanker. However, we
recognize that numerous scenarios could be exercised in any given port;
consequently, joint spill and terrorism response exercises may not be
the most urgent for a port that receives limited quantities of energy
commodities. Figure 16 shows firefighters preparing for a potential
marine response during a training exercise.
Figure 16: Firefighters Preparing for a Maritime Terrorism Training
Exercise:
[See PDF for image]
This is a photograph of firefighters preparing for a maritime terrorism
training exercise.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Two developments--one a project at an individual port, the other a new
requirement added by Congress--may help bring about more integrated
responses. Specifically:
* At one port, we found a potential leading practice for integrating a
marine terrorism response. The port's Marine Terrorism Response (MTR)
project was launched to develop and validate a multiagency response
system and national model plan to help mobilize local, state, and
federal resources for marine terrorism incidents. The MTR's goals
include increasing preparedness, identifying gaps in emergency response
capabilities, and planning for timely restoration of trade. The project
generated a response plan and a field guide for how to integrate
responses for a range of issues, such as public safety, response
coordination, recovery, and crime scene management. Stakeholders plan
to incorporate existing response plans, such as the ACP, as annexes to
the MTR. According to the FBI official involved with the MTR planning
process, the MTR serves as an effective linkage between the spill and
terrorism response sections of the National Response Plan.[Footnote 70]
* Under the SAFE Port Act of 2006, DHS must develop interagency
operational centers by fall 2009 for port security at all high-priority
ports. The Coast Guard and the FBI are among the agencies that will be
represented at these operational centers, as will other public and
private sector stakeholders who would be adversely affected by a
terrorist attack. These centers may also include stakeholders who would
be involved in a joint spill and terrorism response. Integration may be
improved through the daily interaction of all these stakeholders. In
April 2006 testimony before the House Homeland Security Committee,
DHS's Deputy Secretary stated that physically connecting the various
agencies involved is important, and the Port of New York and New
Jersey's Manager of Port Security voiced support for the development of
joint operation centers in key U.S. ports.[Footnote 71]
Port Plans to Mitigate Economic Consequences Could Be Useful:
The economic consequences of a terrorist attack on a tanker could be
significant, particularly if one or more ports are closed. Currently,
guidance in the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan suggests that
ports develop priorities for bringing vessels into port after a
closure. Additionally, AMSPs must include a section on crisis
management and recovery to ensure the continuity of port operations. At
the time of our review, there was no national-level guidance for use by
local ports. We identified some ports that, on their own initiative,
were incorporating economic recovery considerations into their port-
level plans, which could benefit other ports seeking to develop their
own plans for mitigating the economic consequences of an attack.
The SAFE Port Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to
develop protocols for how maritime trade will be reestablished after a
terrorist attack. These protocols must include appropriate factors--
related to public health, national security, and economic need--that
can be used to set priorities for vessels and cargo entering the port
after a closure. While the act does not expressly require the
development of port-level plans for facilitating the resumption of
trade after an incident, DHS could consider developing guidance for
ports to use to develop plans for mitigating economic
consequences.[Footnote 72]
Ports Could Face Challenges in Securing Resources to Carry Out Their
Response Plans:
Ports could face challenges in marshaling resources to improve port
response capabilities, including obtaining or sharing needed marine
firefighting equipment and training, other training, and interoperable
communication systems that allow emergency responders to talk to each
other to effectively coordinate their efforts.
Marine Firefighting Equipment and Training:
The ports we visited varied considerably in their ability to combat
marine fires. Some ports had large fireboats that are designed to deal
with fires on tankers, as well as firefighters trained to conduct
shipboard firefighting operations. In contrast, other energy commodity
ports relied on land-based firefighting companies; these companies told
us that they did not have the training and/or the equipment to fight
marine fires. See figure 17 for two examples of marine firefighting
response.
Figure 17: Examples of Marine Firefighting Response:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains two photographs of examples of marine firefighting
response.
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
While some local ports may not be well equipped to handle marine fires,
companies operating tankers are required to provide for marine
firefighting and salvage capabilities under the Oil Pollution Act of
1990.[Footnote 73] However, we identified several limitations
associated with these requirements:
* Timeliness of response not spelled out. OPA 90 does not specify how
soon after an event either marine firefighting or salvage must occur.
Under a Coast Guard rule proposed in 2002, and not yet issued as final,
contracted marine firefighting resources generally would have to be
provided within 8 hours after notification of an event, while salvage
operations generally would have to begin within 16 hours. Even if this
rule were in force, it might not be timely enough to prevent the vessel
from sinking.
* Extent of planning for salvage varies widely. Salvage is important
for marine firefighting because a ship may sink from an attack, may be
deliberately sunk to control the resulting fire, or may be accidentally
sunk by the firefighters because they are not familiar with ship
stability issues inherent in the marine firefighting environment. In
addition to the OPA 90 requirement, the SAFE Port Act of 2006 requires
the development of salvage response plans to supplement Area Maritime
Security Plans. While all ACPs for the ports we visited contain
sections on salvage, we found that the plans varied widely in detailing
salvage responses. A 2003 National Transportation Safety Board workshop
identified potential shortfalls in local salvage planning and/or
capabilities as an issue that needed to be addressed.[Footnote 74] One
reason for capability shortfalls identified was that locally available
salvage resources may sometimes be lacking.
If ports lack marine firefighting or salvage capabilities, we
identified the following other avenues for obtaining resources to
enhance these capabilities. However, these avenues carry limitations,
mainly related to the speed with which they could be deployed on site.
* Mutual aid agreements. Some port community members have mutual aid
agreements in place to provide assistance in emergencies. These
agreements can be industry-to-industry, municipal-to-municipal,
industry-to-municipal, or municipal-to-industry. However, these
agreements can have inherent delays in response time if needed
resources are located some distance away or require considerable time
for redeployment. For example, one refinery noted, in its site
emergency manual section for ship fire procedures, that there is a need
to evaluate whether refinery responders need to call the local fire
department and request fireboat assistance because of a 45-minute delay
in subsequent arrival of this resource. If the refinery needs to call
for additional assistance from a nearby fire department's fireboats,
the delay could be several hours, according to state fire officials.
* National Oil Spill Response Resource Inventory. Each Coast Guard
Captain of the Port has emergency contracting authority to obtain
needed resources. The National Strike Force's Response Resource
Inventory lists public and private organizations that can provide these
needed spill response resources.[Footnote 75] The Coast Guard is to
review these organizations' resources at least every 3 years to keep an
up-to-date resource list. Again, in some cases delay in getting these
needed resources to the incident location would occur.
In addition to the differences in the availability of marine
firefighting equipment, we found that access to marine firefighting
training, which is highly specialized and different from land-based
firefighting, can be limited because of distance from a training center
or lack of resources. While a range of locations provide firefighter
response training for energy commodity fires in the marine environment,
these facilities are limited and are sometimes not located near a
firefighting response organization that is seeking this
training.[Footnote 76] Some local emergency responders told us they
have not received shipboard firefighting training, which is even more
specialized than general marine firefighting, and many of the
responders we contacted identified the need for additional training. At
one port we visited, fire department officials stated that the
firefighters had not received this training but would board a burning
vessel. See figure 18 for an example of firefighters training to combat
an aviation fuel fire.
Figure 18: Firefighters Training to Combat an Aviation Fuel Fire:
[See PDF for image]
This is a photograph of firefighters training to combat an aviation
fuel fire.
Source: Coast Guard.
[End of figure]
Other Training:
We also found differences in training for federally established
procedures outlining coordination--known as the incident command system
(ICS)--for responding to any incident, including terrorism. Some
emergency responders identified a lack of experience and training on
this system as a potential concern for effectively coordinating and
leading a response to an attack. The Coast Guard and fire departments
are familiar with ICS because they were using it before September 11,
2001, but law enforcement does not have equivalent experience with it.
At the ports we visited, the local Coast Guard and firefighting
responders identified themselves as generally compliant with ICS
training requirements. Although the FBI would have jurisdictional
responsibility for leading the multiagency response to a terrorist
attack on a tanker, FBI personnel did not have to comply with ICS
training requirements until December 31, 2006.
Interoperable Communications:
At the ports we visited, officials identified the lack of fully
interoperable communications as an ongoing issue, as did many of the
after-action reports we reviewed.[Footnote 77] Spill and terrorism
responders may have difficulty coordinating their emergency response if
their communications systems are not interoperable--that is, one
agency's equipment may not be able to communicate with another's. For
example, according to local emergency planners, during one port
exercise in 2006 the responders used their cell phones because of
interoperability problems. This workaround may be adequate during an
exercise, an FBI official noted, but responders may not be able to rely
on the cell phone communications network during an actual event. While
interoperability is a problem for emergency responders throughout the
nation, responders in the marine environment face additional
challenges.[Footnote 78] These include the need for additional
equipment on or near ships so that radio signals can get through to the
ship's hold, as well as marine band radios for operating on water.
Response organizations have some options to work around the problem of
interoperability. For example, the FBI can use a range of equipment to
coordinate the signals of all the various responding agencies'
communications equipment, but it takes some time to make this equipment
operational because the equipment has to be brought to the site, and
each responding organization has to provide a radio to the same
location for the workaround system to function. The Coast Guard also
has communications equipment for interoperability stored in locations
around the nation, but again, there would be a delay in getting this
equipment to the site of an incident.
DHS Grants May Become More Accessible for Response and Recovery
Projects, but Funding Decisions Require Better Application of
Performance Measures:
For ports that may be facing resource shortfalls, finding ways to pay
for improvements and enhancements is an issue. One potential funding
source is DHS's Port Security Grant Program. In the past, most DHS
grants awarded to ports were for terrorism prevention and detection
projects (such as fences, cameras, and security systems), rather than
for response and recovery projects, according to DHS officials. For
some states that contain ports we visited, officials who oversee grant
resource distribution also told us that only a limited number of post-
incident response project applications, such as marine firefighting
assets or shipboard firefighter training, have received grant funding.
This emphasis on prevention and detection is changing. Recent changes
in the grant program are more likely to result in consideration of
response and recovery projects, according to DHS officials. They told
us that the DHS Port Security Grant Program is undergoing a fundamental
shift from a facility security focus to a more comprehensive approach
to managing risk within ports. The Office of Grants and Training,
within the Preparedness Directorate, is working with the Coast Guard to
develop an integrated, risk-based decision-making process for
allocating grant funds for each port area. This shift in strategy
recognizes that port security entails not only prevention and detection
activities but also response and recovery capabilities. Plans for
fiscal year 2007 grant guidance will place more emphasis on post-
incident response projects, according to DHS officials. The SAFE Port
Act of 2006 likewise emphasizes a risk-based approach for port security
grants.
To make effective judgments about such projects, performance measures
are needed to quantitatively determine the spill and terrorism
resources that should be available. Such measures help decide the
extent to which a given resource is needed to effectively conduct a
response within a given time period. At the time of our review, DHS was
surveying available emergency response capabilities within a given
port, according to officials from DHS's Office of Infrastructure
Protection.
In September 2006, the New York City Fire Department Chief of
Counterterrorism and Emergency Preparedness questioned whether the
nation is prepared for an emergency and called for performance measures
that emphasized (1) capability (What can we do?), (2) capacity (How
much can we do?), (3) proficiency (How well can we perform?), and (4)
deployment (How quickly can we deploy capabilities?). As we have
previously reported, in the absence of comparable standards for
emergency responder performance, it is difficult to assess whether
grant resources will be directed effectively to reduce risk.[Footnote
79] Without such performance measures, the federal government would not
be able to conduct an analysis, based on reducing overall risk, that
could be used to set priorities for acquiring needed response
resources. Performance measures are critical for setting priorities to
effectively allocate federal funds.
The Captain of the Port may assist local authorities in reviewing the
adequacy of the port's overall marine firefighting and salvage
capability. Such qualitative reviews assess a range of factors related
to the nature of operations within the port. However, these assessments
cannot set priorities for addressing these shortfalls because they do
not have quantitative performance measures that would provide a way to
compare one shortfall against another to determine such priorities.
Other related assessments face the same priority-setting issues. A
recent qualitative advisory report for siting a potential future LNG
facility illustrates this problem. The assessment identified the need
to send firefighters to specialized fire schools on an annual basis to
become trained in fighting LNG fires, as well as to provide local
firefighters with additional training on hazardous materials and
confined space rescue. The assessment also identified a range of
equipment procurement needs, including additional fireboats capable of
mitigating a large LNG spill on water as well as dry chemicals and foam
caches for extinguishing any resulting fire. While all these shortfalls
may need to be addressed, the assessments do not provide a road map for
setting federal funding priorities.
Conclusions:
The ship-based supply chain for energy commodities remains threatened
and vulnerable, and appropriate security throughout the chain is
essential to ensure safe and efficient delivery. The threats are
especially strong internationally, where the United States faces
limitations in ensuring that facilities in foreign ports are meeting
security standards and in protecting shipments in international waters.
Domestically, the nexus for strengthening security efforts rests with
the U.S. Coast Guard, which has primary responsibility for security
actions in U.S. ports and waterways. Despite considerable efforts to
protect ports and the energy traffic in them, the level of protection
is not where the Coast Guard believes it should be. At some ports Coast
Guard units are not meeting their own levels of required security
activities. Growing demand for Coast Guard resources requires that the
Coast Guard take action on several fronts. In adjusting security
standards to take into account its limited resources, the Coast Guard
needs to assure itself and other stakeholders that its adjustments are
based on a careful assessment of risk. This process has begun with the
Coast Guard's ongoing assessment of risks associated with all CDC
commodities, and since this assessment is already under way, we do not
see a need to make a recommendation in this case. The results of that
study, and of any comparative analysis that includes hazardous
materials not on the CDC list, will be important in a careful and
dispassionate analysis for ensuring that available resources are
deployed in such a way that commodities receive protection commensurate
with the relative risks involved. This is especially important with the
expected growth in LNG imports. Similarly, we believe that the results
of the risk analyses stemming from use of the Maritime Security Risk
Assessment Model will be important in determining how field units can
best make use of security resources at their ports. With the ability to
compare different targets and different levels of protection offered by
security stakeholders, the model should allow the Coast Guard to take a
more complete accounting for the various risks at U.S. ports. These two
efforts are vital inputs that are needed to ensure an accurate
reflection of security risks to tankers and the ports that receive them.
Local Coast Guard units have been active in preparing for the coming
growth in LNG shipments, engaging with local law enforcement agencies
as a means to augment Coast Guard resources. The assistance the Coast
Guard already receives from state and local law enforcement is vital
for many units as they try to meet security activity requirements with
limited resources. Coast Guard headquarters, however, needs to do more
to help these local efforts. More specifically, it needs to begin
centralized planning for how to address resource shortfalls across many
locations. As LNG facilities continue to multiply, the resulting
increase in workload will affect some Coast Guard units but not others,
necessitating a centralized response as well as a port-specific one. It
is important for the Coast Guard to begin this centralized planning
soon, when attention can also be paid to assessing the options for
partnering with state or local law enforcement agencies to ensure
appropriate security. This broader planning is important for ensuring a
proper distribution of resources to best meet the Coast Guard's diverse
responsibilities.
In the event of a successful attack on an energy commodity tanker,
ports would need to provide an effective, integrated response to
protect public safety and the environment, conduct a terrorism
investigation, and restore operations in a timely manner. Consequently,
clearly defined and understood roles and responsibilities for all
stakeholders who would need to respond are needed to ensure an
effective response. Operational plans for the response, among the
various levels of government involved, should be explicitly linked. As
we have reported previously, it is essential that these roles and
responsibilities be clearly communicated and understood. Furthermore,
while we recognize that ports may have exercise priorities other than
responding to a terrorist attack on a tanker, we believe that combined
spill and terrorism response exercises should be considered and pursued
in ports that are considered to be at risk. In addition, national-level
guidance has generally suggested that ports plan for mitigating the
economic consequences of an attack. In implementing the post-incident
recovery portions of the SAFE Port Act, DHS has an opportunity to
provide specific guidance for how ports could plan for lessening
potentially significant economic consequences, particularly if an
attack results in a port closure. Finally, DHS has just begun to focus
more on providing funding for response resources through the Port
Security Grant program. However, DHS cannot be assured that it will
appropriately target funding to the projects that most reduce overall
risk because it has not developed quantitative performance measures.
These measures would allow DHS to set priorities for funding on the
basis of reducing overall risk. To make effective judgments about such
projects, performance measures are needed to quantitatively determine
the spill and terrorism resources that should be available.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the
Commandant of the Coast Guard to take the following actions:
* Develop a national resource allocation plan that will balance the
need to meet new LNG security responsibilities with other existing
security responsibilities and other Coast Guard missions. This plan
needs to encompass goals and objectives, timelines, impacts on other
missions, roles of private sector operators, and use of existing state
and local agency capacity.
* Develop national-level guidance that ports can use to plan for
helping to mitigate economic consequences, particularly in the case of
port closures.
We also recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the
Commandant of the Coast Guard and that the Attorney General direct the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to work together to
take the following two actions:
* At the national level, help ensure that a detailed operational plan
has been developed that integrates the different spill and terrorism
response sections of the National Response Plan.
* At the local level, help ensure that spill and terrorism response
activities are integrated for the best possible response by maximizing
the integration of spill and terrorism response planning and exercises
at ports that receive energy commodities where attacks on tankers pose
a significant threat.
We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security work with federal,
state, and local stakeholders to develop explicit performance measures
for emergency response capabilities and use them in risk-based analyses
to set priorities for acquiring needed response resources.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense,
State, Justice, and Homeland Security, including the Coast Guard, for
their review and comment. These departments provided formal written
comments, except for the Department of State, which provided oral
comments. The Department of Defense, in its written comments, concurred
with our recommendations. The Departments of Justice, through the FBI,
and Homeland Security generally concurred with our recommendations and
provided specific comments on the recommendations that are detailed
below.
Regarding our recommendation that the Coast Guard develop a national
resource allocation plan that takes into account new LNG security
responsibilities along with its other mission demands, DHS generally
concurred. It stated, however, that while it agrees with the need to
address resource demands based on forecasted increases in LNG imports,
it also stated that LNG was one of many Certain Dangerous Cargoes that
add risk to the maritime environment, and the Coast Guard would address
the risk from CDCs as a whole. We agree that there are other dangerous
cargoes and it is logical for the Coast Guard to review them
holistically in targeting its resources to where the risks are
greatest. On the basis of its comments, the Coast Guard plans to
examine the risk caused by dangerous commodities, and to take a number
of steps to allocate resources. We will monitor the Coast Guard's
actions to see if these actions, collectively or in combination with a
plan, allow it to optimally allocate its limited resource to meet
growing security requirements along with its various other mission
needs. Such a plan is important to ensure the best distribution of
resources to meet the Coast Guard's diverse responsibilities.
Regarding our recommendation to develop national-level guidance to help
ports plan how to mitigate economic consequences, particularly in the
case of port closures, DHS generally concurred. It stated that its
experience from Hurricane Katrina showed that disruptions to the
maritime transportation system can have significant economic impacts
and that these impacts need to be considered during recovery actions.
It also stated that the Coast Guard, in partnership with CBP, is
currently engaged in a broad effort to improve maritime recovery
planning. While information on this effort was not provided to us
during our review, according to its comment, the Coast Guard seems to
recognize the problem and is taking action to address the basis of our
concern.
Regarding our recommendation to develop a detailed national operational
plan that integrates spill and terrorism sections of the National
Response Plan, both DHS and FBI generally concurred. They both stated,
however, that the NRP itself already serves as the basis for
integrating such response planning, and the FBI did not concur with the
need to develop a separate operational plan. As we have noted in prior
reports, effective planning and coordination require the development of
detailed operational plans for response. While the NRP serves as a
strategy-level doctrinal document, it is not an operational plan. We
remain concerned that an intentional attack on an energy commodity
tanker in a U.S. port may not be met by the best possible response
without such a plan to direct the specific circumstance when both the
spill and terrorism response sections of the NRP must be integrated and
implemented simultaneously. Without a detailed operational plan for
this situation, effective and efficient law enforcement investigation
and environmental consequence mitigation may be hindered. As we have
recently reported, the implementation of the NRP following Hurricane
Katrina identified concerns with coordination within and between
federal government entities using the NRP. Further, the October 2005
draft version of the MOTR called for DHS and DOJ to develop specific,
detailed supporting operational plans for their responsibilities, in
close consultation with other departments and agencies. However, this
requirement was dropped from the October 2006 final version of the
MOTR. As a result, no detailed operational plans exist for the
situation described in the response section of this report.[Footnote
80] We believe our recommendation will help fill the guidance gap
between doctrine and port-level operations.
Regarding our recommendation to maximize terrorism and spill response
planning and exercises at the local level for the best possible
response, DHS generally concurred and FBI concurred. DHS said that
while these efforts must be coordinated they need not be an
amalgamation. It stated that there are opportunities for this
coordination at the local committees that are responsible for planning
terrorism and spill response and because the Coast Guard serves as
chair for both committees, coordination already occurs. In its comments
FBI listed exercises that combined terrorism and spill response. It
also stated that local Maritime Liaison Agents were specifically
directed to engage agency partners to ensure integration of FBI
response. While these actions are beneficial for increased integration,
there is no direct link between the actual local terrorism plan and
spill response plan. Also, because terrorism response plans have
distribution limited to those who need to know, many nonsecurity
stakeholders--particularly in the spill response community--would not
have access to these plans in an emergency, allowing for the
possibility for these stakeholders to take actions that may hinder
terrorism response.
Regarding our recommendation that the Secretary of Homeland Security
work with federal, state, and local stakeholders to develop explicit
performance measures for emergency response capabilities, DHS responded
that it was taking the recommendation under advisement and was
exploring approaches to address our recommendation. We will follow up
with DHS later to get its formal position on this recommendation.
All of the respondents provided technical comments that we incorporated
into the report as appropriate. Written comments from DHS are
reproduced in appendix V, written comments from FBI are reproduced in
appendix VI, and written comments from the Department of Defense are
reproduced in appendix VII.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents
earlier, we plan on no further distribution of this report until 30
days after its issue date. At that time we will send copies of this
report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the
U.S. Coast Guard, and the Attorney General. We will also make copies
available to others at no charge at GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
This report was prepared by two teams within GAO, each of which
concentrated on particular aspects of the assignment. If you or your
staffs have any questions regarding (1) the types of threats to tankers
carrying energy commodities and (2) the measures being taken to protect
tankers and the challenges federal agencies face in making these
actions effective, please call Stephen L. Caldwell at (202) 512-9610,
or caldwells@gao.gov. For questions regarding (1) the potential
consequences of a successful attack on tankers or energy infrastructure
or (2) the plans in place and the potential challenges in responding to
an attack, please call Mark Gaffigan at (202) 512-3841, or
gaffiganm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IX.
Signed by:
Stephen L. Caldwell:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
Signed by:
Mark Gaffigan:
Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objective, Scope, and Methodology:
The objectives of this report were to (1) determine the types of
terrorist threats to tankers carrying energy commodities and the
potential consequences of a successful attack; (2) describe what
measures are being taken both internationally and domestically to
protect these tankers, and what challenges, if any, federal agencies
face in making these actions effective; and (3) if a terrorist attack
succeeds despite these protective measures, describe what plans are in
place to respond and discuss the potential challenges federal agencies
may face in responding to a future attack.
To determine the types of terrorist threats to tankers carrying energy
commodities, we conducted interviews with maritime intelligence
officials from the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy at the National Maritime
Intelligence Center.[Footnote 81] We also met with Coast Guard and
Customs and Border Protection officials at headquarters and in the
field responsible for port and vessel security to determine their views
about maritime terrorism related to energy tankers and infrastructure.
During site visits to domestic ports, we also interviewed operators of
petroleum waterside facilities and tankers to determine their
understanding of the threat environment. We also met with shipping and
vessel management companies to discuss their views of the threats they
face at foreign loading ports and while in transit to the United
States. To gain an international perspective on threats to tankers and
loading facilities, we conducted interviews with officials from
international maritime organizations, international shipping and
petroleum trade associations, vessel operators, vessel insurers, and
private security and risk management organizations. We also reviewed
classified intelligence documents, including port threat assessments,
and government directives related to maritime security.
Continuing with our first objective to describe the potential public
safety, environmental, and economic consequences of a successful
terrorist attack on a waterside energy facility or tanker, we met with
officials from the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection
Agency, the U.S. Maritime Administration, the Coast Guard, and the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. In addition, we conducted a panel
study with academic and industry experts to specifically determine the
consequences of an attack on a liquefied natural gas (LNG) tanker. We
also visited major petroleum, LNG, and liquefied petroleum gas
terminals to discuss possible consequences of attacks at these
locations. We also analyzed import data from U.S. government sources
for petroleum and other energy commodities into the United States and
the ports receiving the imports. Finally, we reviewed published
information, such as studies and scholarly articles, to determine the
environmental and public health and safety consequences of a terrorist
attack to a petroleum waterside facility or tanker.
To describe measures that are being taken to protect these tankers, and
what challenges, if any, federal agencies face in making these actions
effective, we interviewed a variety of foreign and domestic government
officials and private industry representatives. To determine the
actions taken in foreign nations, we visited four countries. The
selection criteria for our overseas site visits were the amount of
energy commodities exported to the United States and the opportunity to
learn about maritime anti-terrorism best practices. At the countries we
visited we conducted interviews with government officials responsible
for maritime security activities and petroleum waterside facility and
tanker operators. We also obtained information from the Coast Guard,
international maritime organizations, tanker operators, vessel
management companies, and insurers to understand port and vessel
security practices and procedures overseas and while tankers are in
transit to the United States.
To determine the actions taken domestically, we met with officials in
the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, State, Energy,
Transportation, and Justice; private sector facility and vessel
operators; and state and local officials dealing with homeland
security, emergency response, and law enforcement.
We also conducted site visits to a nonprobability sample of petroleum
and liquefied gas import and export facilities in the United States.
During our site visits we observed security practices and conducted
interviews with representatives of federal agencies that oversee the
security of the energy facilities, as well as facility security
officers and relevant local and state law enforcement officials. The
information obtained from these site visits cannot be generalized to
all petroleum and liquefied gas import and export facilities nationwide.
We also reviewed government and industry documents and data sources
relevant to domestic actions taken by agencies and companies to prevent
terrorist attacks. To establish criteria for evaluating the Coast
Guard's ability to mitigate the risk of maritime terrorism, we obtained
9 months of Operation Neptune Shield (ONS) Scorecard security
performance data--the Coast Guard's performance measurement tool for
tracking performance in meeting security activities at the nations most
strategically important ports--from select Coast Guard field units
covering the months of November 2005 through July 2006. We chose to
review scorecard data for ports that the U.S. Maritime Administration
identified as being top ports for receiving energy commodity tankers.
We calculated the ONS 9-month average of both the monthly activity
requirement attainment percentages and share of workload conducted by
other government agencies. In conducting this work, we met with Coast
Guard headquarters personnel on several occasions to further our
understanding. We also asked Coast Guard officials responsible for the
scorecard data what steps they took to ensure the reliability of the
data and determined that they were sufficiently accurate for our
purposes.
To describe what plans are in place for responding to a terrorist
attack, should one occur despite protective measures, and discuss the
challenges federal agencies may face in responding, we conducted
interviews with officials from the Departments of Homeland Security and
Justice; the Environmental Protection Agency; as well as officials
representing port authorities, state and local offices of public safety
and emergency management, oil and gas facilities, and first responders,
including police and fire departments. These interviews were conducted
to identify spill, terrorism, and economic response plans and
priorities; mechanisms for response coordination; access to resources;
training availability; types of exercises conducted; potential
communications challenges; performance metrics; and information-
sharing systems. During our site visits, we observed port operations
and the working relationships between some government and private
stakeholders. To assess the integration of national and local spill and
terrorism response plans, we gathered and reviewed identified plans.
Finally, we interviewed emergency response officials and reviewed after-
action reports to identify best practices and lessons learned as a
result of emergency response exercises and incidents.
We conducted our work from April 2005 to February 2007 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Selected Energy Commodities Transported by Tanker into
United States:
Crude Oil:
* Crude oil is used to produce a wide array of petroleum products,
including gasoline, diesel and jet fuels, heating oil, lubricants,
asphalt, plastics, and many other products used for their energy or
chemical content.
* Crude oils range from very light (high in gasoline) to very heavy
(high in residual oils). Sour crude is high in sulfur content. Sweet
crude is low in sulfur and therefore often more valuable than other
kinds.
Gasoline:
* A complex mixture of relatively volatile hydrocarbons with or without
small quantities of additives, blended to form a fuel suitable for use
in spark-ignition engines.
* Motor gasoline includes conventional gasoline; all types of
oxygenated gasoline, including gasohol; and reformulated gasoline, but
excludes aviation gasoline.
Jet Fuel:
* A refined petroleum product used in jet aircraft engines.
* Kerosene-type jet fuel is used for commercial and military turbojet
and turboprop aircraft engines.
* Naphtha-type jet fuel is used primarily for military turbojet and
turboprop aircraft engines because it has a lower freeze point than
other aviation fuels and meets engine requirements at high altitudes
and speeds.
LNG:
* A natural gas that has been cooled to minus 260 degrees Fahrenheit to
a liquid state so that it can be transported.
* Consists almost entirely of methane (85-95 percent) along with small
concentrations of ethane, propane, butane, and trace amounts of
nitrogen.
* Mainly used as fuel for electricity generation, home heating,
industrial manufacturing, and, to a lesser extent, motor vehicles.
LPG:
* Group of hydrocarbons, such as propane and butane, derived mainly as
a byproduct of oilfield production and crude oil refining processes.
* The vast majority of LPG traded internationally consists of propane
and butane cargo.
* LPG has a variety of agricultural, household, petrochemical, and, to
a lesser extent, vehicle fuel applications.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Recent High-Profile Terrorism Incidents against Tankers
and Energy Infrastructure:
Table 4: High-Profile Terrorism Incidents against Tankers and Energy
Infrastructure by Target and Attack Method since 2002:
Date: June 2006;
Target, location: Shell Gas Facility, Nigeria;
Attack method: Armed assault;
Description: Nigerian militants attacked an energy facility and
abducted foreign oil workers in the oil-rich Niger delta. The Movement
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta is responsible for a wave of
militant attacks in Nigeria.
Date: Feb. 2006;
Target, location: Saudi Aramco facility, Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia;
Attack method: Suicide attack;
Description: Two cars packed with explosives tried to attack a major
oil processing facility in Saudi Arabia's eastern province. Al Qaeda
suicide attackers were killed along with two Saudi guards.
Date: April 2004;
Target, location: Al Basrah and Khawr Al Amaya oil terminals, Iraq;
Attack method: Suicide attack;
Description: Closely timed suicide boat attacks on northern Persian
Gulf oil terminals in Iraq left two Navy sailors and one Coast
Guardsman dead and five others injured.
Date: Aug. 2003;
Target, location: M/V Penrider, en route from Singapore to Malaysia;
Attack method: Armed assault;
Description: The Free Aceh Movement claimed responsibility for
hijacking the M/V Penrider, a fully laden tanker shipping fuel oil in
Southeast Asia. Three hostages were eventually released following a
ransom payment.
Date: March 2003;
Target, location: Chemical Tanker Dewi Madrim, Strait of Malacca;
Attack method: Armed assault;
Description: Ten pirates boarded tanker from a speedboat. Pirates took
the helm, altered the speed, disabled ship's radio, and steered the
vessel for an hour. Pirates left with cash and abducted captain and
first officer.
Date: Oct. 2002;
Target, location: M/V Limburg, Yemen;
Attack method: Suicide attack;
Description: Small boat filled with explosives rammed the side of the
French-flagged oil tanker Limburg as it was approaching the Ash Shihr
Terminal several miles off the coast of Yemen. The suicide attack
killed one crew member and 90,000 barrels of oil spilled.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Assessing and Managing Risks Using a Risk Management
Approach:
Risk management is a systematic approach for analyzing risk and
deciding how best to address it. Because resources are limited and
cannot eliminate all risks, careful choices need to be made in deciding
which actions yield the greatest benefit. Figure 19 depicts a risk
management framework that is our synthesis of government requirements
and prevailing best practices previously reported.[Footnote 82] To be
effective, this process must be repeated when threats or conditions
change to incorporate any new information to adjust and revise the
assessments and actions.
Figure 19: Risk Management Framework:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is an illustration of an interlocking circle that
represents the risk management framework. The following data is
depicted:
Strategic goals,objectives and constraints:
Risk assessment;
Alternatives evaluation;
Management selection;
Implementation and monitoring.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Setting strategic goals, objectives, and constraints is a key first
step in implementing a risk management approach and helps to ensure
that management decisions are focused on achieving a strategic purpose.
These decisions should take place in the context of an agency's
strategic plan that includes goals and objectives that are clear,
concise, and measurable.
Risk assessment, a critical step in the approach, helps decision makers
identify and evaluate potential risks so that countermeasures can be
designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate the effects of risk.
Risk assessment is a qualitative and/or quantitative determination of
the likelihood of an adverse event occurring and the severity, or
impact, of its consequences. Risk assessment in a homeland security
application often involves assessing three key elements--threat,
criticality, and vulnerability:
* A threat assessment identifies and evaluates potential threats on the
basis of factors such as capabilities, intentions, and past activities.
* A criticality or consequence assessment evaluates and prioritizes
assets and functions in terms of specific criteria, such as their
importance to public safety and the economy, as a basis for identifying
which structures or processes are relatively more important to protect
from attack.
* A vulnerability assessment identifies weaknesses that may be
exploited by identified threats and suggests options to address those
weaknesses.
Information from these three assessments contributes to an overall risk
assessment that characterizes risks on a scale such as high, medium, or
low and provides input for evaluating alternatives and management
prioritization of security initiatives.
The next two steps involve deciding what mitigation measures to adopt.
Alternatives evaluation considers what actions may be needed to address
identified risks, the associated costs of taking these actions, and any
resulting benefits. This information is provided to agency management
to aid in completing the next step--selecting alternative actions best
suited to the unique needs of the organization.
The final step in the approach involves implementing the selected
actions and evaluating the extent to which they mitigate risk. This
involves developing criteria for monitoring the performance of these
actions and follow-up to ensure that these actions are effective and
reflect evolving risk.
Risk management has received widespread support from Congress, the
President, and the Secretary of Homeland Security as a tool that can
help set priorities and inform decisions about mitigating risks.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
[hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov]:
March 12, 2007:
Mr. Stephen L. Caldwell:
Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Mr. Jim Wells:
Director, Natural Resources and Environmental Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Caldwell and Mr Wells:
RE: Draft Report GAO-07-286SU, Maritime Security: Federal Efforts
Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist
Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers:
The Department of Homeland Security appreciates the opportunity to
review and comment on the draft report referenced above. We found that
your report is thorough and makes significant contributions to the
United States Coast Guard's (USCG) actions to ensure the security of
energy commodity, maritime critical infrastructure and key resources.
We provide the following comments regarding the Report's specific
recommendations.
Recommendation 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to develop a national
resource allocation plan that will balance the need to meet new LNG
security responsibilities with other existing security responsibilities
and other Coast Guard missions. This plan needs to encompass goals and
objectives, timelines, impacts on other missions, roles of private
sector operators, and use of existing state and local agency capacity.
DHS Response: Concur with comments. The Coast Guard appreciates the
need to address forecast resource demands brought about by new LNG
imports. However, LNG is just one of a number of Certain Dangerous
Cargoes (CDCs) that add risk to the maritime environment. Although the
Coast Guard will not speculate about future funding needs, we recognize
the need to plan for new facilities projected to come on-line. As no
additional resources were requested in either the FY07 or FY08 budget
proposals, the Coast Guard is analyzing how to best meet security needs
for not just LNG carriers, but for CDCs as a whole, and will examine
how to best address the risk through potential resource requests,
revisions to Operation Neptune Shield (ONS) as well as revised guidance
to field commanders who review LNG terminal applications.
Recommendation 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard to develop national
level guidance that ports can use to plan for helping to mitigate
economic consequences, particularly in the case of port closures.
DHS Response: Concur with comments. While Coast Guard partially agrees
with the report's characterization that "Ports Generally Do Not Have
Plans for Mitigating Economic Consequences," the experiences from
Hurricane Katrina did show the Coast Guard that disruptions to the
marine transportation system can have significant economic impacts and
Coast Guard planning and response/recovery actions must consider these
factors in order to recover most efficiently. As such, the Coast Guard
is undertaking a national level effort to improve maritime recovery
planning. The Coast Guard and DHS sponsored a National Maritime
Recovery Symposium in August of 2006 which identified a number of gaps
and provided a roadmap to improved maritime recovery planning.
Additionally, the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
have forged a formal partnership to develop national level protocols to
plan and execute maritime resumption of trade operations. Ultimately
additional guidance will be provided to the field commanders on
requirements to bolster maritime recovery planning and post-incident
recovery management operations. This will enhance and expand the
guidance already provided for in the Area Maritime Security Plans, as
well as other applicable plans.
Recommendation 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard and that the Attorney
General direct the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
work together to take the following action: At the national level,
develop a detailed operational plan that integrates the different spill
and terrorism response sections of the National Response Plan.
DHS Response: Concur with comments. The Coast Guard agrees with the
need for a national plan and the need to work closely with the FBI, as
well as all federal, state and local partners. The National Response
Plan (NRP) serves this need as the doctrinal base for integrating all
national, regional, and sub-regional (including port specific)
contingency plans into a coordinated whole. The NRP annexes for
Emergency Support Functions (ESF) 10 and 13 serve the spill and
terrorism response needs of an incident involving an energy commodity
tanker. These "horizontally complementary" annexes/plans are
compatible, overlap to some degree and work together under the NRP to
address the needs of the incident. The NRP is currently under re-write
involving government agencies at multiple levels. Through this re-
write, the USCG is supporting the ESF workgroups and the DHS writing
team to ensure integration of spill and terrorism issues. The Coast
Guard will also continue existing national-level inter-agency
cooperation, i.e. use of the National Response Team (NRT) and Regional
Response Teams (RRT) as prescribed in the National Contingency Plan, as
well as supporting coordination between Area Committees (AC) and Area
Maritime Security Committees (AMSC) as mechanisms to increase
interagency coordination and improve response to incidents involving
energy commodity tankers. Collectively, these efforts will improve
coordination, cooperation, and exercises between involved agencies.
Recommendation 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland
Security direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard and that the Attorney
General direct the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
work together to take the following action: at the local level, help
ensure that spill and terrorism response activities are integrated for
the best possible response by maximizing the integration of spill and
terrorism response planning and exercises at ports that receive energy
commodities where attacks on tankers pose a significant threat.
DHS Response: Concur with comments. The Coast Guard coordinates and
participates in a variety of exercises, with a number of different
federal, state and local agency partners, including the FBI. At the
national and local level, the spill and terrorism response planning
need not be an amalgamation but must be coordinated. At the port level,
the local Area Committees (AC) which develop Area Contingency Plans for
oil and hazardous material spill response and the Area Maritime
Security Committees (AMSC) which develop Area Maritime Security Plans
work among all stakeholders to ensure coordinated preparedness and
response actions. These local committees are also empowered to hold
integrated exercises with their regional FBI representatives and
national exercise policy supports such coordination. Insofar as the
Coast Guard serves as chair for both committees (AC & AMSC), and the
FBI sits on the AMSC, significant coordination and synergy between
these two groups is already occurring. The USCG recognizes, however,
that we must maximize the opportunities to coordinate where appropriate
spill and terrorism exercises in ports where attacks on energy
commodity tankers pose a notable threat.
Recommendation 5: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland
Security work with federal, state, and local stakeholders to develop
explicit performance measures for emergency response capabilities and
use them in risk-based analyses to set priorities for acquiring needed
response resources.
DHS Response: We are taking this recommendation under advisement and
are exploring approaches for addressing the recommendation.
We thank you again for the opportunity to offer comments on this draft
report and look forward to working with you on future homeland security
issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Federal Bureau of Investigation:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Federal Bureau of Investigation:
Washington, DC 20535-0001:
February 8, 2007:
Mr. Stephen L. Caldwell:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Re: GAO'S Draft Report: Federal Efforts Needed To Address Challenges In
Preventing And Responding To Terrorist Attacks On Energy Commodity
Tankers:
Dear Mr. Caldwell:
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to review the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) draft report titled "Federal Efforts
Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist
Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers" (hereafter referenced as the
"Report"). This letter constitutes the FBI's formal response.
Based on our review of this Report, the FBI concurs with the GAO's
assessment of the need for more direct interaction and coordination
between the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and the FBI at the
national and local levels to integrate the different spill and
terrorism response annexes of the National Response Plan (NRP);
however, we do not concur with the prescriptive recommendation to
develop a detailed operational plan to achieve such results. The FBI
contends the NRP itself is the primary plan for integrating these two
concerns, and as such, the NRP serves as the foundation for development
of procedures to more effectively and efficiently implement this
integration.
The NRP and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) are
currently under review and revision. This revision will include
harmonizing the respective NRP annexes as well as integrating NIMS
concepts, principles, terminology, systems and organization process
into the revised NRP. Delivery of the revised NRP and NIMS documents
are scheduled for June 1, 2007.
In keeping with the GAO's recommendation for integrated exercises at
seaports, the FBI further contends the government would be better
served at this point by conducting joint exercises to implement and
validate the revised, harmonized response processes. Any resulting gaps
will be addressed mutually by the FBI and the USCG through an
appropriate framework.
The FBI concurs with the recommendation to help ensure spill and
terrorism response activities at the local level are integrated for the
best possible response by maximizing the integration of spill and
terrorism response planning and exercises at ports that receive energy
commodities where attacks on tankers pose a significant threat. During
calendar year 2006, the FBI and USCG participated in seven (7)
interagency exercises wherein the scenarios included variations of
attacks and explosions involving energy commodity tankers, facilities
or key resources and a resulting spill of significance. These exercises
included the following:
Date(s): March 21-23;
Exercise Name: Columbia Challenge 2006;
Location: Portland, Oregon.
Date(s): April 25;
Exercise Name: Trinity 2006;
Location: Houston, Texas.
Date(s): May 2;
Exercise Name: Prince William Sound Terrorism Training Exercise 2006;
Location: Valdez, Alaska.
Date(s): August 1;
Exercise Name: Bay Sentinel 2006;
Location: Tampa, Florida.
Date(s): August 30;
Exercise Name: Kitchi Gummi Guardian 2006;
Location: Duluth, Minnesota.
Date(s): September 25;
Exercise Name: Sea River and Exxon Mobil Tanker FTX;
Location: Valdez, Alaska.
Date(s): November 6;
Exercise Name: Stripped Fury 2006;
Location: Mobile, Alabama.
The USCG is sponsoring a multi-agency, full-scale exercise within the
Baltimore and National Capital Region called Nautical Shield/Capital
Shield in September 2007. It is anticipated this exercise will focus on
developing a depth of integration at strategic, operational, and
tactical/functional levels.
In further support of this recommendation, the FBI's Maritime Security
Program (MSP) recently provided guidance to field office Maritime
Liaison Agents (MLAs) within its MSP FY07 Second Quarter MLA guidance
and Effective Practices electronic communication. Specifically, MLAs
were directed to actively engage interagency partners at both the
exercise planning and execution levels to ensure integration of FBI
response capabilities, including but not limited to MLAs, Hazardous
Materials Response Teams, Evidence Response Teams and Crisis Management
Coordinators. An example of such interagency engagement cited was the
combining of spill and terrorism response activities within a single
exercise.
The FBI will continue to look for opportunities to participate in joint
training exercises which will enhance the level of integration of spill
and terrorism response activities within local maritime jurisdictions.
Additionally, the FBI anticipates providing more definitive guidance to
field office MLAs regarding joint response planning for maritime
incidents upon receipt of the revised NRP.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to respond to this Report. If you
have questions regarding our response, please feel free to contact me
any time.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Joseph Billy, Jr.
Assistant Director:
Counterterrorism Division:
National Security Branch:
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Special Operations & Low Intensity Conflict:
2500 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, DC 20301-2500:
February 15, 2007:
Mr. Stephen L. Caldwell:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Caldwell:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft
report, 'Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address
Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy
Commodity Tankers,' dated January 31, 2007 (GAO Code 440406/GAO-07-
286SU). The Department has reviewed and concurs with the GAO report.
SOLIC recognizes the tremendous scope of the GAO engagement subject,
and the importance in reviewing the threats that our Nation's energy
supply chain faces and applauds the efforts of the GAO study team.
Suggested technical changes to the report have been provided
separately. DoD appreciates the opportunity to comment on the GAO draft
report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Thomas W. O'Connell:
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contacts:
Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610, or caldwells@gao.gov:
Mark Gaffigan, (202) 512-3841, or gaffiganm@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
[End of section]
In addition to the contacts named above, Jonathan Bachman, Jason
Berman, Steven Calvo, Jonathan Carver, Frances Cook, Frank Chase Cook,
Amy Higgins, David Lysy, Jean McSween, Erica Miles, Jobenia Odum, Josh
Ormond, Janice Poling, Franklin Rusco, Peter Singer, Carol Shulman,
Stan Stenerson, Barbara Timmerman, James Turkett, Jim Wells, and
Margaret Wrightson made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One
Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.
Maritime Security: One Year Later: A Progress Report on the SAFE Port
Act. GAO-08-171T. Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2007.
Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act and Efforts to Secure Our Nation's
Seaports. GAO-08-86T. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of
Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-1240T. Washington, D.C.:
September 18, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of
Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-1081T. Washington, D.C.:
September 6, 2007.
Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of
Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-454. Washington, D.C.: August
17, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related
Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington, D.C.: July
31, 2007.
Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R.
Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.
Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related
Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-835T. Washington, D.C.: May 15,
2007.
[End of section]
Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.: May 10,
2007.
Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port
Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007.
Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in
Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: March 28,
2007.
Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on
a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification. GAO-07-316.
Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2007.
Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington,
D.C.: September 6, 2006.
Coast Guard: Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures Are Generally
Sound, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist. GAO-06-816. Washington,
D.C.: August 16, 2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery
Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.:
July 31, 2006.
Maritime Security: Information Sharing Efforts Are Improving. GAO-06-
933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006.
Energy Security: Issues Related to Potential Reductions in Venezuelan
Oil Production. GAO-06-668. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2006.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and Future
Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,
D.C.: February 23, 2006.
Homeland Security: DHS Is Taking Steps to Enhance Security at Chemical
Facilities, but Additional Authority Is Needed. GAO-06-150. Washington,
D.C.: January 27, 2006.
Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and
Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 2005.
Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from
Additional Management Actions by State and DHS. GAO-05-859. Washington,
D.C.: September 13, 2005.
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and
Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.:
May 17, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing,
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-
394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006
Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005.
Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and
Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January 31,
2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport
Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.:
January 14, 2005.
Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime
Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.:
December 10, 2004.
Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective
Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.:
September 30, 2004.
Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate
Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System. GAO-04-868.
Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning
Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington,
D.C.: June 30, 2004.
Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year 2005
and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004.
Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing
Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March
31, 2004.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target
Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington,
D.C.: December 16, 2003.
Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime
Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T.
Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003.
Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be
Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington, D.C.: August 27, 2003.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require
Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,
D.C.: July 25, 2003.
[End of section]
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland
Security in Balancing Its Border Security and Trade Facilitation
Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term
Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] In this report, the term "energy commodities" refers to crude oil,
refined petroleum products, and natural gas.
[2] While most petroleum is imported as crude oil and refined in U.S.
terminals, tankers also import products already refined from crude oil.
Crude oil is refined into petroleum products using several processes
that start with simple distillation. The products are referred to as
"light" petroleum products (the group of petroleum products with lower
boiling temperatures, including gasoline, jet fuel, and diesel fuel)
and "heavy" petroleum products (those that remain after the lighter
products are distilled away, such as asphalt). See appendix II for a
description of assorted energy commodities imported into the United
States by tanker.
[3] LNG is primarily methane, while LPG is propane or butane that has
been cooled or pressurized to reduce its volume. LPG imports are
relatively small in volume compared to LNG imports.
[4] Canada is the other primary supplier of crude oil and natural gas
to the United States, but its exports arrive by pipeline.
[5] The five are located at Everett, Massachusetts (near Boston); Cove
Point, Maryland (on Chesapeake Bay); Elba Island, Georgia (near
Savannah); Lake Charles, Louisiana (in western Louisiana); and offshore
in the Gulf of Mexico, 116 miles south of the Louisiana coast.
[6] In addition to the 11 onshore LNG terminals, 2 offshore terminals
have been approved by the Maritime Administration, which is responsible
for approving new offshore LNG facilities. A total of 32 new onshore
and offshore LNG facilities have been proposed or approved by either
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or the Maritime
Administration.
[7] IMO is an agency of the United Nations that facilitates
international regulation of safety and security of commercial shipping.
[8] Countries where ports are located are referred to as "port states."
Countries where ships are registered are referred to as "flag states."
As of November 30, 2006, there were 156 contracting governments to the
SOLAS Convention, representing 99 percent of the world shipping fleet
by tonnage.
[9] Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064.
[10] Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484.
[11] See: GAO, Maritime Transportation: Major Oil Spills Occur
Infrequently, but Risks to the Federal Oil Spill Fund Remain, GAO-07-
1085 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2007).
[12] In general, the scope of our review is limited to terrorist
attacks. We did not evaluate the security of the maritime energy supply
chain from other attacks, such as the militaries of other countries, or
from natural disasters, such as hurricanes or earthquakes. For
information on ports and natural disasters see GAO, Port Risk
Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster
Planning and Recovery, GAO-07-412 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2007),
and GAO, Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and
Recovery Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina, GAO-06-903 (Washington,
D.C.: July 31, 2006).
[13] Nonprobability sampling is a method of sampling where observations
are selected in a manner that is not completely random, usually using
specific characteristics of the population as criteria. Results from
nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a
population because in a nonprobability sample, some elements of the
population being studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being
selected as part of the sample.
[14] We have also reported the views of our findings related
specifically to LNG in a separate report. See GAO, Maritime Security:
Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on a Tanker Carrying
Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification, GAO-07-316 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 22, 2007).
[15] Specific details regarding the operationalization and integration
of spill and terrorism response plans were provided in the Sensitive
Security Information version of this report.
[16] A barrel is equivalent to 42 gallons of oil.
[17] The Ultra Large Crude Carrier type of tanker is even larger than
the Very Large Crude Carrier, but because of changing route economics,
Ultra Large Crude Carriers make up a small portion of the overall
tanker market.
[18] LOOP, the only U.S. deepwater oil port that can handle fully
loaded Very Large Crude Carriers, is located 18 miles off the Louisiana
coast and currently handles about 10 percent of U.S. crude oil imports.
[19] The U.S. Maritime Administration reports that in 2005, 79 percent
of tanker calls (U.S.-flag and foreign-flag) at U.S. ports were by
double-hull tankers.
[20] This includes both crude oil and petroleum products.
[21] Imports of natural gas from Mexico also arrive in the United
States via pipeline.
[22] This section presents petroleum and LNG import data for 2004.
Although 2005 data are more recent, normal petroleum import patterns
were disrupted by the series of hurricanes that affected the Gulf
Coast. Because of these impacts, 2004 data are more representative.
[23] The National Strategy for Maritime Security (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 2005).
[24] See GAO, Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation
and Sustainability Remain Key Challenges, GAO-05-448T (Washington,
D.C.: May 2005).
[25] See appendix V for additional information on risk management.
[26] For further discussion of risk management as it relates to
homeland security, see GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed
to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other
Critical Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: December. 2005).
[27] See appendix III for descriptions of recent terrorist attacks
against maritime or energy targets.
[28] MARSEC is a three-tiered system developed by the Coast Guard to
communicate the prevailing threat environment to the marine elements of
the national transportation system, including ports, facilities, and
critical assets and infrastructure. The levels align closely with DHS's
color-coded Homeland Security Alert System in the following way: MARSEC
1 applies when threat conditions Green, Blue, or Yellow are set; MARSEC
2 applies when threat condition Orange is set; and MARSEC 3 applies
when threat condition Red is set.
[29] Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884.
[30] Michael D. Greenberg et al., Maritime Terrorism: Risk and
Liability (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2006), 22.
[31] Piracy is defined by the International Maritime Bureau, a division
of the International Chamber of Commerce that tracks and reports pirate
attacks, as, "an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with
the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the
apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that
act."
[32] Coast Guard Mission Capabilities: Hearing before the Subcommittee
on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, 109th Cong. 18-25 (2006) (statement
of Rear Admiral Wayne Justice and Rear Admiral Joseph Nimmich, U.S.
Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security).
[33] There are three types of LPG tankers: fully refrigerated,
partially refrigerated, and fully pressurized, which describes the
method used to keep the LPG cargo in a liquid state. Partially
refrigerated LPG tankers keep their cargo in a liquid state with a
combination of refrigeration and pressure. Generally larger LPG
tankers, like those used in international trade, are fully
refrigerated.
[34] Data are from National Research Council of the National Academies.
"Oil in the Sea III: Inputs, Fates, and Effects" the National Academies
Press: Washington, D.C. 2003. Numbers do not add to 100 percent due to
rounding.
[35] As we will discuss later in this report, however, concerns about
supply disruption can have an effect on price, and in the case of the
Exxon Valdez spill, price was temporarily affected.
[36] Lightering is the process of transferring oil at sea from a very
large or ultra-large carrier to smaller tankers that are capable of
entering the port.
[37] Partick L .Anderson. "Lost Earnings Due to the West Coast Port
Shutdown--Preliminary Estimate--Anderson Economic Group LLC (Lansing,
Michigan, Oct. 7, 2002).
[38] The estimate is lower than some other studies that examined the
incident because it took into consideration that cargoes were simply
delayed, and not lost entirely.
[39] Peter Gordon; James Moore II; Harry Richardson; and Pan Qisheng,
"The Economic Impact of a Terrorist Attack on the Twin Ports of Los
Angeles-Long Beach" in The Economic Impacts of Terrorist Attacks, Peter
Gordon, James Moore II, and Harry Richardson, eds., (Northampton,
Massachusetts, 2006).
[40] John S. Cook and Charles P. Shirkey. "A Review of Valdez Oil Spill
Market Impacts," Petroleum Marketing Monthly, a publication of the
Energy Information Administration, March 1989.
[41] Crew list visas are nonimmigrant visas that cover all crew members
of a vessel or aircraft included on a master list submitted to State
Department officials.
[42] See GAO, Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit
from Additional Management Actions by State and DHS, GAO-05-859
(Washington D.C.: Sept. 13, 2005).
[43] The Navy and Coast Guard also work with foreign nations to improve
their ability to prevent terrorist attacks in the waters around their
countries. In exercises such as South East Asia Cooperation Against
Terrorism (SEA-CAT) and Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
(CARAT), the Navy works to improve other countries' skills and to
increase interoperability among nations. In these exercises the forces
from the different countries practice boarding tactics and techniques
and other skills. The Navy and Coast Guard also take part in
multinational conferences, such as the Alameda Conference on East Asian
and Pacific Region Maritime Security in February 2006. This conference,
sponsored by the Coast Guard, was aimed at coordinating maritime
security assistance for the Strait of Malacca region and beyond.
Another conference, held in Benin and sponsored by the Navy, was aimed
at improving security around the Gulf of Guinea.
[44] The Coast Guard has contracted with a satellite communication
provider to test the ability to receive signals up to 2000 miles from
U.S. shores.
[45] Since September 11, 2001, the funding for the Coast Guard's
homeland security mission area--which consists of ports, waterways, and
coastal security; illegal drug interdiction; undocumented migrant
interdiction; defense readiness; and other law enforcement--has
increased substantially. It now roughly equals funding for all Coast
Guard non-homeland security mission programs. For example, in the Coast
Guard's fiscal year 2007 budget request, Coast Guard requested a total
of $8.4 billion, of which $4.5 billion (54 percent) was requested for
Coast Guard maritime homeland security missions. The Coast Guard does
not separate funding for security activities to protect energy
commodity tankers.
[46] Coast Guard conducts various actions to ensure facility and vessel
operators are complying with MTSA. The Coast Guard conducts annual site
visits and spot checks to ensure facility operators are complying with
their MTSA-approved security plan--plans for access control, physical
security, and perimeter surveillance. In ensuring vessel operator MTSA
compliance, the Coast Guard conducts, among other activities, boardings
to ensure that the crew have appropriate documentation or that the
vessel, when moored, is taking steps to restrict access. Furthermore,
should the Coast Guard identify security-related deficiencies by vessel
or facility operators, it will increase the frequency of its spot
inspections until it determines that the vessel or facility operators
have taken the necessary corrective actions. We currently have another
assignment under way examining compliance with MTSA requirements in
more detail. As a result, we do not address MTSA compliance in detail
in this report.
[47] CBP and the Coast Guard work together to handle high risk crew
members and to ensure that those crewmembers do not leave the tanker.
They require actions such as posting guards to prevent unauthorized
personnel from leaving the vessel and visits to the ship by agency
personnel to ensure high risk personnel are still on board.
[48] CDCs are defined in 33 C.F.R. § 160.204, a section of Coast Guard
regulations that addresses ports and waterways safety. The list
primarily includes nonenergy products that are flammable, toxic, or
explosive, such as chlorine and sulfur dioxide.
[49] The guidance is contained in a Coast Guard operations order called
Operation Neptune Shield (ONS). First issued in 2003 and revised
periodically since, it contains a classified set of requirements
establishing the Coast Guard's homeland security activity levels. As
such, the order sets scalable performance minimums that escalate as the
MARSEC level increases.
[50] In addition to state and local law enforcement support, the
Department of Defense (Defense) can also support Coast Guard maritime
homeland security operations based on memorandums of agreement between
Defense and the Department of Homeland Security. Examples of military
support provided to the Coast Guard by Defense include conducting mine
countermeasures in ports, surveillance of terrorist maritime movements,
and sustaining Defense and Coast Guard personnel and platforms
conducting offshore operations for extended periods of time. According
to a departmental official, Defense has not been asked to provide these
capabilities in a domestic maritime terrorism incident involving
tankers or energy infrastructure to date.
[51] Area Maritime Security Committees were required by Coast Guard
regulations implementing MTSA and are composed of the local Coast Guard
Captain of the Port and officials of federal, local, and state
governments; law enforcement agencies; maritime industry and labor
organizations; and other port stakeholders that may be affected by
security policies. The responsibilities of the committees include, in
part, identifying critical port infrastructure, identifying risks to
the port, developing mitigation strategies for these risks, and
communicating appropriate security information to port stakeholders.
[52] See GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinement Needed to Assess
Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005).
[53] Coast Guard policy requires Coast Guard field units to conduct
additional security activities at higher MARSEC levels.
[54] The objective of a consequence analysis for CDC commodities is to
predict the blast loads, damage to nearby structures, ship integrity,
heat load, potential mass casualties, environmental hazards, and
potential disruption to both commercial and military operations.
[55] The Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model is a tool developed by
the Coast Guard to determine relative risks at ports that can be
compared both within the port and among ports.
[56] An existing LNG import facility is located in Puerto Rico.
[57] Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594.
[58] Preexisting interagency plans are incorporated into sections of
the NRP as supporting operational plans. The National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) is the subplan that serves
as the basis for federal spill response activities under the NRP
section for spill response (Emergency Support Function #10).
[59] 6 U.S.C. § 942.
[60] MTSA calls for plans "to deter and minimize damage from
transportation security incidents," such as terrorist attacks. For the
purposes of this report the phrases "terrorism response plans" and
"terrorism response" are substituted.
[61] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities,
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).
[62] USCG headquarters officials reported that, since the end of GAO's
audit work, the USCG and the FBI have jointly responded in two maritime
cases that reflected a nexus between environmental response and
transnational crime/terrorism: M/V Tong Chang and M/V Dubai Express.
GAO was not able to review these cases and cannot comment on them
because they occurred after audit work completion. In addition, USCG
headquarters officials stated that, at the direction of the President,
DHS, DOJ and DOD completed the Maritime Operational Threat Response
Forces (MOTR Forces) plan, in July 2007. According to USCG headquarters
officials, the MOTR Forces plan is a supporting plan to the base MOTR,
designed to permit the interoperability and synchronization of DHS,
DOJ, and DOD maritime competencies and capabilities. GAO was not able
to review and cannot comment on the MOTR Forces support plan because it
was developed after audit work completion.
[63] GAO-06-618.
[64] Specific details regarding exercising spill and terrorism response
plans were provided in the Sensitive Security Information version of
this report.
[65] The U.S. Coast Guard SONS exercise program is designed to increase
the preparedness of the entire response organization from the field
level to agency heads in Washington, D.C. This program is focused on
exercising the entire National Response System at the local, regional,
and national levels using large-scale, high-probability oil and
hazardous material incidents that result from unintentional causes such
as maritime casualties and natural disasters.
[66] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Protect the Nation's
Seaports, Audit Report 06-26 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006).
[67] Specific details regarding coordination of the MOTR were provided
in the Sensitive Security Information version of this report.
[68] Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) guidance recognized that local emergency spill
planning committees should consider the possibility of terrorist events
as they review existing plans and consider how to incorporate
counterterrorism measures. This guidance noted that one difference in
dealing with a terrorist-derived incident is that law enforcement
officials will be involved in the response as investigators, and that
their priorities may create emergency response coordination challenges
that spill response committees should address in their plan.
[69] According to FBI officials, FBI policy is that every field office
of the FBI that has within its jurisdiction a port or other navigable
waterway will have an agent who is assigned to serve in the MLA
position. FBI officials stated that there are 124 MLAs around the
country for all navigable waterways and ports where field offices are
located.
[70] Coast Guard headquarters is reviewing the MTR for possible
dissemination as a model approach to coordinating a terrorism response.
[71] Testimony of the Honorable Michael P. Jackson, Deputy Secretary,
Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. House of
Representative Committee on Homeland Security on H. R. 4954 (To improve
maritime and cargo security through enhanced layered defenses, and for
other purposes), April 4, 2006.
[72] Specific details regarding the operationalization and integration
of spill and terrorism response plans were provided in the Sensitive
Security Information version of this report.
[73] As implemented by Coast Guard regulations in 33 § CFR 155.1050(k).
[74] "Marine Salvage Capabilities Responding to Terrorist Attacks in
U.S. Ports--Actions to Improve Readiness," Report of the Committee for
Marine Salvage Response Capability: A Workshop of the National
Transportation Safety Board, August 5-6, 2003, Washington, D.C.
[75] The National Strike Force was established in 1973. Originally
composed of three 17-member Strike Teams, today's National Strike Force
totals over 200 active duty, civilian, and reserve Coast Guard
personnel and includes the National Strike Force Coordination Center
(NSFCC), the Atlantic Strike Team, the Gulf Strike Team, the Pacific
Strike Team, and the Public Information Assist Team located at the
NSFCC. NSFCC provides support and standardization guidance to the
Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific strike teams. NSFCC is also home to
National Response Resources Inventory and the National Oil Spill
Removal Organization Classification Program.
[76] This training is necessary for responding to an attack on a
tanker, because marine firefighting presents special considerations
that are not present in land-based firefighting, such as vessel
stability, water discharge discipline, vessel dewatering, and shipboard
firefighting systems (such as onboard firefighting foam deluge
systems). The National Fire Protection Association developed NFPA 1405:
"Guide for Land-Based Firefighters Who Respond to Marine Vessels" at
the request of, and in cooperation with, the Coast Guard and with the
assistance of the fire service and maritime communities in response to
a recognized need in this area for firefighter training.
[77] The DHS fiscal 2007 appropriations act calls for DHS to conduct
baseline interoperability assessments across the country by October
2007, and every 5 years thereafter.
[78] GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental
Cooperation Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable
Communications, GAO-04-740 (Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004).
[79] GAO, Homeland Security - DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders'
All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-652 (Washington,
D.C.: July 20005).
[80] USCG headquarters officials stated that, at the direction of the
President, DHS, DOJ, and DOD completed the Maritime Operational Threat
Response Forces plan, in July 2007. According to USCG headquarters
officials, the MOTR Forces plan is a supporting plan to the base MOTR,
designed to permit the interoperability and synchronization of DHS,
DOJ, and DOD maritime competencies and capabilities. GAO was not able
to review and cannot comment on the MOTR Forces support plan because it
was developed after audit work completion.
[81] Central Intelligence Agency officials declined our request for a
briefing on threats to energy tankers.
[82] See GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess
Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: December 2005).
[End of section]
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