Plan Colombia
Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance Gao ID: GAO-09-71 October 6, 2008In September 1999, the government of Colombia announced a strategy, known as "Plan Colombia," to (1) reduce the production of illicit drugs (primarily cocaine) by 50 percent in 6 years and (2) improve security in Colombia by re-claiming control of areas held by illegal armed groups. Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided over $6 billion to support Plan Colombia. The Departments of State, Defense, and Justice and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) manage the assistance. GAO examined (1) the progress made toward Plan Colombia's drug reduction and enhanced security objectives, (2) the results of U.S. aid for the military and police, (3) the results of U.S. aid for non-military programs, and (4) the status of efforts to "nationalize" or transfer operations and funding responsibilities for U.S.-supported programs to Colombia.
Plan Colombia's goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illegal narcotics by 50 percent in 6 years was not fully achieved. From 2000 to 2006, opium poppy cultivation and heroin production declined about 50 percent, while coca cultivation and cocaine production levels increased by about 15 and 4 percent, respectively. These increases, in part, can be explained by measures taken by coca farmers to counter U.S. and Colombian eradication efforts. Colombia has improved its security climate through systematic military and police engagements with illegal armed groups and by degrading these groups' finances. U.S. Embassy Bogot? officials cautioned that these security gains will not be irreversible until illegal armed groups can no longer threaten the stability of the government of Colombia, but become a law enforcement problem requiring only police attention. Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense provided nearly $4.9 billion to the Colombian military and National Police. Notably, over 130 U.S.-funded helicopters have provided the air mobility needed to rapidly move Colombian counternarcotics and counterinsurgency forces. U.S. advisors, training, equipment, and intelligence assistance have also helped professionalize Colombia's military and police forces, which have recorded a number of achievements including the aerial and manual eradication of hundreds of thousands of hectares of coca, the seizure of tons of cocaine, and the capture or killing of a number of illegal armed group leaders and thousands of combatants. However, these efforts face several challenges, including countermeasures taken by coca farmers to combat U.S. and Colombian eradication efforts. Since fiscal year 2000, State, Justice, and USAID have provided nearly $1.3 billion for a wide range of social, economic, and justice sector programs. These programs have had a range of accomplishments, including aiding internally displaced persons and reforming Colombia's justice sector. But some efforts have been slow in achieving their objectives while others are difficult to assess. For example, the largest share of U.S. non-military assistance has gone towards alternative development, which has provided hundreds of thousands of Colombians legal economic alternatives to the illicit drug trade. But, alternative development is not provided in most areas where coca is cultivated and USAID does not assess how such programs relate to its strategic goals of reducing the production of illicit drugs or achieving sustainable results. In response to congressional direction in 2005 and budget cuts in fiscal year 2008, State and the other U.S. departments and agencies have accelerated their nationalization efforts, with State focusing on Colombian military and National Police aviation programs. One aviation program has been nationalized and two are in transition, with the largest--the Army Aviation Brigade--slated for turnover by 2012. Two National Police aviation programs have no turnover dates established. State, Defense, Justice, and USAID each have their own approaches to nationalization, with different timelines and objectives that have not been coordinated to promote potential efficiencies.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-71, Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance
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Report to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2008:
Plan Colombia:
Drug Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved;
U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance:
GAO-09-71:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-71, a report to the Honorable Joseph R. Biden,
Jr., Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
n September 1999, the government of Colombia announced a strategy,
known as ’Plan Colombia,“ to (1) reduce the production of illicit drugs
(primarily cocaine) by 50 percent in 6 years and (2) improve security
in Colombia by re-claiming control of areas held by illegal armed
groups. Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided over $6
billion to support Plan Colombia. The Departments of State, Defense,
and Justice and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
manage the assistance. GAO examined (1) the progress made toward Plan
Colombia‘s drug reduction and enhanced security objectives, (2) the
results of U.S. aid for the military and police, (3) the results of
U.S. aid for non-military programs, and (4) the status of efforts to
’nationalize“ or transfer operations and funding responsibilities for
U.S.-supported programs to Colombia.
What GAO Found:
Plan Colombia‘s goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and
distribution of illegal narcotics by 50 percent in 6 years was not
fully achieved. From 2000 to 2006, opium poppy cultivation and heroin
production declined about 50 percent, while coca cultivation and
cocaine production levels increased by about 15 and 4 percent,
respectively. These increases, in part, can be explained by measures
taken by coca farmers to counter U.S. and Colombian eradication
efforts. Colombia has improved its security climate through systematic
military and police engagements with illegal armed groups and by
degrading these groups‘ finances. U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials
cautioned that these security gains will not be irreversible until
illegal armed groups can no longer threaten the stability of the
government of Colombia, but become a law enforcement problem requiring
only police attention.
Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense provided nearly $4.9 billion
to the Colombian military and National Police. Notably, U.S.–funded
helicopters have provided the air mobility needed to rapidly move
Colombian counternarcotics and counterinsurgency forces. U.S. advisors,
training, equipment, and intelligence assistance have also helped
professionalize Colombia's military and police forces, which have
recorded a number of achievements including the aerial and manual
eradication of hundreds of thousands of hectares of coca, the seizure
of tons of cocaine, and the capture or killing of a number of illegal
armed group leaders and thousands of combatants. However, these efforts
face several challenges, including countermeasures taken by coca
farmers to combat U.S. and Colombian eradication efforts.
Since fiscal year 2000, State, Justice, and USAID have provided nearly
$1.3 billion for a wide range of social, economic, and justice sector
programs. These programs have had a range of accomplishments, including
aiding internally displaced persons and reforming Colombia‘s justice
sector. But some efforts have been slow in achieving their objectives
while others are difficult to assess. For example, the largest share of
U.S. non-military assistance has gone towards alternative development,
which has provided hundreds of thousands of Colombians legal economic
alternatives to the illicit drug trade. But, alternative development is
not provided in most areas where coca is cultivated and USAID does not
assess how such programs relate to its strategic goals of reducing the
production of illicit drugs or achieving sustainable results.
In response to congressional direction in 2005 and budget cuts in
fiscal year 2008, State and the other U.S. departments and agencies
have accelerated their nationalization efforts, with State focusing on
Colombian military and National Police aviation programs. One aviation
program has been nationalized and two are in transition, with the
largest”the Army Aviation Brigade”slated for turnover by 2012. Two
National Police aviation programs have no turnover dates established.
State, Defense, Justice, and USAID each have their own approaches to
nationalization, with different timelines and objectives that have not
been coordinated to promote potential efficiencies.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that State, in conjunction with the other departments,
USAID, and Colombia, develop an integrated nationalization plan that
defines U.S. and Colombian roles and responsibilities, future funding
requirements, and timelines. We also recommend that USAID develop
measures to better assess its alternative development program. In
commenting on the recommendations, State said it will continue to
improve coordination of nationalization efforts, and USAID/Colombia
noted that it is working to identify new indicators to better measure
progress.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-71]. For more
information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 512-4268 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Plan Colombia Did Not Fully Meet Its Drug Reduction Goals, but Major
Security Advances Have Been Achieved:
U.S. Assistance Promotes Colombian Military and Police Counternarcotics
and Security Objectives:
U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance Promotes Social and Economic Progress and
the Rule of Law, but Is Not Directly Linked to Reductions in Drug
Production:
U.S. Efforts to Transfer Program Operations and Funding
Responsibilities to Colombia Have Had Mixed Results:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: U.S. Support Provided to the Army Aviation Brigade and
Police Air Service:
Appendix III: Estimated Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production in
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, 2000-2007:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
GAO Comments:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State:
GAO Comment:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Office of National Drug Control Policy:
GAO Comments:
Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
GAO Comments:
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgment:
Related GAO Products:
Tables:
Table 1: U.S. Assistance under Plan Colombia and the PCCP by Program
Objective--Fiscal Year Appropriations 2000 through 2008:
Table 2: U.S. Assistance Provided to the Colombian Military and
National Police, Fiscal Year Appropriations 2000 through 2008:
Table 3: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance, Fiscal Year Appropriations 2000
through 2008:
Table 4: Aviation Program Nationalization Efforts Supported by State:
Table 5: U.S. Support Services Provided to the Army Aviation Brigade:
Table 6: U.S. Support Services Provided to National Police Air Service:
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of Colombia:
Figure 2: Program Assistance Objectives in Colombia, 2000-2013:
Figure 3: Colombia's Clear, Hold, and Consolidate Strategy:
Figure 4: Estimated Colombian Opium Poppy Cultivation and Heroin
Production, 2000-2007:
Figure 5: Estimated Coca Cultivation in Colombia, 2000-2007:
Figure 6: Estimated Production of Pure Cocaine in Colombia, 2000-2007:
Figure 7: Estimated Amount of Export Quality Cocaine Flowing Towards
the United States, 2000-2007:
Figure 8: Homicides in Colombia, 2000-2007:
Figure 9: Kidnappings in Colombia, 2000-2007:
Figure 10: Ridership on Colombian Roads, 2000-2006:
Figure 11: State and Defense Support to the Army Aviation Brigade:
Figure 12: Coca Growing Regions in 2004:
Figure 13: Coca Growing Regions in 2006:
Figure 14: Alternative Development Projects and Coca Cultivation in
Colombia:
Figure 15: Displaced Persons Receive Job Training:
Figure 16: Colombian Government Worker Processes Paramilitary Soldier:
Figure 17: Justice Training on Mass Grave Exhumation at Fiscalia
Headquarters:
Figure 18: State's Contractor Reduction Plan for the Army Aviation
Brigade, 2004-2010:
Figure 19: Coca Cultivation in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, 2000-2007:
Figure 20: Cocaine Production in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, 2000-
2007:
Abbreviations:
ABD: Air Bridge Denial:
ACI: Andean Counterdrug Initiative:
ADAM: Areas for Municipal Level Alternative Development:
ARAVI: Police Air Service:
AUC: United Self Defense Forces of Colombia:
CCAI: Coordination Center for Integrated Government Action:
CNC: Crime and Narcotics Center:
CSIS: Center for Strategic and International Studies:
ELN: National Liberation Army:
ESF: Economic Support Funds:
FARC: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia:
FMF: Foreign Military Financing:
FMS: Foreign Military Sales:
IACM: Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement:
IDP: internally displaced person:
IMET: International Military Education and Training:
INL: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs:
ISS: Infrastructure Security Strategy:
MIDAS: More Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development:
NAS: Narcotics Affairs Section:
ONDCP: Office of National Drug Control Policy:
PCCP: Plan Colombia Consolidation Phase:
PCHP: Plan Colombia Helicopter Program:
PRM: Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration:
UNODC: United Nations Office of Drug Control:
USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 6, 2008:
The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Chairman:
Committee on Foreign Relations:
United States Senate:
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The United States has been providing assistance to Colombia since the
early 1970s to help the Colombian military, the National Police and
other law enforcement agencies, and civilian agencies in their efforts
to reduce illicit drug production and trafficking activities. Despite
this assistance, in the late 1990s, Colombia was the world's leading
producer of cocaine and had become a major source of heroin used in the
United States. In October 1999, the Colombian government announced a 6-
year strategy, known as Plan Colombia, to (1) reduce the cultivation,
processing, and distribution of illicit narcotics in Colombia by 50
percent over a 6-year period,[Footnote 1] and (2) improve the security
climate in Colombia by reclaiming control of areas held by a number of
illegal armed groups, which in the last decade had financed their
activities largely through drug trade profits.[Footnote 2]
Plan Colombia's counternarcotics strategy centered on illicit crop
eradication and interdiction activities and alternative development
projects designed to offer farmers an alternative to growing coca and
opium poppy. Plan Colombia sought to reclaim control of territory
dominated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its
Spanish acronym, FARC) and other illegal armed groups through a variety
of means, including the growth and professionalism of the Colombian
military and National Police,[Footnote 3] systematic military
engagement with insurgent groups, and an expanded police presence
throughout the country. Plan Colombia also included a number of social,
economic, and judicial reform programs designed to broadly support its
drug reduction and security objectives. In January 2007, the Colombians
issued a 6-year (2007-2013) follow-on strategy, referred to as the Plan
Colombia Consolidation Phase (PCCP),[Footnote 4] which includes many of
the same strategies and programs initiated under Plan Colombia.
[Footnote 5]
Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided more than $6
billion[Footnote 6] in military and nonmilitary assistance to Colombia.
Under the general guidance and direction of the White House Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP),[Footnote 7] the Departments of
State (State) and Defense (Defense) have overseen assistance provided
to the Colombian military and National Police for Plan Colombia's
counternarcotics and improved security objectives. State has provided
most of this assistance, focusing on five major aviation
programs[Footnote 8] for the Colombian Army, Air Force, and National
Police. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the
Department of Justice (Justice), and State have overseen nonmilitary
assistance for programs that support alternative development, aid to
internally displaced persons and the demobilization of illegal armed
groups, and judicial reform efforts.
Beginning in 2005, Congress called on the Secretary of State to develop
a multiyear strategy to guide anticipated follow-on assistance to Plan
Colombia.[Footnote 9] Congress directed that this strategy include a
detailed explanation of how State (and the other U.S. departments and
agencies involved) planned to "nationalize" or transfer program
operations and funding responsibilities to the government of Colombia.
In response, State issued a report to Congress in March 2006 that noted
the need for continued and sustained support for military and
nonmilitary assistance programs in Colombia for the short-and mid-term,
followed by reductions as nationalization efforts take hold.[Footnote
10] State updated this strategy in two reports to Congress dated April
2007 and April 2008.[Footnote 11] The April 2007 report included a
proposed funding plan illustrating the administration's intent to
provide an additional $4 billion in assistance under PCCP. The plan
called for a gradual reduction in assistance to the Colombian military
and National Police, an initial increase in funding for nonmilitary
assistance programs, followed by relatively constant funding levels for
nonmilitary assistance through fiscal year 2013. According to State, in
fiscal year 2008, Congress accelerated these plans by reducing
appropriations for Colombian military and police programs (in
particular, aviation programs) by nearly $170 million, while increasing
appropriations for nonmilitary programs (in particular, alternative
development projects) by over $85 million with the expectation that
this funding shift will lead to major reductions in coca growth.
At your request, we examined U.S. assistance efforts since fiscal year
2000 when funding for Plan Colombia was first approved. Specifically,
we examined (1) the progress made toward Plan Colombia's drug reduction
and enhanced security objectives; (2) program support provided to the
Colombian military and National Police, including specific results and
related challenges; (3) nonmilitary program support provided to
Colombia, including specific results and related challenges; and (4)
the status of U.S. and Colombian efforts to nationalize U.S. assistance
and the challenges, if any, these efforts face.
To address these objectives, we reviewed planning, implementation, and
other documentation related to U.S. counternarcotics and
counterterrorism assistance to the government of Colombia since 2000,
including our prior reports on various Plan Colombia related programs.
(See Related GAO Products at the end of this report.) We met with
officials at Defense, Justice, State, ONDCP, and USAID in Washington,
D.C.; U.S. Southern Command headquarters, Miami, Florida; the Joint
Interagency Task Force-South, Key West, Florida; State's Office of
Aviation at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida; and the U.S. Embassy in
Bogotá, Colombia. In Colombia, we discussed U.S. assistance efforts
with U.S. embassy officials and cognizant Colombian military, police,
and civilian agency officials. We also met with U.S.-funded contractors
assisting with the U.S. programs for the Colombian Army and National
Police, and USAID implementing partners primarily involved in
alternative development programs. We visited several Colombian military
and police bases, including La Macarena, Larandia, Tolemaida, and
Tumaco, and numerous nonmilitary program sites, including alternative
development project sites, throughout Colombia. We also observed an
aerial eradication operation. (See app. I for a more complete
description of our scope and methodology.)
We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to October 2008, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
Plan Colombia's goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and
distribution of illegal narcotics by 50 percent in 6 years (through
2006) was not fully achieved, however, major security advances have
been made. From 2000 to 2006, opium poppy cultivation and heroin
production declined about 50 percent. Estimated coca cultivation was
about 15 percent greater in 2006 than in 2000 as coca farmers took
countermeasures such as moving to more remote portions of Colombia to
avoid U.S. and Colombian eradication efforts.[Footnote 12] Estimated
cocaine production was about 4 percent greater in 2006 than in 2000.
ONDCP officials noted that cocaine production rates did not keep pace
with rising levels of coca cultivation due to the impact of aerial and
manual eradication on coca field yield rates.[Footnote 13] According to
U.S. officials, Colombia improved its security climate through its
counternarcotics strategy, military and police actions, and other
efforts (such as its demobilization and deserter programs), which have
weakened the operational capabilities of FARC and other illegal armed
groups. As a result of these efforts, several indicators of security
have shown marked improvement since 2000. For example, between 2000 and
2007, the Colombian government reports that the number of murders and
kidnappings were reduced by at least one-third and oil pipeline attacks
were reduced to almost zero. Nonetheless, U.S. and Colombian officials
cautioned that the progress made is not irreversible. U.S. embassy
officials told us that security gains will become irreversible only
when FARC and other illegal armed groups can no longer directly
threaten the central government and, instead, become a local law
enforcement problem requiring only police attention.
U.S. assistance totaling nearly $4.9 billion since 2000 has provided
the Colombian military and National Police with a range of
capabilities, primarily air mobility, needed to pursue Plan Colombia's
counternarcotics and security objectives.
* U.S. support to the Colombian military included providing 72
helicopters and related support services to the Army's Aviation
Brigade; equipment and training for the Army's Counternarcotics Brigade
and other Army mobile units dedicated to counternarcotics and
counterinsurgency operations; aviation and ground support assistance to
help protect the Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline from insurgent
attacks; aviation assets and support for the Colombian Air Force's Air
Bridge Denial program; and support for Navy and Marine interdiction
programs designed to seize drugs as they transit Colombia's coastal
waters and rivers. Since 2000, U.S. assistance has increased the
Colombian military's overall operational capability, in particular, its
air mobility. These enhanced capabilities have contributed to a number
of achievements including the Colombian military's seizure of hundreds
of tons of illicit drugs, an estimated 50 percent reduction in FARC
combatants since the outset of Plan Colombia, and the extension of the
government's presence.
* U.S. assistance to the National Police included support for its
Aerial Eradication Program and Air Service, funding for a police
commando unit dedicated to counternarcotics and counterterrorism
objectives, seaport and airport interdiction programs, and the creation
of mobile rural police squadrons that have helped establish a police
presence in 169 municipalities, which lacked a presence in 2000. Since
2000, the National Police have utilized U.S. assistance to aerially or
manually eradicate over a million hectares of coca and opium poppy;
destroy several hundred cocaine hydrochloride laboratories;[Footnote
14] and seize thousands of metric tons of cocaine and heroin.
However, both the military and the National Police face a number of
challenges. For example, current coca cultivation levels have increased
since Plan Colombia's inception, in part, because countermeasures taken
by coca farmers, including replanting and moving to more remote parts
of the country, have mitigated extensive aerial and manual eradication
operations.
Since fiscal year 2000, U.S.-supported nonmilitary programs totaling
nearly $1.3 billion have had a range of accomplishments, but some of
these efforts have been slow in achieving their objectives while others
are difficult to assess. The largest share of U.S. nonmilitary
assistance has gone toward alternative development, which has benefited
hundreds of thousands of Colombians through the creation and expansion
of legal economic opportunities. However, alternative development
programs currently lack measures to gauge whether they contribute to
USAID's stated strategic goal of reducing the production of illicit
narcotics by creating sustainable projects that can function without
additional U.S. support after the start-up phase is implemented.
According to USAID, support to individuals displaced by violence in
Colombia has benefited millions of people; however, by some accounts,
many other displaced persons cannot access this assistance. According
to USAID and Colombian officials, U.S. support for the demobilization
and reintegration of former illegal armed combatants has likely
improved security, but the reintegration of the former combatants into
society and reparations to their victims has been slow. USAID democracy
and human rights programs have expanded access to the democratic
process for Colombian citizens, and are supporting a new Colombian
initiative to coordinate military and civilian strategies in some
areas. Finally, Justice and USAID assistance has helped improve the
rule of law in Colombia, though progress has been hampered by Colombian
judicial authorities' limited capacity to address the large number of
criminal cases in Colombia and the lack of transportation needed to
investigate crimes in remote and insecure locations.
In response to congressional direction in 2005 and budget cuts mandated
by Congress for fiscal year 2008, State and other agencies accelerated
their efforts to transfer program and funding responsibilities for U.S.
supported programs to Colombia beginning with the Colombian military
and National Police aviation programs, which form the core of State's
assistance. Undertaken as a series of separate initiatives, progress
has been mixed with one aviation program nationalized, two programs in
transition, and two programs with no definite transfer dates
established. In addition, State has taken action to nationalize a
portion of its non-aviation program support. Defense, Justice, and
USAID each have their own approach to nationalization and differing
time lines. The U.S. Military Group in Bogotá and State's Bureau for
Political and Military Affairs are developing a strategy for Congress
outlining their plans to reduce the level of Foreign Military Financing
and Defense counternarcotics funding provided to Colombia over the next
several years.[Footnote 15] Justice and USAID expect that it will take
years to create the conditions and partnerships needed to ensure the
long-term sustainability of programs and projects initiated with U.S.
funding, however, both agencies have begun the process of nationalizing
some of their project activities. Key nationalization challenges
include uncertain future U.S. funding levels and the Colombian
government's uncertain ability to rapidly assume program costs despite
improvements in its economy.
We recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the
Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Administrator of USAID,
and the government of Colombia, develop a joint plan for turning over
operational and funding responsibilities for U.S.-supported programs to
Colombia. This plan should include clearly defined U.S. roles and
responsibilities for all U.S. departments and agencies involved;
funding requirements, including a detailed assessment of Colombia's
fiscal situation, spending priorities, and ability to provide
additional funding; and milestones for completing the transition.
We also recommend that the Administrator of USAID develop performance
measures to help USAID (1) assess whether alternative development
assistance is reducing the production of illicit narcotics and (2)
determine to what extent the agency's alternative development projects
are self-sustaining.
In commenting on a draft of this report, State agreed that it should
continue to improve the coordination of nationalization efforts among
Defense, other executive branch agencies, and the government of
Colombia. However, State did not further address how it intends to
develop an integrated plan involving these agencies and the government
of Colombia. We continue to believe such an effort is needed to fully
integrate and coordinate U.S. goals, timetables, and funding needs in
Colombia. In its comments, USAID stated that the measures it has are
sufficient to gauge progress towards its strategic goals. However,
USAID went on to say that better measures and indicators to assess
alternative development projects could be developed, and that the
USAID/Colombia mission is working with the USAID missions in Bolivia
and Peru, which also manage alternative development programs, to
identify new indicators to help assess progress.
Background:
For decades, Colombia was one of Latin America's more stable
democracies and successful economies. However, by the late 1990s it had
entered a period of sustained crisis due to the emerging strength of
the FARC, the Army of National Liberation (ELN), and paramilitary
groups (primarily, the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia or AUC)
who were increasingly financing their activities through profits from
illicit narcotics.[Footnote 16] These groups were assuming increasing
control of the coca and opium poppy growing areas of the country
through wide scale violence and human rights abuses, which affected to
varying degrees each of Colombia's 32 departments (see fig. 1).
Colombia suffered a severe economic downturn in the late 1990s as its
armed forces and police were unable to respond to the growing strength
of these illegal armed groups, and levels of murder, kidnapping,
extortion, economic sabotage, and illicit drug trafficking spiraled
upward.[Footnote 17] According to State, in the 7 years prior to Plan
Colombia, coca cultivation had increased by over 300 percent and opium
poppy cultivation had increased by 75 percent.
Figure 1: Map of Colombia:
[See PDF for image]
Source: Map Resources.
[End of figure]
Despite U.S. and Colombian efforts to counter the drug-trafficking
activities of these illegal armed groups, State reports that Colombia
remains the source for about 90 percent of the cocaine entering the
United States, and the primary source of heroin east of the Mississippi
River. According to State officials, FARC and other illegal groups
remain active in areas where coca and opium poppy are grown and are
involved in every facet of the narcotics business from cultivation to
transporting drugs to points outside Colombia.
Plan Colombia Provided a Focus for Counternarcotics and
Counterterrorism Efforts:
Announced by Colombian President Andres Pastrana in 1999, Plan Colombia
was designed to counter the country's drug and security crisis through
a comprehensive 6-year, $7.5 billion plan linked to three objectives:
(1) reduce the flow of illicit narcotics and improve security, (2)
promote social and economic justice, and (3) promote the rule of law.
While the latter two objectives were not specifically designed to
reduce the flow of illicit narcotics and improve security, they broadly
facilitate these goals by addressing some of the underlying social and
economic realities that drive individuals toward the illicit drug trade
and by providing a legal framework for bringing drug traffickers and
terrorists to justice.
As shown in figure 2, State and Defense assistance for the Colombian
military and National Police has supported a counternarcotics strategy
focused on reducing illicit narcotics and improving security. Central
to this support have been State-led efforts to provide the Colombians
with air mobility, which supports the full range of military programs
and many nonmilitary programs by providing access and security in
remote areas. Nonmilitary assistance efforts are implemented by USAID,
Justice, and, State, which oversee a diverse range of social, economic,
and justice initiatives.
Figure 2: Program Assistance Objectives in Colombia, 2000-2013:
[See PDF for image]
The following information is illustrated in the figure:
State and Defense:
Reduce Illicit Narcotics and Improve Security:
* Support to the Colombian Military:
- Army Aviation;
- Army Ground Forces;
- Infrastructure Security;
- Air Interdiction;
- Coastal and River Interdiction;
* Support to the National Police:
- Eradication;
- Air Service;
- Interdiction;
- Police Presence in Conflict Zones.
USAID and State:
Promote Social and Economic Justice:
* Alternative Development;
* Internally Displaced Persons;
* Demobilization and Reintegration;
* Democracy and Human Rights;
* Civilian Government Capacity Building.
Justice:
Promote Rule of Law:
* Judicial Reform and Capacity Building.
Source: GAO, based on State, Defense, USAID, and Justice.
[End of figure]
In January 2007, the government of Colombia announced a 6-year follow-
on strategy, the PCCP. This new strategy includes the same three broad
objectives as Plan Colombia. The government of Colombia has pledged to
provide approximately $44 billion for PCCP. The strategy notes that a
certain level of support from the international community is still
essential. At the time, the United States developed a proposed funding
plan of approximately $4 billion in U.S. support for PCCP for fiscal
years 2007 through 2013.
Security Component of Plan Colombia Expanded:
The government of Colombia significantly expanded the security
component of Plan Colombia with its Democratic Security and Defense
Policy in June 2003, which outlined a "clear, hold, and consolidate"
strategy. The strategy's main objective was to assert state control
over the majority of Colombia's national territory, particularly in
areas affected by the activities of illegal armed groups and drug
traffickers. Colombian officials said this new strategy will take years
to fully implement. (See fig. 3.) Expanded authority approved by the
U.S. Congress at about the same time allowed agencies to support this
security strategy.
Figure 3: Colombia's Clear, Hold, and Consolidate Strategy:
[See PDF for image]
The following information is illustrated in the figure:
Clear: Areas with active presence of IAGs;
Objective: Disrupt and drive out IAG and assume territorial
control; Military Intensive Effort.
Hold: Controlled areas in process of institutional recovery;
Objective: Maintain order and security within the community.
Attract other institutions of the State; Police And Military
Intensive Effort.
Consolidate: Stabilized areas;
Objective: Consolidation of State authority and establishment
of all State institutions and public services; Social And Political
Intensive Effort.
Source: Colombian Ministry o5 Defense.
[End of figure]
The government of Colombia has taken a number of steps to implement
this strategy, including:
* Increasing the size of its military and police from 279,000 in 2000
to 415,000 in 2007.
* Conducting a series of offensive actions against FARC under a
military strategy called Plan Patriota, which began in June 2003 with
efforts to clear FARC from areas surrounding Colombia's capital,
Bogotá. In mid-2004, the military implemented a second, more ambitious
phase of Plan Patriota aimed at attacking key FARC fronts encompassing
the southern Colombian departments of Caquetá, Guaviare, and Meta.
Based in Larandia, Joint Task Force-Omega was established in 2004 to
coordinate the efforts of the Colombian Army, Air Force, and Marines in
this area.
* Creating the Coordination Center for Integrated Government Action
(CCAI) in 2004 to coordinate the delivery of military and civilian
assistance in 58 targeted municipalities emerging from conflict in 11
regions throughout Colombia.
An updated version of the Colombian defense strategy was released in
coordination with the PCCP strategy in January 2007. Incorporating
lessons learned from the 2003 strategy, this latest strategy focuses on
clearing one region at a time and places a greater emphasis on
consolidating military gains through coordinated civil-military
assistance designed to solidify the government's presence in previously
conflictive areas by providing a range of government services to local
populations.
To implement this strategy, the government of Colombia has taken
several actions, including focusing Joint Task Force-Omega's efforts in
La Macarena--a traditional FARC stronghold--through a new military
offensive called Plan Consolidacíon. The government also developed a
coordinated military and civilian plan of action called the
Consolidation Plan for La Macarena, which has been in place since
October 2007. As part of this plan, CCAI established a joint civil-
military fusion center to coordinate military, police, economic
development, and judicial activities. If successful, the approach in La
Macarena is intended to serve as a model for similar CCAI efforts in 10
other regions of the country. It represents a key test of the
government's enhanced state presence strategy and a potential indicator
of the long-term prospects for reducing Colombia's drug trade by
systematically re-establishing government control throughout the
country.
U.S. Funding for Plan Colombia:
Between fiscal years 2000 and 2008, the United States has provided over
$6 billion in military and nonmilitary assistance to Colombia. (See
table 1.)
Table 1: U.S. Assistance under Plan Colombia and the PCCP by Program
Objective--Fiscal Year Appropriations 2000 through 2008 (Dollars in
millions):
Program objective: Reduce Illicit Narcotics and Improve Security;
Fiscal year 2000: $817.8;
Fiscal year 2001: $232.8;
Fiscal year 2002: $395.9;
Fiscal year 2003: $607.9;
Fiscal year 2004: $617.7;
Fiscal year 2005: $585.6;
Fiscal year 2006: $587.3;
Fiscal year 2007: $591.1;
Fiscal year 2008: (Est.): $423.4;
Total: $4,859.5.
Program objective: Promote Social and Economic Justice;
Fiscal year 2000: $80.0;
Fiscal year 2001: $0.5;
Fiscal year 2002: $109.9;
Fiscal year 2003: $125.7;
Fiscal year 2004: $126.5;
Fiscal year 2005: $124.7;
Fiscal year 2006: $130.4;
Fiscal year 2007: $139.7;
Fiscal year 2008: (Est.): $194.4;
Total: $1,031.8.
Program objective: Promote Rule of Law;
Fiscal year 2000: $121.1;
Fiscal year 2001: $0.9;
Fiscal year 2002: $15.8;
Fiscal year 2003: $27.0;
Fiscal year 2004: 9.0;
Fiscal year 2005: $7.3;
Fiscal year 2006: $10.5;
Fiscal year 2007: $7.8;
Fiscal year 2008: (Est.): $39.4;
Total: $238.7.
Program objective: Total;
Fiscal year 2000: $1,018.9;
Fiscal year 2001: $234.2;
Fiscal year 2002: $521.6;
Fiscal year 2003: $760.6;
Fiscal year 2004: $753.2;
Fiscal year 2005: $717.6;
Fiscal year 2006: $728.2;
Fiscal year 2007: $738.6;
Fiscal year 2008: (Est.): $657.2;
Total: $6,130.0.
[End of table]
Sources: State and Defense.
Note: To obtain consistent and comparable funding data from each of the
departments and agencies involved, we use appropriated U.S. assistance
throughout this report. We refer to the funding as "provided," though
all of it may not have been obligated or expended. State appropriations
accounts include the Plan Colombia emergency supplemental; the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), which became the Andean Counterdrug
Program (ACP) in fiscal year 2008; International Narcotics Control and
Law Enforcement (INCLE); Foreign Military Financing (FMF);
International Military Education and Training (IMET); and Non-
proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR).
USAID and Justice received the bulk of their funding through the ACI
account until fiscal year 2008. Beginning in 2008, funding for Justice
and USAID rule of law programs was provided through INCLE, with other
USAID programs funded through the Economic Support Fund (ESF). Defense
receives the bulk of its funding through its own counternarcotics
budget for Colombia and state-controlled FMF and IMET funds.
[End of table]
Most State assistance for Colombia is overseen by its Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/ INL),
though the Bureau for Political and Military Affairs is responsible for
FMF and IMET funds. State/INL's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in the
U.S. Embassy Bogotá oversees daily program operations. State's Office
of Aviation supports the NAS with advisors and contract personnel who
are involved with the implementation of U.S. assistance provided to the
Colombian Army's Plan Colombia Helicopter Program (PCHP) and the
National Police's Aerial Eradication Program. The Military Group in the
U.S. Embassy Bogotá manages both Defense counternarcotics support and
State FMF and IMET funding. USAID and Justice have full-time staff
based in Bogotá to oversee and manage their nonmilitary assistance
programs. U.S. agencies are supported in their efforts by an extensive
U.S.-funded contract workforce, which provides a range of services from
aviation program support to alternative development project
implementation.[Footnote 18]
U.S. Nationalization Efforts:
From the outset of Plan Colombia, Congress has stated that U.S.
assistance efforts should be nationalized over time and has followed
through with a number of specific reporting requirements and budget
decisions to help ensure this objective is achieved. Beginning in 2004,
Congress signaled that U.S. program administrators should begin the
process of drawing down support for U.S. financed aviation programs in
Colombia, which it noted accounted for a significant portion of U.S.
assistance to Colombia.
In 2005, House appropriators requested that the administration develop
a multiyear strategy defining U.S. program and nationalization plans
going forward under the PCCP. The administration responded in March
2006 with a report to Congress that outlined program achievements under
Plan Colombia and a broad outline of planned nationalization efforts
beginning with U.S. financed aviation programs.[Footnote 19] Follow-on
reports issued in April 2007 and April 2008 further refined the
administration's plans by providing a proposed funding plan
illustrating how U.S. assistance efforts would be reduced from 2007
through 2013 as the Colombians assume greater responsibility for
programs funded and managed by the United States.[Footnote 20]
Plan Colombia Did Not Fully Meet Its Drug Reduction Goals, but Major
Security Advances Have Been Achieved:
Plan Colombia's goal of reducing the cultivation, processing, and
distribution of illegal narcotics by targeting coca cultivation was not
achieved. Although estimated opium poppy cultivation and heroin
production were reduced by about 50 percent, coca cultivation and
cocaine production increased, though data from 2007 indicate that
cocaine production slightly declined. Colombia's security climate has
improved as a result of progress in a number of areas, but U.S. and
Colombian officials cautioned that current programs must be maintained
for several years before security gains can be considered irreversible.
Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Fully Achieved:
From 2000 to 2006, estimated opium poppy cultivation and heroin
production declined about 50 percent, but coca cultivation and cocaine
production increased over the period. To put Colombia's 6-year drug
reduction goal in perspective, we note that although U.S. funding for
Plan Colombia was approved in July 2000, many U.S.-supported programs
to increase the Colombian military and police capacity to eradicate
drug crops and disrupt the production and distribution of heroin and
cocaine did not become operational until 2001 and later. Meanwhile,
estimated illicit drug cultivation and production in Colombia continued
to rise through 2001, with estimated cultivation and production
declining in 2002 through 2004. However, the declines for coca
cultivation and cocaine production were not sustained. In addition, the
estimated flow of cocaine towards the United States from South America
rose over the period.
Poppy Cultivation and Heroin Production Reduced by About 50 Percent
Since 2000:
As illustrated in figure 4, estimated opium poppy cultivation and
heroin production levels in 2006 were about half of what they had been
in 2000.
Figure 4: Estimated Colombian Opium Poppy Cultivation and Heroin
Production, 2000-2007[A]:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple vertical bar graph depicting the following
data:
Estimated Colombian Opium Poppy Cultivation and Heroin Production, 2000-
2007[A]:
Year: 2000;
Poppy cultivation (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 5;
Heroin production (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 8.7.
Year: 2001;
Poppy cultivation (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 6.5;
Heroin production (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 11.4.
Year: 2002;
Poppy cultivation (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 4.9;
Heroin production (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 8.5.
Year: 2003;
Poppy cultivation (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 4.4;
Heroin production (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 7.8.
Year: 2004;
Poppy cultivation (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 2.1;
Heroin production (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 3.8.
Year: 2005;
Poppy cultivation (thousands of hectares/metric tons): No data;
Heroin production (thousands of hectares/metric tons): No data.
Year: 2006;
Poppy cultivation (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 2;
Heroin production (thousands of hectares/metric tons): 4.6.
Year: 2007;
Poppy cultivation (thousands of hectares/metric tons): No data;
Heroin production (thousands of hectares/metric tons): No data.
[A] Estimates for 2005 and 2007 were not completed due to adverse
weather conditions.
Sources: 2008 International Narcotics Control and Strategy Report
(INCSR) and ONDCP.
[End of figure]
Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production Reduction Goals Were Not Met:
As illustrated in figure 5, coca cultivation was about 15 percent
greater in 2006 than in 2000, with an estimated 157,000 hectares
cultivated in 2006 compared to 136,200 hectares in 2000. State
officials noted that extensive aerial and manual eradication efforts
during this period were not sufficient to overcome countermeasures
taken by coca farmers as discussed later in this report. U.S. officials
also noted the increase in estimated coca cultivation levels from 2005
through 2007, may have been due, at least in part, to the Crime and
Narcotics Centers' decision to increase the size of the coca
cultivation survey areas in Colombia beginning in 2004 and subsequent
years.
Figure 5: Estimated Coca Cultivation in Colombia, 2000-2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Estimated Coca Cultivation in Colombia, 2000-2007:
Year: 2000;
Thousands of hectares: 136.
Year: 2001;
Thousands of hectares: 170.
Year: 2002;
Thousands of hectares: 144.
Year: 2003;
Thousands of hectares: 114.
Year: 2004;
Thousands of hectares: 114.
Year: 2005;
Thousands of hectares: 144.
Year: 2006;
Thousands of hectares: 157.
Year: 2007;
Thousands of hectares: 167.
Sources: 2006 and 2007 (interim) Interagency Assessment of Cocaine
Movement (IACM) and ONDCP.
Note: Coca cultivation estimates are produced by the Central
Intelligence Agency's Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC). CNC
significantly expanded the number of hectares surveyed for coca growth
beginning in 2005 in an effort to improve the accuracy and
comprehensiveness of the estimate. Between 2004 and 2006, CNC's survey
area rose from 10.9 million hectares to 23.6 million hectares. The
United Nations produces its own annual estimates of coca cultivation in
Colombia. U.S. and U.N. estimates of coca cultivation vary widely due
to technical and methodological differences.
[End of figure]
As illustrated in figure 6, estimated cocaine production was about 4
percent greater in 2006 than in 2000, with 550 metric tons produced in
2006 compared to 530 metric tons in 2000. However, in September 2008,
ONDCP officials noted that cocaine production did not keep pace with
rising coca cultivation levels because eradication efforts had degraded
coca fields so less cocaine was being produced per hectare of
cultivated coca. ONDCP also announced that estimated cocaine production
rates in Colombia for 2003 through 2007 had been revised downward based
on the results of recent research showing diminished coca field yield
rates. On the basis of these revised estimates, ONDCP estimated cocaine
production decreased by almost 25 percent from a high of 700 metric
tons in 2001 to 535 metric tons in 2007.
Figure 6: Estimated Production of Pure Cocaine in Colombia, 2000-
2007[A,B]:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Estimated Production of Pure Cocaine in Colombia, 2000-2007[A,B]:
Year: 2000;
Production in metric tons: 530.
Year: 2001;
Production in metric tons: 700.
Year: 2002;
Production in metric tons: 585.
Year: 2003;
Production in metric tons: 445.
Year: 2004;
Production in metric tons: 415.
Year: 2005;
Production in metric tons: 525.
Year: 2006;
Production in metric tons: 550.
Year: 2007;
Production in metric tons: 535.
Sources: 2006 and 2007 (interim) IACM and ONDCP.
[A] According to ONDCP officials, cocaine production estimates are
given in "100 percent pure" metric tons to facilitate year-to-year
comparisons.
[B] Production estimates for 2003 to 2007 were recently revised
downward based on analysis of coca leaf yield rates.
[End of figure]
As illustrated in figure 7, in 2000, the interagency counternarcotics
community estimated that 460 metric tons of cocaine was flowing towards
the United States from South America.[Footnote 21] In 2004, the
interagency began reporting low and high ranges of estimated flow.
Using the midpoints of these ranges, the estimated flow of cocaine to
the United States in 2004 was about 500 metric tons; in 2005 it rose to
over 625 metric tons; in 2006 and 2007, it was about 620 metric tons.
[Footnote 22]
Figure 7: Estimated Amount of Export Quality Cocaine Flowing Towards
the United States, 2000-2007[A]:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple vertical bar graph depicting the following
data:
Estimated Amount of Export Quality Cocaine Flowing Towards the United
States, 2000-2007[A]:
Year: 2000;
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), Single point IACM estimate: 461.
Year: 2001;
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), Single point IACM estimate: 521.
Year: 2002;
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), Single point IACM estimate: 532.
Year: 2003;
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), Single point IACM estimate: 422.
Year: 2004;
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), IACM low estimate: 325;
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), IACM high estimate: 675.
Year: 2005;
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), IACM low estimate: 518;
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), IACM high estimate: 733.
Year: 2006;
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), IACM low estimate: 530;
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), IACM high estimate: 710.
Year: 2007;
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), IACM low estimate: 545;
Cocaine flow (in metric tons), IACM high estimate: 700.
[A] Flow estimates use export quality cocaine (that is, less than 100
percent pure) to reflect the fact that shipped cocaine is almost always
diluted. Export quality purity levels can vary from year to year,
depending on a number of variables.
[B] Because of methodological concerns, beginning in 2004, the
Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement, which represents the
principal source of information about cocaine flow in the transit zone,
began providing its cocaine flow estimates in the form of a range.
[End of figure]
Reductions in Colombia's estimated cocaine production have been largely
offset by increases in cocaine production in Peru and to a lesser
extent Bolivia. Although U.S. government estimates suggest that South
American cocaine production levels have fluctuated since 2000,
production in 2007 was 12 percent higher than in 2000. See appendix III
for more detail about the interagency counternarcotics community's
estimates of coca cultivation and cocaine production in Colombia,
Bolivia, and Peru.
Plan Colombia Achieved Important Security Advances:
Since 2000, U.S. assistance has enabled the Colombians to achieve
significant security advances in two key areas. First, the government
has expanded its presence throughout the country, particularly in many
areas formerly dominated by illegal armed groups. Second, the
government, through its counternarcotics strategy, military and police
actions, and other efforts (such as its demobilization and deserter
programs) has degraded the finances of illegal armed groups and
weakened their operational capabilities. These advances have
contributed to an improved security environment as shown by key
indicators (see figs. 8 through 10) reported by the government of
Colombia.
Figure 8: Homicides in Colombia, 2000-2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Year: 2000;
Number of homicides: 26,540.
Year: 2001;
Number of homicides: 27,840.
Year: 2002;
Number of homicides: 28,837.
Year: 2003;
Number of homicides: 23,523.
Year: 2004;
Number of homicides: 20,208.
Year: 2005;
Number of homicides: 18,111.
Year: 2006;
Number of homicides: 17,479.
Year: 2007;
Number of homicides: 17,198.
Source: Colombian Ministry of Defense.
[End of figure]
Figure 9: Kidnappings in Colombia, 2000-2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Year: 2000;
Number of kidnappings: 2,889.
Year: 2001;
Number of kidnappings: 1,210.
Year: 2002;
Number of kidnappings: 1,709.
Year: 2003;
Number of kidnappings: 1,257.
Year: 2004;
Number of kidnappings: 758.
Year: 2005;
Number of kidnappings: 377.
Year: 2006;
Number of kidnappings: 292.
Year: 2007;
Number of kidnappings: 226.
Source: Colombian Ministry of Defense.
[End of figure]
Figure 10: Ridership on Colombian Roads, 2000-2006:
This figure is a vertical bar graph depicting the following data:
Year: 2000;
Millions of riders: 2,889.
Year: 2001;
Millions of riders: 1,210.
Year: 2002;
Millions of riders: 1,709.
Year: 2003;
Millions of riders: 1,257.
Year: 2004;
Millions of riders: 758.
Year: 2005;
Millions of riders: 377.
Year: 2006;
Millions of riders: 292.
Year: 2007;
Millions of riders: 226.
Source: Colombian Ministry of Transportation.
[End of figure]
Colombian Government Controls More of the Country:
One central tenet of Plan Colombia and follow-on security plans is that
Colombian government must reassert and consolidate its control in
contested areas dominated or partially controlled by illegal armed
groups. According to an analysis provided by the Colombian Ministry of
Defense in February 2008, the government was in full or partial control
of about 90 percent of the country in 2007 compared with about 70
percent in 2003.[Footnote 23] U.S. officials we spoke to generally
agreed that the government of Colombia had made major progress
reasserting its control over large parts of the country and that
Colombia's estimates of enhanced state presence were reasonably
accurate.
Illegal Armed Group Finances and Operating Capabilities Have Been
Degraded:
U.S. and Colombian officials and some observers agree that Plan
Colombia's counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts have degraded
the finances and operating capacity of illegal armed groups, including
FARC, paramilitaries, ELN, and other drug-trafficking organizations.
However, these officials also cautioned that FARC, while severely
weakened, remains a threat to Colombia's national security.
FARC's Capabilities and Finances Have Been Significantly Reduced, but
It Remains a National Security Threat:
According to U.S. and Colombian officials and some reports, FARC's
capabilities and finances have been substantially diminished as a
result of U.S. and Colombian counternarcotics efforts and continued
pressure from the Colombian military. According to the Drug Enforcement
Administration, since 2000, FARC has been Colombia's principal drug-
trafficking organization, accounting for approximately 60 percent of
the cocaine exported from Colombia to the United States.[Footnote 24]
According to ONDCP, FARC membership has declined from an estimated high
of 17,000 in 2001 to an estimated force of 8,000 or less today. In June
2007, ONDCP reported that Colombia's antidrug efforts reduced FARC's
overall profits per kilogram of cocaine from a range of $320 to $460 in
2003 to between $195 and $320 in 2005.
According to State and embassy officials, and nongovernmental
observers, the number of FARC combatants and its capabilities have been
dramatically reduced by continuous assaults on its top leadership,
[Footnote 25] the capture or killing of FARC members in conflictive
zones, and a large number of desertions. In 2007, the Colombian
Ministry of Defense reported that it had captured or killed
approximately 4,600 FARC combatants and about 2,500 had demobilized.
According to the Colombian Ministry of Defense, as of July 2008, over
1,700 FARC have demobilized this year--over two-thirds of the total for
all of 2007. U.S. Military Group officials told us FARC now avoids
direct combat with Colombian security forces and is limited to hit and
run terrorist attacks.
Nonetheless, Defense and Colombian officials caution that FARC remains
a national security threat, exercising control over important parts of
the country, such as Meta, which serves as a key transport corridor
linking many of the coca cultivation areas in the eastern part of the
country with the Pacific ports used to transport cocaine out of the
country. According to U.S. military group officials, the government of
Colombia's goal is to reduce FARC's members, finances, and operating
capabilities so it no longer poses a national security threat. To
achieve this goal, Colombian President Uribe has accelerated the pace
of all activities to help ensure this happens by 2010 when his current
term ends. However, according to U.S. Military Group officials, FARC
will not reach the point where it can no longer pose a significant
threat to Colombia's government until the number of combatants is
reduced to less than 4,000. In February 2008, U.S. Military Group
officials told us that they estimated that this point could be reached
in 18 months, but not without continued U.S. support.
AUC Has Demobilized, but Remnants Remain a Threat:
Beginning in late 2003, AUC entered into a peace accord with the
government of Colombia to demobilize and lay down its arms. From 2003
to 2006, AUC paramilitary members reported to demobilization centers
around the country. According to USAID officials, approximately 32,000
paramilitary soldiers and support staff entered the demobilization
process.
However, according to Defense officials, former midlevel officers of
AUC have taken advantage of the vacuum created by the demobilization of
AUC to form or join regional criminal bands engaged in drug
trafficking, which threaten to destabilize the political system and
civilian security. According to a May 2007 report by the International
Crisis Group,[Footnote 26] estimates of the total number of individuals
involved in these criminal bands range from 3,000 to 9,000, with many
of the members former AUC. These include the "Aguilas Negras," (Black
Eagles), which operates in northeastern Colombia along the border with
Venezuela, and the "Nueva Generacíon Organizacíon" (New Generation
Organization), which operates in the department of Nariño. According to
Defense officials, while homicides and kidnappings throughout Colombia
have decreased, fighting among illegal armed groups has resulted in an
increase in violence and internal displacement in certain regions of
the country, such as the southern Colombian department of Nariño.
ELN Has Been Weakened and Drug-Trafficking Organizations Have Been
Fragmented:
According to U.S. embassy and Colombian military officials, a number of
factors, including Colombian counternarcotics efforts, military
pressure, and competition with FARC, have combined to weaken ELN.
According to U.S. military group officials, in 2000, ELN was estimated
to number approximately 5,000 combatants; it is currently estimated to
number between 2,200 and 3,000.
According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, in addition to the
insurgent and paramilitary groups that engage in drug trafficking,
other major drug trafficking groups operate in Colombia. These include
the North Valle de Cauca group based in the southwestern Colombian
department of Valle de Cauca and the North Coast group based in the
Caribbean cities of Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Santa Marta. According
to Drug Enforcement Administration officials and reports, Colombian law
enforcement successes, including the arrest and extradition of major
traffickers, have helped fragment these groups, forcing them to become
"niche" organizations, specializing in limited aspects of the drug
trade in order to avoid being identified, arrested, and prosecuted.
Nevertheless, according to a 2006 Drug Enforcement Administration
report, these organizations are increasingly self-sufficient in cocaine
base production, have a firm grip on Caribbean and Pacific smuggling
routes, and dominate the wholesale cocaine markets in the eastern
United States and Europe.
U.S. Assistance Promotes Colombian Military and Police Counternarcotics
and Security Objectives:
State and Defense provided nearly $4.9 billion from fiscal years 2000
to 2008 to the Colombian military and police to support Plan Colombia's
counternarcotics and security objectives (see table 2). U.S. assistance
to the Colombian military has focused on developing the capabilities of
the Colombian Army's Aviation Brigade and the creation of an Army
Counternarcotics Brigade and mobile units that focus on
counternarcotics, infrastructure protection, and counterinsurgency
missions. State and Defense also provided extensive support for the Air
Force's Air Bridge Denial Program; and Navy and Marine interdiction
efforts.[Footnote 27] U.S. support for the National Police has focused
on its Aerial Eradication Program and Air Service. Other U.S.
assistance supported the creation of mobile squadrons of rural police
(referred to as "Carabineros"), which have helped establish (1) a
police presence in 169 Colombian municipalities that had no police
presence in 2002, and (2) specialized interdiction programs that attack
cocaine labs and narcotrafficking in the ports.
Table 2: U.S. Assistance Provided to the Colombian Military and
National Police, Fiscal Year Appropriations 2000 through 2008 (Dollars
in millions):
Service: Colombian Military;
Fiscal year 2000: $683.5;
Fiscal year 2001: $192.8;
Fiscal year 2002: $257.1;
Fiscal year 2003: $443.4;
Fiscal year 2004: $445.5;
Fiscal year 2005: $394.7;
Fiscal year 2006: $382.8;
Fiscal year 2007: $373.5;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $268.4;
Total[E]: $3,441.7.
Service: Colombian Military: Army Aviation;
Fiscal year 2000: [A];
Fiscal year 2001: [A];
Fiscal year 2002: $78.0;
Fiscal year 2003: $140.8;
Fiscal year 2004: $155.2;
Fiscal year 2005: $127.5;
Fiscal year 2006: $143.2;
Fiscal year 2007: $129.6;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $69.7;
Total[E]: $844.1.
Service: Colombian Military: Army Ground Forces;
Fiscal year 2000: [A];
Fiscal year 2001: [A];
Fiscal year 2002: $9.7;
Fiscal year 2003: $6.3;
Fiscal year 2004: $18.1;
Fiscal year 2005: $13.4;
Fiscal year 2006: $22.2;
Fiscal year 2007: $17.7;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $16.4;
Total[E]: $103.7.
Service: Colombian Military: Infrastructure Security;
Fiscal year 2000: [A];
Fiscal year 2001: [A];
Fiscal year 2002: $6.0;
Fiscal year 2003: $93.0;
Fiscal year 2004: $4.0;
Fiscal year 2005: $4.0;
Fiscal year 2006: $4.0;
Fiscal year 2007: $4.0;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $0.0;
Total[E]: $115.0.
Service: Colombian Military: Air Interdiction[B];
Fiscal year 2000: No Program;
Fiscal year 2001: No Program;
Fiscal year 2002: $14.0;
Fiscal year 2003: $8.0;
Fiscal year 2004: $7.1;
Fiscal year 2005: $0.0;
Fiscal year 2006: $4.6;
Fiscal year 2007: $18.8;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $10.0;
Total[E]: $62.5.
Service: Colombian Military: Coastal and River Interdiction;
Fiscal year 2000: [A];
Fiscal year 2001: [A];
Fiscal year 2002: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2003: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2004: $26.2;
Fiscal year 2005: $11.8;
Fiscal year 2006: $19.1;
Fiscal year 2007: $19.2;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $13.0;
Total[E]: $89.3.
Service: Colombian Military: Other[C];
Fiscal year 2000: $134.9;
Fiscal year 2001: $190.9;
Fiscal year 2002: $149.4;
Fiscal year 2003: $195.4;
Fiscal year 2004: $234.8;
Fiscal year 2005: $238.1;
Fiscal year 2006: $189.7;
Fiscal year 2007: $184.4;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $159.2;
Total[E]: $1,676.8.
Service: Colombian Military: Not allocated[A];
Fiscal year 2000: $548.6;
Fiscal year 2001: $1.9;
Fiscal year 2002: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2003: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2004: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2005: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2006: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2007: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): 0.0;
Total[E]: $550.5.
Service: Colombian National Police;
Fiscal year 2000: $134.3;
Fiscal year 2001: $40.0;
Fiscal year 2002: $138.8;
Fiscal year 2003: $164.5;
Fiscal year 2004: $172.2;
Fiscal year 2005: $190.9;
Fiscal year 2006: $204.5;
Fiscal year 2007: $217.6;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $155.0;
Total[E]: $1,417.8.
Service: Colombian National Police: Eradication;
Fiscal year 2000: [A];
Fiscal year 2001: [A];
Fiscal year 2002: $37.4;
Fiscal year 2003: $63.7;
Fiscal year 2004: $44.2;
Fiscal year 2005: $82.5;
Fiscal year 2006: $81.7;
Fiscal year 2007: $82.0;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $66.5;
Total[E]: $457.9.
Service: Colombian National Police: Air Service;
Fiscal year 2000: [A];
Fiscal year 2001: [A];
Fiscal year 2002: $67.5;
Fiscal year 2003: $62.3;
Fiscal year 2004: $71.2;
Fiscal year 2005: $70.0;
Fiscal year 2006: $70.5;
Fiscal year 2007: $69.0;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $52.5;
Total[E]: $463.0.
Service: Colombian National Police: Interdiction;
Fiscal year 2000: [A];
Fiscal year 2001: [A];
Fiscal year 2002: $24.3;
Fiscal year 2003: $21.0;
Fiscal year 2004: $41.0;
Fiscal year 2005: $16.9;
Fiscal year 2006: $16.5;
Fiscal year 2007: $16.5;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $16.5;
Total[E]: $152.7.
Service: Colombian National Police: Police Presence in Conflict Zones;
Fiscal year 2000: No program;
Fiscal year 2001: No program;
Fiscal year 2002: $4.8;
Fiscal year 2003: $15.5;
Fiscal year 2004: $13.8;
Fiscal year 2005: $20.1;
Fiscal year 2006: $19.4;
Fiscal year 2007: $18.7;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $0.0;
Total[E]: $92.1.
Service: Colombian National Police: Other[D];
Fiscal year 2000: $18.7;
Fiscal year 2001: $0.0;
Fiscal year 2002: $4.9;
Fiscal year 2003: $2.0;
Fiscal year 2004: $2.0;
Fiscal year 2005: $1.4;
Fiscal year 2006: $16.4;
Fiscal year 2007: $31.5;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $19.5;
Total[E]: $96.4.
Service: Colombian National Police: Not allocated[A];
Fiscal year 2000: $115.6;
Fiscal year 2001: $40.0;
Fiscal year 2002: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2003: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2004: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2005: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2006: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2007: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): 0.0;
Total[E]: $155.6.
Service: Total;
Fiscal year 2000: $817.8;
Fiscal year 2001: $232.8;
Fiscal year 2002: $395.9;
Fiscal year 2003: $607.9;
Fiscal year 2004: $617.7;
Fiscal year 2005: $585.6;
Fiscal year 2006: $587.3;
Fiscal year 2007: $591.1;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $423.4;
Total[E]: $4,859.5.
Sources: State and Defense.
Note: To obtain consistent and comparable funding data from each of the
departments and agencies involved, we use appropriated U.S. assistance
throughout this report. We refer to funding as "provided," though all
of it may not have been obligated or expended. Funding sources include
State funded ACI, INCLE, FMF, IMET, NADR, and Defense counternarcotics
funding. State officials noted funding data represents allocated
amounts, which do not reflect any subsequent budget reprogramming that
might have occurred or restrictions placed on funds by Congress due to
certification requirements relating to human rights or environmental
concerns over the aerial spray program.
[A] State could not allocate appropriations by program category in
fiscal years 2000 and 2001.
[B] This category addresses State's Air Bridge Denial program.
[C] Includes Defense counternarcotics funding (which averaged $147
million between fiscal years 2000-2008), which it could not allocate by
program category; a portion of State's Critical Flight Safety Program;
and Defense supplied aviation support for battlefield medical
evacuations.
[D] Includes other major expenses such as a portion of State's Critical
Flight Safety Program.
[E] Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
[End of table]
This support has led to a range of accomplishments since 2000 including
increasing the cost of doing business for both coca farmers and drug
traffickers by eradicating illicit drug crops and seizing finished
product; destroying hydrochloride laboratories; demobilizing,
capturing, and killing thousands of combatants; and the capture or
killing of several high-profile leaders of FARC and other illegal armed
groups. Program officials noted, however, that a number of challenges
have diminished the effect U.S. assistance has had on reducing the flow
of cocaine to the United States, including the countermeasures taken by
coca farmers to mitigate the effect of U.S. and Colombian eradication
programs.
Army Aviation Brigade:
Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense have provided over $844
million to help expand and maintain an Army Aviation Brigade that has
seen almost a threefold increase in the number of aircraft it manages
and a near doubling in its total personnel since 2000. Increased air
mobility has been described by the Colombian Ministry of Defense as a
key outcome of U.S. support for Plan Colombia. Air mobility is needed
to conduct spray operations and move Army Counternarcotics Brigade
personnel to eradication sites to provide needed security. Air mobility
is also needed to transport different Colombian army units waging
security operations against FARC and other illegal armed groups where
rapid deployment is essential for delivering combat troops to the point
of attack.
The brigade consists of three fleets of helicopters. The first,
referred to as the Plan Colombia Helicopter Program or PCHP, consists
of 52 U.S. aircraft--17 UH-1Ns, 22 UH-IIs, and 13 UH-60L Blackhawks--
that State provided to the Colombians under a no-cost lease.[Footnote
28] The second fleet, commonly referred to as the FMS fleet, consists
of 20 UH-60Ls, which Colombia acquired through the Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) program. The third fleet consists primarily of Russian and
U.S. aircraft leased by the Army Aviation Brigade, along with aircraft
that have been nationalized.[Footnote 29]
State, with assistance from Defense, has provided the PCHP fleet with
the essential support components needed to manage a modern combat
aviation service, including infrastructure and maintenance support;
contract pilots and mechanics; assistance to train pilots and
mechanics; flight planning, safety, and quality standards and
procedures; and a logistics system. Defense provides a Technical
Assistance Field Team to support the brigade's FMS fleet. The team is
contracted to provide oversight of FMS fleet maintenance activities and
to help train brigade mechanics working on these helicopters. Defense
also is providing the Ministry of Defense with a logistics system and a
limited aviation depot to enable the Colombians to perform certain
depot-level repairs on their helicopters. Appendix II describes these
support services in more detail. Figure 11 illustrates some examples.
Figure 11: State and Defense Support to the Army Aviation Brigade:
[See PDF for image]
This figure contains the following four photographs:
* State-funded Hangar at Tolemaida;
* Defense-funded flight simulator at Melgar Facility;
* PCHP helicopter repair at Tolemaida (source: GAO);
* Defense-funded engine test bed for Limited Aviation Depot.
[End of figure]
According to U.S. and Colombian officials, a key challenge facing the
brigade is to train and retain enough pilots and mechanics to manage
the brigade without continued U.S. support--a challenge we have noted
previously. In June 2003, we reported that the Colombian Army could not
maintain the PCHP helicopters because it did not have sufficient
numbers of qualified pilots and mechanics.[Footnote 30] At that time,
U.S. officials expected they would have enough trained entry level
pilots by December 2004. They also told us that 54 maintenance
personnel required basic training, but noted that it would be 3 to 5
years before these mechanics would be qualified to repair helicopters.
We found that the Army Aviation Brigade is still understaffed.
According to State, as of June 2008, a total of 43 contract pilots and
87 contract mechanics were needed to operate the PCHP program.[Footnote
31] U.S. officials expect that almost all of these contract personnel
will be replaced with Colombian Army personnel by 2012, at which time
U.S. program officials said all program support to the Army Aviation
Brigade would consist of technical support. According to the Commander
of the Army Aviation Brigade, however, the Colombians are buying 15
additional UH-60 Blackhawks through the FMS system for delivery
starting in October 2008 and, in July 2008, the United States loaned 18
UH-1Ns from PCHP's inventory to Colombia.[Footnote 32] These additional
helicopters will strain U.S. efforts to help the Colombians ensure they
have enough trained pilots and mechanics to meet their needs. Military
Group and NAS officials told us that current U.S. funding and training
plans can accommodate Colombia's planned FMS purchase and the 18 loaned
UH-1Ns.[Footnote 33] These officials cautioned, however, that any
additional Colombian aircraft purchases will have a significant impact
on future funding and training requirements.
While the Colombian Army has not had difficulty retaining pilots, the
lack of a dedicated career path that provides an incentive for pilots
to remain with the brigade could adversely affect retention. According
to a U.S. Embassy Bogotá report, the lack of a warrant officer program
means that, to earn promotion, Army Aviation Brigade officers must
command ground troops, taking them away from being helicopter pilots.
This lack of a dedicated career path may be a problem as more junior
staff progress in their careers. According to the Commander of the Army
Aviation Brigade, the Colombian Army has approved plans to establish a
career path for military and police aviators by creating a warrant
officer program. However, the Ministry of Defense and the Colombian
legislature must approve this before the program can begin.
Army Ground Forces:
Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense have provided over $104
million to advise, train, and equip Colombian ground forces, which grew
by almost 50 percent during this period. This assistance supported the
creation of an Army Counternarcotics Brigade, Army mobile units, and a
Joint Special Operations Command. Each pursues various counternarcotics
and counterinsurgency missions under a national joint command
structure.
Counternarcotics Brigade:
The Army's Counternarcotics Brigade was originally established in 1999
to plan and conduct interdiction operations against drug traffickers in
southern Colombia.[Footnote 34] U.S. and Colombian officials credit the
brigade with providing the security needed to conduct aerial and manual
eradication operations, along with drug and precursor seizures and the
destruction of base and hydrochloride laboratories.
The brigade's initial focus was on the departments of Putumayo and
Caquetá where, at the time, much of Colombia's coca cultivation was
located. Subsequently, the brigade was designated a national asset
capable of operating anywhere in Colombia. The brigade's mission was
also extended to include counterinsurgency operations in line with
expanded program authority passed by Congress in 2002 that allowed U.S.
assistance to be used for both counternarcotics and counterterrorism
purposes. Defense provided the brigade with training, equipment, and
infrastructure support including the construction of facilities at Tres
Esquinas and Larandia, while State assistance provided the brigade with
weapons, ammunition, and training. The brigade carries out ground
interdiction operations and provides ground security for the National
Police's aerial and manual eradication efforts. The brigade is
supported by the Army Aviation Brigade, which provides air mobility.
According to State and U.S. military group officials, the brigade now
provides its own training and most of its equipment. Beginning in
fiscal year 2004, State reduced the amount of funding for the brigade
from approximately $5 million to $2.2 million in fiscal year 2007. It
is scheduled to remain at this level in fiscal year 2008.
Mobile Army Brigades and Special Forces Units:
Defense provided support has helped equip mobile Army brigades and
joint special forces units which, according to Defense officials, seek
to establish "irreversible" security gains against FARC and other
illegal armed groups.[Footnote 35] In particular, this assistance (1)
enabled the Army to form mobile brigades for counterinsurgency efforts,
such as Joint Task Force-Omega[Footnote 36] in central Colombia, and
(2) facilitated the establishment of a Joint Special Forces Command
made up of a commando unit, an urban hostage rescue unit, and a
Colombian Marine special forces unit.
According to Defense officials, U.S. assistance to the mobile brigades
consisted primarily of intelligence and logistics support,[Footnote 37]
training, weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and infrastructure support
including a fortified base in La Macarena, which is the home base for
Joint Task Force-Omega's mobile units.[Footnote 38] This assistance has
helped the Colombian Army conduct mobile operations throughout
Colombia, a capacity that Defense officials said generally did not
exist at the outset of Plan Colombia. According to a senior U.S.
Military Group official, the mobile brigades' effectiveness can be seen
in the number of combatants from illegal armed groups captured and
killed or who have surrendered. For example, Joint Task Force-Omega
documentation provided by the Colombians show that, as of February
2008, the task force had captured over 1,000 combatants, killed almost
100, and persuaded about 400 to surrender. The United States continues
to provide support for the Army's mobile brigades, but U.S. officials
expect this support to be reduced as the brigades become increasingly
self-sufficient.
U.S. support has helped the Colombian military establish a Joint
Special Forces Command that also operates under the direction of the
General Command of the Armed Forces. The support consisted of training,
weapons, ammunition, and infrastructure support, including for the
command's principal compound near Bogotá. According to Defense
officials, the command includes approximately 2,000 soldiers from five
units made up of Colombian Army, Air Force, and Marine components. It
is tasked with pursuing high-value targets and rescuing hostages in
urban and rural environments. U.S. officials described this command as
similar to the U.S. Special Operations Command and said that, prior to
2004, the Colombian military did not have the capability to conduct
joint special forces operations. According to U.S. officials, the
command has been involved in a number of high-profile operations,
including the recent rescue of 15 hostages that included three U.S.
citizens.
Infrastructure Security Strategy:
In fiscal years 2000-2008, Congress provided over $115 million to help
Colombia implement phase one of its infrastructure security strategy,
designed to protect the first 110 miles of the nearly 500 mile-long
Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline from terrorist attacks[Footnote 39]. In
prior years, insurgent attacks on the pipeline resulted in major
economic losses for both the Colombian government and oil companies
operating in the country. For instance, in 2001, the pipeline was
attacked 170 times and forced to shut down for over 200 days, resulting
in approximately $500 million in lost revenues, as well as considerable
environmental damage. According to State, there was only one attack
made on the entire length of the pipeline in 2007.
U.S. support provided for both an aviation component and a ground
combat support element and included two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters,
eight UH-II helicopters,[Footnote 40] and related logistics support and
ground facilities. Nearly $30 million was used for U.S. Special Forces
training and equipment provided to about 1,600 Colombian Army soldiers
assigned to protect this portion of the pipeline.[Footnote 41]
In December 2007, the United States transferred operating and funding
responsibility for the infrastructure security strategy to Colombia--
including nine helicopters.
Air Interdiction:
Beginning in fiscal year 2003, State has provided over $62 million in
assistance[Footnote 42] to enable the Colombian Air Force to implement
the Air Bridge Denial (ABD) program, which is designed to improve the
Colombian government's capacity to stop drug trafficking in Colombian
airspace by identifying, tracking, and forcing suspicious aircraft to
land so that law enforcement authorities can take control of the
aircraft, arrest suspects, and seize drugs.[Footnote 43] The program
was expanded in 2007 to include surveillance of Colombia's coastal
waters to strengthen the Colombian government's capacity to address the
emerging threat posed by semisubmersible vessels.
To support the program, State and Defense have provided the Colombian
Air Force with seven surveillance aircraft,[Footnote 44] which monitor
Colombian airspace for suspicious traffic, infrastructure support at
four ABD bases located across Colombia, contract aviation maintenance
support, training, ground and air safety monitors, and funding for
spare parts and fuel. The program also utilizes a network of U.S.
detection resources including five in-country radars, over-the-horizon
radars located outside Colombia, and airborne radar systems. In June
2007, the United States began nationalizing the ABD program, including
transferring the title of surveillance aircraft and responsibility for
operating and maintaining the five radars located in Colombia.
According to NAS officials, the United States is training Colombian Air
Force ground and air safety monitors and maintenance personnel and
expects to nationalize the program by 2010, with only limited U.S.
funding in subsequent years.
According to NAS officials, suspicious aircraft tracks dropped from 637
in 2003 to 84 in 2007. In 2007, the Colombian Air Force forced three
suspected drug-trafficking aircraft to land and each aircraft was
seized; however, according to a senior NAS official, the crews escaped,
and no cocaine was found. In the same year, the ABD program was
expanded to include a maritime patrol mission. While conducting a
maritime patrol, ABD aircraft assisted in the sinking of two self-
propelled semisubmersibles, which resulted in the arrest of seven
individuals and the seizure or destruction of approximately 11 metric
tons of cocaine. In our September 2005 report,[Footnote 45] we noted
that the stated purpose of the program (the seizure of aircraft,
personnel, and drugs) was rarely achieved, though the program did
succeed in reducing the number of suspicious flights over Colombia--a
valuable program outcome, according to U.S. and Colombian officials.
Coastal and River Interdiction:
Since fiscal year 2000, State and Defense provided over $89 million to
help sustain and expand Colombian Navy and Marine interdiction efforts.
According to Defense, from January to June 2007, an estimated 70
percent of Colombia's cocaine was smuggled out of the country using go-
fast vessels, fishing boats, and other forms of maritime transport.
State and Defense support for the Colombian Navy is designed to help
improve their capacity to stop drug traffickers from using Colombia's
Caribbean and Pacific coasts to conduct drug-trafficking activities.
[Footnote 46] State and Defense support for the Colombian Marines is
designed to help gain control of Colombia's network of navigable
rivers, which traffickers use to transport precursor chemicals and
finished products. According to Colombian Ministry of Defense
officials, the number of metric tons of cocaine seized by the Navy and
Marines represented over half of all cocaine seized by Colombia in
2007.
State and Defense assistance to the Colombian Navy provided for
infrastructure development (such as new storage refueling equipment for
the Navy station in Tumaco), the transfer of two vessels to Colombia,
eight "Midnight Express" interceptor boats, two Cessna Grand Caravan
transport aircraft, weapons, fuel, communications equipment, and
training. State assistance also helped the Colombian Navy establish a
special intelligence unit in the northern city of Cartagena to collect
and distribute time-sensitive intelligence on suspect vessels in the
Caribbean. In 2007, the unit coordinated 35 interdiction operations,
which resulted in the arrests of 40 traffickers, the seizure of over 9
metric tons of cocaine, and the seizure of 21 trafficker vessels
including one semisubmersible vessel. The U.S. Embassy Bogotá credits
this unit for over 95 percent of all Colombian Navy seizures in the
Caribbean, forcing traffickers to rely more on departure sites along
the Pacific Coast and areas near Venezuela and Panama.
The Colombian Navy faces certain challenges. First, it generally lacks
the resources needed to provide comprehensive coverage over Colombia's
Pacific coastline. For example, according to Colombian Navy officials,
the Navy has only three stations to cover all of Colombia's Pacific
coastline. Second, according to U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials, these
services lack adequate intelligence information to guide interdiction
efforts along the Pacific coast. According to embassy officials, the
United States is working with the Colombians to expand intelligence
gathering and dissemination efforts to the Pacific coast, in part by
providing support to expand the Navy's intelligence unit in Cartagena
to cover this area. Third, traffickers have increasingly diversified
their routes and methods, including using semisubmersibles to avoid
detection.
For the Colombian Marines, State and Defense provided support for
infrastructure development (such as docks and hangars), 95 patrol
boats, weapons, ammunition, fuel, communications equipment, night
vision goggles, and engines. Colombia's rivers serve as a vital
transport network and are used to transport the precursor chemicals
used to make cocaine and heroin, as well as to deliver the final
product to ports on Colombia's Caribbean and Pacific coasts. According
to State, up to 40 percent of the cocaine transported in Colombia moves
through the complex river network in Colombia's south-central region to
the southwestern coastal shore.
According to U.S. Southern Command officials, the key challenge facing
the riverine program is a general lack of resources given the scope of
the problem. The Colombian marines maintain a permanent presence on
only about one-third of Colombia's nearly 8,000 miles of navigable
rivers. U.S. embassy planning documents have set a goal of helping the
Colombian Marines achieve a coverage rate of at least 60 percent by
2010.
National Police Eradication Program:
Since the early 1990s, State/INL has supported the Colombian National
Police Aerial Eradication Program, which is designed to spray coca and
opium poppy. Since fiscal year 2000, State has provided over $458
million to support the program, which increased its spray operations
about threefold. The Aerial Eradication Program consists of U.S.-owned
spray aircraft and helicopters, as well as contractor support to help
fly, maintain, and operate these assets at forward operating locations
throughout Colombia. As of August 2008, these aircraft included 13
armored AT-802 spray aircraft; 13 UH-1N helicopters[Footnote 47] used
as gunships or search and rescue aircraft; four C-27 transport aircraft
used to ferry supplies and personnel to and from the various spray
bases; and two reconnaissance aircraft used to find and identify coca
cultivation, and plan and verify the results of spray missions. A
typical spray mission consists of four spray aircraft supported by
helicopter gunships to protect the spray aircraft along with a search
and rescue helicopter to rescue downed pilots and crew. In addition,
ground security is provided as needed by the Army Counternarcotics
Brigade.
U.S. funded counternarcotics efforts, which focused on aerial spraying,
did not achieve Plan Colombia's overarching goal of reducing the
cultivation, production, and distribution of cocaine by 50 percent, in
part because coca farmers responded with a series of effective
countermeasures. These countermeasures included (1) pruning coca plants
after spraying; (2) re-planting with younger coca plants or plant
grafts;[Footnote 48] (3) decreasing the size of coca plots; (4)
interspersing coca with legitimate crops to avoid detection; (5) moving
coca cultivation to areas of the country off-limits to spray aircraft,
such as the national parks and a 10 kilometer area along Colombia's
border with Ecuador;[Footnote 49] and (6) moving coca crops to more
remote parts of the country--a development that has created a
"dispersal effect" (see figures 12 and 13). While these measures
allowed coca farmers to continue cultivation, they have increased the
coca farmers and traffickers' cost of doing business.
Figure 12: Coca Growing Regions in 2004:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of Colombia depicting coca growing regions in
2004, as well as department boundaries. The regions are indicated as
having one of the following cultivation densities, in hectares per
square kilometer:
0.0;
0.0-1.0;
1.0-4.0;
4.0-8.0;
More than 8.0.
Source: Crime and Narcotics Center.
[End of figure]
Figure 13: Coca Growing Regions in 2006:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of Colombia depicting coca growing regions in
2006, as well as department boundaries. The regions are indicated as
having one of the following cultivation densities, in hectares per
square kilometer:
0.0;
0.0-2.0;
2.0-8.0;
Over 8.0.
Source: Crime and Narcotics Center.
[End of figure]
NAS officials said Colombia and the United States have taken several
actions to address this issue. For instance, the government of Colombia
initiated a program in 2004 to manually eradicate coca. Since 2004, the
amount of coca manually eradicated increased from about 11,000 hectares
to about 66,000 hectares in 2007. According to NAS officials, in
response to congressional budget cuts in fiscal year 2008, the embassy
reduced its aerial eradication goal to 130,000, compared with 160,000
in 2007. This reduction may be offset by a planned increase in manual
eradication efforts from 66,000 hectares in 2007 to 100,000 hectares in
2008. However, manual eradication efforts require significant
personnel, security, and transportation, including air mobility
resources. Through the end of May 2008, Colombia reported that about
28,000 hectares had been manually eradicated. In addition, manual
eradication often takes place in conflictive areas against a backdrop
of violence, which makes full implementation of this strategy even more
problematic. According to State, despite protection measures taken,
manual eradicators were attacked numerous times--by sniper fire,
minefields, and improvised explosive devices--and through August 2008,
23 eradicators were killed, bringing to 118 the total number of
eradicators killed since 2005.
National Police Air Service:
Since fiscal year 2000, State provided over $463 million to help expand
and sustain the Police Air Service (known by its Spanish acronym,
ARAVI). Similar to the role played by the Army Aviation Brigade, ARAVI
provides air mobility support for a range of National Police functions
including aerial and manual eradication efforts that require gunship
and search and rescue support for the spray planes, as well as airlift
support for the manual eradication teams and associated security
personnel. In addition, ARAVI provides airlift for the National
Police's commandos unit, known as Junglas. According to NAS officials,
ARAVI consists of 61 NAS-supported aircraft and 30 National Police-
supported aircraft. Key program support elements include hanger and
taxiway construction upgrades to the Air Service's operating base
outside of Bogotá; the provision of contract mechanics; training; and
funding for spare parts, fuel, and other expenses.[Footnote 50]
Appendix II describes these support services in more detail.
According to NAS officials, in addition to enabling ARAVI to better
manage its aviation assets, ARAVI has become self-sufficient in some
areas.[Footnote 51] For instance, it provides its own entry-level pilot
and mechanic training and can plan and execute its own operations.
However, U.S. and contractor officials said that ARAVI still continues
to suffer from major limitations. According to NAS and contractor
officials, ARAVI:
* Receives approximately 70 percent of its total maintenance and
operating funding from State. According to Embassy Bogotá officials,
the Colombian Ministry of Defense often underfunds the service on the
assumption that State will make up the difference.
* Lacks some specialized maintenance personnel. For instance, according
to State-funded U.S. contractor personnel, in February 2008, the
service only had about half of the required number of quality control
inspectors. To make up the shortfall, the service relies on quality
control inspectors provided by the contractor.
* Has high absentee rates. This is a problem that we have reported on
in the past.[Footnote 52] For example, according to data supplied by
the contractor, during the second week of February 2008, only 25
percent of the technicians and 40 percent of the assigned inspectors
were present to service ARAVI's UH-60s.
National Police Interdiction Efforts:
Since fiscal year 2000, State provided over $153 million to strengthen
the National Police's efforts to interdict illicit drug trafficking.
According to State, in fiscal year 2007, it focused most of its
assistance on equipping and training the Junglas, but also provided
assistance for maritime, airport, and road interdiction programs.
The Junglas consist of 500 specially selected police divided into three
companies based at Bogotá, Santa Marta, and Tulua, as well as a 60-man
instructor group based at the National Police rural training center.
Described by U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials as being widely considered
as one of the best trained and equipped commando units in Latin
America, they are often the unit of choice in operations to destroy
drug production laboratories and other narcoterrorist high value
targets, many of which are located in remote, hard-to-find locations.
State support for the Junglas consisted of specialized equipment
typically provided to U.S. Army Special Forces teams, such as M-4
carbines, mortars, helmets, and vests, as well as specialized training
provided in Colombia and the United States. According to State, in 2006
and 2007, the Junglas were responsible for more than half of all the
hydrochloric and coca base laboratories destroyed by the National
Police, and seized over 64 metric tons of cocaine during the same
period.
State also supported the National Police's maritime and airport
security programs to strengthen the National Police's capability to
protect against illicit cargo--primarily narcotics--smuggled through
Colombia's principal seaports and airports. State assistance included
funding for training, technical assistance, and limited logistical
support (including K-9 support) for port security units at eight
Colombian seaports and six airports. According to State, units based at
Colombia's principal seaports and airports seized more than 13 metric
tons of illicit drugs in 2006; a figure that rose to over 22 metric
tons in 2007.
Reestablishing a Police Presence in Conflictive Zones:
Since fiscal year 2000, the United States provided over $92
million[Footnote 53] to help the Colombians establish Carabineros
squadrons. The Carabineros were initially created to provide an
immediate State presence in conflictive areas reclaimed by the
Colombian military.[Footnote 54] According to State, the Colombians
currently have 68 Carabineros squadrons, each staffed with 120
personnel. The squadrons provide temporary support as other government
services and a permanent police presence are established in reclaimed
areas. State support consisted of training, weapons, ammunition, night
vision goggles, metal detectors, radios, vehicles, and other items
including some limited support for permanent police stations:
The Carabineros supported President Uribe's goal of re-establishing a
State presence in each of the country's 1,099 municipalities (169
municipalities had no police presence prior to 2002). Though a July
2007 U.S. Embassy Bogotá report noted there are now police stations in
every municipality throughout Colombia, these often consist of a small
number of police who are responsible for areas covering hundreds of
square miles of territory. Despite these limitations, State noted that
in contrast to earlier years, no police stations were overrun in 2007.
NAS officials attributed this development to improved based defense
training, defensive upgrades, and the increased police presence that
Carabinero squadrons provide in rural areas.
U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance Promotes Social and Economic Progress and
the Rule of Law, but Is Not Directly Linked to Reductions in Drug
Production:
Since fiscal year 2000, the United States has provided nearly $1.3
billion for nonmilitary assistance to Colombia, focusing on the
promotion of (1) economic and social progress and (2) the rule of law,
including judicial reform. To support social and economic progress, the
largest share of U.S. nonmilitary assistance has gone toward
alternative development, which has been a key element of U.S.
counternarcotics assistance and has bettered the lives of hundreds of
thousands of Colombians. Other social programs have assisted thousands
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and more than 30,000 former
combatants. Assistance for the rule of law and judicial reform have
expanded access to the democratic process for Colombian citizens,
including the consolidation of state authority and the established
government institutions and public services in many areas reclaimed
from illegal armed groups. (See table 3.)
Table 3: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance, Fiscal Year Appropriations 2000
through 2008 (Dollars in millions):
Program category: Promote Social and Economic Justice;
Fiscal year 2000: $80.0;
Fiscal year 2001: $0.5;
Fiscal year 2002: $109.9;
Fiscal year 2003: $125.7;
Fiscal year 2004: $126.5;
Fiscal year 2005: $124.7;
Fiscal year 2006: $130.4;
Fiscal year 2007: $139.8;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $194.4;
Total: $1,031.9.
Program category: Promote Social and Economic Justice: Alternative
Development;
Fiscal year 2000: [A];
Fiscal year 2001: [A];
Fiscal year 2002: $49.9;
Fiscal year 2003: $60.2;
Fiscal year 2004: $59.8;
Fiscal year 2005: $70.7;
Fiscal year 2006: $72.0;
Fiscal year 2007: $68.2;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $119.7;
Total: $500.5.
Program category: Promote Social and Economic Justice: Internally
Displaced Persons;
Fiscal year 2000: [A];
Fiscal year 2001: [A];
Fiscal year 2002: $34.0;
Fiscal year 2003: $41.5;
Fiscal year 2004: $42.6;
Fiscal year 2005: $32.0;
Fiscal year 2006: $30.7;
Fiscal year 2007: $31.1;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $35.3;
Total: $247.2.
Program category: Promote Social and Economic Justice: Demobilization
and Reintegration;
Fiscal year 2000: No Program;
Fiscal year 2001: No Program;
Fiscal year 2002: $2.0;
Fiscal year 2003: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2004: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2005: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2006: $8.9;
Fiscal year 2007: $15.7;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $18.3;
Total: $44.9.
Program category: Promote Social and Economic Justice: Democracy and
Human Rights;
Fiscal year 2000: [A];
Fiscal year 2001: [A];
Fiscal year 2002: $24.0;
Fiscal year 2003: $24.0;
Fiscal year 2004: $24.0;
Fiscal year 2005: $22.0;
Fiscal year 2006: $18.8;
Fiscal year 2007: $24.8;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $21.1;
Total: $158.7.
Program category: Promote Social and Economic Justice: Not
allocated[A];
Fiscal year 2000: $80.0;
Fiscal year 2001: $0.5;
Fiscal year 2002: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2003: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2004: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2005: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2006: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2007: 0.0;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): 0.0;
Total: $80.5.
Program category: Promote the Rule of Law-Judicial Reform and Capacity
Building[B];
Fiscal year 2000: $121.1;
Fiscal year 2001: $0.9;
Fiscal year 2002: $15.8;
Fiscal year 2003: $27.0;
Fiscal year 2004: $9.0;
Fiscal year 2005: $7.3;
Fiscal year 2006: $10.5;
Fiscal year 2007: $7.8;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $39.4;
Total: $238.9.
Program category: Total;
Fiscal year 2000: $201.1;
Fiscal year 2001: $1.4;
Fiscal year 2002: $125.7;
Fiscal year 2003: $152.7;
Fiscal year 2004: $135.5;
Fiscal year 2005: $132.0;
Fiscal year 2006: $140.9;
Fiscal year 2007: $147.6;
Fiscal year 2008 (Est.): $233.8;
Total: $1,270.7.
Source: State.
Note: To obtain consistent and comparable funding data from each of the
departments and agencies involved, we use appropriated U.S. assistance
throughout this report. We refer to the funding as "provided," though
all of it may not have been obligated or expended. Funding sources
include the State controlled Andean Counterdrug Initiative, Economic
Support Funds, and Defense controlled counternarcotics funding. State
officials noted funding data represents the amount allocated for the
categories and does not reflect any budget reprogramming that occurred
after allocations were made or holds placed by Congress on funds due to
certification requirements relating to human rights or environmental
concerns over the aerial spray program.
[A] State could not allocate appropriations by program category in
fiscal years 2000 and 2001.
[B] "Promote the Rule of Law" also includes other programs such as
Demand Reduction and Culture of Lawfulness.
[End of table]
Nevertheless, these programs face several limitations and challenges.
For example, the geographic areas where alternative development
programs operate are limited by security concerns, and programs have
not demonstrated a clear link to reductions in illicit drug cultivation
and production. In addition, many displaced persons may not have access
to IDP assistance, the reintegration of former combatants into society
and reparations to their victims has been slow, and funding to continue
these programs is a concern. Finally, Colombia's justice system has
limited capacity to address the magnitude of criminal activity in
Colombia.
Alternative Development Has Benefited Many Colombians, but USAID Does
Not Track Progress in Drug Reduction and Sustainability:
USAID provided more than $500 million in assistance between fiscal
years 2000 and 2008 to implement alternative development projects,
which are a key component of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in
Colombia. USAID's goal for alternative development focuses on reducing
the production of illicit narcotics by creating sustainable projects
that can function without additional U.S. support after the start-up
phase is implemented. In recent years, USAID modified its alternative
development strategy to emphasize sustainability. With regard to its
strategic goal, alternative development projects face two key
challenges--USAID currently has almost no alternative development
projects in areas where the majority of coca is grown, and a government
of Colombia policy prohibits alternative development assistance
projects in communities where any illicit crops are being cultivated.
USAID Modified Its Alternative Development Approach to Emphasize
Sustainability:
USAID's original alternative development strategy in 2000 focused on
encouraging farmers to manually eradicate illicit crops and providing
assistance to those who did through licit, short-term, income-producing
opportunities. These efforts were concentrated in the departments of
Caquetá and Putumayo, where, at the time, most of Colombia's coca was
cultivated and where U.S. eradication efforts were focused. However,
USAID and its implementing partners found it difficult to implement
projects in the largely undeveloped south where the Colombian
government exercised minimal control. As a result, in February 2002,
USAID revised its approach to support long-term, income-generating
activities, focus more attention and resources outside southern
Colombia, and encourage private-sector participation. In 2004, we
reported that the revised alternative development program had made
progress but was limited in scope and may not be sustainable.[Footnote
55]
USAID revised its alternative development strategy beginning in 2006 to
focus on specific geographic corridors, improve coordination, and
increase the likelihood of achieving sustainable projects. The
geographic corridors are in six regions in the western part of Colombia
where the government has greater control and markets and transportation
routes are more developed. However, the corridors are not in primary
coca cultivation areas. USAID officials told us that the alternative
development corridors are intended to act as a magnet, providing legal
economic opportunities to attract individuals from regions that
cultivate illicit crops, while also preventing people within the
corridors from cultivating coca.
USAID's current strategy is carried out through two major projects--
Areas for Municipal Level Alternative Development (ADAM) and More
Investment for Sustainable Alternative Development (MIDAS). ADAM works
with individuals, communities, and the private sector to develop licit
crops with long-term income potential, such as cacao and specialty
coffee. ADAM also supports social infrastructure activities such as
schools and water treatment plants, providing training, technical
assistance, and financing of community projects. It emphasizes
engagement with communities and individual beneficiaries to get their
support and focuses on smaller scale agricultural development with long-
term earning potential. For example, under ADAM, USAID provided
infrastructure improvements to a facility that processes blackberries
in order to increase capacity and continues to provide technical
assistance to farmers who grow blackberries for the facility.
MIDAS promotes private-sector led business initiatives and works with
the Colombian government to make economic and policy reforms intended
to maximize employment and income growth. USAID encourages public and
private-sector investment in activities that raise rural incomes and
create jobs, and it provides training and technical assistance to the
Colombian government at the local and national levels to expand
financial services into rural areas, build capacity of municipal
governments, and encourage the Colombian government's investment in
programs. For example, MIDAS worked with the Colombian government to
lower microfinance fees and provided technical assistance to private
lenders, which led to increased availability of small loans in rural
areas that can be used to start up small-and medium-sized businesses.
Overall, alternative development beneficiaries we talked with told us
their quality of life has improved because they faced less intimidation
by FARC and had better access to schools and social services, even
though they generally earned less money compared with cultivating and
trafficking in illicit drugs.
Alternative Development Challenges:
One challenge facing alternative development programs is their limited
geographic scope. Alternative development programs are largely focused
in economic corridors in the western part of Colombia, where, according
to USAID officials, a greater potential exists for success due to
access to markets, existing infrastructure, and state presence and
security. Currently, USAID has almost no alternative development
projects in eastern Colombia, where the majority of coca is grown. (See
fig. 14.) While the majority of the Colombian population lives within
the USAID economic corridors, the lack of programs in eastern Colombia
nonetheless poses a challenge for linking alternative development to
reducing the production of illicit drugs. The USAID Mission Director
told us that the mission intends to expand the geographic scope of
alternative development programs as the government of Colombia gains
control over conflictive areas. However, the lack of transportation
infrastructure in most coca growing areas limits the chances of program
success and future expansion. USAID and other U.S. Embassy Bogotá
officials emphasized that alternative development programs have
benefited from security gains made possible through the Colombian
military's enhanced air mobility, but large areas of Colombia are still
not secure.
According to USAID officials, another challenge is the government of
Colombia's "Zero Illicit" policy, which prohibits alternative
development assistance projects in communities where any illicit crops
are being cultivated. Acción Social[Footnote 56] officials said the
policy is intended to foster a culture of lawfulness and encourage
communities to exert peer pressure on families growing illicit crops so
that the community at large may become eligible for assistance.
[Footnote 57] However, USAID officials expressed concern that the
policy limits their ability to operate in areas where coca is grown.
The policy also complicates USAID's current strategy of working in
conflictive areas like Meta, where coca is cultivated in high
concentrations. One nongovernmental organization official told us the
policy is a major problem because if one farmer grows coca in a
community otherwise fully engaged in and committed to growing licit
crops, then all aid is supposed to be suspended to that community.
However, USAID officials told us programs have only been suspended a
few times due to this requirement.
Figure 14: Alternative Development Projects and Coca Cultivation in
Colombia:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a map of Colombia with the following indicated:
* USAID corridors;
* Alternative development municipalities;
* Areas of Coca cultivation in 2006.
Source: GAO based on USAID map from September 2007.
[End of figure]
USAID Measures of Progress Do Not Assess Reductions in Illicit Drug
Cultivation or Project Sustainability:
USAID collects data on 15 indicators that measure progress on
alternative development; however, none of these indicators measures
progress toward USAID's goal of reducing illicit narcotics production
through the creation of sustainable economic projects.[Footnote 58]
Rather, USAID collects data on program indicators such as the number of
families benefited and hectares of legal crops planted. While this
information helps USAID track the progress of projects, it does not
help with assessing USAID's progress in reducing illicit crop
production or its ability to create sustainable projects.
In 2004, USAID officials said a new strategy was being developed that
would allow for the creation of new performance measures. But, USAID
did not develop indicators that are useful in determining whether
alternative development reduces drug production. For example, while
USAID intends for coca farmers in eastern Colombia to move to areas
with alternative development projects, USAID does not track the number
of beneficiaries who moved out of areas prone to coca cultivation.
In addition, while the current alternative development strategy is
designed to produce sustainable results, USAID does not collect
tracking data on beneficiaries who have received assistance to
determine whether they remain in licit productive activities or which
projects have resulted in sustainable businesses without government
subsidies. The contractor responsible for implementing USAID's
alternative development programs told us USAID does not monitor the
necessary indicators and, therefore, cannot determine the extent to
which projects are contributing to reducing coca cultivation or
increasing stability.
Assistance for Internally Displaced Persons Is Limited:
Since fiscal year 2000, State's Population Refugee and Migration (PRM)
bureau reports it has provided $88 million in short-term, humanitarian
assistance to support IDPs and other vulnerable groups (such as Afro-
Colombians and indigenous peoples).[Footnote 59] PRM provides
humanitarian assistance for up to 3 months after a person is displaced,
providing emergency supplies as well as technical assistance and
guidance to the government of Colombia and local humanitarian groups to
build their capacity to serve IDPs.
In addition, from fiscal years 2000 to 2007, USAID has provided over
$200 million for longer term economic and social assistance to support
IDPs and vulnerable groups. USAID assistance has focused on housing
needs and generating employment through job training and business
development and has also included institutional strengthening of
Colombian government entities and nongovernmental organizations through
technical assistance and training in areas such as delivery of housing
improvements and subsidies and the provision of health care. According
to USAID, more than 3 million people have benefited from this
assistance.
Figure 15: Displaced Persons Receive Job Training:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of displaced persons receive job training.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
However, according to State and USAID officials, the number of newly
displaced persons in Colombia continues to rise, and it can be
difficult to register as an IDP. According to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, Colombia has up to 3 million IDPs--the most
of any country in the world. Acción Social reports it has registered
over 2.5 million IDPs.[Footnote 60] But State PRM officials report that
international and non-governmental organizations estimate that between
25 and 40 percent of IDPs are not registered. Acción Social officials
disagreed and estimated under-registration to be 10 percent. In any
case, Acción Social officials said that the agency's budget is not
sufficient to provide assistance to all the IDPs registered.
AUC Combatants Have Demobilized, but Reintegration and Reparations Have
Been Slow:
In 2003, the Colombian government and AUC entered into a peace accord
to demobilize. State data indicate the United States has provided over
$44 million for USAID programs for monitoring and processing
demobilized AUC combatants, the verification mission of the
Organization of the American States, reparations and reconciliation for
victims of paramilitary violence, and the reintegration of adult and
child ex-combatants into Colombian society. USAID also supports the
National Commission on Reparation and Reconciliation, which was created
to deliver reparations and assistance to victims.
From 2003 to 2006, according to USAID, approximately 32,000 AUC members
demobilized. Most were offered pardons for the crime of raising arms
against the Colombian state and were enrolled in a government of
Colombia reintegration program. AUC leaders and soldiers who had been
charged, arrested, or convicted of any major crime against humanity
(such as murder and kidnapping) were offered alternative sentencing in
exchange for providing details of crimes in depositions to Colombian
officials.[Footnote 61] USAID assisted the government of Colombia in
the creation of 37 service centers, mostly in large cities, at which ex-
combatants could register for health services, job training, and
education and career opportunities, and has assisted the service
centers in tracking the demobilized soldiers' participation in the
reintegration process. USAID also assisted with AUC identity
verification, criminal record checks, initial legal processing,
documentation of biometric data (such as pictures, thumbprints, and DNA
samples), and issuance of a registration card.
U.S. and Colombian officials report that the AUC demobilization has
enhanced security through reductions in murders, displacements, and
human rights abuses. Depositions have uncovered thousands of crimes,
hundreds of former combatants are serving jail sentences for their
crimes, and victims of paramilitary violence are beginning to see
resolution to crimes committed against them and their families.
In April 2008, the government of Colombia began allowing some FARC
deserters to receive benefits similar to those received by AUC.
[Footnote 62] FARC ex-combatants who cooperate with Colombian
authorities may receive pardons; enter a reintegration program; and
have access to training, medical benefits, and counseling.[Footnote 63]
Figure 16: Colombian Government Worker Processes Paramilitary Soldier:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of Colombian Government Worker Processing Paramilitary
Soldier.
Source: USAID.
[End of figure]
Despite the progress made, Colombian and USAID officials told us the
reintegration of demobilized combatants has been slow, and many may
have returned to a life of crime. The reintegration program is the
primary system to prevent the demobilized from joining the ranks of
criminal gangs. However, USAID officials estimate that approximately
6,000 of the demobilized have not accessed the service centers.
Moreover, Colombian officials told us many businesses have been
reluctant to hire the ex-combatants, and the majority has not found
employment in the formal economy. Criminal gangs recruit heavily from
the ranks of the demobilized, and Colombian officials estimate about 10
percent (or 3,000) have joined these illegal groups.
In addition, a senior Colombian official reported that reparations to
the victims of paramilitary violence have been slow. Ex-combatants have
not been forthcoming about illegally obtained assets--which can be used
to pay for reparations--and often hide them under the names of family
or acquaintances. Victims of paramilitary violence have criticized the
reparations process as slow and expressed resentment of the benefits
paid to demobilized paramilitaries under the reintegration program.
Initially, victims could not receive reparations unless there was a
conviction, which required a lengthy judicial process. But, in April
2008, Colombia began to provide compensation to over 120,000
paramilitary victims without the requirement for a conviction.
USAID Support for Democracy:
Since fiscal year 2000, State data indicates that USAID has provided
over $150 million to support the rule of law in Colombia through human
rights protection, the creation of conflict resolution centers, and
training of public defenders, among other activities. [Footnote 64]
* USAID has provided more than 4,500 human rights workers protection
assistance such as communications equipment and bullet proof vests, as
well as technical assistance, training, equipment, and funding to
programs that protect union leaders, journalists, mayors, and leaders
of civil society organizations. USAID also created and provides
assistance to Colombia's Early Warning System, to alert authorities of
violent acts committed by illegally armed groups. According to USAID,
since its inception in 2001, the Early Warning System has prevented
over 200 situations that may have caused massacres or forced
displacements.
* By the end of 2007, USAID achieved its goal of creating 45 justice
sector institutions known as Justice Houses, and has trained over 2,000
conciliators who help to resolve cases at Justice Houses; these
conciliators have handled over 7 million cases, relieving pressure on
the Colombian court system. USAID has also refurbished or constructed
45 court rooms to ensure they are adequate for oral hearings under the
new criminal justice system, and is developing 16 "virtual" court
rooms, by which the defendant, judges, prosecutors, and public
defenders can all participate via closed circuit television.
* USAID has trained 1,600 public defenders since 2003, including
training in a new criminal procedure code, and the Colombian government
now pays all of the defenders' salaries.[Footnote 65]
However, these programs face challenges in receiving commitments from
the Colombian government and addressing shortfalls in equal access to
justice for all Colombians. USAID officials expressed concern about the
Colombian government's ability to fund the Early Warning System--USAID
currently pays 95 to 98 percent of the salaries. According to USAID
officials, a letter of understanding between USAID and the Colombian
government calls for Colombia to pay 100 percent in 2011. In addition,
the 45 Justice Houses in Colombia are located in large cities primarily
in the western half of the country, with almost no Justice Houses in
the less populated eastern half of the country where high rates of
violence and crime occur. However, USAID plans to assist the Colombian
government in strengthening state presence in rural areas of Colombia
through the construction of 10 new regional Justice Houses in rural,
post conflict areas.
Since the beginning of 2007, USAID and Defense have committed $28.5
million for two programs that support Colombia's "Clear, Hold and
Consolidate" strategy: (1) the Regional Governance Consolidation
Program [Footnote 66] and (2) the Initial Governance Response Program.
[Footnote 67] Both programs directly support the Coordination Center
for Integrated Government Action (CCAI), which was created in 2004 to
integrate several military, police, and civil agencies and to
coordinate national-level efforts to reestablish governance in areas
that previously had little or no government presence. USAID works to
increase the operational capacity of CCAI by providing direct planning
and strategic assistance; for example, USAID hired a consulting firm to
develop a detailed operational plan for CCAI's activities in Meta.
[Footnote 68] USAID also assists CCAI with projects designed to
reinforce stability in areas formerly controlled by insurgents and
quickly build trust between the government and local communities in
Meta--such as La Macarena.
USAID officials said Colombia's consolidation strategy may serve as a
model for future program activities throughout Colombia; however, CCAI
faces challenges that could limit its success. CCAI does not have its
own budget and relies on support, funding, and personnel from other
agencies within the Colombian government. While Defense officials
estimate that CCAI spent over $100 million from Colombian government
agencies in 2007, it often faced delays in receiving the funding. Also,
security remains a primary concern for CCAI because it operates in
areas where illegal armed groups are present. For example, CCAI
representatives in La Macarena do not travel outside of a 5-kilometer
radius of the city center due to security concerns.
Justice Support for Rule of Law:
Justice has provided over $114 million in fiscal years 2000 through
2007 for programs intended to improve the rule of law in Colombia,
primarily for the transition to a new criminal justice system and
training and related assistance for investigating human rights crimes
and crimes confessed to by former combatants during the AUC
demobilization.
About $42 million was for training, technical assistance, and equipment
to support the implementation of a new accusatory criminal justice
system. In 2004, Colombia enacted a new Criminal Procedure Code, which
began the implementation[Footnote 69] of an oral accusatory system
involving the presentation and confrontation of evidence at oral public
trials, similar to the system used in the United States. Justice
training has included simulated crime scenes and court proceedings to
develop the necessary legal and practical understanding of the oral
accusatory system. Justice reports it has trained over 40,000 judges,
prosecutors, police investigators, and forensic experts in preparation
for their new roles.
According to Justice, the new accusatory system has improved the
resolution of criminal cases in Colombia. Under the old system, trials
took an average of 5 years; this has been reduced to 1 year under the
current system. According to Justice, the new system has led to an
increase in the conviction rate of 60 to 80 percent, with Colombia
reporting 48,000 convictions in the first 2 years of implementation.
Furthermore, the number of complainants and witnesses increased since
implementation, which suggests a greater public confidence in the new
system.
Justice also provided about $10 million for fiscal years 2005 to 2007
to both the Fiscalia's Justice and Peace Unit and Human Rights Unit to
support the AUC demobilization under the Justice and Peace Process. The
Justice and Peace Unit oversees the process through which demobilized
paramilitaries give depositions that detail their knowledge of the
paramilitary structure and of crimes such as mass killings or human
rights abuses. Justice has provided more than $2 million in equipment,
including video recording technology, to aid in the processing of
approximately 5,000 depositions at the Justice and Peace offices in
Bogotá, Medellin, and Barranquilla. The unit also collects and
processes complaints filed by victims of paramilitary violence. The
Human Rights Unit is tasked with the investigation and prosecution of
human rights violations, such as attacks on union leaders, forced
disappearances, and mass graves, as well as the investigation and
prosecution of demobilized paramilitary members suspected of human
rights violations.
According to Colombian officials, depositions have led to the
confession of over 1,400 crimes that the government had no prior
knowledge of, as well as the locations of an estimated 10,000 murder
victims in 3,500 grave sites. Over 1,200 victims' remains have been
recovered through exhumations, and the human identification labs
continue to work on the identification of the remains using DNA
testing. According to Justice, the depositions of 25 paramilitary
leaders have been initiated and, in May 2008, 15 leaders were
extradited to the United States. The Justice and Peace Unit has
received over 130,000 victims' claims.
Justice also provided about $10 million from fiscal years 2005 to 2007
to increase the capacity for the Colombian government to investigate
criminal cases. Justice provided vehicles and funds for investigators
to travel to crime scenes and collect evidence; specialized forensic
training and equipment for Colombian exhumation teams that unearth
victims' remains based on information uncovered in depositions; and
training, technical assistance, and DNA processing kits to Colombian
human identification labs to streamline and improve DNA identification
efficiency. Justice is also funding a project to collect DNA samples
from 10,000 demobilized AUC members and enter the data into a DNA
identification database, which could later be compared with DNA found
at crime scenes. Additionally, funds were allocated to contract 30
attorneys to assist with the analysis and processing of thousands of
complaints from paramilitary victims. Finally, Justice provided
specialized criminal training in the areas of money laundering and
anticorruption.
Figure 17: Justice Training on Mass Grave Exhumation at Fiscalia
Headquarters:
[See PDF for image]
Photograph of Justice training on mass grave exhumation at Fiscalia
Headquarters.
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Despite U.S. assistance toward improving Colombian investigative and
prosecutorial capabilities, Colombian officials expressed concern that
they lack the capacity to pursue criminal cases due to a lack of
personnel, air mobility, and security, particularly given that most of
the paramilitary killings and other AUC crimes occurred in rural areas
too dangerous or too difficult to reach by road. In particular:
* Fiscalia and Justice officials said neither the Justice and Peace
Unit nor the Human Rights Unit have enough investigators and
prosecutors to fully execute their missions. For example, 45
prosecutors from the Human Rights Unit have to cover more than 4,000
assigned cases. From 2002 to 2007, the unit produced less than 400
convictions. Further, thousands of depositions and victim complaints,
which Colombian officials say are likely to reveal additional crimes,
have yet to be processed by the Fiscalia. As of October 2007, over
3,000 known grave sites had not been exhumed and less than half of the
recovered human remains had been identified. Justice has provided
assistance to expand the unit, including regional units in 7 cities
outside of Bogotá. Moreover, Justice reported in September 2008 that
the Human Rights Unit has received an additional 72 prosecutors and 110
investigators, but noted that more investigators are needed.
* According to Colombian and U.S. officials, criminal and human rights
investigations and exhumation of graves often require hours and
sometimes days to complete. The investigators often have to go to
conflictive areas that are impossible to access without sufficient
transportation resources. For example, in remote areas investigators
often need army or police helicopters. The Colombian National Police
have programmed over 15,600 flying hours for their helicopters for
2008; however, police officials stated that none of these hours were
allocated for Fiscalia investigations. U.S. officials confirmed
Fiscalia's need for additional transportation resources, including
funding for commercial transportation as well as assets provided by
Colombian security forces.
U.S. Efforts to Transfer Program Operations and Funding
Responsibilities to Colombia Have Had Mixed Results:
From the outset of Plan Colombia, Congress made clear that it expects
all U.S. support programs would eventually transition to Colombia. With
the completion of Plan Colombia and the start-up of its second phase,
Congress reiterated this guidance and called on State and other
affected agencies to increase the pace of nationalization with a focus
on the major aviation programs under Plan Colombia that are largely
funded by State.[Footnote 70] In response to this guidance and budget
cuts to fiscal year 2008 military assistance to Colombia instituted by
Congress, State and Defense have accelerated efforts to nationalize or
partly nationalize the five major Colombian military and National
Police aviation programs supported by the United States.[Footnote 71]
Apart from these efforts, State has taken action to nationalize
portions of its nonaviation program support, and State and Defense are
seeking to transfer a portion of the assistance Defense manages in
other program areas to the Colombians by 2010. Justice and USAID view
their efforts as extending over a longer period than U.S. support to
the Colombian military and have not yet developed specific
nationalization plans; however, each agency is seeking to provide its
Colombian counterparts with the technical capabilities needed to manage
program operations on their own. U.S. nationalization efforts
collectively face the challenges of uncertain funding levels and
questions pertaining to Colombia's near-term ability to assume
additional funding responsibilities.
State Has Defined Nationalization Plans for the Army Aviation Brigade
and Plans to Provide Ongoing Support for National Police Aviation
Programs:
State has initiated the transfer of program funding and operations for
the Army Aviation Brigade to the Colombians--by far the largest
aviation program funded by State. Nationalization efforts have centered
on a contractor reduction plan created by State in 2004 to eliminate
the Colombians' reliance on U.S. contract pilots and mechanics (see
fig. 18).[Footnote 72] This process, however, will not be completed
until at least 2012 when State expects the Colombians will have enough
trained pilots and mechanics to operate the brigade on their own.
Contract pilot and mechanic totals provided by State indicate that the
plan is on track.[Footnote 73] U.S. officials added that the transfer
of U.S. titled aircraft and the termination of U.S. support for other
costs, such as parts and supplies, will occur by 2012 as part of this
plan.
Figure 18: State's Contractor Reduction Plan for the Army Aviation
Brigade, 2004-2010:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a multiple vertical bar graph depicting the following
data:
Year: 2004;
Number of pilots: 82;
Number of mechanics: 312.
Year: 2005;
Number of pilots: 100;
Number of mechanics: 266.
Year: 2006;
Number of pilots: 70;
Number of mechanics: 213.
Year: 2007;
Number of pilots: 38;
Number of mechanics: 173.
Year: 2008;
Number of pilots: 28;
Number of mechanics: 120.
Year: 2009;
Number of pilots: 6;
Number of mechanics: 63.
Year: 2010;
Number of pilots: 6;
Number of mechanics: 24.
Source: State Department.
Note: State officials noted that targets for 2011 and 2012 will be
negotiated in connection with renewal up the PCHP support contract in
2010.
[End of figure]
In contrast to the Army Aviation Brigade, State has not developed
contractor reduction plans for the National Police's Air Service or
Aerial Eradication Program--the second and third largest aviation
programs supported by State, which work together to address U.S. and
Colombian counternarcotics objectives. U.S. Embassy and State program
officials explained that State's assistance to the police is expected
to continue for the indefinite future, subject to congressional funding
decisions, to sustain a partnership with the police which predates Plan
Colombia. However, State has taken certain steps, such as training
Colombian mechanics to replace contract personnel, to reduce the
Colombian's dependence on U.S. assistance. As of June 2008, only 3 of
the Colombian National Police's Air Service 233 pilots were contract
personnel, while 61 out of 422 mechanics were contractors. For the
Colombian National Police's Aerial Eradication Program, as of June
2008, 61 out of 76 pilots were contract personnel, while 166 out of 172
mechanics were contract staff. NAS plans to institute a series of
efforts, including the training of spray plane mechanics, to increase
the ability of the Colombians to assume a greater share of total
program costs.
Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Cuts Accelerated Nationalization Efforts:
U.S. nationalization efforts were accelerated in the wake of the fiscal
year 2008 budget cuts instituted by Congress but remain focused on
State funded aviation programs. Based on discussions with the
Colombians beginning in 2007, the United States identified six key
elements of NAS aviation programs as a starting point for accelerated
nationalization efforts, which supplement the steps described above. As
show in table 4, these six areas cut across U.S. supported aviation
programs in Colombia. U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials estimated that
these actions could result in nearly $70 million in annual program
savings. NAS is currently seeking to identify additional budget savings
by reducing its aerial spray program and through a wide assortment of
"efficiencies" they expect to implement. State officials noted that
these reductions and efficiencies will lead to diminished eradication
and interdiction results.
Table 4: Aviation Program Nationalization Efforts Supported by State
(Dollars in millions):
Assets/program: Infrastructure Security Strategy;
Nationalization date (actual or expected): November 2007;
Estimated annual recurring savings to the United States[A]: $3 million;
Description: Nine helicopters devoted to the ISS project were
transferred to Colombia in November 2007. All related support costs
were also transferred at that time.
Assets/program: K-Max;
Nationalization date (actual or expected): February 2008;
Estimated annual recurring savings to the United States[A]: $5 million;
Description: These helicopters were not highly valued by the Colombians
given their limited utility to support drug eradication or interdiction
efforts. The helicopters were removed from the country.
Assets/program: Colombian National Police titled aircraft;
Nationalization date (actual or expected): March 2008;
Estimated annual recurring savings to the United States[A]: $2 million;
Description: Transition of support responsibility for 13 ARAVI aircraft
took place in March 2008.
Assets/program: 18 UH1Ns;
Nationalization date (actual or expected): July 2008;
Estimated annual recurring savings to the United States[A]: $29
million;
Description: The Colombian Army Aviation Brigade has assumed operating
responsibility for these aircraft under a loan agreement with the
United States, which runs through December 2009.
Assets/program: Fuel costs;
Nationalization date (actual or expected): October 2008;
Estimated annual recurring savings to the United States[A]: $14-18
million;
Description: The transfer of fuel costs to the Colombians took place on
October 1, 2008.
Assets/program: Air Bridge Denial;
Nationalization date (actual or expected): January 2010;
Estimated annual recurring savings to the United States[A]: $10
million;
Description: Transition of the Air Bridge Denial program is under way,
with a signed letter of agreement and aircraft titles transferred to
the Colombians. The next step will be a 2-year transition of
maintenance responsibilities to the Colombian Air Force.
Source: NAS Bogotá.
[A] All savings are estimates. Actual savings will not be known until
all contracts are renegotiated to reflect changes due to
nationalization.
[End of table]
State has made significant progress in nationalizing nonaviation
programs, including support for interdiction efforts (seaport, airport
security, base security and roads, and Junglas operations) and programs
designed to extend the Colombian government's presence throughout the
country (mainly, reestablishing a National Police presence in all
municipalities); and an individual deserter program, which supplements
the formal demobilization and re-integration programs managed by USAID.
NAS largely describes all of these programs, with regards to U.S.
funded employee or contractor involvement, as being fully nationalized
or nearly nationalized with only limited U.S. oversight or technical
assistance being provided.
Defense and State are Working on a Transition Strategy:
Defense nationalization efforts are managed by the U.S. military group
in Bogotá. A senior military group official noted that Defense's
nationalization efforts are based on limited draw downs in Defense
managed funds which include both State FMF funds and Defense's
counternarcotics budget. The U.S. government is seeking to establish a
strategic partnership with Colombia by 2010 whereby the Colombian
Ministry of Defense will accelerate its efforts to assume increased
funding and management responsibilities for programs currently
supported with U.S. military assistance. The same official noted that
the Military Group has closely coordinated this nationalization
strategy with the Colombian military at all levels since November 2007.
According to Defense officials, the 2008 cuts in FMF and Defense
funding led to a reexamination of plans to transition some program
funding and implementation responsibilities to the Colombians.[Footnote
74] In line with this reexamination, the U.S. Military Group in Bogotá
and State's Bureau for Political and Military Affairs are developing a
report to Congress which will detail their strategy to reduce FMF and
Defense counternarcotics support over the next several years with an
initial focus on 2010 when it is hoped the Colombians will reach a
point of "irreversibility" with regards to security advances against
the FARC and other illegal armed groups.
USAID and Justice Efforts Focus on Sustainability and Will Take Years
to Implement:
USAID and Justice are focusing on the sustainability of projects and
providing the Colombians with the technical capabilities to manage
their own programs; however, neither agency has developed comprehensive
transition plans.[Footnote 75] USAID and Justice efforts to transfer
program and funding responsibilities differ significantly from State
and Defense since, with limited exceptions, they do not have physical
assets to turn over to the Colombians. Rather, their efforts center on
training and capacity building to allow the Colombians to ultimately
manage their own programs.
USAID efforts focus on developing sustainable nonmilitary assistance
programs, increasing the capacity of the government of Colombia to
design and manage similar projects, and transferring any support
activities, as warranted. USAID is seeking to create sustainable
projects, in part, by increasing financial participation by the
Colombian government, private sector, and project beneficiaries. For
example, USAID alternative development projects are funded 70 percent
to 90 percent by outside groups, on average, and have over $500 million
in public and private funds.
USAID is also seeking to increase the Colombians' ability to design and
manage their own assistance programs by involving relevant government
of Colombia staff in project design and implementation activities. For
example, USAID provides technical assistance to the government of
Colombia on financial policy reforms that seek to expand financial
services to underserved groups and isolated regions. USAID also
provides training to Colombian banks, credit unions, and
nongovernmental organizations to establish and expand financial
services for these groups. USAID has made efforts to transfer specific
program operations and funding responsibilities for several projects.
For example, USAID is transferring the Human Rights Early Warning
System, which was originally funded entirely by USAID. Under an
agreement, the government of Colombia currently funds 30 percent of
this program and is supposed to assume full operational and financial
responsibilities of this program in 2011. In addition, USAID will now
contribute no more than 50 percent toward the construction of Justice
Houses, which were initially constructed entirely with USAID funds.
Justice efforts focus on building the capacity of the Colombian
government in several areas, such as increasing the ability of the
government to investigate and prosecute crimes, as well as provide
protection to witnesses and legal personnel. Justice officials describe
the process as one of creating an enduring partnership with the
Colombian government through the provision of training and technical
assistance. Justice conducts many "train the trainers" programs
designed to enhance the ability of the Colombian government to
continuously build institutional knowledge in certain program areas.
Uncertain U.S. Assistance Levels and Government of Colombia Funding
Complicate Nationalization Efforts:
Both U.S. and Colombian officials said the congressionally mandated
cuts to military assistance in 2008 and uncertainty over future years'
funding complicate the process of planning and implementing
nationalization efforts. In addition, while Colombia's economic outlook
has improved in recent years, its ability to appropriate funds quickly
or reallocate funds already approved is limited.
U.S. Congressionally Mandated Spending Cuts Altered Nationalization
Plans:
State noted in its April 2008 multiyear strategy report to Congress
that the fiscal year 2008 budget significantly changed the mix of U.S.
assistance to Colombia by reducing eradication, interdiction, and FMF
programs and increasing support for economic development, rule of law,
human rights, and humanitarian assistance. The report notes agreement
with Congress on the importance of increasing support for nonmilitary
programs, but State expressed concern regarding Colombia's ability to
use this assistance without the security that air mobility assets
provide. The report also notes State's concern about the need to
"ensure a smooth and coordinated transition of financial and
operational responsibilities to the government of Colombia for
interdiction, eradication, and counterterrorism programs."
The Colombian Vice Minister of Defense stressed that the budget cuts
mandated by Congress could not be fully absorbed within Colombia's
current budget cycle and added that the Ministry of Defense is severely
restricted in its ability to reprogram funds or request emergency
spending from the central government. He also said that unplanned cuts
of this magnitude put major programs at risk, in particular programs
aimed at providing the Colombians with air mobility capabilities needed
to support drug reduction, enhanced state presence, and a range of
social and economic programs.
Both U.S. and Colombian officials are working on a detailed
nationalization agreement that would outline next steps, transition
plans, key players and responsibilities, and potential funding sources.
[Footnote 76] In line with this objective, the Colombians have formed
an Office of Special Projects to head up all nationalization efforts
involving the Ministry of Defense. The office Director told us that,
while all prior attempts at nationalization planning have not been
implemented, the government of Colombia has begun a serious effort to
plan for nationalization. According to the Director, this effort
includes (1) developing an inventory of all U.S. assistance provided to
Colombia in order to identify potential candidates for nationalization,
(2) prioritizing the list and working with the Ministry of Financing
and the National Planning Department to ensure that adequate funds will
be made available to finance these priority items, and (3) discussing
the prioritized list with U.S. representatives.
Colombia's Ability to Assume Program Costs Has Improved:
Despite an improving economy and growth in public-sector resources, the
Colombians have issued a call for international assistance to help fund
a portion of PCCP from 2007 through 2013 noting that even a "single
year without international support would force a retreat on the
important advances that have been made so far." The call for assistance
is similar to that issued by the Colombians at the outset of Plan
Colombia, when internal security concerns and poor economic conditions
limited the Colombian government's ability to fund its counternarcotics
and counterterrorism objectives. The PCCP plan calls for spending by
Colombia to total almost $44 billion from 2007 through 2013, with $6
billion of this total devoted to counternarcotics and counterterrorism
operations and the balance devoted to social, economic, and rule of law
efforts.[Footnote 77]
When Plan Colombia was first announced in 1999, a combination of
domestic and foreign events limited Colombia's economic growth and its
ability to fully fund the costs of its plan. As noted in a November
2007 assessment by the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS),[Footnote 78] Colombia's financial system experienced a period
of stress, during the late 1990s, characterized by the failure of
several banks and other financial institutions, as well as by the
severe deterioration of the system's financial health. The situation
was exacerbated by violent conflict and, in 1999, the country's gross
domestic product fell by 4.2 percent, the first contraction in output
since the 1930s. In 2003, we reported that Colombia's ability to
provide additional funding to sustain the counternarcotics programs
without a greatly improved economy was limited.[Footnote 79]
Improvements in Colombia's security environment and economy have
allowed the government to significantly increase spending levels in a
number of areas. Colombia's $130 billion economy grew at 6.8 percent in
2006, the highest rate in 28 years and two points faster than the Latin
American average. Colombia has reduced its inflation rate from 16.7
percent in 1998 to 4.5 percent in 2006. According to the CSIS report,
Colombia has improved its economy through a combination of fiscal
reforms, public debt management, reduction of inflation, and
strengthening of the financial system--policies that, along with three
successive International Monetary Fund arrangements, have placed the
country on a path of sustainable growth while reducing poverty and
unemployment.
Conclusions:
While Plan Colombia's drug reduction goals were not fully met, U.S.
assistance has helped stabilize Colombia's internal security situation
by weakening the power of illegal armed groups to hold disputed areas
that largely correlate to the major coca growing regions in the
country. State anticipates that billions of dollars in additional aid
will need to be provided to Colombia through at least 2013 to help
achieve a desired end-state where drug, security, social and economic
welfare, and civil society problems reach manageable levels.
One principal challenge is determining which combination of military
and nonmilitary programs will have the greatest affect on combating the
drug trade in Colombia. Program activities in the past have relied
heavily on the use of aerial spraying as a key tool for driving down
coca cultivation levels, and the vast bulk of U.S. counternarcotics
assistance has gone to eradication and interdiction efforts. However,
coca cultivation reduction goals were not met. As a result, Congress
directed a decreased emphasis on aerial eradication, while directing
that more be spent on alternative development and in other nonmilitary
program areas. However, USAID does not currently measure the effect
alternative development has on this goal or the extent to which its
programs are self-sustaining.
Congress has renewed its call for accelerated nationalization efforts
on the part of State and other U.S. agencies operating in Colombia.
Both State and Defense are engaged in reducing assistance for military
and police programs. USAID and Justice officials agree that sustainable
nonmilitary programs will take years to develop, however, both agencies
have begun to nationalize some portions of their assistance. While high-
level planning for nationalization has taken place and several discrete
planning efforts are in place or are under development, U.S.
nationalization efforts are not guided by an integrated plan that fully
addresses the complex mix of agency programs, differing agency goals,
and varying timetables for nationalization. Such a plan should include
key milestones and future funding requirements that take into account
the government of Colombia's ability to assume program costs supported
by the United States.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Secretary of State, in conjunction with the
Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, and Administrator of USAID, and
in coordination with the government of Colombia, develop an integrated
nationalization plan that details plans for turning over operational
and funding responsibilities for U.S.-supported programs to Colombia.
This plan should define U.S. roles and responsibilities for all U.S.-
supported military and non-military programs. Other key plan elements
should include future funding requirements; a detailed assessment of
Colombia's fiscal situation, spending priorities, and ability to assume
additional funding responsibilities; and specific milestones for
completing the transition to the Colombians.
We also recommend that the Director of Foreign Assistance and
Administrator of USAID develop performance measurements that will help
USAID (1) assess whether alternative development assistance is reducing
the production of illicit narcotics, and (2) determine to what extent
the agency's alternative development projects are self-sustaining.
Agency Comments and Evaluation:
We provided a draft of this report to the departments of Defense,
Homeland Security, Justice, and State; ONDCP; and USAID for their
comments. Defense, State, ONDCP, and USAID provided written comments,
which are reproduced in appendixes IV through VII. All except Homeland
Security provided technical comments and updates, which we incorporated
in the report, as appropriate.[Footnote 80]
In commenting on our recommendation to the Secretary of State, State
agreed that it should continue to improve the coordination of
nationalization efforts among Defense, other executive branch agencies,
and the government of Colombia. State noted that its annual multiyear
strategy report (which it first provided to Congress in 2006) offers
the most useful format to address our recommendation. While State's
annual report is useful, it does not incorporate and rationalize the
complex mix of agency programs, funding plans and schedules, differing
agency goals, and varying timetables for nationalization as we
recommend. State did not address how it intends to address these more
detailed elements with Defense, Justice, and USAID. We continue to
believe that an integrated plan addressing these elements would benefit
the interagency and the Congress alike, as future assistance for
Colombia is considered.
In commenting on our recommendation to the Administrator of USAID,
USAID stated that the measures it has are sufficient to gauge progress
towards its strategic goals. However, USAID went on to say that better
measures/indicators to assess alternative development projects could be
developed. The USAID mission in Colombia noted that it is working with
the USAID missions in Bolivia and Peru, which also manage alternative
development programs, to identify new indicators to help measure
progress. The USAID/Colombia mission also stated that USAID/Washington
should lead an effort, in conjunction with the field and other
interested agencies, to develop common indicators that would enhance
USAID's ability to measure alternative development performance. We
concur. In making our recommendation, we concluded that USAID's
measures were largely output indicators that did not directly address
reducing illicit drug activities or the long-term sustainability of
USAID's efforts. An overall review such as USAID/Colombia suggests may
help address this shortcoming.
ONDCP and State commented that our draft report left the impression
that little or no progress had been made with regards to Plan
Colombia's counternarcotics goal. In response, we modified the report
title and specific references in the report to better reflect that some
progress was made; primarily, opium poppy cultivation and heroin
production were reduced by about 50 percent. However, coca cultivation
and cocaine production have been the focus of Colombian and U.S. drug
reduction efforts since 2000. Neither was reduced; rather, both coca
cultivation and cocaine production rose from 2000 to 2006. However, at
ONDCP's suggestion, we added current information that suggests cocaine
productivity (cocaine yield per hectare of coca) in Colombia has
declined in recent years.
Finally, ONDCP also commented that the report did not adequately
address the full range of program goals associated with Plan Colombia
and the progress made towards achieving these goals. We disagree. In
characterizing and summarizing Plan Colombia's goals and U.S. programs,
we reviewed reports prepared by State as well as our prior reports, and
discussed the goals and associated programs with U.S. officials both in
Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, and with numerous
government of Colombia officials. We addressed U.S. assistance provided
for nine specific Colombian military and National Police programs to
increase their operational capacity, as well as numerous State,
Justice, and USAID efforts to promote social and economic justice,
including alternative development, and to promote the rule of law,
including judicial reform and capacity building. We also note that
State, USAID, and Defense did not raise similar concerns.
As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense and
State; the Attorney General; the Director of Foreign Assistance and
USAID Administrator; and the Director of ONDCP. We will also make
copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will
be available at no charge on the GAO web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4268 or FordJ@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford, Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
We examined U.S. assistance efforts since 2000 when funding for Plan
Colombia was first approved. Specifically, we examined (1) the progress
made toward Plan Colombia's drug reduction and enhanced security
objectives; (2) program support provided to the Colombian military and
National Police, including specific results and related challenges; (3)
nonmilitary program support provided to Colombia, including specific
results and related challenges; and (4) the status of U.S. and
Colombian efforts to nationalize U.S. assistance and the challenges, if
any, these efforts face.
Drug Reduction and Enhanced Security:
To address the progress made toward Plan Colombia's drug reduction and
enhanced security objectives, we reviewed various U.S. and Colombian
government reports and met with cognizant officials to discuss trends
and the nature of the data. For trends in drug cultivation, production,
and flow we relied primarily on U.S. agencies' information and
officials. For trends in security data on government territorial
control, homicides, kidnappings, and ridership on Colombian roads, we
relied on data reported by the Colombian Ministry of Defense and other
Colombian government ministries.
Drug Reduction:
To evaluate trends in Colombian drug cultivation and trafficking since
calendar year 2000, we reviewed various studies, such as the National
Drug Threat Assessment produced each year by the National Drug
Intelligence Center. We reviewed various strategy documents produced by
the United States that are the basis for overall drug control efforts,
such as the Office of National Drug Control Policy's (ONDCP) annual
National Drug Control Strategy, and the Department of State's (State)
annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR).
* To track changes in coca cultivation and cocaine production trends in
Colombia we relied on the Interagency Assessment of Cocaine Movement
(IACM), an annual interagency study designed to advise policymakers and
resource analysts whose responsibilities include detection, monitoring,
and interdicting illegal drug shipments.
* To track changes in the combined amount of cocaine flowing towards
the United States from Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, we relied on IACM.
* Because no similar interagency flow assessments are done for heroin,
we obtained estimates of production and seizures from State's INCSR and
the National Drug Threat Assessments.
To understand how these estimates were developed, we discussed the
studies and overall trends in the illicit drug threat from Colombia
with officials from the Defense Intelligence Agency in Arlington,
Virginia; the Drug Enforcement Administration in Arlington, Virginia;
the Central Intelligence Agency's Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC),
Langley, Virginia; the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, Key West,
Florida; and the Narcotics Affairs Section and the U.S. Military Group,
U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, Colombia. We also met with and discussed these
overall trends with Colombian officials in the Ministries of Defense,
including the Deputy Minister of Defense. In addition, we compared the
patterns and trends for the cultivation, production, and movement of
cocaine and the cultivation and production of opium and noted that they
were broadly consistent.
We determined cultivation, production, and illicit narcotics flow data
have some limitations, due in part to the illegal nature of the drug
trade and the time lag inherent in collecting meaningful data. With
regard to estimates of coca cultivation and cocaine production levels
in Colombia, we noted that CNC expanded the number of hectares surveyed
for coca cultivation beginning in 2005 in response to concerns that
coca farmers were moving their operations to avoid aerial spray
operations. Between 2004 and 2006, CNC's survey area rose from 10.9
million hectares to 23.6 million hectares. This change complicates the
process of comparing pre-2005 cultivation levels with later year
estimates. In addition, because of methodological concerns, the IACM
began reporting in 2004 its estimated flow of cocaine as a range rather
than a point estimate. Notwithstanding these limitations, we determined
that these data were sufficiently reliable to provide an overall
indication of the relative magnitude of, and general trends in,
Colombia's illicit drug trade since 2000.
Security:
To evaluate security trends, we used data provided primarily by the
government of Colombia. To assess its reliability, we interviewed
knowledgeable officials at the U.S. Embassy Bogotá and compared general
patterns across data sets. We met with and discussed these overall
trends with Colombian officials in the Ministries of Defense (including
the Deputy Minister of Defense) and Justice (including the Colombian
Attorney General). Some civil society representatives expressed concern
that Colombian officials may be pressured to present favorable
statistics, and that some information may be exaggerated. Nonetheless,
U.S. officials, both in Washington, D.C., and Bogotá expressed
confidence that the data illustrate overall trends that are widely
accepted as accurate. U.S. officials added that while specific checks
on the validity of these data are not conducted, data provided by
Colombia are consistent with independent U.S. Embassy Bogotá reporting
on Colombia's political, military, and economic environment. As a
result, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to
indicate general trends in government territorial control, homicides,
kidnappings, and ridership between 2000 and 2006.
U.S. Assistance to the Colombian Military and National Police:
To assess program support provided to the Colombian military and
National Police since 2000, including results and related challenges,
we reviewed and analyzed congressional budget presentations, program
and project status reports, our prior reports, and related information.
We also reviewed program and budgetary data from the various
departments and agencies in Washington, D.C., that manage these
programs and met with officials responsible for these programs,
including officials from State and Defense, as well as the Office of
National Drug Control Policy. We met with cognizant U.S. officials at
the U.S. Southern Command headquarters, Miami, Florida; State's Office
of Aviation Programs headquarters, Patrick Air Force Base, Florida; and
the Joint Interagency Task Force-South, Key West, Florida. At the U.S.
Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia, we met with U.S. officials with the
Narcotics Affairs Section, the U.S. Military Group, and the Drug
Enforcement Administration, as well as U.S.-funded contractor
representatives assisting with the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade, the
National Police Air Service, and the police aerial eradication program.
In Bogotá, we also met with Colombian Ministry of Defense military and
police commanders and other officials, including the Deputy Minister of
Defense. We visited facilities and met with Colombian Army commanders
at the Army's Aviation Brigade headquarters in Tolemaida, the
Counternarcotics Brigade headquarters in Larandia, and Task Force-
Omega's operating base in La Macarena; and Colombian Marine commanders
at their operating base in Tumaco. We also visited facilities and met
with Colombian National Police commanders and other officials at its
main base in Guaymaral (near Bogotá) and a police operating base in
Tumaco, where we observed an aerial eradication mission in southern
Nariño.
To evaluate the reliability of funding and performance data (beyond the
drug cultivation, production, and flow, as well as security indicators
discussed above) provided by U.S. and Colombian officials, we analyzed
relevant U.S. and Colombian data sources and interviewed cognizant
officials to determine the basis for reported information. We performed
cross-checks of the data by comparing internal and external budget
reports (such as State and Defense Congressional Budget
Justifications), agency performance reports, and classified information
sources. We determined that the cost and performance data provided were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report.
U.S. Assistance for Nonmilitary Programs:
To assess nonmilitary program support provided since 2000, including
results and related challenges, we reviewed our prior reports along
with pertinent planning, implementation, strategic, and related
documents and met with cognizant U.S. officials at State and Justice
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in
Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia. To review
the progress of alternative development programs, we met USAID
officials and contractors in Washington, D.C., and in Colombia. We
reviewed pertinent planning documentation including USAID strategic
plans for 2000-2005 and 2006-2007, as well as progress reports produced
by USAID's prime contractor. We observed alternative development
programs in the departments of Bolivar, Huila, Popayán, and Santander.
To review efforts on internally displaced persons and demobilization,
we met with officials from USAID, Justice, and State's Population
Refugee and Migration Bureau in Washington, D.C., and in Colombia. We
interviewed government of Colombia officials from Acción Social, the
National Commission on Reconciliation and Reparations, the Ministry of
Interior and Justice, the Fiscalia, the Superior Council for the
Judiciary, Inspector General's Office, the Public Defenders
Directorate, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Labor and
Social Protection. We also met with the High Commissioner for
Reconciliation and Reintegration in Colombia, and with civil society
and private-sector representatives both in Washington, D.C., and
Colombia regarding human rights issues. We observed programs in the
cities of Bogotá, Cartagena, and Medellin.
To evaluate the reliability of funding and performance data provided by
U.S. and Colombian officials, we analyzed relevant U.S. and Colombian
data sources and interviewed cognizant officials to determine the basis
for reported information. We performed cross-checks of provided data
against internal agency budget documents and external U.S. budget
reports (such as State, USAID, and Justice Congressional Budget
Justifications), agency performance reports, and Colombian reports and
studies. We determined that the cost data provided by U.S. agencies was
sufficiently reliable for our purposes.
We did note certain limitations with regard to the performance data we
received from U.S. agencies. Because of the difficult security
situation in Colombia, U.S. agencies must often rely on third parties
to document performance data. In particular, the USAID Office of
Inspector General raised some concerns in May 2007 regarding the
consistency with which alternative development performance goals had
been defined, but was nevertheless able to use the data to determine
whether overall goals had been met. Consequently, we determined that
the data on families that have benefited from alternative development
assistance, infrastructure projects completed, hectares of licit
agricultural crops developed, and private-sector funds leveraged by
USAID activities were sufficiently reliable to allow for broad
comparisons of actual performance in 2007 against the goals that had
been set, but that these data could not be used for very precise
comparisons.
Efforts to Nationalize:
To determine the status of U.S. and Colombian efforts to nationalize
U.S. assistance, we reviewed planning and strategic documents related
to nationalization, including a memorandum of understanding between the
United States and Colombia regarding the transfer of programs. We met
with State and Defense officials in Washington, D.C.; State's Office of
Aviation Programs at Patrick Air Force Base; and U.S. Southern Command
in Florida. We met with a special consultant to State who was
conducting a strategic review of State programs in Colombia. In
Colombia, we met with designated U.S. Embassy Bogotá officials
responsible for managing U.S. nationalization efforts, along with an
ambassador appointed by State to lead negotiations with Colombia
regarding current and planned steps in the nationalization process. We
discussed the implications of nationalization with Colombian government
officials from the National Planning Department, the Ministry of
Defense (in particular, the Office of Special Projects charged with
leading the ministry's nationalization efforts), the Colombian Army and
National Police, the Ministry of Interior and Justice, and Acci“n
Social.
Finally, the information and observations on foreign law in this report
do not reflect our independent legal analysis but are based on
interviews with cognizant officials and secondary sources.
[End of section]
Appendix II: U.S. Support Provided to the Army Aviation Brigade and
Police Air Service:
State and Defense officials told us that the Army Aviation Brigade has
been provided with essential support services needed to manage a modern
combat aviation service, including infrastructure and maintenance
support; contract pilots and mechanics; assistance to train pilots and
mechanics; flight planning, safety, and quality control standards and
procedures; and a logistics system. Table 5 describes these support
services in more detail.
Table 5: U.S. Support Services Provided to the Army Aviation Brigade:
Agency: State and Defense;
Location: Tolemaida and 12 operating locations throughout Colombia;
Description: Infrastructure and maintenance support: State funded
construction of helipads, hangars, warehouses, offices, training
facilities, and other infrastructure. Defense funded the construction
of a new aviation brigade headquarters, base operations offices, and
hanger facilities. Defense also funded a Technical Assistance Field
Team, based at Tolemaida, to support the Aviation Brigade's maintenance
and logistics requirements and oversee contractor-provided maintenance
support for Colombia's FMS UH-60s. Tolemaida serves as the Aviation
Brigade's principal headquarters and maintenance center and is where
most of the maintenance on PCHP and FMS helicopters is performed.
Agency: State;
Location: Tolemaida and 12 operating locations;
Description: Contract pilots and mechanics: A State contractor provides
pilots and mechanics to ensure that the brigade has adequate personnel
to fly and maintain PCHP aircraft.
Agency: State and Defense;
Location: Tolemaida and 12 operating bases;
Description: Logistics support: A State contractor provides an array of
logistics services for the PCHP, including the provision of parts and
supplies. The Colombians make their own arrangements for FMS fleet
logistics requirements.
Agency: State and Defense;
Location: Tolemaida, Melgar, and U.S. locations;
Description: Pilot training: State and Defense fund entry-level and
advanced pilot training (classroom, simulated flight, hands-on, and on-
the-job) to Colombian Army personnel through a combination of training
offered at the Joint Initial Entry Rotary Wing School in Melgar,
Colombia; Tolemaida; and at U.S.-based training facilities including
Fort Rucker in Alabama. Defense assistance helped establish and support
the Joint Initial Entry Rotary Wing School within the Colombian Air
Force in 2001. The school trains entry-level pilots from all three
Colombian military services, including pilots flying the Army Aviation
Brigade's PCHP and FMS helicopters. Defense assistance to the school
included the provision of training helicopters, two helicopter
simulators, spare parts, fuel, computers, and other equipment. Entry-
level training provides the basis for pilots to become, with additional
training and experience, co-pilots and, eventually, pilots-in-command.
Pilot training is geared for the specific aircraft they intend to fly
and normally takes 2 to 3 years to complete; The police can also send
trainees to the Joint Initial Entry Rotary Wing School, but have relied
almost entirely on their own initial entry rotary wing flight school
located in Mariquita to train their own pilots. U.S. officials have
encouraged the Ministry of Defense to combine the two schools into a
single operation located at either Melgar or Mariquita to save
expenses. Ministry officials told us they will determine which of the
two schools to close by the end of 2008.
Agency: State and Defense;
Location: Tolemaida;
Description: Mechanics training: State and Defense provide training
through a combination of in-country and U.S.-based training resources.
This training combines both classroom and intensive on-the-job training
provided by State and Defense contractors. Mechanics progress through
three separate training phases--rising from journeyman to master
mechanics--a process that can take as long as 5 years.
Agency: State and Defense;
Location: Tolemaida and 10 operating bases;
Description: Flight safety and operating standards: U.S. assistance has
helped the Colombians incorporate U.S. aviation flight planning,
safety, and quality procedures into their own standards. For instance,
the Colombian Army's flying regulations are based on the U.S. Army
standards, which require a formal flight hour program, safety
procedures and checklists, and a host of other requirements.
Agency: Defense;
Location: Madrid Air Base outside Bogotá;
Description: Infrastructure and maintenance support: Defense is
supporting a limited aviation depot to conduct major repairs in-
country. At present, the Colombian military and police do not have the
capacity to perform major, depot-level repairs of helicopters,
requiring the Colombians to send engines, rotor blades, and other major
parts to the United States for costly repairs. When completed in 2009,
this facility will increase the capacity of the military and police to
perform major engine and rotor blade repairs for both the UH-IIs and
Blackhawks. According to an analysis of cost data prepared by the U.S.
Southern Command, a limited aviation depot should allow the Colombians
to save over $10 million each year in repair costs once the facility
becomes fully operational.
Agency: Defense;
Location: Bogotá;
Description: Logistics support: Defense is funding the establishment of
a Logistics Command and Control System. The three services and the
police all operate and maintain U.S.-built helicopters, but they have
no easy way to identify what spare parts each service has available and
where the parts are located. They also do not have a means of
exchanging funding information to pay for these parts. When completed
in 2010, the system will provide the military and police with an
integrated, software-based logistics network to manage five critical
functions: maintenance, warehouse, supply, finance, and human
resources. For instance, the system will enable each service to
determine inventory levels in real time, track service and supply
requisitions, and exchange funding data.
Source: U.S. Embassy Bogotá, Narcotics Affairs Section and U.S.
Military Group.
[End of table]
Similar to the Army Aviation Brigade, State has provided key program
support elements to the Colombian National Police's Air Service. These
elements include contract mechanics; mechanics training; the
construction of helipads and hangers; and funding for spare parts,
fuel, and other expenses. Table 6 describes these support services in
more detail.
Table 6: U.S. Support Services Provided to National Police Air Service:
Agency: State;
Location: Guaymaral and 4 operating locations throughout Colombia;
Description: Infrastructure and maintenance support: State funds,
hangars, warehouses, offices, training facilities and other
infrastructure. Guaymaral serves as the Police Air Service's (ARAVI)
principal headquarters and maintenance center and is where most of the
maintenance on U.S. and ARAVI-owned helicopters is performed.
Agency: State;
Location: Guayamaral and 4 operating locations throughout Colombia;
Description: Contract mechanics: State funds contract mechanics to
ensure ARAVI has adequate support to maintain NAS-supported aircraft.
Agency: State;
Location: Guaymaral, and 4 operating locations throughout Colombia;
Description: Logistics support: A State contractor provides an array of
logistics services for the NAS-supported ARAVI fleet, including the
provision of parts and supplies.
Agency: State;
Location: Mariquita and U.S. locations;
Description: Pilot training: State provides funding for entry level
rotary wing training at Mariquita as well as for UH-60 training in the
United States.
Agency: State;
Location: Guaymaral and other operating locations;
Description: Mechanics training: A State contractor provides intensive
on-the job training provided.
Agency: State;
Location: Bogotá and other locations;
Description: Search and rescue: NAS funded training to enable 13 ARAVI
personnel to become search and rescue paramedics, enabling them to
substitute in part for contract paramedics.
Agency: State;
Location: Guaymaral and other locations;
Description: Flight safety and operating procedures: State assistance
has helped the Colombians incorporate U.S. aviation flight planning,
safety and quality procedures into their own standards. In June 2003,
we reported on the results of a 2002 Aviation Resource Management
Survey conducted by State's Office of Aviation. The survey found
numerous deficiencies. For instance, ARAVI did not have a formal flying
hour program, and its safety program did not have formal risk
management practices. According to State officials, a more recent
Aviation Resource Management Survey, conducted in January 2008, found
that ARAVI had essentially resolved most of these problems and was
incorporating U.S. standards into its operating procedures.
Source: U.S. Embassy, Bogotá, Narcotics Affairs Section.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Estimated Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production in
Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, 2000-2007:
As illustrated in figure 19, the estimated number of hectares of coca
under cultivation in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru has varied since 2000
from an estimated 187,500 hectares to 233,000 hectares in 2007, and
averaged about 200,000 hectares since 2000. As noted in our report,
these changes were due, at least in part, to the Crime and Narcotics
Center's decision to increase the size of the coca cultivation survey
areas in Colombia from 2004 to 2006.
Figure 19: Coca Cultivation in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, 2000-2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following
data:
Coca Cultivation in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, 2000-2007 (in thousands
of hectares):
Year: 2000;
Colombia: 136;
Peru: 31.7;
Bolivia: 19.6;
Total: 187.3.
Year: 2001;
Colombia: 170;
Peru: 32.1;
Bolivia: 19.9;
Total: 222.
Year: 2002;
Colombia: 144;
Peru: 34.7;
Bolivia: 21.6;
Total: 200.3.
Year: 2003;
Colombia: 114;
Peru: 29.3;
Bolivia: 23.2;
Total: 166.5.
Year: 2004;
Colombia: 114;
Peru: 27.5;
Bolivia: 24.6;
Total: 166.1.
Year: 2005;
Colombia: 144;
Peru: 34;
Bolivia: 26.5;
Total: 204.5.
Year: 2006;
Colombia: 157;
Peru: 37;
Bolivia: 25.8;
Total: 219.8.
Year: 2007;
Colombia: 167;
Peru: 36;
Bolivia: 29.5;
Total: 232.5.
Source: 2006 and 2007 (interim) IACM and ONDCP.
Note: Coca cultivation estimates are produced by the Central
Intelligence Agency's Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC).
[End of figure]
The U.S. interagency counternarcotics community uses the number of
hectares of coca under cultivation to help estimate the amount of 100
percent pure cocaine that can be produced in each country. Essentially,
the community calculates production efficiency rates for turning coca
leaf into cocaine and applies it to the total number of hectares under
cultivation. As illustrated in figure 20, the total amount of estimated
pure cocaine produced in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru has fluctuated
since 2000 but has risen from 770 metric tons in 2000 to 865 metric
tons in 2007, and averaged about 860 metric tons per year since 2000.
Figure 20: Cocaine Production in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru, 2000-
2007:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a stacked vertical bar graph depicting the following
data:
Cocaine Production in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, 2000-2007 (in metric
tons of pure cocaine):
Year: 2000;
Colombia: 530;
Peru: 160;
Bolivia: 80;
Total: 770.
Year: 2001;
Colombia: 700;
Peru: 160;
Bolivia: 65;
Total: 925.
Year: 2002;
Colombia: 585;
Peru: 280;
Bolivia: 110;
Total: 975.
Year: 2003;
Colombia: 445;
Peru: 245;
Bolivia: 100;
Total: 790.
Year: 2004;
Colombia: 415;
Peru: 230;
Bolivia: 115;
Total: 760.
Year: 2005;
Colombia: 525;
Peru: 250;
Bolivia: 115;
Total: 890.
Year: 2006;
Colombia: 550;
Peru: 245;
Bolivia: 115;
Total: 910.
Year: 2007;
Colombia: 535;
Peru: 210;
Bolivia: 120;
Total: 865.
Source: 2006 and 2007 (interim) IACM and ONDCP.
[End of figure]
In 2008, the interagency counternarcotics community reduced Colombia's
estimated cocaine production efficiency rate for the years 2003 through
2007. The community attributed the reduced efficiency to Colombia's
efforts to eradicate coca. However, according to Drug Enforcement
Administration officials, the interagency had also raised the
production efficiency rate in Peru for 2002 through 2005 due to better
processing techniques, which offset much of the reduction in Colombia.
The Drug Enforcement Administration also noted that it has not
reassessed the cocaine production efficiency rate in Bolivia since
1993, but expects that Bolivia has improved its processing techniques
and is producing more pure cocaine than the interagency has estimated.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Defense:
Assistant Secretary Of Defense:
Global Security Affairs:
2900 Defense Pentagon:
Washington, D.C. 20301-2900:
September 17, 2008:
Mr. Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO Draft
Report, GAO-08-1077, "Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Met,
but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for
Reducing Assistance," dated August 15, 2008 (GAO Code 320521).
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the draft
report, which represents a generally accurate assessment of DoD support
to Colombia. The enclosed DoD comments are provided for incorporation,
along with this letter, as an appendix to the final report.
Should you have any questions concerning this response, please do not
hesitate to contact Mr. Edward Frothingham, Principal Director for
Transnational Threats, in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Counternarcotics, Counter-proliferation and Global
Threats, at (703) 697-7202.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Joseph A. Benkert:
Enclosure: As stated:
GAO Draft Report Dated August 15, 2008:
GAO-08-1077 (GAO Code 320521):
"Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Met, but Security Has
Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing
Assistance"
Department Of Defense Comments To The GAO Report:
Colombia's Security Improvements:
DoD agrees that Colombia has made dramatic security gains since 2000.
It is important to emphasize, however, that it is vital to continue to
help Colombia consolidate gains made against narcoterrorists and other
criminals until security improvements become irreversible.
DoD Efforts to Transfer Program Responsibility
DoD partially agrees that efforts to transfer program responsibility
have had mixed results. The report however, fails to note progress made
in DoD's model nationalization program - Ground Based Radars. Since
March 31, 2008, the Colombian Air Force has operated and maintained
five U.S. Air Force radars. DoD has initiated the Excess Defense
Articles process for the transfer of this property, currently scheduled
for 2010. [See comment 1]
DoD disagrees with a statement on page 64 of the draft report, which
states that "Defense officials noted that a comparable strategy to
guide an anticipated drawdown in Defense's counternarcotics support to
Colombia has not been developed." In fact, the U.S. Military Group in
Colombia briefed GAO on DoD's Strategic Partner Transition Plan, which
specifically addresses lower levels of DoD Counternarcotics funding
over the next several years. [See comment 2]
Following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's comment
letter dated September 17, 2008.
GAO Comments:
1. The transfer of these assets was not highlighted as a significant
example of nationalization during the course of our review when we met
with Defense officials in Washington, D.C., or the U.S. Military Group
in Bogotá. Nonetheless, we added a statement to report progress in this
area.
2. We incorporated Defense's observation that the Strategic Partner
Transition Plan addresses both Foreign Military Financing and Defense
counternarcotics funding. As noted in our report, however, State's
Political-Military Bureau declined to provide us a copy of the plan
until it is formally released to Congress. As a result, we were not
able to independently assess the plan's content and scope.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial
Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
September 17, 2008:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Plan
Colombia: Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Met, but Security Has Improved;
U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance," GAO
Job Code 320521.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Stuart Lippe, Senior Analyst, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs at
(202) 647-4208.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Bradford R. Higgins:
cc: GAO - Al Huntington:
WHA - Thomas Shannon:
INL - David Johnson:
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Met, but Security Has
Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance
(GAO-08-1077, GAO Code 320521):
The Department of State welcomes the opportunity to review GAO's draft
report "Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Met, but Security
Has Improved; U S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing
Assistance." Separately, the Department of State has provided a number
of technical comments for the factual content in the report, as you had
requested.
The Department further appreciates the wide consultations your staff
undertook in Washington and Bogota during the preparation of this
assessment. In particular, the report's finding that the security
climate has improved and resulted in significant public safety progress
is very welcome as this was a key result in our support to Plan
Colombia and its follow-on programs.
The Department acknowledges the accuracy of the GAO's finding that one
of the original goals for Plan Colombia - the reduction of coca
cultivation by 50 percent -- has not been reached. However, we believe
the report could have been strengthened by emphasizing that there had
been a rapid, more than three-fold increase in the area of coca under
cultivation during the late 1990's, and that this was brought to a halt
under Plan Colombia. Cultivation went from 50,000 hectares in 1995 to
169,000 hectares in 2001. By 2003, it had decreased to 113,000 hectares
after intensive aerial spraying began, but grew to 157,000 in 2006.
Cultivation of coca is, of course, only one measure for evaluating
progress in achieving counternarcotics objectives. The report did
include the eradication and interdiction programs that keep cocaine
from reaching the U.S. market, and alternative development programs
that provide new crop opportunities for farmers, but we believe that it
would have been strengthened had these programs been highlighted.
Moreover, declines in production potential because there is a reduced
yield for new plantings merited being taken into account.
One of our most important counternarcotics goals is to reduce the
supply of cocaine reaching the United States. In 2007, the Colombian
government reported that it had interdicted more than 190 metric tons
of cocaine and coca base and nearly 1,000 metric tons since 2000. At
the same time, aerial and manual eradication has removed additional
hundreds of tons of coca from production each year. Production
potential has been reduced as growers migrated from Putumayo, Guaviare
and Caqueta to more marginal areas, planting less productive coca. Pure
cocaine potential production because of reduced yields dropped from an
estimated 700 metric tons in 2001 to 610 metric tons in 2006.
Information that was announced by the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP) on September 10, 2008, and which we regret was not
available when the report was being drafted, indicates that new
productivity data shows that in 2007 Colombia's maximum production
potential dropped to about 535 metric tons of pure cocaine. Applying
this productivity information against cultivation data from previous
years, the past year estimates of cocaine production are also being
revised downward. Thus, ONDCP's 2006 estimate falls from 610 metric
tons to 550 metric tons. While ONDCP estimates that there were 167,000
hectares of coca fields in 2007, the actual production potential of
cocaine has declined by a significant 24 percent since 2001. [See
comment 1]
Reduction in coca cultivation and potential production, improved
eradication and interdiction capacity, and alternative development
growth were among a number of Plan Colombia goals sought by the U.S.
and Colombia. In fact, there are a wide range of additional
measurements that also demonstrate significant successes for U.S.
assistance, including Colombia's transition to a new accusatorial
system of justice and the extension of a police and other government
agencies' presence throughout the country. These Plan Colombia programs
and the increased security they have brought about, as the report
accurately noted, have helped reduce kidnapping and homicide rates, and
strengthened the capacity of the Colombian military and police to
address long-standing threats from narcotics trafficking and terrorist
organizations. Increased security also aided the Colombian government's
efforts to strengthen its economy, reduce poverty, improve human rights
and deliver humanitarian and social assistance. While the report
describes these achievements, we believe their significance warrants
this additional stressing.
In many ways, Colombian programs and U.S. support have evolved from our
original, more narrow focus into a comprehensive strategy that can now
serve as a model to inform efforts in other challenged or failing
states. The Department believes the report could have noted how this
evolution in the approach to Plan Colombia's goals and objectives
reflected an important flexibility as implementation progressed and the
new opportunities that were presented.
As World Bank President Robert Zoellick noted in his August 22
Washington Post op-ed, "Colombia's experience has shown that a
legitimate state cannot coexist with a thriving narcotics industry,
which will corrode the government, businesses and legal systems as well
as fund enemies." The broad strengthening of the Colombian state and
the re-energized vigor of its democracy will allow for continued
progress.
Demand for illegal drugs in the United States and Europe is by
definition beyond the scope of the report, but we find that it cannot
be overlooked in any consideration of the results of counternarcotics
programs, even if only mentioned here as a cautionary note for further
attention.
In turning to the report's recommendation that U.S. agencies develop an
integrated nationalization plan, we note "Plan Colombia" and its follow-
on "Strategy to Strengthen Democracy and Promote Social Development,"
both represent comprehensive Colombian strategy statements. The United
States, as well as others in the international community, support
separate elements of that strategy. The Colombian government's plans
for its future funding and programs are far larger than the envisioned
U.S. contributions, and one of Colombia's goals is to reduce the need
for international support over time. This Colombian strategy, as
described in our April 2007 and April 2008 reports to Congress,
represents a well thought-out plan that the United States supports in
cooperation with the Colombian government.
We agree that the Departments of State and Defense should continue to
improve coordination of nationalization plans between themselves and
with the Colombian government in managing the transition of our
military support programs. As the report states, significant steps are
already underway, and we appreciate this recognition.
The report also describes U.S. intentions to maintain support, albeit
at lesser levels, for the Colombian National Police's Aerial
Eradication Program and Aviation Service in order to address continuing
U.S. and Colombian counternarcotics objectives. Assistance for these
police programs was in place before the beginning of Plan Colombia and
will remain necessary in the future as we work with Colombian partners
to strengthen police eradication programs and rural police forces, and
maritime interdiction capabilities.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has developed
sector-specific nationalization plans that involve the transfer of
program responsibilities to Colombia. As the report noted, these
programs do not have substantial physical assets to transfer. Instead,
nationalization plans have focused on the Colombian government assuming
responsibility for the leadership of Plan Colombia and follow-on
programs initiatives that are also a high priority for the United
States.
The Department of Justice does not have a nationalization plan, as
such. Its programs provide support, technical training and capacity
building for justice sector and law enforcement programs that are
managed by Colombia. Justice is, however, increasingly focused on
"training the trainers" and, as the report also described in the case
of USAID, its programs do not involve the "turn over" of substantial
physical assets.
While there is presently strong Congressional funding support for these
social, economic development and rule of law programs, State, Justice
and USAID also agree on the need to improve coordination and promote
potential efficiencies to better transfer operations and funding
responsibilities to Colombia.
Finally, because so many of the "moving parts" of our assistance to
Colombia are quite different, the Department will consult with
Congressional Members and staff to keep them informed of the plans to
achieve U.S. policy goals and our efforts to incorporate and address
Congressional concerns in those plans. Improved coordination within the
Executive Branch as well as with the Congress is desirable. In
particular, the report on our multiyear strategy for assistance to
Colombia, which the Department of State has provided to Congress
annually since 2006, offers the most useful planning format through
which to further address the recommendations and concerns GAO has
described. This report can be expected soon after approval of the FY
2009 budget and will include more detailed information on the
transition of our assistance, in particular our military support
programs.
We appreciate your consideration of these comments, which have been
coordinated with the appropriate officials at the U.S. Departments of
State, Defense and Justice, the U.S. Agency for International
Development and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.
Following are GAO's comments on the State Department's comment letter
dated September 17, 2008.
GAO Comment:
1. We included additional information on coca cultivation and cocaine
production patterns in the final report. We also note that 2007 coca
cultivation and cocaine production data did not become available until
after this report was released for agency comments, and we have added
it, as appropriate.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Office of National Drug Control Policy:
Executive Office Of The President:
Office Of National Drug Control Policy:
Washington, D.C. 20503:
September 17, 2008:
Mr. Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548-0001:
Dear Mr. Ford:
We welcome the opportunity to review GAO's draft report "Plan Colombia:
Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S.
Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance" (GAO 08-
1077). We also request incorporation of the following response as an
appendix. In a separate document, as per your request, we have provided
comments on some of the factual content in the report.
ONDCP acknowledges your finding that one of the ten original goals for
the Colombian Government's Plan Colombia-a 50 percent reduction in the
growth, production, and distribution of illicit drugs within six years-
was not completely met. However, the report title gives the false
impression GAO addressed all ten goals of Plan Colombia, and that there
was limited or no success in drug reduction. [See comment 1] We submit
that Colombia's achievement in reducing, with U.S. support, illicit
drug production in heroin and cocaine should be acknowledged at the
very least as a partial success. Cocaine potential production decreased
by 24 percent, while heroin-reduction efforts actually exceeded the 50
percent goal. We would also underscore the fact that the other nine
goals for Plan Colombia were substantially met and/or exceeded. [See
comment 2]
Your report accurately demonstrates that maintaining security is
crucial to achieving all ten goals. In this regard, Plan Colombia has
fully succeeded. Nowhere is this more evident than on the drug-
reduction front. As you indicate, funding for Plan Colombia from 2000
through 2007 allowed for the development and implementation of programs
sufficiently robust to advance security and reduce the production of
illicit drugs. But the report does not take into account the dramatic
shift in funding that occurred in 2008 just as drug control programs
were beginning to bear fruit. Reduced, current-year funding has
adversely affected the employment of eradication assets. Eradication
goals slipped from 160,000 hectares in 2007 to 130,000 hectares in 2008
(nearly 20 percent) and will drop further to 100,000 hectares in 2009.
Spray aircraft have been reduced from 23 in 2007 to just 13 in 2008,
and the number of spray bases will decrease by 33 percent.
Today, we are seeing historic changes in the U.S. drug market. Heroin
purity continues on a downward trajectory. Between January 2007 and
June 2008, the price per pure gram of cocaine increased 27 percent and
cocaine retail purity fell nearly 16 percent. These supply reduction
indicators are complemented by signs of reduced demand that together
give evidence of a sustained, historic decrease in drug availability.
Without adequate funding, however, future success is in jeopardy.
We appreciate the opportunity to review the report and ask that you
consider placing greater emphasis on recent successes in combating
illicit drug production. We also propose altering the report's title to
suggest a broader view of Plan Colombia objectives - "Plan Colombia
Yields Substantially Improved Security; Drug Reduction Goals Partially
Achieved," for example - and adding a section that articulates the
challenges created by changes in the funding stream.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
John P. Walters:
Director:
Following are GAO's comments on the Office of National Drug Control
Policy's comment letter dated September 17, 2008.
GAO Comments:
1. We disagree. In characterizing and summarizing Plan Colombia's goals
and U.S. programs, we reviewed reports prepared by State as well as our
prior reports, and discussed the goals and associated programs with
U.S. officials both in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Embassy in
Bogotá, and with numerous government of Colombia officials. We
addressed U.S. assistance provided for nine specific Colombian military
and National Police programs to increase their operational capacity, as
well as, numerous State, Justice, and USAID efforts to promote social
and economic justice, including alternative development, and to promote
the rule of law, including judicial reform and capacity building. We
also note that State, USAID, and Defense did not raise similar
concerns.
2. The drop in potential cocaine production that ONDCP cites compares
2001 (when coca cultivation and production peaked) to 2007. Our report
compares 2000 (when U.S. funding for Plan Colombia was first approved)
to 2006 (Plan Colombia's drug reduction goal was tied to 6-year time
period). We also note that 2007 coca cultivation and cocaine production
data did not become available until after this report was released for
agency comments, and we have added it, as appropriate.
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International
Development:
USIAD:
From The American People:
U.S. Agency for International Development:
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW:
Washington, DC 20523:
[hyperlink, http://www.usaid.gov]:
September 11, 2008:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director:
International Affairs and Trade Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's
(USAID) response on the draft GAO report entitled "PLAN COLOMBIA: Drug
Reduction Goal Was Not Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies
Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing Assistance" (GAO-08-1077).
Separately, we have provided a number of technical comments on the
factual content of the report, as you requested.
We find the report's analysis of USAID assistance to be less thorough
than the State and Military sections, with several generalizations
requiring more analysis, which we have attempted to outline. There are
a few areas of clarification which we have detailed in the enclosed
commentary for your consideration. The report outlines several
constraints affecting our development efforts in Colombia. USAID agrees
with other USG agencies that we can improve coordination within the
Executive Branch as well as with the Congress. However, we continue to
rely on the Colombian government's strategies for its own development
as outlined in "Plan Colombia" and its follow-on "Strategy to
Strengthen Democracy and Promote Social Development," to serve as the
overarching framework for our support. In Colombia, USAID works very
closely with State Department offices involved in the assistance effort
and in close partnership with the Government of Colombia. As you will
see in the attached, USAID is working hard to promote nationalization
of the programs it is supporting. Regarding the report's recommendation
on developing better indicators, we believe it would be helpful for
USAID/Washington, in coordination with its field missions and the
interagency group, to develop common indicators that would enhance
USAID's ability to measure AD performance.
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the draft GAO report and
for the courtesies extended by your staff in the conduct of this
review.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Sean R. Mulvaney:
Assistant Administrator:
Bureau for Management:
Enclosure: a/s:
USAID Response to GAO Report:
"Plan Colombia: Drug Reduction Goal Was Not Met, but Security Has
Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed Plans for Reducing
Assistance"
(GAO-08-1077) August 2008:
Recommendation #1:
Joint Nationalization Plan: The GAO recommends that Secretary of State,
Secretary of Defense, Attorney General and the USAID Administrator, in
coordination with the government of Colombia, develop an integrated
nationalization plan that details plans for turning over operational
and funding responsibilities for U.S. supported programs to Colombia.
Response: In the draft report, the GAO team concludes that "Justice and
USAID have not yet developed detailed strategies and plans to guide
their nationalization efforts..." As discussed and presented to the GAO
team, USAID has developed nationalization or "Colombianization"
strategies for each of our programs. [See comment 1] These strategies
differ depending upon the sector, but they focus on increasing
Government of Colombia (GOC) or private sector support and investment
in activities concurrent with decreasing USAID resources, particularly
budget support for salaries. An equally important component of
nationalization is expanding Colombian operational control and
management of programs, and USAID has been very successful in achieving
this objective.
For example, with USAID/Colombia's Democracy and Governance (DG)
program, USAID has signed four agreements with key GOC partner
ministries to document political and financial commitments from GOC
stakeholders on actions they will take to achieve short and long term
program goals. For example, in USAID's Justice Program, USAID has
decreased its financial commitment from funding 100 percent of the cost
of a justice house to 40 percent. This is a direct result of USAID's
nationalization strategy and the agreement signed with the Ministry of
Interior and Justice. The GOC is picking up a large share of this
burden; of the 10 new regional justice houses that are being
constructed in rural post-conflict areas, USAID investments total $4
million, compared to $6 million invested by the GOC. Thus, the GOC is
clearly moving to fund the majority of investments in this program.
This trend is also reflected through USAID's support to Colombian
public defenders. Whereas USAID's justice program previously funded the
salaries of 35 defenders at a cost of approximately $361,000, the GOC
is now paying 100 percent of the salaries of more than 1,600 public
defenders with a GOC investment of more than $31 million.
A detailed nationalization strategy also guides USAID's Human Rights
Program. As mentioned above, USAID signed "Letters of Understanding"
with key GOC counterparts clearly outlining the GOC's financial and
political commitments. These efforts have already resulted in notable
progress toward nationalization; the GOC now assumes 100 percent of the
costs of the Communities at Risk Program and the Human Rights
Observatory. There have been similar results with the GOC's Protection
Program and Early Warning System; USAID now only supports 1.5 percent
of Protection Program's total costs ($676,000), compared to 18 percent
six years ago. Similar accomplishments are underway under the Early
Warning System. In 2003 USAID funded 100 percent of Early Warning
System annual costs ($532,000) and by 2009 USAID will be funding only
50 percent.
Under the Alternative Development (AD) program, private as well as
public sector resources are fundamental to nationalization. USAID-
supported AD projects are funded between 70 to 90 percent by outside
groups on average, and have leveraged over $700 million in 18 months to
support AD initiatives. USAID is currently assisting the GOC to
establish a government-wide policy, definition and budget for
alternative development and how it should be implemented and managed by
the GOC and other stakeholders. In anticipation of this new policy,
USAID made a formal request to the GOC to create an "Alternative
Development budget" across all implementing ministries and agencies in
the government. Currently, the GOC does not have such a budget, and
many ministries'/agencies' policies and programs are not coordinated
with each other. The creation of a government-wide AD budget is a
critical step to ensuring that the USG has a coordinated set of
entities with financial resources to which the AD program can be turned
over during the next several years.
USAID's nationalization strategy for the Internally Displaced Persons
(IDP) program has led to the leveraging of significant amounts of
funding from the GOC. Since 2000 USAID investments have remained
relatively static while GOC resources have skyrocketed. In 2003 the
GOC's budget for IDP assistance was approximately $67 million, while
USAID's was $41.5 million. In 2008, the GOC's budget is approximately
$528 million and USAID's budget was reduced to $35 million. The GOC has
entered into separate agreements with USAID partners with its own
financing, demonstrating the catalytic role our assistance plays.
With regards to the Demobilization and Reintegration (DR) program,
during the GAO team's visit, they heard first-hand how USAID was a
catalyst during the initial years of 2004-05 when the GOC was just
developing the DR program. Over the past several years GOC funding
significantly increased and USG funding has been less than 25 percent
of GOC resources. The GOC's projected budget for 2009-2011 is between
$130-145 million per year compared to USAID's projected levels of
approximately $16 million. USG assistance has always been complementary
to the GOC work, providing specific technical assistance in critical
areas. A new High Commissioner for Reintegration is now in place
providing the leadership needed to sustain this effort.
USAID is playing an important role in supporting the growth of the
Colombian economy to allow the GOC to increase spending levels and
decrease reliance on U.S. assistance. Colombia's economic takeoff after
2003 did not happen by chance. In the Trade Capacity Building Group of
the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations that started in 2004, the
U.S. and Colombian governments agreed on an ambitious agenda including
52 areas of economic reform needed for Colombia to better participate
in and benefit from the FTA. USAID provided technical assistance to the
GOC to help it design and implement policies ranging from fiscal reform
to financial sector strengthening to improving the environment for
small business, and many others. This effort has paid off, and should
be noted in the report. The World Bank's 2008 Doing Business report
ranked Colombia among the top ten reformers worldwide, citing Colombian
efforts supported by USAID. This reform agenda jump-started the
business environment: Colombia's $130 billion economy grew at 6.8
percent in 2006, the highest rate in 28 years and two points faster
than the Latin American average. Colombia has reduced its inflation
rate from 16.7 percent in 1998 to 4.5 percent in 2006.
In addition, regarding microfinance, USAID doesn't just advise on
existing policies or "involve relevant Colombian staff in project
design activities" (p. 65, last paragraph), but is supporting the GOC's
leadership in its efforts to reform the financial system and develop
the microfinance industry.
Another element of USAID's nationalization strategy has been the
initiation of consultative group meetings with its primary GOC
counterpart, Accion Social. Thematic consultative groups, made up of
USAID, GOC and USAID contractor personnel, meet on a regular basis,
reviewing implementation and progress towards agreed upon goals. A high
level consultative group made up of Accion Social and USAID senior
officers also meets regularly, fostering GOC ownership and voice in
management of programs.
Finally, USAID developed and presented a "Colombianization" strategy in
2006 as part of an inter-agency effort. While USAID's nationalization
effort is different than the Department of State's International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL) and the Department of
Defense (DOD), which are responsible for the transfer of assets,
USAID's focus is on reducing the dependence of the national government
on salary support and transferring of leadership to Colombian entities
in the four key sectors that are priorities for the U.S. government. As
demonstrated above in numbers, USAID has already been very successful
in "nationalizing" many of its programs.
Recommendation #2:
Performance Measurement: The GAO recommends that the Administrator of
USAID develop performance measurements to help USAID (1) assess whether
alternative development assistance is reducing the production of
illegal narcotics and (2) determine to what extent the agency's
alternative development projects are self-sustaining.
1) Reducing the production of illegal narcotics: Alternative
development (AD) assistance is one part of the USG's three prong
counternarcotics strategy, (the others being eradication and
interdiction and security assistance), which is not reflected in the
report. In this sense, AD programs are not social programs as labeled
in the draft report. [See comment 2] Four criteria guide AD
programming: economic development potential, existence of illicit
crops, existence of violence/conflict, and local government buy-in. The
report states that the "majority" of coca is grown outside of areas
where AD programs are in place. It is important to highlight that USAID
programs are active in difficult areas as characterized by coca
cultivation such as Norte Santander, Bolivar, Putumayo, parts of
Antioquia, Meta and other areas. AD is also a medium- to long-term
initiative. Preliminary results may be seen with one growing season,
but initiatives to achieve sustainable eradication of illicit crops may
take years to realize, as we have seen in areas such as Tibu, Norte de
Santander; Magdalena Medio, and Sur de Bolivar. Reducing or redeploying
scarce resources prematurely in order to relocate to other areas -
"chasing the coca" - could destabilize these fragile areas still
vulnerable to coca cultivation.
USAID supported AD programs are designed to have the greatest impact in
places where there are people, which is why programs cover half of the
geographic territory of the country where 80-85 percent of Colombians
live. [See comment 3] Further, USAID is working in areas directly
affected by the drug industry. In the 75 municipalities covered under
the ADAM program, there was presence of coca or poppy in 2001-07 in 73
percent of them, with the remaining municipalities directly bordering
those with presence. In the case of the 545 MIDAS supported
municipalities, coca or poppy is present in 31 percent, and 21 percent
of municipalities are bordering areas with growth. Another 12 percent
are "at risk" areas and the remainder is in zones "vulnerable" to the
illicit economy. It is also worth noting that the United Nation (UN)'s
verification of the coca free status [Footnote 1] of the townships in
which USAID's AD programs are located indicate that the United States
Government has helped establish coca-free bulwarks in 688 well-defined
areas where coca was either present or threatening. This is impressive
because it contributes to the sustainable eradication of illicit crops.
These municipalities are in departments of: Narifo, Putumayo, Cauca,
Antioquia, Bolivar, Santander, and Norte de Santander. Another
independent source indicates that, as a reflection of families affected
by the Colombian drug trade, USAID programs are positively impacting
social and economic development of 94 percent of families (361,000 out
of 382,600 families total) involved in the drug industry in those
communities. Primary coca cultivation areas do in fact lie within the
MIDAS/ADAM corridors.
Indicators: We believe USAID's AD efforts do not lack formal
measures/indicators to gauge whether AD initiatives contribute to our
stated strategic goals. However, it is true that these indicators are
not reported to Washington (Andean Counternarcotics Initiative (ACI)
indicators). A common complaint from field Missions regarding AD
programs is that Washington stakeholders prefer output oriented
indicators, which is why the mandatory indicators under AD projects are
focused on the output-based ACI indicators. Also, since AD is but one
part of the three-legged counternarcotics programming stool, the issue
of appropriate measures/indicators is not related solely to alternative
development. That said, USAID's MIDAS and ADAM programs include
indicators that assess impact at the community level, i.e., changes in
coca cultivation in municipalities where programs are in place,
political and social stabilization, among others.
To improve it's monitoring and evaluation system, USAID/Colombia is
working with the USAID/Peru and Bolivia missions to identify new
indicators to help measure progress toward strategic goals. We believe,
however, that USAID Washington should lead an effort, in conjunction
with the field and the interagency group, to develop common indicators
that would enhance USAID's ability to measure AD performance. [See
comment 4]
The report fails to link key indicators such as organizations
strengthened, increased gross market value and families benefited (from
technical assistance in productive activities) to sustainable impact at
the family and farm level. Thus, there appears to be no recognition of
the link between a permanent increase in productive capacity leading to
a permanent increase in income generating capacity, complemented by
strengthened associations more capable of advocating for members in the
marketplace, and sustainability. [See comment 5]
Self-sustaining: As noted in the previous section, all of USAID's
alternative development projects receive at a minimum 70 percent
support from outside sources. As a result, all of these activities will
continue after USAID support ends. [See comment 6]
Footnote:
During the UN's 734 verification missions since November of 2007, only
28 townships (4 percent) did not pass because of the presence of
illicit crops and eight verification missions (1 percent) could not be
undertaken because of security issues.
Following are GAO's comments on the U. S. Agency for International
Development's comment letter dated September 11, 2008.
GAO Comments:
1. We modified the report to note USAID has initiated nationalization
efforts for each of its major program areas and several major projects.
However, we note that USAID's nationalization efforts are program and
project specific and are not integrated with the range of other U.S.
government efforts, as we recommend should be done.
2. We believe we fairly characterized USAID's assistance role in the
counternarcotics strategy for Colombia. However, we did not intend to
imply that USAID alternative development programs are social programs.
We intended to note that USAID's assistance supports social
infrastructure, such as schools and other community projects. We
clarified the text where appropriate.
3. We only intended to note that most coca growing areas do not receive
USAID assistance for various reasons, including restrictions by the
government of Colombia. USAID resources are scarce and must be deployed
to the areas most likely to achieve sustainable results. We added text
to note that the majority of the Colombian population lives within the
geographic areas where USAID operates. However, the fact that the
majority of coca is cultivated outside of USAID's economic corridors
poses challenges for USAID's strategic goal of reducing the production
of illegal drugs.
4. We endorse and commend USAID/Colombia's attempt to work at both the
mission level and with USAID/Washington to develop common indicators
which would enhance USAID's ability to assess the performance of
alternative development projects.
5. We recognize key indicators such as increased gross market value and
number of families benefited are useful in determining the impact of
USAID programs at a family or farm level. However, these indicators do
not measure the sustainability of the projects, such as whether
families or businesses have continued in legal productive activities
after USAID assistance has ended.
6. We agree that outside support for USAID alternative development
projects is a key component of creating self-sustaining projects.
However, this point does not address the fact that USAID does not
currently collect and report data on whether USAID supported activities
continue after its involvement ends.
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgment:
GAO Contact:
Jess Ford, (202) 512-4268, or FordJ@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the above named individual, A.H. Huntington, III,
Assistant Director; Joseph Carney, Jonathan Fremont, Emily Gupta, Jose
Peña, and Michael ten Kate made key contributions to this report.
Technical assistance was provided by Joyce Evans, Jena Sinkfield, and
Cynthia Taylor.
[End of section]
Related GAO Products:
Drug Control: Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries Has
Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are
Needed. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-784].
Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008.
Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics
Efforts, but the Flow of Illicit Drugs into the United States Remains
High. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-215T].
Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2007.
Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics
Efforts, but Tons of Illicit Drugs Continue to Flow into the United
States, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1018].
Washington, D.C.: August 17, 2007.
State Department: State Has Initiated a More Systematic Approach for
Managing Its Aviation Fleet. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-07-264]. Washington, D.C.: February 2, 2007.
Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug
Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-06-200]. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2005.
Security Assistance: Efforts to Secure Colombia's Caño Limón-Coveñas
Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but Challenges Remain. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-971]. Washington, D.C.:
September 6, 2005.
Drug Control: Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has Implemented New
Safeguards, but Its Effect on Drug Trafficking Is Not Clear.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-970]. Washington,
D.C.: September 6, 2005.
Drug Control: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Is Beginning to
Show Intended Results, but Programs Are Not Readily Sustainable.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-726]. Washington,
D.C.: July 2, 2004.
Drug Control: Aviation Program Safety Concerns in Colombia Are Being
Addressed, but State's Planning and Budgeting Process Can Be Improved.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-918]. Washington,
D.C.: July 29, 2004.
Drug Control: Specific Performance Measures and Long-Term Costs for
U.S. Programs in Colombia Have Not Been Developed. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-783]. Washington, D.C.: June
16, 2003.
Drug Control: Financial and Management Challenges Continue to
Complicate Efforts to Reduce Illicit Drug Activities in Colombia.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-820T]. Washington,
D.C.: June 3, 2003.
Drug Control: Coca Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Colombia.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-319R]. Washington,
D.C.: January 8, 2003.
Drug Control: Efforts to Develop Alternatives to Cultivating Illicit
Crops in Colombia Have Made Little Progress and Face Serious Obstacles.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-291]. Washington,
D.C.: February 8, 2002.
Drug Control: Difficulties in Measuring Costs and Results of Transit
Zone Interdiction Efforts. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-02-13]. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2002.
Drug Control: State Department Provides Required Aviation Program
Support, but Safety and Security Should Be Enhanced. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-1021] Washington, D.C.:
September 14, 2001.
Drug Control: U.S. Assistance to Colombia Will Take Years to Produce
Results. [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-26].
Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2000.
Drug Control: Challenges in Implementing Plan Colombia. [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-01-76T]. Washington, D.C.:
October 12, 2000.
Drug Control: U.S. Efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean.
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/NSIAD-00-90R].
Washington, D.C.: February 18, 2000.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Although the government of Colombia announced Plan Colombia in
1999, U.S. funding for counternarcotics purposes was not approved until
July 2000, leading to some uncertainty about when the 6-year goal was
to be achieved. However, the Colombian government announced that it
intended to eliminate coca cultivation by August 2006. For the purposes
of this report, we use 2000 as the beginning of Plan Colombia and 2006
to mark its end. We also focus on the cultivation and processing of
illicit narcotics because only combined "distribution" or "flow" data
for South America is developed for cocaine and no flow data is
developed for heroin.
[2] The drug trade in Colombia is dominated by the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym, FARC); the National
Liberation Army (ELN); criminal gangs which include former members of
the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), which demobilized
under a peace agreement with the government; and several drug cartels.
[3] The National Police are part of the Ministry of Defense.
[4] Formally titled the Strategy to Strengthen Democracy and Promote
Social Development.
[5] Plan Colombia's security component is supplemented by government of
Colombia security strategies and military plans of operations issued
between 2003 and 2007. These strategies and plans are included in all
references to "Plan Colombia" and PCCP in this report.
[6] To obtain consistent and comparable funding data from each of the
departments and agencies involved, we use appropriated U.S. assistance
throughout this report. We refer to the funding as "provided," though
all of it may not have been obligated or expended.
[7] ONDCP establishes policies, priorities, and objectives for the
nation's drug control program. The Director of ONDCP evaluates,
coordinates, and oversees both the international and domestic anti-drug
efforts of executive branch agencies and ensures that such efforts
sustain and complement state and local anti-drug activities.
[8] These are the Army's Aviation Brigade and Infrastructure Security
Strategy, the Air Force's Air Bridge Denial Program, and the National
Police's Air Service and Aerial Eradication Program.
[9] See H. Report 109-152 (p. 63) accompanying H.R. 3057, the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act for fiscal
year 2006 and H. Report 109-486 (p. 40) accompanying H.R. 5522, the
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act
for fiscal year 2007.
[10] Report to Congress: U.S. Assistance Programs in Colombia and Plans
to Transfer Responsibilities to Colombia, March 2006.
[11] Report to Congress: U.S. Assistance Programs in Colombia, April
2007, and Report to Congress: U.S. Assistance Programs in Colombia,
April 2008.
[12] Coca cultivation estimates are produced by the Central
Intelligence Agency's Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC). CNC expanded
the number of hectares surveyed for coca growth beginning in 2004 in an
effort to improve the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the estimate.
Between 2004 and 2006, CNC's survey area rose from 10.9 million
hectares to 23.6 million hectares.
[13] ONDCP announced in September 2008 that estimated cocaine
production rates for 2003 through 2007 had been revised downward based
on the results of recent research showing diminished coca field yield
rates in Colombia. On the basis of these revised estimates, ONDCP noted
that cocaine production decreased by almost 25 percent from a high of
700 metric tons in 2001 to 535 metric tons in 2007.
[14] Hydrochloride laboratories are used in the final stages of
processing coca into cocaine and are considered high-value targets.
[15] Foreign Military Financing funds are appropriated to State but are
managed by the U.S. Military Group in Bogotá.
[16] FARC and ELN remain active. AUC was demobilized under the Justice
and Peace process instituted in 2003.
[17] FARC, ELN, and AUC are on State's list of terrorist organizations.
Recognizing that the insurgents and illicit drug activities are
inextricably linked, Congress provided "expanded authority" in 2002,
which enabled the government of Colombia to use U.S.-provided equipment
to fight groups designated as terrorist organizations as well as to
fight drug trafficking.
[18] The Secretary of State is required to file an annual report to
Congress on the activities of U.S. businesses that have entered into
agreements in the previous 12-month period with State or Defense to
carry out counternarcotics activities in Colombia. For example, see
Report to Congress on Certain Counternarcotics Activities in Colombia,
Apr. 21, 2008.
[19] Report to Congress: U.S. Assistance Programs in Colombia and Plans
to Transfer Responsibilities to Colombia, March 2006.
[20] Report to Congress: U.S. Assistance Programs in Colombia, March
2007; and Report to Congress: U.S. Assistance Programs in Colombia,
April 2008.
[21] According to ONDCP officials, a similar assessment is not done for
heroin.
[22] Not all of this cocaine reaches the United States. The United
States and other countries in the "transit zone" between South America
and the United States interdict hundreds of tons of cocaine a year. See
GAO, Drug Control: Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries
Has Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans
Are Needed, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-784]
(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008); GAO, Drug Control: U.S. Assistance
Has Helped Mexican Counternarcotics Efforts, but Tons of Illicit Drugs
Continue to Flow into the United States, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1018] (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
17, 2007); and GAO, Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely
Declines in Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance
Measures for Transit Zone Operations, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-200] (Washington, D.C.: Nov.
15, 2005).
[23] The analysis also suggested that while the government increased
its presence in most areas of the country, some became more contested,
including the southern department of Putumayo--a critical region of
coca cultivation--and the eastern department of Vichada, which borders
Venezuela.
[24] According to Defense officials, FARC derives about 80 percent of
its total revenue from drug trafficking.
[25] For example, Luis Edgar Devia Silva (alias "Raul Reyes"), a member
of FARC's central command, was killed in a raid over the border with
Ecuador in March 2008.
[26] International Crisis Group, Colombia's New Armed Groups, Latin
America Report Number 20, May 10, 2007.
[27] Pursuant to the "Leahy Amendment," U.S. assistance to the
Colombian military may only be provided to units that have been vetted
for human rights abuses as certified by the Secretary of State.
[28] The United States originally provided the brigade with a total of
72 helicopters (33 UH-1N, 25 UH-II, and 14 UH-60). According to State
officials, several aircraft were transferred to the police, some were
nationalized, and others have crashed.
[29] For example, this fleet includes seven UH-IIs and two Blackhawks
transferred to the Army Aviation Brigade as part of Colombia's
infrastructure security strategy.
[30] See GAO, Drug Control: Specific Performance Measures and Long-Term
Costs for U.S. Programs in Colombia Have Not Been Developed,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-783] (Washington,
D.C.: June 16, 2003).
[310] State officials noted that these levels represent nearly a 50 and
75 percent reduction, respectively, in on-hand contract pilots and
mechanics since 2004 when the contractor reduction plan was put in
place.
[32] This loan agreement runs through December 2009. During this
period, the Colombians have agreed to assume all operating and
maintenance costs.
[33] In August 2008, one of these helicopters crashed.
[34] The United States originally agreed to provide training and
equipment for a brigade made up of three battalions (which became
operational in December 1999, December 2000, and May 2001,
respectively) and a headquarters staff that initially totaled about
2,285 professional and conscripted soldiers.
[35] This support refers to the counternarcotics funding directly
appropriated to Defense, as well as FMF funds provided through State's
Bureau for Political-Military Affairs.
[36] According to Colombian officials, Joint Task Force-Omega was
established in 2004 to coordinate the efforts of the Colombian Army,
Air Force, and Marines against FARC in its traditional stronghold in
central Colombia, which incorporates portions of the departments of
Meta, Guaviare, and Caquetá.
[37] Defense Planning Assistance Training Teams provide military
planning and training to Colombian military units, including the mobile
brigades.
[38] Joint Task Force-Omega is supported by five mobile Army brigades.
According to Colombian officials, Joint Task Force-Omega, which is
comprised of about 10,000 soldiers, is tasked with clearing FARC from
central Colombia and holding reclaimed areas with a focus on the pilot
project for re-asserting government control in La Macarena in Meta.
[39] This strategy consisted of three phases. Phase one focused on
protecting the first 110 miles of the pipeline. Phase two was designed
to protect the rest of the pipeline, and phase three was to secure
other infrastructure throughout Colombia. However, phases two and three
of the strategy were later broadly incorporated into Colombia's Defense
Policy and Security Strategy in 2003.
[40] According to NAS officials, one of the UH-II helicopters crashed
in 2006.
[41] See GAO, Security Assistance: Efforts to Secure Colombia's Caño
Limón-Coveñas Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks, but Challenges Remain,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-971] (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005).
[42] State provided an additional $35 million in fiscal year 2001 to
the Colombian Air Force to upgrade interceptor aircraft. These are used
to the support the ABD program and other air force missions.
[43] The ABD program operated in both Colombia and Peru during the
1990s. The program was suspended in both countries in April 2001 when a
legitimate civilian aircraft was shot down in Peru and two U.S.
citizens were killed. The program was restarted in Colombia in August
2003 after additional safeguards were established.
[44] One of these aircraft crashed and is unrepairable.
[45] See GAO, Drug Control: Air Bridge Denial Program in Colombia Has
Implemented New Safeguards, But Its Effect on Drug Trafficking is Not
Clear,[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-970]
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005).
[46] Colombia's efforts are supplemented by U.S. interdiction resources
as described in our November 2005 report on transit zone operations.
See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-200].
[47] State officials told us that a total of 17 UH-1Ns are dedicated to
the eradication program. As of August 2008, 4 of these aircraft were
undergoing conversion to UH-1STs at Patrick Air Force Base as part of a
service life extension program. The cost of upgrading each aircraft is
approximately $3 million and the total estimated cost of upgrading all
17 aircraft is about $50 million.
[48] According to NAS officials, on average, an estimated 40 percent of
the coca eradicated is replanted, although in some cases, NAS officials
have validated that up to about 80 percent of the coca sprayed appears
to have been replanted or pruned.
[49] Ecuador has expressed concern that spray drifting across the
border into its territory has caused damage. In December 2005, Colombia
agreed to stop spraying within a 10-kilometer strip along its border
with Ecuador. However, due to concerns about the growth of coca in this
area, in late 2006, the Colombian government resumed spray operations
for 2 months, provoking a diplomatic dispute that has not been
resolved.
[50] All ARAVI pilots are Colombian National Police personnel.
[51] Defense is providing the Colombian Air Force with a Limited
Aviation Depot that will also service ARAVI helicopters, enabling the
military and police to perform some major depot-level repairs in
Colombia. Defense is also funding a Logistics Command and Control
System that will reduce the need for each service to maintain a full
complement of spare parts by allowing them to share parts.
[52] See GAO, State Department: State Has Initiated a More Systematic
Approach for Managing Its Aviation Fleet, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-264] (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
2, 2007).
[53] State officials told us that legislation eliminated funding for
this program in fiscal year 2008, but the Department has requested $19
million in funding for fiscal year 2009.
[54] According to NAS officials, the Carabineros' mission was later
expanded to include providing security for manual eradication efforts
and targeting the new criminal gangs formed in the wake of AUC's
demobilization.
[55] GAO, Drug Control: U.S. Nonmilitary Assistance to Colombia Is
Beginning to Show Intended Results, but Programs Are Not Readily
Sustainable, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-726]
(Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2004).
[56] Acción Social is USAID's government of Colombia counterpart for
alternative development and other social programs.
[57] Acción Social partners with the United Nations Office of Drug
Control (UNODC) to monitor areas that receive alternative development
assistance and verify they are coca and poppy free. According to USAID,
if illicit crops are found, all alternative development projects in the
community where the coca is found are to be suspended. The community
has up to 38 days to manually eradicate the crops, and UNODC will
return to verify if the illicit crops have been eradicated. If so, the
alternative development projects may resume.
[58] USAID tracked eradication of coca and poppy through the end of
2006. In 2007, USAID stopped tracking eradication of illicit crops
because alternative development program communities cannot cultivate
illicit drugs to participate.
[59] According to State, PRM also provided un-earmarked funding to the
United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross, a
portion of which may have been used to assist IDPs.
[60] The government of Colombia has a lengthy IDP registration process
and only registers people as IDPs if they have been displaced by
violence committed by a recognized illegal armed group, such as FARC or
ELN. Those who have been displaced by criminal gangs, by economic
hardship, or by eradication programs are not eligible for benefits.
[61] While the majority were pardoned, over 2,000 AUC combatants were
implicated in major crimes.
[62] According to the government of Colombia, since 2002, over 14,000
individuals have deserted from other illegal armed groups, primarily
FARC.
[63] The intelligence received from FARC deserters has been useful to
Colombian military officials. FARC desertion is on the rise; according
to the government of Colombia, 50 percent more FARC members deserted in
2007 than in 2006.
[64] USAID also supports the consolidation of security gains made
through governance support in conflictive zones.
[65] A Colombian constitutional mandate gives citizens the right to a
public defender.
[66] The 5-year Regional Governance Consolidation Program supports the
Coordination Center for Integrated Government Action (CCAI) in 26
municipalities, which the Colombian military regained control of from
the FARC more than 2 years ago, where CCAI works to provide both
security and services for the local population in order to consolidate
military gains. USAID assists CCAI in building the capacity of local
institutions (such as mayors' offices and city councils) to implement
good governance practices and improve the delivery of services.
[67] The Initial Governance Response Program supports CCAI in high-
priority municipalities in areas traditionally held by the FARC, which
are major producers of coca, and also the location of ongoing military
operations of the Colombian military. The program supports a Colombian
government project to combine military, police, and civilian efforts to
simultaneously support the different components of the "clear, hold,
and consolidate" strategy.
[68] USAID is also supporting CCAI on the development of a second
consolidation plan for four municipalities in the departments of Sucre
and Bolivar.
[69] The oral accusatory system was implemented in four geographic
phases between 2005 and January 2008. The Colombian constitution
requires that criminal cases be processed under either the old written
system or the new oral accusatory system, depending on when the alleged
crime occurred.
[70] These programs are the Army's Aviation Brigade and Infrastructure
Security Strategy, the Air Force's Air Bridge Denial Program, and the
National Police's Air Service and Aerial Eradication Program.
[71] State noted that it will seek to maintain pre-Plan Colombia
support levels, adjusted for inflation, to main "high impact" programs
such as the National Police's air service and aerial eradication
program, rural police support, and maritime interdiction efforts.
[72] In 2004, the NAS and the Office of Aviation in Bogotá brought key
staff together to discuss and develop a formal contractor reduction
plan for the Army Aviation Brigade centered on replacing contract
pilots and mechanics with Colombian Army personnel trained to Office of
Aviation standards. The working group defined "nationalization" as a
sustained capability within the Colombian Army Aviation Brigade to
support its operations using trained and equipped soldiers able to (1)
safely and successfully execute assigned missions while operating and
maintaining assigned aircraft to State's Office of Aviation standards,
and (2) operate with minimal U.S. government oversight while the
government of Colombia incrementally assumes funding responsibility.
[73] As of June 2008, 43 out of 336 pilots and 87 out of 283 mechanics
were contract personnel.
[74] According to the U.S. Military Group, it identified 20 programs it
considers vital to achieving "irreversibility" and maintaining a
strategic partnership with Colombia while still absorbing mandated
budget cuts. These programs are divided into eight program categories
ranked by funding priority as follows: rotary wing operations, ground
operations, riverine operations, fixed wing operations, joint
initiatives, naval interdiction, governability, and intelligence and
communication.
[75] In 2003 and 2004, we recommended that U.S. agencies develop plans
to guide future U.S. assistance to the Colombian military, National
Police, and civilian agencies. See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-03-783] and [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO-04-726].
[76] State declined to provide a copy of this strategy to us citing its
deliberative nature but claimed it substantially reflects congressional
concerns and will be made available to us and Congress as soon as
possible.
[77] Proposals developed by State, call for total military and
nonmilitary assistance of about $4 billion (fiscal years 2007 through
2013).
[78] Center for Strategic and International Studies. Back from the
Brink: Evaluating Progress in Colombia, 1999-2007 (Washington, D.C.:
November 2007).
[79] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-783].
[80] The Department of Homeland Security concluded our report did not
deal with any programs or projects under its control. As a result, they
offered no comments on the report's contents, findings, or
recommendations.
[End of section]
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