Radio Communications
Congressional Action Needed to Ensure Agencies Collaborate to Develop a Joint Solution Gao ID: GAO-09-133 December 12, 2008The Integrated Wireless Network (IWN) was intended to be a collaborative effort among the Departments of Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), and the Treasury to provide secure, seamless, interoperable, and reliable nationwide wireless communications in support of federal agents and officers engaged in law enforcement, protective services, homeland defense, and disaster response missions. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which the three departments are developing a joint radio communications solution. To address this objective, GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant documentation and interviewed department officials about the extent to which they are collaborating with the other departments on IWN or an alternative joint radio communications solution.
The Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and the Treasury had originally intended IWN to be a joint radio communications solution to improve communication among law enforcement agencies; however, IWN is no longer being pursued as a joint development project. Instead of focusing on a joint solution, the departments have begun independently modernizing their own wireless communications systems. While the Departments of Justice and the Treasury (and later the Department of Homeland Security) collaborated on a pilot demonstration of IWN in the Seattle/Blaine area that continues to provide service to multiple agencies, the departments have determined that this specific system design cannot be implemented on a nationwide scale, and they have not acted collaboratively to identify an alternative approach for a jointly coordinated communications solution. In addition, the formal governance structure that was established among the three departments has been disbanded, and the contract for developing a new IWN design, awarded over a year and a half ago, is not being used jointly by the departments for this purpose. Currently, the Department of Justice is planning to implement a nationwide network for its component agencies, and the Department of Homeland Security and its components are pursuing numerous independent solutions. A primary reason why the collaboration on a joint communications solution has not been successful is that the departments did not effectively employ key cross-agency collaboration practices. Specifically, they could not agree on a common outcome or purpose to overcome their differences in missions, cultures, and established ways of doing business; they have not established a collaborative governance structure with a process for decision making and resolving disputes; and they have not developed a joint strategy for moving forward. While the Department of Homeland Security considers improving radio communications at the nation's borders to be a major priority, the Department of Justice's priorities are in other areas. Program officials from both departments acknowledged that these differing priorities led to an inability to resolve conflicts. As a result, they now have several initiatives aimed at high-level coordination, none of which are focused on developing a joint communications solution. While department officials have signed an updated memorandum of understanding related to coordinating their radio communications projects, they have not made any progress on reestablishing a joint governance structure and decision-making procedures to address the challenges of collaborating on a joint communications solution. In abandoning collaboration on a joint solution, the departments risk duplication of effort and inefficient use of resources as they continue to invest significant resources in independent solutions. Further, these efforts will not ensure the interoperability needed to serve day-to-day law enforcement operations or a coordinated response to terrorist or other events.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-133, Radio Communications: Congressional Action Needed to Ensure Agencies Collaborate to Develop a Joint Solution
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-133
entitled 'Radio Communications: Congressional Action Needed to Ensure
Agencies Collaborate to Develop a Joint Solution' which was released on
December 12, 2008.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
December 2008:
Radio Communications:
Congressional Action Needed to Ensure Agencies Collaborate to Develop a
Joint Solution:
GAO-09-133:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-133, a report to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Integrated Wireless Network (IWN) was intended to be a
collaborative effort among the Departments of Justice (DOJ), Homeland
Security (DHS), and the Treasury to provide secure, seamless,
interoperable, and reliable nationwide wireless communications in
support of federal agents and officers engaged in law enforcement,
protective services, homeland defense, and disaster response missions.
GAO was asked to determine the extent to which the three departments
are developing a joint radio communications solution. To address this
objective, GAO reviewed and analyzed relevant documentation and
interviewed department officials about the extent to which they are
collaborating with the other departments on IWN or an alternative joint
radio communications solution.
What GAO Found:
The Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and the Treasury had
originally intended IWN to be a joint radio communications solution to
improve communication among law enforcement agencies; however, IWN is
no longer being pursued as a joint development project. Instead of
focusing on a joint solution, the departments have begun independently
modernizing their own wireless communications systems. While the
Departments of Justice and the Treasury (and later the Department of
Homeland Security) collaborated on a pilot demonstration of IWN in the
Seattle/Blaine area that continues to provide service to multiple
agencies, the departments have determined that this specific system
design cannot be implemented on a nationwide scale, and they have not
acted collaboratively to identify an alternative approach for a jointly
coordinated communications solution. In addition, the formal governance
structure that was established among the three departments has been
disbanded, and the contract for developing a new IWN design, awarded
over a year and a half ago, is not being used jointly by the
departments for this purpose. Currently, the Department of Justice is
planning to implement a nationwide network for its component agencies,
and the Department of Homeland Security and its components are pursuing
numerous independent solutions.
A primary reason why the collaboration on a joint communications
solution has not been successful is that the departments did not
effectively employ key cross-agency collaboration practices.
Specifically, they could not agree on a common outcome or purpose to
overcome their differences in missions, cultures, and established ways
of doing business; they have not established a collaborative governance
structure with a process for decision making and resolving disputes;
and they have not developed a joint strategy for moving forward. While
the Department of Homeland Security considers improving radio
communications at the nation‘s borders to be a major priority, the
Department of Justice‘s priorities are in other areas. Program
officials from both departments acknowledged that these differing
priorities led to an inability to resolve conflicts. As a result, they
now have several initiatives aimed at high-level coordination, none of
which are focused on developing a joint communications solution. While
department officials have signed an updated memorandum of understanding
related to coordinating their radio communications projects, they have
not made any progress on reestablishing a joint governance structure
and decision-making procedures to address the challenges of
collaborating on a joint communications solution.
In abandoning collaboration on a joint solution, the departments risk
duplication of effort and inefficient use of resources as they continue
to invest significant resources in independent solutions. Further,
these efforts will not ensure the interoperability needed to serve day-
to-day law enforcement operations or a coordinated response to
terrorist or other events.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is not recommending executive action. However, Congress should
consider, given the critical importance of improving radio
communications among federal agencies, requiring that DOJ, DHS, and the
Treasury employ key cross-agency collaboration practices to develop a
joint radio communications solution. In written comments on a draft of
this report, DOJ and DHS largely disagreed with GAO‘s findings and
conclusions. GAO continues to believe that adoption of key
collaborative practices is critical.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-133]. For more
information, contact Joel Willemssen at (202) 512-6253 or
willemssenj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Briefing to Staff of the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Justice:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of the Treasury:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Abbreviations:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
ECPC: Emergency Communications Preparedness Center:
IWN: Integrated Wireless Network:
NTIA: National Telecommunications and Information Administration:
MOU: memorandum of understanding:
OEC: Office of Emergency Communications:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
December 12, 2008:
The Honorable Joseph Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina have
highlighted the critical importance of having effective radio
communications systems for law enforcement and public safety agencies
including federal agencies with such responsibilities. In order to
effectively respond to events such as natural disasters, criminal
activities, and domestic terrorism, law enforcement and public safety
agencies need reliable systems that enable communication with their
counterparts in other disciplines and jurisdictions. Further, since the
1990s, increasing demand for radio communications capabilities in both
the private and public sectors has created a need to use radio
communications capacity more efficiently.
The Integrated Wireless Network (IWN) was intended to be a
collaborative effort among the Departments of Justice (DOJ), Homeland
Security (DHS), and the Treasury to provide secure, seamless,
interoperable,[Footnote 1] and reliable nationwide wireless
communications in support of federal agents and officers engaged in law
enforcement, protective services, homeland defense, and disaster
response missions. This initiative, begun in 2001, was originally
estimated to cost approximately $5 billion.
At your request, we determined the extent to which DOJ, DHS, and the
Treasury are developing a joint radio communications solution to
improve communications among federal agencies. To address this
objective,
* we reviewed and analyzed documentation from DOJ, DHS, and the
Treasury to determine the status of IWN,
* interviewed officials from each department about the extent to which
they are collaborating with the other departments on IWN or on an
alternative joint radio communications solution,
* reviewed and analyzed documentation for independent radio
communications projects at DOJ and DHS to identify actions the
departments are taking to improve their radio communications systems,
* reviewed and analyzed past and present agreements among the
departments to determine the extent to which a governance structure is
in place that enables effective collaboration, and:
* compared collaboration activities performed by the departments to
selected practices previously identified by GAO as helpful to
sustaining collaboration among federal agencies.[Footnote 2]
We performed our audit work in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area
at DOJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, DHS, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and
Border Protection, the Treasury, the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration, and the Office of Management and Budget. We also
conducted work at agency field offices in the Seattle, Washington,
metropolitan area, which was the location of a key pilot demonstration
for the IWN program.
We conducted this performance audit from February to September 2008, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
This report summarizes the information we provided to your staff during
our September 25, 2008, briefing. The full briefing, including our
objective, scope, and methodology, can be found in appendix I.
In summary, our briefing made the following points:
* DOJ, DHS, and the Treasury had originally intended IWN to be a joint
radio communications solution to improve communication among law
enforcement agencies; however, IWN is no longer being pursued as a
joint development project. Instead of focusing on a joint solution, the
departments have begun independently modernizing their own wireless
communications systems. While DOJ and the Treasury (and later DHS)
collaborated on a pilot demonstration of IWN in the Seattle/Blaine area
that continues to provide service to multiple agencies, the departments
have determined that this specific system design cannot be implemented
on a nationwide scale, and they have not acted collaboratively to
identify an alternative approach for a jointly coordinated
communications solution. In addition, the formal governance structure
that was established among the three departments has been disbanded,
and the contract for developing a new IWN design, awarded over a year
and a half ago, is not being used jointly by the departments for this
purpose. Currently, DOJ is planning to implement a nationwide network
for its component agencies, and DHS and its components are pursuing
numerous independent solutions.
* A primary reason why the collaboration on a joint communications
solution has not been successful is that the departments did not
effectively employ key cross-agency collaboration practices.
Specifically, they could not agree on a common outcome or purpose that
overcame their differences in missions, cultures, and established ways
of doing business; they did not establish an effective collaborative
governance structure with a process for decision making and resolving
disputes; and they have not developed a joint strategy for moving
forward. While DHS considers improving radio communications at the
nation's borders to be a major priority, DOJ's priorities are in other
areas. Program officials from both departments acknowledged that these
differing priorities led to an inability to resolve conflicts. As a
result, while the departments now have several initiatives aimed at
high-level coordination, none are focused on developing a joint
communications solution. While department officials have signed an
updated memorandum of understanding related to coordinating their radio
communications projects, they have not made any progress in
reestablishing a joint governance structure and decision-making
procedures to address the challenges of collaborating on a joint
communications solution.
* In abandoning collaboration on a joint solution, the departments risk
duplication of effort and inefficiency as they continue to invest
significant resources in independent solutions. Further, these efforts
will not ensure the interoperability needed to serve day-to-day law
enforcement operations or a coordinated response to terrorist or other
events. While collaboration on a joint solution is critical for
success, this joint solution need not be based necessarily on a single,
nationwide network, such as an extension of the original IWN design. It
could also consist of a mutually agreed-upon strategy for developing
separate but interoperable networks and systems that incorporate
lessons learned from past efforts.
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Congress should consider requiring the Departments of Justice, Homeland
Security, and Treasury to collaborate on the development and
implementation of a joint radio communications solution. Specifically,
Congress should consider requiring the departments to:
* establish an effective governance structure that includes a formal
process for making decisions and resolving disputes,
* define and articulate a common outcome for this joint effort, and:
* develop a joint strategy for improving radio communications.
Congress should also consider specifying deadlines for completing each
of these requirements.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from DOJ, DHS,
and the Treasury, which are reprinted in appendixes II, III, and IV
respectively.
In comments from DOJ, the Assistant Attorney General for Administration
largely disagreed with our findings and conclusions. DOJ stated that we
had not recognized that circumstances had changed since the inception
of our review and that departmental leaders had agreed on a common
approach that would address concerns we have raised. However, we
believe that our review accurately characterizes the evolution of
circumstances throughout the development of IWN as well as the current
status of the program. For example, we noted in our briefing slides
that the departments had collaborated productively on the Seattle/
Blaine pilot program, which served as a working demonstration and test
of the IWN design. We also acknowledged in the slides that the
departments had recently established a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) regarding development of interoperable communications systems in
the future. While that step is important, an effective governance
structure still needs to be implemented before decisions can be made
and procedures established for overcoming the differing missions,
priorities, funding structures, and capabilities among the departments.
DOJ also commented that the current business environment is not
conducive to a single mobile-radio solution, and that such an approach
is no longer feasible or cost-effective. In the slides we pointed out
that a single, common project or system is not necessarily the best
solution, and our conclusions do not advocate such a system as the best
solution. We concluded that successful collaboration on a joint
solution--whether that solution is IWN or an alternative approach--is
necessary to promote efficient use of resources, reduce duplicative
efforts, and encourage interoperability. Although a joint solution
could be based on a single, nationwide network, such as an extension of
the original IWN design, it could also be, for example, a mutually
agreed-upon strategy for developing separate but interoperable networks
and systems.
DOJ stated that it planned to continue pursuing eventual integration
and interoperability with DHS and other entities using common standards
and guidelines rather than through a single, central solution. We agree
that the implementation of common standards and guidelines are
important and can help facilitate a joint project such as this. The
Seattle/Blaine pilot project, for example, was based on the Project 25
set of standards. However, agreement has not yet been reached on the
standards and guidelines that are to shape future collaboration among
the departments on a joint approach to radio communications. As
reflected in the briefing slides, we believe that success hinges on a
means to overcome differences in missions and cultures, a collaborative
governance structure through which decisions are made and disputes
resolved, and a joint strategy to align activities and resources to
achieve a joint solution.
DOJ also stated that where the report seemed to suggest that DOJ and
other agencies had not collaborated, that in fact the departments had
worked together and collaborated extensively. However, as described in
the briefing, we disagree with this statement. While DOJ has
collaborated with other agencies on the Seattle/Blaine pilot project,
the agencies determined that that specific system design could not be
implemented on a nationwide scale, and they have not acted
collaboratively to identify an alternative approach for a jointly
coordinated communication solution. As discussed in the briefing, while
the departments recently established an MOU regarding development of
interoperable communications systems in the future, no progress had
been made in re-establishing the joint governance structure outlined in
the agreement, and the departments have been actively working to
develop independent communications systems. In effectively abandoning
collaboration on a joint solution, the departments risk duplication of
effort and inefficient use of resources as they continue to invest
significant resources in independent solutions. Further, these
stovepipe efforts will not ensure the interoperability needed to serve
day-to-day law enforcement operations or a coordinated response to
terrorist or other events. As stated above, the adoption of key
collaboration practices will be critical to a successful outcome.
Finally, the department stated that it understood GAO's concern that
the departments risk duplication of effort and that it had made great
progress in minimizing duplication/overlap, as evidenced by the
Seattle/Blaine pilot project. However, as discussed above, the pilot
project has not been chosen as a basis for a jointly coordinated,
nationwide communications solution, nor has any other specific strategy
been adopted that would provide assurance that duplication will be
minimized in the future. DOJ also agreed that agencies must begin
meeting quarterly to improve communications and that they must better
document their overall, collective strategy beyond the MOU. Until a
joint strategy to align activities and resources is adopted, we believe
the potential for duplication and overlap remains.
In comments from DHS, the Director of the Departmental Audit Liaison
Office discussed the development of the IWN program and noted that
issues had been identified with joint governance, the management of
priorities and requirements across multiple departments, and addressing
user requirements within schedule constraints. In this regard, DHS
stated that our report was focused on mandating that the three agencies
have one radio communications solution and that it implied that any
other option would result in a stovepipe of non-interoperable
communications systems. We disagree. As discussed above, in the slides
we pointed out that a single, common project or system is not
necessarily the best solution, and we do not advocate such a system as
the best solution. We concluded that successful collaboration on a
joint solution--whether that solution is IWN or an alternative
approach--is necessary to promote efficient use of resources, reduce
duplicative efforts, and encourage interoperability. Although a joint
solution could be based on a single, nationwide network, such as an
extension of the original IWN design, it could also be, for example, a
mutually agreed-upon strategy for developing separate but interoperable
networks and systems.
Regarding the breakdown of the original collaborative structure for the
IWN program, DHS commented that DHS and DOJ are employing different
radio designs funded by Congress that are commensurate with spectrum
needs in their environments and that the two departments have different
regional priorities, such that a common system will not work on a
national level. In the briefing, we recognized that the two departments
had different priorities and that those differences led to an inability
to resolve conflicts on the original IWN program. However, as discussed
above, in effectively abandoning collaboration on a joint solution, the
departments risk duplication of effort and inefficient use of resources
as they continue to invest significant resources in independent
solutions. Given their differences, adoption of key collaboration
practices will be critical to ensuring that separate projects in the
two departments are successfully coordinated in the future so that
radio communications are improved among federal agencies, costs
reduced, and duplication eliminated wherever possible.
DHS also commented that we had not discussed the departments' concerns
about the projected expense of expanding the Seattle/Blaine pilot
project to a national level. While we did not discuss specific cost
projections for this option, which is no longer being considered, we
recognize that any investment in coordinated future communications
between the departments will be substantial. Accordingly, it will be
critical to ensure a properly coordinated approach so that duplication
and overlap is avoided.
Regarding current collaboration with DOJ and Treasury, DHS noted that a
memorandum of understanding had been signed in January 2008 and
described how decisions are to be made under this agreement. DHS went
on to describe internal priorities, such as the need for radio system
upgrades in Customs and Border Protection, and stated that any cross-
departmental efforts should not result in delays to these priorities.
We do not dispute the urgency for upgrading radio systems that DHS
cites. However, given that all three departments have differing
priorities, as discussed in the slides, it remains critical that key
collaboration practices are adopted to ensure successful coordination
across departments.
Finally, DHS briefly outlined its vision for a "tiered" strategy for
achieving effective radio communications in a timely and cost-effective
manner. DHS stated that the first goal of the partnership will be to
define an outcome and an associated joint strategy. We agree that these
elements--along with an effective governance structure that includes a
formal process for making decisions and resolving disputes--are key
elements for successful collaboration and implementation of a joint
radio communications solution.
In comments from the Treasury, the Chief Information Officer stated
that the department continued to be highly supportive of the overall
goals of the IWN program and looked forward to continuing to work with
DOJ and DHS to advance law enforcement and emergency services
communications.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and Secretary of the Treasury. The report also is available
at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-6253 or at willemssenj@gao.gov. Contact points
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be
found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report
are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Joel C. Willemssen:
Managing Director, Information Technology:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Briefing to Staff of the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs:
Radio Communications: Congressional Action Needed to Ensure Agencies
Collaborate to Develop a Joint Solution:
Briefing for the Staff of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs:
September 25, 2008:
Outline of Briefing:
Introduction:
Objective, Scope, and Methodology:
Results in Brief:
Background:
DOJ, DHS, and Treasury Are No Longer Pursuing a Joint Solution:
Conclusions:
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
[End of section]
Introduction:
The tragic events of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina have highlighted the
critical importance of having effective radio communications systems
for law enforcement and public safety agencies including federal
agencies with such responsibilities. In order to effectively respond to
events such as natural disasters, criminal activities, and domestic
terrorism, law enforcement and public safety agencies need reliable
systems that enable communication with their counterparts in other
disciplines and jurisdictions. Further, since the 1990s, increasing
demand for radio communications capabilities in both the private and
public sectors has created a need to use radio communications capacity
more efficiently.
The Integrated Wireless Network (IWN) was intended to be a
collaborative effort among the Departments of Justice (DOJ), Homeland
Security (DHS), and the Treasury to provide secure, seamless,
interoperable,[Footnote 3] and reliable nationwide wireless
communications in support of federal agents and officers engaged in law
enforcement, protective services, homeland defense, and disaster
response missions. This initiative, begun in 2001, was originally
estimated to cost approximately $5 billion.
[End of Introduction]
Objective, Scope, and Methodology:
As agreed, our objective for this review was to determine the extent to
which DOJ, DHS, and Treasury are developing a joint radio
communications solution to improve communication among federal
agencies. To address our objective, we:
* reviewed and analyzed documentation from DOJ, DHS, and Treasury to
determine the status of IWN,
* interviewed officials from each department about the extent to which
they are collaborating with the other departments on IWN or an
alternative joint radio communications solution,
* reviewed and analyzed documentation for independent radio
communications projects at DOJ and DHS to identify actions the
departments are taking to improve their radio communications systems,
* reviewed and analyzed past and present agreements among the
departments to determine the extent to which a governance structure is
in place that enables effective collaboration, and;
* compared collaboration activities performed by the departments to
selected practices previously identified by GAO as helpful to
sustaining collaboration among federal agencies.[Footnote 4]
We performed our audit work in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area
at DOJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, DHS, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and
Border Protection, Treasury, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, and the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration. We also conducted work at these agencies‘ field offices
in the Seattle, Washington, metropolitan area, which was the location
of the key pilot demonstration for the IWN program.
We conducted this performance audit from February 2008 to September
2008, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives,
and we believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis
for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of Objective, Scope, and Methodology]
Results In Brief:
While DOJ, DHS, and Treasury had originally intended IWN to be a joint
radio communications solution to improve communication among law
enforcement agencies, IWN is no longer being pursued as a joint
development project. Instead of focusing on a joint solution, the
departments have begun independently modernizing their own wireless
communications systems. While DOJ and Treasury (and later DHS)
collaborated on a pilot demonstration of IWN in the Seattle/Blaine area
that continues to provide service to multiple agencies, the departments
have determined that this specific system design cannot be implemented
on a nationwide scale, and they have not acted collaboratively to
identify an alternative approach for a jointly coordinated
communications solution. In addition, the formal governance structure
that was established among the three departments has been disbanded,
and the contract for developing a new IWN design, awarded over a year
and a half ago, is not being used jointly by the departments for this
purpose. Currently, DOJ is planning to implement a nationwide network
for its component agencies, and DHS and its components are pursuing
numerous independent solutions.
A primary reason why the collaboration on a joint communications
solution has not been successful is that the departments did not
effectively employ key cross-agency collaboration practices.
Specifically, they could not agree on a common outcome or purpose to
overcome their differences in missions, cultures, and established ways
of doing business; they have not established a collaborative governance
structure with a process for decision making and resolving disputes;
and they have not developed a joint strategy for moving forward. While
DHS considers improving radio communications at the nation‘s borders to
be a major priority, DOJ‘s priorities are in other areas. Program
officials from both departments acknowledged that differing priorities
led to an inability to resolve conflicts. As a result, they now have
several initiatives aimed at high-level coordination, none of which are
focused on developing a joint communications solution. Department
officials have indicated that they have not made any progress on re-
establishing a joint governance structure and decision-making
procedures for a joint communications solution.
In abandoning collaboration on a joint solution, the departments risk
duplication of effort and inefficient use of resources as they continue
to invest significant resources in independent solutions. Further,
these stovepipe efforts will not ensure the interoperability needed to
serve day-to-day law enforcement operations or a coordinated response
to terrorist or other events.
Given the importance of collaborating effectively toward improving
radio communications among federal agencies, reducing costs, and
eliminating duplication where possible and the departments‘ failure to
develop a joint radio communications solution through their own
initiative, Congress should consider requiring that the Departments of
Justice, Homeland Security, and Treasury employ key cross-agency
collaboration practices discussed in this report to develop a joint
radio communications solution.
We received comments via e-mail from DOJ and DHS on a draft of these
briefing slides. Treasury officials stated that they had no comments on
the draft briefing slides.
In their comments, officials from DOJ‘s Office of the Chief Information
Officer disagreed with our findings and conclusions in several areas.
First, the department officials stated that our analysis was flawed and
unrealistic in focusing on a single, common project as the best
solution for supporting missions, improving interoperability, and
achieving cost efficiencies. We disagree that our conclusions advocate
a single system as the best solution and clarified our position in the
briefing that a joint approach could mean a single system or it could
be a mutually agreed-upon strategy for developing separate but
interoperable networks.
Second, DOJ officials stated that we misrepresented their efforts to
work with other agencies, including DHS, and that the department had
tried to reach consensus and compromise with DHS but organizational
challenges could not be overcome. We acknowledge that DOJ took steps to
collaborate on IWN; however, we also note that when the challenges of
collaborating could not be overcome, progress stalled. Rather than
contradicting our conclusions, we believe these facts support our
analysis that key practices for collaborating were not established or
sustained. Unless such practices are established and sustained, the
departments are unlikely to succeed at implementing a joint
collaborative solution.
Third, department officials stated that we unfairly characterized the
results of the Seattle/Blaine pilot and failed to recognize DHS‘s lack
of contribution to the pilot and its requirements development. However,
the pilot and its requirements development occurred prior to DHS‘s
involvement in the program. Further, we acknowledge within our briefing
that the pilot provided a working demonstration and test of the
preliminary network design as well as several specific benefits.
Nevertheless, our discussions with users in the pilot area reveal that
the pilot network did not meet many of their needs. In order to make
progress in addressing unmet needs through a joint partnership, it will
be important that the departments collaborate on alternative approaches
based on lessons learned from this pilot.
Finally, DOJ expressed concern that our findings did not address the
business and operational issues facing IWN, including differing
missions and priorities and a lack of funding. While these issues can
be challenging, the departments have not implemented the governance
structure or employed the key collaboration practices needed to
overcome these challenges.
Officials from DHS‘s National Protection and Programs Directorate did
not state whether they agreed or disagreed with our findings but
provided suggestions for consideration in the development of a joint
strategy, including expanding the partnership to include other federal
departments, leveraging existing infrastructure across all levels of
government, and ensuring that interoperability is a priority focus. The
additional considerations proposed by DHS for inclusion in the joint
partnership are consistent with our results and may merit attention as
the partnership develops. DHS officials also provided technical
comments that we have incorporated into the briefing slides, as
appropriate.
[End of Results in Brief]
Background:
Radio frequency communications are vital to public safety organizations
that respond to natural disasters and terrorist acts. These
organizations include the nation‘s first responders (such as
firefighters, police officers, and ambulance services) as well as
federal agencies that have law enforcement and public safety
responsibilities, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Federal
law enforcement agencies rely on wireless land mobile radio systems for
their day-to-day operations and use radio communications to provide for
the safety of agents and the public. Further, in order to perform
public safety operations effectively, these communications must be
secure as well as reliable.
The origins of the IWN program date back to 2001. At that time, DOJ and
Treasury were independently pursuing efforts to upgrade their land
mobile radio systems to meet a National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA) requirement to reduce their use of
radio frequency spectrum.[Footnote 5] Due to the similarity of their
law enforcement missions and overlapping geographic jurisdictions, the
two departments began discussing a joint project in August 2001.
The subsequent events of 9/11 further underscored the need for secure,
wireless, interoperable communications for all levels of government,
and in November 2001, DOJ and Treasury[Footnote 6] took the initiative
to create the IWN program by signing a memorandum of understanding to
collaborate on achieving cost efficiencies and improving communications
operability[Footnote 7] among their own law enforcement agencies as
well as with other federal, state, and local organizations. The IWN
joint program was intended to be a nationwide radio communications
system that would provide secure, seamless, and reliable wireless
communications in support of law enforcement. In addition, the IWN
program would serve as a means for upgrading aging equipment.
In November 2002, DOJ awarded a contract to obtain the services,
hardware, and software to develop a pilot for the IWN network in the
Seattle/Blaine area and test the viability of a proposed IWN design and
technology.[Footnote 8] After 2 years in development, the pilot was
considered operational in December 2004 at a cost of approximately $32
million. This pilot provided a digital, trunked,[Footnote 9] Project
25[Footnote 10]-compatible radio communications network for several
federal agencies and enabled interoperability with several state and
local law enforcement organizations in the Seattle/Blaine area.
Following the establishment of DHS, several law enforcement components
from DOJ and Treasury were transferred to the new department and the
scope of IWN was expanded. In June 2004, DOJ,[Footnote 11] DHS,
[Footnote 12] and Treasury[Footnote 13] signed a new memorandum of
understanding. This agreement established the following governance
structure to oversee and carry out the implementation of IWN:
* The Joint Program Office, consisting of staff assigned to the office
on a full-time basis from each of the departments, was responsible
for”among other things”performing all IWN program administrative and
project management functions.
* The IWN Executive Board, consisting of the Chief Information Officer
from each of the departments, was responsible for providing executive-
level guidance and policy and program direction to the Joint Program
Office.
* The National Project Team, comprised of representatives from each
component/bureau participating in the IWN program, was responsible
for”among other things”providing information to the Joint Program
Office required for the development, implementation, and administration
of the IWN system.
The memorandum of understanding described identical responsibilities
and resource contributions for DOJ and DHS. However, Treasury was not
required to share the costs of designing and building IWN, given its
reduced number of law enforcement personnel after creation of DHS.
In July 2004, the IWN Executive Board initiated an acquisition strategy
to award a contract to:
* obtain reliable, secure, nationwide wireless communication
capabilities;
* reduce costs by leveraging economies of scale;
* enable rapid deployment of radio communications functionality
nationwide;
* enhance interoperability, operational effectiveness, and support
though increased coverage and capabilities; and;
* establish interoperability with other federal and non-federal
wireless users through the consistent application of standards
developed from this effort.
The strategy envisioned selecting a single contractor to implement the
entire IWN program using a 3-phased process:
* In phase 1, vendors submitted information regarding their high-level
conceptual approach, organizational experience, and past performance.
As a result of this process, four vendors continued in the acquisition
process. This phase was completed in December 2004.
* In phase 2, the four vendors submitted detailed technical,
management, and cost proposals to accomplish the entire IWN program.
Based on an evaluation of these proposals, two vendors were awarded
contracts to prepare detailed system designs. This phase was originally
scheduled for completion in May 2005 but was not completed until June
2006.
* Phase 3 was to select the winning contractor based on evaluation of
the detailed system designs submitted by each contractor. As a result
of this process, General Dynamics C4 Systems was selected as the IWN
systems integrator in April 2007. Figure 1 shows a timeline of major
events related to IWN.
Figure 1: Timeline of Events Related to IWN:
[Refer to PDF for image]
September, 1993: NTIA issued requirement for reducing use of radio
frequency spectrum;
November, 2001: DOJ and Treasury signed MOU;
November, 2002: DOJ and Treasury begin developing an IWN pilot in the
Seattle/Blaine area;
June, 2004: DOJ, DHS, and Treasury signed IWN MOU;
July, 2004: IWN Executive Board initiated acquisition process;
December, 2004: Seattle/Blaine pilot became operational;
April, 2007: IWN systems integration contract awarded.
[End of figure]
We have previously reported on the importance of communications
interoperability to effective public safety operations.[Footnote 14]
Interoperability has been significantly hampered by the use of
incompatible radio systems. Different technologies and configurations,
including proprietary designs made by different manufacturers, have
limited the interoperability of such systems.
In 2004, we reported that a fundamental barrier to successfully
establishing interoperable communications for public safety was the
lack of effective, collaborative, interdisciplinary, and
intergovernmental planning.[Footnote 15] Further, in 2007, we made
recommendations to DHS to improve interoperable communications among
federal, state, and local first responders.[Footnote 16] Among other
things, we recommended that DHS develop a plan that strategically
focused its interoperability programs and provided quantifiable
performance measures. Program officials indicated that they were in the
process of developing such a plan; however, they had not established a
completion date for it.
We have also previously reported on key practices agencies should
employ to help them overcome the barriers to successful inter-agency
collaboration.[Footnote 17] These practices include:
* Defining and articulating a common outcome or purpose that overcomes
differences in department missions, cultures, and established ways of
doing business.
* Establishing a governance structure, including a collaborative
management structure with defined leadership, roles and
responsibilities, and a formalized process for making decisions and
resolving disputes.
* Establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies that work in
concert with those of the partners or are joint in nature to align
activities and resources to accomplish the common outcome.
Implementing these practices is critical to sustaining a successful
inter-agency project such as IWN.
[End of Background section]
DOJ, DHS, and Treasury are no longer pursuing a joint solution:
Given the importance of radio communications and the reality of limited
resources, it is critical that agencies find ways to work together to
achieve effective and efficient interoperable solutions. In particular,
the advantages of collaborating to develop a joint radio communications
solution clearly outweigh the benefits of each department pursuing its
own radio communications initiative, as DOJ, DHS, and Treasury agreed
when they signed on to the IWN program. The benefits of developing IWN
as a joint communications solution, as identified by the program,
include:
* supporting departmental missions effectively and efficiently,
* providing sufficient communications coverage for current operations,
* achieving efficient use of radio spectrum,
* improving interoperability with federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies, and;
* achieving cost efficiencies through resource consolidation and
economies of scale.
Achieving these benefits hinges on successful inter-agency
collaboration.
Despite early progress, the departments are pursuing independent
solutions:
Although the departments made early progress in jointly developing and
implementing a pilot program, they are no longer pursuing IWN as a
joint solution and instead are independently modernizing their own
wireless communications systems.
DOJ and Treasury (and later DHS) contributed resources to develop an
operational pilot in the Seattle/Blaine area to demonstrate the
original IWN design. This pilot provided a working demonstration and
test of the preliminary network design, generally improved
communications in the coverage area, addressed federal encryption
requirements through new equipment, established technical solutions for
interoperability with selected state and local organizations, and
provided valuable lessons learned. While the pilot remains operational
and has been expanded to increase coverage in areas of Washington and
Oregon, several DOJ and DHS components in the region have been unable
to fully use the system due to unmet requirements. Components in the
area continue to maintain legacy networks to ensure complete coverage.
Since the pilot demonstration, DOJ and DHS have concluded that the
pilot design could not be implemented jointly on a nationwide scale.
DOJ officials expressed concern that it would be too expensive to
expand the pilot network to fulfill DOJ, DHS and Treasury requirements
on a nationwide scale, while DHS officials were also concerned that the
design would not be technically well suited to meet DHS needs.
Since deciding not to proceed with the IWN pilot design jointly, the
departments have not developed an alternative approach for
collaborating on a joint communications solution, either through
development of a single, nationwide network, such as an extension of
the original IWN design, or a through a mutually agreed-upon strategy
for developing separate but interoperable networks and systems that can
accommodate the needs of all participants and incorporate the lessons
learned from prior efforts (such as the pilot). For example:
* The departments have not used their IWN contract as a vehicle for
development of a joint solution. For nearly three years, DOJ, DHS, and
Treasury jointly participated in the process of selecting a systems
integrator. However, since that selection, the departments have not
used the IWN contract (awarded a year and a half ago) to begin
developing a joint nationwide radio communications solution. Instead,
the task order that has been issued based on the IWN contract is being
used for establishing a joint program office for the contractor and
DOJ”not for DHS or Treasury. The task order specifies that the
contractor will draft architecture documents for developing a
communications system for DOJ”it does not include DHS or Treasury.
* The formal governance structure for IWN originally supported by the
three departments has been disbanded. Specifically, the IWN Executive
Board and the National Project Team stopped meeting after award of the
IWN contract. In addition, the Joint Program Office that was intended
to manage IWN is no longer supported by shared staff and resources from
the three agencies.[Footnote 18] Although officials from the three
departments stated that they talk to each other about radio
communications issues, these discussions have not occurred on a regular
basis and have not been used to re-establish a formal governance
structure for developing a joint communications solution.
Further, despite initial agreement to establish IWN as a joint program,
the departments have been actively working to develop independent
communications systems. DOJ is currently planning to implement a
nationwide network for its components, while DHS and its components are
pursuing multiple approaches to meet their individual priorities.
Specifically:
* DOJ is developing a department-level nationwide radio network, which
officials refer to as the Law Enforcement Wireless Communications
solution. It is intended to ensure basic operability for its components
that need to replace legacy systems that Drug Enforcement
Administration officials noted can be as old as 20 years. According to
department officials, the DOJ Wireless Management Office is working
with the IWN contractor to develop a phased approach to implementing
this network. As part of the first phase, DOJ plans to consolidate
legacy systems on a regional basis, replace or decommission certain
systems, and deploy new systems to meet federal requirements for
reduced spectrum use and encryption. Establishing interoperability with
other federal, state, and local organizations; network redundancy;
trunking; and spectrum efficiency are to be included in later phases,
as funding is available. According to the department, the total cost is
estimated at $1.23 billion, and the system will be implemented over 6-7
years.
* DHS is pursuing multiple approaches at both the component and
department levels to meet different priorities. For example, since
2005, Customs and Border Protection has been developing and
implementing a nationwide radio communications network intended to
improve and update radio communications for Customs and Border
Protection officers and agents”referred to as the Tactical
Communications Modernization Project. In contrast, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement officials have adopted a different approach,
looking for opportunities to strategically partner with other agencies
and leverage existing assets to meet their operational requirements.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement has submitted a number of proposals
to the department for approval. While initiatives such as these are
reviewed by the DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer, they are
funded at the component level and focus on meeting the needs of
individual components.
In addition to such component initiatives, the DHS Office of Emergency
Communications (OEC), which is responsible for IWN, is pursuing a high-
level strategy for developing radio communications networks, based on
shared infrastructure, as an alternative to the original IWN design.
The OEC approach, which has been explored with the assistance of the
Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications,[Footnote 19]
focuses on coordination with federal, state, and local organizations
that are building or planning to build large communications networks so
that these networks might also meet the needs of member federal
agencies. However, the OEC‘s shared infrastructure approach has yet to
be approved at the department level. In addition, this approach focuses
on coordination with other government agencies and not specifically
among DHS components or the law enforcement community, which was an
original goal for the IWN program.
The departments have not employed key cross-agency collaboration
practices:
A primary reason that collaboration on a joint communications solution
has not been successful and the benefits envisioned by the departments
have not been realized is that the departments did not effectively
employ key cross-agency collaboration practices. As we previously
mentioned, these practices include defining and articulating a common
outcome or purpose, establishing a governance structure, and
establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies to accomplish a
common outcome. For example:
* The departments have not defined and articulated a common outcome or
purpose that overcomes differences in department missions, cultures,
and established ways of doing business. Although the departments
originally recognized the benefits of collaborating on a joint
solution, they allowed differences in priorities and opinions to stall
their collaboration efforts. Specifically, DOJ saw IWN as a concept or
vision for new development, which would culminate in a nationwide radio
communications network for federal law enforcement. DHS, in contrast,
considered the IWN contract to be a vehicle for systems integration. In
addition, DHS considered improving radio communications around the
nation‘s borders to be a major priority, while DOJ‘s priorities were
focused in other areas of the nation. Further, the departments could
not agree on the direction that IWN should take after deciding that the
design of the pilot would not be appropriate for a nationwide network.
DOJ and DHS program officials have both acknowledged that differing
priorities led to an inability to resolve conflicts. They further
explained that delays in progress and continued deterioration of legacy
systems led the departments to independently pursue other solutions.
* The departments did not establish a collaborative governance
structure that includes a management structure, defined roles and
responsibilities, and a formalized process for decision making and
resolving disputes. Although the departments attempted to establish a
joint governance structure, it was not effective at decision making and
resolving disputes and the partnership was discontinued. Both DOJ and
DHS stated that making joint decisions in their original partnership
depended on reaching consensus among the departments, and when
consensus could not be reached, progress on IWN stalled.
* The departments did not establish a mutual or joint strategy to align
activities and resources to accomplish a common outcome. Despite
acknowledging the potential benefits from collaborating on a joint
solution, the departments have not produced a strategic or
implementation plan that outlines a strategy for developing a joint
radio communications solution, whether that solution is IWN or an
alternative joint approach.
The departments are aware that efforts to collaborate have not been
successful. Although they have established three high-level initiatives
to address coordination, these initiatives are not focused on
implementing a collaborative joint communications solution across DOJ,
DHS, and Treasury. Specifically:
* The three departments signed a new memorandum of understanding in
January 2008 that aims at coordinating their joint wireless programs.
Although the goals of the current memorandum are similar to those that
the departments specified in their 2004 agreement for IWN, DOJ and DHS
officials have stated that no progress has been made in re-establishing
the joint governance structure outlined by the agreement. In addition,
decision-making procedures outlined in the 2008 memorandum”like those
in the 2004 agreement”do not clearly define how to overcome barriers
faced when consensus cannot be reached among the departments. DOJ and
DHS officials agreed the memorandum serves primarily as a means for
facilitating communication among the departments when opportunities and
funding are available.
* Participation in the Federal Partnership for Interoperable
Communications is voluntary for both federal and state entities,
coordination occurs on an ad-hoc basis, and meeting participants do not
necessarily include officials who are in positions to make decisions
about their agency‘s radio communications programs. As previously
described, the DHS OEC‘s shared infrastructure approach is intended to
explore collaboration through the Federal Partnership for Interoperable
Communications and focuses on coordinating radio communications
initiatives among federal, state, and local organizations based on
operational needs. However, DOJ officials stated that the Federal
Partnership for Interoperable Communications serves primarily as a
working group of technical staff, while Treasury officials noted that,
to date, they have attended the group‘s meetings primarily as observers
rather than as active participants. Therefore, it is unclear whether
this initiative can address the day-to-day mission needs of law
enforcement agencies.
* In accordance with the 21st Century Emergency Communications Act,
[Footnote 20] the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center[Footnote
21] (ECPC) has been created and is supported by the OEC. The purposes
of this group include serving as the focal point for interdepartmental
efforts and providing a clearinghouse for relevant information
regarding the ability of emergency response providers and relevant
government officials to communicate in the event of natural or man-made
disasters and acts of terrorism. DHS officials believe that the
creation of the ECPC will address collaboration and may be the proper
forum for coordinating a joint solution. However, the charter for this
organization has not yet been approved. Although DOJ and Treasury both
participate in the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center, DOJ
officials noted that this group is focused on emergency communications
and response, and it is unclear whether this group can address the day-
to-day operational requirements of law enforcement agencies.
Although these initiatives are focused on coordination, participation
is not required and joint governance and decision-making structures
have not been established. Further, with DOJ and DHS pursuing
independent solutions, it is clear that the departments do not view
these initiatives as a means to collaborate on the IWN program and have
not defined or committed to an alternative approach to develop a joint
communications solution. Without a commitment to collaborate on a joint
solution, they will continue to invest significant resources in
independent solutions that risk duplication of effort and inefficient
use of resources. Further, these stovepipe efforts will not ensure the
interoperability needed to serve day-to-day law enforcement operations
or for responding to terrorist or other events that require a
coordinated response.
[End of section]
Conclusions:
Despite early progress on the pilot effort, the departments have been
unable to sustain development of a joint radio communications solution
on their own. As a result, after seven years of effort, they are no
longer pursuing IWN as a joint solution and are instead pursuing
potentially duplicative and wasteful independent solutions.
A primary reason that collaboration on a joint communications solution
has failed and the benefits envisioned by the departments have not been
realized is that the departments did not effectively employ key cross-
agency collaboration practices that could overcome the challenges faced
in such programs. Specifically, they lacked a means to overcome
differences in missions and cultures, a collaborative governance
structure that could make decisions and resolve disputes, and a joint
strategy to align activities and resources to achieve a joint solution.
As long as the departments pursue separate initiatives and expend their
resources independently, they risk duplication and inefficiency, and
may fail to achieve the level of interoperability that is vital for
both law enforcement and emergency communications. While successful
collaboration on a joint solution is necessary, this joint solution
could be based on a single, nationwide network, such as an extension of
the original IWN design, or it could also be a mutually agreed-upon
strategy for developing separate but interoperable networks and systems
that incorporate lessons learned from past efforts. Given the
importance of collaborating effectively toward improving radio
communications among federal agencies, reducing costs, and eliminating
duplication where possible and the departments‘ failure to develop a
joint radio communications solution through their own initiative,
Congressional action should be considered to ensure that this
collaboration takes place.
[End of Conclusions section]
Matters for Congressional Consideration:
The Congress should consider requiring that the Departments of Justice,
Homeland Security, and Treasury collaborate on the development and
implementation of a joint radio communications solution. Specifically,
Congress should consider requiring the departments to:
* establish an effective governance structure that includes a formal
process for making decisions and resolving disputes;
* define and articulate a common outcome for this joint effort; and;
* develop a joint strategy for improving radio communications.
Congress should also consider specifying deadlines for completing each
of these requirements.
[End of Matters for Congressional Consideration section]
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We received comments via e-mail from DOJ and DHS on a draft of these
briefing slides. Treasury officials stated that they had no comments on
the draft briefing slides.
Officials from DOJ‘s Office of the Chief Information Officer disagreed
with our findings and conclusions in several areas and expressed
concerns that we did not accurately characterize the department‘s
efforts to collaborate. Officials from DHS‘s National Protection and
Programs Directorate did not state whether they agreed or disagreed
with our findings, but provided suggestions for additional
consideration; in addition, DHS officials provided technical comments
that we incorporated into the briefing slides, as appropriate.
Officials from DOJ‘s Office of the Chief Information Officer disagreed
with our findings and conclusions in several areas. First, the
officials stated that our analysis was flawed and unrealistic in
focusing on a single, common project as the best solution for
supporting missions, improving interoperability, and achieving cost
efficiencies. However, we disagree that our conclusions advocate a
single, common project or system as the best solution. We concluded
that successful collaboration on a joint solution, whether that
solution is IWN or an alternative approach, is necessary to promote
efficient use of resources, reduce duplicative efforts, and encourage
interoperability. Although a joint solution could be based on a single,
nationwide network, such as an extension of the original IWN design, it
could also be, for example, a mutually agreed-upon strategy for
developing separate but interoperable networks and systems.
Accordingly, we have clarified our briefing slides to emphasize that we
have not concluded that a single monolithic project or system is the
most appropriate joint collaborative solution.
Second, the department officials stated that we misrepresented DOJ
efforts to work with other agencies, including DHS. Specifically, DOJ
officials stated that they had tried to reach consensus and compromise
with DHS, but DHS leadership had not embraced the concept of a joint
program, forcing DOJ to work individually with the DHS components
instead of with a single, consolidated program office within the DHS
organization. Furthermore, the DOJ officials cited lack of centralized
funding at DHS to be another key challenge to collaborating with that
department. We acknowledge that DOJ took steps to collaborate on IWN,
but when the challenges could not be overcome, progress stalled. We
recognize the challenges faced in collaborating among departments, and,
in particular, the challenges described by DOJ in collaborating with
DHS. However, rather than contradicting our conclusions, we believe
these facts support our analysis that key practices for collaborating
were not established or sustained. Unless such practices are
established and sustained, the departments are unlikely to succeed at
implementing a joint collaborative solution.
Third, DOJ officials also stated that we unfairly characterized the
results of the Seattle/Blaine pilot and failed to recognize DHS‘s lack
of contribution to the pilot and its requirements development. However,
the pilot and its requirements development occurred prior to DHS‘s
involvement in the program. Further, in our briefing, we note that the
Seattle/Blaine pilot afforded several benefits to users in Washington
and Oregon, including improving communications in the coverage area and
establishing technical solutions for interoperability with state and
local organizations. Further, we agree that the pilot served as a
working demonstration and test of the IWN design and that additional
participation from DHS might have resulted in additional requirements
being met. However, our discussions with users and potential users
revealed that the pilot network did not meet many of their needs. In
order to make progress in addressing unmet needs through a joint
partnership, it will be important that the departments collaborate on
alternative approaches based on lessons learned from this pilot.
Finally, DOJ officials also expressed concern that our findings did not
address business and operational issues facing IWN, including a lack of
adequate funding and the differing missions, priorities, funding
structures, and existing capabilities at DHS and DOJ. While we agree
that the departments have faced significant challenges, we believe that
collaboration on a joint strategy remains critically important. We
recognize that the departments have taken initial steps to re-establish
coordination, such as signing a revised memorandum of understanding.
However, an effective governance structure needs to be implemented
before decisions can be made and procedures established for overcoming
the differing missions, priorities, funding structures, and
capabilities among the departments.
We also obtained comments on a draft of this briefing via e-mail from
DHS‘s National Protection and Programs Directorate officials. In these
comments, the DHS officials did not state whether they agreed or
disagreed with our findings, but they supported the continued
development of a joint federal radio communications strategy and stated
that more specific guidance was needed. Specifically, DHS identified
three elements for inclusion in the development of a joint strategy:
* Expand the partnership to include other federal departments that rely
on mission-critical wireless communications beyond the law enforcement
community.
* Leverage existing infrastructure across all levels of government to
ensure cost effectiveness and reduce duplication of effort.
* Ensure that interoperability is a priority focus beyond the upgrade
and modernization focuses of the original IWN concept.
In addition, the department stated that there was a need within DHS to
further align authority and resources with responsibility for a joint
solution. For example, while the Office of Emergency Communications was
given responsibility for IWN, it was not given authority and only
limited resources for the management of the program and therefore had
limited ability to drive stakeholders toward a joint solution. The
additional considerations proposed by DHS for inclusion in the joint
partnership are consistent with our results, and may merit attention as
the partnership develops. DHS officials also provided technical
comments on our draft briefing slides, which we have incorporated, as
appropriate.
[End of Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section]
[End of Appendix I]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Justice:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Washington, D.C. 20530:
November 28, 2008:
Mr. Joel C. Willemssen:
Director, Information Technology:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G. Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Willemssen:
The Department of Justice (DOJ) appreciates the opportunity to comment
on the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report entitled, Radio
Communications: Congressional Action Needed to Ensure Agencies
Collaborate to Develop a Joint Solution, GAO-09-133. DOJ is concerned
about the report's findings and conclusion. Our primary issue with the
report is that it does not recognize the changed circumstances since
the inception of the project. GAO began the audit with the view that a
single, shared project among law enforcement entities would be the best
solution and its findings in this report continue to assert that this
is the best approach. In fact, leadership of the three agencies
addressed in the audit--DOJ, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
and the Department of Treasury (DOT) -- have since agreed upon and are
pursuing a common approach that should address the GAO concerns and
render the recommendations outdated. Most importantly, we need to be
certain that Congress does not act upon the GAO report in a manner that
pursues a path that is different than the one that now best addresses
our collective business needs.
Over the past five years, we have learned that the business environment
in which we operate is not conducive to a single, mobile-radio
solution, and in fact our experiences and the progress of technology
have moved us to a place where we have collectively determined that
such an approach is not feasible or cost-effective today. We wish that
the GAO had more fully addressed the history and challenges of the
project and shown how the current planned and agreed upon approach is
indeed the best solution.
Given the separate funding streams and the scarcity of resources
available to each agency for mobile radio technology, as well as the
unique operational needs and different work environments of each
agency, it simply is not realistic or wise to pursue a single, unified
project approach. The overall project cost estimate was $5 billion.
DOJ's current estimate of its portion is approximately $1.2 billion,
which is significantly less than the original projection for DOJ. None
of the agencies has received such resources to date, and separate
appropriations further complicate a single project and acquisition
approach. In addition, while DOJ has centralized its radio resources in
the Law Enforcement Wireless Communications account, others have not.
Agency operational priorities and needs also are very different, e.g.,
areas to be covered, types of equipment, etc. For example, DOJ needs
city and highway coverage, whereas DHS needs ports and border coverage.
In short, it would be a mistake to pursue a single mobile radio
solution for all agencies.
We certainly understand GAO's point that a single solution offers
savings opportunities compared to redundant, separate systems. However,
what the three agencies are now pursuing are not redundant systems, it
is interoperable systems tailored to the differing needs of each
agency. Thus, we will achieve the cost savings that come with
interoperability while maintaining the necessary capabilities required
by each agency's operational and geographic circumstances.
Rather than a single, central solution, DOJ plans to continue pursuing
eventual integration and interoperability with DHS and other federal
partners, and with state/local/tribal entities, using common standards
and guidelines. The radio market already is evolving toward this model
given the need of fire and EMS personnel to talk to law enforcement. We
must build our solutions to these standards, and continue to
collaborate toward these ends.
Where the report seems to suggest that DOJ and the other agencies have
not collaborated, in fact we have worked together and collaborated
extensively. We developed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that was
signed by the Deputy Attorney General and the Deputy Secretaries of
Treasury and Homeland Security on January 9, 2008, establishing a new
and realistic plan for moving forward with mobile radio technology
acquisition.
Consistent with the MOU, the DOJ integrated wireless network (IWN)
program plans to continue using the contract awarded to General
Dynamics and invites other agencies to join us in this. General
Dynamics was selected by an inter-agency group, its rates are good, and
the contractor team is skilled at integrating technical
requirements/needs consistent with funding mechanisms in the Federal
setting. This contract offers us the staffing flexibility and skills
needed to get the job done.
Despite our progress, we understand GAO's concern that the three
departments risk duplication of effort and inefficient use of
resources. In fact, we have made great progress and duplication/overlap
is minimal today, as evidenced by our Seattle pilot program results.
Users in the field, such as DHS, are satisfied with the new solutions.
There are new capabilities and increased usage, as well as greater
efficiency through reduction of communication towers needed. The system
currently supports 1,426 agents, including 1,031 from DOJ and 291 from
DHS. Currently, 19 Federal agencies use IWN in the Pacific Northwest.
In addition, the IWN has:
* Allowed DOJ to reduce the amount of radio spectrum use by up to 50
percent;
* Reduced radio transmission sites by 40 percent thus eliminating lease
and circuit costs for these sites;
* Allowed DOJ components to decommission their VHF legacy sites in all
areas that IWN is currently deployed; and;
* Provided enhanced coverage using fewer sites by eliminating redundant
sites, leading to increased coverage for all components over their
legacy systems.
Despite our disagreement with GAO's premise that a single solution is
needed, there are areas of agreement with GAO. We agree that our
agencies must begin meeting quarterly to improve communications and
that we must better document our overall, collective strategy beyond
the MOU. We need to increase our advocacy of industry standards, and
recognize our collective buying power positions us to push the market
toward better standards and solutions.
In summary, we believe we are headed in the right direction with regard
to mobile radio technology and that pursuing standards to ensure
integration and interoperability is the solution; not a single,
collective acquisition or project. We hope that we will have the
opportunity to brief Congress on the progress we are making and our
future plans with regard to radio technology. In addition, we would be
happy to brief Congress on efficiencies gained and lessons learned in
the Seattle pilot as well. Thank you for the opportunity to review the
draft report.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Lee J. Lofthus:
Assistant Attorney General for Administration:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
[hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov]
December 8, 2008:
Joel C. Willemssen:
Managing Director, Information Technology:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Willemssen:
Subject: Department of Homeland Security input for GAO Draft Report 09-
133, "Radio Communications: Congressional Action Needed to Ensure
Agencies Collaborate to Develop a Joint Solution," December 2008:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity
to respond to this draft report before its publication. The report does
not include specific recommendations but presents four actions related
to the Integrated Wireless Network (IWN) for consideration by Congress.
The Office of Emergency Communications within the National Protection
and Programs Directorate has prepared this response to address the
actions requested by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and
provide comments on the overall report.
Effective radio communications systems are critically important for law
enforcement and public officials responding to events such as natural
disasters, criminal activities, and domestic terrorism. The IWN
initiative, begun in 2001, was intended to serve as the contracting
tool that would be able to improve the Federal tactical communications
capabilities among DHS, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the
Department of Treasury (Treasury), the primary Federal law enforcement
agencies. Over time, this fundamental concept has evolved and accounted
for changes in the wireless technology industry and operational
requirements of the partner agencies. Lessons learned from major events
(e.g., 9/11, Hurricane Katrina) indicate that Federal wireless needs
extend beyond a limited number of Federal partners or a single
discipline (e.g., law enforcement), and that interoperability with
State, local, and tribal agencies must be considered an essential
requirement of any joint Federal wireless solution.
Additional management and administration lessons learned from the IWN
Program and the Seattle/Blaine Pilot Project identified issues with
joint governance; the management of priorities and requirements across
multiple departments; and the addressing of user requirements within
schedule constraints. The GAO's report is focused on mandating that the
three agencies have one radio communications solution and implies that
any other option will result in a stovepipe of noninteroperable
communication systems. In addition, the GAO report states that the
governance structure for pursuing a joint communications solution was
disbanded due to a lack of collaboration and agreement; in fact, DHS
and DOJ are employing different radio designs funded by Congress that
are commensurate with spectrum needs in their environments. Because DOJ
and DHS have different regional priorities - the majority of DOJ users
operate in highly populated, geographically condensed urban areas with
limited frequencies, while the majority of DHS users operate in remote
border areas - a common system will not work on a national level,
although common systems can work in particular cases. Planning for
spectrum efficiency is as much a function of the geographic landscape
in which law enforcement is operating as it is a function of joint
planning.
The report does not elaborate on DOJ and DHS's concerns over the
expense of taking the Seattle/Blaine operational pilot nationwide to
fulfill the requirements of DHS, DOJ, and Treasury; providing these
cost estimates would have provided better context for understanding the
decision not to implement the pilot design on a nationwide scale.
Specifically, in response to GAO's matters of consideration to
Congress, the following comments are offered:
Implement the MOU as articulated. In the event that common ground
cannot be reached, attempt a new governance model within the framework
of the Emergency Communications Preparedness Center (ECPC) with
authority to make decisions and resolve disputes among partners.
Response: In January, 2008, the DHS, DOJ, and Treasury signed a
Memorandum of Understanding describing an agreed-upon governance
structure. Joint wireless programs will be governed by the Joint
Wireless Programs Coordinating Council, which will meet on a quarterly
basis. Decisions will be reached by consensus and documented through
interagency Memoranda of Agreement signed by the Chief Information
Officers from each participating Department. In the event consensus is
not reached, the issue will be referred for consideration by the Deputy
Attorney General and the Deputy Secretaries of DHS and Treasury. Any
agreed-upon interoperability requirements must be taken into account
early in the system-design stage and should not in any way delay
operational upgrade requirements in later stages. It is essential to
the DHS mission that current radio system modernizations undertaken
across departments do not result in delays to much-needed upgrades in
the DHS component radio systems, thus posing risk to mission
effectiveness and the safety of agents and officers. For example,
current needs within DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for radio
systems upgrades are absolutely pressing. Radio systems provide
critical lifelines to officer safety, but many areas are using radio
systems that are old and past their life expectancies.
Similarly, DHS CBP must coordinate its modernization schedule to
support the operational needs of SBInet, which has a project dependency
on the Global Positioning System Blue Force Tracking data generated by
the Land Mobile Radio (LMR) microphones. DHS CBP must implement new
systems a year ahead of SBInet deployments. LMR modernization efforts
are long-term projects with significant external schedule dependencies.
The time required to obtain spectrum certifications, clear spectrum
licenses with neighboring countries, negotiate site leases, and work
around environmental and seasonal restrictions (some sites may be
inaccessible for several months out of the year) pose significant
obstacles to timely implementation of new systems.
Develop a joint outcome and strategy for improving radio communications
among the expanded partnership within the ECPC.
Response: DHS, DOJ, and Treasury will use a tiered strategy to achieve
effective radio communications in a timely and cost-effective manner.
Where necessary, investments will first address immediate mission-
critical operability and coverage requirements. Concurrently, the
partnership will focus on standardization and optimization of networks
planned or in service. The first goal of the expanded partnership under
the ECPC will be to define an outcome and an associated joint strategy.
The final tier of the strategy will involve partnering with private
partners on research and development efforts to migrate to emerging
wireless technologies that meet public safety requirements and
standards for reliability, sustainability, security, and coverage.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental Audit Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of the Treasury:
Department Of The Treasury:
Washington, D.C. 20220:
November 13, 2008:
Mr. Nick Marinos:
Senior Information Technology Analyst:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Marinos:
The Department of the Treasury has reviewed the draft report entitled
Radio Communications: Congressional Action Needed to Ensure Agencies
Collaborate to Develop a Joint Solution and appreciates the opportunity
to comment.
The Department continues to be highly supportive of the overall goals
of the Integrated Wireless Network program and the Federal Partnership
for Interoperable Communications. Treasury looks forward to continuing
to work with the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, as well
as other Federal agencies, to advance law enforcement and emergency
services communications.
Please contact me at 202-622-5093 or at Michael.Duffy@do.treas.gov
should you have any questions.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Michael D. Duffy:
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Information Systems and Chief
Information Officer:
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Joel C. Willemssen, (202) 512-6253, or willemssenj@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the individual named above, Linda D. Koontz, Director;
John de Ferrari, Assistant Director; Shannin O'Neill; Neil Doherty;
Nancy Glover; Nick Marinos; Melissa Schermerhorn; Jennifer Stavros-
Turner; and Shaunyce Wallace made key contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Interoperability is the ability of different systems to readily
connect with each other and enable timely communications.
[2] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005) and GAO, Electronic Government: Potential Exists for Enhancing
Collaboration on Four Initiatives, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-6] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 10,
2003).
[3] Interoperability is the ability of different systems to readily
connect with each other and enable timely communications.
[4] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005) and GAO, Electronic Government: Potential Exists for Enhancing
Collaboration on Four Initiatives, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-6] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 10,
2003).
[5] In 1992, Congress passed the Telecommunications Authorization Act
of 1992 (Pub. L. No. 102-538 (1992)), which mandated that the Secretary
of Commerce and the NTIA (the organization responsible for effective
use of radio frequencies by federal agencies) develop a plan to make
more efficient use of federal land mobile radio spectrum. In response,
NTIA required, with certain exceptions, that the channel bandwidth in
certain frequency bands used by federal agencies for land mobile radio
systems be reduced from 25 to 12.5 kilohertz. This reduction in channel
bandwidth is referred to as narrow banding. NTIA specified different
time frames for the transition based on the frequency band and whether
it was a new or existing system.
[6] According to Treasury officials, Treasury agents made up about one-
third of the potential users for the IWN system while DOJ agents
included about two-thirds of the potential users.
[7] Operability is the ability of emergency responders to establish and
sustain communications in support of mission operations.
[8] Treasury contributed resources to the Seattle/Blaine pilot.
[9] Trunking is a computer-controlled system that uses all available
frequencies in a pool, automatically allocating an open frequency each
time a user on the system initiates a radio call. Although trunking
provides greater spectrum efficiency and functionality, it costs
significantly more than conventional technology, which uses dedicated
frequencies assigned to individual groups of users.
[10] Project 25 is a suite of national standards which define open
standards for vendors to use when designing land mobile radio
communications equipment.
[11] The DOJ Wireless Management Office is currently responsible for
funding and management related to wireless communications and IWN for
the department.
[12] The Office of the Chief Information Officer was originally
responsible for the IWN program at DHS. Since DHS was created, the
department went through a series of management changes. In May 2007,
the Office of the Chief Information Officer transferred all management
responsibilities for IWN to the newly formed Office of Emergency
Communications, which is currently responsible for IWN. The Office of
the Chief Information Officer retained authority over spectrum
allocation for the DHS components.
[13] The Treasury Wireless Program Office represents the department in
IWN-related activities. However, while Treasury currently has about
4,500 agents, the total number of agents and officers who are potential
radio users among all three departments is over 80,000.
[14] GAO, First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications
Interoperability, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-301]
(Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007).
[15] GAO,Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental
Cooperation Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable
Communications, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-740]
(Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004).
[16] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-301].
[17] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] and [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-6].
[18] Treasury currently has one employee collocated with the DOJ
Wireless Management Office to facilitate exchange of information. DHS
does not contribute any staff or resources to the joint program office.
[19] The Federal Partnership for Interoperable Communications, which is
sponsored by the OEC, is an organization intended to address federal
wireless communications interoperability by fostering intergovernmental
cooperation and identifying and leveraging common synergies. It
includes 44 federal member agencies and approximately 160 participants.
[20] 21st Century Emergency Communications Act of 2006, §671 of the
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No.
109-295 (2006).
[21] Current proposed membership for the Emergency Communications
Preparedness Center includes the Departments of Commerce, Defense,
Interior, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, Agriculture, Energy,
Labor, Health and Human Services, the Federal Communications
Commission, and the General Services Administration.
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
