Homeland Security
Federal Efforts Are Helping to Address Some Challenges Faced by State and Local Fusion Centers Gao ID: GAO-08-636T April 17, 2008Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, state and local governments formed fusion centers, collaborative efforts to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity. Recognizing that the centers are a critical mechanism for sharing information, the federal government--including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), which has primary responsibility for governmentwide information sharing--is taking steps to partner with fusion centers. This testimony focuses on (1) the characteristics of fusion centers as of September 2007 and (2) federal efforts to help alleviate challenges centers identified. This testimony is based on GAO's October 2007 report on 58 fusion centers and related federal efforts to support them as well as updated information GAO obtained in March 2008 by reviewing plans describing selected federal efforts and attending the second annual national fusion center conference.
Almost all states and several local governments have established or are in the process of establishing fusion centers that vary in their characteristics. Centers were generally established to address gaps in information sharing, and the majority of the centers GAO contacted had adopted broad missions that could include both counterterrorism and law enforcement-related information. While law enforcement entities, such as state police, are the lead or managing agencies in the majority of the centers GAO contacted, the centers varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies. The majority of the operational fusion centers GAO contacted had federal personnel, including from DHS or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), assigned to them as of September 2007. DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address challenges fusion center officials identified. DHS and DOJ have provided many fusion centers access to their information systems, but fusion center officials cited challenges accessing and managing multiple information systems. Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for state and local personnel and set timeliness goals for granting clearances. However, officials cited challenges obtaining and using clearances. DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have also taken steps to develop guidance and provide technical assistance to fusion centers, for instance, by issuing guidelines for establishing and operating centers. However, officials at 21 centers cited challenges with the availability of training for mission-specific issues. DHS and DOJ have continued providing a technical assistance program for fusion centers and disseminated a baseline capabilities draft in March 2008 that outlines minimum operational standards for fusion centers. While this support and guidance is promising, it is too soon to determine the extent to which it will address challenges identified by officials contacted. Finally, officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers contacted reported facing challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 centers reported challenges with funding, some of which affected these centers' sustainability. To support fusion centers, both DHS and the FBI have assigned, and continue to assign, personnel to the centers. To help address funding issues, DHS has provided funding for fusion-center related activities. The National Strategy for Information Sharing, issued in October 2007 by the President, states that the federal government will support the establishment of fusion centers and help sustain them through grant funding, technical assistance, and training. However, some fusion center officials raised concerns about how specifically the federal government was planning to assist state and local governments to sustain fusion centers as it works to incorporate fusion centers into the ISE and to implement the strategy.
GAO-08-636T, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Address Some Challenges Faced by State and Local Fusion Centers
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Testimony:
Before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector
Preparedness and Integration, Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery:
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT:
Thursday, April 17, 2008:
Homeland Security:
Federal Efforts Are Helping to Address Some Challenges Faced by State
and Local Fusion Centers:
Statement of Eileen R. Larence, Director: Homeland Security and Justice
Issues:
GAO-08-636T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-636T, a testimony before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee
on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration,
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, state and local
governments formed fusion centers, collaborative efforts to detect,
prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.
Recognizing that the centers are a critical mechanism for sharing
information, the federal government”including the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Program
Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), which has
primary responsibility for governmentwide information sharing”is taking
steps to partner with fusion centers.
This testimony focuses on (1) the characteristics of fusion centers as
of September 2007 and (2) federal efforts to help alleviate challenges
centers identified. This testimony is based on GAO‘s October 2007
report on 58 fusion centers and related federal efforts to support them
as well as updated information GAO obtained in March 2008 by reviewing
plans describing selected federal efforts and attending the second
annual national fusion center conference.
What GAO Found:
Almost all states and several local governments have established or are
in the process of establishing fusion centers that vary in their
characteristics. Centers were generally established to address gaps in
information sharing, and the majority of the centers GAO contacted had
adopted broad missions that could include both counterterrorism and law
enforcement–related information. While law enforcement entities, such
as state police, are the lead or managing agencies in the majority of
the centers GAO contacted, the centers varied in their staff sizes and
partnerships with other agencies. The majority of the operational
fusion centers GAO contacted had federal personnel, including from DHS
or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), assigned to them as of
September 2007.
DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address
challenges fusion center officials identified.
* DHS and DOJ have provided many fusion centers access to their
information systems, but fusion center officials cited challenges
accessing and managing multiple information systems.
*Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for state and
local personnel and set timeliness goals for granting clearances.
However, officials cited challenges obtaining and using clearances.
*DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have also taken steps to develop guidance and
provide technical assistance to fusion centers, for instance, by
issuing guidelines for establishing and operating centers. However,
officials at 21 centers cited challenges with the availability of
training for mission-specific issues. DHS and DOJ have continued
providing a technical assistance program for fusion centers and
disseminated a baseline capabilities draft in March 2008 that outlines
minimum operational standards for fusion centers. While this support
and guidance is promising, it is too soon to determine the extent to
which it will address challenges identified by officials contacted.
* Finally, officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers contacted reported
facing challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54
centers reported challenges with funding, some of which affected these
centers‘ sustainability. To support fusion centers, both DHS and the
FBI have assigned, and continue to assign, personnel to the centers. To
help address funding issues, DHS has provided funding for fusion-center
related activities.
The National Strategy for Information Sharing, issued in October 2007
by the President, states that the federal government will support the
establishment of fusion centers and help sustain them through grant
funding, technical assistance, and training. However, some fusion
center officials raised concerns about how specifically the federal
government was planning to assist state and local governments to
sustain fusion centers as it works to incorporate fusion centers into
the ISE and to implement the strategy.
What GAO Recommends:
While this testimony contains no new recommendations, GAO has
recommended that the federal government define and articulate its long-
term fusion center role and whether it expects to provide resources to
help ensure their sustainability. PM-ISE agreed with the recommendation
and is in the process of implementing it.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-636T]. For more
information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 or
larencee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing on fusion
centers. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, most states and
several local governments have established fusion centers to address
gaps in homeland security and law enforcement information sharing by
the federal government and to provide a conduit of this information
within the state. While fusion centers vary, reflecting differences in
state and local needs, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act) defines a fusion center as
a "collaborative effort of two or more federal, state, local, or tribal
government agencies that combine resources, expertise, or information
with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect,
prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist
activity."[Footnote 1]
With information-sharing weaknesses recognized as a major contributing
factor in the nation's lack of preparedness for the September 11
attacks, a number of information-sharing initiatives were mandated in
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(Intelligence Reform Act). For example, the Intelligence Reform Act, as
amended in August 2007 by the 9/11 Commission Act, requires the
President to take action to facilitate the sharing of terrorism-related
information by establishing an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) to
combine policies, procedures, and technologies that link people,
systems, and information among all appropriate federal, state, local,
and tribal entities and the private sector.[Footnote 2] To oversee
development and implementation of the ISE, the act also required the
President to appoint a program manager, which the President did in
April 2005.[Footnote 3]
The Program Manager for the ISE (PM-ISE), the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are taking steps to
partner with fusion centers as part of the information sharing
environment. In November 2006, the PM-ISE issued a plan for
implementing the ISE that incorporated presidentially approved
recommendations for federal, state, local, and private-sector
information sharing. The implementation plan acknowledges that the
collaboration between fusion centers and with the federal government
marks a tremendous increase in the nation's overall analytic capacity
that can be used to combat terrorism, and it identifies the creation of
an integrated nationwide network of fusion centers as a way to promote
two-way information sharing with the federal government. Under the
plan, DHS and DOJ are to assume responsibility for technical assistance
and training to support fusion centers. Both DHS and DOJ have
established program offices to oversee their relationships with fusion
centers. In October 2007, the President issued the first National
Strategy for Information Sharing: Success and Challenges in Improving
Terrorism-Related Information Sharing (National Strategy), which
further highlights the importance of state and local fusion centers as
valuable information-sharing resources to be incorporated into the
national information sharing framework.
In addition, the 9/11 Commission Act contains several provisions
related to fusion centers.[Footnote 4] For example, in accordance with
the act, DHS established a fusion center program office. This office is
responsible for providing operational and intelligence advice and
assistance to fusion centers, facilitating coordination and information
flow between fusion centers and DHS, and deploying DHS personnel to
fusion centers. In addition, the act requires that the Secretary of
DHS, in consultation with the Attorney General, establish guidelines
for fusion centers that include standards related to privacy policies
and training.
My testimony today discusses (1) the characteristics of state and local
fusion centers as of September 2007[Footnote 5] and (2) the extent to
which efforts under way by the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ are helping to
address some of the challenges identified by fusion centers. My
statement is based on (1) the results of our October 2007 report
[Footnote 6] that discusses the status and characteristics of 58 state
and local fusion centers as well as federal efforts underway to help
address challenges the centers identified; and (2) updated information
we obtained in March 2008 about selected federal efforts to support
fusion centers.[Footnote 7] To obtain updated information, we reviewed
plans and documents describing these federal efforts and attended the
second annual national fusion center conference.[Footnote 8] We
conducted this work according to generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Summary:
Fusion centers, which vary in their characteristics, are operating or
being established in almost all states and several local jurisdictions
across the country. Specifically, officials in many (43 of 58) of the
fusion centers we contacted described their centers as operational as
of September 2007.[Footnote 9] These centers were generally created by
state and local governments to improve information sharing across
levels of government and to prevent terrorism or other threats. While 9
of these operational centers had opened within the couple of years
after September 11, 2001, 34 had opened since January 2004. The
majority of the centers had scopes of operations and missions that
included more than just counterterrorism-related activities, such as a
focus on all crimes or all hazards. Adopting a broader focus helped
provide information about all threats and increased the center's
sustainability, for instance, by including additional stakeholders who
could provide staff and support, and is consistent with the definition
of a fusion center in the 9/11 Commission Act. Law enforcement
entities, such as state police, were the lead or managing agencies in
the majority of the operational centers we contacted. While the centers
varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies, as of
September 2007, at least 34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we
contacted reported that they had federal personnel assigned to their
centers. Twelve of the centers were colocated with Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) field units. Many of the operational centers
reported having access to unclassified and, to a lesser extent,
classified DHS and FBI systems and networks. Thus far, products
disseminated and services provided varied from daily bulletins to in-
depth reports or assessments.
We reported in October 2007 that fusion centers face challenges in
several areas and that--in light of the importance of fusion centers in
facilitating information sharing among levels of government--federal
efforts are under way that begin to address these challenges.[Footnote
10] As of March 2008, many of these efforts are still ongoing.
* DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken steps to provide fusion centers
access to federal information systems, but some fusion center officials
cited challenges accessing relevant, actionable information and
managing multiple, competing, or duplicative information systems. For
example, officials in 30 of the 58 centers we contacted reported
challenges related to volume of information or managing multiple
systems. As a result, these center officials said that their ability to
receive and share information with those who need it may be limited.
Ongoing efforts to improve the quality and flow of information include
the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group's efforts to
provide a nonfederal perspective to the intelligence community and its
products.
* Both DHS and the FBI have provided clearances to numerous state and
local officials and have set timeliness goals for the issuance of new
clearances. However, obtaining and using security clearances
represented a challenge for 44 of the 58 centers we contacted, which
could limit their ability to access and use some information. In
addition, while law and executive order provide that a security
clearance granted by one federal agency should generally be accepted by
other agencies, officials in 19 of the centers encountered difficulties
with federal agencies, particularly DHS and the FBI, accepting each
others' clearances. DHS and DOJ officials reported that they were not
aware of recent fusion center challenges with reciprocity of
clearances. However, they said that there were complications in the
clearance process, for instance, because several federal agencies
conduct their own processes without central coordination.
* Fusion center officials also cited challenges obtaining guidance and
training. In particular, they cited the need for clearer and more
specific guidance in a variety of areas, including standards for
analyst training and information-sharing policies and procedures, to
help address operational challenges. DHS, DOJ, along with the PM-ISE,
continue to take steps to develop guidance and provide technical
assistance and training. For instance, DHS and DOJ disseminated a draft
baseline capabilities document that outlines minimum operational
standards for fusion centers to state and local officials in March 2008
for feedback.
* Notwithstanding DHS and FBI efforts to deploy personnel to fusion
centers and DHS's grant funding to support their establishment and
enhancement, fusion center officials reported challenges obtaining and
retaining qualified personnel and ensuring sufficient funding to
sustain the centers. To improve efforts to create a national network of
fusion centers, in our October 2007 report we recommended--and DHS and
the PM-ISE concurred--that the federal government determine and
articulate its long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to
provide resources to centers to help ensure their sustainability. The
National Strategy, issued by the President in October 2007, states that
the federal government will support the establishment of fusion centers
and help sustain them through grant funding, technical assistance, and
training. However, some fusion center officials raised concerns at the
national conference about how specifically the federal government plans
to assist state and local governments to sustain fusion centers as it
works to incorporate these centers into the ISE and to implement the
strategy.
Most States and Several Local Jurisdictions Have or Are Planning Fusion
Centers That Vary in Their Characteristics:
Almost all states and several local governments have established or are
in the process of establishing a fusion center. Specifically, officials
in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted described their centers as
operational, and officials in 15 centers considered their centers to be
in the planning or early stages of development as of September 2007.
Officials cited a variety of reasons why their state or local area
established a fusion center. To improve information sharing--related to
homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement--among federal,
state, and local entities and to prevent terrorism or threats after the
attacks of September 11 were the most frequently cited reasons for
establishing a fusion center. Several officials cited the need to
enhance information sharing within their own jurisdictions across
disciplines as the reason why they established a center. While 9
centers opened in the couple of years after the attacks of September
11, 2001, 34 of the 43 operational centers have opened since January
2004 as shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: Number of Operational Fusion Centers GAO Contacted Opened by
Year:
[See PDF for image]
This figure is a horizontal bar graph depicting the following data:
Number of Operational Fusion Centers GAO Contacted Opened by Year:
Year Opened: 2001;
Number of centers: 2.
Year Opened: 2002;
Number of centers: 1.
Year Opened: 2003;
Number of centers: 6.
Year Opened: 2004;
Number of centers: 7.
Year Opened: 2005;
Number of centers: 12.
Year Opened: 2006;
Number of centers: 10.
Year Opened: 2007;
Number of centers: 5.
Source: GAO analysis, information from fusion centers.
[End of figure]
Consistent with the 9/11 Commission Act's definition of a fusion center
and the purpose of a fusion center, as defined in the Fusion Center
Guidelines, officials in 41 of the 43 operational centers we contacted
said that their scopes of operations focused on more than just
counterterrorism. For instance, officials in 22 of these centers
described their centers' scope as all crimes or all crimes and
counterterrorism, and officials in 19 operational centers said that
their scopes of operations included all-hazards information (such as
related to public health and safety or emergency response). Further, 23
of the 36 operational fusion centers that provided us mission
statements had missions that involved collecting, analyzing, and
disseminating criminal as well as terrorism-related information. Eleven
other fusion centers had missions that involved enhancing, supporting,
or coordinating information and intelligence dissemination to both law
enforcement and homeland security agencies. Officials told us that
adopting a broader focus helped provide information about all threats
because of the link of many crimes to terrorist activity and also
increased the centers' sustainability, for instance, by including
additional stakeholders. Indeed, the National Strategy highlights the
importance of the centers fostering a culture that recognizes the
importance of fusing "all crimes with national security implications"
and "all hazards" information, which often involves identifying
criminal activity and other information that might be a precursor to a
terrorist plot.
Law enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of
investigation, were the lead or managing agencies in the majority of
the operational centers we contacted. The centers varied in their staff
sizes and partnerships with other agencies, ranging from fewer than 5
employees to over 80. In addition to a variety of state and local law
enforcement agencies, some centers included personnel detailed from
emergency management, fire, corrections, or transportation partners. As
of September 2007, at least 34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we
contacted reported that they had personnel from at least one federal
agency assigned to their centers. For example, DHS had deployed full-
time intelligence officers to 17 of the 43 operational fusion centers
we contacted and was in the process of staffing 8 additional centers.
About three quarters of the operational centers we contacted reported
that the FBI had assigned personnel, including intelligence analysts
and special agents, to their centers. Additionally, 12 of the
operational centers we contacted were colocated in an FBI field office
or with an FBI task force, such as a Joint Terrorism Task Force or a
Field Intelligence Group. Further, 19 of the operational centers
reported that they had other DHS or DOJ components represented in their
centers, such as personnel from Customs and Border Protection;
Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Transportation Security
Administration; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; or Drug
Enforcement Administration.
Many fusion centers reported having access to DHS's and DOJ's
unclassified networks or systems, such as the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN) and Law Enforcement Online (LEO),
containing, among other things, terrorism-related information.[Footnote
11] For example, as of September 2007, 40 of the 43 operational centers
reported they had access to HSIN, and 39 reported having access to LEO.
In addition, 16 of the 43 centers said they had or were in the process
of obtaining access to DHS's classified network of secret-level
homeland security data, and 23 reported they had or were in the process
of obtaining access to the FBI's classified systems containing, among
other things, secret-level investigative case files.
Thus far, products disseminated and services provided also varied.
Fusion centers reported that they issued a variety of products, such as
daily and weekly bulletins on general criminal or intelligence
information and assessments that, in general, provided in-depth
reporting on an emerging threat, group, or crime.
Federal Agencies' Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help Address Some
Reported Challenges:
Fusion center officials identified challenges in establishing and
operating their centers in several areas, such as accessing and
managing multiple information systems, obtaining and using security
clearances, finding sufficient guidance and training, obtaining and
retaining personnel, and obtaining funding. DHS and DOJ, recognizing
the importance of fusion centers in information sharing, have efforts
under way that begin to address many of these challenges.
DHS, DOJ, and PM-ISE Have Some Actions Under Way to Address Fusion
Center Challenges with Accessing and Managing Information Systems:
Fusion center officials reported challenges accessing and managing
multiple information systems. In October 2007, we reported that DHS and
the FBI had provided many operational fusion centers access to their
primary unclassified information systems (HSIN and LEO) and had
outlined plans to provide access to their primary classified networks
to state and local centers that had federal personnel at the center.
However, officials at 31 of the 58 centers we contacted reported
challenges obtaining access to federal information systems or networks.
For instance, officials in some centers cited challenges with DHS and
the FBI not providing fusion center personnel with direct access to
their classified systems. Fusion center personnel in these centers had
to rely on federal personnel who were assigned to the center or other
state personnel assigned to FBI task forces to access these systems,
obtain the relevant information, and share it with them. Further,
officials in 12 fusion centers reported challenges meeting system
security requirements or establishing the technical capabilities
necessary to access information systems, and DHS and the FBI had taken
some steps to address these challenges. For example, we reported that
DHS reviews the fusion centers' security status and assesses its
adequacy in light of its intention to deploy personnel and information
systems to the center. In March 2008, the DHS Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis stated that DHS planned to deploy its secret-
level homeland security data network to 41 fusion centers by the end of
fiscal year 2008.
While officials in many fusion centers cited challenges obtaining
access to systems, primarily classified ones, officials in 30 of the 58
fusion centers we contacted reported that the heavy volume of
information or the existence of multiple systems with often redundant
information was a challenge to manage. Officials in 18 fusion centers
said that they had difficulty with what they perceived to be the high
volume of information their center receives, variously describing the
flow of information as "overwhelming," "information overload," and
"excessive." For example, officials described how center personnel must
sort through the large amount of information, much of which is not
relevant to the center, to find information that is useful or important
to them. In addition, officials in 18 fusion centers found the lack of
integration among these multiple, competing, or duplicative information
systems challenging, or said they wanted a single mechanism or system
through which to receive or send information.
In October 2007, we reported that officials from the PM-ISE's office
were collaborating with other agencies, including DHS and DOJ, to
identify potential opportunities to streamline system access and
improve the quality and flow of information. For example, PM-ISE
officials reported that these entities had completed a review of the
most commonly used systems, such as HSIN, LEO, and the Regional
Information Sharing Systems,[Footnote 12] that included an examination
of users' needs to identify potential areas to streamline system
access. In October 2007, we also reported that such a review was in
accordance with recommendations that fusion centers made during the
first annual national fusion center conference in March 2007 and with
what several officials we contacted told us. Specifically, officials in
23 of the 58 fusion centers told us that DHS and DOJ, to facilitate
implementation of a national network of fusion centers, should reduce
the number of existing systems or develop a unified platform or
mechanism for information sharing with fusion centers. In addition, the
PM-ISE, along with DHS, DOJ, and other federal agencies, are taking
steps to improve the quality and flow of information through the
establishment of an Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination
Group (ITACG), which was made a statutorily mandated body by the 9/11
Commission Act.[Footnote 13] This group, which is to include state,
local, and tribal representatives detailed to work with the National
Counterterrorism Center, is to provide advice, counsel, and subject-
matter expertise to the intelligence community about the types of
terrorism-related information needed by state, local, and tribal
governments and how these entities use that terrorism-related
information to fulfill their counterterrorism responsibilities. In
doing so, the PM-ISE reported that the ITACG is to enable the timely
production by the National Counterterrorism Center of clear, relevant,
and federally coordinated terrorism-related information products
intended for dissemination to state, local, and tribal officials. In
October 2007, we reported that PM-ISE officials indicated that the
ITACG had achieved an initial operational capability. As of March 2008,
four state and local law enforcement representatives had been detailed
to the ITACG to provide a nonfederal perspective to the intelligence
community in its situational and threat reporting and intelligence
products, by, for example, requesting changes to report language to
better address state and local needs. According to one of the
representatives, these changes have involved requesting that specific
tactical information be included in reports or that, where possible,
the security classification of a report be lowered so that it could be
disseminated more broadly to state and local officials. While these
efforts to improve the quality and flow of information to state and
local users are promising, it is too soon to determine the extent to
which they will address the challenges in accessing and managing
information reported to us by fusion center officials.
DHS and the FBI Provide Clearances to Fusion Center Officials, but
Officials Cited Some Challenges with Obtaining and Using Clearances:
Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for numerous
state and local personnel in order to access classified information and
have set goals to reduce the length of time it takes to obtain a
security clearance. For example, DHS set a goal of 90 days to complete
a Secret clearance, and the FBI set a goal of 45 to 60 days to complete
a Secret clearance and 6 to 9 months to complete a Top Secret
clearance. DHS and the FBI have also provided centers with information
about the security clearance process and time frames, stating that
processing time for individual security clearances can vary, depending
on complexity. However, obtaining and using security clearances
represented a challenge for many of the fusion centers (44 of 58) we
contacted. For instance, officials at 32 of the centers cited
difficulties with the length of time it takes to receive a security
clearance from DHS or the FBI. However, some fusion center officials
acknowledged that that the length of time to conduct the required
background checks was necessary to ensure that clearances were only
given to individuals who meet the requirements.
In October 2007, we also reported that while law and executive order
provide that a security clearance granted by one government agency
should generally be accepted by other agencies, officials in 19 of the
centers we contacted encountered difficulties with federal agencies,
particularly DHS and the FBI, accepting each others' clearances. This
reported lack of reciprocity could hinder the centers' ability to
access facilities, computer systems, and information from multiple
agencies. DHS and DOJ officials said that they were not aware of fusion
centers encountering recent challenges with reciprocity of security
clearances. However, they said that there were complications in the
clearance process because, for example, multiple federal agencies carry
out their own processes and grant clearances without central
coordination.
DHS and DOJ Continue to Provide Guidance, Technical Assistance, and
Training to Fusion Centers:
DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE continue to provide fusion centers with
guidance, technical assistance, and training to help address their
challenges in these areas. In October 2007, we reported that DHS and
DOJ had, in August 2006, issued jointly developed Fusion Center
Guidelines that outline 18 recommended elements for establishing and
operating fusion centers. Intended to help ensure that fusion centers
were set up and operated consistently, they cover elements such as
ensuring appropriate security measures are in place for facility, data,
and personnel. Officials in many (48 of 58) of the fusion centers we
contacted said that they found the guidelines generally good and
useful, however others said they were not specific enough to address
their challenges. In addition, officials at 19 fusion centers said that
they lacked guidance on specific information-sharing policies and
procedures, such as privacy and civil liberties issues. Furthermore,
officials at 21 of the centers we contacted said that the availability
of adequate training for mission-related issues, such as training on
intelligence analysis, was a challenge. Officials in 11 centers, most
of which were operational centers that had been in existence for more
than 2 years, expressed a need for the federal government to establish
standards for training fusion center analysts. This could help ensure
that analysts are trained in a similar way nationwide, thereby
facilitating communication amongst fusion center analysts.
DHS and DOJ provide a technical assistance service program for fusion
centers, which, among other services, includes assistance developing a
comprehensive privacy and civil liberties policy,[Footnote 14] and have
ongoing efforts to provide training to fusion centers. Additionally,
along with the PM-ISE and others, DHS and DOJ have sponsored regional
and national conferences, including the second annual national fusion
center conference in March 2008, which was designed to support fusion
centers in building capabilities and understanding their roles and
responsibilities as described in the National Strategy. In addition,
DHS and DOJ, in collaboration with others, disseminated in March 2008 a
draft baseline capabilities document.[Footnote 15] Building on the
Fusion Center Guidelines, the document outlines baseline capabilities
and steps that fusion centers could take to ensure compliance in 12
topic areas, including management and governance, security,
intelligence analysis and production, and intelligence and information
dissemination. The document states that when a fusion center achieves
all of these standards, it is considered to have the standards,
structures, and tools in place to support the gathering, analysis, and
dissemination of terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement
information. Such a baseline level of capability is critical to
establishing a national, integrated network of fusion centers,
according to the National Strategy. DHS and DOJ solicited the feedback
of state and local officials on this document at the national fusion
center conference--the results of which have yet to be compiled and
released.
Fusion Center Officials Cited Challenges with Personnel and Funding;
DHS and the FBI Are Helping to Address These Issues to Some Extent:
Many fusion center officials we contacted reported challenges related
to obtaining personnel (43 of 58) and obtaining and maintaining funding
when establishing and operating their centers (54 of 58)--challenges
that some of these officials also said affected their centers'
sustainability. For example, officials in 37 centers said they
encountered challenges with federal, state, or local agencies not being
able to detail personnel to their fusion center, particularly in the
face of resource constraints. Fusion centers rely on such details as a
means of staffing the centers and enhancing information sharing with
other state and local agencies. Furthermore, officials in 20 of the
centers we contacted said that they faced challenges finding,
attracting, and retaining qualified personnel. For instance, one
official said that it was challenging to find personnel with the
expertise to understand the concept behind the development of the
center and to use the tools to build the center. While many of these
reported challenges were attributed to difficulties at the state and
local level, we reported that DHS and the FBI had ongoing efforts to
assign personnel to support centers and facilitate information sharing.
Both DHS and the FBI have continued to support fusion centers by
deploying personnel, consistent with the 9/11 Commission Act. As of
March 2008, DHS had deployed 23 officers to fusion centers and has
plans to place officers in as many as 35 centers by the end of fiscal
year 2008, and the FBI had assigned about 200 personnel to 44 fusion
centers, according to DHS and FBI officials respectively.[Footnote 16]
In terms of funding, officials encountered challenges obtaining both
federal and state funding. Specifically, officials in 35 of the 58
centers encountered challenges with the complexity of the federal grant
process, uncertainty as to whether they would receive federal funds, or
declining federal funding, and officials from 28 of the 58 centers
reported having difficulty obtaining state or local funding. They said
that these issues created confusion for their centers over the steps
needed to secure federal funds, made it difficult to plan for the
future, and created concerns about the fusion centers' abilities to
sustain their capabilities for the long term. Fusion center officials
also identified challenges with restrictions on the use of federal
grant funds, unclear and changing grant guidance, and a lack of
understanding of how federal funding decisions are made.[Footnote 17]
For example, officials in 21 fusion centers said that obtaining
adequate funding for personnel was difficult, and officials in 17
fusion centers found federal time limits on the use of grant funds for
personnel challenging.[Footnote 18]
In October 2007, we reported that DHS had provided grant funding for
fusion-related activities and had made some changes to ease the grant
process and adjust some of the restrictions on the timing and use of
grant funds. For example, DHS expanded grant funding in fiscal year
2006 in the area of allowable costs for information sharing and
collaborative efforts. Funds could be used by states to develop and
enhance fusion centers, particularly by hiring contract or government
employees as intelligence analysts; purchasing information-technology
equipment; or hiring consultants to develop and enhance fusion centers.
However, we also reported that, despite this funding, fusion center
officials were concerned about the extent of federal support they could
expect over the long term, especially in relation to the role of their
state or local jurisdictions. Given that at the time, federal plans or
guidance did not articulate the long-term role the federal government
expected to play in fusion centers, we recommended, and the PM-ISE and
DHS concurred, that the federal government determine and articulate its
long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to provide
resources to help ensure their sustainability. Further, we stated that
particular emphasis should be placed on how best to sustain those
fusion center functions that support a national information-sharing
capability as critical nodes of the ISE.
In promoting that fusion centers achieve a baseline level of
capability, the National Strategy states that the federal government
will support the establishment of fusion centers and help sustain them
through grant funding, technical assistance, and training to achieve
such a baseline level of capability. The strategy outlines specific
roles and responsibilities for federal, state, local, and tribal
authorities in five areas that are related to the establishment and
continued operations of fusion centers and for establishing a national
integrated network of centers. It notes that these roles and
responsibilities were developed in partnership with state and local
officials and represent a collective view. While the strategy
acknowledges that fusion centers are owned and managed by state and
local governments, it identifies the objective is to assist state and
local governments in the establishment and sustained operation of these
centers. However, some fusion center officials raised concerns at the
national fusion center conference about how specifically the federal
government was planning to assist state and local governments to
sustain fusion centers. For example, whether federal funding for fusion
centers would continue to be available through DHS's homeland security
grant program or whether in the future there would be fusion-center
specific funding has yet to be determined. In addition, some officials
raised questions about limits on federal funding for personnel. For
example, according to the fiscal year 2008 homeland security grant
program guidance, costs associated with hiring new intelligence
analysts are still allowable for 2 years. After which, the states and
urban areas will be responsible for supporting the sustainment costs of
those intelligence analysts (as well as providing a budget plan for
doing so) after the 2-year federal funding period is over. In our
October 2007 report, we reported on challenges that officials found
with federal time limits on the use of grant funds for personnel. In
particular, some of these officials expressed concerns about
maintaining their personnel levels, and one official told us that the 2-
year limit on the use of DHS grant funds for personnel made retaining
personnel challenging because state and local agencies may lack the
resources to continue funding the position, which could hinder the
center's ability to continue to operate. In discussing the
implementation of the National Strategy at the fusion center
conference, a Homeland Security Council official stated that the
question of federal versus state and local roles in sustaining fusion
centers is a very difficult question and one that is not yet resolved
but is ongoing.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, fusion centers are operating or are being
established in almost all states and several local jurisdictions.
Although fusion centers were primarily established to meet or enhance
information sharing within a state or local area, they have become a
critical component of the federal government's plans as it works to
improve information sharing in accordance with law and policy. Indeed,
the National Strategy recognizes fusion centers as vital assets to
information sharing and critical in the creation of an integrated
national network to promote two-way sharing of terrorism-related
information. Given the federal interest in fusion centers and the
centers' interest in supporting such a national network, it is
important that the federal government continue to provide fusion
centers with added value as an incentive to facilitate such a network.
In October 2007 we reported that DHS's and DOJ's efforts to assist
fusion centers, such as providing access to information systems,
security clearances, guidance and technical assistance, personnel, and
funding, had begun to address a number of the challenges fusion center
directors identified to us. Several of those efforts are continuing and
evolving, including the establishment of ITACG to improve the quality
of information provided to state and local users and the release of
baseline capabilities for the operation of fusion centers. These
efforts are promising; however, it is too soon to determine the extent
to which they will address all of the challenges reported to us by
fusion center officials. It is also important for fusion center
management to understand the federal government's role with respect to
these centers since this affects state and local governments' support
to centers. In this regard, we recommended in our October 2007 report
that the federal government define and articulate its long-term fusion
center role. The National Strategy clearly articulates a vision for the
federal government's role in supporting centers--that is by helping to
sustain centers through grant funding, technical assistance, and
training. However, fusion center officials raised some concerns about
sustainability of funding and personnel as the federal government
continues work to incorporate fusion centers into the information
sharing environment and implement the National Strategy.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer
any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at
this time.
Contact Information:
For further information on this testimony, please contact Eileen
Larence at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at larencee@gao.gov. Individuals
making key contributions to this testimony include Mary Catherine Hult,
Tom Lombardi, and Jeffrey Niblack.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. 266, 322 (2007).
[2] See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1016, 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-70 (2004),
amended by Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 504, 121 Stat. at 313-17.
[3] On June 2, 2005, the President issued a memorandum placing the PM-
ISE and its staff within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
[4] See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110-53 § 511, 121 Stat. at 317-24 (adding
section 210A to subtitle A, title II of the Homeland Security Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135).
[5] For purposes of this report, we use "local fusion center" to refer
to centers established by major urban areas, counties, cities, and
intrastate regions.
[6] GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate
Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion
Centers, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-35]
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007).
[7] Because we selected a non-probability sample of fusion centers to
include in our review, the results of our work are not generalizable to
the population of all fusion centers. However, because we selected all
state-operated fusion centers, as well as local fusion centers on the
basis of their stage of development and geographic diversity, the
information we gathered from these centers provided us with an overview
of challenges encountered and federal efforts to support the centers.
[8] Over 900 federal, state, and local law enforcement and homeland
security officials attended the conference, according to its sponsors,
which included the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
DOJ, DHS, FBI, PM-ISE, and the Global Justice Information Sharing
Initiative.
[9] We contacted all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 local
areas. However, 1 state did not plan a fusion center. For that reason,
we reported responses from 58 fusion centers--43 operational and 15 in
the planning or early stages of development.
[10] We presented information about challenges encountered by 58 fusion
centers--those in all stages of development--as they were establishing
and operating their centers. Fusion centers may have encountered more
than one challenge related to a particular area, for example, related
to guidance and training.
[11] HSIN serves as DHS's primary nationwide information-sharing tool
for communicating sensitive but unclassified homeland security
information. LEO serves as a real-time online controlled-access
communications and information-sharing data repository for sensitive
but unclassified information about, among other things, antiterrorism,
intelligence, law enforcement, and criminal justice.
[12] The Regional Information Sharing Systems is a nationwide
initiative to share sensitive but unclassified criminal intelligence
among stakeholders in law enforcement, first responders, and the
private sector.
[13] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 521, 121 Stat. at 328-32 (adding section
210D to subtitle A, title II of the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No.
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135).
[14] The 9/11 Commission Act requires that the guidelines established
by DHS for fusion centers include standards for centers to develop,
publish, and adhere to a privacy and civil liberties policy that is
consistent with federal, state, and local, law, and standards for
providing privacy and civil liberties training for all representatives
at the fusion center. Further, the act requires that DHS employees who
are detailed to fusion centers receive privacy and civil liberties
training.
[15] DHS, DOJ, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Baseline
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, A Companion
Document to the Fusion Center Guidelines (March 2008).
[16] These deployments may be to fusion centers other than the 58
centers that were included in our October 2007 report.
[17] A primary federal funding source for fusion centers is DHS's
Homeland Security Grant Program, which awards funds to state, local,
and tribal governments to enhance their ability to prepare for,
prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks and other major disasters.
[18] According to the fiscal year 2007 DHS homeland security grant
program guidance, Urban Areas Security Initiative and Law Enforcement
Terrorism Prevention Program funds could be used to hire new staff or
contractor positions to serve as intelligence analysts to enable
information and intelligence sharing capabilities. The costs associated
with hiring the new intelligence analysts were allowable for 2 years,
after which states and urban areas shall be responsible for supporting
the costs to sustain those intelligence analysts.
[End of section]
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