Drug Control
Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and an Updated Accountability Framework can Further Enhance DEA's Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities Gao ID: GAO-09-63 March 20, 2009Given the global context of the war on drugs--coupled with growing recognition since September 11, 2001 (9/11), of the nexus between drug trafficking and terrorism--the mission of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and efforts to forge effective interagency partnerships and coordination are increasingly important. GAO was asked to examine, in the context of the post-9/11 environment, DEA's (1) priorities, (2) interagency partnerships and coordination mechanisms, and (3) strategic plan and performance measures. GAO reviewed DEA policy, planning, and budget documents and visited 7 of DEA's 21 domestic field offices and 3 of its 7 regional offices abroad-- sites selected to reflect diverse drug-trafficking threats, among other factors. GAO also contacted other relevant federal agencies-- including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--and various state and local partner agencies.
Since 9/11, while continuing its primary mission of enforcing U.S. controlled substances laws, DEA has supported U.S. counterterrorism efforts by prioritizing narcoterrorism cases--drug-trafficking cases linked to terrorism-- and by implementing other policies and actions, such as collecting terrorismrelated intelligence from confidential informants and foreign partners. Also, DEA is using a new enforcement authority to pursue and arrest narcoterrorists--even those who operate outside the United States. Because most of the nation's illegal drug supply is distributed by Mexican drug organizations, DEA's partnerships and coordination with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies that have border-related missions-ICE and CBP--are important. However, an outdated interagency agreement-and long-standing disputes involving ICE's drug enforcement role and DEA's oversight of that role--have led to conflicts and the potential for duplicative investigative efforts. Another interagency agreement, predating CBP's formation under DHS, has led to operational inefficiencies, as reflected in a bifurcated process for handling illegal drugs seized at the nation's borders. That is, drugs seized by CBP between ports of entry are to be referred to DEA, but drugs seized at ports of entry are to be referred to ICE. According to CBP, an updated agreement that specifies a standardized process would be more efficient and less confusing. Further, in conducting the war on drugs, an important interagency coordination mechanism is the Special Operations Division, a DEA-led intelligence center that targets the command and control capabilities of major drug-trafficking organizations. Another coordination mechanism is the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion Center, which collects and analyzes drug-trafficking and related financial information and disseminates investigative leads. However, ICE is providing limited information to the Special Operations Division and is not participating in the OCDETF Fusion Center. As a result, according to DEA, these coordination entities are not as effective as they could be. Resolution of these interagency issues necessitates involvement by both the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, given that their respective departments' component agencies have been unable to reach mutually acceptable agreements. Notably, because of links between drug trafficking and terrorism, DEA has established new partnerships with the Department of Defense (DOD), especially in Afghanistan, where they share intelligence and DOD provides airlift and other support for DEA operations. DEA's strategic plan has not been updated since 2003; also, DEA's annual performance plans do not provide results-focused measures for assessing the agency's post-9/11 activities, such as counterterrorism efforts. A current and comprehensive strategic planning and performance measurement framework would help to ensure accountability by providing crucial information to DEA's senior leadership for making management decisions and to the Congress and the administration for assessing program effectiveness. In February 2009, DOJ reported that it was reviewing DEA's updated strategic plan.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-63, Drug Control: Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and an Updated Accountability Framework can Further Enhance DEA's Efforts to Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities
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Report to the Co-Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control,
U.S. Senate:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
March 2009:
Drug Control:
Better Coordination with the Department of Homeland Security and an
Updated Accountability Framework Can Further Enhance DEA's Efforts to
Meet Post-9/11 Responsibilities:
GAO-09-63:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-63, a report to the Co-Chairman, Caucus on
International Narcotics Control, U.S. Senate.
Why GAO Did This Study:
Given the global context of the war on drugs”coupled with growing
recognition since September 11, 2001 (9/11), of the nexus between drug
trafficking and terrorism”the mission of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and efforts to forge effective interagency
partnerships and coordination are increasingly important. GAO was asked
to examine, in the context of the post-9/11 environment, DEA‘s (1)
priorities, (2) interagency partnerships and coordination mechanisms,
and (3) strategic plan and performance measures. GAO reviewed DEA
policy, planning, and budget documents and visited 7 of DEA‘s 21
domestic field offices and 3 of its 7 regional offices abroad”sites
selected to reflect diverse drug-trafficking threats, among other
factors. GAO also contacted other relevant federal agencies”including
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP)”and various state and local partner agencies.
What GAO Found:
Since 9/11, while continuing its primary mission of enforcing U.S.
controlled substances laws, DEA has supported U.S. counterterrorism
efforts by prioritizing narcoterrorism cases”drug-trafficking cases
linked to terrorism”and by implementing other policies and actions,
such as collecting terrorism-related intelligence from confidential
informants and foreign partners. Also, DEA is using a new enforcement
authority to pursue and arrest narcoterrorists”even those who operate
outside the United States.
Because most of the nation‘s illegal drug supply is distributed by
Mexican drug organizations, DEA‘s partnerships and coordination with
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies that have border-related
missions–ICE and CBP”are important. However, an outdated interagency
agreement–and long-standing disputes involving ICE‘s drug enforcement
role and DEA‘s oversight of that role”have led to conflicts and the
potential for duplicative investigative efforts. Another interagency
agreement, predating CBP‘s formation under DHS, has led to operational
inefficiencies, as reflected in a bifurcated process for handling
illegal drugs seized at the nation‘s borders. That is, drugs seized by
CBP between ports of entry are to be referred to DEA, but drugs seized
at ports of entry are to be referred to ICE. According to CBP, an
updated agreement that specifies a standardized process would be more
efficient and less confusing. Further, in conducting the war on drugs,
an important interagency coordination mechanism is the Special
Operations Division, a DEA-led intelligence center that targets the
command and control capabilities of major drug-trafficking
organizations. Another coordination mechanism is the Organized Crime
Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Fusion Center, which collects and
analyzes drug-trafficking and related financial information and
disseminates investigative leads. However, ICE is providing limited
information to the Special Operations Division and is not participating
in the OCDETF Fusion Center. As a result, according to DEA, these
coordination entities are not as effective as they could be. Resolution
of these interagency issues necessitates involvement by both the
Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, given that
their respective departments‘ component agencies have been unable to
reach mutually acceptable agreements. Notably, because of links between
drug trafficking and terrorism, DEA has established new partnerships
with the Department of Defense (DOD), especially in Afghanistan, where
they share intelligence and DOD provides airlift and other support for
DEA operations.
DEA‘s strategic plan has not been updated since 2003; also, DEA‘s
annual performance plans do not provide results-focused measures for
assessing the agency‘s post-9/11 activities, such as counterterrorism
efforts. A current and comprehensive strategic planning and performance
measurement framework would help to ensure accountability by providing
crucial information to DEA‘s senior leadership for making management
decisions and to the Congress and the administration for assessing
program effectiveness. In February 2009, DOJ reported that it was
reviewing DEA‘s updated strategic plan.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland
Security take actions to enhance the effectiveness of (1) interagency
partnerships involving DEA, ICE, and CBP and (2) the multiagency
Special Operations Division and the OCDETF Fusion Center. DOJ agreed.
DHS responded that discussions with DOJ are ongoing. DHS neither
explicitly agreed nor disagreed with GAO‘s recommendations but
suggested revisions to the wording, which GAO did not make.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-63]. For more
information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-6510 or
larencee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Since 9/11, DEA Has Adopted New Policies and Utilized a New Enforcement
Authority to Assist in Counterterrorism Efforts and Respond to Changing
Global Drug Threats While Addressing Resource Constraints:
DEA Partners with Federal, State, and Local Agencies, and though Some
Partnerships Have Improved since 9/11, Others Continue to Have
Conflicts and Inefficiencies:
DEA Coordinates Activities and Leverages Resources through Multiagency
Task Forces and Intelligence Centers; However, Two Centers Are Less
Effective Because ICE Is Not Providing All Relevant Intelligence:
DEA Has Improved Its Strategic Plan and Performance Measures; However,
They Do Not Reflect the Agency's Current Direction and Programs and Are
Insufficient to Measure Progress and Guide Future Investments:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Justice:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Drug-Related Intelligence Centers--Missions and Participating
Agencies:
Table 2: DEA Field Divisions; Other Federal Agencies; and State, Local,
and Tribal Agencies Visited by GAO at Domestic Locations:
Table 3: Federal and Foreign Agencies and Personnel Interviewed by GAO
at International Locations:
Table 4: National Sheriffs' Association's Drug Enforcement Committee
Members Interviewed by GAO:
Table 5: Multiagency Task Forces and Intelligence Centers Visited by
GAO:
Figures:
Figure 1: Map of DEA's Domestic Divisions:
Figure 2: Map of DEA's International Regions:
Figure 3: DEA Enacted Budget Authority for the Salary and Expenses
Account:
Figure 4: DEA Authorized and Actual Full-time Equivalent Positions,
Fiscal Years 2000 through 2007:
Figure 5: Department of State Obligations under Interagency Agreements
with DEA, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007:
Figure 6: DOD Obligations under Interagency Agreements with DEA, Fiscal
Years 2000 through 2007:
Abbreviations:
ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives:
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
CPOT: consolidated priority organization target:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOD: Department of Defense:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FTE: full-time equivalent:
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act of 1993:
HIDTA: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area:
ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
MOU: memorandum of understanding:
OCDETF: Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force:
ONDCP: Office of National Drug Control Policy:
PTO: priority target organization:
USMS: U.S. Marshals Service:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
March 20, 2009:
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley:
Co-Chairman:
Caucus on International Narcotics Control:
United States Senate:
Dear Mr. Co-Chairman:
Illegal drugs and drug abuse remain a problem in the United States. In
2007, 114 million Americans--46 percent of the U.S. population over the
age of 12--reported having used illegal drugs at least once in their
lifetime and about one-third of these individuals (36 million
Americans) reported having used illegal drugs during the previous year,
according to government estimates.[Footnote 1] Revenue generated from
illegal drug trafficking is estimated to have topped $64 billion in
2000.[Footnote 2] In addition, in 2002, the most recent year for which
estimates were published, drug use was estimated to cost the U.S.
economy over $180 billion annually in health care costs, lost
productivity, and other costs.[Footnote 3]
The diversity of illegal drugs and their sources make drug control
efforts challenging. Drugs consumed in the United States include
substances grown and produced domestically, such as marijuana; smuggled
from other countries, such as cocaine; and diverted from legal uses to
be used illegally, such as oxycodone. While marijuana and
methamphetamine are produced domestically, the distribution of those
drugs and drugs smuggled into the country are increasingly controlled
by Mexican drug-trafficking organizations. Although some drugs, such as
MDMA, commonly known as ecstasy, enter the United States through the
northern border and by other means, most drugs are smuggled through the
southern border with Mexico. Also, the 2008 National Drug Control
Strategy noted that because of interdiction successes in the transit
zone--a 6 million square mile area that includes Central America, the
Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific Ocean--South
American drug traffickers are increasingly using West Africa as a
gateway to Europe and North America. In addition, according to the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Department of Justice (DOJ)
component agency dedicated to enforcing the controlled substances laws
of the United States through targeting and disrupting drug-trafficking
organizations, the illegal use of pharmaceutical drugs has become an
increasing concern in recent years.
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), within the
Executive Office of the President, directs the nation's
counternarcotics policy and is responsible for developing the annual
National Drug Control Strategy, a three-part strategy that aims to (1)
prevent drug use before it starts, (2) intervene and heal those who use
drugs, and (3) disrupt the market for illegal substances. DEA, as the
federal law enforcement agency dedicated to enforcing the controlled
substances laws of the United States, plays a role in the third
objective of the strategy--disrupting the market for illegal
substances. In particular, DEA seeks to investigate and arrest drug
traffickers and help prepare prosecutions.
In fiscal year 2007, DEA operated under a $2 billion budget with 9,309
positions to work toward those goals.[Footnote 4] DEA operates through
227 domestic field offices that encompass all 50 states and also has an
international presence overseas with 87 foreign offices in 63
countries. To accomplish its mission domestically and internationally,
DEA partners with other federal law enforcement agencies, such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other DOJ components, as well
as U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), and other Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) offices. DEA coordinates with federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies directly and through task forces, particularly
task forces in the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF)
program and the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program.
[Footnote 5] DEA also coordinates international drug control efforts
with the Departments of State and Defense and host-country governments
in foreign locations.
While the fight against illegal drugs is ongoing, the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001 (9/11) prompted the FBI to reprioritize policies
and programs to support counterterrorism efforts. Additionally, DEA has
found links between terrorist organizations and drug traffickers--in
particular, terrorist organizations using drug trafficking and related
proceeds to fund terrorist activities. As a result, agencies that
formerly focused on preventing and investigating traditional crimes,
such as drug trafficking, have taken on new homeland security
responsibilities.
Because of ongoing concerns about drug abuse and trafficking, the
changing landscape in counternarcotics enforcement, and the links
between drug trafficking and terrorism, you asked us to review changes
to DEA in the years following 9/11. This report examines (1) post-9/11
changes to DEA policies, strategies, and authorities to support
national counterterrorism efforts and address evolving global drug
threats; (2) changes to DEA's partnerships with federal, state, and
local agencies with counternarcotics responsibilities since 9/11, and
any effects of those changes; (3) mechanisms DEA uses to coordinate and
avoid duplication with partner agencies; and (4) the extent to which
DEA's strategic plan and performance measures have changed to reflect
the post-9/11 environment.
To understand the larger drug control context, we reviewed policy and
planning documents obtained from ONDCP, including the National Drug
Control Strategy, and we interviewed relevant ONDCP officials. Also, to
obtain additional perspectives on these topics, we conducted a
literature search of congressional hearings, DOJ Office of the
Inspector General reports, and other published materials. We reviewed
DEA budget documentation for fiscal years 2000 through 2009 and other
relevant agency documentation. We interviewed DEA officials, including
the Chief of Operations and the Chief of Intelligence, at DEA
headquarters, and the Special Agent-in-Charge of the Special Operations
Division.[Footnote 6] Also, we conducted site visits and spoke with
special agents-in-charge and other officials at 7 of DEA's 21 domestic
field divisions.[Footnote 7] We selected these sites to reflect diverse
characteristics, including (1) drug-trafficking and consumption threats
identified by the 2008 National Drug Threat Assessment (e.g.,
marijuana, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine); (2) geographic
differences such as border and nonborder areas, urban and rural areas,
and federally recognized Indian reservations; and (3) locations with
and without OCDETF and HIDTA representation. While the information
obtained during these visits cannot be generalized to all of DEA's
domestic field divisions, the information provided valuable insights
into a variety of drug enforcement issues and mechanisms. For
perspectives on DEA's international presence, we spoke with officials
at DEA's regional offices in Mexico and Thailand, two countries in
which DEA has had long-standing operations and partnerships, as well as
in Afghanistan where DEA resources have been increased in recent years.
Also, we spoke by telephone with a DEA official in Brussels, Belgium,
to better understand DEA's new attention to drug trafficking in West
Africa;[Footnote 8] and the Regional Director of DEA Bogotá, where DEA
has had a presence since 1972, about changes since 9/11 and
partnerships with other federal agencies there. While the information
obtained during these visits cannot be generalized to all of DEA's
foreign field offices, they provided valuable insights into DEA's
operations, partnerships, and coordination overseas. To understand how
DEA partners and coordinates with other federal agencies, we reviewed
counternarcotics documentation, including interagency agreements and
agency directives, and interviewed officials from:
* DEA and other DOJ components, including the FBI; the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the U.S. Marshals
Service (USMS); the Executive Office for OCDETF; and the OCDETF Fusion
Center;[Footnote 9]
* two DHS components--ICE and CBP;
* the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, and the respective U.S. embassies' Narcotics
Affairs Sections in Bangkok (Thailand), Bogotá (Colombia), and Kabul
(Afghanistan); and:
* the Department of Defense's (DOD) Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and
Global Threats.
In states where we visited DEA's domestic field divisions, we also
interviewed officials from DEA's principal federal partners and at
least one state, local, or tribal law enforcement agency (see table 2
in appendix I). In addition, we conducted telephone interviews with 17
of the 27 members of the National Sheriffs' Association's Drug
Enforcement Committee (see table 4 in appendix I). These 17 members,
while not representative of all local law enforcement, provided us
additional insights into DEA's partnerships and coordination with local
law enforcement. Although DEA partners with agencies that have
counternarcotics roles that focus on interdiction, such as the U.S.
Coast Guard, we do not discuss DEA's partnerships with those agencies
in this report because DEA does not focus on interdiction activities.
We compared DEA's strategic plan, performance measures, and interagency
coordination activities with recommendations made in the Final Report
of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(9/11 Commission Report) and the Government Performance and Results Act
of 1993 (GPRA),[Footnote 10] and interagency coordination practices
recommended by GAO.[Footnote 11] Appendix I contains additional details
about our objectives, scope, and methodology.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through March 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Results in Brief:
In the years since 9/11, DEA has given top priority to narcoterrorism
cases (drug cases linked to terrorism) and changed existing procedures
as well as used new policies and authorities to support this shift in
focus. Specifically, while DEA continues to focus on counternarcotics
efforts, DEA modified its policies to prioritize narcotics
investigations that have links to terrorist organizations and to
require that informants who provide drug-related intelligence be
questioned at least quarterly to collect terrorism-related
intelligence. DEA is also pursuing narcoterrorists using a new
enforcement authority authorized as part of the USA PATRIOT Improvement
and Reauthorization Act of 2005, which criminalizes "narcoterrorism"--
drug trafficking in support of terrorism--even if it occurs outside the
United States.[Footnote 12] As of October 2008, use of this authority
had resulted in the indictment of four individuals. To further enhance
the coordination of counternarcotics and terrorism intelligence, a
component of DEA rejoined the intelligence community. DEA made
strategic modifications to focus on major drug-trafficking
organizations, their financial infrastructures, and global drug
threats. For example, DEA has made drug-trafficking organizations most
responsible for the smuggling of illegal drugs into the United States
the top investigative priority after those cases that involve links to
terrorism. In fulfilling its counternarcotics mission while taking on
new responsibilities and addressing other challenges since 9/11, DEA's
inflation-adjusted budget increased by less than 1 percent during
fiscal years 2002 through 2007. As a result, during a self-initiated
hiring freeze that lasted from August 2006 until December 2007,
[Footnote 13] DEA pursued fewer narcotics-trafficking cases and reduced
some programs.
DEA partners domestically with federal, state, and local agencies, and
internationally with federal and host-country agencies; however,
partnerships have changed since 9/11 and outdated interagency
agreements have led to conflicts with ICE and operational
inefficiencies at CBP. In October 2005, we reported that agencies can
more effectively coordinate by leveraging resources, agreeing on roles
and responsibilities, establishing compatible policies and priorities
for operating across agency boundaries, and monitoring the status and
results of these efforts.[Footnote 14] DEA partners with DOJ components
such as the FBI, USMS, and ATF, and reprioritizations and
reorganizations since 9/11 have improved some of these partnerships.
However, DEA's partnerships with DHS component agencies--ICE and CBP--
are less clearly defined. An outdated interagency agreement that does
not reflect ICE's current organization and responsibilities--coupled
with long-standing jurisdictional disputes involving ICE's drug
enforcement role and DEA's oversight of ICE's drug-related
investigations--have led to conflicts between DEA and ICE that remain
unresolved. Without an updated interagency agreement between DEA and
ICE, there is potential for duplicative investigative efforts and
concern that officer safety could be compromised. Also, while DEA and
ICE have cross-designation procedures for giving ICE agents authority
to pursue counternarcotics cases, the procedures have proven to be
inefficient and problematic, which has led to fewer ICE agents being
designated to assist in counternarcotics efforts. Another interagency
agreement--predating CBP's organization under DHS--has led to
operational inefficiencies at CBP for handling illegal drugs seized at
the nation's borders and referring related intelligence to DEA. Without
an updated interagency agreement between DEA and CBP, these operational
inefficiencies are likely to continue. Applicable interagency
agreements involving DEA, ICE, and CBP have not been updated or amended
and there is no monitoring process in place to ensure that new
agreements will be reached. Internationally, DEA partners with the
Department of State to provide counternarcotics training and related
support to other nations. Also, DEA has new and evolving partnerships
with DOD in Afghanistan, Africa, and Central Asia where linkages exist
between narcotics trafficking, DEA's area of expertise, and terrorist
activities.
DEA continues to use multiagency task forces and intelligence centers
to coordinate counternarcotics investigations and operations with other
law enforcement entities, avoid duplication, and leverage partner
agency resources; however, there are limitations to the effectiveness
of the Special Operations Division because ICE is not providing all of
its drug-related information.[Footnote 15] Also, ICE is not
participating in the OCDETF Fusion Center. DEA participates with
federal, state, and local law enforcement in the OCDETF program to
jointly target major drug-trafficking organizations and the HIDTA
program to coordinate investigations and operations in regions with
significant drug-trafficking problems. According to officials we
interviewed, these multiagency task forces are effective for leveraging
limited resources to target multijurisdictional drug-trafficking
organizations. DEA has a lead role in the Special Operations Division
and the OCDETF Fusion Center, which bring together the intelligence and
analytical resources of federal agencies with counternarcotics roles to
detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to illegal drug trafficking
and, in some cases, terrorist activity. The 9/11 Commission Report
asserted that information sharing and the use of all relevant sources
of information are critical for combating threats to the United States.
However, though ICE leadership is aware of this, and DEA has discussed
it, ICE has continued to provide limited information to the Special
Operations Division and is not participating in the OCDETF Fusion
Center. ICE officials acknowledged that ICE does not share all of its
most sensitive data, such as some confidential informant information
and bank account information, with the Special Operations Division. DEA
officials noted that other agencies, such as the FBI, do share
sensitive information with the division, and DEA has demonstrated that
it can adequately protect the information. Also, the DEA officials
stressed that such information facilitates being able to "connect the
dots" during investigations of major drug-trafficking organizations.
Regarding nonparticipation in the OCDETF Fusion Center, the ICE
officials said that although ICE has made various concessions relating
to the information data set that ICE is willing to share with the
center, none have been acceptable to DEA and, thus, negotiations are at
an impasse. According to DEA, absent full participation by ICE, the
Special Operations Division and the OCDETF Fusion Center are unable to
most effectively identify links to and target major drug-trafficking
organizations.
DEA's strategic planning and performance measurement framework--which
consists of a multiyear strategic plan and annual performance plans--
has improved over time in response to previous criticisms; however,
DEA's strategic plan has not been updated since 2003 and does not
reflect all of the program and policy changes the agency has made since
9/11, particularly in reference to DEA's role in supporting the
nation's counterterrorism efforts--efforts that have received increased
DEA focus and funding since 9/11.[Footnote 16] As such, the strategic
plan does not fully reflect the intended purpose of providing a
template for ensuring measurable results and operational
accountability. DEA's 2009 annual performance plan does include four
performance measures of the agency's counterterrorism efforts--
measures such as the number of intelligence products completed by DEA's
Office of National Security Intelligence. However, these measures do
not provide a basis for assessing the effects of DEA's efforts, such as
the prevention of specific terrorist actions. Having an up-to-date
strategic plan and results-focused annual performance plans could
improve DEA's efforts to provide the Congress, the administration, and
other policymakers with information needed to assess the agency's
progress, help inform future funding and program decisions, and ensure
that the agency is achieving its part of the National Drug Control
Strategy.
To enhance collaborative efforts to combat narcotics trafficking, we
are recommending that the Attorney General and the Secretary of
Homeland Security jointly develop a new interagency agreement or other
mechanism to clarify their respective departments' counternarcotics
roles and responsibilities, particularly the roles and responsibilities
of DEA, ICE, and CBP, and monitor the implementation of the new
agreement or other mechanism and make any needed adjustments. We are
recommending that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland
Security develop more efficient cross-designation procedures--that is,
procedures for granting ICE agents authority to pursue counternarcotics
cases. Also, we are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland
Security (1) direct ICE to contribute all relevant drug-related
information to the Special Operations Division and fully participate in
the OCDETF Fusion Center and (2) ensure that ICE fully responds.
Finally, we are recommending that the Administrator of DEA update the
agency's strategic plan to more fully and accurately reflect the
agency's post-9/11 responsibilities and activities and also establish
appropriate performance measures that provide a basis for assessing
progress. On February 6, 2009, in commenting on a draft of this report,
DOJ concurred with our recommendations. On March 9, 2009, DHS responded
to our draft report asserting that the Secretary of Homeland Security
and the Attorney General have begun meeting regularly in order to
enhance coordination between DHS and DOJ on a range of issues,
including those addressed in this report. While neither explicitly
agreeing nor disagreeing with our recommendations, DHS suggested
several revisions to the wording of the recommendations, which we
considered but did not make. We believe that implementation of our
recommendations will help to ensure continued progress in addressing
long-standing issues.
Background:
DEA is the nation's federal agency dedicated to drug law enforcement.
DEA was created in 1973 as a result of Department of Justice
Reorganization Plan No. 2 and Executive Order 11727.[Footnote 17]
Basically, the President proposed the "creation of a single,
comprehensive Federal agency within the Department of Justice to lead
the war against illicit drug traffic," namely DEA, which consolidated
the drug enforcement functions performed by legacy DOJ components and
by the Department of the Treasury (Treasury).[Footnote 18] The
implementing executive order authorized the Attorney General, through
DEA, to coordinate the enforcement of U.S. drug laws among all
executive branch departments and agencies, requiring those agencies to
assist DEA on drug enforcement efforts when requested.
Today, DEA works to disrupt and dismantle the leadership, command,
control, and financial infrastructure of major drug-trafficking
organizations. DEA uses a multifaceted approach that includes
investigating narcotics cases and preparing them for prosecution;
managing a national drug intelligence program to collect, analyze, and
disseminate drug intelligence; enforcing counternarcotics laws
involving the diversion of legally produced substances for illegal
purposes; and coordinating with and leveraging the resources of
international, federal, state, and local partners.
DEA's operations are conducted under a framework comprising four
strategic areas: (1) domestic enforcement, (2) international
enforcement, (3) state and local assistance, and (4) diversion control.
[Footnote 19]
Domestic Enforcement:
DEA works to eliminate drug use and trafficking domestically with a
multijurisdictional approach that focuses federal, state, and local
resources to disrupt and dismantle drug-trafficking organizations. DEA
investigates, arrests, and refers to prosecution individuals associated
with these drug-trafficking organizations. DEA also collaborates with
federal, state, and local law enforcement partners; develops
intelligence through court-ordered wiretaps, confidential informants,
and other sources; and utilizes asset forfeiture authorities.[Footnote
20] As of September 30, 2008, DEA had 6,023 personnel based in domestic
field offices, which included 3,809 special agents.[Footnote 21] These
personnel operate from 227 domestic field offices, which are organized
under 21 divisions that encompass the nation (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Map of DEA's Domestic Divisions:
[Refer to PDF for image: map of the United States]
DEA's Domestic Divisions:
1. Atlanta Field Division;
2. Boston Field Division;
3. Chicago Field Division;
4. Dallas Field Division;
5. Denver Field Division;
6. Detroit Field Division;
7. El Paso Field Division;
8. Houston Field Division;
9. Los Angeles Field Division;
10. Miami Field Division;
11. Newark Field Division;
12. New Orleans Field Division;
13. New York Field Division;
14. Philadelphia Field Division;
15. Phoenix Field Division;
16. San Diego Field Division;
17. San Francisco Field Division;
18. Seattle Field Division;
19. St. Louis Field Division;
20. Caribbean Field Division;
21. Washington, D.C. Field Division.
Sources: GAO (analysis, map art), MapResources (map), DEA (data).
[End of figure]
International Enforcement:
Since the majority of illegal narcotics are produced outside the United
States and smuggled into the country, DEA has established the largest
federal law enforcement presence overseas to disrupt and dismantle the
world's most significant drug-trafficking organizations where they are
located. As of September 30, 2008, the agency's 616 foreign-stationed
personnel included 427 special agents, operating from its foreign
offices. DEA's foreign field offices are divided into seven regions
(see figure 2).
Figure 2: Map of DEA's International Regions:
[Refer to PDF for image: map of the World]
DEA's International Regions:
North And Central America Region:
Belize;
Canada (2 offices);
Costa Rica;
El Salvador;
Guatemala;
Honduras;
Mexico (11 offices);
Nicaragua;
Panama;
Regional office: Mexico City, Mexico.
Caribbean Region:
Barbados;
Dominican Republic;
Haiti;
Jamaica;
Netherlands Antilles;
Puerto Rico;
Suriname;
Trinidad & Tobago;
Regional office: San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Andean Region:
Colombia (2 offices);
Ecuador (2 offices);
Peru;
Venezuela;
Regional office: Bogotá, Colombia.
Southern Cone Region:
Argentina;
Bolivia (4 offices);
Brazil (2 offices);
Chile;
Paraguay;
Regional office: La Paz, Bolivia.
Europe/Africa Region:
Austria;
Belgium;
Denmark;
France;
Italy (2 offices);
Netherlands;
Nigeria;
Poland;
South Africa;
Spain;
Switzerland;
United Kingdom;
Regional office: Rome, Italy.
Middle East/Central Asia Region:
Afghanistan;
Cyprus;
Egypt;
Greece;
India;
Pakistan (2 offices);
Russia;
Tajikistan;
Turkey (2 offices);
Turkmenistan;
United Arab Emirates;
Uzbekistan;
Regional office: Ankara, Turkey.
Far East Region:
Australia;
Burma;
China;
Hong Kong;
Japan;
Laos;
Malaysia;
Philippines;
Singapore;
South Korea;
Thailand (3 offices);
Vietnam;
Regional office: Bangkok, Thailand.
Source: GAO (map art), Map Resources (map), DEA (data).
[End of figure]
DEA's foreign offices conduct bilateral drug investigations with host-
country counternarcotics agencies, coordinate international drug
intelligence, train foreign law enforcement agency personnel in drug
enforcement methods, assist with domestic U.S. counternarcotics
investigations that have international links, liaise with foreign
governments and law enforcement agencies, and collaborate on drug
investigations and other efforts with other U.S. law enforcement
activities, as needed.
State and Local Assistance:
To ensure a consistent national approach to drug law enforcement, DEA
trains state and local law enforcement officers. DEA's training is
designed to enhance the capabilities of state and local law enforcement
in investigative techniques, intelligence gathering, and cleanup of
toxic laboratories associated with the production of illegal substances
such as methamphetamine. DEA also manages DOJ counternarcotics grant
programs that provide assistance to state and local law enforcement.
Diversion Control:
The mission of DEA's Diversion Control Program is to prevent, detect,
and investigate the redirection of controlled pharmaceuticals (such as
narcotics, stimulants, and depressants) and certain listed chemicals
(such as ephedrine) into the illicit market, while ensuring that
adequate supplies are available to meet medical, scientific, and other
legitimate needs. To achieve this mission, the program's investigative
resources are focused on identifying, targeting, disrupting, or
dismantling diverters of licit controlled substances and chemicals at
the domestic and international level. The program is funded through the
Diversion Control Fee Account, which consists of registration fees paid
by licensed pharmacies and wholesale distributors of licit controlled
substances.[Footnote 22] Because we focused on DEA's efforts to disrupt
and dismantle the market for illegal drugs, we do not address the
Diversion Control Program or the diversion of legal drugs in this
report.
Since 9/11, DEA Has Adopted New Policies and Utilized a New Enforcement
Authority to Assist in Counterterrorism Efforts and Respond to Changing
Global Drug Threats While Addressing Resource Constraints:
In the context of 9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism, DEA changed
some policies and strategies to assist in counterterrorism efforts and
respond to global drug threats, such as prioritizing narcotics cases
with links to terrorism, collecting terrorism-related intelligence from
confidential sources, utilizing a new law enforcement authority, and
participating in the intelligence community. In addition, in order to
most effectively use resources, DEA has focused investigations on
narcotics-trafficking organizations most responsible for smuggling
illegal drugs to the United States, and has targeted these
organizations' financial infrastructures. While increasing its
counterterrorism efforts and maintaining its traditional role of
pursuing narcotics traffickers, DEA operated under a relatively flat
budget and implemented a temporary hiring freeze to address resource
constraints, which led to the pursuit of fewer narcotics cases.
DEA Contributes to the Global War on Terrorism by Giving Top Priority
to Cases with Links to Terrorism, Adapting Intelligence Collection and
Sharing Policies, Pursuing Narcoterrorists, and Rejoining the
Intelligence Community:
According to DOJ officials, following the terrorist attacks of 9/11,
DEA and other federal law enforcement agencies were asked to leverage
their resources and ongoing efforts to assist in counterterrorism and
homeland security efforts. In 2002, with the implementation of the
Global War on Terrorism, DEA implemented policies to prioritize
counternarcotics cases that have links to terrorism. To further support
the nation's counterterrorism efforts, DEA headquarters also mandated
that DEA agents periodically (at least every quarter) question all of
the agency's worldwide network of confidential informants
(approximately 5,000) to determine whether they have information
related to terrorist organizations or plots. According to DEA,
confidential informants have provided valuable information on
terrorists groups, for example, in Afghanistan where this information
has thwarted hostile acts against U.S. personnel and interests. In
2003, DEA also instituted procedures that require agents to share
terrorism-related information with partner agencies and the FBI's Joint
Terrorism Task Forces to further ensure intelligence coordination and
participate in the determination of linkages between terrorists and
narcotics traffickers.[Footnote 23] These procedures require that DEA
agents and agents-in-charge (1) immediately pass terrorism-related
information to the local FBI office and Joint Terrorism Task Force; (2)
forward information to relevant state and local law enforcement; (3) in
foreign offices, immediately pass the information to relevant
government agencies that are part of the respective U.S. embassy; (4)
notify DEA headquarters of the information and the agencies with which
information was coordinated; and (5) pass information to the Special
Operations Division. These protocols were reiterated most recently in
2004. A senior DEA official reported that these protocols help to
leverage interagency resources and enhance the nation's
counterterrorism efforts.
DEA is directly contributing to counterterrorism efforts by pursuing
narcoterrorists--those who fund terrorist activities with proceeds from
narcotics trafficking--through the use of a new enforcement authority.
Section 122 of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 960a) expands federal jurisdiction for
drug crimes committed outside the United States, where the prohibited
drug activity is for the purpose of funding any person or organization
that has engaged or engages in terrorist activity or terrorism.
[Footnote 24] As a practical matter, the provision expanded the reach
of U.S. law enforcement beyond U.S. borders by granting
extraterritorial jurisdiction to investigate, indict, and seek the
extradition of narcoterrorists worldwide. While DEA has pursued drug-
trafficking organizations identified as having links to terrorist
organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,
commonly known as FARC, DEA officials reported that prior to the
passage of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005,
and specifically 21 U.S.C. § 960a, DEA was unable to charge traffickers
outside the United States unless it could prove that they intended to
traffic narcotics to the United States. This proof requirement does not
appear under the new provision, which made trafficking narcotics to any
destination with the intent to fund terrorist activities prosecutable
in U.S. federal courts. According to DEA officials, approaches to
applying the new provision are still being explored because of its
recent enactment, the complexity of international investigations and
relations, and the continuously developing partnerships with foreign
law enforcement agencies. Nonetheless, the officials stressed that the
new authority is an important tool in the counterterrorism fight
because most countries generally accept the illegality of drug
trafficking and the danger of allowing drug-trafficking organizations
to flourish. Because of this general agreement, in some countries, DEA
has leveraged its relationships with host governments to arrest and
extradite traffickers on narcotics charges in cases where terrorism
charges could prove divisive for relations with the host country. As of
October 2008, DEA reported that four individuals had been charged under
21 U.S.C. § 960a.
Additionally, a component of DEA, the Office of National Security
Intelligence, joined the intelligence community in 2006 to better
coordinate drug-and terror-related intelligence. DEA was a member of
the intelligence community until it was removed in 1981 in conjunction
with then-ongoing efforts to separate the federal government's
intelligence and law enforcement functions. The 9/11 Commission Report
identified intelligence and information sharing as two of five key
areas that the federal government needed to improve to decrease the
likelihood of a terrorist attack in the future. DEA and intelligence
community agencies recognized that DEA can contribute unique narcotics
and terrorism-related intelligence to the intelligence community. For
example, DEA collects intelligence from confidential informants,
judicial wiretaps, and foreign law enforcement partners--sources that
may not be available to other intelligence community partners. Since
becoming an official member of the intelligence community in 2006,
DEA's Office of National Security Intelligence has established liaison
positions at various intelligence community components, such as the
Central Intelligence Agency, and also provides reports to intelligence
community partner agencies--self-initiated reports as well as reports
generated in response to specific requests. For example, DEA reported
in April 2008 that it provides partner agencies approximately 130
terrorism-related intelligence reports per month. According to senior
officials at DEA, membership in the intelligence community has provided
a link that ensures that terrorism and narcotics intelligence is
coordinated with all intelligence community partners. Further,
according to a recent DOJ Office of the Inspector General report,
intelligence community partners find DEA's intelligence valuable in
their efforts to examine ongoing threats.[Footnote 25]
DEA Modified Strategies to Target, Disrupt, and Dismantle the Most
Dangerous Drug-Trafficking Organizations and Their Financial
Infrastructures:
While DEA made a number of changes to its policies and procedures to
reflect the nation's and law enforcement's counterterrorism priority
following 9/11, DEA made additional strategic modifications to focus on
the most serious drug traffickers and their financial infrastructures.
According to DEA's Chief of Operations, prior to 9/11, DEA pursued
major drug-trafficking organizations; however, the adoption of the
consolidated priority organization target (CPOT) strategy has focused
drug enforcement efforts on the narcotics-trafficking organizations
most responsible for the importation of illegal drugs into the United
States. The CPOT list was launched by the Executive Office for OCDETF
in 2002 as part of a comprehensive drug enforcement strategy that uses
the expertise of multiple federal law enforcement agencies to identify
and target the most significant drug-trafficking organizations and
their components. According to a senior official in the Executive
Office for OCDETF, since 2002, the Executive Office for OCDETF has
managed the CPOT selection process, set the selection criteria, and
maintained responsibility for the dissemination of the CPOT list. DEA
has reported that by targeting organizations with the greatest effect
on the U.S. drug supply, DEA is maximizing the use of limited
resources.
All 46 of the narcotics-trafficking organizations on the CPOT list are
based in countries outside the United States. DEA has added personnel
to foreign offices, and plans to increase the number of foreign-
deployed personnel as funding allows, to pursue CPOT organizations
where they operate. DEA officials have described their efforts of
pursuing drug traffickers abroad before their illegal narcotics can
arrive in the United States or at the nation's borders as "expanding
the border." From fiscal years 2000 through 2007, DEA increased the
number of agents stationed in foreign offices by 14 percent, to 427
positions, and foreign intelligence specialists by 28 percent, to 67
positions. DEA increased the number of agents in regions where DEA has
identified new and emerging drug threats, such as in the Middle East,
East Asia, and South and Central America, and has plans to further
increase its presence in these regions.
In order to increase DEA's resources in foreign offices, the
administration decreased some domestic programs to focus resources on
the CPOT program. For example, mobile enforcement teams, teams of 8 to
12 agents who deploy to assist local law enforcement with drug problems
or traffickers that cannot be addressed with local resources, were
eliminated from DEA's 2005 and subsequent budget requests to focus
resources on higher priorities, including the CPOT strategy.[Footnote
26] Likewise, Demand Reduction, a program that uses DEA's expertise to
assist state and local law enforcement with efforts to prevent and
reduce illegal drug use, was eliminated from DEA's budget requests
beginning in 2005.
In 2003, the DEA Administrator made financial investigations one of the
top priorities for DEA, articulating that attacking the financial
infrastructure of drug-trafficking organizations was essential to fully
dismantling them. Accordingly, the Administrator made financial
investigations a required component of every narcotics investigation.
To implement this, DEA established the Office of Financial Operations
and provided agents with specialized training on financial operations.
Also, DEA charged the Office of Financial Operations with being the
point of contact for the financial services industry as well as
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. With the emphasis
on investigating the financial infrastructures of drug-trafficking
organizations, DEA has reported denying $7 billion in revenue to drug-
trafficking organizations from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2007.
[Footnote 27]
While DEA's Role Has Expanded to Include Assisting in Counterterrorism
Efforts, Resource Constraints and a Self-Imposed Hiring Freeze Have
Affected Its Ability to Pursue Some Narcotics Targets:
While DEA has implemented changes, such as assisting in
counterterrorism efforts and focusing on CPOTs, it has done so in the
context of resource constraints and a self-imposed hiring freeze, which
have affected its ability to pursue some narcotics targets. To maintain
funding for operations in the context of a relatively flat budget, DEA
implemented a hiring freeze that lasted from August 2006 until December
2007, when DEA began operating under its fiscal year 2008
appropriation. DEA has reported that as a result of the hiring freeze
and other factors, it pursued fewer CPOT-linked priority target
organization (PTO) and non-PTO cases.[Footnote 28]
Since 9/11, DEA has received limited additional funding to support
specific programs that assist in counterterrorism efforts. As such,
DEA's new strategies and policies generally have been undertaken with
few additional resources. DEA's direct funding for salaries and
expenses increased by approximately $280 million during the fiscal
years following 9/11--from $1.48 billion in fiscal year 2002 to $1.76
billion in fiscal year 2007 (see figure 3).[Footnote 29] However, after
adjusting for inflation, that increase amounts to less than 1 percent
per year, on average. Additionally, figure 3 shows that DEA's budget
has been relatively flat from 2002 to 2007 after adjustment for
inflation and even experienced slight decreases from fiscal years 2003
through 2004 and from fiscal years 2005 through 2006.
Figure 3: DEA Enacted Budget Authority for the Salary and Expenses
Account (dollars in millions):
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Fiscal year: 2000;
Not adjusted for inflation: $1,256;
Adjusted for inflation: $1,530.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Not adjusted for inflation: $1,360;
Adjusted for inflation: $1,619.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Not adjusted for inflation: $1,481;
Adjusted for inflation: $1,729.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Not adjusted for inflation: $1,551;
Adjusted for inflation: $1,775.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Not adjusted for inflation: $1,585;
Adjusted for inflation: $1.768.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Not adjusted for inflation: $1,639;
Adjusted for inflation: $1,772.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Not adjusted for inflation: $1,689;
Adjusted for inflation: $1,768.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Not adjusted for inflation: $1,757;
Adjusted for inflation: $1,790.
Source: GAO analysis of DEA and ONDCP data.
Note: Data exclude the DEA Diversion Control Fee Account.
[End of figure]
From fiscal years 2000 through 2005, DEA received annual authorizations
to increase the number of personnel it could employ. However, DEA has
reported that because of budget constraints, it was unable to increase
the actual number of onboard staff and concurrently maintain the
agency's operations. As shown in figure 4, although DEA was authorized
to increase the number of personnel on board by more than 8 percent
from 7,336 in fiscal year 2000 to 8,025 in fiscal year 2007, the actual
number of personnel on board was lower in 2007 than in 2000.
Figure 4: DEA Authorized and Actual Full-time Equivalent Positions,
Fiscal Years 2000 through 2007:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Fiscal year: 2000;
Actual FTE: 7,131;
Authorized FTE: 7,336.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Actual FTE: 7,063;
Authorized FTE: 7,412.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Actual FTE: 6,973;
Authorized FTE: 7,515.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Actual FTE: 6,921;
Authorized FTE: 7,661.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Actual FTE: 7,087;
Authorized FTE: 8,018.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Actual FTE: 7,122;
Authorized FTE: 8,250.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Actual FTE: 7,225;
Authorized FTE: 8,157.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Actual FTE: 7,071;
Authorized FTE: 8,025.
Source: GAO analysis of DEA and ONDCP data.
Note: Data exclude full-time equivalents (FTE) funded through the DEA
Diversion Control Fee Account.
[End of figure]
In August 2006, to address budget limitations while maintaining
priority programs and operations, DEA elected to institute a hiring
freeze, which remained in effect until December 2007. A senior DEA
official explained that DEA chose to defer hiring and streamline
programs for efficiency in addition to non-priority program cuts noted
above. According to DEA estimates, as a result of the hiring freeze,
there are now approximately 220 to 225 fewer special agents operating
in the field. DEA noted, for example, that during the hiring freeze,
the agency trained only one class of new agents, whereas the agency
typically trains four to nine classes of new agents each year. Also,
according to DEA, the reduction in the number of agents resulted in a
22 percent decrease in the number of special agent investigative work
hours dedicated to CPOT-linked cases during fiscal year 2007 compared
to fiscal year 2006. Further, DEA reported that because of the hiring
freeze, 34 percent fewer CPOT-linked PTOs were identified and 41
percent fewer were disrupted or dismantled in fiscal year 2007 than
targeted in DEA's goal. Likewise, the agency reported that it pursued 8
percent fewer non-PTOs--organizations of lower priority to DEA--from
the first quarter of fiscal year 2006 to the first quarter of fiscal
year 2008.
The hiring freeze ended in December 2007 with enactment of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, which provided additional
funding to enable DEA to lift the hiring freeze.[Footnote 30] DEA
reported that from January 6, 2008, through September 27, 2008, it
hired 150 special agents and 189 nonagents and held four special agent
training classes. DEA has reported that it intends to hire an
additional 200 special agents and 550 nonagents in fiscal year 2009.
DEA Partners with Federal, State, and Local Agencies, and though Some
Partnerships Have Improved since 9/11, Others Continue to Have
Conflicts and Inefficiencies:
DEA partners with other federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies to leverage counternarcotics resources. DEA partners with DOJ
components, such as the FBI, USMS, and ATF, and reprioritizations and
reorganizations since 9/11 have improved some of these partnerships.
DEA also partners with DHS law enforcement agencies, such as ICE and
CBP on narcotics-smuggling cases, but outdated interagency agreements,
among other reasons, have led to conflicts with ICE and operational
inefficiencies at CBP. DEA continues to partner with the Departments of
State and Defense, and these partnerships have evolved in regions such
as Afghanistan, Africa, and Central Asia. Finally, DEA leverages the
manpower and intelligence resources of state and local law enforcement
agencies while also partnering with these agencies to provide training
and other resources.
DEA Continues to Build Collaborative Partnerships and Clearly Define
Roles and Responsibilities with Other DOJ Law Enforcement Agencies:
Since 9/11, DEA has made progress in partnering with other DOJ law
enforcement agencies--the FBI, USMS, and ATF--on investigations,
intelligence sharing, and operations, and more clearly defining roles
and jurisdictional responsibilities within DOJ. While DEA and the FBI
have long partnered to enforce the counternarcotics laws of the United
States, the events of 9/11 led the FBI to revise its priorities and
shift resources from traditional crime enforcement activities, such as
counternarcotics, to counterterrorism and other issues. For example,
while the FBI had 2,078 positions dedicated to counternarcotics prior
to 9/11, the number had reduced to 600 positions by the end of fiscal
year 2006--and 86 percent of the 600 positions were funded under the
OCDETF program. According to the Chief of the FBI's Criminal
Investigative Division, as a result of this reduction, the FBI has
pursued fewer drug cases. For example, DOJ statistics show that the FBI
referred 40 percent fewer drug cases to U.S. Attorneys and participated
in 44 percent fewer OCDETF investigations in fiscal year 2007 compared
with fiscal year 2000. According to DEA and FBI officials at
headquarters and in field offices, before 9/11, DEA and the FBI had
conflicts caused by investigational overlap. Since 9/11, the FBI's
focus on counterterrorism efforts has reduced such overlap with DEA,
and FBI officials report that they collaborate more with DEA directly
and through other mechanisms. For example, senior DEA agents and a
supervisory FBI agent in field offices reported that the two agencies
have improved their relationships through efforts such as the OCDETF
program, which leverages the resources of the FBI, DEA, and other
agencies.
During our field visits, DEA special agents-in-charge of the Los
Angeles, Phoenix, and Seattle field offices told us that DEA
collaborates with the FBI on counternarcotics and counterterrorism
intelligence, often via participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces,
OCDETF task forces, and investigations involving gangs. For example,
DEA and the FBI partnered on an investigation targeting gang and drug
activity in Los Angeles that resulted in the indictment of 20
defendants in November 2007. Additionally, two senior FBI field agents
indicated that they regularly use information-sharing tools, such as
the DEA-led Special Operations Division, to ensure that information is
coordinated with DEA and other agencies on counternarcotics
investigations. Senior officials at DEA headquarters also indicated
that the FBI's participation in the Special Operations Division was
vital, given that the FBI provides terrorism case information as well
as counternarcotics intelligence.
In three countries--Colombia, Mexico, and Thailand--DEA and the FBI
collaborate through Resolution 6, an agreement whereby FBI agents are
posted in DEA's offices in these countries to jointly conduct
investigations of multijurisdictional and international drug-
trafficking organizations.[Footnote 31] FBI agents in these locations
reported that their collaboration with DEA facilitated cooperation and
reduced the risk of duplicative or overlapping investigations.
Additionally, both agencies report to the U.S. ambassador within the
respective embassy, and U.S. government policy is that DEA is the
primary point of contact for all counternarcotics investigations in
foreign countries.
DEA also partners with USMS and ATF on relevant counternarcotics cases.
Each agency's defined role in such investigations and participation in
coordination mechanisms, such as OCDETF task forces, have helped to
facilitate collaboration. As the principal federal agency responsible
for locating and apprehending fugitives, USMS primarily coordinates
with DEA on the apprehension of narcotics fugitives and suspects
indicted on narcotics charges. The Attorney General issued a policy in
1988 that allows DEA to turn over its fugitive apprehension
responsibilities to USMS. By leveraging the resources of USMS, DEA can
use its special agents on other investigative priorities.
ATF also has a defined role focusing on the firearms aspect of
counternarcotics investigations, which facilitates collaboration with
DEA. Because ATF's mission includes, among other things, enforcing U.S.
laws regulating firearms and explosives, a senior ATF official reported
that the agency does not conduct independent, complex narcotics
investigations; however, suspects involved in firearms-trafficking
cases often are involved in or have links to drug-trafficking
organizations. As such, firearms investigations often evolve to
incorporate a narcotics component. However, according to senior
officials at ATF headquarters and field offices, when cases develop
more complex linkages to narcotics trafficking, such as cases involving
international drug-trafficking organizations, ATF either invites DEA to
participate or turns those cases over to DEA. Senior ATF officials
representing offices in New York and the western region of the United
States reported that they collaborate well with DEA because ATF has a
clearly defined role that is distinct from DEA's, which reduces
duplicative investigative efforts.
Also, in providing technical comments on a draft of this report in
January 2009, DOJ noted that DEA agents were participants--in either a
full-time, part-time, or as-needed capacity--in 31 ATF task forces
(referred to as Violent Crime Impact Teams).[Footnote 32] The
department noted that DEA has requested an enhancement for its fiscal
year 2010 budget to create 36 special agent positions to further
support these teams.
DEA Partners with DHS Component Agencies; However, Outdated Interagency
Agreements, among Other Causes, Have Led to Conflicts with ICE and
Operational Inefficiencies at CBP:
In carrying out its counternarcotics mission, DEA partners with related
DHS component agencies, ICE and CBP. However, an outdated interagency
agreement and long-standing jurisdictional disputes have led to
conflicts between DEA and ICE, with the potential for duplicating
investigative efforts and compromising officer safety.[Footnote 33]
Another interagency agreement--predating CBP's organization under DHS-
-has led to operational inefficiencies at CBP regarding the reporting
and disposal of illegal drugs seized at the border.
DEA and ICE Partner on Counternarcotics Efforts, Although an Outdated
Interagency Agreement and Long-standing Jurisdictional Disputes
regarding Roles and Responsibilities Have Led to Conflicts:
DEA and ICE partner on drug enforcement efforts; however, conflicts
exist because the applicable interagency agreement has not been updated
since 1994 to reflect organizational and other changes, and long-
standing disputes over ICE's drug enforcement role and DEA's respective
oversight exist. Specifically, these disputes date back to DEA's and
ICE's predecessor agencies, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
and the U.S. Customs Service (Customs), which was then a component of
Treasury.[Footnote 34] According to the President's message to the
Congress that accompanied Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, DEA was
created "to serve as a single, comprehensive Federal agency within the
Department of Justice to lead the war against illicit drug traffic."
Among other things, the reorganization plan transferred all of
Treasury's drug-related intelligence, investigative, and law
enforcement functions to the Attorney General, and by delegation, DEA,
except to the extent that they relate to searches and seizures of drugs
and the apprehension and detention of suspects at "regular inspection
locations at ports of entry or anywhere along the land or water borders
of the United States." The plan further required Treasury officials to
turn over drug-related evidence and suspects to the Attorney General.
Thus, although Treasury remained responsible for interdicting drugs and
drug suspects at ports and borders, it retained drug-related
intelligence, investigative, and law enforcement functions only to the
extent that those functions relate to searches and seizures of drugs,
or the apprehension or detention of persons in connection therewith at
ports and borders. All other drug-related intelligence, investigative,
and law enforcement functions were to be the responsibility of DEA.
While Reorganization Plan No. 2 was intended to clarify
counternarcotics roles and reduce conflicts between DOJ and Treasury
component agencies, disputes continued. As a result of these
disagreements, DEA and Customs sought clarification on a variety of
issues, including Customs' jurisdiction over counternarcotics cases,
from DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel, which is responsible for addressing
questions of legal authority among executive branch agencies, among
other things. In addressing the disagreement over Customs' drug
enforcement jurisdiction, the Office of Legal Counsel stated that the
role of Customs in drug enforcement was limited to interdictions at the
international borders of the United States and that as a result of the
reorganization plan that created DEA, Customs did not have independent
authority to carry out drug investigations.[Footnote 35] The Office of
Legal Counsel further stated that under 21 U.S.C. § 873(b), the
Attorney General is authorized to request assistance from other federal
agencies in carrying out Title 21 enforcement duties and that it is the
duty of those agencies to furnish assistance. The Office of Legal
Counsel further observed that Customs agents may participate in drug
investigations, but that the Attorney General required Customs agents
to work under the supervision of DEA when doing so.[Footnote 36] This
principle is embodied in DOJ's regulations, which authorize "cross-
designated" federal law enforcement officers to undertake "drug
investigations under the supervision of the DEA."[Footnote 37]
In an attempt to resolve their differences, DEA and Customs negotiated
a memorandum of understanding (MOU), the most recent version of which
was completed in 1994, to set forth the policies and procedures by
which DEA would cross-designate Customs (now ICE) agents to enforce
Title 21.[Footnote 38] The stated purpose of the MOU was to enhance the
overall drug enforcement strategy by empowering cross-designated
Customs agents to enforce Title 21;[Footnote 39] promote coordination,
communication, and cooperation; and avoid dangerous, confrontational,
and duplicative activities between the two agencies. Among other
things, the MOU specifically restricted cross-designated Customs agents
to investigating individuals and organizations involved in the
smuggling of controlled substances across U.S. international borders or
through ports of entry. It prohibited Customs agents, even once cross-
designated, from using Title 21 authority to perform domestic or
nonsmuggling counternarcotics investigations.
Disputes about how to interpret the 1994 MOU continue to hinder
collaboration between DEA and ICE. First, while the MOU authorizes
cross-designated ICE agents to investigate individuals and
organizations involved in drug smuggling across U.S. international
borders or through ports of entry, the MOU does not include any
parameters for what constitutes a border or port-of-entry smuggling
investigation. ICE officials have stated that ICE's border enforcement
authority extends to all ICE investigations of drug trafficking that
have a demonstrated link to the border, including investigations that
lead to the nation's interior. However, a senior ICE official also
acknowledged that determining what defines a demonstrated link to the
border often relies upon agent experience. DEA's view of what
constitutes a border or port-of-entry smuggling investigation is
narrower in scope. According to both DEA and ICE officials, this lack
of clarity has led to disagreements between DEA and ICE regarding the
difference between drug enforcement connected to the border and related
smuggling violations versus domestic enforcement of U.S. drug laws.
Further, ICE has stated that it is increasingly difficult to separate
drug-smuggling investigations from alien smuggling investigations
because the same organizations often participate in both types of
smuggling. For example, during an ICE operation conducted against an
alien smuggling organization along the Southwest border in May 2007,
ICE agents discovered that the organization was also trafficking in
marijuana.
Second, DEA and Customs, and later, ICE, have disagreed on the scope of
supervision that DEA is to exercise over ICE counternarcotics
investigations under the MOU. While the MOU recognizes that cross-
designated Customs agents are to work under DEA supervision when
conducting counternarcotics investigations, it also states that "such
supervision shall be general in nature." DHS, in a January 2008
proposal to the Office of Management and Budget advocating concurrent
authority for ICE to investigate counternarcotics crimes, noted that
"One bureau cannot effectively supervise, in the long term, what
amounts to a significant part of another bureau's resources, policy,
programs, and activity." Further, an ICE unit chief stated that under
the current MOU, DEA's oversight of drug investigations among federal
agencies is based on an "antiquated process," which is cumbersome,
slow, and ineffective. This ICE official also expressed concern that
DEA intends to increase its supervision of ICE agents who conduct
counternarcotics investigations. DEA, meanwhile, noted that its primary
concern is that counternarcotics investigations are coordinated across
agencies.
Third, a 1999 addendum to the MOU identified DEA as the primary point
of contact for all counternarcotics investigations that involve the
cooperation of foreign law enforcement agencies. However, according to
a senior DEA official, ICE does not always coordinate its international
drug-related investigations with DEA country offices, and the official
provided us examples of five occurrences of this from 2005 through
2006. As a result, according to DEA's Chief of Operations, DEA's
relationships with some foreign law enforcement authorities were
negatively affected. ICE's Director of Investigations responded that
two of the five investigations were not narcotics cases, two others
were coordinated with DEA domestic offices as required by the MOU, and
one had been coordinated with foreign government authorities
responsible for border security. The U.S. ambassadors in two countries
where these events occurred expressed concern about the disputes, and
asked DEA and ICE to improve coordination to avoid adversely affecting
other collaborative law enforcement efforts with these countries.
ICE and DEA also disagree about certain restrictions on ICE's authority
to collect foreign drug intelligence under the terms of a 1975 MOU.
[Footnote 40] This MOU states that Customs (now ICE) has primary
responsibility for intelligence gathering on smuggling activities and
supports DEA in investigating drug smuggling and trafficking. The MOU
further states that nothing in the agreement precludes Customs (ICE)
from gathering information from the air and marine community related to
the transporting of contraband, and that the agency will continue to
coordinate with and gather information from foreign customs services on
all smuggling activities. However, the agreement states that Customs
officers may not employ an informant for counternarcotics efforts
without DEA's prior approval. ICE maintains that these provisions
preclude ICE's 200 special agents assigned to 52 foreign offices
throughout the world from developing drug-smuggling intelligence. ICE
officials have stated that ICE must rely upon DEA to provide
international drug-smuggling intelligence to assist in their border
security missions, which limits their effectiveness. DEA disagrees with
this interpretation of the 1975 MOU, stating that the 1975 MOU does not
prohibit ICE from collecting drug intelligence, but rather prohibits
ICE from employing an informant without prior agreement and concurrence
from DEA.
There have been negotiations to revise the MOUs between DEA and ICE to
resolve the above disputes and reflect the reorganization of Customs
into ICE, but these negotiations have been unsuccessful. For example,
in 2004, DEA requested that the MOU be renegotiated to address various
operational issues and reflect the reorganization of the government
under the Homeland Security Act of 2002; however, the negotiations
between DEA and ICE were unsuccessful and the agencies continue to
operate under the terms of the existing MOU. DEA has reported that DHS
is seeking to expand its authority to independently pursue
counternarcotics investigations, which would fragment the nation's
counternarcotics efforts. ICE officials, meanwhile, have reported that
DEA desires to increase its supervision of ICE agents and operations
and that ICE is unable to effectively accomplish its mission because it
is hampered by requirements to coordinate with and be supervised by DEA
on counternarcotics investigations. As mentioned previously, DHS
submitted a legislative proposal in January 2008 to the Office of
Management and Budget advocating that ICE be granted authority to
enforce U.S. drug laws independent of DEA, so that ICE could
investigate all narcotics-smuggling crimes and thereby unify DHS border
security. DEA, in its response opposing the proposal, expressed concern
that approval of the proposal would fragment the federal government's
drug enforcement efforts and would reduce cooperation and coordination
of investigations--as had been the case before Reorganization Plan No.
2 established DEA. Further, DEA responded that it was not clear how or
if the concurrent authority would ameliorate the current jurisdictional
and interagency conflicts. According to ICE, as of October 2008, the
Office of Management and Budget had not submitted the proposal to the
Congress because DHS and DOJ did not agree on a resolution to the
proposal. As a result, the two agencies still operate under the
guidelines established by existing MOUs.
In October 2005, we reported that agencies can more effectively
collaborate by leveraging resources, agreeing on roles and
responsibilities, and establishing compatible policies and priorities
for operating across agency boundaries; our report also noted the
importance of monitoring these activities.[Footnote 41] While senior
officials in certain DEA and ICE field offices that we visited have
established positive working relationships with their counterparts to
improve the effectiveness of partnerships, these efforts are not
institutionalized as a consistent practice at all locations. For
example, in Mexico City, where drug trafficking is prevalent, DEA and
ICE officials agreed that the relationship between the two agencies has
strains and DEA officials reported that a new MOU could improve the
relationship by clarifying roles and responsibilities. Additionally,
representatives of two of the state enforcement agencies we spoke with
expressed concern about the poor working relationship between DEA and
ICE and the resulting potential for compromising counterdrug
operations. While safety and duplicative investigations are concerns
for all law enforcement entities, without establishing effective
collaboration practices with mutually defined roles, responsibilities,
and shared goals, there is a greater likelihood for duplication between
the agencies and incidents that could threaten law enforcement officer
safety. Further, because the disagreements between ICE (formerly
Customs) and DEA have a long history, resolution may not be reached
absent focused attention by the Attorney General and the Secretary of
Homeland Security. Until these issues are resolved, it will be
difficult for DEA and ICE to ensure that shared objectives are achieved
and resources are used effectively.
Another source of disagreement between DEA and ICE concerns the cross-
designation of ICE agents. First, in accordance with a ceiling
established in conjunction with the terms of the existing MOU, a
maximum of 1,475 ICE agents can be cross-designated at a given time.
According to ICE officials, this maximum limits ICE's ability to
accomplish its mission because agents who are not cross-designated
cannot pursue border-related drug-smuggling investigations into the
United States. Further, ICE officials noted that the number of agents
permitted to be cross-designated (1,475) was chosen when Customs had
only 3,500 criminal investigators, whereas ICE currently has more than
6,000 agents.
DEA, in response to our inquiry, reported that ICE has not demonstrated
the need for--or asked for--additional cross-designations for its
agents. According to DEA, as of January 2008, 1,256 ICE agents were
cross-designated--below the 1,475 maximum--and as of October 2008, DEA
reported that it did not have any outstanding cross-designation
requests from ICE.
However, ICE officials told us in October 2008 that it had submitted to
DEA a list of 120 ICE agents for cross-designation but had received no
response. ICE reported that the names of some agents on the list had
been submitted for cross-designation as many as three times and others
were submitted as far back as 2002. ICE further reported that the
current process of submitting paper cross-designation requests to DEA
field offices, which then are to forward the requests to DEA
headquarters for approval, has resulted in misplaced and mismailed
requests. DEA responded that ICE's primary liaison to DEA had not
reported problems with the cross-designation process or outstanding
requests. In January 2009, in commenting on a draft of this report, ICE
expressed an opposing view. Specifically, ICE stated that its agents--
assigned to DEA in a liaison capacity--have on numerous occasions
brought to the attention of DEA headquarters management that cross-
designation requests were not being forwarded from local DEA offices to
DEA headquarters. Also, in its comments, ICE noted that DEA currently
did not have a liaison officer assigned to ICE headquarters as directed
by the 1994 MOU.
DEA and CBP Share Narcotics-Smuggling Intelligence and Coordinate
Activities; However, Procedures for Handling Illegal Drugs Seized at
the Nation's Borders Predate CBP's Organization under DHS and Are Not
Standardized:
DEA and CBP also partner on drug enforcement efforts, and senior
officials in DEA and CBP headquarters and field offices report that
they have improved their coordination since 9/11 by sharing more
narcotics-smuggling intelligence and collaborating on counternarcotics
efforts. However, procedures for handling illegal drugs seized at the
nation's borders predate CBP's current organization under DHS and are
not standardized.[Footnote 42]
CBP is responsible for, among other things, seizing illegal drugs at
the nation's borders--at ports of entry and between the ports of entry.
According to DEA's Chief of Operations and senior officials at CBP
headquarters, the two agencies have improved their coordination in the
years since 9/11. For example, senior officials at CBP headquarters and
field offices reported that DEA is providing more intelligence to CBP
that is useful for its drug interdiction efforts. The Chief of
Intelligence Operations for CBP's Tucson Sector (Office of Field
Operations) reported that DEA is more closely coordinating on
counterdrug operations that cross the border with Mexico. Also, CBP is
coordinating with DEA by providing staff and intelligence to DEA's El
Paso Intelligence Center, a tactical intelligence coordination center,
which has improved the coordination of drug and smuggling intelligence
according to DEA and CBP officials there.
According to CBP officials, despite improved coordination and
partnership between CBP and DEA, agreements between the two agencies
have not been updated to reflect the merging of several border security
agencies into CBP and ICE as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
Prior to the formation of DHS, CBP's drug-related enforcement
responsibilities between the ports of entry were primarily handled by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service's Border Patrol, while drug-
related enforcement responsibilities at the ports of entry were handled
by inspectors with Customs.[Footnote 43] However, while an agreement
existed between DEA and the Immigration and Naturalization Service that
outlined the handling of illegal drugs seized between the ports of
entry, the agreement has not been updated to reflect the formation of
DHS. Also, in providing technical comments on a draft of this report,
CBP noted that there are no formal agreements for how illegal drugs
seized at the ports of entry are to be handled. Generally, the absence
of updated agreements can be attributed largely to the considerable
challenges faced by DHS upon its establishment in March 2003--
challenges associated with the reorganization, transformation, and
management of assembling 22 separate federal agencies and organizations
with multiple missions and cultures into one department.
Today, agents with CBP's Office of Border Patrol, which operates along
the nation's borders between the ports of entry, follow drug seizure
and intelligence guidelines laid out in a 1996 MOU between DEA and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Specifically, the MOU outlines
that Border Patrol agents are to turn over to DEA all drugs and related
intelligence seized at the border between the ports of entry. However,
CBP's Office of Field Operations, which operates at the nation's ports
of entry, has no formal agreements with DEA and, as a result of legacy
operations from Customs, Office of Field Operations' agents turn over
all drugs seized at ports of entry to ICE.[Footnote 44] According to a
program manager in CBP's Office of Field Operations, this bifurcated
process has led to inefficiencies and confusion. The official added
that a standardized process for handling drugs seized by CBP along the
U.S. international borders would be more efficient and less confusing.
Similarly, DHS's Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, the policy arm
for the department's counternarcotics efforts, has expressed concern
regarding the handling of illegal drugs seized by DHS components at the
nation's borders. Further, the broad scope of CBP's responsibilities
reinforces the need for standardizing the handling of illegal drugs
seized. For example, the following are noted in CBP's Performance and
Accountability Report for fiscal year 2007:
* CBP is responsible for protecting more than 5,000 miles of border
with Canada, 1,900 miles of border with Mexico, and 95,000 miles of
shoreline.
* More than 46,743 CBP employees manage, control, and protect the
nation's borders at and between 327 official ports of entry. The Border
Patrol's 20 sectors encompass 142 stations nationwide and 34 permanent
checkpoints.
* In fiscal year 2007, CBP processed over 400 million passengers and
pedestrians and more than 25 million sea, truck, and rail containers
and seized over 1.7 million pounds of illegal drugs.
The bifurcated process of CBP's referrals to either ICE or DEA adds
additional complexities to an already complicated system, and a
standardized process of referring drug-related investigations could
help streamline and strengthen CBP's role and limit confusion and
inefficiency.[Footnote 45] Agreed-upon roles and responsibilities and
compatible policies are important elements to a collaborative working
relationship.[Footnote 46] Establishing effective collaboration
practices could improve the collective efforts of DEA, CBP, and ICE to
address the smuggling of illegal narcotics.
DEA Benefits from Department of State Counternarcotics Assistance, and
the Department of State Benefits from DEA's Counternarcotics Expertise,
Including New and Evolving Efforts in Afghanistan:
Since 9/11, DEA has continued to benefit from the Department of State's
support of DEA's international counternarcotics programs and foreign
offices, as well as the department's support of the international law
enforcement community in general.[Footnote 47] Via interagency
agreements, the department assists DEA's international operations in a
variety of ways, including ordering equipment to develop the capacity
of DEA's foreign law enforcement partners, administering DEA funding
provided to foreign countries, and funding DEA training of foreign law
enforcement agencies.[Footnote 48] However, funding with which the
Department of State reimburses DEA for certain expenditures, such as
training, has fluctuated greatly, which affects DEA's long-term
training strategies. The department has benefited from DEA's law
enforcement expertise and procedural guidance on international
counternarcotics programs and from DEA's foreign partnerships, such as
DEA's role in Afghanistan.
Among other things, the Department of State provides foreign assistance
to support other countries' efforts to build counternarcotics and law
enforcement capacities, which ultimately benefits DEA agents as they
conduct bilateral drug investigations with their foreign counterparts.
DEA also may leverage the use of aircraft, wiretapping equipment, and
other equipment or facilities provided to host-country law enforcement
by the Department of State. In Afghanistan and other countries, the
department funds the operations and maintenance of sensitive
investigative units,[Footnote 49] which partner with DEA to conduct
bilateral drug investigations. According to DEA officials, the Afghan
Sensitive Investigate Unit is a critical component of DEA's efforts to
disrupt and dismantle drug-trafficking organizations operating in
Afghanistan.
DEA also trains foreign law enforcement counterparts under interagency
agreements with the Department of State. DEA has trained foreign law
enforcement officers since 1969 to improve their capability, knowledge,
and motivation to pursue high-level international narcotics
investigations and to increase foreign law enforcement cooperation.
Specifically, DEA trains foreign law enforcement through its in-country
and regional training programs and at regional international law
enforcement academies.[Footnote 50] According to DEA's Office of
Training, DEA trained nearly 1,400 foreign law enforcement officers in
fiscal year 2007 through interagency agreements with the Department of
State.
While the Department of State continues to provide administrative,
financial, and logistical support to DEA country offices, the
department's obligated funding to DEA for counternarcotics training
activities via interagency agreements was 54 percent less in fiscal
year 2007 than in fiscal year 2001, and has fluctuated greatly over
that time period (see figure 5). The department reported that these
fluctuations are a result of other department priorities. In addition,
Department of State officials also reported that there is no guarantee
that an embassy's request for DEA training will be granted. DEA
reported that the fluctuations in funding most affect its bilateral
training programs with other countries. DEA indicated that a reliable
annual funding base would improve its ability to provide a consistent
number of courses annually and develop training programs that build
upon previous training sessions. A DEA training official stated that
DEA country attachés have also increased their efforts to coordinate
with the Narcotics Affairs Sections at U.S. embassies to mitigate the
fluctuations in the Department of State's requests for DEA training
activities in other countries.
Figure 5: Department of State Obligations under Interagency Agreements
with DEA, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2007 (dollars in thousands):
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2001;
Obligations: $3,861.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Obligations: $1,599.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Obligations: $3,545.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Obligations: $663.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Obligations: $1,974.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Obligations: $1,024.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Obligations: $1,782.
Source: GAO summary of DEA and Department of State data.
[End of figure]
While the Department of State has supported DEA's international
counternarcotics programs, foreign offices, and law enforcement
training efforts, the department has also benefited from DEA's law
enforcement expertise and narcotics intelligence. According to DEA and
Department of State officials at headquarters and foreign posts, DEA
serves as a technical consultant to the department on funding decisions
for law enforcement projects requested by host governments. In
addition, DEA uses its law enforcement expertise to identify
competencies that the Department of State should include in training
curricula to improve the capacity of foreign law enforcement agencies.
Finally, DEA and Department of State officials reported that DEA
provides intelligence that the department uses to better target
resources to support host-country governments' efforts, such as in
Colombia where the Department of State uses DEA intelligence in its
efforts to eradicate coca and poppy, necessary precursors for cocaine
and heroin, respectively.
Senior DEA and Department of State officials at headquarters and
embassies we visited in Bangkok and Kabul reported that in general
their roles in international counternarcotics efforts were distinct and
clearly defined. While DEA's primary emphasis internationally is on
bilateral drug investigations, the Department of State emphasizes
capacity building of foreign law enforcement agencies. DEA and
Department of State officials reported that they cooperate well through
regular meetings (e.g., monthly or biweekly meetings) to share
information and coordinate law enforcement activities at the respective
embassies.
DEA and DOD Continue to Share International Counternarcotics
Intelligence, DOD Provides Support to DEA, and Their Partnership Is
Evolving in Afghanistan and Elsewhere:
DEA and DOD continue to share international counternarcotics
intelligence and, as both agencies recognize and address linkages
between narcotics traffickers and terrorists, are developing new and
evolving partnerships in Afghanistan, Africa, and Central Asia. Prior
to and since 9/11, DOD has provided domestic support for
counternarcotics operations to DEA and its federal, state, and local
counterparts.[Footnote 51] For example, according to DEA and DOD
officials, National Guard intelligence analysts work in HIDTA
investigative support centers, described further below, to provide DEA
and its federal, state, and local partners with linguistic or
intelligence analysis skills.
Since 9/11, DEA has increasingly partnered with DOD as both agencies
have shifted resources to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The DOD and DEA
partnership has evolved in Afghanistan as DOD has increased funding to
DEA counternarcotics efforts via interagency agreements, implemented
programs that build the capacity of DEA law enforcement partners, and
provided limited operational support for DEA's bilateral drug
investigations, such as airlift and evacuation assistance. According to
senior DEA and DOD officials in Afghanistan, DOD previously viewed
counternarcotics and counterterrorism as separate issues; however, DOD
now recognizes narcotics trafficking as a threat to U.S. national
security interests because of the relationship between narcotics
trafficking and terrorist-financing networks. DOD enters into
agreements with DEA for counternarcotics law enforcement training
programs, travel expenses for training program instructors, and support
of DEA personnel assigned to DOD. As illustrated in figure 6, DOD
components--including the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threats,
as well as several joint interagency task forces--have increased
obligations to DEA under interagency agreements from $456,000 in fiscal
year 2003 to over $2.5 million in fiscal year 2007, an increase of 455
percent.
Figure 6: DOD Obligations under Interagency Agreements with DEA, Fiscal
Years 2000 through 2007 (dollars in thousands):
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2000;
Obligations: $0.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Obligations: $0.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Obligations: $0.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Obligations: $456.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Obligations: $182.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Obligations: $1,117.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Obligations: $2,060.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Obligations: $2,527.
Source: GAO summary of DEA data.
[End of figure]
In addition to the obligated amounts shown in figure 6, DOD has
provided other funding to support DEA's efforts. For example, in fiscal
years 2004 to 2007, DOD provided $226.9 million for training and
equipping (and building a facility for) the Afghan National
Interdiction Unit. Also, DOD provided funding for DEA to train the
Afghan Sensitive Investigative Unit at the DEA training facility in
Quantico, Virginia.
Senior DEA and DOD officials reported that the agencies' relationship
in Afghanistan continues to evolve, is mutually beneficial, and has
been helped by the fact that each agency has a distinct and clear
mission in Afghanistan. While DEA has benefited from DOD's interagency
funding, capacity building, and operational support, DEA's Chief of
Intelligence reported that DOD has benefited from DEA intelligence,
which has helped to thwart several attacks in Afghanistan. DEA reported
that it seeks to further improve coordination with DOD by placing
additional liaison officers and intelligence research specialists at
DOD commands.
DEA Partners with State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies to Leverage
Manpower and Intelligence While Providing Training and Other Support:
DEA partners with state and local law enforcement agencies to leverage
the manpower and intelligence that they provide, while supplying them
with counternarcotics training and other support, such as intelligence
about drug-trafficking organizations that operate across jurisdictional
boundaries. DEA partners with state and local law enforcement agencies
through the DEA state and local task force program. The program
partners DEA agents and state and local law enforcement officers in
permanent task forces to investigate and develop cases against
significant local drug-trafficking organizations that have links to
regional and international organizations. State and local law
enforcement agencies receive three primary benefits from participating
in task forces: (1) DEA, in most cases, reimburses state and local
agencies for officer overtime related to participation in task force
efforts; (2) state and local law enforcement officers receive federal
credentials, which allow the officers to pursue narcotics
investigations outside of their local jurisdictions; and (3) state and
local law enforcement agencies receive a percentage of assets seized as
the result of successful operations. According to senior officials at
DEA headquarters and in field offices such as New York, working with
state and local law enforcement officers in a task force environment
gives DEA access to knowledge about the local area and provides
additional personnel for counternarcotics efforts. As of the end of
fiscal year 2007, DEA reported that there were a total of 118 DEA state
and local task forces, with 1,401 state and local officers, and DEA
reimbursed the respective agencies for overtime for 1,133 state and
local task force officers.
While the state and local law enforcement agencies receive benefits
from working in a task force environment, some state and local law
enforcement agencies expressed concern about decreased federal funding
for such task forces. Specifically, representatives from 11 state and
local law enforcement agencies commented that if federal funding for
local drug task forces continues to decrease, their ability to pursue
narcotics cases at the local level would be affected.
In addition to the state and local task force program, DEA also
coordinates directly with state and local law enforcement agencies to
share information. For example, DEA provides information to state and
local law enforcement agencies on imminent enforcement operations to
avoid disrupting investigations and to ensure officer safety. Of the
representatives of 16 state and local agencies that do not participate
in task forces that we spoke with, representatives of 12 said that they
nevertheless communicate directly--via telephone or face-to-face
conversations--with DEA before conducting narcotics enforcement
operations to ensure the safety of their officers. Those same 12
agencies reported that DEA coordinates with them before conducting
operations. However, regarding the other 4 agencies, one official noted
that DEA has not operated in his jurisdiction, while officials at the
other 3 agencies reported that DEA did not always provide notification
of narcotics enforcement operations--an issue that occurred regularly
for 2 of the agencies. Officials at these 2 agencies expressed concern
that the safety of their officers could be jeopardized if communication
were not improved.
DEA also provides training to state and local law enforcement officers,
including (1) clandestine laboratory training, which instructs state
and local law enforcement officers how to identify, protect, and
dispose of hazardous materials encountered in methamphetamine
laboratories; (2) commander training for state and local drug units;
and (3) basic narcotics investigative techniques. Of the 35 state and
local law enforcement agencies whose representatives we spoke with, 20
reported that they had participated in DEA's training courses. Seven of
those 20 reported participating in clandestine laboratory training, the
most commonly attended course. State and local law enforcement officers
we spoke with in rural jurisdictions reported that DEA training was
particularly valuable because, as part of the training, DEA contributed
equipment to trainees for use in their home jurisdictions.
DEA Coordinates Activities and Leverages Resources through Multiagency
Task Forces and Intelligence Centers; However, Two Centers Are Less
Effective Because ICE Is Not Providing All Relevant Intelligence:
DEA coordinates with other federal law enforcement agencies and, in
some cases, state and local law enforcement agencies, on multiagency
task forces and in intelligence centers that target drug-trafficking
organizations operating at the regional, national, and international
levels. As in its state and local task forces, DEA coordinates with and
leverages the personnel and resources of other agencies in drug
enforcement efforts through OCDETF and HIDTA task forces, which
comprise DEA, other federal law enforcement agencies, and in the case
of some task forces, state and local law enforcement agencies. DEA also
coordinates intelligence, investigations, and drug enforcement
operations with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies
through intelligence centers to avoid duplicative efforts and ensure
officer and agent safety. However, ICE is not fully participating in
two of these intelligence centers--the Special Operations Division and
the OCDETF Fusion Center. The lack of full participation by ICE limits
the ability of these interagency entities to most effectively
investigate major drug-trafficking organizations.
DEA Uses Task Forces to Coordinate with and Leverage the Resources of
Federal, State, and Local Agencies to Target Regional, National, and
International Drug-Trafficking Organizations:
DEA works with multiagency task forces in the OCDETF and HIDTA programs
to coordinate efforts and leverage the resources of federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies. OCDETF task forces--typically case-
specific, temporary task forces--leverage the resources of federal law
enforcement agencies and, for certain cases, state and local law
enforcement to identify, disrupt, and dismantle the drug-trafficking
and money-laundering organizations most responsible for the nation's
supply of illegal drugs--particularly CPOTs. For example, on some task
forces, DEA leverages the expertise of the Internal Revenue Service's
Criminal Investigation Division to investigate complex drug money-
laundering cases. Generally, DEA participates in a majority (about 90
percent) of OCDETF task forces and usually has a leadership role.
During fiscal year 2007, for instance, DEA led or co-led 81 percent of
all OCDETF investigations.
DEA also coordinates with federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies through task forces in 28 geographic areas across the country
that have been designated as HIDTAs--that is, areas identified as
having drug-trafficking problems that exceed the resources of state and
local agencies. In particular, HIDTA task forces focus on drug-
trafficking organizations that operate within a particular region of
the United States but affect drug distribution across the nation.
[Footnote 52] Unlike OCDETF task forces, which do not require the
participation of state or local law enforcement, HIDTA task forces
require the participation of at least one federal and one state or
local agency. HIDTA task forces also require participating agencies to
operate out of shared work facilities (otherwise known as collocation)
and interact freely with other participants (otherwise known as
commingling). As required by the ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, DEA
participates in each HIDTA intelligence support center and, therefore,
each HIDTA.[Footnote 53] However, DEA is not required to and does not
participate in every HIDTA task force. For example, in fiscal year
2007, DEA participated in 62 of the Southwest Border HIDTA's 111 task
forces. According to ONDCP, in fiscal year 2007, DEA provided fewer
agents to participate in HIDTA task forces because of the hiring
freeze. Additionally, according to officials at ONDCP responsible for
managing the HIDTA program, DEA is unable to provide full-time agents
to HIDTA task forces in rural areas because of resource limitations.
Senior DEA officials responsible for the Miami, New York, and Seattle
field offices reported that working through OCDETF and HIDTA task
forces has improved collaboration between DEA and other participating
agencies and helped DEA leverage the personnel resources and knowledge
that other participating agencies bring to drug enforcement. For
example, according to the DEA Associate Special Agent-in-Charge of the
New York field office, the participation of DEA, ICE, and the Internal
Revenue Service in the permanent OCDETF task force in New York has led
to better cooperation and reduced conflicts on money-laundering
investigations related to drug-trafficking organizations. Also, a local
law enforcement official responsible for counternarcotics efforts in
Tampa (Florida) stated that participating in HIDTA task forces allowed
for greater access to federal funding, improved cooperation with DEA,
and increased the ability to share law enforcement resources locally,
such as the joint monitoring of judicial wiretaps targeting drug
traffickers.
DEA Uses Multiagency Intelligence Centers to Coordinate Intelligence
and Investigations; However, the Special Operations Division and the
OCDETF Fusion Center Are Less Effective Because ICE Is Not Providing
All of Its Drug-Related Intelligence:
DEA and other federal agencies and, in some cases, state, local, and
foreign law enforcement agencies coordinate intelligence and
investigative efforts against drug-trafficking organizations through
multiagency intelligence centers such as the Special Operations
Division and the OCDETF Fusion Center. However, the effectiveness of
these two centers is limited because ICE is not sharing all of its drug-
related intelligence. Intelligence fusion centers are collaborative
efforts to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and,
in some cases, terrorist activity. Drug intelligence fusion centers
provide a centralized location where DEA and other law enforcement
agencies share drug-related intelligence with the goals of linking
ongoing investigations and targeting major drug-trafficking
organizations. In addition, the 9/11 Commission Report stressed that
sharing all available information from relevant sources is critical to
assessing and responding to threats. Table 1 identifies key
counternarcotics intelligence centers and their lead agencies,
missions, and participating agencies.
Table 1: Drug-Related Intelligence Centers--Missions and Participating
Agencies:
Intelligence center: DEA-led Special Operations Division;
Lead agency: DEA;
Mission of intelligence center: (1) Coordinates intelligence received
from sources worldwide and provides information to partner agencies to
support ongoing investigations against drug-trafficking organizations.
(2) Assists DEA's domestic field divisions in building national
conspiracy cases by using multijurisdictional wiretaps. (3) Coordinates
ongoing counternarcotics investigations across federal law enforcement
agencies;
Participating agencies: DEA, FBI, USMS, ATF, DOJ Criminal Division,
National Drug Intelligence Center, ICE, CBP, Internal Revenue Service-
Criminal Investigation, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense
Intelligence Agency, U.S. Southern Command, Joint Interagency Task
Force-South, Joint Interagency Task Force-West, U.S. Special Operations
Command, National Security Agency, and United Kingdom's Serious
Organized Crime Agency.
Intelligence center: OCDETF Fusion Center;
Lead agency: DEA;
Mission of intelligence center: (1) Conducts cross-agency integration
and analysis of drug and related financial intelligence to create
comprehensive, strategic intelligence assessments of major drug-
trafficking organizations. (2) Passes leads to OCDETF participants in
the field to assist in developing more comprehensive investigations of
major drug-trafficking organizations;
Participating agencies: DEA, El Paso Intelligence Center, FBI, USMS,
ATF, National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Coast Guard, Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network, and Internal Revenue Service-Criminal
Investigation.
Intelligence center: El Paso Intelligence Center;
Lead agency: DEA;
Mission of intelligence center: (1) Provides real-time tactical
intelligence to federal, state, and local law enforcement regarding the
networks of drug-trafficking organizations operating in the United
States. (2) Provides access to the intelligence bases of all federal
law enforcement agencies to assist in developing probable cause to
search vehicles for drugs during traffic stops by state and local law
enforcement. (3) Provides training to state and local law enforcement
on interdiction techniques. (4) Serves as the repository for
information about drugs seized in the United States;
Participating agencies: DEA, FBI, ATF, USMS, National Drug Intelligence
Center, DHS, CBP, ICE, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Secret Service, Internal
Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation, Department of the Interior,
DOD, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Joint Interagency Task
Force-South, Joint Interagency Task Force-North, Texas Air National
Guard, Texas Department of Public Safety, El Paso County Sheriff's
Office, and El Paso Police Division.
Intelligence center: Joint Interagency Task Force-South;
Lead agency: U.S. Coast Guard;
Mission of intelligence center: Conducts counter-illicit-trafficking
operations in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific by detecting and
monitoring illicit air and maritime targets, fusing intelligence from
various sources, providing information to law enforcement and military
agencies, and promoting regional security cooperation;
Participating agencies: U.S. Coast Guard, DEA, FBI, National Drug
Intelligence Center, CBP, ICE, Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency,
National Security Agency, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency,
National Reconnaissance Office, U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force,
U.S. Marine Corps, United Kingdom's Serious Organized Crime Agency, and
components of foreign militaries.[A]
Intelligence center: HIDTA Intelligence Support Centers;
Lead agency: Varies;
Mission of intelligence center: Deconflicts partner and nonpartner
agency HIDTA-region-specific counternarcotics operations and, in some
cases, ongoing investigations to avoid duplicative efforts and ensure
officer safety;
Participating agencies: Varies across the 28 HIDTAs, but includes DEA
and usually includes other federal law enforcement agencies and state
or local law enforcement agencies.
Sources: DEA and ONDCP.
[A] Other foreign militaries include the British, Dutch, French, and
Spanish navies as well as military support provided by nations in Latin
America. Because of the sensitive nature of these nations partnering
with the United States on military endeavors, we are not specifically
identifying these nations in this report.
[End of table]
The usefulness of these intelligence centers to target drug-trafficking
organizations is only as good as the information that participating
agencies contribute to them. The 9/11 Commission Report asserted that
intelligence sharing is critical to combat threats to the United States
and that intelligence analysts should utilize all relevant sources of
information. While DEA has reported good coordination with and
participation by relevant federal agencies in most of the above
centers, DEA officials have reported that ICE is not submitting all of
its drug-related intelligence to the Special Operations Division, and
that ICE does not participate in the OCDETF Fusion Center.
The DEA Special Agent-in-Charge of the Special Operations Division
reported that while ICE provides staff and some data to the center, ICE
agents are not submitting all drug-related intelligence necessary to
ensure that cases do not overlap and efforts are not duplicated. The
DEA official stated that not submitting all relevant information limits
the usefulness of the Special Operations Division in supporting ongoing
investigations. For example, during the course of a DEA investigation
in New York, DEA determined that ICE agents working on an overlapping
investigation had not provided relevant drug-related intelligence to
the Special Operations Division but had provided it to a local
intelligence center. Because DEA agents coordinated with the local
intelligence center, DEA became aware of the information and
coordinated the investigations. In this case, not routinely providing
the drug-related intelligence to the Special Operations Division
resulted in overlapping investigations and could have resulted in
officer safety concerns.
ICE reported that it has been a participant in the Special Operations
Division since 1996 and is providing information obtained from judicial
wiretaps related to narcotics investigations. Further, ICE reported
that in recognition of the importance of the Special Operations
Division's primary purpose--which is to deconflict and prevent
investigative overlap and thereby minimize the inherent threat to
officer safety--ICE has dedicated 10 agents to the division, plus a GS-
15 Supervisory Special Agent to serve as the division's Assistant
Special Agent-in-Charge, and also contributes $2 million annually to
the support the division's functions and capabilities. Moreover, ICE
noted that in addition to its managerial responsibilities, ICE
regularly attends Special Operations Division coordination meetings in
which agencies with investigative overlap meet face-to-face to discuss
investigative strategy, prosecutorial venue, and agency roles.
As further evidence of its support, ICE pointed out a July 2000 policy
memorandum--from the Acting Assistant Commissioner of Customs to the
agency's special agents-in-charge and other managers--stating that use
of the Special Operations Division was mandatory in order to coordinate
Customs' counternarcotics investigations with DEA, FBI, and the
Internal Revenue Service. More recently, in September 2008, during the
course of our review, the Director of ICE's Office of Investigations
issued a policy memorandum to all of the agency's field offices,
specifying that agents should submit information to the Special
Operations Division when the information is "significant enough to
warrant focused investigative action." The DEA Special Agent-in-Charge
of the Special Operations Division reported that--before issuance of
the September 2008 memorandum--ICE agents were not submitting all drug-
related intelligence to the Special Operations Division. In January
2009, the DEA Special Agent-in-Charge reported that the amount of drug-
related data submitted by ICE agents to the Special Operations Division
increased after issuance of the September 2008 memorandum; however, the
DEA official noted that despite the 2000 and 2008 memorandums, ICE
agents continue to withhold some drug-related intelligence data.
ICE officials acknowledged that ICE does not share all of its most
sensitive data, such as some confidential informant information and
bank account information, with the Special Operations Division. DEA
officials stated that without this information, the division cannot
effectively "connect the dots" to follow all potential investigative
leads and go as far as possible in identifying linkages to major drug-
trafficking organizations. The DEA officials also said that other
agencies, such as the FBI, do share such information and DEA has
demonstrated that the agency can adequately protect it.
ICE officials also acknowledged that ICE does not participate in the
OCDETF Fusion Center, although negotiations about ICE's participation
have been ongoing since December 2005. ICE officials reported that the
agency does not participate in the OCDETF Fusion Center because there
is not agreement on the conditions for participation--including the
types of data ICE will provide to the center and how sensitive
confidential source information will be safeguarded. ICE officials said
that although ICE has made various concessions relating to the
information data set that ICE is willing to share with the center, none
have been acceptable to DEA and thus negotiations are at an impasse. As
additional perspective, the ICE officials noted that ICE has
participated in working groups concerning the operational and technical
development of the OCDETF Fusion Center since fall 2003. Since that
time, however, the ICE officials noted that the mission of the center
"has changed dramatically and ICE now finds itself stuck in
negotiations between assisting DEA to a degree ICE finds unnecessary
and protecting the identities of its sources."
In October 2008, senior ICE officials reported that the agency is
willing to provide the same types of data to the OCDETF Fusion Center
that other participating agencies provide. The ICE officials noted,
however, that the Executive Office for OCDETF was asking ICE to submit
more types of data than other partners, including the FBI. In separate
responses to our inquiry, the Director of the Executive Office for
OCDETF and DEA's Assistant Administrator and Chief of Intelligence
reported that neither OCDETF nor DEA has asked ICE to provide more data
than other agencies and that ICE has objected to providing the same
types of information as other agencies.
DEA stated that it is unable to most effectively target major drug-
trafficking organizations and avoid duplicative investigative efforts
because ICE is not providing all drug-related information to the
Special Operations Division and the OCDETF Fusion Center. Therefore,
until DEA and ICE resolve this impasse, investigations into drug-
trafficking organizations may be affected and duplication of
investigative efforts may occur.
DEA Has Improved Its Strategic Plan and Performance Measures; However,
They Do Not Reflect the Agency's Current Direction and Programs and Are
Insufficient to Measure Progress and Guide Future Investments:
DEA's strategic planning and performance measurement framework,
particularly its strategic plan and annual performance plans, have seen
improvements since we and DOJ's Office of the Inspector General
reviewed and identified problems with previous versions. However, the
framework does not reflect all of DEA's activities, in particular,
those undertaken to assist in counterterrorism efforts. DOJ is required
to engage in strategic planning and performance planning under GPRA,
and requires that component agencies (including DEA) develop strategic
plans and annual performance plans that contribute to department-level
plans to fulfill GPRA requirements.[Footnote 54] DEA uses a multiyear
strategic plan that presents DEA's missions and long-term goals,
objectives, and strategies[Footnote 55] and annual performance plans
that lay out the agency's annual budget and describe the agency's major
programs, annual strategies, performance measures, and expectations for
the programs for strategic planning and performance measurement.
DEA's strategic plan links to DOJ's long-term strategic plan and serves
as the DEA strategic planning and performance measurement framework's
long-range planning document. Specifically, the strategic plan defines
what DEA seeks to accomplish, presents the strategies DEA plans to use
to achieve desired results, and provides a basis for measuring the
agency's success in achieving the stated goals and objectives.
According to DEA, the strategic plan is the template for ensuring
measurable results and accountability in day-to-day operations. The
plan consists of a mission, to enforce the controlled substances laws
and regulations of the United States; a general goal, to contribute to
DOJ's goal to reduce the availability of drugs in America; four
strategic goals: (1) disrupt and dismantle international PTOs, (2)
disrupt and dismantle domestic PTOs, (3) assist state and local
agencies with drug enforcement, and (4) reduce the diversion of licit
drugs; and goals, objectives, and strategies for each of the four
strategic goals.
DEA's annual performance plans are to be updated as part of each fiscal
year's congressional budget submission to provide the strategic
planning and performance measurement framework's direct linkage between
DEA's longer-term goals defined in the strategic plan and the day-to-
day activities of its managers and staff. The annual performance plan
submitted with DEA's 2009 congressional budget justification includes
performance measures that are linked to the four strategic goals in the
strategic plan.
In May 1997, we reported that strategic planning is a continuous
process and leading management practice in strategic planning provides
that though plans may cover a specific time period over several years,
plans are to be updated and revised every 3 years.[Footnote 56] We have
also reported that strategic plans should align an agency's activities,
core processes, and resources to support mission-related outcomes.
Further, in 1997 we reported that strategic plans help an agency to
maintain a consistent sense of direction and serve as a foundation for
the most important things an agency does each day by communicating
goals and strategies throughout an agency and assigning accountability
to managers and staff for goal achievement. With regard to annual
performance plans, we reported in 1998 that performance plans submitted
to the Congress are to reflect an agency's annual performance goals and
measures, and that the process of setting annual targets and measuring
progress enables agencies to show clear relationships between overall
goals and daily operations within the agency.[Footnote 57]
DEA's strategic planning and performance measurement framework, while
improved over previous efforts, has not been updated and does not
reflect some key new and ongoing efforts. For example, while DEA is
assisting in counterterrorism efforts through policies requiring that
agents collect terrorism information from confidential informants and
refer terrorism-related intelligence to intelligence community
partners, and DEA also has strategies to pursue narcoterrorists and
coordinate intelligence through participation in the intelligence
community, DEA's strategic plan has not been updated since 2003 to
reflect these efforts.[Footnote 58] As such, the strategic plan does
not fully reflect the intended purpose of providing a template for
ensuring measurable results and operational accountability. DEA's 2009
annual performance plan does include four performance measures
regarding counterterrorism efforts: (1) the percentage of bilateral
investigations initiated in the Middle East, Central Asia, and
Southwest Asia regions; (2) the number of counternarcotics operations
conducted by foreign-deployed advisory support teams in conjunction
with the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police/National Interdiction Unit;
(3) the number of Afghan National Interdiction Unit officers trained by
foreign-deployed advisory support team agents and deployed; and (4) the
percentage of counterterrorism-related products completed by DEA's
Office of National Security Intelligence and the Special Operations
Division. However, these measures do not provide a basis for assessing
the results of DEA's counterterrorism efforts--efforts that include
giving top priority to counternarcotics cases with links to terrorism
and pursuing narcoterrorists.
DEA has also reported that its coordination and collaboration with
other federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies are
essential to its work. However, DEA's strategic planning and
performance measurement framework does not reflect the importance of
such efforts. For example, while DEA's strategic plan and the 2009
annual performance plan list strategies to coordinate with domestic and
foreign law enforcement, these documents do not have measures of the
results of this coordination.
An updated strategic plan that includes long-term goals, objectives,
and strategies and complete annual performance plans that list the
measures used to gauge performance, could assist the Congress, the
administration, and other stakeholders in assessing the effectiveness
of funded DEA activities, such as counterterrorism and coordination
efforts.
Conclusions:
Given the evolving and global context of illegal drug trafficking--
coupled with competing demands for limited law enforcement resources
and the complexities of investigations that target major drug-
trafficking organizations--effective partnerships between DEA and other
law enforcement agencies at all levels of government are necessary for
conducting the war on drugs. Effective partnering has become
increasingly important since 9/11, with growing recognition of the
nexus between drug trafficking and terrorism.
Moreover, because most of the nation's illegal drug supply is produced
and smuggled from abroad, DEA's partnerships with DHS component
agencies (ICE and CBP) that have border-related missions are
particularly important. Yet, the operational underpinnings of DEA's
partnerships with ICE and CBP--the applicable interagency agreements
(MOUs)--predate the formation of DHS and have not been successfully
revised. The impasse between DEA and ICE in negotiating a new MOU has
lasted for several years and involves significantly differing views
regarding roles and responsibilities. Also, the process to cross-
designate ICE agents for conducting counternarcotics investigations is
inefficient and has resulted in fewer agents being available to conduct
such investigations. Furthermore, while there have been memorandums or
policy directives from management regarding ICE's (and previously
Customs') participation and information sharing in the Special
Operations Division, ICE is not sharing all of its sensitive drug-
related data with the division, even though DEA asserts that adequate
protections are in place, as evidenced, for example, by the FBI's
willingness to share its sensitive information. Likewise, ICE is not
participating in the OCDETF Fusion Center largely because of an impasse
in negotiations regarding the types of data that ICE would provide.
Absent ICE's full participation, the Special Operations Division and
the OCDETF Fusion Center are not as effective as they could be,
according to DEA. Further, the DEA and CBP partnership can be
strengthened to limit inefficiencies and confusion by revising the
existing, bifurcated process for handling illegal drugs seized by CBP
at the nation's borders--a process that differs for seizures at ports
of entry and seizures between ports of entry.
Effective coordination and partnerships between DOJ and DHS would help
to fulfill the nation's counterdrug strategy. As such, the joint
involvement of the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland
Security would be useful not only for developing a new MOU or other
mechanism to clarify counternarcotics roles and responsibilities
between the departments, but also for developing processes for
monitoring its implementation and making any needed adjustments.
Finally, in considering revisions to its strategic plan, DEA has not
incorporated post-9/11 responsibilities and activities, or established
appropriate performance measures that provide a basis for assessing
progress to their goals. A comprehensive and current strategic planning
and performance measurement framework would help ensure accountability
by providing information to DEA's leadership for making organizational
and management decisions and to stakeholders, such as the Congress and
the administration, for tracking resources and assessing the
effectiveness of the war on drugs.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To further enhance interagency collaboration in combating narcotics
trafficking--and its links to terrorist organizations or activities--
and to help ensure integrated policy and program direction across all
parts of DEA, we are making five recommendations. Specifically, we
recommend that:
* the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security jointly
and expeditiously develop a new MOU or other mechanism to (1) clarify
their respective departments' counternarcotics roles and
responsibilities, particularly those of DEA, ICE, and CBP, (2) provide
efficient procedures for cross-designating ICE agents to conduct
counternarcotics investigations, and (3) standardize procedures for
handling illegal drugs seized at the nation's borders and making
referrals to DEA;
* the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security develop
processes for periodically monitoring the implementation of the new MOU
or other mechanism and make any needed adjustments;
* the Secretary of Homeland Security (1) direct ICE to contribute all
relevant drug-related information to the Special Operations Division
and (2) ensure that ICE fully responds;
* the Secretary of Homeland Security (1) direct ICE to participate in
the OCDETF Fusion Center and (2) ensure that ICE fully responds; and:
* the Administrator of DEA update the agency's strategic plan to more
fully and accurately reflect the agency's post-9/11 responsibilities
and activities and also establish appropriate performance measures that
provide a basis for assessing progress.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
On January 5, 2009, we provided a draft of this report for comment to
DOJ, DHS, the Department of State, DOD, and ONDCP.
In its written comments, dated February 6, 2009, DOJ concurred with our
recommendations. DOJ commented that it will continue its efforts to
establish a mutually agreeable MOU with DHS and also noted that a
mechanism for monitoring ongoing implementation of such an agreement
must be an essential part of the MOU. Also, DOJ commented that it
stands ready to facilitate ICE's participation in the Special
Operations Division and the OCDETF Fusion Center.
In reference to our final recommendation, DOJ commented that DEA has
submitted to the department for review and approval an updated
strategic plan (for fiscal years 2009-2014), which includes additional
language that supports the post-9/11 goal of addressing
counterterrorism. DOJ also noted that the updated strategic plan
includes performance measures related to DEA's Office of National
Security Intelligence and that DEA was in the process of evaluating
further performance measures related to CPOTs and PTOs that are linked
to terrorist organizations. DOJ did not provide us an estimated date
for completing departmental vetting of DEA's updated strategic plan.
The full text of DOJ's written comments is reprinted in appendix II.
DOJ also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in this
report where appropriate.
In its written comments, dated March 9, 2009, DHS noted that the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General have begun
meeting regularly in order to enhance coordination between DHS and DOJ
on a range of issues, including those addressed in this report. While
neither explicitly agreeing nor disagreeing with our recommendations,
DHS suggested several revisions to the wording of the recommendations
that we make solely to the Secretary of Homeland Security or jointly to
the Secretary and the Attorney General. For instance, DHS commented
that--as the two departments work together to clarify roles and
responsibilities--the new agreements reached by the departments might
not take the form of an updated MOU or other mechanism that continues
the current practice of cross-designation. Rather, DHS noted that a
wide range of options could be explored for making best use of DHS's
law enforcement and border enforcement authorities and resources. We
believe that the language of our first recommendation, which calls for
development of a "new MOU or other mechanism" is sufficiently broad to
provide for a wide range of options that DHS and DOJ can jointly
consider for ensuring effective interagency collaboration.
Also, in its written comments, DHS suggested that because the form of
any new arrangement is still under discussion with DOJ, our second
recommendation should be stricken--that is, the recommendation that the
Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security develop
processes for periodically monitoring the implementation of the new MOU
or other mechanism and make any needed adjustments. We believe that
irrespective of the form of any new arrangement, implementation of the
recommendation will help to ensure maintenance of continued progress in
addressing long-standing issues.
Regarding ICE's involvement with the Special Operations Division and
the OCDETF Fusion Center, DHS commented that DOJ and DHS are discussing
issues of mutual information sharing and participation. Noting that it
expects to address these issues in the manner most likely to ensure
officer safety, efficient use of federal resources, and success in the
ultimate goal of combating drugs and the related crimes, DHS offered
some alternative language for the wording of our recommendations. We
believe that the constructive intent of our recommendations--which is
to generate action to enhance interagency collaboration in combating
narcotics trafficking--is more important than the nuanced wording of
the recommendations. Moreover, going forward, both DHS and DOJ have an
opportunity to clearly articulate--to applicable congressional
committees, as required by 31 U.S.C. § 720[Footnote 59]--the
substantive implementation actions taken in response to our
recommendations.
The full text of DHS's written comments is reprinted at appendix III.
DHS component agencies, ICE and CBP, provided technical comments that
we incorporated in this report where appropriate.
On January 27, 2009, the Department of State's Director of the GAO
Liaison Office, Bureau of Resource Management, responded by e-mail that
the department had no comments. On January 12, 2009, DOD's Office of
the Inspector General responded by e-mail that the department had no
comments. On January 16, 2009, ONDCP's Deputy General Counsel responded
by e-mail that the office had no comments.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
after the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, State, Defense, the
Office of National Drug Control Policy and other interested parties. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish to
discuss the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-6510 or
larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Eileen Larence:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Objectives:
In response to a request from the Co-Chairman of the Senate Caucus on
International Narcotics Control, we examined:
* changes to the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) policies,
strategies, and authorities post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) to support
national counterterrorism efforts and address evolving global drug
threats;
* changes to DEA's partnerships with federal, state, and local agencies
with counternarcotics responsibilities since 9/11 and any effects of
those changes;
* mechanisms DEA uses to coordinate and avoid duplication with partner
agencies; and:
* the extent to which DEA's strategic plan and performance measures
reflect the post-9/11 environment.
Scope and Methodology:
We reviewed the National Drug Control Strategy to gain context for
DEA's role in supporting the objective of disrupting and dismantling
the market for illegal substances.[Footnote 60] To obtain additional
perspectives on DEA's role in enforcing the counternarcotics laws of
the United States, we conducted a literature search of congressional
hearings, Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General
reports, and other published materials. We interviewed DEA officials,
including the Chief of Operations and the Chief of Intelligence, at DEA
headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. During these interviews, DEA
identified agencies it partners with and mechanisms it uses to
coordinate its activities with other agencies.[Footnote 61] We also
visited a nonprobability sample of DEA's domestic field divisions and
foreign country offices to discuss changes to DEA since 9/11 and how
DEA partners with other entities (see tables 2 and 3).[Footnote 62] At
the domestic locations, we interviewed other federal, state, and local
law enforcement officials to better understand how DEA coordinates with
other agencies. Although the information obtained cannot be generalized
as representative across the nation, we selected these domestic
locations because they represent or include (1) diverse geographical
areas, including border and nonborder areas, urban and rural areas, and
Indian tribe reservations; (2) various drug-trafficking and consumption
threats (e.g., marijuana, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine); and (3)
locations with and without Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
(OCDETF) and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)
representation.
To understand DEA's focus on international operations and coordination
with other U.S. government agencies abroad since 9/11, we interviewed
DEA officials and other federal officials at five international
locations (see table 3). We spoke with officials in Mexico City,
Mexico; Bogotá, Colombia; and Bangkok, Thailand, because DEA has had
long-standing operations and partnerships in those countries. Also, in
each of these three countries, DEA has a regional office and a
Resolution 6 team, a program that colocates Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) agents in DEA offices overseas to combat drugs. We
visited DEA's country office in Afghanistan because DEA reportedly had
shifted substantial resources to Afghanistan; created major new
programs in-country, such as the Foreign-deployed Advisory and Support
Team program; and developed stronger relationships with U.S. government
agencies there, particularly with the Department of Defense (DOD). In
addition, DEA mentors and trains sensitive investigative units in
Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico, and Thailand. Also, we spoke by
telephone with a DEA official in Brussels, Belgium, to better
understand DEA's new focus on drug trafficking in West Africa.[Footnote
63]
We did not discuss DEA's partnerships with interdiction agencies, such
as the U.S. Coast Guard, in detail in this document because DEA is not
the lead agency in U.S. interdiction activities. Additionally, while
DEA is responsible for monitoring the diversion of legal, controlled
substances for illegal use, we did not review diversion control
activities because they are not appropriated activities and DOJ's
Office of the Inspector General recently issued a report on DEA's use
of the diversion control fee account.[Footnote 64] More details about
the scope and methodology of our work regarding each of the objectives
are presented in the following sections.
Table 2: DEA Field Divisions; Other Federal Agencies; and State, Local,
and Tribal Agencies Visited by GAO at Domestic Locations:
DEA field divisions visited[A]: Detroit;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Location: Detroit, MI;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Federal agencies[B]: U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE);
Other law enforcement agencies visited: State, local, and tribal
agencies:
* Michigan State Police;
* Wayne County Sheriff's Office.
DEA field divisions visited[A]: Detroit;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Location: Columbus, OH;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Federal agencies[B]: FBI;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: State, local, and tribal
agencies:
* Columbus Police Department.
DEA field divisions visited[A]: Detroit;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Location: Mansfield, OH;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Federal agencies[B]: Not
applicable;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: State, local, and tribal
agencies:
* Mansfield Police Department.
DEA field divisions visited[A]: Detroit;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Location: Newark, OH; Other law
enforcement agencies visited: Federal agencies[B]: Not applicable;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: State, local, and tribal
agencies:
* Licking County Sheriff's Office.
DEA field divisions visited[A]: Miami[C];
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Location: Miami, FL;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Federal agencies[B]: Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), FBI, ICE, U.S. Marshals Service;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: State, local, and tribal
agencies:
* Miami-Dade County Police Department.
DEA field divisions visited[A]: Miami[C];
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Location: Tampa, FL;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Federal agencies[B]: Not
applicable;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: State, local, and tribal
agencies:
* Tampa Police Department;
* Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office.
DEA field divisions visited[A]: New York;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Location: New York City, NY;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Federal agencies[B]: ATF, FBI,
ICE;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: State, local, and tribal
agencies:
* New York City Police Department.
DEA field divisions visited[A]: Phoenix;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Location: Phoenix, AZ;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Federal agencies[B]: Not
applicable;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: State, local, and tribal
agencies:
* Arizona Department of Public Safety;
* Maricopa County Sheriff.
DEA field divisions visited[A]: Phoenix;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Location: Tucson, AZ;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Federal agencies[B]: CBP, FBI,
ICE;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: State, local, and tribal
agencies:
* Pima County Sheriff's Office.
DEA field divisions visited[A]: Phoenix;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Location: Sacaton, AZ;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Federal agencies[B]: Not
applicable;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: State, local, and tribal
agencies:
* Gila River Indian Community Police Department.
DEA field divisions visited[A]: Phoenix;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Location: Sells, AZ;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Federal agencies[B]: Not
applicable;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: State, local, and tribal
agencies:
* Tohono O'Odham Nation Police Department.
DEA field divisions visited[A]: Los Angeles;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Location: Los Angeles, CA;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Federal agencies[B]: ATF, FBI;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: State, local, and tribal
agencies:
* California Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement.
DEA field divisions visited[A]: St. Louis[D];
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Location: Des Moines, IA;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Federal agencies[B]: Not
applicable;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: State, local, and tribal
agencies:
* Iowa Department of Public Safety.
DEA field divisions visited[A]: St. Louis[D];
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Location: Marshalltown, IA;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Federal agencies[B]: Not
applicable;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: State, local, and tribal
agencies:
* Marshall County Sheriff's Office.
DEA field divisions visited[A]: Seattle;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Location: Seattle, WA;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: Federal agencies[B]: CBP, ICE;
Other law enforcement agencies visited: State, local, and tribal
agencies:
* King County Sheriff's Office.
Source: GAO.
[A] The geographical scope or area of responsibility of a DEA field
division can encompass several states (e.g., the Detroit Division's
area of responsibility includes Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio). Thus, a
DEA field division, in addition to having a division office location,
may also have district offices or other posts of duty. The specific
locations we visited are noted in the table.
[B] Locations where we did not contact other federal agencies during
our visits are denoted by "not applicable."
[C] In addition to visiting DEA's Miami Division, we also visited and
spoke with DEA officials at the Tampa District Office.
[D] While we did not visit DEA's St. Louis Division, we visited and
spoke with officials at DEA's Des Moines Resident Office, which is part
of the St. Louis Division.
[End of table]
Table 3: Federal and Foreign Agencies and Personnel Interviewed by GAO
at International Locations:
Country: Afghanistan;
City: Kabul;
Agencies and personnel interviewed: British Serious Organized Crime
Agency, U.S. Combined Security Transition Command Afghanistan, U.S.
Defense Attaché, DOJ, DEA, U.S. Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM),
FBI, U.S. Joint Interagency Coordination Group, U.S. Department of
State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(State).
Country: Belgium;
City: Brussels[A];
Agencies and personnel interviewed: DEA.
Country: Colombia;
City: Bogotá[A];
Agencies and personnel interviewed: DEA, FBI, ICE, State.
Country: Mexico;
City: Mexico City;
Agencies and personnel interviewed: ATF, DEA, DOJ, FBI, ICE.
Country: Thailand;
City: Bangkok;
Agencies and personnel interviewed: DEA, DCM, FBI, ICE, State.
Source: GAO.
[A] Denotes agencies contacted via telephone or video conference. All
other interviews were conducted in person.
[End of table]
Changes to DEA Policies, Strategies, and Authorities Post-9/11 to
Support National Counterterrorism Efforts and Address Evolving Global
Drug Threats:
To ascertain changes to DEA's policies, strategies, and authorities
since 9/11 to support national counterterrorism efforts and address
evolving global drug threats and how DEA has contributed to the Global
War on Terrorism, we reviewed:
* DEA budget data for fiscal years 2000 through 2007, including DEA's
congressional budget justifications;
* DEA documents relating to the hiring freeze;[Footnote 65]
* DEA staffing data;
* provisions of the Controlled Substances Act (Title 21 of the U.S.
Code), including sections 959 and 960a that provide extraterritorial
jurisdiction to DEA;
* DEA case statistics on investigations linked to consolidated priority
organization targets and Department of State-designated foreign
terrorist organizations;
* DEA guidance and standard operating procedures for conducting
financial investigations and collecting and forwarding information on
cases with terrorism links to the intelligence community; and:
* documents related to DEA's programs that assist other law enforcement
agencies, such as DEA's mobile enforcement teams.
We also interviewed DEA officials and other federal, state, and local
law enforcement officials about changes to DEA's strategies, policies,
and activities since 9/11 and the effects of these changes on DEA and
other law enforcement entities.
Changes to DEA's Partnerships with Federal, State, and Local Agencies
with Counternarcotics Responsibilities since 9/11 and the Effects of
Those Changes:
To determine changes to DEA's partnerships with federal, state, and
local agencies with counternarcotics responsibilities since 9/11 and
the effects of those changes, we interviewed officials at:
* DEA, including DEA's Chiefs of Operations and Intelligence and other
headquarters and field personnel, to gain perspective on changes to
DEA's partnerships and coordination since 9/11 and the effects of these
changes;
* other DOJ components, including the FBI; the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the United States Marshals Service;
and the Executive Office for OCDETF;
* two Department of Homeland Security components that have
counternarcotics responsibilities--U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and U.S. Customs and Border Protection;
* the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs and the respective U.S. embassies' Narcotics
Affairs Sections in Bangkok (Thailand), Bogotá (Colombia), and Kabul
(Afghanistan); and:
* DOD's Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global Threats.
We also interviewed officials at selected state and local partner
agencies that have perspectives on changes to federal agencies' drug
control missions after 9/11. Details on locations visited and federal
agencies whose officials we interviewed are included in tables 2 and 3.
In addition, we reviewed various documents, including:
* GAO, Inspector General, and Congressional Research Service reports on
DEA's partner agencies (e.g., reports on the FBI's transformation after
9/11);
* DEA and other agency budget data for fiscal years 2000 through 2007,
including data on reimbursable authority provided to DEA;
* memorandums of understanding between DEA and partner agencies and
other documentation illustrating changes to agencies' counternarcotics
strategies and activities and relationships with DEA since 9/11; and:
* data from the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys and the Executive
Office for OCDETF for fiscal years 2000 through 2007 illustrating
changes in the number of narcotics cases brought by federal law
enforcement agencies.
To better understand DEA's partnerships and coordination with state and
local law enforcement, we:
* reviewed budget documents and other information for fiscal years 2000
through 2007 provided by DEA officials responsible for state and local
efforts and managing field offices illustrating (1) DEA funds allocated
to support state and local programs and (2) trend data regarding the
number of state and local officers assigned to interagency task forces;
* interviewed DEA officials responsible for state and local efforts at
headquarters and the field to collect information on changes to DEA's
work at the field offices;
* interviewed officials at selected state, local, and tribal law
enforcement agencies within proximity to the DEA offices we visited
(see table 2); and:
* conducted a telephone survey of 17 of the 27 members of the National
Sheriffs' Association's Drug Enforcement Committee who agreed to
participate (see table 4).[Footnote 66]
Table 4: National Sheriffs' Association's Drug Enforcement Committee
Members Interviewed by GAO:
State: Alabama;
City: Brewton;
Agencies interviewed: Escambia County Sheriff's Office.
State: Arkansas;
City: Wynne;
Agencies interviewed: Cross County Sheriff's Office.
State: Florida;
City: Labelle;
Agencies interviewed: Hendry County Sheriff's Office.
State: Florida;
City: Orlando;
Agencies interviewed: Orange County Sheriff's Office.
State: Georgia;
City: Dahlonega;
Agencies interviewed: Lumpkin County Sheriff's Office.
State: Illinois;
City: Wheaton;
Agencies interviewed: Dupage County Sheriff's Office.
State: Kentucky;
City: Glasgow;
Agencies interviewed: Barren County Sheriff's Office.
State: Minnesota;
City: Rochester;
Agencies interviewed: Olmsted County Sheriff's Office.
State: North Carolina;
City: Morganton;
Agencies interviewed: Burke County Sheriff's Office.
State: Ohio;
City: Hamilton;
Agencies interviewed: Butler County Sheriff's Department.
State: Pennsylvania;
City: Towanda;
Agencies interviewed: Bradford County Sheriff's Office.
State: South Dakota;
City: Sioux Falls;
Agencies interviewed: Minnehaha County Sheriff's Office.
State: Texas;
City: Orange;
Agencies interviewed: Orange County Sheriff's Office.
State: Vermont;
City: Bennington;
Agencies interviewed: Bennington County Sheriff's Office.
State: Vermont;
City: Burlington;
Agencies interviewed: Chittenden County Sheriff's Office.
State: Wisconsin;
City: Jefferson;
Agencies interviewed: Jefferson County Sheriff's Office.
State: Wyoming;
City: Sundance;
Agencies interviewed: Crook County Sheriff's Office.
Source: GAO.
Note: We contacted all 27 members of the National Sheriffs'
Association's Drug Enforcement Committee and were able to complete
interviews with 17 members who were available during the period that we
conducted our telephone survey.
[End of table]
We then compared DEA's partnerships with federal, state, and local
agencies with past GAO recommendations on practices that can enhance
and sustain collaboration among federal agencies.[Footnote 67]
Mechanisms DEA Uses to Coordinate and Avoid Duplication with Partner
Agencies:
To understand the mechanisms DEA uses to coordinate and avoid
duplication with partner agencies, we first interviewed DEA officials
to identify the task forces and intelligence centers used by DEA. We
then interviewed federal, state, and local officials at various
multiagency task forces and intelligence centers to discuss their
effectiveness at coordinating efforts and avoiding duplication (see
table 5). We also reviewed memorandums of understanding between DEA and
other law enforcement entities governing their relationships at task
forces and intelligence centers and other agency documents illustrating
resources dedicated to task forces and intelligence centers for fiscal
years 2000 through 2007. We then compared DEA's and partner agencies'
coordination efforts with recommendations on information sharing made
in the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission Report) and Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government.[Footnote 68]
Table 5: Multiagency Task Forces and Intelligence Centers Visited by
GAO:
State or country: Afghanistan;
City: Kabul;
Task force or intelligence center:
* U.S. Border Management Task Force;
* Interagency Operations Coordination Center.
State or country:
Arizona;
City: Tucson;
Task force or intelligence center:
* Southwest Border HIDTA.
State or country: District of Columbia;
City: Metropolitan area;
Task force or intelligence center:
* DEA-led Special Operations Division;
* National Joint Terrorism Task Force;
* OCDETF Fusion Center.
State or country: Florida;
City: Key West;
Task force or intelligence center:
* Joint Interagency Task Force-South.
State or country: Michigan;
City: Detroit;
Task force or intelligence center:
* Michigan HIDTA.
State or country: New York;
City: New York;
Task force or intelligence center:
* New York/New Jersey HIDTA.
State or country: Texas;
City: El Paso;
Task force or intelligence center:
* El Paso Intelligence Center.
State or country: Thailand;
City: Bangkok[A];
Task force or intelligence center:
* Joint Interagency Task Force-West.
State or country: Washington;
City: Seattle;
Task force or intelligence center:
* Northwest HIDTA.
Source: GAO.
[A] We interviewed a representative from the Joint Interagency Task
Force-West in Bangkok, Thailand; however, the task force is
headquartered at the U.S. Pacific Command (Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii).
[End of table]
The Extent to Which DEA's Strategic Plan and Performance Measures
Reflect the Post-9/11 Environment:
To determine the extent to which DEA's strategic plan and performance
measures reflect the post 9/11 environment, we reviewed:
* the National Drug Control Strategy prepared by the Office of National
Drug Control Policy,
* DEA's most recently available strategic plan (Strategic Plan: Fiscal
Years 2003-2008) and DEA's annual performance plans for 2008 and 2009,
and:
* DOJ's Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2007-2012.
We discussed the development and implementation of DEA's strategic plan
with responsible DEA officials and then compared DEA's strategic plan
and related performance measures with requirements of the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), GAO's Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government,[Footnote 69] and GAO's
recommended practices for implementing GPRA.[Footnote 70]
Data Reliability:
To assess the reliability of statistical information and budget data we
obtained from DEA and partner agencies--such as budget authority and
full-time equivalent personnel data, number of case referrals to U.S.
Attorney's offices, and performance data--we discussed the sources of
the data with agency officials and reviewed documentation regarding the
compilation of data. We determined that the data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this review.
We did not review or assess information relating to specific instances
of intelligence sharing between DEA and other federal agencies,
primarily because such information involves ongoing counterterrorism
investigations or intelligence community activities.
We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through March 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Justice:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Office of the Deputy Attorney General:
Associate Deputy Attorney General:
Director Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces:
Washington, D.C. 20530:
February 6, 2009:
Ms. Eileen Larence:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Larence:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the subject draft report and
for the opportunity to respond on behalf of the Department of Justice
(DOJ).
The recommendations directed to the Department of Justice are: (1) that
the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a
new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or other mechanism to clarify
their respective departments' counternarcotics roles and
responsibilities, to handle cross-designation of ICE agents on
counternarcotics investigations, and to standardize procedures for
handling illegal drugs; (2) that the Attorney General and the Secretary
of Homeland Security develop process for periodically monitoring
implementation of the new MOU; and (3) that the Administrator of DEA
make certain updates to the agency's strategic plan.
DOJ concurs with these recommendations. DOJ recognizes that interagency
cooperation is fundamental to successful law enforcement. DOJ will
continue its efforts to reach a mutually agreeable MOU with the
Department of Homeland Security that will ensure optimal communication
among our respective law enforcement agencies, effective coordination
of investigations, and efficient cross-designation of ICE agents. DOJ
concurs with the draft report's recommendation that a mechanism for
monitoring ongoing implementation of such an agreement must be an
essential aspect of the MOU.
With respect to the recommendation regarding revision of DEA's
strategic plan, DEA has submitted its FY 2009-2014 Strategic Plan,
which includes additional language that supports DOJ's post-9/11 goal
to address counter-terrorism. The Strategic Plan includes performance
measures related to its Office of National Security Intelligence. DEA
is in the process of evaluating further performance measures related to
Consolidated Priority Organization Targets (CPOTs)/Priority Target
Organizations (PTOs) that are linked to terrorist organizations.
Finally, DOJ concurs with the draft report's finding that the OCDETF
Fusion Center and the Special Operations Division are key institutions
in law enforcement's ability to pool intelligence and thereby
coordinate a comprehensive attack on the most dangerous and pervasive
drug-trafficking organizations. DOJ stands ready to facilitate ICE's
participation in these institutions in any way possible.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Stuart G. Nash:
Associate Deputy Attorney General and Director Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Forces:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
March 9, 2009:
Ms. Eileen Larence:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice:
Government Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Ms. Larence:
Thank you for providing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with
the opportunity to review draft report GAO-09-63 "Drug Control: Better
Coordination with Some Federal Partners and an Updated Accountability
Framework Can Enhance DEA's efforts to Meet Post 9/11 Responsibilities"
(Report).
The audit examines DEA's priorities, partnerships, and strategic plan,
including DEA's relationships with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and in particular, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE). For a number of years ICE has actively sought a mutually
beneficial collaborative partnership with DEA that would promote the
effectiveness and efficiency of both agencies. Secretary Napolitano and
Attorney General Holder have begun meeting regularly in order to
enhance coordination between DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ) on
a range of issues, including those addressed in the Report. In light of
these ongoing discussions, DHS does not think it necessary or
appropriate to limit potential solutions to the GAO recommendations
made in this Report, and as such would like to request revisions. The
specific recommendations are addressed below.
Recommendation 1:
Recommendation 1: The Attorney General and the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security jointly and expeditiously develop a new
MOU or other mechanism to:
a. Clarify their respective department's counternarcotics roles and
responsibilities, particularly those of DEA, ICE, and CBP;
b. Provide efficient procedures for cross-designating ICE agents to
conduct counternarcotics investigations, and;
c. Standardize procedures for handling illegal drugs seized at the
nation's borders and making referrals to DEA.
Response: DHS agrees with the statement in the Report that "agencies
can more effectively collaborate on complex challenges by leveraging
resources, agreeing on roles and responsibilities, and establishing
compatible policies and priorities for operating across agency
boundaries." DHS and DOJ are working together to ensure coordination
and de-confliction of counternarcotics and related investigations. As
DHS and DOJ clarify roles and responsibilities, however, new agreements
might not take the form of an updated MOU or other mechanism that
continues the current practice of cross designation. DHS does not want
to confine the solution to an MOU or similar mechanism. The agencies
should be encouraged to explore a wide range of options that would
promote the most effective and efficient approach to handling drug
enforcement. Such options, for example, might include an arrangement
similar to the one that DEA has with FBI (where there is no MOU or
direct supervision) or legislative action that would make the best use
of DHS's unique law enforcement and border enforcement authorities and
resources. In light of ongoing discussions between the agencies, DHS
requests that Recommendation 1 be rewritten as follows:
Recommendation 1: The Attorney General and the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security jointly and expeditiously:
a. Agree on the scope of each department's counternarcotics
jurisdictional authorities so as to maximize the effectiveness of their
respective department's counternarcotics roles and responsibilities;
b. Ensure that processes for coordination and de-confliction of
counternarcotics investigations are effective and fully utilized;
c. Standardize procedures for handling illegal drugs seized at the
nation's borders.
Recommendation 2:
Recommendation 2: The Attorney General and the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security develop processes for periodically
monitoring the implementation of the new MOU or other mechanism and
make any needed adjustments.
Response: As noted above, DHS and DOJ are working together to resolve
jurisdictional and operational issues in the counternarcotics arena.
Because DHS's suggested revision of Recommendation 1 captures the need
for ongoing coordination and de-confliction of investigative operations
(the ultimate goal of any new mechanism); and because the form of any
new arrangement is still under discussion, DHS requests that
Recommendation 2 be stricken.
Recommendations 3 and 4:
Recommendation 3: The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security:
a. Direct ICE to contribute all relevant drug-related information to
the Special Operations Division; and;
b. Ensure ICE fully responds
Recommendation 4: The Secretary of Department of Homeland Security:
a. Direct ICE to participate in the OCDETF Fusion Center; and;
b. Ensure that ICE fully responds.
Response: DOJ and DHS are discussing issues of mutual information
sharing and participation in joint initiatives. DHS expects to address
these issues in the manner most likely to ensure officer safety,
efficient use of Federal resources, and success in the ultimate goal of
combating drugs and related crimes. DHS requests that Recommendations 3
and 4 be rewritten (and renumbered as appropriate) as follows.
Recommendation 3: The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security:
a. Expeditiously review ICE policy regarding the sharing of drug-
related information with the Special Operations Division to ensure that
all relevant information is transmitted;
b. Ensure that ICE implements any necessary change in policy:
Recommendation 4: The Attorney General and the Secretary of Department
of Homeland Security:
a. Expeditiously conclude negotiations regarding ICE participation in
the OCDETF Fusion Center in a manner that ensures a mutually beneficial
level of participation and information sharing; and;
b. Ensure that ICE and DEA implement the agreement regarding
participation and information sharing.
DHS has no comment on Recommendation 5. Again, we very much appreciate
the opportunity to comment.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director, Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Eileen Larence, (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Danny Burton, Assistant
Director, and Sean Lovitt, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment.
John Bagnulo, Shannon Finnegan, and Ryan MacMaster contributed
significantly to all aspects of this report.
Michele Fejfar assisted with methodology and data reliability.
Willie Commons and Christine Davis provided legal support.
Sally Williamson assisted in report development.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Office
of Applied Studies, Results from the 2007 National Survey on Drug Use
and Health: National Findings, NSDUH Series H-34, DHHS Publication No.
SMA 08-4343 (Rockville, Md.: 2008). These are the most recent data
available.
[2] Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control
Policy, What America's Users Spend on Illegal Drugs, 1988-2000
(Washington, D.C.: December 2001). These are the most recent data
available.
[3] Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control
Policy, The Economic Costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, 1992-
2002 (Washington, D.C.: November 2004).
[4] DEA's $2 billion budget for fiscal year 2007 does not include
funding or positions reimbursed through agreements with other federal
agencies.
[5] OCDETF task forces are short-and long-term task forces made up of
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies that target
identified organizations linked to the major drug-trafficking
organizations most responsible for the nation's drug supply. HIDTA task
forces, funded and managed by ONDCP, are made up of federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies that combat local and regional drug
problems that are beyond the control of local law enforcement.
[6] Functional since 1994, the DEA-led Special Operations Division was
established to target the command and control capabilities of major
drug-trafficking organizations. Originally, the division was operated
exclusively by DEA and DOJ's Criminal Division, but other federal
agencies soon became partners, beginning with the FBI in 1995, followed
by the U.S. Customs Service in 1996. Presently, additional partners
include the Internal Revenue Service; the U.S. Marshals Service; the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the Central
Intelligence Agency; and the Defense Intelligence Agency.
[7] DEA operates 21 domestic field division offices that are
responsible for overseeing DEA's efforts in the respective geographic
areas of responsibility. We visited the following domestic field
divisions: Detroit, Michigan; Los Angeles, California; Miami, Florida;
New York, New York; Phoenix, Arizona; Seattle, Washington; and St.
Louis, Missouri (see table 2 in appendix I).
[8] Because the Country Attaché of DEA's office located in Lagos,
Nigeria, was unable to speak with us, we spoke with the Assistant
Regional Director for the Europe Region, whose area of responsibility
includes West Africa.
[9] The OCDETF Fusion Center, which began operating in fiscal year
2006, was created to enhance the overall capacity of the OCDETF program
to engage in intelligence-driven law enforcement by combining the
analytical resources and intelligence information of the OCDETF member
agencies and others. The center collects and analyzes drug-trafficking
and related financial information and disseminates investigative leads
to OCDETF participants.
[10] Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285.
[11] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Enhance and
Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[12] This enforcement authority was enacted in March 2006 as section
122 of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192, 225 (2006). It is codified at 21
U.S.C. § 960a.
[13] DEA ended the hiring freeze following enactment of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat.
1844 (2007). According to the explanatory statement accompanying DEA's
appropriation, the Congress provided funding above the President's
request in order to enable DEA to lift the hiring freeze. 153 Cong.
Rec. H15741, H15799 (2007).
[14] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[15] While other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies
have special operations divisions, for the purposes of this report,
Special Operations Division refers to the DEA-run intelligence
coordination center. Because of the sensitivity of intelligence
coordinated by the Special Operations Division, we do not identify
specific intelligence that is provided to the center in this report.
[16] In its February 6, 2009, written comments on a draft of this
report, DOJ noted that DEA has submitted to the department for review
and approval an updated strategic plan (for fiscal years 2009-2014),
which includes additional language that supports the post-9/11 goal of
addressing counterterrorism.
[17] Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-
253, 88 Stat. 50 (1974), is reprinted in 5 U.S.C. appendix 1, along
with the accompanying President's Message to Congress. Executive Order
No. 11727 appears at 38 Fed. Reg. 18357 (1973).
[18] As discussed in more detail later in this report, Reorganization
Plan No. 2 preserved Treasury's authority to conduct drug searches,
seizures, and arrests "at regular inspection locations at ports of
entry or anywhere along the land or water borders of the United
States," provided that any evidence or persons seized by Treasury
officials are turned over to the Attorney General.
[19] Diversion control is the detection, prevention, and elimination of
the diversion of legal drugs, such as pharmaceuticals, to the illegal
drug market.
[20] 21 U.S.C. § 881 provides that proceeds from drug-related crimes,
as well as property used to facilitate certain crimes, are subject to
forfeiture to the government in order to ensure that criminals do not
benefit financially from their illegal acts.
[21] Domestically, as of September 30, 2008, DEA also employed 2,487
employees at headquarters and operational support facilities, such as
the El Paso Intelligence Center, OCDETF Fusion Center, the DEA-led
Special Operations Division, and laboratories.
[22] For fiscal year 2008, the account total was $239 million.
[23] Joint Terrorism Task Forces are partnerships between the FBI and
other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
[24] In general, extraterritorial jurisdiction would exist under 21
U.S.C. § 960a based on a sufficient connection between U.S. interests
and the offender or his or her offense.
[25] Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit
Division, The Drug Enforcement Administration's Use of Intelligence
Analysts, Audit Report 08-23 (Washington, D.C.: 2008).
[26] In 2008, DEA received funding to reinstate mobile enforcement
teams in 10 DEA domestic field division offices--Dallas, Detroit,
Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, Newark, Philadelphia, San Diego, St.
Louis, and Washington, D.C.
[27] Revenue denied is the sum of DEA's worldwide asset seizures and
the production value of drug seizures.
[28] PTOs are those drug-trafficking organizations that have an
identified hierarchy engaged in the highest levels of drug trafficking,
drug money laundering operations, or both and have a significant
international, national, regional, or local impact upon drug
availability.
[29] For this analysis, we did not include funding from the Diversion
Control Fee Account, which consists of fees charged to DEA registrants,
such as legal manufacturers, distributors, dispensers (including
physicians), importers, and exporters of controlled substances and
listed chemicals.
[30] Pub. L. No. 110-161, Division B, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007). According
to the explanatory statement accompanying DEA's appropriation, DEA
received additional funding above the President's budget request to
enable DEA to lift the hiring freeze. 153 Cong. Rec. H15741, H15799
(2007).
[31] Resolution 6 is a 1994 joint resolution between DEA and the FBI
designed to enhance their coordination of international narcotics
cases. Under Resolution 6, FBI agents are assigned to DEA foreign field
offices to conduct counternarcotics investigations.
[32] Initiated in 2004 by DOJ and ATF, the Violent Crime Impact Team
program is designed to reduce homicides and other firearms-related
violent crime in selected cities. See Department of Justice, Office of
the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division, Review of
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' Violent Crime
Impact Team Initiative, I-2006-005 (Washington, D.C., May 2006).
[33] According to DEA and other federal, state, and local agencies that
we contacted, overlapping operations resulting from investigations that
are not coordinated can lead to high-risk incidents, including the
possibility of injured or killed law enforcement officers.
[34] The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred Customs and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, with the exception of certain
functions, to the newly created DHS. Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 403, 412,
441, 451(b), 462, 116 Stat. 2135, 2178, 2179-2180, 2192, 2196, 2202-
2205 (2002). DHS established ICE by combining the criminal
investigators from Customs and the criminal investigators from the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, which had been a component of
DOJ. The remaining elements of Customs and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service were reorganized into, among other agencies,
CBP.
[35] Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for the
Deputy Attorney General, "United States Customs Service Jurisdiction"
(June 3, 1986).
[36] Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for
Joseph R. Davis, Chief Counsel, DEA, "Authority of the United States
Customs Service to Participate in Law Enforcement Efforts Against Drug
Violators" (June 11, 1985).
[37] 28 C.F.R. subpart R, appendix, § 11.
[38] Titled "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Drug Enforcement
Administration and the United States Customs Service to Implement Title
21 Cross-Designation Policies and Procedures," the 1994 MOU was the
core document incorporated into the parties' Cross-Designation Manual,
which also included a variety of other implementing documents. Upon the
creation of DHS and the reorganization of Customs, ICE became a party
to this agreement.
[39] As reflected in the MOU, Title 21 of the United States Code
contains the country's controlled substances laws, including the
Controlled Substances Act and the Controlled Substances Import and
Export Act of 1970.
[40] The 1975 MOU is titled "Memorandum of Understanding between the
Customs Service and Drug Enforcement Administration on Operating
Guidelines." The parties incorporated this MOU into their Cross-
Designation Manual along with the 1994 MOU.
[41] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[42] CBP was created in 2003 by combining, among other things, the port-
of-entry and border-related resources and missions of Customs and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. See Reorganization Plan
Modification for the Department of Homeland Security, H.R. Doc. No. 108-
32 (Feb. 4, 2003).
[43] In its technical comments on a draft of this report, ICE noted
that prior to the creation of DHS both Customs and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service shared responsibilities for interdicting illegal
immigrants and contraband at the border. ICE explained that (1) Border
Patrol agents operated between the ports of entry with a primary
mission of interdicting illegal aliens and contraband and (2) Customs
also employed Customs patrol officers who operated between the ports of
entry with a primary mission of interdicting narcotics. ICE noted that
even today, it employs Native American Customs patrol officers (known
as the "Shadow Wolves") on the Tohono O'Odham Indian Nation in Arizona.
Further, ICE noted that prior to the creation of DHS, inspectors of
Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service were cross-
designated at ports of entry to enforce both customs and immigration
laws.
[44] Under current procedures, when an ICE agent is notified by CBP
that a seizure has occurred at a port of entry, the ICE agent is to
respond, process the evidence, and conduct an investigation. According
to ICE, in this scenario, ICE does not turn over the narcotics to DEA;
rather, ICE provides a copy of the report of investigation and the
violator's biographical information for input into DEA's database.
[45] In its technical comments on a draft of this report, DEA noted
that the present MOU is a legacy issue for CBP that affects
coordinating drug seizures at the border but does not affect
cooperative efforts between DEA and CBP. DEA commented that the two
agencies have an excellent working relationship.
[46] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[47] DEA coordinates with the Department of State's Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in Washington,
D.C., and the department's Narcotics Affairs Sections in U.S. embassies
abroad, which receive program guidance and funding from the bureau.
[48] The interagency agreements we reviewed stem from two different
sources of authority. The Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535, authorizes
agencies to enter into agreements, such as reimbursable agreements or
MOUs, for the interagency provision of goods and services. Further, the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. § 2291 et seq.)
authorizes similar interagency agreements for foreign assistance
purposes. See 22 U.S.C. § 2392(b).
[49] Sensitive investigative units are groups of host-nation
investigators that DEA polygraphs, trains, equips, and mentors to
conduct bilateral drug investigations and collect counternarcotics
intelligence. DEA, with Department of State assistance, supports 11
sensitive investigative units, including one in Afghanistan.
[50] Funded by the Department of State, international law enforcement
academies are a collaborative effort among U.S. law enforcement
agencies, including DEA, to provide law enforcement training and
technical assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies. International
law enforcement academies are located in Bangkok, Thailand; Budapest,
Hungary; Gaborone, Botswana; San Salvador, El Salvador; and Roswell,
New Mexico.
[51] DOD is authorized to provide specific types of support to civilian
law enforcement officials in the form of information sharing, as well
as facility and equipment loans and associated personnel support. See
generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-374. DOD policy generally encourages
cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials in a manner
consistent with the needs of national security and military
preparedness and in accordance with applicable law and other principles
limiting direct military involvement in searches, seizures, arrests, or
other similar civilian law enforcement activities. See DOD Directive
5525.5, sections 4 and E.4.1.3. In addition to providing support to
civilian law enforcement, DOD also serves as the lead agency to detect
and monitor the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the
United States. 10 U.S.C. § 124(a).
[52] HIDTAs are designated by the Director of ONDCP in consultation
with the Attorney General, the Secretaries of Homeland Security and the
Treasury, the heads of the National Drug Control Program agencies, and
relevant governors to determine whether (1) an area is a significant
center of illegal drug production, manufacturing, importation, or
distribution; (2) state, local, and tribal law enforcement have
dedicated resources to the problem; (3) drug-related activities are
having a significant impact on the area and other areas of the country;
and (4) a significant increase in federal resources to the area is
necessary to combat drug and drug-related activities. 21 U.S.C.
1706(b)(1), (d). Each HIDTA may have multiple task forces, and each
task force may have different participating federal, state, and local
agencies.
[53] ONDCP Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-469, § 301, 120
Stat. 3502, 3518-24, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1706.
[54] GPRA requires federal agencies--defined as executive departments,
such as DOJ--to develop strategic plans and annual performance plans.
However, related guidance advises that component agencies, such as DEA,
should develop goals and measures that are linked with the parent
agency's strategic goals.
[55] At the time of our review, DEA's most current strategic plan
covered fiscal years 2003 to 2008 but had not been updated since 2003.
[56] GAO, Agencies' Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to
Facilitate Congressional Review, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-10.1.16] (Washington, D.C.: May
1997).
[57] GAO, Managing for Results: Agencies' Annual Performance Plans Can
Help Address Strategic Planning Challenges, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-98-44] (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30,
1998).
[58] In its February 6, 2009, written comments on a draft of this
report, DOJ noted that DEA has submitted to the department for review
and approval an updated strategic plan (for fiscal years 2009-2014),
which includes additional language that supports the post-9/11 goal of
addressing counterterrorism.
[59] Specifically, 31 U.S.C. § 720 requires the head of a federal
agency to submit a written statement of the actions taken on our
recommendations to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs and to the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform not later than 60 days from the date of the report
and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the
agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after
the date of the report.
[60] The three national priorities for combating narcotics in the
United States are stopping drug use before it starts, intervening and
healing America's drug users, and disrupting and dismantling the market
for illegal drugs. Our scope excludes the first two priorities.
[61] Within the metropolitan Washington, D.C., area, we interviewed
officials at DEA; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Executive
Office for Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces; the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the U.S. Marshals Service;
U.S. Customs and Border Protection; U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; the Office of National Drug Control Policy; the Department
of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs; and the Department of Defense's Office of the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global
Threats.
[62] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population, because in a nonprobability sample some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample.
[63] Because of unforeseen circumstances, the Country Attaché of DEA's
office located in Lagos, Nigeria, was unable to meet with us. However,
we were able to speak with the Assistant Regional Director for the
Europe Region, whose area of responsibility includes West Africa.
[64] The diversion control fee account consists of registration fees
paid by licensed pharmacies and wholesale distributors of licit
controlled substances. See, for example, Department of Justice, Office
of the Inspector General, Review of the Drug Enforcement
Administration's Use of the Diversion Control Fee Account, I-2008-002
(Washington, D.C.: February 2008).
[65] Beginning in August 2006, DEA initiated a hiring freeze to address
funding constraints created in part by unfunded pay increases and
budget rescissions. The hiring freeze ended in December 2007 with
enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-
161, Division B, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007). According to the explanatory
statement accompanying DEA's appropriation, DEA received additional
funding above the President's budget request to enable DEA to lift the
hiring freeze. 153 Cong. Rec. H15741, H15799 (2007).
[66] The National Sheriff's Association is a nonprofit organization
that provides programs for sheriffs, their deputies, chiefs of police,
and other law enforcement professionals to raise the level of
professionalism within the criminal justice field. The primary purpose
of the association's Drug Enforcement Committee is to provide a forum
to discuss and address the issues that sheriffs' offices face when
combating illegal drugs.
[67] See GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[68] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).
[69] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[70] See GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[End of section]
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