Combating Gangs
Better Coordination and Performance Measurement Would Help Clarify Roles of Federal Agencies and Strengthen Assessment of Efforts Gao ID: GAO-09-708 July 24, 2009The Department of Justice (DOJ) estimates that the United States has about a million gang members. While state and local agencies have primary responsibility for combating gang crime, the federal government has key roles to enforce laws and help fund programs to provide alternatives to gang membership for at-risk youth. GAO was asked to examine federal efforts to combat gang crime. This report addresses (1) the roles of DOJ and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in combating gang crime and the extent to which DOJ and DHS agencies coordinate their efforts with each other and state and local agencies; (2) the extent to which DOJ and DHS measure their gang enforcement efforts; and (3) how federal grant funding is used to administer or support activities to reduce gang-related crime. GAO reviewed federal agencies' plans, resources, and measures and interviewed federal, state, and local officials in 15 localities with federally led anti-gang task forces representing varying population sizes and locations.
Various DOJ and DHS components have taken distinct roles in combating gang crime, and at the headquarters level, DOJ has established several entities to share information on gang-related investigations across agencies. However, some of these entities have not differentiated roles and responsibilities. For example, two entities have overlapping responsibilities for coordinating the federal response to the same gang threat. Prior GAO work found that overlap among programs can waste funds and limit effectiveness, and that agencies should work together to define and agree on their respective roles and facilitate information sharing. At the field division level, federal agencies have established strategies to help coordinate anti-gang efforts including federally led task forces. Officials GAO interviewed were generally satisfied with the task force structure for leveraging resources and taking advantage of contributions from all participating agencies. Federal agencies have taken actions to measure the results of their gang enforcement efforts, but these efforts have been hindered by three factors. Among other measures, one agency tracks the number of investigations that disrupted or shut down criminal gangs, while another agency tracks its gang-related convictions. However, agencies' efforts to measure results of federal actions to combat gang crime have been hampered by lack of a shared definition of "gang" among agencies, underreporting of information by United States Attorneys Offices (USAOs), and the lack of departmentwide DOJ performance measures for anti-gang efforts. Definitions of "gang" vary in terms of number of members, time or type of offenses, and other characteristics. According to DOJ officials, lack of a shared definition of "gang" complicates data collection and evaluation efforts across federal agencies, but does not adversely affect law enforcement activity. DOJ officials stated that USAOs have underreported gang-related cases and work, in part because attorneys historically have not viewed data collection as a priority. In the absence of periodic monitoring of USAO's gang-related case information, DOJ cannot be certain that USAOs have accurately recorded gang-related data. Further, DOJ lacks performance measures that would help agencies to assess progress made over time on anti-gang efforts and provide decision makers with key data to facilitate resource allocation. DOJ administers several grant programs to assist communities to address gang problems; however, initiatives funded through some of these programs have had mixed results. A series of grant programs funded from the 1980s to 2009 to test a comprehensive communitywide model are nearing completion. Evaluations found little evidence that these programs reduced youth gang crime. DOJ does not plan to fund future grants testing this model; rather, DOJ plans to provide technical assistance to communities implementing anti-gang programs without federal funding. DOJ also awarded grants to 12 communities during fiscal years 2006 to 2008 under another anti-gang initiative. The first evaluations of this initiative are due in late 2009, and no additional grants will be funded pending the evaluation results.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-708, Combating Gangs: Better Coordination and Performance Measurement Would Help Clarify Roles of Federal Agencies and Strengthen Assessment of Efforts
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
July 2009:
Better Coordination and Performance Measurement Would Help Clarify
Roles of Federal Agencies and Strengthen Assessment of Efforts:
GAO-09-708:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-708, a report to the Ranking Member, Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Justice (DOJ) estimates that the United States has
about a million gang members. While state and local agencies have
primary responsibility for combating gang crime, the federal government
has key roles to enforce laws and help fund programs to provide
alternatives to gang membership for at-risk youth. GAO was asked to
examine federal efforts to combat gang crime. This report addresses (1)
the roles of DOJ and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in
combating gang crime and the extent to which DOJ and DHS agencies
coordinate their efforts with each other and state and local agencies;
(2) the extent to which DOJ and DHS measure their gang enforcement
efforts; and (3) how federal grant funding is used to administer or
support activities to reduce gang-related crime. GAO reviewed federal
agencies‘ plans, resources, and measures and interviewed federal,
state, and local officials in 15 localities with federally led anti-
gang task forces representing varying population sizes and locations.
What GAO Found:
Various DOJ and DHS components have taken distinct roles in combating
gang crime, and at the headquarters level, DOJ has established several
entities to share information on gang-related investigations across
agencies. However, some of these entities have not differentiated roles
and responsibilities. For example, two entities have overlapping
responsibilities for coordinating the federal response to the same gang
threat. Prior GAO work found that overlap among programs can waste
funds and limit effectiveness, and that agencies should work together
to define and agree on their respective roles and facilitate
information sharing. At the field division level, federal agencies have
established strategies to help coordinate anti-gang efforts including
federally led task forces. Officials GAO interviewed were generally
satisfied with the task force structure for leveraging resources and
taking advantage of contributions from all participating agencies.
Federal agencies have taken actions to measure the results of their
gang enforcement efforts, but these efforts have been hindered by three
factors. Among other measures, one agency tracks the number of
investigations that disrupted or shut down criminal gangs, while
another agency tracks its gang-related convictions. However, agencies‘
efforts to measure results of federal actions to combat gang crime have
been hampered by lack of a shared definition of ’gang“ among agencies,
underreporting of information by United States Attorneys Offices
(USAOs), and the lack of departmentwide DOJ performance measures for
anti-gang efforts. Definitions of ’gang“ vary in terms of number of
members, time or type of offenses, and other characteristics. According
to DOJ officials, lack of a shared definition of ’gang“ complicates
data collection and evaluation efforts across federal agencies, but
does not adversely affect law enforcement activity. DOJ officials
stated that USAOs have underreported gang-related cases and work, in
part because attorneys historically have not viewed data collection as
a priority. In the absence of periodic monitoring of USAO‘s gang-
related case information, DOJ cannot be certain that USAOs have
accurately recorded gang-related data. Further, DOJ lacks performance
measures that would help agencies to assess progress made over time on
anti-gang efforts and provide decision makers with key data to
facilitate resource allocation.
DOJ administers several grant programs to assist communities to address
gang problems; however, initiatives funded through some of these
programs have had mixed results. A series of grant programs funded from
the 1980s to 2009 to test a comprehensive communitywide model are
nearing completion. Evaluations found little evidence that these
programs reduced youth gang crime. DOJ does not plan to fund future
grants testing this model; rather, DOJ plans to provide technical
assistance to communities implementing anti-gang programs without
federal funding. DOJ also awarded grants to 12 communities during
fiscal years 2006 to 2008 under another anti-gang initiative. The first
evaluations of this initiative are due in late 2009, and no additional
grants will be funded pending the evaluation results.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOJ reexamine roles of headquarters anti-gang
entities, establish performance measures for anti-gang efforts, review
USAO gang-related case data, and, along with DHS, develop a common
definition for ’gang.“ DHS concurred with the recommendations; DOJ is
considering whether to establish measures and a common definition and
concurred with the other recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-708] or key
components. For more information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-
8777 or larencee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Lack of Differentiated Roles and Responsibilities among Headquarters
Anti-Gang Coordinating Groups and Gaps in Participation Could Hinder
Coordination Efforts:
Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Have Established Measures for Gang
Enforcement Efforts, but Common Definitions and a DOJ Departmentwide
Performance Measure Would Strengthen Performance Measurement:
DOJ Has Funded Grant Programs to Test Anti-Gang Models, but Evaluations
Have Reported Mixed Results in the Programs' Sustainability and
Contributions to Reductions in Crime:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Nature and Scope of Gang and Gang Crime in the United
States:
Appendix II: Federal Statutes Used in Gang-Related Prosecutions:
Appendix III: Important Elements of an Approach to Combating Gangs:
Appendix IV: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Justice:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Headquarters Level Entities Focused on Coordination of Anti-
Gang Efforts:
Table 2: OJJDP Anti-Gang Grant Programs That Were Currently Funded as
of January 2009:
Table 3: Federal Criminal Statutes Frequently Used to Prosecute Gang
Members:
Table 4: Officials We Interviewed in 15 Selected Localities:
Figures:
Figure 1: DOJ and DHS Agencies and Offices with Key Roles in Federal
Enforcement Efforts to Combat Criminal Gang Activity:
Figure 2: FBI Agent FTEs on Anti-Gang Efforts and All Investigative
Activities (Fiscal Years 2003 to 2008):
Figure 3: DEA Agent FTEs on Anti-Gang Efforts and All Investigative
Activities (Fiscal Years 2003 to 2008):
Figure 4: DOJ's Fiscal Year 2007 to 2012 Strategic Plan Includes Anti-
Gang Strategies but Lacks a Gang-Specific Performance Measure:
Figure 5: FBI Gang-Related Disruptions (Fiscal Years 2003 to 2008):
Figure 6: FBI Gang-Related Dismantlements (Fiscal Years 2003 to 2008):
Figure 7: ATF Gang-Related Convictions (Fiscal Years 2003 to 2008):
Figure 8: DEA Gang-Related Arrests (Fiscal Years 2003 to 2008):
Figure 9: ICE Gang-Related Arrests (Fiscal Years 2006 to 2008):
Figure 10: Services and Programs Funded Under the Richmond, Virginia,
Gang Reduction and Intervention Program:
Figure 11: At-Risk Youth Design and Complete an Anti-Gang Mural in
Tampa, Florida, as Part of the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative:
Figure 12: National Youth Gang Surveys (2002 to 2006):
Abbreviations:
ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives:
BJA: Bureau of Justice Assistance:
CBP: Customs and Border Protection:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
EOUSA: Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
FTE: Full time equivalents:
GangTECC: National Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination
Center:
HIDTA: high intensity drug trafficking areas:
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
LIONS: National Legal Information Office Network System:
MS-13: Mara Salvatrucha:
NGIC: National Gang Intelligence Center:
ONDCP: Office of National Drug Control Policy (White House):
OJJDP: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention:
OJP: Office of Justice Programs:
RICO: Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act:
USA-5: U.S. Attorney-5:
USAO: U.S. Attorney's Office:
USMS: U.S. Marshals Service:
VICAR: Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Act:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office: Washington, DC 20548:
July 24, 2009:
The Honorable Darrell E. Issa:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
Dear Mr. Issa:
According to estimates from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the United
States has about 20,000 gangs and 1 million gang members, and gangs are
active in every U.S. state and territory and Washington, D.C.[Footnote
1] Once considered a problem of urban areas of the country, gangs began
migrating in the 1980s and 1990s into suburban and rural communities,
as well. Gangs are involved in violent crimes such as armed robbery,
assault, homicide, and shootings. They dominate retail-level drug
distribution throughout the country, and they are increasingly becoming
involved in wholesale-level drug trafficking.
While most of the responsibility for combating gang crime rests with
state and local law enforcement and social service agencies as well as
community and local faith-based organizations, the federal government
also has important responsibilities. The federal government's role
includes enforcing laws to combat gang crime and identifying and
supporting promising programs to help prevent young people from
becoming gang members or to intervene to provide at-risk youth with
alternatives to being part of a gang. DOJ and U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), have key roles in federal law enforcement efforts to
investigate and prosecute gang-related crimes. DOJ also administers
programs to assist local communities in efforts designed to prevent the
spread of gangs and gang crime, and sponsors evaluations of whether the
strategies it supports are effective in reducing gang-related crime.
You asked us to review federal programs to combat gang violence and
coordination mechanisms among federal, state, and local agencies for
anti-gang efforts. This report addresses the following questions: (1)
What are the roles of DOJ and DHS related to combating gangs, and to
what extent do DOJ and DHS agencies collaborate and coordinate their
efforts in combating gangs with each other and state and local
partners? (2) To what extent do DOJ and DHS measure the results of
their gang enforcement efforts? and (3) How does DOJ use grant funding
to administer and/or support activities to reduce gang-related crime
and what have been the reported results of grant-funded activities? We
also provide information on the nature and scope of the gang problem in
the United States (see appendix I); federal statutes, including federal
racketeering statutes, used to prosecute gang members (see appendix
II); and factors to consider in developing and implementing anti-gang
approaches (see appendix III).
To examine the roles of DOJ and DHS agencies in gang enforcement
efforts and the extent to which their efforts are coordinated with
other federal, state, and local partners, we reviewed federal
strategies and plans to combat gang crime and interviewed headquarters
DOJ, DHS, and component agency officials involved in gang crime
enforcement activities.[Footnote 2] We reviewed DOJ's, DHS's, and
components' strategic plans including goals and objectives for efforts
to combat gang crime. We compared DOJ and DHS coordination and
information sharing efforts to criteria in our prior work on effective
interagency collaboration and results-oriented government.[Footnote 3]
We also examined staffing levels and budgets for DOJ agencies and ICE.
To assess the reliability of statistical information and budget data we
obtained, we discussed the sources of the data with agency officials
and reviewed documentation regarding the compilation of data. We
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this report. Using semi-structured interview instruments, we
interviewed the U.S. Attorney or designated staff of U.S. Attorneys
Offices (USAO)[Footnote 4] and supervisory agents of DOJ and DHS law
enforcement agencies involved in investigating and prosecuting gang
members in 15 localities across the country. We also reviewed anti-gang
strategies and other documentation of enforcement efforts to reduce
criminal gang activity in these localities. The localities we visited
were Atlanta, Ga. Baltimore, Md. Brooklyn, N.Y.; Chicago, Il.
Cleveland, Ohio; Dallas, Tex.; Durham, N.C.; Los Angeles, Calif.;
Manhattan, N.Y.; Milwaukee, Wisc.; Newark, N.J.; Pittsburgh, Pa.;
Raleigh, N.C.; Richmond, Va.; and Tampa, Fla. We selected these
localities based on a mix of criteria that included population size,
geographic location, violent crime rates, and receipt of federal grants
to address gang-related crime problems. Other criteria considered in
selecting these localities included the location of the USAO and
federal law enforcement agency field offices, the presence of federally
led task forces to combat gang crime, and suggestions from DOJ and DHS
components. In addition, we met with selected state and local
prosecutors and law enforcement officials in these localities to
discuss the gang problem in their area and the role of DOJ agencies and
ICE in helping to address it. The results of our site visits cannot be
generalized across all DOJ or ICE field offices and states and
localities in the United States. However, because we selected these
sites and localities based on a variety of factors, they provided us
with an overview and examples of the activities and coordination of DOJ
and DHS efforts to combat gang crime, including law enforcement as well
as prevention and intervention programs.
To determine the extent to which federal agencies have measured the
results of their gang enforcement efforts, we first assessed how DOJ
and DHS components defined "gang" and gang-related crimes. We reviewed
data maintained by DOJ and DHS law enforcement agencies and U.S.
Attorneys on gang-related investigations and prosecutions, and we
interviewed headquarters officials. To assess the reliability of
statistical information we obtained, we discussed the sources of the
data with agency officials and reviewed documentation regarding the
compilation of data. We determined that the data were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this review. We also reviewed DOJ and DHS
strategic plans, budgets, and performance reports. We compared DOJ and
DHS efforts to measure the results of their gang enforcement efforts to
criteria in our prior work on effective interagency collaboration and
results oriented government.[Footnote 5] We also asked interviewees in
the 15 localities we visited how they measured the results of local
gang enforcement efforts.
To determine how DOJ administers and/or supports gang prevention,
intervention, and suppression programs through grant funding and the
programs' reported results, we examined documentation on DOJ's overall
approach and objectives for anti-gang grant programs as well as DOJ-
sponsored evaluations and a guide on best practices to address
community gang problems. We also reviewed funding levels for fiscal
years 2007 and 2008 for the four DOJ grant programs that we identified
as being directly focused on anti-gang efforts.[Footnote 6] We
interviewed DOJ headquarters officials about the status of funding,
sustainability of anti-gang programs without federal funding, and
results of evaluations of the effectiveness of the anti-gang grant
programs, among other topics. Eight of the 15 localities we visited had
received federal grants for anti-gang efforts, and we interviewed grant
recipients to determine activities that they were pursuing with the
grant funds and how they planned to sustain programs when federal
funding expired. In addition, we interviewed USAO officials in the 15
localities we visited to obtain information on their roles in anti-gang
efforts. We reviewed guidance on developing and implementing
comprehensive prevention, intervention, and suppression programs and
key documents related to the four federal grant programs, such as grant
applications. We also reviewed available nationwide evaluations of
grant programs sponsored by DOJ. We obtained information and views from
nine criminal justice researchers on how effective the federal
government has been in measuring its gang suppression, prevention, and
intervention activities; and on whether the programs are sustainable
without federal funding and likely to be implemented by communities
that did not receive federal grants based on lessons learned from the
federally funded projects. We identified the researchers through a
review of literature related to gangs and gang crime issues,
researchers' participation in gang-related conferences, and by asking
federal officials for recommendations.
We conducted this performance audit from December 2007 through July
2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional
details on our scope and methodology, including the locations we
visited, are in appendix IV.
Background:
Gangs Operate across the United States and Internationally:
Gangs, which operate in all 50 states and the District of Columbia,
vary in size, ethnic composition, membership, and organizational
structure. Gangs range from groups that have regional or national
status and operate in a number of states throughout the country to
local groups that are associated with a particular neighborhood or
street. Most gangs nationwide are local neighborhood or street groups.
Assessments by DOJ and other organizations have identified gang crime
problems nationwide from large cities to rural communities. In many
communities, criminal gangs commit as much as 80 percent of crime,
according to law enforcement officials. See appendix I for information
on the extent to which communities of various sizes experience gang
crime problems, recent gang crime trends observed, descriptions of
major national-level gang organizations, and impacts of national and
local street gangs in the localities we visited.
Gang crime problems are not unique to the United States. In other
countries, urban youth gangs operate often in association with adult
organized-crime organizations. For example, gang activity has been
reported in Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Africa,
and Asia, as well as in Russia and the countries of eastern and central
Europe following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Some of these
international gangs can be linked to gangs in the United States. We
have ongoing work examining efforts to combat gangs with transnational
connections and plan to report on this issue later this year.
Overview of Missions and Responsibilities of Federal Agencies Involved
in Enforcement Efforts to Combat Gang Crime:
DOJ and DHS are the departments with key roles in federal enforcement
efforts to investigate and prosecute gang-related crimes (See figure
1). DOJ's involvement is primarily through its Criminal Division; the
93 U.S. Attorneys in 94 judicial districts across the nation that
operate with administrative and operational support from the Executive
Office of U.S. Attorneys (EOUSA);[Footnote 7] and three law enforcement
agencies: the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); and the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA). In addition, the U.S. Marshals
Service (USMS) fugitive task force program assists law enforcement
agencies in apprehending dangerous fugitives, including gang members,
who are not arrested after having been criminally charged. ICE is the
DHS agency with the largest role in investigating gang-related crimes,
and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for
interdicting gang-related illicit activities that cross United States
borders.[Footnote 8]
Figure 1: DOJ and DHS Agencies and Offices with Key Roles in Federal
Enforcement Efforts to Combat Criminal Gang Activity:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
This figure contains organizational charts depicting relationships as
follows:
DHS:
Top level:
Secretary (Headquarters);
Second level, reporting to Secretary (Headquarters level):
ICE;
CBP;
Third level (field offices):
ICE, reporting to ICE Headquarters;
CBP, reporting to CBP Headquarters.
DOJ:
Top level (Headquarters):
Attorney General;
Second level, reporting to Attorney General:
Deputy Attorney General;
Third level, reporting to Deputy Attorney General:
FBI;
EOUSA;
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division;
ATF;
DEA;
USMS;
Fourth level (field offices):
FBI, reporting to FBI Headquarters;
USAOs, Reporting to EOUSA Headquarters;
AFT, reporting to AFT Headquarters;
DEA, reporting to DEA Headquarters;
USMS, reporting to USMS Headquarters.
Source: GAO analysis of DHS, and DOJ data.
[End of figure]
Within DOJ, the Criminal Division, along with U.S. Attorneys, is
charged with enforcing most federal criminal laws.[Footnote 9] The
Criminal Division can prosecute a wide range of criminal matters,
including many of those involving gangs and gang members. Criminal
Division attorneys are to prosecute nationally significant cases and
formulate and implement criminal enforcement policy, among other
responsibilities. The Criminal Division oversees the investigation and
prosecution of gang-related crimes under five Deputy Assistant
Attorneys General. Each one supervises three or four sections dealing
with specific violations of criminal law. The work of each of the
sections is driven by the type of criminal matter under investigation
(i.e., organized crime and racketeering, as well as narcotics and
dangerous drugs), not whether gangs and/or gang members are involved in
the crimes. As a result, according to a DOJ Criminal Division official,
all five Criminal Division deputy assistant attorneys general oversee
sections that deal with crimes and criminal matters that involve gangs
and gang members. The Criminal Division has also established the Gang
Unit to help coordinate multi-jurisdictional gang investigations and
prosecutions.
The 93 U.S. Attorneys prosecute the majority of criminal cases as well
as civil litigation, handled by DOJ. In 2005, as part of a DOJ
initiative to combat gangs, the Attorney General instructed each U.S.
Attorney to name an anti-gang coordinator to work in consultation with
federal, state, and local agencies to develop a comprehensive anti-gang
strategy focusing on prevention and enforcement. EOUSA provides general
executive assistance and supervision to USAOs and has a national gang
coordinator who helps act as a liaison between the USAOs and other DOJ
components involved in gang prosecution efforts. EOUSA provides
operational support for information technology, training, and other
functions, and prepares an annual statistical report of U.S. Attorneys,
among other functions.
The FBI has jurisdiction to investigate a broad range of violations of
federal law including organized crime and violent crime that can
involve gangs and gang members. ATF, as part of its mission, conducts
investigations to reduce violent crimes involving firearms and
explosives, which frequently involve gangs and gang members.[Footnote
10] DEA is the nation's single-mission drug enforcement agency with
responsibility for enforcing controlled substance laws and regulations.
Some DEA priority investigations target gangs involved in narcotics
trafficking. USMS is the enforcement arm of the federal courts with
responsibilities including apprehending fugitives from federal justice,
protecting federal judges, transporting federal prisoners, operating
the witness security program, and seizing property acquired by
criminals through illegal activities. The USMS fugitive task force
program and other initiatives target fugitive gang members who have
been criminally charged.
Within DHS, ICE, the largest investigative arm of the department, has
responsibility for a range of issues that may threaten national
security, including financial and immigration fraud violations, as well
as targeting street gangs with connections to international criminal
activities. Within ICE's Office of Investigation, the National Gang
Unit manages and coordinates national efforts to combat the growth and
proliferation of transnational criminal street gangs. Gang members who
have prior criminal convictions, are involved in crimes with a nexus to
the border, or are foreign-born and are in the United States illegally
may be subject to ICE's dual criminal and administrative authorities
that are used to disrupt and dismantle transnational gang activities
with criminal prosecutions and deportation. In addition, CBP, the DHS
component that protects U.S. borders against terrorism, illegal
immigration, and drug smuggling, among other threats, participates in a
national gang intelligence group.
Grant Funding Supports Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Enforcement
Activities:
DOJ supports community gang prevention, intervention, and enforcement
activities through grant funding of demonstration projects[Footnote 11]
managed by its Office of Justice Programs (OJP). The mission of OJP is
to increase public safety and improve the fair administration of
justice across America through innovative leadership and programs that
include demonstration programs to assist state and local governments to
reduce crime, as well as crime and criminal justice research and
evaluation, training, and technical assistance. OJP's Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Programs (OJJDP) and Bureau
of Justice Assistance (BJA) administer the demonstration programs we
have identified as being directly focused on anti-gang efforts, while
its National Institute of Justice is responsible for evaluating some
program results and generating research-based knowledge to help inform
policy, develop strategies, and deploy resources.
Lack of Differentiated Roles and Responsibilities among Headquarters
Anti-Gang Coordinating Groups and Gaps in Participation Could Hinder
Coordination Efforts:
DOJ and DHS component agencies have different roles and
responsibilities for combating gang crime and focus on different
aspects of gang enforcement. At the headquarters level, DOJ and FBI
have established several coordinating entities to share information on
gang-related investigations and intelligence across agency boundaries.
Nevertheless, some of these entities have not sufficiently
differentiated their roles and responsibilities, thus impacting their
ability to coordinate anti-gang efforts. In addition, ICE has not yet
fully participated in some coordinating group functions. At the field
division level, federal law enforcement agencies have established
entities and strategies to help coordinate anti-gang efforts by, for
example, establishing anti-gang task forces and case "deconfliction"
mechanisms,[Footnote 12] and developing district-wide anti-gang
strategies through the USAOs. In localities we visited officials from
federal, state, and local law enforcement offices cited benefits to
coordinating through task forces.
DOJ and DHS Component Agencies Focus on Different Aspects of Gang
Enforcement and Have Dedicated More Resources to Gang Enforcement
Efforts Since Fiscal Year 2003:
Gang enforcement is primarily the responsibility of state and local law
enforcement agencies that address community-based violence and crime on
a daily basis. At the federal level, no one department or agency has
sole responsibility for gang enforcement. Various DOJ and DHS
components focus on different aspects of gang enforcement as part of
their broader missions. Within DOJ, the FBI focuses primarily on
investigating violent, multi jurisdictional gangs whose activities
constitute criminal enterprises by identifying, investigating, and
prosecuting the leadership and key members of violent gangs; disrupting
or dismantling gangs' criminal enterprise; and recovering illegal
assets through seizures and forfeitures.[Footnote 13] ATF primarily
focuses on efforts to reduce the occurrence of firearms, arson, and
explosives-related violent crime, including such crimes committed by
gang members.[Footnote 14] The primary focus of DEA's enforcement
efforts is on the links between gangs and drug trafficking. USMS's role
is to apprehend gang members who have been criminally charged but not
arrested. Within DHS, ICE's primary focus for gang enforcement is to
disrupt and dismantle violent transnational criminal street gangs by
investigating cross-border smuggling and financial and fraud-related
crimes. ICE uses its dual criminal and administrative authorities to
address gang crime with the twofold approach of criminal prosecution
and deportation.
For these federal law enforcement agencies, enforcement of gang-related
crimes competes for resources with agencies' other program areas, such
as counterterrorism, illegal-drug and firearms trafficking, white
collar crime, and public corruption. For example, the FBI investigation
of gang crime is part of two FBI priorities; major thefts and violent
crime, and combating transnational and criminal organizations and
enterprises, FBI's tenth and sixth ranked priorities, respectively.
FBI, ICE, and DEA are the three federal law enforcement agencies that
specifically track agent time dedicated to gang enforcement
efforts.[Footnote 15] These federal agencies have dedicated a
relatively small portion of overall agent resources to anti-gang
efforts, but these resource levels have increased since fiscal year
2003. For example, according to FBI data, agent full time equivalents
(FTEs) spent on anti-gang efforts ranged from a low of 4.1 percent of
total agent FTEs in fiscal year 2003 to a high of 7.7 percent of total
agent FTEs in fiscal year 2008. Figure 2 summarizes FBI FTEs on anti-
gang efforts and all investigative activities from fiscal year 2003 to
fiscal year 2008.
Figure 2: FBI Agent FTEs on Anti-Gang Efforts and All Investigative
Activities (Fiscal Years 2003 to 2008):
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2003;
Agent FTEs on Anti-Gang efforts: 409;
Agent FTEs on all investigative activities: 9,991;
Total Agent FTEs: 10,400.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Agent FTEs on Anti-Gang efforts: 458;
Agent FTEs on all investigative activities: 10,073;
Total Agent FTEs: 10,531.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Agent FTEs on Anti-Gang efforts: 519;
Agent FTEs on all investigative activities: 10,686;
Total Agent FTEs: 11,205.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Agent FTEs on Anti-Gang efforts: 678;
Agent FTEs on all investigative activities: 10,997;
Total Agent FTEs: 11,675.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Agent FTEs on Anti-Gang efforts: 725;
Agent FTEs on all investigative activities: 10,530;
Total Agent FTEs: 11,255.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Agent FTEs on Anti-Gang efforts: 944;
Agent FTEs on all investigative activities: 12,283;
Total Agent FTEs: 13,227.
Source: FBI data.
[End of figure]
As shown in figure 3, DEA's agent FTEs on anti-gang efforts are a
relatively small portion of overall agents FTEs, but have increased
from 161 in fiscal year 2003 to 225 in fiscal year 2008.
Figure 3: DEA Agent FTEs on Anti-Gang Efforts and All Investigative
Activities (Fiscal Years 2003 to 2008):
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2003;
Agent FTEs on Anti-Gang efforts: 161;
Agent FTEs on all investigative activities: 2,777;
Total Agent FTEs: 2,938.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Agent FTEs on Anti-Gang efforts: 163;
Agent FTEs on all investigative activities: 2,942;
Total Agent FTEs: 3,105.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Agent FTEs on Anti-Gang efforts: 211;
Agent FTEs on all investigative activities: 3,388;
Total Agent FTEs: 3,599.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Agent FTEs on Anti-Gang efforts: 281;
Agent FTEs on all investigative activities: 3,561;
Total Agent FTEs: 3,842.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Agent FTEs on Anti-Gang efforts: 300;
Agent FTEs on all investigative activities: 3,591;
Total Agent FTEs: 3,891.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Agent FTEs on Anti-Gang efforts: 225;
Agent FTEs on all investigative activities: 3,487;
Total Agent FTEs: 3,712.
Source: DEA data.
[End of figure]
The chief of the Gang Unit for DOJ's Criminal Division said that
federal law enforcement agencies are spending more time on gang-related
investigations now than they did several years ago because (1) agencies
have been able to hire additional agents for counter-terrorism
investigations, so agents who were diverted from criminal
investigations to counter-terrorism immediately after the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, are returning to criminal investigations
and (2) the prior administration and Congress had an interest in
expanding the federal role on addressing violent crime and supporting
anti-gang efforts, so federal law enforcement agencies responded by
placing an increased emphasis in these areas. At this point, it is too
early to tell what impact, if any, these additional resources would
have on gang enforcement efforts.
DOJ and DHS Have Established Headquarters-Level Entities to Coordinate
and Share Information on Gang Enforcement Efforts, but Have Not
Differentiated Entities' Roles and Responsibilities:
Since 2004, at the headquarters level, DOJ has established several
entities to coordinate and share information on gangs and gang
enforcement efforts across department and agency boundaries. As shown
in table 1, these entities include the Gang Unit; the National Gang
Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination Center (GangTECC); the
National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC); the Anti-Gang Coordination
Committee; and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) National Gang Task
Force.[Footnote 16] These entities have different roles and
responsibilities, but in general, they serve as mechanisms for
deconflicting cases, providing law enforcement agencies with
information on gangs and gang activities, and coordinating
participating agencies' strategies and task forces.
Table 1: Headquarters Level Entities Focused on Coordination of Anti-
Gang Efforts:
Entity: Gang Unit;
Year established: 2006;
Lead agency or office: DOJ Criminal Division;
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ Criminal Division;
Staff: 12 prosecutors;
Coordination/information sharing role: Coordinate with local U.S.
Attorneys' Offices on legal issues and multi-district gang cases and
work with law enforcement agencies to achieve coordinated prevention
and enforcement strategies.
Entity: GangTECC;
Year established: 2006;
Lead agency or office: DOJ Criminal Division;
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ: FBI, DEA, ATF, Bureau of
Prisons (BOP), USMS, and Criminal Division; DHS: ICE;
Staff: About 14, including a director, deputy director, and agents
detailed from participating agencies;
Coordination/information sharing role: Coordinate and deconflict
overlapping gang-related investigations and prosecutions and serve as a
coordinating center for multi-jurisdictional gang investigations.
Entity: Anti-Gang Coordination Committee;
Year established: 2006;
Lead agency or office: DOJ Office of; Deputy Attorney General;
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ: FBI, ATF, USMS, DEA, BOP,
EOUSA, BJA, OJJDP, National Drug Intelligence Center, Civil Rights
Division, Criminal Division, Office of Legal Policy, Budget Office,
Office of Legislative Affairs, Office of Public Affairs, Justice
Management Division, Office of Justice Programs, Attorney General's
Advisory Committee, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Tax
Division, GangTECC, NGIC, and NIJ; DHS: ICE, CBP; U.S. Department of
Treasury: Internal Revenue Service;
Staff: None;
Coordination/information sharing role: Organize DOJ's efforts to combat
gangs, including to provide recommendations to the Deputy Attorney
General on all matters relating to anti-gang activities, review
applications for funds for gang-related task forces from U.S. Attorneys
and approve creation of violent crime task forces around the country.
Entity: NGIC;
Year established: 2005;
Lead agency or office: FBI;
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ: FBI, DEA, ATF, USMS, BOP, and
National Drug Intelligence Center; DHS: ICE, CBP; U.S. Department of
Defense: National Guard;
Staff: About 22, including a director, two deputy directors, 13 FBI
intelligence analysts, and at least one analyst detailed from each
participating agency;
Coordination/information sharing role: Provide law enforcement agencies
with information and analysis of federal, state, and local law
enforcement intelligence focusing on gangs that pose a significant
threat to U.S. communities.
Entity: MS-13 National Gang Task Force;
Year established: 2004;
Lead agency or office: FBI;
Participating agencies and offices: DOJ: FBI; DHS: No participating
agencies;
Staff: Supervisor, 4 FBI supervisory special agents, and 6 FBI
analysts;
Coordination/information sharing role: Coordinate the development of
local, state, federal, and multi-jurisdictional FBI investigations of
MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, including transnational investigations,
into national level investigations and prosecutions.
Source: GAO analysis of DOJ and DHS information.
[End of table]
These entities provide DOJ and DHS with a means to operate across
agency boundaries. For example, according to the Office of the Deputy
Attorney General, GangTECC has provided an avenue through which
participating agencies share information to help facilitate
communication among participating agencies at the headquarters level.
NGIC has worked to provide law enforcement agencies with information
and analysis of federal, state, and local law enforcement intelligence
focusing on gangs that pose a significant threat to U.S. communities,
including information on the growth, migration, criminal activity, and
structure of gangs. NGIC has helped to facilitate information sharing
on gang-related issues by, for example, issuing intelligence bulletins
to law enforcement agencies.
Our work on effective interagency collaboration has shown that when
multiple agencies are working to address aspects of the same problem,
there is a risk that overlap or fragmentation among programs can waste
scarce funds, confuse and frustrate program customers or stakeholders,
and limit overall program effectiveness.[Footnote 17] Collaborating
agencies should work together to define and agree on their respective
roles and responsibilities and can use a number of possible mechanisms,
such as memoranda of understanding, to clarify who will do what,
organize joint and individual efforts, and facilitate information
sharing. The headquarters-level anti-gang entities have defined their
individual roles and responsibilities. Although some overlaps in
mission may be appropriate to help reduce gaps, these entities have not
yet clearly identified their differentiated roles and responsibilities,
resulting in possible gaps or unnecessary overlap in agencies'
coordination and sharing of information on gang enforcement efforts.
Examples include:
* The purpose of GangTECC is to allow participating agencies including
ICE to access and use each respective agency's gang intelligence, allow
immediate access to operational information in a collocated environment
and provide a national deconfliction center for gang operations.
Although the roles and participation by DOJ and its component agencies
in GangTECC were specified by the Deputy Attorney General in a July
2006 memorandum establishing GangTECC, as well as in the GangTECC
Concept of Operations, GangTECC and ICE have not yet documented ICE's
participation in the center. ICE's participation has varied since
GangTECC's inception. According to the head of ICE's National Gang
Unit, in the past ICE's representative to GangTECC was engaged with
other responsibilities at ICE headquarters, which periodically impacted
the amount of time that the representative spent at GangTECC. However,
the head of the National Gang Unit said that ICE's representative is
assigned to GangTECC on a full-time basis. ICE officials said that they
are willing to work with other GangTECC officials to develop a
memorandum of understanding that documents ICE's role and participation
in the center but had not yet done so at the conclusion of our audit
work.
* Establishment of task forces at the field office level has not always
been fully coordinated with ICE. Specifically, according to Anti-Gang
Coordination Committee guidance, concurrence for each new gang or
violent crime task force at the field office level is to be obtained by
representatives of FBI, ATF, DEA, USMS, ICE, and the local USAO, as
well as local or state police departments. The Anti-Gang Coordination
Committee gives final approval to DOJ law enforcement agencies for
establishing new anti-gang task forces in field locations.[Footnote 18]
According to the Chief of the Gang Unit, this process for establishing
new task forces in field locations helps to reduce task force overlap
and duplication of effort. However, ICE did not have the opportunity to
provide its concurrence for the creation of all recently approved task
forces, making it difficult for the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee to
ensure that there are no unnecessary overlaps in the creation or
mission of task forces. Our review of the approval process for eight
task forces authorized by the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee from
January 2008 through June 2008 found that ICE's concurrence was not
obtained in three instances.[Footnote 19] Moreover, ICE is not
represented on the Task Force Subcommittee of the Anti-Gang
Coordination Committee, which, on behalf of the committee, reviews and
provides recommendations concerning new task force
applications.[Footnote 20] DOJ officials said that no Memorandum of
Understanding or other document outlines ICE's participation in the
process for approving task forces.
* GangTECC and the MS-13 National Gang Task Force have overlapping
missions and responsibilities for coordination and deconfliction of
multi-jurisdictional investigations involving the MS-13 and 18th Street
gangs. The two entities have these overlaps in part because the MS-13
Task Force already existed when GangTECC was established in 2006 and
was not dismantled or folded into GangTECC at that time. The two
entities differ in that GangTECC has participants from ATF, DEA, ICE,
FBI, USMS, and other DOJ and DHS components and has responsibility for
coordinating multi-jurisdictional investigations of all gangs except
FBI-led investigations involving the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs. The
MS-13 National Gang Task Force, on the other hand, has only FBI
participants and is responsible for coordinating FBI's multi-
jurisdictional investigations involving MS-13 and 18th Street gangs. As
a result, both entities coordinate some multi-jurisdictional MS-13 and
18th Street gang investigations and risk unnecessary federal resource
expenditures to fund two entities when a single group could be more
efficient. The GangTECC and MS-13 Task Force Directors acknowledged
that there is overlap between the missions and responsibilities of the
two entities, and the chief of the DOJ Criminal Division's Gang Unit
also noted that the two entities have overlapping jurisdictions and no
formal coordination mechanisms. The Directors stated that the two
entities do share information about the gangs and were co-located to
encourage that interaction. Moreover, the director of GangTECC said he
had invited representatives of the MS-13 National Gang Task Force to
participate in meetings. As the invitation had been extended just prior
to the conclusion of our audit work, we were not able to assess the
level of participation. The Directors also said that while there is
mission overlap, it has not jeopardized investigations or law
enforcement operations. Nevertheless, the rationale for why two
separate entities are needed is unclear. For example, the Criminal
Division chief said that if DOJ were starting from scratch in creating
a structure for coordinating federal anti-gang investigations, the
department would not have the structure that currently exists because
of the potential for this overlap. While the overlap may not have
interfered with investigations or operations to date, it is not clear
that this is the most efficient and effective use of federal resources.
Articulating and differentiating among roles, responsibilities, and
missions of headquarters-level anti-gang entities and ensuring ICE's
full participation in authorizing anti-gang task forces would help to
identify gaps or overlaps among the entities and participating agencies
and help to increase the understanding of federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies of each of the entities' mission and goals. In
addition, such action would strengthen these headquarters-level
coordination efforts to help to ensure that they are not unnecessarily
expending resources on overlapping missions.
In Localities We Visited Agencies Cited Benefits to Coordinating
Federal Anti-Gang Efforts Primarily through Taskforces:
At the field level, federal law enforcement agencies primarily conduct
and coordinate their gang enforcement efforts through task forces.
Examples include:
* The FBI's Violent Gang Safe Street Task Forces were established in
1992 to serve as long-term and coordinated teams of federal, state, and
local law enforcement officers and prosecutors. These task forces focus
on disrupting and dismantling the most violent and criminally active
gang threats in the United States. According to the FBI, as of April
2009, 144 Safe Streets Taskforces were operating in locations across
the country.
* ATF's Violent Crime Impact Teams were established in 2004 through
partnerships with other state and local agencies to reduce firearms-
related violent crime including violent gang crime in small, geographic
areas experiencing an increase in violent crime. As of April 2009, 31
Violent Crime Impact Teams were operating in locations across the
country, according to ATF.
* DEA's Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) program was established in 1995
to address the spread of drug trafficking and associated violent crime
in urban and rural areas. Due to budgetary constraints, the MET program
was temporarily suspended in June 2007, however, in January 2008,
Congress directed DEA to use appropriated funds to continue the MET
program.[Footnote 21] At that time, DEA also made MET investigations
targeting the drug trafficking activities of criminal street gangs and
criminal organizations that supply them a priority. Teams of eight
agents each operate in ten DEA field divisions nationwide, according to
DEA.[Footnote 22]
* USMS' fugitive task force program and other initiatives such as
Operation FALCON (Federal and Local Cops Organized Nationally) target
fugitive gang members. Additionally, USMS coordinates a "Most Wanted
Gang Members" list through GangTECC.
* ICE works with state and local law enforcement agencies in conducting
its gang enforcement activities under its anti-gang initiative called
Operation Community Shield.[Footnote 23] Under this initiative,
investigations focus on transnational street gangs, gangs whose members
are subject to ICE's immigration and customs authorities because the
members are foreign born and/or in the country illegally or have been
involved in crimes with a nexus to the U.S. borders (i.e. narcotics
trafficking and human trafficking). ICE investigations also focus on
gangs operating in the United States and abroad as complex organized
criminal organizations.
At the field division level, many officials from federal, state, and
local law enforcement offices cited benefits to coordinating federal
anti-gang efforts primarily through task forces and were generally
satisfied that the task force approach resulted in collaboration and
information sharing among the various law enforcement entities. These
officials provided examples of how these taskforces provide avenues
through which federal, state, and local agencies can directly share
resources and partner in conducting gang investigations, as noted
below:
* Ten of the twenty local police chiefs or supervisors of gang units
that we interviewed said that federally-led taskforces have resources
to pay informants, conduct wiretaps, and purchase vehicles for
surveillance and undercover operations; among other resources which
state and local law enforcement agencies often do not have, or the
officials noted that local law enforcement officers assigned to
federally-led taskforces have better access to technology and new
investigative techniques than officers not assigned to task forces. Use
of these investigative tools and equipment allow state and local
agencies to work with federal agencies in conducting investigations
that target gangs as criminal enterprises, types of cases which state
and local agencies would generally not be able to conduct in the
absence of federal resources and assistance.
Officials also provided examples of how task forces provide
opportunities for direct information and intelligence sharing among
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, as noted below:
* Four of the twenty local law enforcement officials said that one of
the primary benefits to their agencies participating in federally led
task forces is access to information and intelligence on gangs. State
and local officers assigned to federally led task forces benefit by
learning new investigative techniques that they, in turn, can share
with other local law enforcement officers.
* In nineteen of the thirty four federal law enforcement field division
offices we visited, supervisory agents noted that their task forces
also benefited from state and local police officers' intimate knowledge
of the gang problems in their local communities.
In addition to these benefits, several officials identified a challenge
to the task force structure that they work to overcome. In some cases,
federal, state, and local agencies that participate in task forces may
have differing priorities and interests for gang enforcement
activities. For example, supervisors at two FBI field divisions said
that the FBI focuses on long-term gang investigations designed to
eliminate entire gangs. In contrast, they said that state and local law
enforcement agencies tend to focus on efforts to help reduce gang crime
and violence in the short-term and look for short-term results for
their communities. Consequently, the officials said that state and
local law enforcement agencies are sometimes reluctant to dedicate
resources to support the long-term investigations, but that these
issues are worked through jointly by federal and local agencies
involved in the task force.
In addition to task forces, interviewees in the localities we visited
described other mechanisms or tools for deconflicting law enforcement
actions, sharing information, and coordinating gang enforcement
activities with one another. In areas of the country identified by the
White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) as high
intensity drug trafficking areas (HIDTA), including New York City,
Chicago, and Los Angeles, the HIDTAs monitored law enforcement
activities including anti-gang operations to deconflict and coordinate
across law enforcement agencies. In Richmond, Virginia, federal, state,
and local agencies met regularly to deconflict cases and discuss anti-
gang initiatives through a Cooperative Violence Reduction Partnership,
which was created and chaired by the Richmond Chief of Police.
Similarly, in Tampa, Florida, the Hillsborough County Sheriff's
Department and the Tampa Police Department co-chair of a Multi-Area
Gang Task Force composed of representatives of 60 law enforcement
agencies, including local, state and county police departments, FBI,
ATF, and ICE. The task force participants share intelligence at monthly
meetings and support one another in major anti-gang operations.
The USAOs also have responsibilities for coordinating anti-gang efforts
in their districts. For example, each of the 15 USAOs we visited had
complied with DOJ requirements to appoint an Anti-Gang Coordinator for
the district to help formulate the anti-gang strategies for their
districts. The Anti-Gang Coordinators implement training opportunities
for prosecutors and law enforcement agents and officers, act as
liaisons for the USAO on gang-related cases with prosecutors from other
offices as well as law enforcement officers and agents, and are
proactively involved in developing strategies for investigating and
prosecuting gang members with violent criminal behavior. Each USAO we
visited had also completed a districtwide anti-gang strategy, as
required by the Attorney General in 2005. According to guidance from
the Attorney General, USAOs were to consult with federal, state, and
local law enforcement; social service organizations; and community and
faith-based groups in their district to develop the strategies. They
included a description of the gang problem in each district; a
description of how agencies within the district were responding or
planned to respond to the problem; a description of whether the
district has a specific gang unit or the resources being used to
investigate and prosecute gangs; a description of the roles played by
state and local law enforcement agencies in combating gangs; and any
suggestions on how DOJ could more effectively address the gang problem
on a local or national level. Anti-Gang Coordinators are required to
prepare annual reports on the district's anti-gang strategy, which are
submitted to EOUSA and then provided to the Deputy Attorney General who
informs the Attorney General of anti-gang activities throughout the
nation. The reports are used to identify best practices, which are
discussed at national conferences and informally among prosecutors.
Federal Agencies Have Measures for Gang Enforcement Efforts, but Lack a
Common Definition of "Gang" and a DOJ Departmentwide Performance
Measure:
Federal agencies have developed and used measures to assess their gang
enforcement efforts, but they lack a common or shared definition for
"gang," hindering their efforts to measure and report on gangs, gang
crime, and enforcement activities. While DOJ has emphasized strategies
for combating gangs as a part of its strategic objective to reduce
violent crime, the department lacks a departmentwide performance
measure for its anti-gang efforts. DOJ and DHS law enforcement agencies
measure their gang crime enforcement efforts by counting outputs such
as gang activities disrupted, arrests made, and enforcement activities
conducted. However, U.S. Attorneys have underreported their efforts in
prosecuting gang-related cases as well as the amount of time spent
working on gang-related cases. EOUSA has taken steps to improve
reporting on gang enforcement efforts. For example, as a result of our
review and in following up on its 2006 guidance on reporting case and
time management information on "gang-related" activities, the EOUSA
Director issued guidance to USAOs in February 2009 noting the
underreporting of gang cases and gang-related work time, and
reinforcing the importance of tracking anti-gang activities.
Lack of a Shared Definition for Gangs Hinders Measurement of Gang Crime
Enforcement across Federal Departments and Agencies:
Gangs vary in size, ethnic composition, membership, and organizational
structure, which makes it challenging to develop a uniform definition
of "gang." Federal law enforcement agencies have developed and used
different working definitions of a "gang" and other associated terms,
such as "gang-related." However, these agencies lack a common or shared
definition for "gang" and related terms, hindering federal agencies'
efforts to accurately measure and report on gangs, gang crime, and
enforcement activities.
Our prior work on performance management and measurement practices for
entities involved in implementing crosscutting programs has shown that
establishing common definitions can help to ensure that data used for
common purposes or assessing performance is, among other things,
consistently defined and interpreted.[Footnote 24] For example, we
noted that a broadly accepted definition of "homeland security" did not
exist and that some officials believed it was essential that the
concept and related terms be defined, particularly because homeland
security initiatives are crosscutting, and a clear definition promotes
a common understanding of operational plans and requirements, and can
help avoid duplication of effort and gaps in coverage. Common
definitions promote more effective agency and intergovernmental
operations and permit more accurate monitoring of homeland security
expenditures at all levels of government.[Footnote 25]
With respect to the definition of "gang," DOJ and its components have
discussed needs and possibilities for developing a common or shared
definition for gangs in terms of numbers of members and organizational
characteristics, but have not yet reached consensus on such a shared
definition. DOJ developed a working definition of a "gang" as a group
or association of three or more persons who may have a common
identifying sign, symbol, or name and who are involved in criminal
activity which creates an atmosphere of fear and intimidation. The DOJ
definition is used by its component agencies such as ATF and FBI. ICE's
working definition of a gang also specifies that three or more persons
must be involved in criminal activity; however, ICE's definition
requires that a gang crime be an ongoing pattern of criminal activity
committed on two or more separate occasions. These working definitions
are also distinct from a provision of federal law, which, for specified
purposes, defines a criminal street gang as "an ongoing group, club,
organization, or association of five or more persons that has as one of
its primary purposes the commission of one or more of the described
criminal offenses; the members of which engage, or have engaged within
the past 5 years, in a continuing series of described offenses; and the
activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce.[Footnote 26]
According to the FBI's National Gang Strategy, a universal definition
for a "gang" would facilitate intelligence collection and sharing,
target selection, prosecution, and overall program management. The DOJ
Criminal Division Gang Unit Chief recognized that having a standard
definition of "gang" across agencies and departments would result in
better statistics on how agencies are performing on gang-related
criminal investigations. Other DOJ components also identified negative
impacts resulting from the absence of a shared definition. For example,
in its 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment, DOJ reported that one of
the greatest impediments to the collection of accurate gang-related
data was the lack of a national uniform definition of a gang used by
all federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. EOUSA officials
also said that lack of consistent definitions of "gang member" and
"gang-related crime" contributed to underreporting of gang-related
cases by USAOs; therefore, EOUSA may not have complete data on its gang-
related cases. Given the lack of a common definition, federal agencies
do not have consistent and comprehensive data on the scope of the gang
problem and the resources allocated to anti-gang efforts.
According to DOJ and DHS agencies, lack of a shared definition of
"gang" and related terms stems, in part, from headquarters-level
coordination entities not attempting to reach consensus on how to use
the term, and DOJ's desire to provide agencies with flexibility in
defining gangs. Agency officials said lack of a common definition did
not adversely affect law enforcement activity. According to the Chief
of the Gang Unit, agencies have not attempted to reach a consensus on a
shared definition of "gang" because, while consistent use of the term
would improve the quality of information available on federal efforts
to combat gang violence, it would not make a difference in the cases
investigated and prosecuted by federal agencies. For example, this
official noted that a consistent definition of "gang" has no impact on
U.S. Attorneys' decisions to prosecute cases nor on the charges brought
against gang-related defendants. Although lack of a common definition
for "gang," may not negatively affect gang investigations and
prosecutions, the absence of a common or shared definition for "gang"
and related terms makes it difficult for federal agencies to completely
and accurately report on gang-related data.
DOJ Lacks a Departmentwide Performance Measure for Anti-Gang Efforts:
At the department level, DOJ lacks a performance measure for anti-gang
efforts.[Footnote 27] Congress enacted the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)[Footnote 28] to have agencies focus on the
performance and results of programs, rather than on program resources
and activities. The principles of the act include establishing
measurable goals and related measures, developing strategies for
achieving results, and identifying the resources that will be required
to achieve the goals. GPRA requires federal agencies to develop
strategic plans and performance goals and to identify resources needed
to achieve them, as well as for agencies to develop performance
measures to use in assessing the relevant outputs, service levels, and
outcomes of each program activity. The act does not require agencies to
use these principles for individual programs, but our related work and
the experience of leading organizations have shown that the principles
are the basic underpinning for performance-based management--a means to
strengthen program performance. Performance measures help federal
agencies to assess progress made on anti-gang efforts over time and
provide decision makers with key data to facilitate the resource
allocation process.
One of the three strategic goals in DOJ's fiscal year 2007 to 2012
strategic plan is the goal to "prevent crime, enforce federal laws and
represent the rights and interests of the American people." A strategic
objective under this goal is to "reduce the threat, incidence, and
prevalence of violent crime." As shown in figure 4, associated with
this strategic objective are various strategies, four of which are
directly related to anti-gang efforts.
Figure 4: DOJ's Fiscal Year 2007 to 2012 Strategic Plan Includes Anti-
Gang Strategies but Lacks a Gang-Specific Performance Measure:
[Refer to PDF for image: table]
DOJ Strategic Goals/Prevention Measures:
I. Prevent Terrorism and Promote the Nation‘s Security.
II. Prevent Crime, Enforce Federal Laws, and Represent the Rights and
Interests of the American People:
Performance Measures:
* Number of organized criminal enterprises dismantled;
* Number of child pornography Web sites or Web hosts shut down;
* Percentage of firearms investigations resulting in a referral for
criminal prosecution;
* DOJ‘s reduction in the supply of drugs available for consumption in
the U.S.
* Number of disruptions and dismantlements of Consolidated Priority
Organizations Target-linked drug trafficking organizations;
* Number of high-impact Internet fraud targets neutralized;
* Number of criminal enterprises engaging in white collar crime
dismantled;
* Percentage of cases favorably resolved;
* Percentage of Assets/Funds returned to creditors;
* Homicides per site;
* Percentage reduction in DNA backlog;
* Percentage of children recovered within 72 hours of an issuance of an
AMBER alert.
Strategic Objective: Reduce the Threat, Incidence, and Prevalence of
Violent Crime:
Strategies:
* Combat gun violence through Project Safe Neighborhoods;
* Implement a comprehensive anti-gang strategy;
* Target, investigate, and prosecute the most violent street gangs in
our cities and communities;
* Deploy the National Gang Targeting, Enforcement, and Coordination
Center to disrupt and dismantle violent gangs in the United States that
threaten national security, border protection, and public safety;
* Deploy Violent Crime Impact Teams to combat violent crime;
* Vigorously prosecute organized crime and racketeering;
* Provide operational enforcement assistance and training to tribal
governments;
* Enforce regulatory requirements for firearms and explosives;
* Provide technical assistance and support to law enforcement partners
to fight violent crime;
* Prevent violent crime in the United States by reducing international
violent crime.
III. Ensure the Fair and Efficient Administration of Justice.
Source: GAO analysis of DOJ‘s fiscal year 2007-2012 strategic plan.
[End of figure]
While DOJ has outlined a number of departmentwide performance measures
under the strategic goal, none relate specifically to gangs. DOJ
undertook a process to identify long-term, measurable goals (key
indicators) that would show, at a high level, progress toward meeting
the department's strategic goals and objectives. Such measures are
departmentwide in nature as they represent priority areas for DOJ, and
are reflected in DOJ's strategic plan, as well as other GPRA-related
documents such as the performance and accountability report. According
to DOJ, anti-gang efforts are folded into several of the performance
measures, including disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking
organizations and reducing the supply of drugs available for
consumption in the United States. Given that efforts to address gangs
have been a major part of DOJ's overall approach to combating violent
crime, the lack of a departmentwide performance measure or measures
focused specifically on anti-gang efforts makes it difficult for the
department and Congress to assess the effectiveness of the department's
overall anti-gang effort.
DOJ and DHS Law Enforcement Agencies Have Established Measures to
Assess Their Anti-Gang Efforts, and Outputs Measured Have Generally
Increased since Fiscal Year 2003:
It can be difficult for law enforcement agencies to measure outcomes or
results of their law enforcement efforts, including anti-gang efforts.
Trying to isolate the effects of federal law enforcement efforts from
other factors that affect outcomes but over which DOJ has little or no
control presents a formidable challenge because many factors contribute
to the rise and fall of crime rates including federal, state, local,
and tribal law enforcement activities and sociological, economic, and
other factors. DOJ and DHS law enforcement agencies have established
output measures, such as numbers of arrests and convictions, for
assessing their gang crime enforcement efforts. Outputs provide status
information about an initiative or program in terms of completing an
action in a specified time frame. For example, the FBI uses disruptions
and dismantlements as its primary gang enforcement measures[Footnote
29] and also reports on gang-related convictions. Among other things,
ATF collects and reports information on gang-related convictions, and
DEA and ICE collect and report information on gang-related
arrests.[Footnote 30] USAOs collect information on gang-related cases
filed and gang-related defendants.
Since fiscal year 2003, federal law enforcement agencies' gang-related
measures have generally increased. DOJ and DHS officials attributed
these increases to the allocation of additional resources for anti-gang
efforts over the past few years. As shown in figure 5, since fiscal
year 2003, the number of FBI gang-related disruptions has increased
from 166 to 716 in fiscal year 2008.
Figure 5: FBI Gang-Related Disruptions (Fiscal Years 2003 to 2008):
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2003;
Disruptions: 166.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Disruptions: 299.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Disruptions: 465.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Disruptions: 509.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Disruptions: 463.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Disruptions: 716.
Source: FBI data.
[End of figure]
As shown in figure 6, the number of FBI gang-related dismantlements has
remained fairly constant over the 6 years from fiscal year 2003 to
fiscal year 2008, ranging from a high of 67 dismantlements reported in
fiscal year 2006 to a low of 40 dismantlements reported in fiscal year
2004.
Figure 6: FBI Gang-Related Dismantlements (Fiscal Years 2003 to 2008):
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2003;
Gang-Related Dismantlements: 46.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Gang-Related Dismantlements: 40.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Gang-Related Dismantlements: 65.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Gang-Related Dismantlements: 67.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Gang-Related Dismantlements: 66.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Gang-Related Dismantlements: 59.
Source: FBI data.
[End of figure]
In addition, FBI reports on gang-related convictions. From fiscal year
2003 through 2008, the FBI reported gang-related convictions that
ranged from a high of 2,762 in fiscal year 2008 to a low of 1,690 in
fiscal year 2005.
Among other gang-related measures, ATF also reports the number of gang-
related convictions by fiscal year. As shown in figure 7, since fiscal
year 2003, the number of convictions has generally increased each year,
and the number of gang-related convictions in fiscal year 2008 was
about 5 times the number of such convictions in fiscal year 2003.
Figure 7: ATF Gang-Related Convictions (Fiscal Years 2003 to 2008):
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2003;
Gang related convictions: 417.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Gang related convictions: 679.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Gang related convictions: 1,199.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Gang related convictions: 1,680.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Gang related convictions: 2,142.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Gang related convictions: 2,130.
Source: ATF data.
[End of figure]
As shown in figure 8, DEA reported number of gang-related arrests have
also increased slightly from 1,823 in fiscal year 2003 to 2,038 in
fiscal year 2008, but were at their highest level over the 6-year
period in fiscal year 2006.
Figure 8: DEA Gang-Related Arrests (Fiscal Years 2003 to 2008):
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2003;
Arrests: 1,823.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Arrests: 1,627.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Arrests: 1,988.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Arrests: 2,783.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Arrests: 2,448.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Arrests: 2,038.
Source: DEA data.
[End of figure]
Among other gang-related measures, ICE reports on the number of gang-
related criminal and administrative arrests by fiscal year.[Footnote
31] As shown in figure 9, the number of criminal and administrative
gang-related arrests made by ICE has increased since fiscal year 2006,
the first full fiscal year that it compiled this information.
Figure 9: ICE Gang-Related Arrests (Fiscal Years 2006 to 2008):
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2006;
Gang related criminal arrests: 647;
Gang-related administrative arrests: 1,988.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Gang related criminal arrests: 1,442;
Gang-related administrative arrests: 1,860.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Gang related criminal arrests: 1,654;
Gang-related administrative arrests: 2,211.
Source: ICE data.
[End of figure]
Underreporting of U.S. Attorneys' Gang-Related Case and Time Management
Information Has Resulted in Inaccurate Measurement of Federal Gang
Enforcement Efforts, but EOUSA Has Taken Action to Improve Reporting:
According to EOUSA officials, USAOs have underreported the number of
gang-related cases their offices handle and the amount of time they
spend working on these gang-related cases. For fiscal year 2008, EOUSA
data showed 536 cases filed in which a gang member had a participating
role, a number that officials said they believe underreports the extent
to which USAOs were prosecuting gang-related crimes. In 2006, EOUSA
issued guidance to USAO personnel for them to record information in
National Legal Information Office Network System (LIONS) and U.S.
Attorney-5 (USA-5) systems on numbers of gang-related cases and matters
and time spent working on gang-related cases and matters to assist in
tracking resources and outputs for gang enforcement efforts. LIONS is
the centralized computer database used by USAOs and managed by EOUSA to
prepare annual statistical reports on the activities of the U.S.
Attorneys by types of cases opened, pending, and closed. USAO personnel
use the USA-5 system for time management, and EOUSA uses the system to
analyze and help manage assignment of resources to priority crime areas
such as counter-terrorism, narcotics, and organized crime.
EOUSA officials said that improvements to the data collection are
needed. A 2008 DOJ Office of Inspector General report found that
caseload and time management concerns contributed to reliance by EOUSA
on incomplete and inaccurate data to determine resource needs, allocate
positions, and respond to inquiries from Congress and other interested
parties.[Footnote 32] EOUSA officials identified three key challenges
that impact the reliability of all case and time management
information. First, because every attorney and support person in USAOs
enters data into the information systems, the potential for errors and
omissions is great. Second, the systems have become more complex to use
as additional codes are created to record information on cases and time
spent on various activities to respond to congressional interest, DOJ
priorities, and audits. Third, attorneys, historically, have not viewed
data entry as a priority, so they have not always been diligent about
being sure that it is done correctly. With regard to collecting data
specifically on gang-related cases, EOUSA officials identified other
specific challenges. For example, extra data entry steps are required
to enter information on gangs into LIONS and USA-5 beyond those steps
required for inputting general case information to the systems.
[Footnote 33] Moreover, attorneys may not determine until after initial
information on a case is entered into LIONS that the case is gang-
related and then not go back into LIONS and revise the initial
information to show that defendants are gang-related. In addition,
EOUSA officials noted that attorneys do not have a common definition
for what constitutes a "gang" and "gang-related crime" that would allow
for consistent reporting.
EOUSA has taken steps to improve reporting on gang enforcement efforts.
As a result of our review and in following up on its 2006 guidance on
reporting case and time management information on "gang-related"
activities, the EOUSA Director issued guidance to USAOs in February
2009 noting the underreporting of gang cases and gang-related work time
in LIONS and USA-5, respectively, and reinforcing the importance of
providing accurate information on anti-gang activities in these
systems. In addition, EOUSA officials said that they continue to
provide training to USAO personnel on use of the information systems
and the importance of reporting complete and accurate information. Peer
reviews conducted at USAOs every 3 years also assess, among other
operations, the systems in place for entering information into LIONS
and USA-5. This February 2009 guidance and training for USAOs are
positive steps to help improve USAOs' collection and reporting of data
on gang-related cases. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government state that internal controls should generally be
designed to assure that ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of
normal operations.[Footnote 34] Given that USAOs have not consistently
and accurately entered data on gang-related cases into their case and
time management systems as required by EOUSA's 2006 guidance, in the
absence of periodic monitoring of USAOs' gang-related data, EOUSA
cannot be certain that USAOs have followed the guidance and accurately
recorded gang-related data.
DOJ Has Funded Grant Programs to Test Anti-Gang Models, but Evaluations
Have Reported Mixed Results in the Programs' Sustainability and
Contributions to Reductions in Crime:
DOJ anti-gang grants involve not only law enforcement efforts, but also
efforts focused on gang prevention, intervention, and re-entry support
for former gang members who are released from prison. DOJ, through
OJJDP, has provided grant funding to localities across the nation under
the Gang-Free Schools and Communities Program, Gang Reduction Program,
and the Gang Prevention Coordination Assistance Program primarily to
test models for communities to follow in implementing approaches for
addressing gang problems. DOJ, through, BJA, also provides grant
funding under the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative, which is the
largest current anti-gang program. Communities that received grants
from OJJDP and BJA had flexibility in determining how to allocate and
use grant funding and used the funding in support of different anti-
gang approaches and programs. Grant programs for which DOJ-sponsored
evaluations were completed reported mixed results for achieving
reductions in gang crime with benefits for grant recipients but little
evidence that the programs effectively reduced youth gang crime.
Sustainability of grant programs after federal funding ended has also
been a concern.
DOJ Has Supported Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Enforcement
Programs through Grant Programs That Emphasize Coordination and
Collaboration:
DOJ, the department with responsibility for administering anti-gang
grants, has pursued a strategy to assist communities in combating gang
crime that involves not only law enforcement efforts, but also efforts
to prevent young people from joining gangs, intervene and provide
alternatives to gang membership for youth who are gang-affiliated, and
offer support through re-entry activities for former gang members who
are released from prison and returning to their communities. In fiscal
year 2008, DOJ, through OJJDP and BJA, reported providing $14.9 million
for three grant programs specifically directed to combating gang
activity, and demonstration projects were still spending OJJDP funds
for two other anti-gang programs.[Footnote 35] Three of the current
grant programs--Gang Free Schools and Communities, Gang Reduction, and
Gang Prevention Coordination Assistance--are administered by OJJDP. The
other program, the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative, is administered
by BJA.[Footnote 36] In addition to allocating funding under these
discretionary grant programs, DOJ reported that it allocated about $8.1
million in fiscal year 2008 for specific anti-gang programs, as
directed by Congress. Grantees included cities, counties, law
enforcement agencies, and private organizations in locations across the
United States.
Officials of OJP noted many similarities in the grant initiatives
funded by OJJDP and BJA. Most importantly, officials said, both models
emphasize coordination and collaboration among law enforcement and
social service agencies at the federal, state, and local levels, as
well as community and faith-based groups that are involved in anti-gang
efforts. However, the officials also noted differences between the
OJJDP and BJA grant programs. For example, BJA does not specifically
direct services to juveniles, and the BJA grant program has a component
to provide assistance to former gang members released from prison and
reentering their communities that was not present in the OJJDP grant
programs.
OJJDP Grants Tested a Communitywide Gang Program Model:
DOJ has provided grant funding to localities across the nation under
the Gang-Free Schools and Communities Program, Gang Reduction Program,
and the Gang Prevention Coordination Assistance Program primarily to
test models for communities to follow in implementing approaches for
addressing gang problems. Since the 1980's, OJJDP's anti-gang programs
for juveniles were demonstrations or tests of the Comprehensive
Community-Wide Gang Program Model developed by Irving Spergel, a
researcher and professor at the University of Chicago. This model was
based on the results of an assessment directed by Dr. Spergel and
funded by OJJDP beginning in 1987 and was first implemented in the
Little Village neighborhood of Chicago in 1993. To develop the model,
Dr. Spergel and his research team conducted a national survey to
attempt to identify every promising community gang program in the
United States and then identify the common elements that were essential
to each program's successes based on community representatives'
responses to the survey questions. The research team identified the
following five elements common to promising community gang programs
that became the comprehensive model:
* Community mobilization: Involvement of local citizens, including
former gang-involved youth; community groups; and agencies, as well as
coordination of programs and staff functions within and across
agencies.
* Opportunities provision: Development of a variety of specific
education, training, and employment programs targeting gang-involved
youth.
* Social intervention: Involvement of youth-serving agencies, schools,
faith-based organizations, police, and other juvenile and criminal
justice organizations in reaching out to gang-involved youth and their
families and linking them to needed services.
* Suppression: Use of procedures including close supervision and
monitoring of gang-involved youth by agencies of the juvenile and
criminal justice systems and also by community-based agencies, schools,
and other groups.
* Organizational change and development: Development and implementation
of policies and procedures that result in the most effective use of
available and potential resources, within and across agencies, to
better address the gang problem.[Footnote 37]
In 1995, OJJDP awarded funds to five competitively-selected sites that
demonstrated the capacity to implement the model and then, in 1999,
OJJDP funded a rural gang initiative to test the model in four rural
communities with growing gang problems.[Footnote 38] Evaluations of the
first five sites to demonstrate the model determined that, while
results varied from location to location, when properly implemented, a
combination of prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies was
successful in reducing the gang problem. A national evaluation of the
rural gang initiative was not completed because of staffing issues on
the evaluation team.
OJJDP continued to test the model with two of the three programs that
were funded as of January 2009. The Gang-Free Schools and Communities
Program began in 2000 and the Gang Reduction Program began in 2003. The
third program, the Gang Prevention Coordination Assistance Program, is
not an additional test of Dr. Spergel's Comprehensive Community-Wide
Gang Program Model. Rather, the program provides funds for
demonstration locations to hire a coordinator who will enhance the
coordination of existing community-based gang prevention and
intervention strategies that are closely aligned with local law
enforcement efforts. Table 2 provides information on these four anti-
gang programs that were currently funded as of January 2009.[Footnote
39]
Table 2: OJJDP Anti-Gang Grant Programs That Were Currently Funded as
of January 2009:
Anti-Gang demonstration grant program: Gang-Free Schools and
Communities;
Purpose: To build on accomplishments of anti-gang efforts since 1994,
increase knowledge about youth gangs, and demonstrate successful gang
prevention and intervention activities;
Status: As of March 2009, all grant funds were expended. Some
communities were continuing some aspects of the program with local
funding sources;
Funding: level: $1.05 million awarded to each pilot site in 2001. An
additional $205,000 for Houston, Tex. and Pittsburgh, Pa. in 2007;
Communities awarded funding: Gang-Free Communities was funded in six
communities: Broward County, Fla.; Lakewood, Wash.; East Los Angeles,
Calif.; Louisville, Ky.; San Francisco, Calif.; and Washington, D.C.;
Gang-Free Schools was funded in four other communities: East Cleveland,
Ohio; Houston, Tex., Miami/Dade County, Fla.; and Pittsburgh, Pa.
Anti-Gang demonstration grant program: Gang Reduction Program;
Purpose: To reduce gang activity in targeted communities by addressing
personal, family, and community factors with a relationship to juvenile
delinquency and gang involvement;
Status: The anticipated project end date for Richmond, VA; Los Angeles,
CA; and North Miami Beach, FL is September 30, 2009. Milwaukee, Wisc.
no longer receives grant funds;
Funding: level: $2.5 million awarded to each pilot site in 2003. An
additional $200,000 for Los Angles, Calif. and Richmond Va. in 2006;
Communities awarded funding: Richmond, Va; Los Angeles, Calif.;
Milwaukee, Wisc.; and North Miami Beach, Fla.
Anti-Gang demonstration grant program: Gang Prevention Coordination
Assistance Program;
Purpose: To facilitate coordination of community-based gang prevention
and intervention programs with local law enforcement by funding a
coordinator position;
Status: Funded beginning in fiscal year 2007;
Funding: level: $2.3 million awarded in fiscal year 2008. Grants
received ranged by community from about $169,000 to $200,000;
Communities awarded funding: Multiple locations. Twelve grant awards
made in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. In January 2009, OJJDP announced it
was seeking applications for fiscal year 2009 and would award 12 grants
of up to $200,000.
Source: GAO analysis of OJP data.
[End of table]
BJA's Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative Is the Largest Current Anti-
Gang Program:
The Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative administered by BJA is the
largest currently funded anti-gang program. The initiative was
announced in 2006 as an extension of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN),
which has the broader goal of reducing violent crime in communities.
[Footnote 40] The Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative was designed to
build on successes in the Project Safe Neighborhoods program by
stressing the importance of collaboration among federal, state, and
local law enforcement and community organizations. The initiative
provided grant funding to sites in the following three areas: (1) law
enforcement; (2) programs to prevent youth from joining gangs or
remaining affiliated with gangs; and (3) services for former gang
members re-entering the community after prison terms. Specifically,
each community awarded funds under the initiative received a total
grant of $2.5 million to be used over 3 years. Of the $2.5 million in
grant funding, $1 million was to be spent on law enforcement; $1
million on prevention and intervention activities; and $0.5 million to
create reentry assistance programs for transitional housing, job
readiness and placement assistance, and substance abuse and mental
health treatment to prisoners re-entering society. By incorporating
these three components into the grant program, DOJ intends to address
gang membership and gang violence at every stage. The following 12
locations received grant awards from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal
year 2008:
* Fiscal year 2006 grantees: Los Angeles, Calif.; Tampa, Fla.;
Milwaukee, Wisc.; Cleveland, Ohio; an area of Pennsylvania encompassing
communities from Easton to Lancaster, Pa.; and Dallas/Fort Worth, Tex.
* Fiscal year 2007 grantees: Oklahoma City, Okla.; Raleigh/Durham,
N.C.; Rochester, N.Y.; and Indianapolis, Ind.
* Fiscal year 2008 grantees: Chicago, Ill., and Detroit, Mich.
Communities Have Used Federal Anti-Gang Grants for Different Approaches
and Programs:
Communities that received grants from OJJDP and BJA had flexibility in
determining how to allocate and use grant funding and used the funding
in support of different anti-gang approaches and programs, including
intervention activities directed specifically to at-risk youth and
prevention activities designed to benefit a range of residents in the
targeted communities. Examples of activities initiated by OJJDP-funded
communities in locations we visited include:
* A summer program with activities for youth and families at city parks
that stayed open until midnight--Los Angeles, Calif.
* A full range of services for gang-affiliated offenders who had been
incarcerated and were returning to the community. Services available
included training in adult literacy and anger management, substance
abuse prevention, housing assistance, and job placement--Dallas, Tex.
* Parenting classes and prenatal and infant health care services--
Richmond, VA:
* Youth mentoring programs--Durham, N.C.
The way communities chose to distribute grant funds also differed. Some
communities chose to distribute a larger amount of funds to a small
number of subgrantees and participants, whereas other communities chose
to distribute smaller funding amounts to a larger number of sub-
grantees and/or serve large numbers of people. Officials in Pittsburgh,
Pa., and Richmond, Va., who participated in OJJDP's Gang-Free Schools
and Communities Program and the Gang Reduction Program, respectively,
provided examples of how funds were allocated in their communities.
* In Pittsburgh, Pa., the Gang-Free Schools and Communities project
served about 100 boys in the area where the highest incidents of
violent gang activity were reported. This target area was also heavily
affected by poverty, unemployment, and social disorganization. The
participants were identified by the schools or other community
organizations as being "gang-involved" and were provided with
prevention and intervention services. Services include an after-school
program and a mentoring program, as well as substance abuse treatment
and employment services.
* In Richmond, Va., the Gang Reduction and Intervention Program was
broader in scope, serving youth with a range of services from medical
care to job training based on their needs. Officials stressed the
importance of the assessment phase of the program. The officials
developed a resource inventory tool to assess resource availability and
gaps that has been shared with other communities nationwide. Richmond
was using both proven and new programs in two target areas of the city
to work on gang prevention and intervention issues. For example, the
officials said that one of their subgrantees, the Boys and Girls Club,
had a proven track record in successfully implementing gang prevention
and intervention programs, but that they had also supported more than
60 other promising programs through the grant, ranging from small faith-
based groups to larger community organizations. The grant had been used
to provide services to a large number of young people and other
residents, and it resulted in collaborative partnerships among social
service agencies and community service providers and, to an extent,
between law enforcement and social service agencies. Figure 10 shows
several services and programs that received funding under the grant.
Figure 10: Services and Programs Funded Under the Richmond, Virginia,
Gang Reduction and Intervention Program:
[Refer to PDF for image: four photographs]
(1) At-risk youth participate in a summer Cal Ripken Baseball Camp;
(2 and 3) Richmond police and Gang Reduction and Intervention Program
staff donated 300 gifts to children in targeted neighborhoods for the
2008 holiday season;
(4) owners of an apartment complex in the target area donated use of an
apartment for the Richmond Gang Reduction and Intervention Program to
offer medical and social services to residents.
Source: Va. Attorney General‘s Office, Richmond, Va.
[End of figure]
Communities we visited that received funding under the Comprehensive
Anti-Gang Initiative also were using, or planned to use, the grants for
a wide variety of activities.[Footnote 41] For example, in Dallas,
Tex., program officials said that gang prevention activities would take
place primarily in schools. The officials planned to use the law
enforcement component of the initiative for police overtime for
operations designed to get gang members off of the streets in targeted
areas. The re-entry component funds were to be used to implement a
comprehensive strategy to assist offenders to prepare for release while
still in prison and then offer services on their release from prison.
In Tampa, Fla., the city's "Gang Out" program provided many prevention
activities. For example, in June 2008, more than 1,200 at-risk youth
aged 7 to 14 in nine neighborhoods identified as "hot spots" for gang
activity were participating in "Gang Out" programs. Children were
referred to the program by law enforcement, social services, school
officials, parents, or others, and they were provided access to a
variety of structured services and activities according to their needs
(i.e. mental health counseling, tutoring, mentoring, field trips, and
participation on sports teams). Tampa officials said they were using
the law enforcement portion of the grant to help pay overtime for law
enforcement task forces investigating gang crime, and to develop a
database to facilitate information sharing among federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies. Re-entry funding was being used to
provide counseling, job placement assistance, housing, and other
services to ex-gang members about to exit prison and return to the
Tampa area. Figure 11 shows one young Gang-Out participant at work on
an anti-gang mural and the mural the young people completed.
Figure 11: At-Risk Youth Design and Complete an Anti-Gang Mural in
Tampa, Florida, as Part of the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative:
[Refer to PDF for image: two photographs]
Source: Hillsborough County, Fla. Gang Out Program.
[End of figure]
DOJ Reported Lessons Learned and Grant Recipients Reported Benefits,
but Projects Had Mixed Results and Were Difficult to Sustain:
DOJ sponsored evaluations of OJJDP grant programs that reported both
benefits and challenges faced by communities in implementing
comprehensive anti-gang models and awarded a contract to Michigan State
University for a national evaluation of BJA's Comprehensive Anti-Gang
Initiative. Cosmos Corporation completed an evaluation of the Gang Free
Schools and Communities program in November 2007.[Footnote 42] The
Urban Institute completed an interim evaluation of the Gang Reduction
Program in May 2008.[Footnote 43] The final evaluation of the Gang
Reduction Program was not completed in April 2009 as scheduled because
OJJDP officials said that the evaluators were waiting to receive
additional data from one demonstration site and anticipated that the
evaluation would be completed in 2009. The officials did not provide a
revised estimated completion date for the evaluation. Officials said
that no evaluation component of the Gang Prevention Coordination
Assistance Program was funded because funding levels awarded to
communities for gang prevention coordinator positions were relatively
small amounts of $200,000 or less. With respect to BJA's Comprehensive
Anti-Gang Initiative, Michigan State University is expected to complete
an interim report in late 2009 and provide it to NIJ, the OJP component
handling the evaluation of the program.
According to DOJ-sponsored evaluations, grant recipients benefited in
various ways from the grant programs. First, grant recipients received
federal funds to implement gang enforcement, prevention, intervention,
and reentry programs that they might otherwise not have been able to
implement. These programs benefited those individuals who participated
in them. For example, the evaluation of the Gang-Free Schools and
Communities Program found that each of the four communities awarded
grants implemented the programs according to requirements by providing
outreach and social services to at least 100 youth in targeted
communities and neighborhoods. The youth served ranged in age from 12
to 24 years with a median age of 16.2 years, and 75 percent of the
participating youth were gang members. Second, grant recipients
received technical assistance and support from OJJDP and BJA to
implement their approaches to addressing gangs. For example, the
interim evaluation of the Gang Reduction Program found that significant
implementation successes were achieved at all four of the sites. Each
grantee developed strategic plans consistent with target area needs and
problems and achieved broad participation in planning the program.
Communication about gang issues within the target area and among
participating organizations generally improved over the course of the
program. Third, as a result of having federal funds and participating
in a grant program, sites obtained needed leverage to bring together a
wide range of stakeholders, such as law enforcement agencies, social
service providers, and faith-based and community groups, to address
communities' gang problems.
Despite these benefits, the projects reported mixed results in
achieving reductions in gang crime. For example, evaluations of OJJDP-
funded programs--the Gang-Free Schools and Communities Program and the
Gang Reduction Program--showed that, while grantees were successful in
doing strategic planning, forming community partnerships, and
implementing programs, and their experiences offered insights on best
practices, they found little evidence that the programs effectively
reduced youth gang crime. In particular, the Gang-Free Schools and
Communities Program evaluation concluded that while some measures of
gang crime decreased and each location had anecdotal evidence of
success with some individuals, overall, the program had little positive
effect on the targeted youth who participated in the programs.
Similarly, the preliminary evaluation of the Gang Reduction Program
found that the program had not achieved its goal of reducing gang
crime. One location, Los Angles, Calif., had a decrease in gang crime
rates. The other locations had no changes or slight increases in gang
crime after program implementation.
In addition, communities that received funding under OJJDP's grants to
demonstrate the Comprehensive Community-Wide Anti-Gang Model faced
difficulties in sustaining their programs after federal funding ended.
No sites that received grant funds under the Rural Gang Initiative
sustained the project with local funding or new grants after federal
funding ended. Likewise, by 2004, all of the communities that had
received funding under the Gang-Free Communities program had used all
of the federal funding allocated and could not continue the programs
with other funding sources. Of communities that received funding under
the Gang-Free Schools program, Cleveland, Ohio did not sustain the
program, however, as of March 2009, three other communities that
received grants were sustaining at least some parts of their programs
with other sources of funding. For example, the Houston, Tex., and
North Miami Beach, Fla., programs received city funds; and the
Pittsburgh, Pa., program received funding from the School Board and
Project Safe Neighborhoods. The project coordinator in Pittsburgh, Pa.,
noted that sustainability is a great challenge. According to the
coordinator, sustaining a program that targeted and enrolled about 100
gang-involved youth who lived or attended school in the target area
once federal funding expires was definitely possible. However,
expanding the program was a concern. For example, the coordinator
wanted the project to be able to serve girls in addition to boys and
increase efforts to provide services to youth reentering the community
after being detained in juvenile facilities, but she had not identified
funding sources to do so. Finally, OJJDP reported that very little
planning for sustainability of projects and services funded by the Gang
Reduction Program had taken place by 2006; however, in 2007, OJJDP
reported that three of the four communities that were awarded funding
under the Gang Reduction Program had taken steps toward sustaining at
least portions of the initiative beyond the federal funding period. For
example, in North Miami Beach, Fla., the initiative was incorporated as
a nonprofit organization in 2007 and in Richmond, Va., partnerships
with the Office of the Attorney General and Richmond Police Department
ensured that some efforts would be sustained.
DOJ has not yet made decisions about whether to expand existing anti-
gang grant programs or fund new programs in the future. In particular,
OJJDP and BJA officials told us that the department has not yet made
decisions about priorities and availability of funding for future anti-
gang programs. As of March 2009, OJJDP officials said that in the short
term, no plans are in process for funding future demonstration projects
of the Comprehensive Community-Wide Gang Program Model because OJJDP
plans to use the funding it has available to provide information and
technical assistance to communities nationwide to assist them in
implementing community-based anti-gang efforts using lessons learned
from the demonstration projects that have been completed or are
underway. To this end, in 2008, DOJ published a report on best
practices to address community gang problems based on OJJDP's
comprehensive gang model and lessons learned from the demonstration
projects.[Footnote 44] The report is available to interested
communities through OJJDP's Web site, and OJJDP officials said that
they had discussed aspects of the report with officials of communities
that were interested in implementing the model. According to OJJDP
officials, communities in Nevada, Oklahoma, Utah, and North Carolina
are developing anti-gang programs based on OJJDP's recommendations
without federal funding, and have consulted OJJDP for information on
best practices and lessons learned. Since these programs are all in the
planning stages, it is too early to tell whether they will be
successfully implemented, reduce youth gang crime, and be sustainable
by the communities without federal funding. With regard to the
Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative, the BJA-sponsored evaluation of
sites funded under this program has not yet been completed, but the
evaluation will include assessments of programs' outcomes and
sustainability, among other things. As of April 2009, BJA officials
said that the agency does not currently plan to fund additional
locations under the initiative in the short term and that results
achieved in the communities currently funded under the program would be
considered in making any future determination of whether to expand
federal funding for the initiative to additional communities, and
whether it is feasible for communities to implement the model without
federal funding.
Conclusions:
Gangs have spread across community, state, and regional boundaries to
become a national problem, requiring federal agencies to strengthen
their coordination and collaboration on anti-gang programs and
initiatives to combat gang crime and violence. Carrying out gang
enforcement, prevention, and intervention efforts that involve multiple
agencies with varying jurisdictions and missions is not an easy task,
especially since agencies have limited resources and, in most cases,
competing priorities. Federal agencies have taken positive actions to
coordinate their anti-gang programs and initiatives and share
information about gang threats and multijurisdictional investigations.
However, these actions have not addressed all possible gaps or
unnecessary overlaps in anti-gang programs, nor have they addressed all
of the challenges identified in this report. Further actions by DOJ and
DHS would enhance and sustain their collaboration in combating gangs.
In particular, differentiation of the roles, responsibilities, and
missions of headquarters-level gang coordination entities--including
the MS-13 National Gang Task Force, NGIC, and GangTECC--could enhance
DOJ and DHS's collaboration in combating gang crime and reduce the
potential for expending resources on overlapping missions. Moreover,
DOJ and DHS could strengthen their efforts to more fully involve ICE in
the task force review and approval process. In addition, to assist
Congress, federal agencies, and other stakeholders in understanding and
assessing gang enforcement efforts, additional actions are needed on
the part of DOJ and DHS to improve performance measurement and
evaluation. More specifically, consensus is needed on a shared
definition of "gang" and other related terms to help federal law
enforcement agencies improve their collection, evaluation, and
reporting on gang enforcement efforts. For DOJ, a departmentwide
performance measure for gangs is needed to help the department and
Congress track the progress of the department's overall gang
enforcement efforts. Additionally, at a component level, additional
monitoring of the extent to which USAOs track and record gang-related
case information is needed to ensure accurate reporting of such
information within DOJ and to external stakeholders, such as Congress.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To strengthen federal agencies' coordination of anti-gang efforts; help
reduce gaps or unnecessary overlaps in federal entities' roles and
responsibilities; and assist the department, Congress, and other
stakeholders in assessing federal gang enforcement efforts, we
recommend that the Attorney General take the following three actions:
* direct DOJ law enforcement agencies that lead or participate in the
headquarters-level anti-gang coordination entities--including GangTECC,
NGIC, the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee, and the MS-13 National Gang
Task Force--to, in consultation with DHS, reexamine and reach consensus
on the entities' roles and responsibilities, including identifying and
addressing gaps and unnecessary overlaps;
* develop a departmentwide, strategic-level performance measure for the
department's anti-gang efforts; and:
* direct EOUSA to periodically review gang-related case information
entered by USAOs into the case and time management systems to ensure
more accurate and complete reporting of USAOs' gang-related cases.
We also recommend that the Attorney General and the Secretary of
Homeland Security jointly take the following two actions:
* ensure that ICE is part of the process for reviewing and approving
the creation of new anti-gang task forces and:
* jointly develop a common or shared definition of "gang" for use by
DOJ, DHS, and component agencies for reporting purposes.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
In providing written comments on a draft of this report, DOJ concurred
with three of our five recommendations and stated that it will consider
the other two recommendations. DHS concurred with the two
recommendations directed to DHS. DOJ and DHS provided information on
steps they were taking or planning to take to address the
recommendations.
First, DOJ concurred with our recommendation to, in consultation with
DHS, reexamine the roles and responsibilities of four DOJ headquarters
anti-gang coordinating entities, including identifying and addressing
any potential gaps and unnecessary overlaps. DOJ commented that this
role is performed by the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee and that the
department will continue to work with ICE, the headquarters-level anti-
gang entities, and other DOJ agencies to identify and address gaps and
unnecessary overlaps.
Second, DOJ stated that the department will consider the recommendation
to develop a departmentwide strategic-level performance measure for its
anti-gang efforts as part of its strategic planning process. DOJ stated
that it is in the initial stages of developing its next strategic plan
and that it is too early in the planning process to state for certain
that such a measure would be included. DOJ commented that senior
leadership will consider including such a measure and that it
recognizes that gangs are a major factor in many crimes and that it is
possible that raising the visibility of DOJ's efforts to combat gangs
would weigh in favor of including such a measure. Given that efforts to
address gangs have been a major part of DOJ's overall approach to
combating violent crime, we continue to believe that a departmentwide
performance measure for gangs would help DOJ and Congress track the
progress of the department's overall anti-gang efforts.
Third, DOJ concurred with our recommendation for EOUSA to review the
case and time management systems of the USAOs to ensure more accurate
and complete reporting of their gang-related cases and noted that
beginning in fiscal year 2010, USAOs will be specifically required to
enter gang-related information into the data management systems
accurately and in a timely manner. According to DOJ, compliance with
this requirement will be measured in performance evaluations of each
USAO approximately every 3 years by evaluation and review staff. We
believe this is a positive step that could help DOJ strengthen the
completeness and accuracy of USAOs' data on gang-related cases.
Fourth, DOJ and DHS concurred with our recommendation to ensure that
ICE is part of the process for reviewing the creation of new anti-gang
task forces. DOJ and DHS said they would work on implementing a
procedure for reviewing the creation of new anti-gang task forces, and
DOJ outlined steps it has begun to take to address this recommendation.
Specifically, in a letter dated July 17, 2009, the Deputy Attorney
General formally extended an invitation to ICE to be a member of the
Anti-Gang Coordination Committee and its Taskforce Review Subcommittee
and to be afforded the same level of review as participating DOJ law
enforcement agencies.
Finally, DOJ agreed that a shared definition of "gang" for use by DOJ,
DHS, and component agencies for reporting purposes would facilitate
data collection and evaluation efforts and stated that it would broaden
the discussion on whether to develop such a common definition to
include DHS, and, specifically, ICE; however DOJ also noted some
technical and operational challenges to implementing a uniform
definition, including consideration of possible implementation costs.
DOJ noted that it will use the Anti-Gang Coordination Committee as a
forum to jointly consider a common definition or otherwise develop an
effective performance measurement system for anti-gang activities. DHS
concurred with the recommendation. We agree that it is important for
DOJ to consider the costs in implementing a common definition for
"gang" as it explores this issue with DHS through the Anti-Gang
Coordination Committee. We continue to believe that a shared definition
of "gang" would help agencies improve their collection, evaluation, and
reporting of gang enforcement efforts.
DOJ's and DHS's written comments are contained in appendices V and VI,
respectively. We also incorporated technical comments provided by DOJ,
DHS, and component agencies as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General and the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, selected
congressional committees, and other interested parties. In addition,
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Please contact Eileen Larence at (202)
512-8777 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this
report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and
Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key
contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Eileen R. Larence:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Nature and Scope of Gang and Gang Crime in the United
States:
Department of Justice Assessments Identify Gang Crime Problems
Nationwide from Large Cities to Rural Communities:
Historically, gang crime has been associated with urban areas of the
country. However, as shown in figure 12, Department of Justice (DOJ)
National Youth Gang Surveys from 2002 through 2006 showed that youth
gangs are a problem not only for inner cities, but for surrounding
suburbs and rural areas, as well.[Footnote 45]
Figure 12: National Youth Gang Surveys (2002 to 2006):
[Refer to PDF for image: horizontal bar graph]
Percentage of Law Enforcement Agencies Reporting Youth Gang Problems
2002-2006:
Rural communities:
2006: 14.9%;
Ever reported (2002-2006): 27.4%.
Smaller cities:
2006: 32.6%;
Ever reported (2002-2006): 48.3%.
Suburban counties:
2006: 51.0%;
Ever reported (2002-2006): 61.5%.
Large cities:
2006: 86.4%;
Ever reported (2002-2006): 90.5%.
All respondents:
2006: 33.3%;
Ever reported (2002-2006): 47.3%.
Source: 2006 National Youth Gang Survey.
[End of figure]
The surveys found that respondents who reported gang problems in their
jurisdictions reported increases in various categories of gang-related
crime, as well. More than half of respondents with gang problems
reported increases from 2004 to 2006 in gang-related aggravated
assaults and drug sales. Some respondents also reported increases in
gang-related robberies, larceny/theft, burglary, and auto theft. In
2007, jurisdictions reported the highest annual estimate of youth gang
problems since before 2000, with 86 percent of law enforcement agencies
serving larger cities, 50 percent of suburban counties, 35 percent of
smaller cities, and 15 percent of rural counties reporting that they
experienced problems.
In 2005 and 2009, DOJ reported on the gang threat nationally and by
region to assist policymakers and law enforcement agency administrators
understand the dimensions of the problem and assist them in
facilitating policy and allocating resources to address it.[Footnote
46] The following were some trends the reports identified.
* 58 percent of state and local law enforcement agencies reported
criminal gangs were active in their jurisdictions in 2008 compared with
45 percent of state and local agencies in 2004.
* Local street gangs, or neighborhood-based street gangs, remained a
significant threat because they continue to account for the largest
number of gangs nationwide. Most engage in violence in conjunction with
a variety of crimes, including retail-level drug distribution.
* Gangs remain the primary retail-level distributors of most illicit
drugs throughout the United States. They are also increasingly
distributing wholesale-level quantities of marijuana and cocaine in
most urban and suburban communities.
* Criminal gangs commit as much as 80 percent of the crime in many
communities, according to law enforcement officials throughout the
nation.
* Gang members are becoming more sophisticated in their use of
computers and technology. These new tools are used to communicate,
facilitate criminal activity, and avoid detection by law enforcement.
Many gang members use the Internet to recruit new members and to
communicate with members in other areas of the United States and in
foreign countries.
* Forming multi-agency task forces and joint community groups is an
effective way to combat the problem. However, decreases in funding and
staffing to many task forces have created new challenges for
communities.
Composition, Size and Criminal Activities of Four Major National-Level
Street Gangs:
Major national-level street gangs include the Bloods, Crips, and Mara
Salvatrucha, or MS 13, and 18th Street. Brief descriptions of the
composition, size, and criminal activities of these four national gangs
follow.
Bloods. Bloods members are predominantly African American males.
Membership estimates range from 5,000 to 20,000 members in 37 states.
Bloods members are involved in distribution of drugs, including
cocaine; methamphetamine; heroin; and marijuana, and they are involved
in many other criminal activities, including assault, auto theft,
burglary, car jacking, drive-by shooting, extortion, homicide, and
identification theft.
Crips. Crips members are also predominantly African American males.
Membership is estimated to be 30,000 to 35,000 members in 41 states.
Crips members engage in street-level distribution of powder and crack
cocaine, marijuana, and PCP and are involved in other criminal activity
such as assault, auto theft, burglary, and homicide.
MS-13. MS-13 is an Hispanic street gang estimated to have 8,000 to
10,000 members in at least 38 states. MS-13 is an international gang
with an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 members worldwide. Traditionally in
the United States the gang consisted of loosely affiliated groups;
however, law enforcement officials have reported the coordination of
criminal activity among MS-13 members operating in Atlanta, Dallas, Los
Angeles, New York, and Washington, D.C. metropolitan areas. MS-13
members smuggle drugs into the United States and transport and
distribute them throughout the country. Some members are also involved
in alien smuggling, assault, drive-by shooting, homicide,
identification theft, prostitution operations, robbery, and weapons
trafficking.
18th Street. 18th Street formed in Los Angeles, Calif., but now has an
estimated membership of 30,000 to 50,000 in 28 states. In California,
about 80 percent of its members are illegal aliens from Mexico and
Central America. Gang members are involved in retail-level distribution
of cocaine and marijuana, and, to a lesser extent, heroin and
methamphetamine. They also commit assault, auto theft, car jacking,
robbery, identification fraud, and homicide.
Impacts of National-Level Street Gangs and Local Neighborhood Gangs in
Localities Visited:
Interviewees in 8 of the 15 localities we visited reported the presence
of organized national-level street gangs in their communities in
addition to local neighborhood gangs, while officials in 8 localities
said that local neighborhood gangs were the primary source of gang-
related crime. In all of the localities, officials attributed a wide
range of violent crimes and other criminal activities to gangs.
Interviewees in Baltimore, Md.; Los Angeles, Calif.; Chicago, Ill.;
Dallas, Tex.; Durham, N.C.; Brooklyn and Manhattan, N.Y.; and Newark,
N.J., said that organized national-level gangs are active in their
communities. The level of organization and hierarchy of the national
gangs varied from location to location.
The following are three examples of descriptions by interviewees of how
national gangs impact their communities:
Los Angeles, California: The city and the eight surrounding counties
have about 150,000 gang members linked to 1,000 different gangs. The
gangs are very aggressive and violent. Twenty years ago, the Bloods and
Crips were the national gangs in control. Now, MS-13 and other Hispanic
street gangs, as well as Asian and East European gangs are emerging
with sophisticated structures like organized crime groups. Gangs are
developing increasingly sophisticated tools to engage in criminal
enterprise. For example, Eastern European and other ethnic gangs appear
to be active in white collar crimes such as identify theft and credit
card and health care fraud. Hispanic gangs have affiliated with
international drug trafficking organizations, and an African American
gang is engaged in extortion of money from small business owners.
Chicago, Illinois: The city has a long history of gang activity that
spans generations. The police department has identified families in
which grandparents, parents, and children had all affiliated with
gangs. The city police estimate 70,000 to 100,000 gang members in the
area. Some gangs have as many as 10,000 members. Gangs here are large,
territorial, and highly organized with written rules and a reporting
structure to national gang leaders. Gangs control the retail drug
trade. Gangs have corrupted local officials by having members serve as
election workers at polling places. The city has experienced cases of
police corruption by gang members and gang members employed by the
police department and prisons.
Newark, New Jersey: Ten different sects of Bloods have been identified
here. They fight each other but occasionally align against the Crips.
The relationship between drugs and gangs is strengthening. Gang
membership is rising as various gangs establish territory and
relationships with narcotics trafficking markets in urban areas and
more recently establishing transportation routes to suburban and rural
markets in other states.
Interviewees in the other 7 of the 15 localities we visited described
the gangs in their area as primarily neighborhood or street-based.
Officials in Atlanta, Ga.; Cleveland, Ohio; Milwaukee, Wisc.:
Pittsburgh, Pa.; Raleigh, N.C.; Richmond, Va.; and Tampa, Fla., said
that gangs present in their areas were primarily local street gangs. In
some areas the local gangs loosely identified with national
organizations by, for example, wearing the colors of the Bloods;
however officials said that they did not communicate closely with the
national gang hierarchies. Officials described gang organizations that
were fluid and rapidly changing. Officials said that local gangs can
literally take over neighborhoods. They are no less violent than
national gang members. For example, officials in Newark, N.J., and
Brooklyn, N.Y., said that in areas where both national and street gangs
were present, the local gangs were violent and intimidating enough to
hold their territory against the national gangs. The following are
three examples from officials we interviewed of the composition, size,
and criminal activities of the neighborhood gangs in their localities,
and how they impact their communities.
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: The big problem here is with neighborhood
street gangs that are involved in drug trafficking and retaliation
against witnesses and rival gangs. A recently completed survey
determined that affiliations with national gangs do not exist. Gangs
are relatively small, usually 10 to 25 members, and are typically
affiliated by neighborhood or street block. Some gang sets have adopted
the names of streets where their members live. Gang members are
predominantly young, with ages from early teens to twenties.
Richmond, Virginia: Gangs are widespread in the city. The major problem
is "home-grown" gang members, many of whom have gone to prison and come
back to the community. Because they see no other options, siblings and
children of older gang members follow in family footsteps and join
local gangs. Crimes committed by these groups include vandalism,
murder, assault, and drive-by-shootings.
Tampa, Florida: The gang problem is mostly local. Some gangs operate
within the city limits and some in the outlying county. The entire area
has about 3,000 gang members. Gang members who live outside of the area
also come into the beach, so the police and sheriff's departments spend
time tracking gangs that are not local. Gangs cross geographic, racial,
and cultural boundaries. They are not closely affiliated with national
organizations, although national gang groups do come through the area.
The gangs are extremely violent as they fight for control of turf and
control of the drug trade. Newly arriving immigrants, who tend to carry
large amounts of cash and face language barriers, are susceptible to
being victimized and may turn to Hispanic gangs for protection and
support.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Federal Statutes Used in Gang-Related Prosecutions:
Most criminal cases involving gang members are prosecuted by state and
local prosecutors; however the Department of Justice (DOJ), through its
Criminal Division and U.S. Attorneys, brings federal charges under a
number of different federal statutes against gang members. U.S.
Attorneys prosecute most federal gang-related crimes, and the Criminal
Division prosecutes or assists U.S. Attorneys in prosecuting gang cases
of national significance or those that involve national gangs operating
across United States Attorneys Office (USAO) jurisdictions (e.g. Bloods
and MS-13). Officials in 15 USAOs we visited said that U.S. Attorneys'
guidelines on the types of gang cases that warrant federal prosecution
are generally those involving the most violent and dangerous gang
members and gangs located in the USAO districts.[Footnote 47]
Federal statutes under which gangs members are prosecuted fall into
three categories:
* criminal drug, firearm, and other violent crime statutes where the
unlawful acts are not specifically related to membership in a gang;
* broad statutes under which criminal enterprises--including gangs--may
be prosecuted; and:
* enhanced penalties added to the criminal convictions of defendants
who are gang members.
Federal Prosecutors Most Frequently Reported Using Criminal Drug,
Firearm, and Violent Crime Statutes to Prosecute Gang Members:
Officials in the 15 USAOs we visited most frequently reported
prosecuting gang members under statutes for offenses involving drugs,
firearms, and violent crimes. These offenses are related to the
criminal acts the gang members have committed and not their gang
membership specifically.[Footnote 48] Officials noted the following
reasons that they frequently prosecuted gang cases under these criminal
statutes:
* evidence to support such charges is relatively easy for juries to
understand;
* investigative and prosecutive resources required to build the cases
are not as great as for organized criminal enterprise prosecutions;
and:
* penalties and prison sentences for convictions can be substantial.
Table 3 lists the offense and code section, the statutory elements of
the offense, and penalties for conviction for the federal statutes USAO
officials said they used frequently to prosecute gang members.[Footnote
49]
Table 3: Federal Criminal Statutes Frequently Used to Prosecute Gang
Members:
Federal criminal statute: Unlawful receipt, transportation or
possession of firearms or ammunition; Armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), (5), 924(e);
Elements of the offense: Shipping or transporting in interstate or
foreign commerce, or possessing in or affecting commerce, any firearm
or ammunition; or receiving any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by a person
who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year [felony conviction]; or an
alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States or admitted under
certain nonimmigrant visas, except in certain circumstances;
Penalties for conviction[Footnote 50]: Up to 10 years imprisonment for
a knowing violation. In the case of a person who has three previous
convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, the term of
imprisonment shall be not less than 15 years.
Federal criminal statute: Use of a firearm during or in relation to
certain crimes, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c);
Elements of the offense: During and in relation to any crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime, using or carrying a firearm, or
possessing a firearm in furtherance of any such crime;
Penalties for conviction: In addition to the punishment for the crime
of violence or drug trafficking crime, a consecutive term of
imprisonment of not less than 5 years; not less than 7 years if the
firearm is brandished; and not less than 10 years if the firearm is
discharged. Additional penalties up to not less than 30 years
imprisonment are included depending on the type of firearm possessed
and prior conviction under this subsection.
Federal criminal statute: Robbery and extortion, 18 U.S.C. § 1951;
Elements of the offense: Robbery or extortion or attempting or
conspiring to do so, or committing or threatening physical violence in
furtherance of a plan or purpose to do the same, affecting interstate
commerce;
Penalties for conviction: Up to 20 years imprisonment.
Federal criminal statute: Bank robbery and incidental crimes, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a), (d);
Elements of the offense: (1) By force and violence, or by intimidation,
taking, or attempting to take, from the person or presence of another,
or obtaining or attempting to obtain by extortion any property or money
or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody,
control, management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any
savings and loan association; or (2) Entering or attempting to enter
any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association, or any
building used in whole or in part as such, with intent to commit
therein, any felony affecting such bank or such savings and loan
association and in violation of any statute of the United States, or
any larceny;
Penalties for conviction: Up to 20 years imprisonment. An additional
maximum penalty of up to 25 years imprisonment is applicable where in
committing, or in attempting to commit, the offense, the defendant
assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the
use of a dangerous weapon or device.
Federal criminal statute: Carjacking, 18 U.S.C. § 2119;
Elements of the offense: With the intent to cause death or serious
bodily harm, taking a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped,
or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or
presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or
attempting to do so;
Penalties for conviction: Up to 15 years imprisonment; up 25 years
imprisonment if serious bodily injury results.
Federal criminal statute: Unlawful manufacturing or trafficking
(including possession with intent to commit these offenses); Attempt or
conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(l), 846;
Elements of the offense: Knowingly or intentionally manufacturing,
distributing, or dispensing, or possessing with intent to manufacture,
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; attempt or conspiracy
to do the same;
Penalties for conviction: Up to life imprisonment depending on the type
of drug and amount, prior felony drug conviction, and other factors.
Source: GAO analysis of information from USAOs.
[End of table]
Organized Crime Statutes Allow for Focus on the Criminal Activities of
Entire Gangs, but Prosecutions Can Be Resource Intensive, Time
Consuming, and Complex:
In some instances, USAOs use two broad federal statutes--the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act and the Violent Crimes
in Aid of Racketeering (VICAR) Act--to prosecute criminal enterprise
organizations. While RICO was originally enacted to dismantle organized
crime groups such as the Mafia, prosecutors have successfully used it
to bring cases against members of organized gangs. RICO prohibits the
commission of a pattern of racketeering activity to invest in, maintain
an interest in, or participate in, directly or indirectly, an
enterprise, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign
commerce; it also prohibits conspiracy to commit any of these
activities.[Footnote 51] The second statute, VICAR, was intended to
supplement RICO and makes it unlawful to commit any of a list of
violent crimes in return for anything of pecuniary value from an
enterprise engaged in racketeering activity, or for the purpose of
joining, remaining with, or increasing a position in such an
enterprise.[Footnote 52] The listed violent crimes are murder,
kidnapping, maiming, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting
in serious bodily injury, and threatening to commit a crime of violence
[Footnote 53] and may be violations of state or federal law.[Footnote
54] The statute also makes unlawful attempt and conspiracy to commit
the listed crimes.[Footnote 55] To use these statutes to prosecute
gangs, prosecutors must prove several elements. In particular,
prosecutors must prove that the gang functions as an "enterprise"
[Footnote 56] through evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or
informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a
continuing unit. This may be accomplished by showing that the gang
holds meetings, has a specific, stated mission, collects dues, and has
a decision-making structure, among other characteristics.
DOJ requires that prosecutions under these statutes be coordinated with
DOJ Criminal Division and approved for prosecution by the Criminal
Division's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. In addition, the
staff of that section has developed extensive manuals on RICO and VICAR
to assist federal prosecutors in the preparation for and litigation of
cases involving those statutes.
According to USAO officials we spoke to, RICO and VICAR are tools for
prosecution that can disrupt and destroy entire gang structures. One
USAO official explained that the organized crime statutes allow
prosecutors to tell the entire story of a gang's existence and criminal
activity in an indictment and later to a jury. The official noted that
every aspect of the gang and its history--including how it acquired its
territory; how it makes and disposes of its money; how it uses coded
language, hand signals, and graffiti; and what crimes it has committed
and why--can be offered in one coherent story during the trial. Gang
cases prosecuted under an organized crime statute generally have more
co-defendants than cases prosecuted under narcotics trafficking,
firearms, and other violent crime statutes. The officials explained
that such cases allow prosecutors to reach deep into the gang hierarchy
to the top leaders of the gang organizations and are generally well-
publicized by the news media.
Violations of the criminal provisions of RICO and VICAR carry
significant penalties. A gang member convicted under RICO is subject to
up to 20 years imprisonment, or up to life imprisonment if the
violation is based on racketeering activity for which the maximum
penalty includes life imprisonment. Defendants also remain subject to
conviction and sentencing for the underlying or predicate crimes that
make up the racketeering activity. Additionally, the statute provides
for the forfeiture of property maintained or acquired in violation of
the Act. Under VICAR, conviction may result in up to life imprisonment
depending on the predicate offense committed; VICAR murder is a death-
eligible offense. Gang members convicted of crimes under RICO or VICAR
may be fined up to $250,000. RICO also contains a civil provision that
allows people who have been injured by a RICO defendant to recover
damages in federal court.
USAO interviewees also cited limitations to the use of RICO and VICAR
statutes. RICO and VICAR cases are resource-intensive, time consuming,
and complex, according to some interviewees, and only suited to
prosecutions of highly structured gang organizations; not the local
street gangs that are the predominant gang crime concern in some
localities.
Although U.S. Attorneys do not maintain data on the number of gang-
related organized crime cases they accept for prosecution, the total
number of organized crime cases they accept for prosecution is a small
percentage of the overall caseload. In fiscal year 2007, a total of 217
organized crime cases of all types, including gangs and traditional
groups, against 483 defendants were filed in the United States, about
0.4 percent of the total cases filed--and that figure was an increase
of 39 percent from the previous year.
A case charged under organized crime statutes in Los Angeles, Calif.,
provides an example of the large commitment of time and investigative
and prosecution resources that are required for these complex cases
that result in indictments of leaders and members of large gang
operations.
* A 3-year investigation of the Florencia 13 Gang in Southern Los
Angeles, Calif., resulted in indictments against 102 defendants on RICO
and narcotics trafficking charges. As of January 2009, 76 defendants
had been convicted with other cases pending trial. The defendants were
alleged to be part of a controlled drug distribution operation. Gang
leaders were charged with collecting fees and/or rent from gang members
and others engaged in criminal conduct in areas controlled by the
Florencia 13 Gang. Numerous federal and local law enforcement agencies
were involved in the investigation. Federal agencies included FBI, DEA,
ATF, USMS, ICE, and IRS. Local agencies included Los Angeles City
Police Department, Los Angeles County Sheriff's and Probation
Departments, and local police departments in five other area towns.
DOJ Officials Said Enhanced Penalties for Gang Membership Are Generally
Not Used Because the Elements Are Difficult to Prove:
As part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Congress established an enhanced penalty for gang-related crimes by
authorizing the imposition of an additional term of imprisonment of up
to 10 years for participation in certain federal felonies involving
drugs or violence by members of criminal street gangs.[Footnote 57]
Some USAO officials we visited said that the sentencing enhancement for
gang members was generally not used because the elements of proof
required are difficult for prosecutors to establish.[Footnote 58] For
the defendant to be subject to the enhancement, prosecutors must prove
several elements. At the outset, there are four components required to
establish the "criminal street gang" under the statute: (1) an ongoing
group, club, organization, or association of five or more persons; (2)
that has as one of its primary purposes the commission of one or more
specified felonies involving violence or drugs in violation of federal
law; (3) the members of which engage, or have engaged within the past 5
years, in a continuing series of the same specified felonies; and (4)
the activities of the criminal street gang affect interstate or foreign
commerce.[Footnote 59] In addition, prosecutors must establish that the
defendant committed the crime for which he was charged to promote the
felonious activities of the gang or maintain or increase his position
in the gang; that the defendant had been convicted of another crime of
violence or drug offense arising to a felony under state or federal law
within the past 5 years; and that the defendant participates in a
criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage or have
engaged, in a "continuing series" of federal felonies involving
violence or drugs.[Footnote 60]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Important Elements of an Approach to Combating Gangs:
Federal and local agencies, research experts, and others we
interviewed, as well as research we reviewed, identified important
elements for consideration in developing and implementing an approach
for combating gangs. Among others, these elements include:
* thorough assessment and understanding of local gang problem(s);
* consensus among stakeholders;
* ongoing communication and coordination among stakeholders;
* comprehensive and varied efforts (i.e., prevention, intervention,
suppression, and re-entry);
* public and community outreach and visibility for programs;
* plans for sustainability of programs and efforts; and commitment to
long-term focus; and:
* performance monitoring, evaluation, and feedback incorporation.
Presence of these elements does not guarantee that an approach to
addressing gangs will be successful. These elements are important for
federal, state, and local agencies and communities to consider in
developing and implementing anti-gang approaches. In addition, these
elements should not be considered as an exhaustive list of items for
agencies and communities to consider in developing their anti-gang
approaches. Rather, these elements were identified as key
considerations by the agencies and individuals we interviewed and the
research we examined.
* Thorough assessment and understanding of local gang problem(s):
Agencies and individuals we interviewed and research we examined
indicated that it is important for agencies and communities to
thoroughly assess their gang problems in order to gain a complete
understanding of the nature of the gang threat and the resources needed
to address that threat. For example, in identifying best practices that
resulted from its projects testing the Comprehensive Community-Wide
Anti-Gang Model, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (OJJDP) reported assessments of gang problems helped
projects determine types and levels of gang activity, gang crime
patterns, community perceptions, and gaps in available services
[Footnote 61]. OJJDP found that assessment also assisted communities in
identifying target populations to be served, understanding why those
populations merited attention, and making the best use of available
resources. Similarly, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) reported
that a needs assessment is often the first step in planning a
comprehensive solution to a gang problem, as it can help uncover hidden
problems, set priorities, and develop a communitywide consensus about
what to do.
Similarly, agency officials and research experts we interviewed noted
the importance of agencies and communities thoroughly assessing gang
problems and threats. For example, one prosecutor told us that a "one-
size fits all approach" does not work for addressing gangs. This
prosecutor stated that each jurisdiction or community is different, and
a program that works in one community may not work in another. This is
because of different characteristics and different gang problems in
each community; a gang problem in one community has different
characteristics and occurs in a different environment than a gang
problem in another community. Furthermore, officials from one U.S.
Attorneys Office (USAO) suggested that communities recognize and admit
their gang problems, complete an assessment of those problems, and plan
strategically for how to best address them. Several research experts
also emphasized that gangs are inherently a local problem best
addressed through targeted solutions carefully vetted through community
input.
* Consensus among key stakeholders: Based on our interviews and
examination of research, it is important for stakeholders, including
law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, community-based social service
agencies, schools, citizens' groups, and other interested community
residents, to reach consensus on an overall approach and goals for a
coordinated anti-gang effort. For example, OJJDP reported that partners
should try to find shared goals for anti-gang efforts. According to
BJA, planning can help stakeholders to establish a common mission and
common priorities and minimize parochial perspectives in favor of
broader goals.
Agency officials and research experts we interviewed also noted the
importance of obtaining consensus for anti-gang strategies from all key
stakeholders. Officials involved in managing one Department of Justice
(DOJ) funded grant program said that it is important for all
stakeholders to feel like they have ownership and have bought into the
program. They said that allowing all stakeholders to take credit for
program successes and providing them all with an opportunity to discuss
failures and obstacles helps the program succeed and last over the long
term. Furthermore, one local prosecutor stated that a comprehensive
approach requires all stakeholders within a community--police,
prosecutors, social service providers, and elected officials--to buy
into a comprehensive approach for addressing gang problems. If just one
of these groups is not committed to such an approach, the approach
ultimately may not be successful. Likewise, officials from two USAOs
stated that organizing the effort to combat gang violence and
understanding the problem are key to combating gangs. They suggested
that communities, law enforcement agencies, and researchers agree and
buy into the assessment of the gang problem and the strategies
developed to address that problem.
* Ongoing communication and coordination among stakeholders: After
consensus is established among stakeholders, agencies we interviewed
and research we reviewed indicated that it is important that there be
ongoing communication and coordination among stakeholders involved in
overall anti-gang efforts. For example, according to BJA, one of the
most important components of a successful approach to gangs is
multiagency cooperation.[Footnote 62] BJA reported that communities
should actively involve all community components that have a potential
interest in responding to gang problems.
Federal agencies similarly affirmed the importance of coordination and
multiagency efforts to address gangs as part of a comprehensive
approach but also within specific efforts. For example, officials from
three Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field offices told us that
the most critical element to an approach for successfully addressing
gangs is for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to work
together through joint investigations and task forces to leverage
information, experience, and resources. These agencies also need to
coordinate with and gain cooperation from the USAO to get USAO support
for prosecuting cases. Officials from another FBI field office told us
that a task force or collaborative approach is crucial in successfully
addressing gangs. Agencies that participate in a task force or
collaborative approach should clearly define their roles and
responsibilities and clearly understand other agencies' roles,
responsibilities, resources, and missions. In addition, Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials discussed the task force
model as being a critical element in any successful effort to combat
gangs, drugs, and violent crime. They stated that task forces
facilitate information sharing among participating agencies, nurture
cooperation, and build trust among participants.
* Comprehensive and varied efforts (i.e., law enforcement, prevention,
intervention, and reentry): Agencies and research experts we visited
and research we reviewed indicated that overall anti-gang approaches
should include a variety of efforts that address law enforcement,
prevention, intervention, and reentry. For example, OJJDP reported that
comprehensive programs that incorporate prevention, intervention, and
enforcement components are most likely to be effective. Gang research
experts have argued that enforcement responses are less likely to be
successful if isolated from other strategies. It is important that
prevention and intervention activities occur in conjunction with
suppression, despite challenges in implementing and maintaining such
efforts.[Footnote 63] Moreover, BJA recommended that communities with
emerging or existing gang problems plan, develop, and implement
comprehensive responses that include a broad range of community-based
components.
Officials we interviewed similarly commented on the importance of an
overall anti-gang approach including programs and initiatives that
address law enforcement, prevention, intervention, and reentry. For
example, officials managing one DOJ-grant funded program stated that
strong state laws and gang enforcement efforts are needed to complement
prevention, intervention, and reentry programs. They said that a
successful gang approach is one that appropriately includes and
balances prevention, intervention, enforcement, and reentry. One local
prosecutor suggested that a community or local government invest in
prevention and intervention programs as well as law enforcement
programs, suggesting that communities may be more successful at
combating gangs and curbing gang violence when they take a
communitywide approach in addressing the problem. For example, one of
the research experts we interviewed suggested that pulling together
strategies "across intervention domains" such as law enforcement,
social services, and schools is an effective way to sustain anti-gang
efforts.
* Public and community outreach and visibility for programs: Our
interviews indicated that it is important for entities involved in
implementing anti-gang programs to conduct community outreach and
provide publicity and visibility for the programs and program
accomplishments. For example, officials from one DOJ-funded grant
program told us that one element important to successful program
implementation is for program officials to be visible to communities.
When program officials are on the streets in communities, it shows
communities that the officials care and are invested in the program.
DEA officials also suggested that community leaders need to be willing
to speak out against violence. They stated that before prevention and
intervention efforts can be effective in a specific community, law
enforcement agencies first have to get violence under control so that
community members are not afraid to participate in community events or
report crimes to law enforcement agencies. Moreover, according to one
USAO, anti-gang programs and services can be unified under a common
brand and marketed aggressively, so that the public is aware of the
existence and affiliation of anti-gang efforts.
* Plans for sustainability of programs and efforts: Entities we
interviewed and research we reviewed suggested that agencies and
communities should plan on how to sustain their anti-gang programs and
initiatives over time, particularly as gang problems and availability
of resources change. For example, OJJDP recommended that programs begin
planning for long-term sustainability during the initial stages of
implementation.
Agency officials and experts interviewed also noted that resolving gang
problems can require a long-term commitment. For example, one local
prosecutor told us it can be challenging to sustain a communitywide
approach to dealing with gang problems because such an approach
requires leaders committed to making a long-term investment in the
approach and resources to sustain the long-term effort. Another local
prosecutor noted that it is important to sustain gang programs over the
long term because as soon as a community or region believes it has
solved its gang problems and scales programs back, gangs reemerge.
Research experts noted that communities have to be willing to invest
resources in anti-gang programs, particularly comprehensive programs,
for a long period of time in order to achieve results and establish
programs that include adequate study time up-front in order to measure
results.
* Performance monitoring, evaluation, and feedback incorporation: A
final common element identified by individuals we interviewed and
research we examined was the regular monitoring and evaluation of
program progress and performance and the incorporation of feedback and
performance results into programs. For example, OJJDP reported that
evaluation is a valuable tool that can tell the community whether it
has accomplished what it set out to do and whether there are ways to do
it better.[Footnote 64] The key to good evaluation is to build the
evaluation strategy from the earliest planning stages, throughout
implementation, and throughout the life of the project. Furthermore,
BJA reported that evaluation provides useful feedback on how well anti-
gang programs are working. This information can be used to change the
response, improve the analysis, or even redefine the nature of the
problem. According to BJA, information gathered through assessment can
also be used to plan strategies for types of problems and to revise the
problem-solving process.
The importance of program monitoring, evaluation, and feedback
incorporation was similarly noted by agency officials and experts we
interviewed. For example, officials from one USAO suggested that there
be a feedback loop among researchers, law enforcement, and community
stakeholders to regularly assess the gang problem and solutions being
implemented to address those problems. The community's strategy may
need to be revised to address evolving gang problems or to fix or
replace ineffective programs. Seven research experts suggested that
additional evidence is needed to prove the viability of community-
oriented, comprehensive initiatives and that in general the federal
government has failed to recognize the importance of outcome evaluation
and ongoing funding being contingent on tangible results, instead
focusing on activity counting, such as number of arrests made.
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Scope and Methodology:
To examine the roles of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) in gang enforcement efforts and the extent
to which the efforts are coordinated with each other and state and
local partners, we reviewed federal agencies' strategies and plans to
combat gang crime and interviewed headquarters DOJ and DHS officials
involved in gang crime enforcement activities. We reviewed DOJ's and
DHS's strategic plans including goals and objectives for efforts to
combat gang crime and how the departments assessed their performance in
meeting these goals and objectives. We compared DOJ and DHS
coordination and information sharing efforts to criteria in our prior
work on effective interagency collaboration and results-oriented
government.[Footnote 65] We also examined staffing levels and budgets
for DOJ and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within DHS.
To assess the reliability of statistical information and budget data we
obtained, we discussed the sources of the data with agency officials
and reviewed documentation regarding the compilation of data. We
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of
this report. Using semi-structured interview instruments, we
interviewed the U.S. Attorney or designated staff of U.S. Attorneys
Offices (USAO) and supervisory agents of DOJ and DHS law enforcement
agencies involved in investigating and prosecuting gang members in 15
localities across the country. We also reviewed anti-gang strategies
and other documentation of enforcement efforts to reduce criminal gang
activity in these localities. We focused our discussions on particular
localities within the U.S. Attorneys' districts rather than the
district as a whole. For example, in the U.S. Attorney District of
Maryland, we discussed anti-gang efforts in Baltimore. The localities
we visited were Atlanta, Ga.; Baltimore, Md.; Brooklyn, N.Y.; Chicago,
Ill.; Cleveland, Ohio; Dallas, Tex.; Durham, N.C.; Los Angeles, Calif.;
Manhattan, N.Y.; Milwaukee, Wisc.; Newark, N.J.; Pittsburgh, Pa.;
Raleigh, N.C.; Richmond, Va.; and Tampa, Fla. We selected these
localities based on a mix of criteria that included a desire to talk
with officials in communities of varying sizes and geographic locations
that had received federal grants to address gang-related crime
problems. Other criteria considered in selecting these localities
included the location of the USAO and federal law enforcement agency
field offices, the presence of federally led task forces to combat gang
crime, and recommendations of officials of DOJ and DHS components
during our preliminary interviews.
We also considered the results of our review of data from the 2006
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Report on
localities' population and number of violent crimes. We considered this
data in order to select localities that represent a range of population
sizes and violent crime concerns. We also considered sites that were
located in close geographic proximity where possible in order to
maximize travel resources. At each locality, in addition to meeting
with federal officials, we met with selected state and local
prosecutors and law enforcement officials to discuss the gang problem
in their area and the federal agencies' role in helping to address it.
The results of our site visits cannot be generalized across all U.S.
Attorney districts, DOJ or ICE field offices, or states and localities
in the United States. However, because we selected sites and localities
based on a variety of factors, they provided us with a broad overview
of activities of DOJ and ICE related to federal anti-gang activities
including law enforcement, as well as prevention and intervention
programs. See table 4 for additional information on the interviews we
conducted in each locality we visited.
To determine how DOJ and DHS have measured the results of their gang
enforcement efforts, we first assessed how DOJ and DHS components
define "gang" and gang-related crimes. We then reviewed data on gang-
related investigations and prosecutions maintained by DOJ and DHS law
enforcement agencies and U.S. Attorneys. To assess the reliability of
statistical information and budget data we obtained, we discussed the
sources of the data with agency officials and reviewed documentation
regarding the compilation of data. We determined that the data were
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We also
interviewed headquarters officials about performance measurement
initiatives and reviewed DOJ and DHS strategic plans, budgets, and
performance reports, and we reviewed a DOJ Office of Inspector General
report that evaluated the Executive Office of U.S. Attorney's (EOUSA)
case management system.[Footnote 66] We compared DOJ and DHS efforts to
measure the results of their gang enforcement efforts to our prior work
on effective interagency collaboration and results oriented
government.[Footnote 67] In addition, we asked state and local law
enforcement officials in nine of the 15 localities we visited how they
measured the results of local gang enforcement efforts.
To determine how DOJ administers and/or supports gang prevention,
intervention and law enforcement programs through grant funding, we
examined documentation of DOJ's overall approach and objectives for
anti-gang grant programs, as well as DOJ-sponsored evaluations and a
guide to best practices to address community gang problems. We
interviewed Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(OJJDP) and Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) officials about the
status of funding, sustainability of anti-gang programs without federal
funding, and results of evaluations of the effectiveness of the anti-
gang grant programs, among other topics. We also reviewed funding
levels for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 for the four active grant
programs that we identified as being directly focused on anti-gang
efforts and included in the scope of our review.[Footnote 68] In eight
localities we visited that received federal grants for anti-gang
efforts, we interviewed grant recipients to determine activities that
they were pursuing with the grant funds and how they planned to sustain
programs when federal funding expired. In two of these locations, we
observed youth gang prevention and intervention programs in process and
spoke with participants and representatives of community-based groups
implementing them to gain an understanding of the scope of the
demonstration projects and how they used federal funds for anti-gang
prevention and intervention activities. In addition, we interviewed
USAO officials to obtain information on their roles in anti-gang
programs. We reviewed guidance on developing and implementing
comprehensive prevention, intervention, and suppression programs and
key documents related to the four federal grant programs, including
grant applications, community reports on the use of grant funding and
performance data. We did not, however, review every program supported
by federal funding that communities could use for anti-gang efforts or
for other law enforcement and crime prevention efforts. For example,
DOJ grant programs including the Community Oriented Policing Services,
Weed and Seed, Project Safe Neighborhoods, and Edward Byrne Memorial
Justice Assistance Grant Program were not in the scope of our review
because they are not specifically designated for anti-gang efforts,
although communities could choose to use funds from the grants for anti-
gang activities or for other law enforcement and crime prevention
purposes. We also reviewed available nationwide evaluations of grant
programs sponsored by DOJ.
Nine criminal justice researchers with expertise on anti-gang issues
provided their views on how effective the federal government has been
in measuring its gang suppression, prevention, and intervention
activities and whether the programs are sustainable without federal
funding and likely to be implemented by communities that did not
receive federal grants based on lessons learned from the federally
funded projects.
Semistructured interviews with officials in 15 localities provided
information to help address each of our three reporting objectives.
During our visits, we interviewed officials of the following offices:
* USAOs;
* FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA); and ICE offices when a field division
or resident office or an FBI, ATF, DEA or ICE-led task force was
present and found to be engaged in local anti-gang efforts through
communication with officials of the USAO;
* local law enforcement agencies when those agencies accepted our
request for interview; and:
* state, local, or nongovernmental entities that received or were
responsible for administering DOJ anti-gang grants.
Table 4 lists the officials we interviewed at each locality visited.
Table 4: Officials We Interviewed in 15 Selected Localities:
Locality: Atlanta, Ga.;
U.S. Attorney's Office: Georgia, Northern District;
Federal law enforcement agency: FBI, ATF, ICE; State or local law
enforcement agency: Gwinnett County, Ga., Police Department;
State, local or nongovernmental organization involved in anti-gang
grant administration: [Empty].
Locality: Baltimore, Md.;
U.S. Attorney's Office: District of Maryland;
Federal law enforcement agency: ATF;
State or local law enforcement agency: [Empty];
State, local or nongovernmental organization involved in anti-gang
grant administration: [Empty].
Locality: Chicago, Ill.;
U.S. Attorney's Office: Illinois, Northern District;
Federal law enforcement agency: FBI, ATF, DEA, ICE;
State or local law enforcement agency: Chicago Police Department;
State, local or nongovernmental organization involved in anti-gang
grant administration: [Empty].
Locality: Cleveland, Ohio;
U.S. Attorney's Office: Ohio, Middle District;
Federal law enforcement agency: FBI, ATF, DEA;
State or local law enforcement agency: Cleveland Police Department;
State, local or nongovernmental organization involved in anti-gang
grant administration: Administrators of the anti-gang initiative
including coordinators of law enforcement, prevention and reentry.
Locality: Dallas, Tex.;
U.S. Attorney's Office: Texas, Northern District;
Federal law enforcement agency: FBI, ATF, DEA, ICE;
State or local law enforcement agency: Dallas Police Department and
North Texas Crime Commission;
State, local or nongovernmental organization involved in anti-gang
grant administration: Administrators and partners of the anti-gang
initiative including the North Texas Crime Commission, Offender Reentry
Court, and Boys and Girls Clubs.
Locality: Durham, N.C.;
U.S. Attorney's Office: North Carolina, Middle District;
Federal law enforcement agency: FBI;
State or local law enforcement agency: Durham Police Department; State,
local or nongovernmental organization involved in anti-gang grant
administration: Office of the City Manager, Anti-Gang Program
Administrator.
Locality: Los Angeles, Calif.;
U.S. Attorney's Office: California, Central District;
Federal law enforcement agency: FBI, ATF, DEA, ICE;
State or local law enforcement agency: Los Angeles Police Department;
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department;
State, local or nongovernmental organization involved in anti-gang
grant administration: Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth
Development.
Locality: New York City, N.Y. (Manhattan);
U.S. Attorney's Office: New York, Southern District;
Federal law enforcement agency: FBI, ATF, DEA, ICE;
State or local law enforcement agency: [Empty];
State, local or nongovernmental organization involved in anti-gang
grant administration: [Empty].
Locality: New York City, N.Y. (Brooklyn);
U.S. Attorney's Office: New York, Eastern District;
Federal law enforcement agency: FBI, ATF, DEA, ICE;
State or local law enforcement agency: [Empty];
State, local or nongovernmental organization involved in anti-gang
grant administration: [Empty].
Locality: Milwaukee, Wis.;
U.S. Attorney's Office: Wisconsin, Eastern District;
Federal law enforcement agency: FBI, ATF;
State or local law enforcement agency: [Empty];
State, local or nongovernmental organization involved in anti-gang
grant administration: [Empty].
Locality: Newark, N.J.;
U.S. Attorney's Office: District of New Jersey;
Federal law enforcement agency: FBI, DEA, ICE;
State or local law enforcement agency: Newark Police Department;
State, local or nongovernmental organization involved in anti-gang
grant administration: [Empty].
Locality: Pittsburgh, Pa.;
U.S. Attorney's Office: Pennsylvania, Western District;
Federal law enforcement agency: FBI, ATF;
State or local law enforcement agency: Pittsburgh Bureau of Police;
State, local or nongovernmental organization involved in anti-gang
grant administration: Youth Intervention Project, Pittsburgh Public
Schools.
Locality: Raleigh, N.C.;
U.S. Attorney's Office: North Carolina, Eastern District;
Federal law enforcement agency: FBI;
State or local law enforcement agency: [Empty];
State, local or nongovernmental organization involved in anti-gang
grant administration: Law enforcement coordinator for Anti-Gang
Initiative.
Locality: Richmond, Va.;
U.S. Attorney's Office: Virginia, Eastern District;
Federal law enforcement agency: FBI, ATF;
State or local law enforcement agency: [Empty];
State, local or nongovernmental organization involved in anti-gang
grant administration: Virginia Attorney General's Office; Virginia
Interagency Anti-Gang Workgroup.
Locality: Tampa, Fla.;
U.S. Attorney's Office: Florida, Middle District;
Federal law enforcement agency: FBI, ATF, ICE;
State or local law enforcement agency: Tampa Police Department; Tampa
Sheriff's Department;
State, local or nongovernmental organization involved in anti-gang
grant administration: Hillsborough County, Fla. Community Service
Program.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
We also interviewed officials of the Los Angeles County District
Attorney's Office and the Los Angeles City Attorney's Office who had an
established history of prosecuting gang-related crime, and we pre-
tested our structured interview instruments with law enforcement
officials in Washington, D.C.; Montgomery County, Md.; and Northern
Virginia.
Research experts provided input to our reporting objective on how DOJ
administers and/or supports gang prevention, intervention and law
enforcement programs through grant funding and to appendix IV, which
provides perspective on important elements for consideration in
developing and implementing an approach for combating gangs. We
identified research experts through a review of literature related to
gangs and gang crime issues, their participation in gang-related
conferences, and by asking federal officials for recommendations. We
contacted these research experts by e-mail with several questions, and
we either discussed their answers in telephone interviews or received e-
mail responses from them. The following research experts contributed
their views:
* G. David Curry, University of Missouri-St. Louis:
* Scott Decker, Arizona State University:
* Finn-Aage Esbensen, University of Missouri-St. Louis:
* Karl Hill, University of Washington:
* Ronald Huff, University of California-Irvine:
* Charles Katz, Arizona State University:
* David M. Kennedy, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City
University of New York:
* Malcolm Klein, University of Southern California:
* Irving Spergel, University of Chicago:
We conducted this performance audit from December 2007 through July
2009, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Justice:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Office of the Deputy Attorney General:
Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General:
Chair of the Attorney General's Anti-Gang Coordination Committee:
Washington, DC 20530:
July 17, 2009:
Eileen R. Larence:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Team:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Larence:
Thank you fur the opportunity to review the subject draft report and
for the opportunity to respond on behalf of the Department of Justice
(DOJ). Each of the five recommendations directed to the Department of
Justice is addressed in turn, below.
The first recommendation is for DOJ (in consultation with the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)) to reexamine the roles and
responsibilities of four DOJ headquarters-level anti-gang coordinating
entities, including identifying and addressing any potential gaps and
unnecessary overlaps. DOJ concurs with the recommendation and the
importance of regularly coordinating crosscutting efforts such as law
enforcement's anti-gang efforts. This role is performed by the Attorney
General's Anti-Gang Coordination Committee (AGCC), which meets at least
quarterly and includes DHS's U S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) among. its membership. The AGCC will continue to work with ICE.
DOJ headquarters-level anti-gang entities, and other DOJ components and
agencies to identify and address gaps and unnecessary overlaps.
The second recommendation is for DOJ to develop a Departmentwide
strategic-level performance measure for the Department's anti-gang
efforts. The Department is in the initial stages of developing the next
DOJ Strategic Plan, due in June 2010. The recent change in
Administration will result in adjustments in DOJ's focus and priorities
which will be reflected in this next version. It is too early in the
development process to state for certain that the new plan will include
a Departmentwide, strategic-level performance measure specifically
aimed at antigang efforts; however, the senior leadership will consider
including such a measure. DOJ recognizes that gangs are a major factor
in many crimes, and it is possible that raising the visibility in our
fight against gangs will weigh in favor of including such a measure.
The third recommendation is for DOJs Executive Committee for United
States Attorneys (EOUSA) to review the case and time management systems
of the 93 United States Attorneys' Offices (USAOs) nationwide to ensure
more accurate and complete reporting of their gang-related cases. DOJ
concurs with this recommendation, Since 2006, USAOs have been
instructed to use appropriate codes to identify gang members and the
role of gang members in the National Legal Information Office Network
System (LIONS) and the U.S. Attorney Monthly Resource Summary Reporting
System (USA-5) systems, which record the numbers of gang-related cases
and matters and the time dedicated to working on gang-related cases and
matters. However, in recognition of the fact that USAOs were likely
under-reporting LIONS and USA-S data on gang prosecutions, gang
defendants, and hours spent on gang-related prosecutions, EOUSA has
taken steps to make improvements. On February 15, 2009, EOUSA Director,
Kenneth E. Melson, issued a memorandum instructing all USAOs to use the
appropriate LIONS and USA-5, codes for all gang-related defendants and
cases. More recently, EOUSA also clarified the Evaluation and Review
Staff (EARS) performance evaluations which are conducted in each USAO
approximately every three years. The EARS program is the means by which
EOUSA is able to conduct reviews of internal management controls for
USAOs. Beginning in Fiscal Year 20110 the revised case management
systems standards will specifically require a USAO to timely and
accurately enter gang-related information into the LIONS and USA-5
systems.
The fourth recommendation is for DOJ and DHS to jointly ensure that ICE
participates in the review and approval process for the creation of new
anti-gang task forces. DOJ concurs with the recommendation and has
already taken steps to ensure ICE participation. Specifically, we have
added a line to the DOJ taskforce application requiring district-level
concurrence by the ICE Special Agent in Charge. Moreover, DOJ has
invited a representative of the ICE National Gang Unit to participate
in the headquarters-level Task Force Review Subcommittee (a
subcommittee of the AGCC). These new measures provide ICE with the same
level of review as the other participating DOJ law enforcement
agencies. We are also exploring with ICE whether any of their anti-gang
activities include task forces that should be included in a similarly
coordinated review process at DHS.
The fifth recommendation is for DOJ and DHS to jointly develop a common
definition of "gang" for use by DOJ, DHS, and component agencies for
reporting purposes. DOJ agrees that a common definition would
facilitate data collection and related evaluation efforts. For this
reason, in Spring 2007, the Department's Bureau of Justice Statistics
(BJS) was asked to determine how a uniform definition of "gang" could
be implemented across DO) component agencies. Noting that
implementation would pose both technical and operational challenges,
BJS developed a multi-stage project implementation plan for reporting,
DOJ gang conviction statistics. BJS acknowledged the plan could be
costly. DOJ has not vet begun implementation as we consider whether
after enduring significant cost. measuring the number of gang
convictions will adequately measure our anti-gang performance. DOJ
concurs that it is appropriate to broaden this discussion to include
DHS, and most specifically ICE which engages in significant anti-gang
activities DOJ will seek to use the AGCC us a thrum to jointly consider
a common definition of "gang" or otherwise develop an effective per
nuance measurement system for our anti-gang activities.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jennifer Shasky Calvary:
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
July 16, 2009:
Eileen R. Larence:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
U.S. Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Larence:
ICE Response to GAO Draft Report: "Combating Gangs: Better Coordination
and Performance Measurement Would Help Clarify Roles of Federal
Agencies and Strengthen Assessment of Efforts" GAO-09-708 (440651)
Thank you for providing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
with the opportunity to review and comment on the subject Government
Accountability Office (GAO) draft report.
ICE provides the following information in direct response to the
recommendations directed to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS):
Recommendation 1: "The Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland
Security jointly take the following action: ensure that ICE reviews and
approves the creation of new antigang task forces"
ICE Response: ICE concurs with this recommendation directed to DHS. ICE
will work with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to become an approving
official on the creation of new antigang task forces by identifying and
implementing the procedure for such action.
Recommendation 2: "The Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland
Security jointly take the following action: jointly develop a common or
shared definition of "gang" for use by DOJ, DHS, and component agencies
for reporting purposes."
ICE Response: ICE concurs with this recommendation directed to DHS and
will work with DOJ to jointly develop a common or shared definition of
"gang" for use by DOJ, DHS, and component agencies for reporting
purposes.
Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this Draft Report and
we look forward to working with you on future homeland security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Eileen R. Larence (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Rebecca Gambler, Assistant
Director; Katherine Davis; Anthony Fernandez; Deborah Knorr; Amanda
Miller; Jeffrey Niblack; Octavia Parks; Janet Temko; and Jeremy
Williams made significant contributions to this report.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] See Department of Justice, Attorney General's Report to Congress on
the Growth of Violent Street Gangs in Suburban Areas (Washington, D.C.:
April 2008). The Attorney General based his estimates of the number of
gang members on a nationwide survey of law enforcement officials.
Definitions of what constitutes a gang or gang member vary from
location to location. A DOJ official who heads an effort to coordinate
federal gang crime investigations noted that everything from drug
trafficking organizations, to domestic terrorist groups, to organized
crime, to street gangs could fall under the broad definition of
"gangs." For certain specified purposes, including a federal sentencing
enhancement that provides for an increased penalty for participation in
a criminal street gang, federal law defines the term "criminal street
gang" as an ongoing group, club, organization, or association of five
or more persons that has as one of its primary purposes the commission
of one or more specified criminal offenses involving violence or
controlled substances, the members of the group must engage, or have
engaged within the past five years, in a continuing series of the same
specified crimes, and the activities of the group must affect
interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 521(a).
[2] The component agencies we obtained documents and interviewed
officials from include the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the Drug Enforcement
Administration; the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys; and the
Criminal Division within DOJ, and ICE within DHS. We also obtained
documents and interviewed officials of the U.S. Marshals Service at
headquarters and in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area during the
design phase of our work.
[3] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance
and Sustain Collaboration Among Federal Agencies, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21,
2005).
[4] U.S. Attorneys serve as the chief federal law enforcement officers
in 94 judicial districts across the nation.
[5] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15] and GAO, Agency
Performance Plans: Examples of Practices That Can Improve Usefulness to
Decision-makers, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69] (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
26, 1999).
[6] The four grant programs are the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative,
Gang Reduction Program, Gang Free Schools and Communities Program, and
Gang Prevention Coordination Assistance Program.
[7] The same U.S. Attorney serves the District of Guam and the District
of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
[8] Officials noted that other federal law enforcement agencies,
including the Bureau of Prisons, criminal investigative components of
the Internal Revenue Service; and Department of Housing and Urban
Development among others, may sometimes be involved in gang-related
apprehensions and investigations, as well; however we did not include
these agencies in the scope of our review. We did not conduct detailed
audit work at CBP for this review, but we will examine CBP's anti-gang
efforts in greater detail in our report on combating gangs with
transnational connections, which we plan to issue later this year.
[9] Only federal laws specifically assigned to other divisions are
outside of the purview of the Criminal Division. For example, a new
National Security Division was established in September 2006 with
specific responsibility for international and domestic terrorism and
other national security threats.
[10] U.S. Department of Justice, National Gang Intelligence Center and
National Drug Intelligence Center, 2009 National Gang Threat Assessment
(Washington, D.C.: January 2009). The assessment found that gang
members are increasingly using firearms in conjunction with their
criminal activities and that during the latest five-year reporting
period ending in 2007, 94.3 percent of gang related homicides involved
the use of a firearm.
[11] Demonstration projects show in practice how a particular problem
may be addressed in a new or different way using a particular approach.
[12] "Deconfliction" is the coordination and information sharing among
law enforcement agencies on multi-jurisdiction investigations to help
ensure officer safety and the effective use of resources.
[13] The FBI's National Gang Strategy defines a gang as a criminal
enterprise having an organizational structure, acting as a continuing
criminal conspiracy, which employs violence and any other criminal
activity to sustain the enterprise. According to the strategy, violent
gangs are street level neighborhood, community, and regionally based
gangs; groups brought together for specific violent crime activities;
prison gangs; and outlaw motorcycle gangs. The National Gang Strategy
defines criminal enterprise as any union or group of individuals
associated in fact, although not a legal entity, and that these
individuals are engaged in a pattern of criminal activity together.
[14] According to ATF, gangs employ firearms as "tools of the trade"
that make them a threat to public safety, including guns in the hands
of felons, as well as weapons and explosives used to retaliate against
rival gangs and witnesses to criminal behavior. ATF seeks to enforce
firearms laws to remove violent offenders from communities, stop
illegal firearms trafficking, and prevent prohibited persons from
possessing firearms.
[15] ATF does not specifically track time spent on gang enforcement
efforts because it tracks agent time in relation to its mission of
violent crime. We did not present data on ICE agent FTEs dedicated to
gang enforcement efforts in this report because ICE deemed the
information to be sensitive.
[16] We did not include entities with missions focused exclusively on
combating international gangs outside of the United States in the scope
of our review. MS-13 is a Hispanic street gang estimated to have 8,000
to 10,000 members in at least 38 states.
[17] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15], which uses
the term "collaboration" broadly to include "coordination." We have
adopted that same use in this report.
[18] Any DOJ entity seeking to establish a gang task force must submit
a threat assessment to the relevant USAO and ultimately to the Anti-
Gang Coordination Committee. The purpose of the threat assessment is to
outline the scope and magnitude of the gang issue, delineate whether
there are currently any anti-gang task forces in place, and offer
strategies for combating the issue.
[19] All relevant DOJ component agencies provided their concurrence for
the eight task forces that we reviewed.
[20] DOJ and ICE officials said that ICE is invited to participate in
the agenda for the full Anti-Gang Coordination Committee.
[21] See Explanatory statement accompanying the Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008 Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007).
[22] The divisions are in Dallas and Houston, Tex.; Detroit, Mich.; Los
Angeles and San Diego, Calif.; Miami, Fla.; Newark, N.J.; Philadelphia,
Pa.; St. Louis, Missouri; and Washington, D.C. According to DEA
officials, four additional teams will begin operating during fiscal
year 2009 in Chicago, Ill.; Atlanta, Ga.; El Paso, Tex.; and Phoenix,
Ariz.
[23] Law enforcement agencies have also conducted gang enforcement
activities through the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
(OCDETF). The principal mission of the OCDETF program is to identify,
disrupt, and dismantle the most serious drug trafficking and money
laundering organizations and those primarily responsible for the
nation's drug supply. Federal agencies that participate in OCDETF
include DEA, FBI, ICE, ATF, USMS, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
and the U.S. Coast Guard.
[24] GAO, Managing for Results: Challenges Agencies Face in Producing
Credible Performance Information, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-00-52] (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 4,
2000); and GAO, Managing for Results: Strengthening Regulatory
Agencies' Performance Management Practices, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-00-10] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28,
1999).
[25] GAO, Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and
Partnership Sought, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-490T] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 12,
2002).
[26] 18 U.S.C. § 521(a).
[27] A performance measure is a particular value or characteristic used
to measure output or outcome. Because DOJ has broad responsibility for
anti-gang efforts across multiple component agencies, we reviewed the
extent to which DOJ has established departmentwide, strategic level
performance measures. We did not review the extent to which DHS has
established departmentwide performance measures for anti-gang efforts
because fewer component agencies at DHS have responsibility for anti-
gang efforts.
[28] Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285.
[29] "Disruption" is defined as impeding the normal and effective
operation of the targeted organization, as indicated by changes in its
leadership and/or methods of operation. FBI defines "dismantlement" as
destroying the organization's leadership, financial base, and supply
network so that it is incapable of operating and reconstituting itself.
[30] We provided data on federal agencies' gang-related outputs for
illustrative purposes and did not report data on all outputs for which
agencies collect and report data. The FBI also collects and reports
data on number of gang-related complaints, number of gang-related
indictments, number of gang-related indictments under racketeering and
organized crime statutes, number of other gang-related racketeering
statute indictments, and number gang-related arrests. ATF also collects
and reports data on the number of gang-related defendants referred for
prosecution, percentage of total gang-related defendants referred for
prosecution, and percentage of total gang-related defendants convicted.
DEA and ICE also collect and report data on the number of cases
initiated and other case management statistics.
[31] Administrative arrests use ICE's authority to initiate procedures
for deportation based on a violation of immigration-related statutes,
regulations, or policy.
[32] Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Resource
Management of U.S. Attorneys' Offices (Washington, D.C.: November
2008).
[33] According to EOUSA officials, case information in LIONS is entered
primarily by statute and program category (i.e., counter-terrorism,
narcotics, and organized crime). The gang code is a secondary data-
entry point under "defendant status." These officials said that it is
an unusual way for attorneys and support personnel to enter information
into the system. Similarly, with respect to reporting time spent in the
USA-5 system, time spent on gang-related prosecutions is a secondary
time charge code called a USA-5a. USA-5a breaks out specific codes to
track priorities and special initiatives such as cases involving gangs
and Indian tribes, and its use is an extra data entry step for
attorneys and support staff.
[34] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C., November 1999).
[35] In addition to these programs specifically for anti-gang efforts,
communities may use other DOJ grant programs including Community
Oriented Policing (COPS), Weed and Seed, Project Safe Neighborhoods,
and the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program for anti-
gang activities or for other law enforcement and crime prevention
efforts. Other federal departments may have grant programs that could
be indirectly related to gangs, but we did not include them in our
scope.
[36] Since 2004 when administrative responsibility for the program was
transferred from ATF, BJA has also administered the Gang Resistance,
Education and Training (GREAT) Program, which we did not include in the
scope of our review. GREAT provides funds for a school-based anti-gang
curriculum taught by law enforcement officers with the goal of
preventing delinquency, youth violence, and gang membership by offering
life skills for effective non-violent partnerships. In fiscal year
2008, a total of $7.6 million in GREAT program funding was provided to
84 grantees around the country, down from $14.7 million in funding to
165 grantees in fiscal year 2007.
[37] Communities that implement the model follow a five-step process to
identify the gang problem, mobilize resources to address it, and
evaluate the results: (1) the community acknowledges that it has a gang
problem; (2) the community assesses the characteristics and scope of
its gang problem to identify target areas and populations on which to
focus; (3) using a steering committee, community leaders set goals and
objectives for reducing gang problems within the target areas and
populations; (4) the steering committee makes available relevant
programs, strategies, services, tactics, and procedures consistent with
the model's five core elements; and (5) the steering committee
evaluates the effectiveness of its strategies and programs and, if
necessary, alters the approach.
[38] The first sites OJJDP selected in 1995 to test the comprehensive
model were Mesa, Ariz., Riverside, Calif., Bloomington-Normal, Ill.,
San Antonio, Tex., and Tucson, Ariz. The four communities selected in
1999 to participate in the Rural Gang Initiative to test the
comprehensive gang model in nonmetropolitan areas were Glenn County,
Calif, Mt. Vernon, Ill., Elk City, Okla., and Cowlitz County, Wash.
[39] Results of program evaluations that have been completed on these
programs are discussed later in the report.
[40] Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) is a national initiative
established in 2001 to develop, implement, and evaluate data-driven
violence reduction strategies in communities and improve the long-term
prevention of gun violence. Since 2001, about $2 billion in federal
funds have been allocated. The annual PSN funding level declined from
about $19 million in fiscal year 2007 to $13.6 million in fiscal year
2008 awarded to organizations in the United States and its territories.
Fiscal year 2008 PSN awards ranged from a high of about $583,000 to the
California Governor's Office of Emergency Services to a low of about
$52,000 to the St. Thomas-St John, Virgin Islands Chamber of Commerce.
Funds are used for purposes including hiring additional prosecutors and
assisting state and local jurisdictions in support of training and
community outreach efforts. Project Safe Neighborhoods initiatives
typically involve U.S. Attorneys working with local law enforcement to
implement programs to increase enforcement of federal firearms laws and
prosecution of violent organizations. Some Project Safe Neighborhood
programs address gang crimes.
[41] Some communities we visited were still in the planning phase of
their grant and had not yet implemented programs.
[42] Cosmos Corporation for Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, National Evaluation of the Gang-
Free Schools Initiative (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2007).
[43] Urban Institute for Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Community Collaboratives Addressing
Youth Gang:, Interim Findings from the Gang Reduction Program
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2008).
[44] Department of Justice, Best Practices to Address Community Gang
Problems: OJJDP's Comprehensive Gang Model (Washington, D.C., 2008).
[45] U.S. Department of Justice and National Alliance of Gang
Investigators Associations, 2005 National Gang Threat Assessment,
(Washington, D.C.: 2005); and U.S. Department of Justice, National Gang
Intelligence Center and National Drug Intelligence Center, 2009
National Gang Threat Assessment (Washington, D.C.: January 2009). The
2007 National Youth Gang Survey did not report on gang problems ever
reported in rural communities, but found the 15 percent of agencies
that serve rural counties reported experiencing youth gang problems in
2007.
[46] U.S. Department of Justice and National Alliance of Gang
Investigators Associations, 2005 National Gang Threat Assessment,
(Washington, D.C.: 2005); and U.S. Department of Justice, National Gang
Intelligence Center and National Drug Intelligence Center, 2009
National Gang Threat Assessment (Washington, D.C.: January 2009).
[47] For example, in one USAO, a prosecutor explained that the goal for
his office was to regain stability in neighborhoods where local law
enforcement had lost control and citizens were threatened by gangs
engaged in violence and drug trafficking. Once stability was restored,
state and local prosecutors and police were to resume primary
responsibility for gang-related prosecutions.
[48] As discussed in the body of this report, USAOs do not consistently
maintain data on the number of gang-related cases prosecuted under
various criminal statutes.
[49] This list is not exhaustive; other federal criminal statutes are
also used to prosecute gang-related crimes.
[50] Penalties listed include terms of imprisonment and do not include
other penalties, such as fines and terms of supervised release.
[51] See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68. Under RICO, ’racketeering activity“
includes a broad assortment of state and federal crimes. § 1961(1).
These include, for example, murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson,
robbery, extortion, mail fraud, wire fraud, obstruction of criminal
investigations, obstruction of justice, retaliation against a witness,
forgery or false use of a passport, federal offenses involving
controlled substances, and alien smuggling crimes. See id.
[52] 8 U.S.C. § 1959. "Racketeering activity" has the same meaning as
under RICO. § 1959(b)(1).
[53] As defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16.
[54] 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a).
[55] Id.
[56] See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(b), 1961(4).
[57] Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 150001(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2034 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 521).
[58] Indeed, there were few reported cases where the enhancement has
been successfully utilized to increase the defendant's penalty of
conviction. See e.g., Sepulveda v. United States, 330 F.3d 55, 58-59
(1st Cir. 2003) (affirming on collateral review defendant's sentence
enhancement under § 521).
[59] See 18 U.S.C. § 521(a).
[60] Id. § 521(d). The Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) has a bearing on this statutory provision.
In Apprendi, the Court held, "Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit examined the criminal street gang enhancement in
light of Apprendi and found that Apprendi requires that "the essential
facts for a § 521 enhancement... must be pleaded in an indictment and
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt," rather than found by a
preponderance of the evidence by the judge. United States v. Matthews,
312 F.3d 652, 663 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 521(d)). Beyond a reasonable
doubt is a higher burden to prove than a preponderance of the evidence,
which only requires the greater weight of the evidence. This means that
after Apprendi proving the required elements to increase a defendant's
term of imprisonment under the criminal street gang enhancement would
be subject to a higher burden, like a separate offense. There are no
post-Apprendi reported decisions in which the criminal street gang
enhancement has been successfully used.
[61] Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of
Justice Assistance, Addressing Community Gang Problems: A Practical
Guide (Washington, D.C.: August 1999).
[62] Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of
Justice Assistance, Addressing Community Gang Problems: A Model for
Problem Solving (Washington, D.C.: August 1999).
[63] Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Youth Gang Programs and
Strategies (Washington, D.C.: August 2000).
[64] Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, OJJDP Comprehensive Gang
Model: Planning for Implementation (Washington, D.C.: June 2002).
[65] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[66] DOJ Office of Inspector General, Resource Management of U.S.
Attorneys Offices (Washington, D.C.: November 2008).
[67] See [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-15].
[68] The four grant programs are the Comprehensive Anti-Gang
Initiative, Gang Reduction Program, Gang Free Schools, and Gang
Prevention Coordination Assistance Program.
[End of section]
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