Border Patrol
Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol's Mission, but More Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness Gao ID: GAO-09-824 August 31, 2009The U.S. Border Patrol, part of the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP), operates checkpoints on U.S. roads, mainly in the southwest border states where most illegal entries occur. As part of a three-tiered strategy to maximize detection and apprehension of illegal aliens, Border Patrol agents at checkpoints screen vehicles for illegal aliens and contraband. GAO was asked to assess (1) checkpoint performance and factors affecting performance, (2) checkpoint performance measures, (3) community impacts considered in checkpoint placement and design, and (4) the impact of checkpoint operations on nearby communities. GAO work included a review of Border Patrol data and guidance; visits to checkpoints and communities in five Border Patrol sectors across four southwest border states, selected on the basis of size, type, and volume, among other factors; and discussions with community members and Border Patrol officials in headquarters and field locations.
Checkpoints have contributed to the Border Patrol's ability to seize illegal drugs, apprehend illegal aliens, and screen potential terrorists; however, several factors have impeded higher levels of performance. Checkpoint contributions included over one-third of the Border Patrol's total drug seizures, according to Border Patrol data. Despite these and other contributions, Border Patrol officials said that additional staff, canine teams, and inspection technology were needed to increase checkpoint effectiveness. Border Patrol officials said they plan to increase these resources. The Border Patrol established three performance measures to report the results of checkpoint operations, and while they provide some insight into checkpoint activity, they do not indicate if checkpoints are operating efficiently and effectively. In addition, GAO found that a lack of management oversight and unclear checkpoint data collection guidance resulted in the overstatement of checkpoint performance results in fiscal year 2007 and 2008 agency performance reports, as well as inconsistent data collection practices at checkpoints. These factors hindered management's ability to monitor the need for program improvement. Internal control standards require that agencies accurately record and report data necessary to demonstrate agency performance, and that they provide proper oversight of these activities. The Border Patrol generally followed its guidelines for considering community safety and convenience in four recent checkpoint placement and design decisions, including the proposed permanent checkpoint on Interstate 19 in Arizona. Current and projected traffic volume was a key factor in the design of the proposed Interstate 19 checkpoint, but was not considered when determining the number of inspection lanes for three recently completed checkpoints in Texas due to a lack of guidance. Having explicit guidance on using current and projected traffic volumes could help ensure that future checkpoints are appropriately sized. Individuals GAO contacted who live near checkpoints generally supported their operations but expressed concerns regarding property damage that occurs when illegal aliens and smugglers circumvent checkpoints to avoid apprehension. The Border Patrol is not yet using performance measures it has developed to examine the extent that checkpoint operations affect quality of life in surrounding communities. The Border Patrol uses patrols and technology to detect and respond to circumventions, but officials said that other priorities sometimes precluded positioning more than a minimum number of agents on checkpoint circumvention routes. The Border Patrol has not documented the number of agents needed to address circumventions at the proposed I-19 checkpoint. Given the concerns of nearby residents regarding circumventions, conducting a workforce planning needs assessment at the checkpoint design stage could help ensure that resources needed for addressing such activity are planned for and deployed.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Team: Phone:GAO-09-824, Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol's Mission, but More Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
August 2009:
Border Patrol:
Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol's Mission, but More Consistent
Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could Improve
Effectiveness:
GAO-09-824:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-09-824, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The U.S. Border Patrol, part of the Department of Homeland Security‘s
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), operates checkpoints on U.S.
roads, mainly in the southwest border states where most illegal entries
occur. As part of a three-tiered strategy to maximize detection and
apprehension of illegal aliens, Border Patrol agents at checkpoints
screen vehicles for illegal aliens and contraband. GAO was asked to
assess (1) checkpoint performance and factors affecting performance,
(2) checkpoint performance measures, (3) community impacts considered
in checkpoint placement and design, and (4) the impact of checkpoint
operations on nearby communities. GAO work included a review of Border
Patrol data and guidance; visits to checkpoints and communities in five
Border Patrol sectors across four southwest border states, selected on
the basis of size, type, and volume, among other factors; and
discussions with community members and Border Patrol officials in
headquarters and field locations.
What GAO Found:
Checkpoints have contributed to the Border Patrol‘s ability to seize
illegal drugs, apprehend illegal aliens, and screen potential
terrorists; however, several factors have impeded higher levels of
performance. Checkpoint contributions included over one-third of the
Border Patrol‘s total drug seizures, according to Border Patrol data.
Despite these and other contributions, Border Patrol officials said
that additional staff, canine teams, and inspection technology were
needed to increase checkpoint effectiveness. Border Patrol officials
said they plan to increase these resources.
The Border Patrol established three performance measures to report the
results of checkpoint operations, and while they provide some insight
into checkpoint activity, they do not indicate if checkpoints are
operating efficiently and effectively. In addition, GAO found that a
lack of management oversight and unclear checkpoint data collection
guidance resulted in the overstatement of checkpoint performance
results in fiscal year 2007 and 2008 agency performance reports, as
well as inconsistent data collection practices at checkpoints. These
factors hindered management‘s ability to monitor the need for program
improvement. Internal control standards require that agencies
accurately record and report data necessary to demonstrate agency
performance, and that they provide proper oversight of these
activities.
The Border Patrol generally followed its guidelines for considering
community safety and convenience in four recent checkpoint placement
and design decisions, including the proposed permanent checkpoint on
Interstate 19 in Arizona. Current and projected traffic volume was a
key factor in the design of the proposed Interstate 19 checkpoint, but
was not considered when determining the number of inspection lanes for
three recently completed checkpoints in Texas due to a lack of
guidance. Having explicit guidance on using current and projected
traffic volumes could help ensure that future checkpoints are
appropriately sized.
Individuals GAO contacted who live near checkpoints generally supported
their operations but expressed concerns regarding property damage that
occurs when illegal aliens and smugglers circumvent checkpoints to
avoid apprehension. The Border Patrol is not yet using performance
measures it has developed to examine the extent that checkpoint
operations affect quality of life in surrounding communities. The
Border Patrol uses patrols and technology to detect and respond to
circumventions, but officials said that other priorities sometimes
precluded positioning more than a minimum number of agents on
checkpoint circumvention routes. The Border Patrol has not documented
the number of agents needed to address circumventions at the proposed I-
19 checkpoint. Given the concerns of nearby residents regarding
circumventions, conducting a workforce planning needs assessment at the
checkpoint design stage could help ensure that resources needed for
addressing such activity are planned for and deployed.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that CBP take several actions to strengthen checkpoint
design and staffing, and improve the measurement and reporting of
checkpoint effectiveness, including community impact. CBP agreed with
our recommendations, and identified actions planned or underway to
implement the recommendations.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-824] or key
components. For more information, contact Richard Stana at (202) 512-
8777 or stanar@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Checkpoint Contributions Support the Border Patrol's Mission, But
Several Factors Affect Higher Levels of Performance:
Checkpoint Performance Measures Have Been Established, but Data
Limitations Hinder their Usefulness:
Border Patrol Considered Community Impact in Checkpoint Placement and
Design:
Community Members Cited Some Adverse Impacts of Checkpoint Operations,
and Border Patrol Reported Having Limited Resources to Minimize Them:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Proposed Border Patrol Checkpoint Performance Measures:
Appendix III: Photographs of Potential Checkpoint Locations on I-19, in
Arizona:
Appendix IV: Additional Property Value Data for the State of Arizona,
Santa Cruz County, Pima County, and Tubac:
Appendix V: Additional Economic Data for the State of Arizona, Santa
Cruz County, Pima County, and Tubac:
Appendix VI: Additional Tourism Data for the State of Arizona, Santa
Cruz County, and Pima County:
Appendix VII: Additional Crime Data for the State of Arizona, Santa
Cruz County, Pima County, and Tubac:
Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Results of Border Patrol Checkpoint Performance Measures as
Reported in Annual Performance and Accountability Reports and GAO
Analysis:
Table 2: Selected Border Patrol Checkpoint Locations Compared with
Surrounding Population Densities and Distances to Nearest Hospitals and
Schools:
Table 3: I-19 Proposed Checkpoint Locations Compared with Surrounding
Population Densities and Distances to Nearest Hospitals and Schools:
Table 4: Border Patrol Reasons for Not Selecting Certain Locations for
the I-19 Permanent Checkpoint:
Table 5: Checkpoint Inspection Lanes Compared to Traffic Volume for the
Three Checkpoints Constructed Since 2006:
Table 6: Facilities and Resources Recommended in Border Patrol
Checkpoint Design Guidance Compared to Recently Constructed Permanent
Checkpoints:
Table 7: Border Patrol Response to Community Recommendations Expressed
on the Draft Design of the I-19 Checkpoint:
Table 8: Comparison of Proposed I-19 Permanent Checkpoint with I-35
Checkpoint:
Table 9: Number of Apprehensions and Seizures at the I-19 Checkpoint
and Area Surrounding I-19 Checkpoint:
Table 10: Checkpoints Visited by GAO, by Border Patrol Sector:
Table 11: Total Net Assessed Values and Percentage Change from Previous
Year (in parenthesis) for Select Areas in Arizona, 2000 through 2008:
Table 12: Total Number of Establishments in Tubac, by NAICS Industry,
2000 through 2006:
Table 13: Number of Other Offenses or Incidents Reported to Santa Cruz
County Sheriff's Department, District 2, Quarterly from January 1,
2004, through December 31, 2008:
Figures:
Figure 1: Total Apprehensions of Illegal Aliens Across the Southwest
Border for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2008:
Figure 2: Permanent Checkpoint on I-35, North of Laredo, Texas:
Figure 3: Border Patrol Sectors and Permanent Checkpoints along the
Southwest Border:
Figure 4: Tactical Checkpoint at Arivaca Road, South of Tucson,
Arizona:
Figure 5: Checkpoint on I-19, South of Tucson, Arizona:
Figure 6: Drug Seizures at Checkpoints in the Southwest Border Sectors
for Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008:
Figure 7: Apprehensions of Illegal Aliens at Checkpoints in the
Southwest Border Sectors for Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008:
Figure 8: I-5 and I-15 checkpoints Near San Diego, California:
Figure 9: Canine Working Checkpoint Inspections:
Figure 10: Van with Backscatter X-ray Scanning a Truck (left
photograph) and VACIS Unit (right photograph) Used at Checkpoints to
Detect Concealed Persons or Contraband:
Figure 11: Map of I-19 Corridor with Proposed Checkpoint Locations and
Distances From Schools:
Figure 12: I-35 Checkpoint, North of Laredo, Texas:
Figure 13: Border Patrol Site Plan of the Proposed I-19 Permanent
Checkpoint:
Figure 14: Quarterly Number of Pima County Sheriff's Department
Referrals to the Border Patrol and Santa Cruz County Assists to Other
Agencies, January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2008:
Figure 15: Map of all Arizona Counties, Santa Cruz and Pima Counties,
and the I-19 Corridor:
Figure 16: Median Real Estate Property Value for Residential Properties
in the Arizona Communities of Tubac and Green Valley and Counties of
Santa Cruz and Pima, 2002 through 2008:
Figure 17: Percentage Annual Change in Number of Visitors to Arizona
State Parks, 2002 through 2008:
Figure 18: Number of Violent Crime Offenses and Annual Percentage
Change for Selected Arizona Locations, 2004 through 2008:
Figure 19: Number of Property Crime Offenses and Percentage Annual
Change for Selected Arizona Locations, 2004 through 2008:
Figure 20: KP 41, Looking North, Aerial View, Location Marked:
Figure 21: KP 25, Looking South, Aerial View, Location Marked:
Figure 22: KP 42, Looking North, Aerial View, Location Marked:
Figure 23: KP 42, Looking South, Aerial View, Location Marked:
Figure 24: KP 50, Looking South, Aerial View, Location Marked:
Figure 25: KP 50, Looking North, Aerial View, Location Marked:
Figure 26: Median Residential Sales Prices and Number of Sales in
Tubac, July 2006 through March 2009:
Figure 27: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Net Assessed Values
for Select Areas in Arizona, 2001 through 2008:
Figure 28: Trends for Top Six Industries in Tubac, by Number of
Establishments, 2000 through 2006:
Figure 29: Number of Establishments in Tubac and Percentage Change from
Previous Year, Total Number of Establishments for Arizona, Pima County
and Santa Cruz County, 2001 through 2006:
Figure 30: Number of Real Estate, Rental, and Leasing Establishments in
Tubac and Santa Cruz County and Percentage Change from Previous Year
for Arizona and Pima County, 2001 through 2006:
Figure 31: Number of Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation Establishments
in Tubac and Santa Cruz County and Percentage Change from Previous Year
for Arizona and Pima County, 2001 through 2006:
Figure 32: Number of Accommodation and Food Service Establishments in
Tubac and Santa Cruz County and Percentage Change from Previous Year
for Arizona and Pima County, 2001 through 2006:
Figure 33: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Number of Employees
for Tubac, Santa Cruz County, Pima County, and Arizona, 2001 through
2006:
Figure 34: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Total Annual Payroll,
2002 through 2006:
Figure 35: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Lodging Occupancy
Rates, 2001 through 2008:
Figure 36: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Revenue Per Available
Room, 2001 through 2008:
Figure 37: Percentage Change from Previous Year for Violent Crimes and
Property Crimes in Arizona, 2005 through 2007:
Figure 38: Santa Cruz County Total Offenses, 2004 through 2008:
Figure 39: Santa Cruz County Number of Violent Crime Offenses by
District, 2004 through 2008:
Figure 40: Santa Cruz County Number of Property Crime Offenses by
District, 2004 through 2008:
Figure 41: Cross-District Comparison of Violent Crime Offenses,
Quarterly from January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2008:
Figure 42: Cross-District Comparison of Property Crime Offenses,
Quarterly from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2008:
Figure 43: Cross-District Comparison of Criminal Damage Offenses,
Quarterly from January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2008:
Figure 44: Number of Narcotics and Drug Related Offenses in Santa Cruz
County Sheriff's Department, District 2, Quarterly from January 1,
2004, through December 31, 2008:
Abbreviations:
ADOT: Arizona Department of Transportation:
CAR: Checkpoint Activity Report:
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
CCD: Department of Education Common Core Data:
COMPEX: Compliance Examination:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
EIS: Environmental Impact Statement:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act:
ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
KP: kilometer post:
MLS: Multiple Listing Service:
NAICS: North American Industry Classification System:
NEPA: National Environmental Policy Act:
PAR: Performance and Accountability Report:
SBI: Secure Border Initiative:
UCR: Uniform Crime Reporting:
VACIS: Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
August 31, 2009:
Congressional Requesters:
Several hundred thousand individuals enter the country illegally and
undetected each year, and the impact of this illegal activity affects
communities within the southwest border states. Some of these illegal
aliens[Footnote 1], on more than one occasion, have evaded detection at
the border ports of entry[Footnote 2] by hiding themselves, drugs, or
other contraband in vehicles. Others trekked through the Arizona
desert, waded across the Rio Grande, or otherwise eluded capture by
roving law enforcement patrols somewhere along the nearly 2,000-mile
expanse of the southwest border. U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), a component within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is
responsible for managing, controlling, and securing our nation's
borders, at and between the ports of entry. Between the ports of entry,
the U.S. Border Patrol, a component of CBP, is responsible for
detecting and preventing the illegal entry of persons and contraband,
including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. To achieve these
goals on the southwest border, the Border Patrol has implemented a
multilayered enforcement strategy. This strategy includes the use of
traffic checkpoints generally located from 25 to 100 miles of the
border, where Border Patrol agents screen vehicles for any illegal
aliens or contraband that were able to cross the border
undetected.[Footnote 3] Some of these checkpoints have a permanent
structure with off-highway inspection lanes and technology to
facilitate inspection and convenience, while other checkpoints have
temporary infrastructure in the form of trailers and generators that
are generally used on secondary roads with low traffic volume.
Communities within the border enforcement area may be positively or
negatively impacted by the placement, design, and operation of
checkpoints and other Border Patrol resources, depending on sufficient,
efficient, and strategic use of these resources to address the volume
and type of illegal activity. In regard to checkpoint placement, for
example, the Border Patrol needs to balance identifying locations that
provide the best tactical advantage to detect and apprehend illegal
activity against the impact that such a location would have on public
safety issues that may result from traffic delays and inadvertent
channeling of illegal activity into surrounding communities. In regard
to checkpoint operation, the Border Patrol must balance resources
needed to detect and apprehend illegal activity at the checkpoints
against the need to deter and prevent illegal travel through local
neighborhoods by placing resources along community perimeters.
Historically, the Border Patrol has been unable to address the volume
of cross-border illegal activity, putting greater reliance on the
efficient and strategic use of resources, including checkpoints.
To help federal agencies operate more efficiently and effectively, the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) requires the
establishment of performance goals that define the level of performance
to be achieved, and measures by which to track progress toward these
goals and identify areas that need improvement.[Footnote 4] We
previously reported in 2005 that checkpoints serve an important role in
U.S. border security strategy and that community support for
checkpoints was generally positive; however, we recommended that the
Border Patrol develop measures and collect data to report on, and
potentially improve, checkpoint productivity and effectiveness.
[Footnote 5] Our report also discussed community concerns in the state
of Arizona in regard to checkpoint placement, design, and operation.
You asked us to determine the progress the Border Patrol has made in
implementing these prior recommendations and resolving community
concerns, including concerns about the planned permanent checkpoint on
Interstate 19 (I-19) in Arizona. This report addresses the following
objectives:
* How has checkpoint performance contributed to meeting Border Patrol
goals for securing the southwest border, and what factors, if any, have
affected checkpoint performance?
* To what extent has the Border Patrol established measures of
performance for checkpoints?
* To what extent has the Border Patrol considered community impacts in
the placement and design of checkpoints since 2006, including the
planned I-19 permanent checkpoint?
* How do checkpoint operations impact nearby communities, particularly
those near the I-19 checkpoint, and to what extent does the Border
Patrol address those impacts?
To address these objectives, we reviewed Border Patrol checkpoint
policy documents, reports, manuals, and guidance, and held discussions
with relevant headquarters and field officials concerning border
strategy, checkpoint operations, and the design and placement of
checkpoints. We conducted site visits and observed checkpoint
operations at 15 checkpoints, located in five of the nine Border Patrol
sectors: San Diego sector, California; Tucson sector, Arizona; El Paso
sector, Texas and New Mexico; and Laredo and Rio Grande Valley sectors
in Texas. The sectors we visited were selected to provide diversity in
the size and types of checkpoint operations; estimated volume of
illegal aliens; and topography and density of road networks. While our
site visit results are not representative of observations that may have
been made at other times or locations, they provided us with an overall
understanding of checkpoint operations.
To assess the reliability of checkpoint performance data collected by
the Border Patrol, we spoke with agency officials at Border Patrol's
Washington, D.C. headquarters and at the five sectors we visited in the
field about data integrity procedures, including methods by which data
are checked and reviewed internally for accuracy. We also provided a
data collection instrument to the Border Patrol seeking information on
how checkpoint agents collect checkpoint performance data. We
determined that despite limitations in overall data collection and
oversight processes, the data recorded on certain data fields--
specifically apprehensions and drug seizures at checkpoints--are
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report, with limitations
noted as appropriate.
To assess the extent to which the Border Patrol considered community
impacts in the design and placement of checkpoints, our scope included
checkpoints that were either (a) new permanent checkpoints constructed
since 2006, or (b) new permanent checkpoints currently under
construction. We did not include older checkpoints in our analysis
because the guidelines and standards for checkpoint placement and
design were different and limited documentation is available for them,
according to Border Patrol and CBP officials. We did not include
checkpoints that were or are being renovated or expanded, because they
would not be subject to the Border Patrol's checkpoint placement
guidelines. We also did not include tactical checkpoints in our
analysis, because these lack permanent infrastructure. We also included
in our analysis the planned I-19 permanent checkpoint, rather than all
planned checkpoints, because of the extent of the controversy regarding
that particular checkpoint.
To assess the extent that operations from Border Patrol checkpoints
impact surrounding areas, we interviewed officials from 14 state and
local law enforcement agencies, and various business groups, community
leaders, and other members of communities located near checkpoints we
visited to obtain their views on the impacts of checkpoint operations.
Because this selection of places was a nonprobability sample, the
results from our site visits cannot be generalized to other locations
and checkpoints; however, what we learned from our site visits provided
a useful perspective on the issues addressed in this report. We also
interviewed Border Patrol field officials at the 15 checkpoints we
visited regarding the impacts of checkpoint operations. In addition, we
gathered and compared available crime, tourism, economic, and real
estate data for the state of Arizona and communities near the current
checkpoint on I-19 to examine the extent to which checkpoint operations
impact surrounding communities. We determined that these data used
within the report and appendixes were sufficiently reliable for
providing historical trends and general descriptions.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 to August 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform our audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the
evidence obtained provides this reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides
additional details about our scope and methodology.
Background:
CBP's U.S. Border Patrol is the uniformed enforcement division
responsible for border security between designated official ports of
entry into the country. The Border Patrol reports that its priority
mission is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons, including
weapons of mass destruction, from entering the United States. In
addition, the Border Patrol has a traditional mission of preventing
illegal aliens, smugglers, narcotics, and other contraband from
crossing the border between the ports of entry. To carry out its
missions, the Border Patrol had a budget of $3.5 billion in fiscal year
2009 to establish and maintain operational control of the U.S. border.
[Footnote 6] As of June 2009, the Border Patrol had 19,354 agents
nationwide, an increase of 57 percent since September 2006. Of these
agents, about 88 percent (17,011) were located in the nine Border
Patrol sectors along the southwest border.[Footnote 7] About 4 percent
of the Border Patrol's agents in these sectors were assigned to traffic
checkpoints, according to the Border Patrol.
Despite efforts to enhance border security in recent years, DHS reports
show that significant illegal activity continues to cross the border
undetected. At the ports of entry, CBP has both increased training for
agents and enhanced technology. However, the DHS Annual Performance
Report for fiscal years 2008-2010 sets a goal for detecting and
apprehending about 30 percent of major illegal activity at ports of
entry in 2009, indicating that 70 percent of criminals and contraband
may pass through the ports and continue on interstates and major roads
to the interior of the United States. Between the ports of entry, CBP
is implementing the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear,
multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing
illegal immigration through a comprehensive border protection system.
[Footnote 8]
Along the southwest border, overall Border Patrol apprehensions of
illegal aliens have declined over the past 3 years, from nearly 1.1
million in fiscal year 2006, to 705,000 in fiscal year 2008. This
decreasing pattern was reflected in all sectors except San Diego, which
showed a steady increase across these years, as shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: Total Apprehensions of Illegal Aliens Across the Southwest
Border for Fiscal Years 2006 through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Border Patrol sector: San Diego;
Fiscal year 2006: 142,104;
Fiscal year 2007: 152,460;
Fiscal year 2008: 162,390.
Border Patrol sector: El Centro;
Fiscal year 2006: 61,465;
Fiscal year 2007: 55,883;
Fiscal year 2008: 40,961.
Border Patrol sector: Yuma;
Fiscal year 2006: 118,549;
Fiscal year 2007: 37,992;
Fiscal year 2008: 8,363.
Border Patrol sector: Tucson;
Fiscal year 2006: 392,074;
Fiscal year 2007: 378,239;
Fiscal year 2008: 317,696.
Border Patrol sector: El Paso;
Fiscal year 2006: 122,256;
Fiscal year 2007: 75,464;
Fiscal year 2008: 30,312.
Border Patrol sector: Marfa;
Fiscal year 2006: 7,520;
Fiscal year 2007: 5,536;
Fiscal year 2008: 5,391.
Border Patrol sector: Del Rio;
Fiscal year 2006: 42,636;
Fiscal year 2007: 22,920;
Fiscal year 2008: 20,761.
Border Patrol sector: Laredo;
Fiscal year 2006: 74,840;
Fiscal year 2007: 56,714;
Fiscal year 2008: 43,658.
Border Patrol sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Fiscal year 2006: 110,528;
Fiscal year 2007: 73,430;
Fiscal year 2008: 75,473.
Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data.
[End of figure]
The Tucson sector continues to have the largest number of apprehensions
compared to other sectors along the southwest border, as shown in
figure 1. Border Patrol officials stated that targeted enforcement
efforts in other Border Patrol sectors in previous years caused a shift
in illegal cross-border activity to the Tucson sector.
Checkpoint Role and Characteristics:
Checkpoints are the third layer in the Border Patrol's three-tiered
border enforcement strategy. The other two layers are located at or
near the border, and consist of line watch and roving patrol. According
to the Border Patrol, the majority of Border Patrol agents are assigned
to line watch operations at the border, where they maintain a high
profile and are responsible for deterring, turning back, or arresting
anyone they encounter attempting to illegally cross the border into the
United States. Roving patrol operations consist of smaller contingents
of agents deployed behind the line watch to detect and arrest those
making it past the first layer of defense in areas away from the
immediate border. Traffic checkpoints are located on major U.S.
highways and secondary roads, usually 25 to 100 miles inland from the
border. This permits them to be far enough inland to detect and
apprehend illegal aliens, smugglers, and potential terrorists
attempting to travel farther into the interior of the United States
after evading detection at the border, but are close enough to the
border to potentially control access to major population centers.
The Border Patrol operates two types of checkpoints--permanent and
tactical--that differ in terms of size, infrastructure, and location.
While both types of checkpoints are generally operated at fixed
locations, permanent checkpoints--as their name suggests--are
characterized by their bricks and mortar structure, that may include
off-highway covered lanes for vehicle inspection, and several buildings
including those for administration, detention of persons suspected of
smuggling or other illegal activity, and kennels for canines used in
the inspection process (see figure 2).
Figure 2: Permanent Checkpoint on I-35, North of Laredo, Texas:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
The following are labeled in the photograph:
Canine facility;
Covered primary inspection lanes;
Main checkpoint building and detention facility.
Source: Border Patrol.
[End of figure]
Permanent checkpoints are equipped with technology and computers
connected to national law enforcement databases to enhance the ability
of agents to identify suspects, research criminal histories, and cross-
check terrorist watch lists. Permanent checkpoints generally have
electricity, communication towers, and permanent lighting to enhance
operations at night and in poor weather conditions. These facilities
also offer greater physical safety to agents and the public--
particularly when they are located off-highway--by virtue of protective
concrete barriers separating agents from vehicle traffic, and better
signage and lighting. Permanent checkpoints also have assets to help
lessen the chance that illegal aliens and smugglers will be able to
successfully bypass the checkpoint to avoid detection. These assets
include remote video surveillance, electronic sensors, and agent
patrols in the vicinity of the checkpoints, which may also include
horse patrols and all-terrain vehicles. There are 32 permanent
checkpoints along the southwest border, in eight of the nine Border
Patrol sectors, as shown in figure 3. Of the nine sectors, only the
Tucson sector does not have permanent checkpoints, instead operating
tactical checkpoints.
Figure 3: Border Patrol Sectors and Permanent Checkpoints along the
Southwest Border:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map of the Southwest Border]
The following are labeled in the photograph:
Permanent checkpoints;
City or town;
Border Patrol sector;
State line.
Sources: GAO (analysis), Mapinfo (map), Border Patrol (data).
[End of figure]
Tactical checkpoints are also operated at a fixed location but do not
have permanent buildings or facilities, as shown in figure 4.[Footnote
9] One of the intents of tactical checkpoints is to support permanent
checkpoints by monitoring and inspecting traffic on secondary roads
that the Border Patrol determined are likely to be used by illegal
aliens or smugglers to evade apprehension at permanent checkpoints.
Tactical checkpoint infrastructure may consist of a few Border Patrol
vehicles, used by agents to drive to the location; orange cones to slow
down and direct traffic; portable water supply; a cage for canines (if
deployed at the checkpoint); portable rest facilities; and warning
signs. In general, tactical checkpoints are intended to be set up for
short-term or intermittent use, and open and close based on
intelligence on changing patterns of smuggling and routes used by
illegal aliens. As a result, the number of tactical checkpoints in
operation can change on a daily basis. Thirty-nine tactical checkpoints
were operational at some point in fiscal year 2008 on the southwest
border.
Figure 4: Tactical Checkpoint at Arivaca Road, South of Tucson,
Arizona:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Authority at Border Patrol Checkpoints:
Border Patrol agents at checkpoints have legal authority that agents do
not have when patrolling areas away from the border. The United States
Supreme Court ruled that Border Patrol agents may stop a vehicle at
fixed checkpoints for brief questioning of its occupants even if there
is no reason to believe that the particular vehicle contains illegal
aliens.[Footnote 10] The Court further held that Border Patrol agents
"have wide discretion" to refer motorists selectively to a secondary
inspection area for additional brief questioning.[Footnote 11] In
contrast, the Supreme Court held that Border Patrol agents on roving
patrol may stop a vehicle only if they have reasonable suspicion that
the vehicle contains aliens who may be illegally in the United States--
a higher threshold for stopping and questioning motorists than at
checkpoints.[Footnote 12] The constitutional threshold for searching a
vehicle is the same, however, and must be supported by either consent
or probable cause, whether in the context of a roving patrol or a
checkpoint search.[Footnote 13]
Checkpoints in the Tucson Sector:
The Tucson sector is the only sector along the southwest border without
permanent checkpoints. Although other sectors along the southwest
border deploy a combination of permanent and tactical checkpoints, the
Tucson sector has only tactical checkpoints that operate from fixed
locations. Legislation effectively prohibited the construction of
permanent checkpoints in the Tucson sector, beginning in fiscal year
1999. Specifically, the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 1999, stated that "no funds shall be available for
the site acquisition, design, or construction of any Border Patrol
checkpoint in the Tucson sector."[Footnote 14] The effect of this
legislative language was that no permanent checkpoints could be planned
or constructed in this sector, which had no permanent checkpoints when
the prohibition took effect. Subsequent appropriations acts carried
this construction prohibition forward through fiscal year
2006.[Footnote 15] Furthermore, during fiscal years 2003 through 2006,
the Border Patrol was subject to an additional appropriations
restriction that required it to relocate checkpoints in the Tucson
sector on a regular basis.[Footnote 16] Beginning in fiscal year 2007,
the appropriations restrictions that applied to checkpoints in the
Tucson sector did not appear in DHS's annual appropriations
acts.[Footnote 17] In response, the Border Patrol fixed the position of
the I-19 checkpoint at kilometer post (KP) 42, near Amado,
Arizona.[Footnote 18] Although the I-19 checkpoint has been operating
since November 2006 at this fixed location, the checkpoint lacks
permanent infrastructure and the associated benefits. For example, the
Border Patrol does not have the facilities to detain apprehended
illegal aliens at or near the checkpoint or the access to national
databases to determine whether apprehended individuals are wanted
criminals or potential terrorists. The facility also lacks protective
concrete barriers separating agents from vehicle traffic and a canopy
to protect agents and canines from exposure to the elements while
conducting inspections, as shown in figure 5.
Figure 5: Checkpoint on I-19, South of Tucson, Arizona:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
The Border Patrol has developed plans to construct a permanent
checkpoint on I-19, but the House Committee on Appropriations
instructed the Border Patrol to first take some interim steps.
Specifically, in the House report accompanying DHS's appropriations
bill for fiscal year 2009, the committee instructed the Border Patrol
not to finalize planning for the design and location of a permanent
checkpoint on I-19 until it first establishes and evaluates the
effectiveness of an upgraded interim checkpoint. According to Border
Patrol officials, the upgraded interim checkpoint will have a canopy, a
third inspection lane, and an expanded secondary inspection area, among
other improvements. In addition, the committee also told the Border
Patrol to consider the findings from this GAO study in its planning
efforts.[Footnote 19] The Border Patrol expects the upgraded interim
checkpoint to be completed by May 2010. Tucson sector officials
estimate that constructing the upgraded interim checkpoint will cost
approximately $1.5 million and constructing the permanent I-19
checkpoint will cost approximately $25 million.
Checkpoint Contributions Support the Border Patrol's Mission, But
Several Factors Affect Higher Levels of Performance:
Checkpoint operations have contributed to furthering the Border
Patrol's mission to protect the border, and have also contributed to
protection efforts of other federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies. However, Border Patrol officials have stated that additional
canines, non-intrusive inspection technology, and staff are needed to
increase checkpoint effectiveness. Border Patrol officials stated that
they are taking steps to increase these resources at checkpoints across
the southwest border.
Contributions to the Border Patrol's Mission Include Seizing Illegal
Drugs, Apprehending Illegal Aliens, and Screening for Potential
Terrorists:
Checkpoints contribute to the Border Patrol's mission to protect the
nation from the impact of contraband illegally transported across the
border, as well as the impact of illegal aliens, some of whom may have
ties to organized crime or countries at higher risk of having groups
that sponsor terrorism.
Seizing Illegal Drugs:
Border Patrol data show that checkpoints assisted federal efforts to
disrupt the supply of illegal drugs. In fiscal year 2008, over 3,500 of
the almost 10,100 drug seizures by the Border Patrol along the
southwest border occurred at checkpoints. With a relatively small
allocation of agents--about 4 percent, according to Border Patrol
officials--checkpoints accounted for about 35 percent of Border Patrol
drug seizures along the southwest border. Checkpoint seizures included
various types of illegal drugs. For example, the Tucson sector
checkpoint on I-19 seized 3,200 pounds of marijuana, with an estimated
street value of $2.6 million, in a single event in June 2009.
Additionally, the Laredo sector checkpoint on I-35 seized almost 240
pounds of cocaine with an estimated street value of $7.6 million in a
single event in March 2009.
Overall, the number of drug seizures at southwest border checkpoints
increased slightly from 3,460 in fiscal year 2007 to 3,540 in fiscal
year 2008 (an increase of about 2 percent), while total Border Patrol
seizures decreased slightly, from 10,285 to 10,065 (a decrease of about
4 percent). In two sectors, however, seizures at checkpoints increased
substantially, as shown in figure 6. Specifically, drug seizures at San
Diego sector checkpoints increased by 93 percent from fiscal year 2007
to 2008, while drug seizures at Yuma sector checkpoints increased by 73
percent. Yuma sector checkpoints also had more than twice the number of
seizures compared to other individual sectors.
Figure 6: Drug Seizures at Checkpoints in the Southwest Border Sectors
for Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Border Patrol sector: San Diego;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint seizures: 149;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint seizures: 288.
Border Patrol sector: El Centro;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint seizures: 135;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint seizures: 43.
Border Patrol sector: Yuma;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint seizures: 936;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint seizures: 1,621.
Border Patrol sector: Tucson;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint seizures: 223;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint seizures: 228.
Border Patrol sector: El Paso;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint seizures: 376;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint seizures: 290.
Border Patrol sector: Marfa;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint seizures: 306;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint seizures: 246.
Border Patrol sector: Del Rio;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint seizures: 88;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint seizures: 97.
Border Patrol sector: Laredo;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint seizures: 290;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint seizures: 118.
Border Patrol sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint seizures: 957;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint seizures: 609.
Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data.
Note: The Rio Grande Valley sector's definition of an "at checkpoint"
seizure is broader than that used by other sectors. Other sectors
report counting seizures occurring only at the checkpoints, while the
Rio Grande Valley sector counts all seizures occurring within 2.5 miles
of the checkpoint, as of August 2008.
[End of figure]
According to San Diego sector officials, the increase in seizures at
San Diego sector checkpoints can be attributed to a number of factors,
including:
* a 78 percent increase in the operational hours of sector checkpoints,
* a 123 percent increase in sector manpower,
* utilizing an additional inspection lane during peak traffic times at
the checkpoint on I-8, rather than allowing traffic to pass without
inspection, and:
* increased infrastructure (fencing, light poles, remote video
surveillance system) in the western corridor of the sector may have
pushed traffic east towards the sector checkpoints.
Yuma sector officials attributed the increase in Yuma sector checkpoint
seizures to factors including increases in tactical infrastructure and
technology at the border, which have allowed the sector to move more
agents and canines to sector checkpoints.
Apprehending Illegal Aliens:
Checkpoints have also contributed to apprehensions of illegal aliens.
Nearly 17,000 illegal aliens were apprehended at checkpoints, or 2
percent of the more than 705,000 total Border Patrol apprehensions
along the southwest border in fiscal year 2008. Checkpoint
apprehensions ranged from single individuals to large parties of
illegal aliens led by "coyotes."[Footnote 20] For example, we observed
the apprehension of an illegal alien at a San Diego sector checkpoint
who was hidden beneath the trunk floor of a passenger vehicle during
our visit to the San Diego sector in October 2008. More recently, the
Laredo sector checkpoint on I-35 found 13 illegal aliens concealed in a
tractor-trailer trying to traverse the checkpoint in a single event in
April 2009. The illegal aliens and the driver of the tractor-trailer
were processed for prosecution.
Overall, apprehensions at checkpoints decreased from fiscal year 2007
to 2008, and at a greater rate than for other Border Patrol activities.
During this time frame, the number of apprehensions at all southwest
Border Patrol checkpoints decreased by 26 percent (from 22,792 to
16,959), while apprehensions for other Border Patrol activities along
the southwest border decreased by 18 percent (from 858,638 to 705,005).
In one sector, however, checkpoint apprehensions increased from fiscal
year 2007 to 2008, as shown in figure 7. Tucson sector checkpoint
apprehensions increased by 28 percent from fiscal year 2007 to 2008,
although the total number of checkpoint apprehensions remained higher
in the San Diego, Laredo, and Rio Grande Valley sectors.
Figure 7: Apprehensions of Illegal Aliens at Checkpoints in the
Southwest Border Sectors for Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Border Patrol sector: San Diego;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint apprehensions: 3,071;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint apprehensions: 2,115.
Border Patrol sector: El Centro;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint apprehensions: 859;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint apprehensions: 396.
Border Patrol sector: Yuma;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint apprehensions: 921;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint apprehensions: 547.
Border Patrol sector: Tucson;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint apprehensions: 1,301;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint apprehensions: 1,667.
Border Patrol sector: El Paso;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint apprehensions: 2,096;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint apprehensions: 1,588.
Border Patrol sector: Marfa;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint apprehensions: 1,608;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint apprehensions: 1,508.
Border Patrol sector: Del Rio;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint apprehensions: 505;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint apprehensions: 272.
Border Patrol sector: Laredo;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint apprehensions: 5,557;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint apprehensions: 2,509.
Border Patrol sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Fiscal year 2007 checkpoint apprehensions: 6,874;
Fiscal year 2008 checkpoint apprehensions: 6,357.
Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data.
Note: Rio Grande Valley sector's definition of an "at checkpoint"
apprehension is broader than that used by other sectors. Other sectors
report counting apprehensions occurring only at the checkpoints, while
Rio Grande Valley sector counts all apprehensions occurring within 2.5
miles of the checkpoint, as of August 2008.
[End of figure]
Border Patrol officials stated that Tucson sector checkpoint
apprehensions increased because the sector maintained nearly full-time
operations at all sector checkpoints during fiscal year 2008.
Additionally, the Border Patrol increased the number of operational
checkpoints in the sector from 10 in fiscal year 2007 to 13 in fiscal
year 2008.
Border Patrol officials said that apprehensions decreased in other
sectors in part due to the deterrent effect of increased Border Patrol
presence and infrastructure, and initiatives to criminally prosecute
illegal aliens. For example, Laredo sector officials said that
checkpoint apprehensions decreased by nearly half from fiscal year 2007
to 2008 due to the following contributing factors:
* Increased staff. The number of Border Patrol agents in the Laredo
sector increased from approximately 1,200 agents in fiscal year 2007 to
approximately 1,636 agents in fiscal year 2008. In addition, Operation
Jump Start, which ended in July 2008, provided 286 National Guard
soldiers to support Border Patrol operations in the sector, with
approximately 36 deployed to support checkpoint operations. These
soldiers were placed in areas highly visible to the checkpoints which,
along with increased Border Patrol agents, created a deterrent to
illegal activity.
* Improved infrastructure and technology. Deterrence and detection
capabilities increased in the Laredo sector in terms of improved
traffic checkpoint technology, cameras, license plate readers, and
vehicle and cargo inspection systems (VACIS). In addition, fiscal year
2007 was the first full fiscal year in which the new state-of-the-art
checkpoint on I-35 was operational. Border Patrol officials believe
that human and narcotics smugglers rerouted their cargo to other
locations due to the deterrent effect of the new checkpoint.
* Increased prosecutions. At the beginning of fiscal year 2008, Laredo
sector implemented a prosecution initiative--known as Operation
Streamline--to prosecute and remove all violators charged with illegal
entry in targeted areas in the sector. Although sector checkpoints were
not in these targeted areas, sector officials reported that this zero
tolerance policy resulted in a higher prosecution rate in fiscal year
2008, providing a deterrent to illegal aliens across the sector.
[Footnote 21]
Screening for Potential Terrorists:
Checkpoints also help screen for individuals who may have ties to
terrorism. CBP reported that in fiscal year 2008, there were three
individuals encountered by the Border Patrol at southwest border
checkpoints who were identified as persons linked to terrorism. In
addition, the Border Patrol reported that in fiscal year 2008
checkpoints encountered 530 aliens from special interest countries,
[Footnote 22] which are countries the Department of State has
determined to represent a potential terrorist threat to the United
States.[Footnote 23] While people from these countries may not have any
ties to illegal or terrorist activities, Border Patrol agents detain
aliens from special interest countries if they are in the United States
illegally and Border Patrol agents report these encounters to the local
Sector Intelligence Agent, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
Joint Terrorism Task Force, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) Office of Investigations, and the CBP National Targeting Center.
For example, according to a Border Patrol official in the El Paso
sector, a checkpoint stopped a vehicle and questioned its three Iranian
occupants, determining that one of those occupants was in the United
States illegally. The individual was detained and turned over to U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement for further questioning.
Contributions to Other Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement
Missions Include Identifying Criminals and Leveraging Resources:
Federal, state, and local law enforcement officials from the five
sectors we visited told us that Border Patrol checkpoints enhance their
operations and mission achievement. For example, federal Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials stated that in addition to
individual drug seizures, checkpoints supported DEA goals to disrupt
and dismantle drug smuggling operations by gathering intelligence from
captured drug smugglers turned over to DEA, helping to identify
patterns in smugglers' routes of ingress to the United States, and
increasing smuggling costs by forcing the use of increasingly
sophisticated methods of concealment to evade detection.
Checkpoints provided benefits to state and local law enforcement
officials, including the identification and detention of criminals who
were attempting to evade arrest by state highway patrol, city police,
or county sheriffs, and providing other services in rural areas with
sparse law enforcement presence. For example, Border Patrol agents at
the I-5 checkpoint in San Clemente, California, referred a vehicle with
two men to secondary inspection because the men were acting
suspiciously. Upon inspection, agents found a small quantity of
marijuana and methamphetamine, a large quantity of cash, and a
handwritten demand note. The men and evidence were turned over to the
local sheriff who determined that the men had robbed a local pharmacy
and were primary suspects in another armed robbery. In terms of other
services, several state and local law enforcement officials we met with
said that checkpoint personnel could respond more quickly to highway
accidents and provide access to detention facilities for transfer of
illegal aliens captured by local authorities. For example, a sheriff
responsible for law enforcement near the U.S. Route 77 checkpoint in
Border Patrol's Rio Grande Valley sector reported that the Border
Patrol regularly provides assistance and backup to his office, such as
responding to highway accidents or other incidents, because he often
has only one deputy on duty to cover a large geographic area.
Additionally, this same sheriff reported that if he apprehends an
illegal alien, he turns the person over to the Border Patrol agents at
the nearby checkpoint for processing and detention.
Factors Affecting Checkpoint Performance Include Operational and
Resource Limitations:
Border Patrol guidance and officials from five sectors we visited
identified operational requirements and resources that are important
for effective and efficient checkpoint performance, including (1)
continuous operation, (2) full-time canine inspection capability, (3)
non-intrusive inspection technology, and (4) number and experience of
checkpoint staff. While most permanent checkpoints were operational
nearly 24 hours per day in fiscal year 2008, Border Patrol officials
have stated that additional canines, non-intrusive inspection
technology, and staff are needed to increase checkpoint effectiveness.
Continuous Operation:
According to the Border Patrol, operating checkpoints continuously--
that is, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week--is key to effective and
efficient checkpoint performance. Keeping checkpoints operational is
important because smugglers and illegal aliens closely monitor
potential transit routes and adjust their plans to ensure the greatest
chance of success. For example, a 1995 study of checkpoint operations
in the San Diego sector by the former U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service showed that when the checkpoint on I-5 was
closed, apprehensions at the nearby and operational I-15 checkpoint
fell sharply--there was a 50 percent decline in 1 month.[Footnote 24]
According to the study, this decline resulted from illegal aliens
choosing to travel through the closed checkpoint on I-5 instead of the
operational checkpoint on I-15.[Footnote 25] Recent testimony before
Congress by the Arizona Attorney General discussed the sophisticated
surveillance and communication technology currently used by smugglers.
[Footnote 26] Such technology could allow for immediate notification of
security vulnerabilities, such as a checkpoint closure. Tucson sector
Border Patrol officials and the Assistant Special Agent in Charge from
DEA's Tucson District Office explained that smugglers of humans and
drugs, often sponsored by organized crime, store loads of people or
drugs in "stash houses" after illegally crossing the border until
transit routes are clear. As soon as a checkpoint is closed, the people
or drugs in the stash houses are moved through the checkpoint.
Border Patrol data showed that in fiscal year 2008 most of the 32
permanent checkpoints were near continuous operation, with 25 having
operated 22 hours or more, and 3 having operated between 20 and 22
hours per day, on average. Those operated most frequently include
permanent checkpoints located off highway with enhanced weather
infrastructure in place. For example, the U.S. Route 77 checkpoint in
Border Patrol's Rio Grande Valley sector was operational almost 24
hours per day on average in fiscal year 2008, closing only for a total
of 22 hours because of inclement weather related to Hurricane Dolly.
The remaining four permanent checkpoints were operational less than 7
hours per day on average in fiscal year 2008. These included two
checkpoints with on-highway inspection lanes that were located in high
traffic areas and two checkpoints that were no longer used because they
were relocated to other locations. For example, the I-5 and I-15
checkpoints in the San Diego sector have on-highway inspection lanes,
as shown in figure 8, and the high traffic volume passing through these
checkpoints overwhelms the capability to perform checkpoint inspections
more than 2 hours per day, on average, without causing significant
traffic congestion and safety concerns.[Footnote 27]
Figure 8: I-5 and I-15 Checkpoints Near San Diego, California:
[Refer to PDF for image: two photographs]
Source: Border Patrol.
[End of figure]
The I-8 checkpoint in Yuma sector was relocated as a new tactical
checkpoint 60 miles east of the location where the former permanent
checkpoint was located, due to encroachment of developers and
increasing freeway traffic. Finally, the Oak Grove checkpoint in the
San Diego sector was operational for only 26 hours in fiscal year 2008
because checkpoint operations were shifted from the Oak Grove
checkpoint to other checkpoints farther east, as well as roving
patrols, to increase enforcement in those targeted areas, according to
sector officials.
Border Patrol data also showed that in general tactical checkpoints are
operated much less frequently than permanent checkpoints, a median of
less than 2 hours per day for tactical checkpoints compared to a median
of over 23 hours per day for permanent checkpoints.[Footnote 28] Border
Patrol officials said that safety conditions and staff shortages were
the primary reasons for closure. Tactical checkpoints, which generally
consist of trailers and generators, are more vulnerable to adverse
weather conditions than permanent structures, and may be lower in
priority for staffing during times of low traffic volume. In addition,
Border Patrol headquarters officials said that differences in
operational hours for tactical checkpoints across sectors can occur
because of the operational decisions of each sector's Chief Patrol
Agent based on information on smuggling trends and available staffing
to address those trends.
Use of Canines:
Border Patrol checkpoint policy states that full-time canine presence
at checkpoints is important for the effective and efficient inspection
of vehicles and cargo for illegal drugs and persons, but the manager of
Border Patrol's canine program noted that in general there is not a
sufficient level of canines at checkpoints.[Footnote 29] According to
Border Patrol officials, smugglers have become increasingly
sophisticated in the design of concealed compartments that agents would
find difficult or impossible to detect without canine assistance.
Often, canines alerting to the presence of illegal drugs or hidden
persons may provide Border Patrol agents the only source of probable
cause to search a vehicle or its occupants, according to Border Patrol
officials.[Footnote 30] (See figure 9)
Figure 9: Canine Working Checkpoint Inspections:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Source: Border Patrol.
[End of figure]
Border Patrol officials said there were not enough canines for full-
time checkpoint coverage, even in sectors with the most heavily used
smuggling corridors. In the Tucson sector, for example, sector
officials said that as of July 15, 2009 they have 99 canine teams, but
120 teams would ensure availability when officers are not available for
duty due to leave, training, or supporting other law enforcement
agencies.[Footnote 31] Border Patrol's canine program manager said that
the Border Patrol expected to train 180 canines in fiscal year 2009 and
will send a majority of these canines to southwest border sectors to
address gaps in canine coverage at checkpoints.[Footnote 32] In fiscal
year 2010, the Border Patrol plans to expand its canine facility to
facilitate training and hopes to train an additional 250-300 canines.
However, the program manager noted that additional trained canines will
not alleviate the Border Patrol's immediate need for these assets as
many of the trained canines will replace older canines that will be
retiring. The program manager stated that while the Border Patrol does
not have the resources to address the need for canines in the near
term, the agency plans to train 1,500 canines by fiscal year 2014
which, including canine retirement and replacement, will result in
1,300 deployed canines across all Border Patrol activities, including
checkpoints.
Inspection Technology:
The Border Patrol has identified the deployment of non-intrusive
inspection technologies that allow the inspection of hidden or closed
compartments--in particular, the ability to find contraband and other
security threats--as one of its high-priority needs to improve
checkpoint performance. Non-intrusive inspection technologies, such as
a VACIS or backscatter X-ray machine, as shown in figure 10, use
imaging to help trained operators see the contents of closed vehicles
and containers, which helps them to intercept a broad array of drugs,
other contraband, illegal aliens, or other items of interest without
having to search physically.[Footnote 33] Border Patrol officials told
us that they have seen smugglers using increasingly complex concealment
methods at checkpoints, emphasizing the importance of deploying new
detection technologies to counter these threats. For example, Tucson
sector officials reported that within 1 month of deployment of a
backscatter machine at a sector checkpoint, they identified 30 hidden
compartments in vehicles being used to smuggle illegal drugs. Border
Patrol officials said that backscatter machines have been of great
value to checkpoint officials for discovering hidden compartments.
Figure 10: Van with Backscatter X-ray Scanning a Truck (left
photograph) and VACIS Unit (right photograph) Used at Checkpoints to
Detect Concealed Persons or Contraband:
[Refer to PDF for image: two photographs]
Source: Border Patrol.
[End of figure]
As of May 2009, the Border Patrol reported that it had eight mobile non-
intrusive inspection technologies, such as a VACIS or backscatter
machine, deployed to support Border Patrol operations in the nine
southwest border sectors. Of these eight non-intrusive inspection
technologies, four were dedicated to specific checkpoints and four were
deployed to sectors and were moved among checkpoints or other locations
as deemed necessary by the sector's Chief Patrol Agent. The Border
Patrol reported that the agency is in the process of acquiring
additional mobile non-intrusive inspection equipment for southwest
border checkpoints. Once these units are acquired, the Border Patrol
intends to develop a plan to prioritize the deployment of these units
among checkpoints. Border Patrol officials are of the opinion that
mobile backscatter units are cheaper to obtain and maintain than VACIS
units, require fewer dedicated staff, produce images that are easier
for Border Patrol agents to interpret, and do not require an
environmental assessment to be completed prior to deployment.
Despite tentative plans to deploy additional non-intrusive inspection
technologies at checkpoints, resource constraints may preclude or delay
acquisition and deployment. Both VACIS and backscatter units require a
large concrete apron and trained operators for effective operation, and
some checkpoints lack adequate space or available staff. For example,
at one checkpoint which has a VACIS unit, reportedly only 4 of the 12
agents originally trained to operate the VACIS remain because of
attrition, decreasing the amount of time the VACIS can be used to
screen vehicles. Border Patrol sector officials said that it can be
difficult getting agents to volunteer for VACIS training, as other
Border Patrol duties are preferable. Furthermore, officials responsible
for the current checkpoint on I-19 south of Tucson, Arizona, reported
that more space is needed to improve the effectiveness of the
backscatter unit, as the unit requires an off-road area sufficient to
permit its safe operation without interfering with traffic flow.
Number and Experience of Checkpoint Staff:
Checkpoint performance can also be hindered by limited staffing at
checkpoints. Border Patrol policy recommends the minimum number of
agents for checkpoint operation, but sector managers may have other
priorities for staff placement. Despite the rapid increase in overall
staffing numbers on the southwest border, the number of agents remains
insufficient to fully staff all areas of need, according to Border
Patrol officials. As a result, sector chiefs have developed strategies
that prioritize areas within the sector for achieving operational
control. Priority areas differ among sectors, but generally include the
immediate border area and urban centers, rather than checkpoints. For
example, in the Tucson sector, the Border Patrol deploys about 8
percent of sector operational agents to sector checkpoints on an
average day, according to sector officials. Tucson officials we met
with stated that they would like to deploy additional staff to the
checkpoint, but no additional agents were available, as the majority of
agents are staffed to border areas, which are sector priority areas.
According to Border Patrol officials, checkpoint staffing numbers
should increase as the Border Patrol continues to hire new agents.
Checkpoint performance can also be hindered when assigned staff are new
and do not have experience gained by continuous on-the-job training or
do not have the desire to work at checkpoints. Border Patrol officials
stated that nearly half of all agents have less than 2 years of
experience, and Border Patrol officials in some sectors stated that
agents generally do not consider checkpoint duty to be a desirable
assignment. As such, checkpoints may be staffed on a rotational basis.
These problems are minimized in locations where Border Patrol stations
have operational responsibilities for checkpoints only.[Footnote 34]
For example, agents at five checkpoints in the El Paso sector are
generally staffed to the checkpoint or checkpoint circumvention routes
on a fairly continuous basis. In contrast, Tucson sector agents rotate
checkpoint duty with roving patrol and other enforcement activities,
such as line watch, and may serve at the checkpoint at least once every
14 days, according to sector officials.
Checkpoint Performance Measures Have Been Established, but Data
Limitations Hinder their Usefulness:
The Border Patrol established a number of measures for checkpoint
performance to inform the public on program results and provide
management oversight; however, information gaps and reporting issues
have hindered public accountability, and inconsistent data collection
and entry have hindered management's ability to monitor the need for
program improvement.
Performance Measures Developed for Public Accountability Hindered by
Information Gaps and Reporting Issues:
The Border Patrol chose 3 of 21 performance measures identified by a
working group in 2006 to begin reporting the results of checkpoint
operations under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
(GPRA).[Footnote 35] Under GPRA, agencies are required to hold programs
accountable to Congress and the public by establishing performance
goals, identifying performance measures used to indicate progress
toward meeting the goals, and use the results to improve performance as
necessary. Agencies report their program goals, measures, results, and
corrective actions to the public each year in their Performance and
Accountability Report (PAR). The Border Patrol first reported the
checkpoint performance results for these three measures in CBP's fiscal
year 2007 PAR.
The three GPRA measures used for public reporting relate to (1)
checkpoint drug seizures as a percentage of all Border Patrol seizures,
(2) checkpoint apprehensions as a percentage of all Border Patrol
apprehensions, and (3) the percentage of checkpoint apprehensions that
are referred to a U.S. Attorney for criminal prosecution. These
measures were chosen as contributing directly to the DHS goals to
protect the nation from dangerous persons and contraband, and were
recommended as GPRA measures in a 2007 study commissioned by CBP.
[Footnote 36] The remaining 18 measures identified by the working group
collectively provide some indication of checkpoint performance, but
individually provide more indirect support of border security goals.
For example, the working group identified separate measures for
comparing the number of apprehensions and seizures at checkpoints to
those on circumvention routes[Footnote 37] and the number of seizures
or apprehensions at checkpoints that involved methods of concealment to
smuggle persons or contraband.
Information gaps preclude using the performance measures to determine
the full extent of a checkpoint's effectiveness relative to other
checkpoints and Border Patrol strategies for protecting the nation from
illegal aliens and contraband. According to GPRA guidance, measures
should reflect program outcomes and provide information to assess
accomplishments, make decisions, realign processes, and assign
accountability. Studies commissioned by CBP, however, have documented
that measures of the number of seizures or apprehensions bear little
relationship to effectiveness because they do not compare these numbers
to the amount of illegal activity that passes through undetected.
[Footnote 38] In the absence of this information, the Border Patrol
does not know whether seizure and apprehension rates at checkpoints are
low or high, and if lower rates are due to ineffective performance,
effective deterrence, or a low volume of illegal drugs or aliens
passing through a checkpoint. As a result, the Border Patrol is unable
to use these measures to determine if one checkpoint is performing more
effectively or efficiently than another checkpoint, or how effective
the checkpoint strategy is compared to strategies placing agents at the
border or other locations.[Footnote 39] Border Patrol headquarters
officials said that they do not use the measures as management
indicators of checkpoint performance specifically, although officials
do use the results along with other information for oversight of
overall border strategy.
CBP has not developed models to address these information gaps for
checkpoints, but has done so for other aspects of its border security
strategy. Identifying the extent of illegal activity that occurs is a
challenge faced by law enforcement agencies, but in some cases CBP uses
programs and models specific to certain operations that estimate
illegal activity levels based on various factors. For example, CBP uses
a program, known as Compliance Examination (COMPEX), which estimates
the total amount of illegal activity passing undetected through
official U.S. ports of entry. Developed under the former U.S. Customs
Service, COMPEX randomly selects travelers entering the country for
more detailed inspections. On the basis of the extent to which
violations are found in the in-depth inspections, CBP estimates the
total number of inadmissible aliens and other violators who seek to
enter the country. CBP then calculates an apprehension rate by
comparing the number of violators it actually apprehends with the
estimated number of violators that attempted entry, and reports these
results in DHS's annual performance report to provide program
accountability. Other efforts included models to estimate the
probability of apprehension by sector and an estimate of the number of
illegal border crossings across the southwest border, and estimates of
undetected illegal activity passing across smaller geographic zones.
Border Patrol officials reported that they are exploring the
feasibility of developing a checkpoint performance model to address
checkpoint operational effectiveness and checkpoint impact on overall
border security.[Footnote 40] Although standard practices in program
management call for documenting milestones to ensure results are
achieved, the Border Patrol did not identify time lines or milestones
for completing this effort.[Footnote 41] Doing so could help provide
the Border Patrol with reasonable assurance that its personnel will
determine the feasibility of developing a checkpoint performance model
within a time frame authorized by management.
Reporting issues at Border Patrol headquarters also hindered using the
performance measure results to inform Congress and the public on
checkpoint performance. The Border Patrol began annual reporting on the
three GPRA measures of checkpoint performance in the CBP fiscal year
2007 PAR, but the information reported was inaccurate, resulting in an
overstatement of checkpoint performance for both fiscal years 2007 and
2008, as shown in table 1. Annual Performance and Accountability
Reports are to document the results agencies have achieved compared to
the goals they established, which, as we have previously reported, is
key to improving accountability for results as Congress intended under
GPRA.[Footnote 42] We used Border Patrol data to calculate results for
the three checkpoint measures for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 and
compared these numbers to results the Border Patrol reported in the
PARs. Our analysis showed that the actual checkpoint performance
results were incorrectly reported for two of the three measures in
fiscal year 2007 and for one measure in fiscal year 2008. As a result,
the Border Patrol incorrectly reported that it met its checkpoint
performance targets for these two measures.
Table 1: Results of Border Patrol Checkpoint Performance Measures as
Reported in Annual Performance and Accountability Reports and GAO
Analysis:
Apprehensions at checkpoints as a percentage of total Border Patrol
apprehensions:
Fiscal year 2007 PAR:
Target: 5-10%;
Results reported by Border Patrol: 5%;
Results based on GAO analysis: 3%.
Fiscal year 2008 PAR:
Target: 3-8%;
Results reported by Border Patrol: 2%;
Results based on GAO analysis: 2%.
Percentage of checkpoint cases referred to a U.S. Attorney:
Fiscal year 2007 PAR:
Target: 3-13%;
Results reported by Border Patrol: 13%;
Results based on GAO analysis: 9%.
Fiscal year 2008 PAR:
Target: 8-15%;
Results reported by Border Patrol: 18%;
Results based on GAO analysis: 6%.
Source: GAO analysis of Border Patrol data.
Note: Agency targets and results are for all checkpoints nationwide.
GAO analysis includes data only for checkpoints on the southwest
border, but including data from the few checkpoints on the northern
border does not affect the analysis results.
[End of table]
The results of our analysis differed from those reported in the PARs
for several reasons. In regard to errors in reporting apprehensions,
the Border Patrol reported that Tucson sector data were excluded
because including such data would unfairly reflect on overall
checkpoint performance, as the Tucson sector has a substantially higher
volume of illegal aliens compared to other sectors. According to the
Border Patrol, disclosure statements explaining the exclusion of Tucson
sector data were inadvertently omitted from the fiscal year 2007 PAR,
and that full disclosure would be presented in future reports.
In regard to errors in reporting the number of checkpoint cases
referred to a U.S. Attorney for criminal prosecution, reported data
were overstated because they included referrals to all prosecuting
authorities--federal, state, and local. Including only those referrals
to a U.S. Attorney, as defined in the PAR, would reduce reported
performance results by nearly one-third in 2007 and nearly two-thirds
in 2008. The Border Patrol indicated that including referrals to all
prosecuting authorities is more representative of checkpoint
performance because prosecutions in general are a deterrent to crime.
Department of Justice (DOJ) officials agreed, noting that there are a
variety of cases generated at checkpoints which are referred to state
and local law enforcement agencies and prosecutors. For example, due to
the volume of cases and limited resources, many U.S. Attorneys' Offices
have "intake" or "prosecution thresholds" by which narcotics cases
below certain quantities are routinely referred to state authorities
for arrest and prosecution, according to DOJ officials. In addition,
there are other state offenses, such as individuals arrested on
outstanding warrants, stolen vehicles or merchandise, or some weapons
violations, that are also intercepted at Border Patrol checkpoints. DOJ
officials stated that a measurement that did not include these types of
cases referred to state authorities would miss a substantial number of
criminal cases which were generated by the checkpoints and thus neglect
a valuable indicator of their effectiveness. For these reasons, Border
Patrol plans to revise the performance measure definition for future
PARs to include referrals to any prosecuting authority.
In addition to these reporting issues, data collection issues across
Border Patrol checkpoints also contributed to inconsistent data
reported in the Performance and Accountability Report. Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government call for pertinent
information to be recorded and communicated to management in a form and
within a time frame that enables them to carry out internal control and
other responsibilities. This includes the accurate recording and
reporting of data necessary to demonstrate agency operations.[Footnote
43] To implement this requirement, the Border Patrol developed a
checkpoint activity report (CAR) in 2006 as a means for field agents to
report daily summaries of checkpoint performance, and provided relevant
guidance. Supervisory agents at each station and sector had oversight
responsibility for ensuring that data entry complied with agency
guidance, and headquarters officials had responsibility for conducting
a final review and reliability check.
Information we collected from stations responsible for checkpoint data
entry showed that data collection practices were inconsistent and
incomplete for the apprehension and referral measures included in the
PAR. We provided a data collection instrument to the Border Patrol
seeking information on how checkpoint agents input data into the CAR
for data fields related to apprehensions and seizures at and around
checkpoints. Border Patrol headquarters officials forwarded this data
collection instrument to stations responsible for operating checkpoints
along the southwest border. The responses we received from stations
responsible for 60 checkpoints operating along the southwest border in
fiscal year 2008 showed inconsistencies in data reporting.[Footnote 44]
* Apprehension measure. Officials responsible for data entry at two
checkpoints in the Rio Grande Valley sector did not follow guidance in
recording apprehensions at the checkpoint. CAR guidance defines "at
checkpoint" as an apprehension or seizure that occurs within the pre-
primary, primary, or secondary inspection area of the checkpoint.
Instead, officials at these two checkpoints attributed all
apprehensions within a 2.5-mile radius to the checkpoint, overstating
actual checkpoint apprehensions. Officials said they instituted this
practice in August 2008 because it more accurately represented
checkpoint performance in forcing illegal activity to use longer
circumvention routes to get around the checkpoint. However, the CAR
contains other data fields to capture apprehensions on checkpoint
circumvention routes, and results are reflected in a separate
performance measure.
* Referral measure. Officials responsible for 26 checkpoints reported
that they did not regularly or accurately enter data for the number of
checkpoint apprehensions referred to a U.S. Attorney, understating
checkpoint performance in apprehending criminals who may pose a threat
to public safety. In some cases, Border Patrol sector officials said
this occurred because at the end of the day when checkpoint data are
submitted, supervisors did not know if cases will be referred, and the
CAR may not have been updated to reflect any subsequent referrals.
Border Patrol headquarters officials said that they were unaware of
these data inconsistencies, and that headquarters officials had
generally provided limited oversight of checkpoint performance data,
relying instead on checkpoint and sector officials to ensure data
reliability. According to the Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, activities need to be established to monitor
performance measures and indicators.[Footnote 45] Such controls should
be aimed at validating the propriety and integrity of performance
measures and indicators. Establishing controls for headquarters
oversight of checkpoint performance data could provide the Border
Patrol with additional assurance related to the accuracy, consistency,
and completeness of its checkpoint performance data used to report on
the checkpoint performance measures in the annual PAR. Border Patrol
officials said that they have formed a workgroup to examine these data
integrity issues with respect to checkpoint activity reporting, and
would take action to address the identified issues. For example,
regarding the referral measure, Border Patrol headquarters officials
said that they plan to modify the CAR so that information, such as a
referral to a U.S. Attorney, will be extracted from the databases that
agents use to process the aliens administratively and criminally.
Because the data are to be extracted from these systems, agents should
no longer have to enter the information in two places and errors should
be eliminated in checkpoint reporting.
Performance Measures Established for Program Management Hindered by
Limited System Capabilities and Inconsistent Data Entry Practices:
In addition to the measures used for public reporting in the annual
PAR, the Border Patrol identified other measures for checkpoints that
taken together can provide indicators of performance for internal
management of the program (see appendix II). According to the Senate
report accompanying GPRA,[Footnote 46] performance indicators should,
wherever possible, include those that correlate the level of program
activity with program costs, such as costs per unit of result or
output. The Border Patrol checkpoint performance working group
established 21 performance indicators of checkpoint operations that
were divided into four main groups, including indicators of program
costs in terms of operations and maintenance and man-hours:
* At the checkpoint. These eight measures examine the extent that
checkpoint resources are operational and effective. They include the
percentage of time checkpoints are operational or closed for various
reasons; number of seizures or apprehensions due to canine detection,
sensors, or other technology; number of smuggling events using a method
of concealment; number of aliens per smuggling load; and cost
effectiveness of checkpoints considering operations and maintenance
costs.
* Immediate impact areas. These six measures compare checkpoint
apprehensions and seizures to those on checkpoint circumvention routes,
in geographic areas adjacent to the checkpoint, and at transportation
centers (i.e., bus terminals, train stations) and staging areas (such
as stash houses).
* At the border. These three measures compare checkpoint operations to
other Border Patrol enforcement operations. Two of these three
measures--a comparison of checkpoint apprehensions and drug seizures to
all apprehensions and seizures--were used as GPRA reporting measures in
the annual PAR. The third measure related to cost effectiveness in
terms of comparing man-hours dedicated to checkpoint operations to man-
hours dedicated to other enforcement activities.
* Quality of life. These four measures examine how checkpoint
operations help address major crime across communities and assist other
federal, state, local and tribal agencies. One of these four measures-
-referral of smugglers for prosecution to a U.S. Attorney--was included
as a GPRA reporting measure in the annual PAR. The remaining three
measures examined the reduction of major crimes in areas affected by
checkpoint operations, the number of cases referred to other agencies
identified by checkpoint operations, and the number of apprehensions
turned over to the Border Patrol by other agencies during times the
checkpoint is operational or non-operational.
Inconsistent data entry practices by field agents preclude using many
of the measures as indicators of performance or cost effectiveness.
Responses received from station officials responsible for operating 60
checkpoints on our data collection instrument showed that data reported
in the CAR were often incomplete, inconsistent across stations, or
missing altogether. These officials reported that checkpoint data entry
issues were caused by unclear definitions in checkpoint performance
data guidance, differences between data fields and operations, and
perceived duplication of effort for information available in E-3, which
is the primary information system used by CBP for tracking all
enforcement activities conducted by its components.[Footnote 47]
* Unclear definitions in guidance. Data entry personnel differed in how
they interpreted guidance related to checkpoint data fields, resulting
in inconsistent data reporting across checkpoints and across different
shifts at individual checkpoints. Attributes of successful performance
measures include that the measure is clearly stated, the name and
definition are consistent with the methodology used to calculate it,
and the measure produces the same result under similar conditions.
[Footnote 48] In reporting the number of apprehensions or seizures on
circumvention routes, however, officials at one checkpoint we visited
considered all activity within the station's area of responsibility to
be circumventions, while officials at other checkpoints considered only
the activity on defined circumvention routes. Border Patrol guidance
for the CAR defined circumventions as "to avoid, or get around by
artful maneuvering," but did not specify how this definition should be
applied by checkpoint officials. One Border Patrol field official said
that at one location, supervisors used different definitions for
entering information in the same data fields because of unclear
definitions in CAR guidance, resulting in inconsistencies in data
entry. Specifically, this Border Patrol field official noted that there
was confusion among agents responsible for inputting data into fields
related to concealment methods and cases turned over to other agencies,
because neither field is defined in the CAR guidance. Officials
responsible for 16 of 47 checkpoints responding to an open-ended
question reported that agents need additional instruction, training, or
clearer guidance in using the CAR.
* Differences between data fields and operations. Some data fields in
the CAR are inconsistent with operations, resulting in an
understatement of some activities, including indicators for one of the
cost effectiveness measures. For example, checkpoint officials are
required to track the number of agents staffed per shift in the CAR,
but at least 20 permanent checkpoints operate using an overlapping four-
shift schedule, while the CAR provides for a three-shift format. As a
result, agent hours may be understated at the majority of permanent
checkpoints along the southwest border because checkpoint officials
could not record all of the hours worked in a four-shift schedule.
* Duplication with other information systems. Field agents considered
CAR data entry time consuming and somewhat duplicative of other
information systems. Manual efforts by field agents to go through all
arrest reports daily to identify those that are pertinent to
checkpoints for summary in the CAR can be a labor-intensive effort.
Detailed information on the arrest or activity summarized in the CAR is
already reported in E-3, which tracks enforcement efforts from the
initial arrest to final disposition. Officials responsible for 15 of 47
checkpoints responding to an open-ended question in our data collection
instrument recommended that reporting requirements among information
systems should be integrated to reduce duplication of effort.
Overall, Border Patrol officials said that they were unaware of the
extent of these data entry and reporting issues, and that headquarters
officials had generally provided limited oversight of checkpoint
performance data, relying instead on checkpoint and sector officials to
ensure data reliability. Internal control standards require that
agencies monitor their activities, through management and supervisory
personnel, to assess the quality of performance over time.[Footnote 49]
Consistent with these standards, we have previously reported that an
agency's management should have a strategy to ensure that ongoing
monitoring is effective and will trigger separate evaluations where
problems are identified or systems are critical to measuring
performance.[Footnote 50] Border Patrol headquarters officials stated
that the workgroup formed to address data integrity issues would take
steps to address these identified data entry issues, but officials did
not identify how they would ensure proper oversight of checkpoint data
collection. Specifically, to address unclear definitions in the CAR,
Border Patrol officials reported that they plan to provide updated
directives to field staff regarding definitions, and would provide
associated guidance regarding data input in the CAR. To address
differences between data fields and operations, Border Patrol officials
said they would update the CAR to reflect the current operation of
checkpoints. Border Patrol officials noted that the time frames for
completing these actions are unknown at this point because guidance and
systems need to be developed and then approved by Border Patrol
leadership. Until the Border Patrol fully addresses these data entry
and oversight issues, it will not be able to ensure that data inputted
into the CAR accurately reflects checkpoint operations. Finally, in
regard to system duplication, Border Patrol officials stated that the
recent rollout of E-3 does provide the means to report some performance
data for checkpoints that are common to all components, such as
seizures and apprehensions, but that the CAR is still necessary to
track data for some performance indicators that are unique to
checkpoints, such as hours checkpoints are in operation and staff
assigned to operate those checkpoints.
Other data limitations preclude the Border Patrol from implementing a
measure comparing the cost effectiveness of checkpoint operations with
other Border Patrol strategies, such as line watch and roving patrol
operations. We previously recommended that the Border Patrol implement
such a measure to determine whether it was efficiently utilizing
resources among checkpoints and among its three-tiered border
enforcement strategy, and to assist in allocating additional resources
within sectors or between sectors so that those resources would have
the greatest impact.[Footnote 51] While the GPRA measures do compare
checkpoint apprehensions and seizures to other Border Patrol
activities, the Border Patrol indicated that data are not available on
the number of agents staffed to line watch and roving patrol
operations.[Footnote 52] Without accurate data on the number of agents
staffed to line watch and roving patrol operations, it will not be
possible to compare the cost effectiveness of checkpoints with these
other Border Patrol activities. According to Border Patrol officials,
the agency discontinued tracking agent hours by assignment in 2004,
when it became cost prohibitive to maintain the information system
capturing these data,[Footnote 53] and a comparable system to the CAR
was not implemented for operations other than checkpoints. Officials
stated that they plan to address this limitation by developing a new
data system to track agent hours and assignments for border enforcement
operations. The Border Patrol plans to initially deploy this new data
system by the end of fiscal year 2009, and add updates as needed to
accurately track agent hours by assignment.
Border Patrol Considered Community Impact in Checkpoint Placement and
Design:
Among other factors, the Border Patrol considered community safety and
convenience in recent checkpoint placement and design decisions, in
accordance with Border Patrol guidelines and requirements of other
federal, state, and local agencies. The placement and design process
was completed for three new permanent checkpoints since 2006, and no
public comments were received about their design or placement in fairly
remote areas of Texas. Some members of the public have raised concerns
about the placement and size of a proposed permanent checkpoint for I-
19 in Arizona, which is to be located closer to nearby communities.
Draft plans we reviewed for the I-19 checkpoint were consistent with
Border Patrol guidelines to locate checkpoints in less populated areas
away from schools and hospitals and also considered current and future
traffic volumes in accordance with Department of Transportation goals
to facilitate highway travel and reduce congestion.
Checkpoint Placement Decisions Considered Factors Related to Public
Safety and Convenience:
The Border Patrol finalized three placement decisions for new permanent
checkpoints in the last 3 years in accordance with its Design Guide and
policy documents.[Footnote 54] These checkpoints, all located in Texas,
were placed on I-35, U.S. Route 83, and U.S. Route 62/180.[Footnote 55]
In regard to checkpoint location, Border Patrol guidance includes
factors intended to maximize operational effectiveness and minimize
adverse impact on the public and surrounding communities. Specifically,
the guidance states that to provide strategic advantage, checkpoints
should be placed in locations that provide good visibility of the
surrounding area, near the confluence of two or more significant roads
leading away from the border, and have minimal routes that could be
used by illegal aliens to circumvent the checkpoint. The guidelines
discuss community impact in terms of public safety issues and traffic
considerations. Specifically, preferred checkpoint locations are at
least a half mile from businesses, residences, schools and hospitals,
or other inhabited locations. In addition, the Border Patrol guidelines
suggest that checkpoints be located on a stretch of highway providing
sufficient visibility for traffic compatible with safe operations, for
both the traveling public, as well as agents working at the checkpoint.
[Footnote 56]
We mapped the locations of the three permanent checkpoints placed by
the Border Patrol since 2006 along with relevant population data,
schools, and hospitals, and the results were consistent with Border
Patrol guidance. Specifically, the mapping analysis results, shown in
table 2, indicated that the three checkpoints were located in sparsely
populated areas and at least 9 miles from the nearest hospital or
school.[Footnote 57]
Table 2: Selected Border Patrol Checkpoint Locations Compared with
Surrounding Population Densities and Distances to Nearest Hospitals and
Schools:
Checkpoint location: I-35, Laredo sector;
Estimated number of people living within 1 mile: 4;
Estimated number of people living within 5 miles: 114;
Approximate distance from nearest hospital (in miles): 21;
Approximate distance from nearest school (in miles): 10.
Checkpoint location: U.S. Route 83, Laredo sector;
Estimated number of people living within 1 mile: 8;
Estimated number of people living within 5 miles: 206;
Approximate distance from nearest hospital (in miles): 28;
Approximate distance from nearest school (in miles): 11.
Checkpoint location: U.S. Route 62/180, El Paso sector;
Estimated number of people living within 1 mile: 3;
Estimated number of people living within 5 miles: 472;
Approximate distance from nearest hospital (in miles): 18;
Approximate distance from nearest school (in miles): 9.
Sources: Population estimates: GAO analysis of 2000 Census Data;
Hospital data: 2008 Medicare Hospital Data; School data: Department of
Education Common Core Data for school year 2006-07 and MapInfo.
[End of table]
Border Patrol placement decisions for these checkpoints also passed
through federal, state, and local government review, as well as public
review during the environmental assessment process.[Footnote 58] Our
review of documentation showed that the Border Patrol conducted
environmental assessments for the three checkpoint locations that
included potential community impacts due to noise, air quality, and
water resources, as well as potential socioeconomic impacts on local
income, housing or businesses, child protection, and increased traffic
congestion.[Footnote 59] The results of the assessments were documented
along with relevant correspondence with federal, state, and local
agencies showing compliance with relevant laws and requirements.
[Footnote 60] Results of the environmental assessment conducted for the
three checkpoints showed no adverse impact on communities that would
require an environmental impact statement,[Footnote 61] and no public
comments were received.[Footnote 62]
The placement process for a proposed checkpoint on I-19 in Arizona has
not yet reached the stage of soliciting formal public comment, but some
citizens living in nearby communities have expressed concerns about its
proposed location south of Tucson at KP 41. While some citizens
expressed support for the checkpoint, others noted that the checkpoint
would negatively impact local communities, and should be located
elsewhere, or removed altogether. Community members with this latter
view stated that the Border Patrol should devote checkpoint resources
to deter illegal entry at the border.
Tucson sector officials said they chose KP 41 as the best site for a
permanent checkpoint on I-19 among three other locations: KP 42 (the
location of the current tactical checkpoint), KP 25, and KP 50.
According to Tucson sector officials, while the KP 50 site provided
certain strategic advantages,[Footnote 63] the KP 41 site was selected
because it was furthest from populated areas while also providing
strategic advantage. Officials also noted that when determining the
checkpoint's location, they consulted with developers regarding
expected population growth and plans for development along the I-19
corridor, but officials stated that it is difficult to know what
development will or will not take place in the future, as plans can
change. According to officials, these discussions indicated that
development was expected along I-19, but more densely around the KP 25
and KP 50 sites than the KP 41 site. In addition, officials from the
Arizona Department of Transportation said that the KP 41 location would
likely meet state requirements for highway traffic safety, but could
not make a final determination until the final plans were submitted for
review and approval.
We mapped the four proposed locations for the I-19 checkpoint along
with relevant population data, schools and hospitals, and the results
were consistent with Border Patrol guidance, as shown in table 3. For
example, the data showed that the KP 41 and KP 42 sites were in areas
with fewer people than the other two locations. We also reviewed county
planning documents and zoning maps to determine how the proposed
checkpoint locations compared with plans for future development. These
documents showed that areas around KP 41 were zoned for lower density
population than the KP 25 and KP 50 proposed checkpoint locations.
[Footnote 64]
Table 3: I-19 Proposed Checkpoint Locations Compared with Surrounding
Population Densities and Distances to Nearest Hospitals and Schools:
Kilometer post: 41 (planned location);
Estimated population living within 1 mile: 10;
Estimated population living within 5 miles: 720;
Approximate distance from nearest hospital (in miles): 22;
Approximate distance from nearest school (in miles): 3.
Kilometer post: 42;
Estimated population living within 1 mile: 10;
Estimated population living within 5 miles: 578;
Approximate distance from nearest hospital (in miles): 23;
Approximate distance from nearest school (in miles): 4.
Kilometer post: 25;
Estimated population living within 1 mile: 118;
Estimated population living within 5 miles: 2,821;
Approximate distance from nearest hospital (in miles): 13;
Approximate distance from nearest school (in miles): 2.
Kilometer post: 50;
Estimated population living within 1 mile: 92;
Estimated population living within 5 miles: 1,683;
Approximate distance from nearest hospital (in miles): 28;
Approximate distance from nearest school (in miles): 2.
Sources: Population estimates: GAO analysis of 2000 Census Data;
Hospital data: 2008 Medicare Hospital Data; School data: Department of
Education Common Core Data for school year 2006-07 and MapInfo.
[End of table]
Our mapping analysis also showed that the KP 41 and KP 42 sites were
farther away from schools than the other locations, as shown in figure
11. Proximity to the Rio Rico high school was a reason cited by the
Border Patrol for not choosing the KP 25 location.
Figure 11: Map of I-19 Corridor with Proposed Checkpoint Locations and
Distances From Schools:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated map]
Depicted on the map:
10-mile buffer around I-19;
Checkpoint locations:
KP 25;
KP 41;
KP 42;
KP 50;
Schools:
Rio Rico High School;
Calabasas Middle School;
San Cayetano Elementary School;
Montessori de Santa Cruz-Saint Ann's Hall;
Sopori Elementary School;
Continental Elementary School.
Sources: GAO (analysis), Mapinfo (map), Border Patrol (data).
[End of figure]
We also traveled to the four proposed locations on I-19 with Border
Patrol officials who showed us differences among the sites and factors
they considered in choosing KP 41, including proximity to populated
areas, tactical advantage, and costs of construction. (See table 4.)
Officials noted that while the KP 41 site had certain disadvantages,
such as the highway access road parallel to the interstate (known as a
frontage road) and the proximity to the community of Tubac, they
pointed out that KP 41 was furthest from populated areas, and was the
only site that did not have outlying roads near the interstate that
would allow illegal aliens to circumvent the checkpoint. We also
observed that the terrain around KP 41 was relatively flat, which
Border Patrol officials explained would allow for surveillance of the
surrounding area. In contrast, the KP 25 location was near both
elevated areas and canyons where Border Patrol officials said it would
be more difficult to identify and apprehend illegal activity around the
checkpoint. With respect to the KP 42 site, Border Patrol officials
stated that substantial amount of earthwork would be needed to level
the land, which would increase the construction costs. (See appendix
III for photographs of the various sites.)
Table 4: Border Patrol Reasons for Not Selecting Certain Locations for
the I-19 Permanent Checkpoint:
Kilometer post: 25;
Reasons location not selected, according to the Border Patrol:
* Proximity to Rio Rico population areas and schools;
* Frontage roads and residential streets could allow vehicle
circumvention;
* Terrain (mountains, canyons, vegetation) would more easily allow
pedestrian circumvention;
* Topography would restrict surveillance capability.
Kilometer post: 42 (site of current tactical checkpoint);
Reasons location not selected, according to the Border Patrol:
* Higher cost due to amount of fill required;
* Frontage roads could allow circumvention;
* Proximity to highway overpass would limit expansion.
Kilometer post: 50;
Reasons location not selected, according to the Border Patrol:
* Frontage roads could allow vehicle circumvention;
* Proximity to populated Green Valley community.
Source: Border Patrol information and GAO observations.
[End of table]
We also traveled along I-19 from the U.S. border at Nogales to the city
of Tucson and Border Patrol officials showed us why other sites would
not be suitable alternatives for a checkpoint location. Border Patrol
officials stated that areas south of KP 25 are considered too close to
the border to provide strategic value, a factor listed in Border Patrol
guidance. Areas between KP 25 and KP 41, between KP 42 and KP 50, and
north of KP 50 were not considered suitable for a checkpoint for
reasons including topography, proximity to communities, availability of
circumvention routes, or highway characteristics--such as curves in the
road--that were not compatible with safe operations.
Checkpoint Size and Design Generally Considered Safety and Convenience
of Travelers, Agents, and Detainees:
The Border Patrol's three permanent checkpoints constructed since 2006
were generally designed in accordance with its checkpoint design
guidelines. Factors of consideration included in the design guidelines
related to operational effectiveness, the safety and comfort of agents
and canines working the checkpoint, the safety and convenience of the
public traveling through the checkpoint as well as detainees held at
the checkpoint, and aesthetics for blending checkpoint architecture
with the surrounding community.
According to CBP facilities management officials, checkpoint size is
largely determined by the number of inspection lanes at the checkpoint,
and primary and secondary inspection areas account for the majority of
a checkpoint's size. CBP officials stated that checkpoint buildings,
such as the main building housing administration and detention,
generally account for a relatively small percentage of the checkpoint
size.
Regarding inspection lane criteria, checkpoint design guidelines
recommend sufficient capacity to quickly and safely move traffic
through the checkpoint. Specifically, the design should consider
current and projected traffic volume traveling through the checkpoint,
as well as the preference to locate inspection lanes off-highway,
consistent with national and state initiatives to reduce traffic
congestion and improve highway safety.[Footnote 65] The guidelines also
recommend a minimum of two primary inspection lanes to separate
commercial and passenger vehicles, and a canopy to cover all inspection
areas.
We reviewed the inspection lanes for the three new permanent
checkpoints--which were all located in Texas--and results were
partially consistent with checkpoint design guidance. In accordance
with checkpoint design guidelines, the design for all three checkpoints
included off-highway inspection lanes that separated commercial and
passenger traffic, canopy covers protecting agents and the public, and
at least the minimum number of primary inspection lanes. However, we
could not determine if the Border Patrol complied with its checkpoint
design guidelines to consider current and future traffic volumes when
determining the number of inspection lanes at each checkpoint, because
it did not conduct traffic studies when designing the three
checkpoints. Although not explicitly required, senior CBP and Border
Patrol facilities officials stated that the number of inspection lanes
at a checkpoint should be based to a large extent on current and
projected traffic volume over the next 20 years to ensure that
checkpoint capacity will be sufficient in the near future, and this
should be documented in a traffic study. Traffic design engineering
principles discuss the importance of considering current and expected
traffic volumes over a given period when designing a project, to ensure
sufficient capacity. According to CBP facilities officials, however,
traffic studies were not conducted for the U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint
or the U.S. Route 83 checkpoint, and officials said they have no record
of a traffic study being conducted for the I-35 checkpoint.[Footnote
66] Officials stated that traffic studies may not have been conducted
because it is not an explicit requirement in checkpoint design
guidelines, but agreed that they should have been done to inform
decisions regarding checkpoint design and the number of inspection
lanes. In the absence of documented traffic studies, the Border Patrol
cannot determine if the number of inspection lanes at each of these
checkpoints is consistent with current and projected traffic volumes,
or if a different number of lanes would have been more appropriate.
To provide some information on traffic volumes for these three
checkpoints, we obtained available data on 2007 traffic volumes for
areas near the location of each of the three checkpoints from the Texas
Department of Transportation.[Footnote 67] As shown in table 5, the
relative number of inspection lanes at each checkpoint appears
consistent with 2007 traffic volumes, in that the I-35 checkpoint has a
higher traffic volume and more inspection lanes than the other two
checkpoints.
Table 5: Checkpoint Inspection Lanes Compared to Traffic Volume for the
Three Checkpoints Constructed Since 2006:
Checkpoint: I-35, Laredo sector;
2007 Estimated traffic volume (in vehicles per hour)[A]: 340;
Number of inspection lanes: Primary: 6;
Number of inspection lanes: Secondary: 5.
Checkpoint: U.S. Route 83, Laredo sector;
2007 Estimated traffic volume (in vehicles per hour)[A]: 60;
Number of inspection lanes: Primary: 3;
Number of inspection lanes: Secondary: 2.
Checkpoint: U.S. Route 62/180, El Paso sector;
2007 Estimated traffic volume (in vehicles per hour)[A]: 67;
Number of inspection lanes: Primary: 2[B];
Number of inspection lanes: Secondary: 1.
Source: GAO analysis of Texas Department of Transportation and Border
Patrol data.
[A] Traffic volume is estimated based on an average of northbound and
southbound traffic. It is possible that the volume could be higher for
northbound traffic than southbound.
[B] According to the Border Patrol, the U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint
generally uses one primary lane because traffic volume has been low and
it allows them to expand their secondary area for safer operations.
When traffic increases they plan to open both primary lanes.
[End of table]
Regarding criteria for facilities and other resources, Border Patrol
design guidance lists the buildings and features that are recommended
for inclusion at new permanent checkpoints. According to Border Patrol
officials, this listing of facilities and resources was based on
existing checkpoint design, as well as the professional judgment of
Border Patrol officials regarding the facilities and resources that
enhance checkpoint operations, and should be adjusted to the
circumstances of each checkpoint to maximize checkpoint effectiveness
and efficiency and also facilitate the safety and convenience of
agents, the public, and detainees. For example, design guidance
provides for detention facilities at checkpoints to reduce the amount
of time agents have to leave the checkpoint to transport illegal aliens
to other locations, and also provides separate areas for men, women,
and children who are detained to facilitate their safety.
We reviewed Border Patrol design documents for the three Texas
checkpoints and results showed that two of the three checkpoints had
all but one of the recommended resources; however, one checkpoint did
not have several resources, as shown in table 6. The one resource not
included at the new I-35 checkpoint in the Laredo sector and the new
U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint in the El Paso sector was commercial truck
scales, which can improve checkpoint operations by giving agents
another tool for detecting contraband. According to Border Patrol
officials, truck scales allow agents to compare the weight of cargo on
the truck's manifest to the current weight of cargo at the checkpoint.
A disparity between the two measurements could indicate that the amount
or type of cargo has changed. The U.S. Route 83 checkpoint was also
lacking many other recommended resources, such as canine facilities,
due to space constraints at the site, according to sector officials.
Officials stated that there was limited space to accommodate all of the
resources, because the land is not owned by the Border Patrol but
provided through a multiuse agreement between DHS and the Texas
Department of Transportation. These officials added that additional
funding would be needed to expand the checkpoint site to accommodate
these resources. However, sector officials stated that the resources
currently available at the checkpoint are sufficient for basic
operations, considering the relatively low volume of traffic at the
checkpoint.
Table 6: Facilities and Resources Recommended in Border Patrol
Checkpoint Design Guidance Compared to Recently Constructed Permanent
Checkpoints:
Recommended resource/facility: Safe and adequate detention and
processing area to include records check capabilities;
I-35 checkpoint (Laredo sector): Yes;
U.S. Route 83 checkpoint (Laredo sector): Yes;
U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint (El Paso sector): Yes.
Recommended resource/facility: Control room set up for sensors,
dispatch and radio communication, and video monitoring;
I-35 checkpoint (Laredo sector): Yes;
U.S. Route 83 checkpoint (Laredo sector): Yes;
U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint (El Paso sector): Yes.
Recommended resource/facility: Safe storage space for detainee
possessions;
I-35 checkpoint (Laredo sector): Yes;
U.S. Route 83 checkpoint (Laredo sector): Yes;
U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint (El Paso sector): Yes.
Recommended resource/facility: Loading docks, including safe holding
area for removed cargo;
I-35 checkpoint (Laredo sector): Yes;
U.S. Route 83 checkpoint (Laredo sector): No--Limited space available;
U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint (El Paso sector): Yes.
Recommended resource/facility: Area for vehicle lifts;
I-35 checkpoint (Laredo sector): Yes;
U.S. Route 83 checkpoint (Laredo sector):
Yes; U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint (El Paso sector): Yes.
Recommended resource/facility: Canine facilities;
I-35 checkpoint (Laredo sector): Yes;
U.S. Route 83 checkpoint (Laredo sector): No--Limited space available;
U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint (El Paso sector): Yes.
Recommended resource/facility: Staff and visitor parking areas;
I-35 checkpoint (Laredo sector): Yes;
U.S. Route 83 checkpoint (Laredo sector): Yes;
U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint (El Paso sector): Yes.
Recommended resource/facility: Area for commercial truck scales;
I-35 checkpoint (Laredo sector): Yes, but commercial truck scales are
not in place;
U.S. Route 83 checkpoint (Laredo sector): No--Limited space available;
U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint (El Paso sector): Yes, but commercial
truck scales are not in place.
Recommended resource/facility: Storage area for miscellaneous equipment
and tools;
I-35 checkpoint (Laredo sector): Yes;
U.S. Route 83 checkpoint (Laredo sector): Yes;
U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint (El Paso sector): Yes.
Recommended resource/facility: Storage area for evidence;
I-35 checkpoint (Laredo sector): Yes;
U.S. Route 83 checkpoint (Laredo sector): No--Limited space available;
U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint (El Paso sector): Yes.
Source: Border Patrol checkpoint design guidance, Border Patrol data,
and GAO analysis.
[End of table]
Border Patrol guidelines also include criteria to use aesthetics in the
architecture and design of checkpoints. These criteria state that
checkpoints should be designed in a manner that complements the
indigenous architecture of the surrounding area, including building
scale and proportion. The environmental assessments for the three Texas
checkpoints showed no significant aesthetic impact because of the
remote locations of the checkpoints and lack of community concern over
the design of existing checkpoints. No public comments were received
during the 30-day comment period raising concerns about the lack of
aesthetics in the three checkpoints' final designs.
I-19 Permanent Checkpoint Design:
The design process for the proposed permanent checkpoint on I-19 in
Arizona has not yet been completed as of July 2009, but some citizens
living in nearby communities have expressed concerns about its
potential size and appearance. Border Patrol officials stated that in
general, the I-19 and other new permanent checkpoints are to be larger
than existing checkpoints because many of the latter are outdated and
undersized to address current traffic volume and changes in operation.
As these older checkpoints are replaced, the Border Patrol plans to
enlarge and redesign them to reflect new technology and to incorporate
lessons learned from experiences with more recently built checkpoints,
according to officials.
CBP and Border Patrol officials stated that plans for the permanent I-
19 checkpoint are based on the recently constructed I-35 checkpoint
near Laredo, which they identified as a model checkpoint in terms of
layout, resources, and size. (See figure 12.) Tucson sector officials
said that the I-19 checkpoint design also incorporated lessons learned
from the I-35 checkpoint design. For example, officials stated that the
design of the I-35 checkpoint was found to be too small and had to be
expanded to accommodate a VACIS unit, and that operations at the I-35
checkpoint showed that more space was needed in the inspection areas
for safe truck maneuvering.
Figure 15: Figure 12: I-35 Checkpoint, North of Laredo, Texas:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustrated photograph]
The following are labeled on the photograph:
Canine facility;
Loading dock;
VACIS area;
Covered primary inspection lanes;
Main checkpoint building and detention facility;
Commercial secondary inspection area;
Non-commercial secondary inspection area;
Bus inspection area;
Vehicle lift.
Source: Border Patrol.
[End of figure]
One key difference between the I-19 checkpoint design and that of the
three new checkpoints in Texas is that the Border Patrol plans to
incorporate aesthetics into the I-19 checkpoint design, in response to
community concerns. Some community members who visited the I-35
checkpoint were concerned that the I-19 checkpoint would disrupt the
beauty of the local landscape in that it would be too large and
visually unappealing. Although not reflected in the current draft
design, Border Patrol officials said the final design issued for public
comment would reflect input from the community on options for blending
the checkpoint in with the surrounding community and landscape.
Border Patrol officials from the Tucson sector and the community have
coordinated on other aspects of the I-19 checkpoint design. Tucson
sector officials have met with community members at least 45 times from
2006 to 2009 to address community questions or concerns. In addition, a
community workgroup was established in April 2007 to allow direct
community involvement in discussions about the proposed permanent
checkpoint.[Footnote 68] In June 2007, this workgroup split into two
subcommittees. One subcommittee issued a report to the Border Patrol
with recommendations to reduce the impact of the checkpoint on
surrounding communities and to improve its effectiveness and public
convenience. The other subcommittee issued a report expressing
opposition to a permanent checkpoint on I-19, recommending that
resources be placed on the border instead.
We met with Border Patrol officials and reviewed documents showing how
the Border Patrol has modified the design of the checkpoint in response
to community input. To address concerns about the size of the
checkpoint, for example, Border Patrol officials said they removed
certain structures from the design plans, such as a station house,
helipad, and fueling island. In addition, to ensure checkpoint lighting
did not adversely impact a local observatory, officials stated that
they plan to comply with the local dark sky ordinance by covering
checkpoint lighting with a canopy, among other things.[Footnote 69]
Border Patrol officials stated that other recommendations made by the
workgroup to increase the safety and convenience for travelers through
the checkpoint--such as clearly posted signage--will be included in the
checkpoint design, as shown in table 7.
Table 7: Border Patrol Response to Community Recommendations Expressed
on the Draft Design of the I-19 Checkpoint:
Aesthetics:
Community recommendations: Adhere to local dark sky ordinance;
Border Patrol response as of June 2009: Checkpoint is to meet or exceed
dark sky ordinance requirements.
Community recommendations: Seek to mitigate noise;
Border Patrol response as of June 2009: Recommendation to be researched
and considered.
Safety/convenience:
Community recommendations: Clearly posted signage;
Border Patrol response as of June 2009: Included in draft design.
Community recommendations: Off-highway location;
Border Patrol response as of June 2009: Included in draft design.
Community recommendations: Rumble strips;
Border Patrol response as of June 2009: Included in draft design.
Community recommendations: Sufficient traffic lanes to preclude
congestion;
Border Patrol response as of June 2009: Included in draft design.
Community recommendations: Safe inspection area, to include canopies;
Border Patrol response as of June 2009: Included in draft design.
Community recommendations: Separate lanes for commercial and non-
commercial traffic;
Border Patrol response as of June 2009: Included in draft design.
Community recommendations: Separate lanes to expedite those enrolled in
expedited travel programs;
Border Patrol response as of June 2009: Not part of current design
plans due to limited time savings for those enrolled, according to
sector officials.
Community recommendations: Refrigerated dock spaces for perishable
commodity examinations at the secondary inspection area;
Border Patrol response as of June 2009: Included in draft design.
Community recommendations: A VACIS machine as part of the facility;
Border Patrol response as of June 2009: Another type of non-intrusive
inspection technology--an X-ray backscatter machine--is included in
draft design.
Source: Community Workgroup on Southern Arizona Checkpoints and Border
Patrol.
[End of table]
Draft Planning Documents Show Proposed I-19 Checkpoint Will Be Largest
Checkpoint:
Our review of the draft plans for the I-19 permanent checkpoint showed
that it is planned to surpass the I-35 checkpoint as the largest
checkpoint on the southwest border in terms of total acreage and
acreage used for checkpoint operations, including primary and secondary
inspection lanes, as shown in table 8. Overall, the I-19 checkpoint is
about 20 percent larger than the I-35 checkpoint in terms of total
acreage and about 69 percent larger in terms of the acreage to be used
for checkpoint operations.
Table 8: Comparison of Proposed I-19 Permanent Checkpoint with I-35
Checkpoint:
Checkpoint: I-19 (proposed);
Border Patrol sector: Tucson;
Total site acreage: 18;
Acreage used for checkpoint operations: 7.1;
Primary inspection lanes: 8;
Secondary inspection lanes: 9.
Checkpoint: I-35;
Border Patrol sector: Laredo;
Total site acreage: 15;
Acreage used for checkpoint operations: 4.2;
Primary inspection lanes: 6;
Secondary inspection lanes: 5.
Source: CBP and Border Patrol data.
[End of table]
Border Patrol officials estimate that 11 of the 18 total acres at the I-
19 checkpoint site are not planned to be dedicated to checkpoint
operations, but are expected to be used for:
* graded slope area (4.0 acres),
* storm water retention areas and septic water filtration areas (3.5
acres), and:
* freeway on and off ramps (3.7 acres), which is a requirement from the
Arizona Department of Transportation.
According to the CBP project manager for the I-19 checkpoint, the large
size of the checkpoint is largely due to the number of inspection lanes
that are planned to meet current and future traffic volume, per design
guidelines. The guidelines indicate that a sufficient number of primary
and secondary inspection lanes are needed to ensure that current
traffic volume can be processed through the checkpoint with minimal
traffic backups and vehicle wait times, as longer wait times create
safety concerns and inconvenience the traveling public. When traffic
backups reach a certain distance from the checkpoint, sector officials
said that they allow traffic to pass through the checkpoint
uninspected, which decreases checkpoint effectiveness.[Footnote 70]
Smugglers and illegal aliens use these opportunities to pass through
the checkpoint undetected, according to sector officials.
Of the eight primary inspection lanes included in the draft design plan
for the I-19 permanent checkpoint, five lanes are required to address
current traffic volume, according to sector officials. The lanes for
processing the current traffic volume include two lanes for commercial
traffic and three lanes for passenger traffic. The design is consistent
with guidance and the community workgroup recommendations to include
off-highway inspection lanes that separate commercial and passenger
vehicles, dedicated truck and bus lanes, and canopy coverage for all
inspection areas.
The remaining three primary inspection lanes in the I-19 checkpoint
design plan are to ensure sufficient capacity for processing future
traffic volume. Border Patrol budget documents state that the
checkpoint construction process alone is estimated to take 5 years, and
design guidelines recommend that construction projects consider
capacity needs over the next 10 years, which can reduce overall
construction costs and maintain longer periods of operational
efficiency. The Arizona Department of Transportation projects that
traffic on the I-19 corridor will increase by 23 percent from 2007 to
2017, and 35 percent from 2007 to 2027.[Footnote 71] Using traffic
projections for the year 2017, the site engineer for the proposed I-19
checkpoint estimated that the five lanes for passenger vehicles will
result in wait times averaging less than 2 minutes, except for three
one-hour periods per day when wait times may increase to 8 to 10
minutes.[Footnote 72] According to the engineer, if the number of
passenger lanes is reduced to four, for example, then wait times are
estimated to exceed 20 minutes three times per day during peak traffic
periods, which would require suspension of inspection activities and
which is unacceptable, according to the Border Patrol. Border Patrol
officials stated that six of the eight lanes will be able to convert
between screening passenger vehicles and commercial traffic, which will
give the I-19 checkpoint flexibility during operation to adapt to
changing traffic patterns.
In regard to the secondary inspection lanes, the proposed nine lanes
were found to be insufficient to meet the Border Patrol's targeted
rates of inspection, according to reports by an engineering firm
commissioned to provide an advisory review for the I-19 checkpoint
design. The engineer reported that to meet target inspection rates
during peak periods, the Border Patrol would need to increase the
number of secondary lanes for non-commercial traffic from 7 to 22
lanes. Tucson sector officials said that they will not build the
additional secondary lanes because they do not have the resources and
staff to use them at this time.[Footnote 73] As a result, the number of
referrals of non-commercial traffic from primary to secondary
inspection will be decreased as needed to preclude traffic congestion.
Plans for the size of the I-19 checkpoint facilities are also
consistent with relevant guidelines. Space allocation guidelines are
based on many factors, including a functional evaluation of individual
space, group consensus of Border Patrol staff, comparison to existing
structures, and use of standard formulae. Border Patrol checkpoint
design guidelines include general processes for determining the size of
these resources or the space required--such as how large the main
checkpoint building should be--but do not impose a one-size-fits-all
approach on checkpoints. As a result, the sizes of each of these areas
may vary at different checkpoints based on the unique circumstances and
operational needs of each checkpoint. For example, the size of the main
checkpoint building, which includes administration, processing, and
detention facilities,[Footnote 74] is larger at the planned I-19
checkpoint than the I-35 checkpoint by approximately 3,400 square feet,
reflecting a greater estimated need at the I-19 checkpoint for
processing and detention of illegal aliens.[Footnote 75] Sector
officials stated that having sufficient processing and detention
capability at the I-19 checkpoint increases operational efficiency and
effectiveness, as agents will no longer have to frequently transport
apprehended individuals to the Tucson or Nogales stations for
processing and detention. In comparison, the canine kennel building at
the I-35 checkpoint is nearly 2,900 square feet larger than the planned
kennel at the I-19 checkpoint. According to CBP data, the canine kennel
building at the I-35 checkpoint is approximately 3,200 square feet,
while the I-19 checkpoint kennel is planned for approximately 290
square feet. Laredo sector officials said that the I-35 checkpoint
kennel was large because the building includes an office, storage room,
bathing room for the canines, bathroom, mechanical room, and a
quarantine area. Tucson sector officials stated that the smaller size
is because the I-19 checkpoint kennel will be only used as a rest area
for the canines.
Plans for the types of resources to be placed at the I-19 checkpoint
for conducting effective operations are also consistent with relevant
guidelines. For example, at the I-19 checkpoint, the Border Patrol
plans to include canine facilities, non-intrusive inspection
technology, vehicle lifts, and loading docks, among other resources, as
shown in figure 13.
Figure 13: Border Patrol Site Plan of the Proposed I-19 Permanent
Checkpoint:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Source: Border Patrol.
[End of figure]
Community Members Cited Some Adverse Impacts of Checkpoint Operations,
and Border Patrol Reported Having Limited Resources to Minimize Them:
Community members living near checkpoints we visited across the four
southwest border states told us they generally supported checkpoints
operating near them because of the law enforcement presence they
provide, but remained most concerned about the property damage that
occurs when illegal aliens trespass on private property to avoid the
checkpoints. Border Patrol policy highlights the need to detect and
respond to this circumvention activity; however, officials stated that
other priorities sometimes precluded positioning more than a minimum
number of agents and resources on checkpoint circumvention routes.
Tucson sector officials stated that when a permanent checkpoint on I-19
is constructed, it will provide additional technological enhancements
to monitor activity in the surrounding areas, but they have not
documented the number of agents that would need to be deployed to
address this activity. Despite concerns regarding property damage type
incidents, community members we spoke with generally said that
checkpoint operations had not adversely impacted their communities in
terms of violent crime, business, or property values, except for those
around the I-19 checkpoint in Arizona. Although the Border Patrol has
identified performance measures that could be used to monitor the
quality of life in areas affected by checkpoint operations, these
measures have not been implemented. Data were not available to
determine any causal relationship between checkpoint operations and
community well-being; however, some data were available showing overall
trends in real estate values, tourism, and crime without controlling
for checkpoint operation or other factors.
Property Damage, Theft, and Littering Cited as Adverse Impacts of
Checkpoint Operations:
Members of local governments, state and local law enforcement, business
groups, ranchers, and residents responding to our request for input
generally supported the Border Patrol and checkpoint operations because
of the law enforcement presence they provide, but generally agreed that
checkpoint operations cause illegal aliens and smugglers to attempt to
circumvent the checkpoint--resulting in adverse impacts to nearby
residents and communities, such as private property damage, theft, and
littering. These concerns were cited most often by ranchers and
residents in areas around checkpoints. Ranchers in Texas, California,
and Arizona said that they experienced cut fences that allowed cattle
or other livestock to escape; drained water tanks or water wastage from
irrigation lines that were left open; theft of water, food, clothing,
or vehicles; and trash including plastic water jugs and food containers
that are either left on the property as trespassers move through the
area, or that washed down rivers or streams from other areas. Local law
enforcement officials near two checkpoints in Texas we visited said
that they frequently respond to calls from ranchers for these reasons,
and ranchers said that these impacts have increased their ranch
security expenses.[Footnote 76] The level of concern was lower in areas
where checkpoints operated infrequently. For example, the San Diego
sector's checkpoints on I-5 and I-15 are rarely operational, resulting
in little need for circumvention and fewer concerns expressed by
community members.
The greatest level of concern about trespassing and property damage was
expressed in the Tucson sector, which has experienced higher levels of
illegal alien apprehensions across the southwest border. In fiscal year
2008, for example, just under half of the 705,000 total Border Patrol
apprehensions of illegal aliens across the southwest border occurred in
the Tucson sector, and sector officials cited a high level of
interaction with the community in responding to citizen concerns.
However, these apprehensions occurred all across the sector, making it
difficult to determine the extent that trespassing on private property
was due to attempts to circumvent the checkpoint or use of other
transit routes.
Our review of Border Patrol data for the Tucson sector showed that
significantly more illegal aliens were apprehended in the area around
the I-19 checkpoint than at the checkpoint itself, although the reverse
was true for drug seizures, as shown in table 9.[Footnote 77]
Specifically, data show that in fiscal year 2008 about 94 percent of
apprehensions occurred in the areas surrounding the I-19 checkpoint
compared to 27 percent of drug seizures.
Table 9: Number of Apprehensions and Seizures at the I-19 Checkpoint
and Area Surrounding I-19 Checkpoint:
Fiscal Year 2008:
At the I-19 checkpoint: Apprehensions: 507;
At the I-19 checkpoint: Seizures: 153;
Area surrounding the I-19 checkpoint: Apprehensions: 7,486;
Area surrounding the I-19 checkpoint: Seizures: 57.
Fiscal Year 2007:
At the I-19 checkpoint: Apprehensions: 474;
At the I-19 checkpoint: Seizures: 167;
Area surrounding the I-19 checkpoint: Apprehensions: 4,351;
Area surrounding the I-19 checkpoint: Seizures: 45.
Source: Border Patrol, CAR for I-19 checkpoint.
[End of table]
These data also show that increases in the number of apprehensions and
drug seizures were greater in the areas surrounding the I-19 checkpoint
than at the checkpoint itself between 2007 and 2008, suggesting that
community impact may have also increased. Specifically, from 2007 to
2008 there was a 72 percent increase in the number of apprehensions in
the surrounding area, compared to a 7 percent increase at the
checkpoint. Data show that the number of drug seizures for these areas
increased by 27 percent from 2007 to 2008, while declining by 8 percent
at the checkpoint.
Data limitations precluded our determining where illegal aliens and
smugglers were apprehended in relation to community boundaries, or
comparing the extent that apprehension patterns on circumvention
routes, or other transit routes, were similar across sectors. Tucson
sector Border Patrol officials stated that illegal activity on
circumvention routes generally occurs in remote locations, but the
Tucson sector has not yet implemented global positioning technology
sector-wide, as used by some other sectors, to pinpoint the location of
apprehensions and drug seizures. Instead, this information is tracked
among geographic grids comprising 7.4 square miles. In addition, while
the CAR contains data fields to capture activity on apprehensions made
of those attempting to circumvent checkpoints, definitions for these
fields were not used consistently across all checkpoints, based on an
analysis of checkpoint officials' responses to our data collection
instrument.
Border Patrol officials stated that the checkpoint strategy intends to
push illegal aliens and smugglers off-highway into rural areas where
they can be more easily apprehended, and the extent that these persons
attempt to avoid the checkpoint is an indicator that checkpoints are an
effective deterrent. Border Patrol officials said that when a new
checkpoint is put in place, or an enhancement is made at an existing
checkpoint, apprehensions commonly increase, followed by a decrease as
smugglers and illegal aliens search for less rigorously defended
transit routes that provide a greater chance of success. In terms of
the I-19 checkpoint, for example, Border Patrol officials attributed
increasing rates of checkpoint circumvention apprehensions to fixing
the checkpoint at its permanent location at KP 42 in November 2006.
Over time, officials said that the fixed location for the checkpoint
resulted in more continuous operation and greater ability to deploy
sensors and other resources that enhance checkpoint effectiveness.
Border Patrol officials acknowledged that the checkpoint strategy can
adversely impact private property owners, and said that sometimes there
were not enough agents in place to deter illegal activity or apprehend
trespassers in surrounding areas. According to Tucson sector officials,
for example, eight agents per shift are assigned to work the checkpoint
lanes and two to four agents per shift are generally assigned in
proximity to the I-19 checkpoint to address activity in the surrounding
areas, but that number varies from shift to shift and depends on the
activity levels during a given time of year. Border Patrol policy
highlights the need to detect and respond to checkpoint circumvention,
stating that it is just as critical to checkpoint effectiveness as the
inspection process, and should be addressed with appropriate
staff.[Footnote 78] However, despite the rapid increase in overall
staffing numbers on the southwest border, Border Patrol sector managers
may have other priorities for staff placement and stations may only
staff checkpoints--and circumvention routes--with the minimum required
manpower.[Footnote 79] In the Tucson sector, for example, checkpoints
and other interior locations had lower priority for staffing than
border locations, especially border towns such as Nogales, which are
major transit routes for illegal activity and had experienced higher
levels of violent crime. As the Border Patrol has gained better control
of these priority areas at the border, planning documents show that
emphasis will shift to other areas, including the I-19 checkpoint.
Checkpoint guidance also identifies other resources, such as
technology, that can assist Border Patrol agents in detecting and
responding to circumvention activity, but checkpoints do not always
have these resources available on a continuous basis. This guidance
states that a combination of resources, including ground sensors and
video surveillance cameras, should be used by each sector and station
as needed to monitor and address local circumvention activities.
According to Border Patrol officials, the placement and use of these
resources can depend on the proximity of checkpoints to populated
areas, the extent of illegal activity in the area, and the availability
of circumvention routes around the checkpoint. However, officials said
that checkpoints may have lower priority than other Border Patrol
activities to receive new technology, and older equipment may be less
reliable and less available for continuous operation, particularly at
tactical checkpoints. For example, the four cameras being used at the I-
19 checkpoint are not connected to commercial power and are therefore
vulnerable to generator and microwave transmitter issues, according to
sector officials. We also noted during our visit to the Tucson sector
that staff were not available to monitor the remote surveillance
cameras, limiting their effectiveness. A sector official stated that
these cameras were continuously monitored only when there was a
sufficient number of staff operating the checkpoint lanes and back-up
patrols. Having these technology resources available--and monitored--
on a continuous basis is important because Border Patrol officials said
that circumvention routes were more likely to be patrolled in response
to a sensor alert or camera indicating that a response is needed to
address activity in these areas.
Tucson sector officials stated that when a permanent checkpoint on I-19
is constructed, it will include a wider range of sensors and technology
improvements, such as SBInet towers,[Footnote 80] that will provide a
better view of the surrounding areas than the towers at the current
checkpoint site and that will enhance agents' ability to monitor the
circumvention areas around the checkpoint. However, checkpoint design
and planning documents do not include an estimate of the number of
agents that would be deployed to address circumvention activity at the
new checkpoint. Our prior work on strategic workforce planning stated
that staffing decisions, including needs assessments and deployment
decisions, should be based on valid and reliable data.[Footnote 81] Per
Border Patrol checkpoint design guidelines, sector officials are
expected to determine the number of staff they will need for checkpoint
operations, such as inspections and processing, as part of the design
process for constructing new checkpoints. For example, the anticipated
staffing level for the new permanent I-19 checkpoint would be 39 agents
on the peak shift, according to Border Patrol officials. However, the
anticipated deployments of these agents are not included in official
design or operational documents, and sector officials are not required
to conduct a workforce planning needs assessment to determine how to
best address impacts on surrounding areas from illegal aliens and
smugglers attempting to avoid the checkpoint. Sector officials stated
that technology improvements would enable fewer agents to monitor
illegal traffic in these areas, and that a sufficient number of agents
will be deployed as necessary in response to the level of illegal
activity. However, given the limited resources currently deployed to
address circumvention activity at the I-19 checkpoint and community
concerns regarding the extent of illegal activity in the circumvention
areas, conducting a workforce planning needs assessment at the
checkpoint design stage could help the Border Patrol ensure that
sufficient resources are planned for and deployed at the new checkpoint
to address circumvention activity.
Citizen reports are also important sources of information alerting
Border Patrol agents to illegal aliens and smugglers trespassing on
private property, and Border Patrol officials told us they also make
efforts to establish relationships with local ranching and community
groups. For example, in the Laredo and San Diego sectors, there are a
total of 19 agents whose full-time or collateral duties are to
regularly coordinate with local ranchers, maintain relationships, and
provide the ranchers with a direct point of contact. Border Patrol
stations within these sectors can develop their own community relations
strategies. In the Rio Grande Valley sector, for example, Falfurrias
station officials told us they hold a monthly meeting with local
ranchers to discuss any issues or information that should be shared
regarding the level of activity and number of incidents on the various
circumvention routes. In contrast, the Patrol Agent in Charge of the
Kingsville station said he prefers to maintain personal relationships
with local area ranchers. The Tucson sector, where officials have cited
a high level of community interaction, has a full-time Community
Relations Director who participated in more than 45 community meetings
from 2006 to 2009 to discuss issues relating to the current and planned
I-19 checkpoint. Across other sectors, community relations strategies
can include participating in community events and organizations such as
fairs, car shows, and reading to children in local schools.
Increased Violent Crime and Decreased Business and Real Estate Values
Not Commonly Cited as Adverse Impacts of Checkpoint Operations:
Despite concerns regarding property damage type incidents,
representatives of local government, state and local law enforcement,
business, ranching, and residents responding to our request for input
generally stated that checkpoints had no adverse effects on their
communities in terms of violent crime rates, business, and real estate
values, similar to findings in our 2005 report in which we reported
that most local community members we contacted saw traffic checkpoints
as beneficial to their communities.[Footnote 82] In some cases this
could be due to the fact that many checkpoints are located in remote
areas away from large population centers, or that some checkpoints are
operated infrequently. In regard to crime, officials from 12 law
enforcement agencies across the four southwest border states told us
that checkpoint operations did not cause an increase in local violent
crime rates. Furthermore, officials from seven of these law enforcement
agencies stated that they believed checkpoints, as well as the presence
of Border Patrol agents, provided a deterrent to criminal activity in
their communities. For example, officials from the Alamogordo, New
Mexico, Department of Public Safety stated that their 2007 crime rates
place them with some of the lowest crime rates among similarly sized
cities in New Mexico. The Department's Director believed that this was
due, in part, to the presence of the Border Patrol agents at the
checkpoints on U.S. Routes 54 and 70, approximately 25 miles south and
west of the city of Alamogordo, respectively. In regard to real estate
values, an official from the local Economic Development Council in
Kingsville, Texas, told us that homes sales and values north of the
U.S. Route 77 checkpoint had increased over the years, which he
believed was due to the increase in agents purchasing homes in the
area.
In contrast, some community members living near the I-19 checkpoint in
the Tucson sector--which is operated for nearly 24 hours per day and is
in the proximity of small communities--expressed concerns that
checkpoint operations caused adverse impacts to their communities in
terms of increased violent crime, loss of tourism, and reduced real
estate values. A 2007 letter from U.S. Representative Gabrielle
Giffords to the Border Patrol Chief detailed concerns from residents in
her district that smugglers were invading their communities,
threatening their homes, and that they had been affected by violence
associated with what appeared to be disputes among drug smugglers.
Residents from the town of Tubac, Arizona, which is a community close
to the I-19 checkpoint location, reported concerns that tourism in
their community had declined due to the proximity of the checkpoint. In
addition, the president of a local civic association from Tubac told us
that the checkpoint had negatively affected home sales and housing
values.
Border Patrol Has Identified Measures for Assessing Impact of
Checkpoint Operations on Surrounding Areas, but Has Not Used Them:
Border Patrol officials said that they are not yet using performance
measures they had developed to examine how checkpoint operations--
including checkpoint circumvention activity--impact the quality of life
in surrounding communities. The measures--which are consistent with the
Border Patrol National Strategy to reduce crime and consequently
improve the quality of life and economic vitality in border enforcement
areas--examine major crime reduction, smuggler activity in areas
affected by checkpoint operations, and coordination with other federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies. (See appendix II for a
description of the quality of life measures.) We have previously
reported that measuring performance allows organizations to track the
progress they are making toward their goals and gives managers critical
information on which to base decisions for improving their programs.
[Footnote 83] Our previous work has shown that when evaluating
performance, agencies needed to have measures that demonstrated
results, covered multiple priorities, provided useful information for
decision making, and successfully addressed important and varied
aspects of program performance.[Footnote 84]
The Border Patrol has included data fields in the CAR to collect
information relevant to some of the quality of life measures, but the
Border Patrol has not developed specific guidance for using the data to
assess the impact of operations on surrounding areas, and not all
sectors and stations consistently enter the data necessary to use the
measures. These limitations in guidance and data collection have
hindered the ability of the Border Patrol to assess the impact of
checkpoints on local communities. For example, one quality of life
measure examines the number of apprehensions and seizures turned over
to the checkpoint from other agencies, known as agency assists or
referrals, when the checkpoint is operational or non-operational. These
data can provide information on the extent to which the Border Patrol
is able to address illegal activity traveling through communities to
circumvent the checkpoint when it is operational. While the Border
Patrol does not consistently track agency assists and referrals from
local law enforcement agencies in the CAR, data we obtained from two
local sheriff's departments near the I-19 checkpoint in the Tucson
sector show that analyzing this information over time may be
informative. As shown in figure 14, Arizona's Santa Cruz County
Sheriff's Department reported a total of 84 assists to other agencies,
including the Border Patrol, in District 2 (which contains the I-19
checkpoint[Footnote 85]) an increase of approximately 8 percent from
2007.[Footnote 86]North of the I-19 checkpoint, Pima County Sheriff's
Department Green Valley District[Footnote 87] reported a total of 247
referrals to the Border Patrol in 2008, a decrease of approximately 7
percent from 2007. Analysis of these data by the Border Patrol may
show, for example, the extent to which relative fluctuations and
differences in agency assists or referrals in and among locations are
due to checkpoint operations or other factors, such as Operation
Stonegarden, a program providing funding to state and local law
enforcement personnel to provide additional coverage on routes of
egress from border areas.
Figure 14: Quarterly Number of Pima County Sheriff's Department
Referrals to the Border Patrol and Santa Cruz County Assists to Other
Agencies, January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Number of referrals or agency assists:
Date: January 1-March 31, 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2: 8;
Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District: 119.
Date: April 1-June 30, 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2: 3;
Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District: 113.
Date: July 1-September 30, 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2: 4;
Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District: 79.
Date: October 1-December 31, 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2: 3;
Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District: 71.
Date: January 1-March 31, 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2: 22;
Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District: 125.
Date: April 1-June 30, 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2: 17;
Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District: 71.
Date: July 1-September 30, 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2: 27;
Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District: 24.
Date: October 1-December 31, 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2: 9;
Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District: 35.
Date: January 1-March 31, 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2: 24;
Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District: 72.
Date: April 1-June 30, 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2: 11;
Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District: 82.
Date: July 1-September 30 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2: 20;
Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District: 57.
Date: October 1-December 31, 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2: 23;
Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District: 54.
Date: January 1-March 31, 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2: 16;
Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District: 88.
Date: April 1-June 30, 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2: 37;
Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District: 71.
Date: July 1-September 30, 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2: 21;
Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District: 53.
Date: October 1-December 31, 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2: 10;
Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District: 35.
Source: Pima County and Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Departments.
Note: Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department tracks the number of
agency assists, which includes Border Patrol and all other agency
assists. Pima County Sheriff's Department tracks the number of
referrals to the Border Patrol separately from other agencies.
[End of figure]
Data Unavailable to Link Checkpoint Operations to Changes in Community
Crime Rates, Tourism, or Real Estate Values:
Sufficient data were not available for us to determine any causal
relationship between checkpoint operations and local crime rates,
tourism trends, or real estate values in nearby communities. With
respect to the I-19 checkpoint, these data limitations also precluded a
comparison of community impacts for the time before and after the
checkpoint on I-19 became fixed at the KP 42 location in November 2006.
Such a comparison would require a complete set of historical data to
develop a baseline understanding, before interpreting factors that can
change the baseline. However, there are limited data sets for specific
geographic areas around the I-19 checkpoint, with county level data the
smallest possible geographic area, in many cases. We conducted a
literature search and identified several studies that attempted to link
Border Patrol checkpoints or other aspects of border enforcement
operations to local crime, business, or real estate values. These
studies were also unable to establish a causal link between Border
Patrol operations and changes in crime rates or real estate values due
to unavailable or incomplete data, or the inability to separate the
impact of border operations from many other contributing factors, such
as local and national economic factors.[Footnote 88] In terms of crime
data, for example, officials from Santa Cruz and Pima County Sheriff's
Departments said that data are not available in their information
systems to identify the number of crimes committed by illegal aliens,
or how many crimes occurred on checkpoint circumvention routes. A more
detailed discussion on our methodology and limitations to this analysis
can be found in appendix I.
Despite the limitations in determining any causal relationship between
checkpoint operations and crime, tourism, and real estate values in
nearby communities, some historical data were available from federal,
state, and local agencies that could be used to show overall trends in
real estate values, tourism,[Footnote 89] and crime for some
communities near the I-19 checkpoint, relevant counties, and the state,
without controlling for checkpoint operations or other factors. As
shown in figure 15, the I-19 checkpoint in Arizona is located in the
northern part of Santa Cruz County and the county immediately to the
north is Pima County. Communities closest to the I-19 checkpoint
include Tubac, which is located approximately 4 miles south of the
checkpoint in Santa Cruz County, and Green Valley, which is located
about 15 miles north of the checkpoint in Pima County.
Figure 15: Map of all Arizona Counties, Santa Cruz and Pima Counties,
and the I-19 Corridor:
[Refer to PDF for image: maps]
a. Arizona;
b. Pima County, Santa Cruz County;
c. I-19 corridor.
Sources: GAO (analysis), MapResources (map).
[End of figure]
Real Estate Property Values:
Real estate property values for locations south and north of the I-19
checkpoint have generally been increasing in the years from 2002
through 2008 as measured by the median county tax assessed value, shown
in figure 16. The Tubac community had the highest real estate values of
the areas we examined, with property values more than three times as
high as properties in Santa Cruz County, and more than twice as high as
properties in the Green Valley community and Pima County.[Footnote 90]
Data on the median sales price and net assessed value of homes in these
areas showed similar results, as shown in appendix IV.
Figure 16: Median Real Estate Property Value for Residential Properties
in the Arizona Communities of Tubac and Green Valley and Counties of
Santa Cruz and Pima, 2002 through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Year: 2002;
Median property value, Tubac: $154,960;
Median property value, Santa Cruz County: $74,599;
Median property value, Pima County: $85,748;
Median property value, Green Valley: $86,672.
Year: 2003;
Median property value, Tubac: $176,214;
Median property value, Santa Cruz County: $75,130;
Median property value, Pima County: $90,886;
Median property value, Green Valley: $88,033.
Year: 2004;
Median property value, Tubac: $174,024;
Median property value, Santa Cruz County: $78,396;
Median property value, Pima County: $101,597;
Median property value, Green Valley: $90,075.
Year: 2005;
Median property value, Tubac: $173,546;
Median property value, Santa Cruz County: $81,346;
Median property value, Pima County: $107,865;
Median property value, Green Valley: $94,421.
Year: 2006;
Median property value, Tubac: $215,036;
Median property value, Santa Cruz County: $83,564;
Median property value, Pima County: $120,485;
Median property value, Green Valley: $109,221.
Year: 2007;
Median property value, Tubac: $287,614;
Median property value, Santa Cruz County: $95,986;
Median property value, Pima County: $143,482;
Median property value, Green Valley: $134,784.
Year: 2008;
Median property value, Tubac: $354,572;
Median property value, Santa Cruz County: $115,046;
Median property value, Pima County: $169,201;
Median property value, Green Valley: $168,564.
Source: Santa Cruz County Tax Assessor‘s Office and Pima County Tax
Assessor‘s Office.
[End of figure]
Tourism:
Tourism data, as reflected by visitor data reported by Arizona state
parks, showed no consistent pattern between the years 2002 through 2008
for parks located near Tubac community (Tubac Presidio State Historic
Park),[Footnote 91] or in other areas of Santa Cruz County (the
Patagonia Lake State Park), and Arizona. As shown in figure 17, the
number of visitors to these parks generally fluctuated within a 15
percent window from year to year, except for the year between 2006 and
2007, when visitors to Tubac state park decreased by 29 percent, a
substantial difference compared to other locations. According to an
Arizona State Parks representative, this decline could have been caused
by several factors, including a large number of events in 2006 at the
Tubac state park to celebrate the park's 50th anniversary that resulted
in more park attendees in 2006, an overall decline in visitors to other
parks in Santa Cruz County, and a statewide decline in overall spending
and international visitors. All of these parks experienced a decline in
visitors the following year ending 2008, ranging from 7 to 10 percent.
Similar declines were seen in other tourism data based on lodging
statistics for the counties and state of Arizona (see appendix VI).
Figure 17: Percentage Annual Change in Number of Visitors to Arizona
State Parks, 2002 through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Year: 2002;
Tubac Presidio State Historic Park: 0%;
Patagonia Lake State Park: -4.4%;
All Arizona State Parks: -10.2%.
Year: 2003;
Tubac Presidio State Historic Park: -10.8%;
Patagonia Lake State Park: -2.4%;
All Arizona State Parks: -3.9%.
Year: 2004;
Tubac Presidio State Historic Park: -7.9%;
Patagonia Lake State Park: 1.2%;
All Arizona State Parks: 3.2%.
Year: 2005;
Tubac Presidio State Historic Park: 4.7%;
Patagonia Lake State Park: -9.7%;
All Arizona State Parks: 0.4%.
Year: 2006;
Tubac Presidio State Historic Park: 14.5%;
Patagonia Lake State Park: 8.6%;
All Arizona State Parks: -0.9%.
Year: 2007;
Tubac Presidio State Historic Park: -29%;
Patagonia Lake State Park: 1.7%;
All Arizona State Parks: 13.8%.
Year: 2008;
Tubac Presidio State Historic Park: -7.4%;
Patagonia Lake State Park: -9.7%;
All Arizona State Parks: -8.5%.
Source: GAO analysis using most recent data from the Arizona State
Parks.
[End of figure]
Crime:
Violent crime data from county sheriff departments[Footnote 92] showed
that the number of homicides, sexual and aggravated assaults, and
robberies was substantially lower in the district containing the I-19
checkpoint and the surrounding communities of Tubac,[Footnote 93]
Tumacacori, Carmen, Amado, and Arivaca than other nearby areas, from
2004 through 2008, but has been increasing at a higher rate than nearby
areas in the last 2 years as shown in figure 18. Specifically, violent
crime in District 2 almost doubled from 8 offenses in 2006 to 15
offenses in 2008. In contrast, violent crime in the Green Valley
District north of the I-19 checkpoint has been decreasing since 2006,
although the number of offenses remains almost twice as high.
Additional information on crime trends for these counties can be found
in appendix VII.
Figure 18: Number of Violent Crime Offenses and Annual Percentage
Change for Selected Arizona Locations, 2004 through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: combined vertical bar and line graph]
Year: 2004;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2 number of offenses:
6;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District number of
offenses: 40;
Santa Cruz County percentage change: 0;
Pima County percentage change: 0.
Year: 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2 number of offenses:
6;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District number of
offenses: 52;
Santa Cruz County percentage change: 10.7%;
Pima County percentage change: 5.2%.
Year: 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2 number of offenses:
8;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District number of
offenses: 60;
Santa Cruz County percentage change: 12.9%;
Pima County percentage change: 2.0%.
Year: 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2 number of offenses:
10;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District number of
offenses: 47;
Santa Cruz County percentage change: 2.9%;
Pima County percentage change: -22.6%.
Year: 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2 number of offenses:
15;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District number of
offenses: 28;
Santa Cruz County percentage change: 27.8%;
Pima County percentage change: 12.0%.
Source: GAO analysis of Pima County and Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s
Departments data.
Note: Percentages for data from relatively small populations may convey
a level of precision that can be misleading because they can change
greatly with minor changes in the data, therefore, when this occurs, we
identify the number.
[End of figure]
Crime patterns were similar for property offenses, which include
burglary, larceny, auto theft, and arson. As shown in figure 19,
District 2 containing the I-19 checkpoint experienced a 38 percent
increase in property crimes compared to Green Valley District from 2007
to 2008, although the total number of offenses in 2008 was much lower;
58 versus 534 offenses, respectively. County level changes were also
higher for Santa Cruz County compared to Pima County, which had a
slight decline.
Figure 19: Number of Property Crime Offenses and Percentage Annual
Change for Selected Arizona Locations, 2004 through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: combined vertical bar and line graph]
Year: 2004;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2 number of offenses:
25;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District number of
offenses: 471;
Santa Cruz County percentage change: 0%;
Pima County percentage change: 0%.
Year: 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2 number of offenses:
33;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District number of
offenses: 446;
Santa Cruz County percentage change: -5.9%;
Pima County percentage change: 6.4%.
Year: 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2 number of offenses:
39;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District number of
offenses: 457;
Santa Cruz County percentage change: 52.2%;
Pima County percentage change: 3.1%.
Year: 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2 number of offenses:
42;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District number of
offenses: 448;
Santa Cruz County percentage change: 16.0%;
Pima County percentage change: -4.8%.
Year: 2008
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2 number of offenses:
58;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District number of
offenses: 534; 7%; 668
Pima County percentage change: -0.6%.
Source: GAO analysis of Pima County and Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s
Departments data.
[End of figure]
Conclusions:
Within the past few years, CBP and the Border Patrol have increased
staff, fencing, and other technology at the border to deter repeated
illegal border crossings. Despite these investments at the border,
however, it would appear that checkpoints will continue to serve a
purpose as part of the Border Patrol's three-tiered strategy. As long
as agency goals indicate that the majority of major criminal activity
will pass through the ports of entry undetected, checkpoints are
uniquely positioned to provide additional opportunities to apprehend
illegal aliens and contraband that travel from the ports along U.S.
interstates or roads.
Since our last report, the Border Patrol has established performance
measures indicating checkpoint contributions toward apprehending
illegal aliens and seizing illegal drugs, but the lack of information
on those passing through checkpoints undetected continues to challenge
the Border Patrol's ability to measure checkpoint effectiveness and
provide public accountability. While the Border Patrol has developed
other measures in response to our 2005 recommendation that collectively
may provide some indication of checkpoint effectiveness and efficiency,
these measures cannot be effectively used until field agents accurately
and consistently collect and enter performance data into the checkpoint
information system. Field agents are unlikely to do so until guidance
is improved, and rigorous oversight is implemented at the station,
sector, and headquarters levels. The Border Patrol states that it will
take action to address these issues. Until these actions are completed,
however, the integrity of the CBP performance and accountability system
in regard to checkpoint operations is uncertain. We reiterate the need
for CBP to act on our prior recommendation to implement a cost-
effectiveness measure in order to help encourage action by headquarters
and field managers to identify best practices for checkpoint operation,
and implement these practices across locations. Similarly, while the
Border Patrol's national strategy cites the importance of assessing the
community impact of Border Patrol operations, the implementation of
such measures is noticeably lacking. Implementing such measures in
areas of community concern may serve to provide greater attention and
priority in Border Patrol operational and staffing decisions to address
any existing issues.
Although the Border Patrol's checkpoint design process includes factors
related to the safety and convenience of travelers, agents, and
detainees, the absence of explicit requirements in Border Patrol
checkpoint design guidelines and standards to consider current and
expected traffic volumes when determining the number of inspection
lanes and to conduct traffic studies could result in inconsistencies in
the checkpoint design process and the risk that checkpoints may not be
appropriately sized. Furthermore, the fact that the checkpoint strategy
intends to push illegal aliens and smugglers to areas around
checkpoints--which could include nearby communities--underscores the
need for the Border Patrol to ensure that it deploys sufficient
resources and staff to these areas. Conducting a needs assessment when
planning for a new or upgraded checkpoint could help better ensure that
officials consider the potential impact of the checkpoint on the
community and plan for a sufficient number of agents and resources.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To improve the reliability and accountability of checkpoint performance
results to the Congress and the public, we recommend that the
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection take the following four
actions:
* Establish milestones for determining the feasibility of a checkpoint
performance model that would allow the Border Patrol to compare
apprehensions and seizures to the level of illegal activity passing
through the checkpoint undetected.
* Establish internal controls for management oversight of the accuracy,
consistency, and completeness of checkpoint performance data.
* Implement the quality of life measures that have already been
identified by the Border Patrol to evaluate the impact that checkpoints
have on local communities. Implementing these measures would include
identifying appropriate data sources available at the local, state, or
federal level, and developing guidance for how data should be collected
and used in support of these measures.
* Use the information generated from the quality of life measures in
conjunction with other relevant factors to inform resource allocations
and address identified impacts.
To ensure that the checkpoint design process results in checkpoints
that are sized and resourced to meet operational and community needs,
we recommend that the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection
take the following two actions:
* Require that current and expected traffic volumes be considered by
the Border Patrol when determining the number of inspection lanes at
new permanent checkpoints, that traffic studies be conducted and
documented, and that these requirements be explicitly documented in
Border Patrol checkpoint design guidelines and standards.
* In connection with planning for new or upgraded checkpoints, conduct
a workforce planning needs assessment for checkpoint staffing
allocations to determine the resources needed to address anticipated
levels of illegal activity around the checkpoint.
Agency Comments:
We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ for review and
comment. DHS provided written comments on August 24, 2009, which are
presented in appendix VIII. In commenting on the draft report, DHS and
CBP stated that they agreed with our recommendations and identified
actions planned or underway to implement the recommendations. DOJ did
not provide formal comments. CBP and DOJ also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the
Attorney General, and other interested parties. In addition, this
report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov].
If you have any further questions about this report, please contact me
at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last
page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in
appendix IX.
Signed by:
Richard M. Stana:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
List of Requesters:
The Honorable Jon Kyl:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security:
Committee on the Judiciary:
United States Senate:
The Honorable John Cornyn:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and Border Security:
Committee on the Judiciary:
United States Senate:
The Honorable David E. Price:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John McCain:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bob Filner:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Gabrielle Giffords:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Ciro D. Rodriguez:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Objectives:
This report addresses the following four principal questions:
* How has checkpoint performance contributed to meeting Border Patrol
goals for securing the southwest border, and what factors, if any, have
affected checkpoint performance?
* To what extent has the Border Patrol established measures of
performance for checkpoints?
* To what extent has the Border Patrol considered community impacts in
the placement and design of checkpoints since 2006, including the
planned I-19 permanent checkpoint?
* How do checkpoint operations impact nearby communities, particularly
those near the I-19 checkpoint, and to what extent does the Border
Patrol address those impacts?
Scope and Methodology:
To address our objectives, we examined and analyzed Border Patrol
checkpoint policy documents, reports, manuals, and guidance concerning
border strategy and checkpoint operations. We interviewed cognizant
Border Patrol officials at Washington, D.C. headquarters, officials in
sector offices, and personnel at selected permanent and tactical
checkpoints. We visited five Border Patrol sectors--San Diego,
California; Tucson, Arizona; Laredo, Texas; Rio Grande Valley, Texas;
and El Paso, Texas (which also covers all of New Mexico). In total, we
visited 12 permanent checkpoints and 3 tactical checkpoints, as shown
in table 10.
Table 10: Checkpoints Visited by GAO, by Border Patrol Sector:
Sector: San Diego;
Checkpoints visited:
* I-5 (permanent);
* I-15 (permanent);
* I-8 West (permanent);
* State Route 94 (permanent).
Sector: Tucson;
Checkpoints visited:
* I-19 (tactical);
* Arivaca Road (tactical);
* State Route 82 (tactical).
Sector: Laredo;
Checkpoints visited:
* I-35 (permanent);
* U.S. Route 83 North (permanent).
Sector: Rio Grande Valley;
Checkpoints visited:
* U.S. Route 77 (permanent);
* U.S. Route 281 (permanent).
Sector: El Paso;
Checkpoints visited:
* I-10 (permanent);
* I-25 (permanent);
* U.S. Route 54 (permanent);
* U.S. Route 70 (permanent).
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
The five sectors we visited were selected to provide a range in the
size and types of checkpoint operations; estimated annual volume of
illegal aliens; volume of vehicular traffic transiting checkpoints;
topography and density of road networks; presence or absence of large
urban areas on or near the border, both on the U.S. and Mexican sides;
and types of checkpoints (permanent and tactical). As we were told by
the Border Patrol in deciding which sectors and checkpoints to visit,
and as we found during our site visits, these five sectors contained a
wide variety of operating conditions. For example, we observed that
traffic volumes varied widely at different checkpoints. Similarly,
there were variations in the estimated numbers of illegal aliens
entering these sectors over the last several years, and differences in
topography, with some being comparatively mountainous and others being
comparatively flat. During the winter months, the Laredo and Rio Grande
Valley sectors have the Rio Grande as a natural barrier to illegal
immigration, while the Tucson sector has a flat desert at the border
that is easily crossed. Some sectors have permanent checkpoints, such
as at Temecula, California, that must be supplemented with tactical
checkpoints, because of substantial secondary road networks around the
permanent checkpoint. Others, such as Rio Grande Valley, have no
alternative secondary roads available to evade the permanent
checkpoints on the limited north-south highways. Some sectors, such as
San Diego and Laredo, have large U.S. and Mexican urban areas on or
very near the international border, while others, such as Tucson, have
only a few much smaller cities on either side at the border. In
choosing these sectors, which are located in all four southwest border
states (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas), we sought and
found a wide range of conditions that appear to reasonably represent
the range of operating conditions faced by the Border Patrol across the
Southwest. However, we were unable to observe all operating conditions
at all times and the conditions we describe are therefore based on
available documentation and observations at our site visits only.
We also interviewed selected officials in communities near some of the
checkpoints, including state and local law enforcement and community
officials, selected community leaders, citizens, and owners of local
businesses. These included the communities of Temecula, California;
Green Valley, Arizona; Nogales, Arizona; Sahaurita, Arizona; Tubac,
Arizona; Laredo, Texas; Sarita, Texas; Kingsville, Texas; Falfurrias,
Texas; Las Cruces, New Mexico; and Alamogordo, New Mexico. Because
these places and persons was a nonprobability sample, the results from
our site visits cannot be generalized to other locations, checkpoints,
local officials, or citizens, but what we learned from our site visits
and the persons we interviewed provided a useful perspective on the
issues addressed in this report.
However, this report does not address some of the larger issues
surrounding illegal immigration into the United States, such as the
disparities in average daily wages between Mexico and the United
States, and the incentives created by these disparities for illegal
immigration, as well as the difficulties of neutralizing such
disparities through work site enforcement. We have addressed some of
these issues in prior work.[Footnote 94] In addition, although
deterring illegal immigration through the likelihood of detection and
apprehension is a goal of the Border Patrol--and checkpoints--we did
not attempt to measure the deterrent effect of the Border Patrol's
operations, as this would have required, among other things, opinion
surveys of Mexican citizens and potential contraband smugglers. This
report also does not address the larger factors related to illegal
drugs in the United States, such as the demand for illegal drugs in the
United States and the incentives those create, U.S. and Mexican
government efforts to address the smuggling of illegal drugs, and the
U.S. government anti-drug policies.
We conducted this performance audit from July 2008 to August 2009 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform our audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the
evidence obtained provides this reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Checkpoint Contributions:
To assess the contributions checkpoints make to the Border Patrol's
mission and the factors that affect checkpoint performance, we reviewed
Border Patrol policy and guidance regarding checkpoint operations and
interviewed officials at Border Patrol headquarters, including the
Chief and other senior managers, and officials responsible for
operating checkpoints in five of the nine Border Patrol sectors on the
southwest border. We obtained data reported in Border Patrol's
checkpoint activity report (CAR) for all checkpoints, permanent and
tactical, located in southwest border states. We were limited to data
from fiscal years 2007 and 2008 because while the CAR was implemented
in July 2006, consistent data for all checkpoints were not available
until October 2006--the beginning of fiscal year 2007. To obtain
checkpoint apprehensions and seizures by sector, we added apprehensions
and seizures that occurred at each sector's checkpoints for each fiscal
year. Of the 71 checkpoints located in the nine southwest border
sectors, only two checkpoints in the Rio Grande Valley sector defined
apprehensions and seizures at checkpoint in a manner inconsistent with
Border Patrol guidance. These two checkpoints count all apprehensions
and seizures occurring within 2.5 miles of the checkpoint as occurring
"at checkpoint," as of August 2008. Prior to August 2008, these two
checkpoints used the same definition as other checkpoints--that an
apprehension or seizure at a checkpoint occurs "at the immediate
checkpoint." Nevertheless, we believe these checkpoint data to be
sufficiently reliable for reporting purposes, with limitations noted,
based on the steps we describe in the next section. We also obtained
data from the Border Patrol on total apprehensions and drug seizures
across each of the nine southwest border sectors to compare the
relative contributions of each sector's checkpoints to overall
apprehensions and drug seizures on the southwest border. In addition,
we obtained data from the CAR on the number of aliens from special
interest countries encountered at checkpoints in fiscal years 2007 and
2008, and obtained information from U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) and Border Patrol officials regarding how those encounters are
managed and documented. We reviewed Border Patrol guidance and
interviewed officials responsible for checkpoint operations in five
Border Patrol sectors regarding factors that influence checkpoint
performance. We also interviewed Drug Enforcement Administration and
selected local law enforcement officials located near checkpoints in
five Border Patrol sectors to determine the extent to which Border
Patrol checkpoints support or impact their respective law enforcement
operations.
Assessment of Checkpoint Performance Measures:
To assess Border Patrol's checkpoint performance measures, we reviewed
documents from Border Patrol and CBP, including a document identifying
various checkpoint performance measures developed by Border Patrol,
CBP's annual Performance and Accountability Reports (PAR) for fiscal
years 2006 through 2008, and DHS's annual performance reports for
fiscal years 2007 through 2010. We also reviewed our prior report on
checkpoints, which found that Border Patrol had not established
adequate performance measures for checkpoints.[Footnote 95] We met with
Border Patrol headquarters officials responsible for developing and
implementing checkpoint performance measures to discuss the measures
and how they are used by Border Patrol management. We also met with
officials at the Border Patrol sectors we visited to discuss the
checkpoint performance measures. In addition, we compared Border
Patrol's performance measures and data collection practices with the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA)[Footnote 96] and
GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.
[Footnote 97]
To assess the reliability of checkpoint performance data and to
determine how checkpoint supervisors input information into the CAR, we
sent a data collection instrument to Border Patrol officials, who
provided it to all Border Patrol stations along the southwest border
responsible for operating checkpoints. The CAR is the primary data
collection system for checkpoint performance data. We received
responses from 60 checkpoints. We determined, based on these responses,
our own observations of checkpoint data entry at some checkpoints, and
a review of Border Patrol provided data, that data on "at checkpoint"
apprehensions and seizures were sufficiently reliable for reporting
purposes, but other data fields were not consistently collected and
therefore not reliable for our reporting purposes. Based on the results
of the data collection instrument, we identified various factors that
contribute to checkpoint data reliability issues. We also interviewed
Border Patrol headquarters officials and officials at the five sectors
we visited in the field about data integrity procedures, including
methods by which data are checked and reviewed for accuracy. We also
reviewed documents to determine what guidance is provided for
collecting and reporting checkpoint performance data, and what steps
could be taken to address identified data problems.
To assess Border Patrol's reporting of checkpoint performance measures
in the annual CBP PAR, we compared the reported results with our own
calculations of checkpoint performance data. These checkpoint
performance measures reported in the PAR are (1) apprehensions at
checkpoints as a percentage of total Border Patrol apprehensions, (2)
drug seizures at checkpoints as a percentage of total Border Patrol
drug seizures, and (3) percentage of checkpoint cases referred to a
U.S. Attorney. For the first two measures, we used data from the CAR to
calculate the total number of checkpoint apprehensions and checkpoint
drug seizures, and divided that result by total apprehensions and drug
seizures in Border Patrol's nine southwest border sectors. For the
referral measure, we again used data from the CAR to calculate the
total number of checkpoint cases that result in a referral to a U.S.
Attorney. We then divided that number by total apprehensions occurring
at southwest border checkpoints. We noted discrepancies between Border
Patrol's reported performance and our analysis of the results of Border
Patrol performance measures, and we discussed these discrepancies with
Border Patrol officials responsible for checkpoint performance
measurement.
We attempted to analyze other aspects of checkpoint performance, such
as apprehensions at checkpoints compared to apprehensions on
circumvention routes and apprehension and seizures using methods of
concealment. However, our ability to report on these measures for all
checkpoints was limited because we identified inconsistencies through
our data collection instrument in how those data are reported by
checkpoints in southwest border sectors. We discussed the issues we
found with Border Patrol headquarters officials responsible for
oversight of checkpoint operations.
We also developed additional measures intended to allow for comparisons
between checkpoints, but certain data limitations hinder detailed
quantitative analysis. As stated earlier, it is not possible to use the
numbers of apprehensions and seizures made at checkpoints as the sole
basis for comparison between checkpoints, because there are a number of
factors and variables that can influence and impact checkpoint
performance. For example, a checkpoint that accounted for 500
apprehensions is not necessarily better or more effective than a
checkpoint that accounted for 50 apprehensions. The differences in
apprehension totals between the checkpoints could be attributed to a
number of factors that are outside of the control of the checkpoint,
such as variations in operational hours and differences in traffic
volume. As such, we developed measures that were intended to normalize
or control for these variables. These measures included examining
apprehensions and seizures on an operational hour basis, apprehensions
and seizures per agent year, and apprehensions and seizures based upon
the average annual daily traffic volume at the checkpoint.
First, in the case of our operational hour analysis, checkpoints that
were not operational as long as others appeared to perform better than
checkpoints that were operational nearly 24 hours per day. For example,
using this measure, the I-5 checkpoint in the San Diego sector is one
of the best performing checkpoints. However, it is only operational, on
average, 1.5 hours per day. Meanwhile, the checkpoint located on U.S.
Route 281 in Falfurrias, Texas, seizes more drugs and apprehends more
illegal aliens than the I-5 checkpoint, and is open 23 hours and 20
minutes every day, on average, but does not perform as well as the I-5
checkpoint using an operational hour measure. Therefore, while the I-5
checkpoint performs well using an operational hour analysis measure,
one can assume that drugs and illegal aliens pass through that
checkpoint in the hours that it is not operational.
Second, we attempted to develop a cost effectiveness measure for
permanent checkpoints that would examine apprehensions and seizures per
agent work year. We chose this measure because a question that is
frequently, if not almost universally, asked about government programs,
is, "What is known about their cost effectiveness?" One potential
measure of such cost effectiveness for the Border Patrol would be how
much did it cost to apprehend a single person or seize illegal drugs in
one checkpoint compared with other checkpoints or other Border Patrol
activities? While this measure and others should not be taken in
isolation as further guides to management decisions, knowledge of the
basic costs of an agency's key outcomes (such as apprehensions of
illegal aliens) per unit of input (agent labor costs) can be part of
the basis for improved allocation of resources.
While such a performance measure can provide some information on cost
effectiveness, some apprehensions or seizures may be considered more
important to the agency than others. For instance, apprehending a drug
smuggler or a terrorist might be considered more important than
apprehending an illegal alien job seeker. Additionally, in attempting
to develop this measure, we learned that at least 20 of the 32
permanent checkpoints on the southwest border have migrated to a four
overlapping shift format, while the CAR is limited to reporting of
three shifts. As a result, at least 20 permanent checkpoints are unable
to accurately report the number of agents assigned to the checkpoint,
limiting our ability to conduct an apprehension and seizure by agent
work year analysis. In addition, the Border Patrol does not track the
number of agents staffed to line watch and roving patrol operations, so
we could not compare the performance of checkpoints (as measured by
apprehensions and seizures per agent work year) to these other Border
Patrol activities.
Third, we attempted to conduct an analysis of permanent checkpoints'
apprehensions and seizures in relation to traffic volume. Because it
could be assumed that checkpoints with high traffic volumes may also
have high apprehension and seizure totals, such an analysis was an
attempt to normalize for differences in traffic volume to determine if
certain checkpoints have higher apprehension and seizure rates per
traffic volume than others. Higher rates of apprehensions and seizures
could indicate a more effective checkpoint--that is, one that is better
able to detect illegal activity--or it could be due to volume of
illegal traffic coming through the checkpoint. We attempted to use the
traffic volume numbers reported by checkpoint in the CAR, but could not
determine whether those numbers were reliable. Therefore, we accessed
the online transportation databases for the four southwest border
states and obtained average annual daily traffic volume for major
highways in California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. However, we
could not conduct a comprehensive analysis for all checkpoints using
this measure because (1) checkpoints were located at various distances
from a traffic counter or (2) checkpoints (particularly tactical
checkpoints) were on a highway that did not have a traffic counter.
Border Patrol's Consideration of Community Impacts in the Checkpoint
Placement and Design Process:
Regarding checkpoint placement and design, we met with officials from
CBP Facilities Management and Engineering, Border Patrol Tactical
Infrastructures, Border Patrol Southwest Operations Division, and
Border Patrol sector and station offices to understand the checkpoint
placement and design process and the roles and responsibilities of each
office and component. We also reviewed available Border Patrol and CBP
documentation describing the checkpoint placement and design process,
such as the 2003 Border Patrol Facilities Design Guide and Border
Patrol checkpoint policy.
We assessed the extent to which the Border Patrol considered community
impacts in the design and placement of checkpoints that were either (a)
new permanent checkpoints constructed in the last 3 years, or (b) new
permanent checkpoints currently under construction. We did not include
all checkpoints in our analysis, because the guidelines and standards
for checkpoint placement and design have changed over time, and it
would not be appropriate to assess checkpoints that were built decades
ago with current checkpoint placement and design guidelines. In
addition, limited documentation is available for checkpoints
constructed prior to 2006, according to Border Patrol and CBP
officials. We did not include checkpoints that were or are being
renovated or expanded, because they would not be subject to Border
Patrol's checkpoint placement guidelines. We also did not include
tactical checkpoints in our analysis, because these lack permanent
infrastructure. We also included in our analysis the planned I-19
permanent checkpoint, rather than all planned checkpoints, because of
the extent of the controversy regarding that particular checkpoint.
We obtained information on checkpoints that met our criteria from
Border Patrol and CBP. Based on this information, and review of
available documentation, we determined that three checkpoints met our
criteria: (1) the I-35 checkpoint in the Laredo sector, which was
completed in 2006, (2) the U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint in the El Paso
sector, which was completed in 2009, and (3) the U.S. Route 83
checkpoint in the Laredo sector--expected to be completed in October
2009. For each of these checkpoints, we reviewed available
documentation related to the placement and design of these checkpoints,
including Border Patrol Facilities Design Guide--which has a section
for checkpoint design--and Border Patrol checkpoint policy. These
documents describe Border Patrol's guidelines for placement and design
of checkpoint facilities, including where they should be located and
the types of resources and capabilities that checkpoints should
include. Border Patrol officials noted that these documents provide
general guidance on checkpoint placement and design, rather than
specific requirements. We also reviewed environmental assessments,
which describe the Border Patrol's rationale for selection of a
particular site, information on consideration of environmental and
community impact, and the Border Patrol's coordination with various
federal and state agencies. We also talked with CBP and Border Patrol
headquarters officials and Border Patrol sector officials about how
placement and design decisions were made for these checkpoints.
Regarding the planned I-19 permanent checkpoint, we used the Border
Patrol Facilities Design Guide and Border Patrol checkpoint policy as
our primary basis for evaluating the placement and design of the I-19
checkpoint. We reviewed available documentation from Border Patrol's
Tucson sector regarding the placement factors considered in determining
the location of the I-19 permanent checkpoint. To observe firsthand the
possible checkpoint locations, we traveled along the I-19 corridor,
from Nogales to Tucson, with Border Patrol officials who explained
their rationale for tentatively choosing the KP 41 location, and why
other sites were not suitable, in their view.
We reviewed available documentation related to the design of the
checkpoint, including a site plan which showed the layout of the
proposed checkpoint and draft environmental assessments. We also met
with Border Patrol officials about their rationale for the design for
the checkpoint, including total size (footprint), resources, and size
of various functional areas. We talked with officials from the Arizona
Department of Transportation (ADOT) about their input and requirements
for the I-19 permanent checkpoint location. We obtained and analyzed
ADOT traffic projection data, which was developed by a contractor
working for ADOT, and talked with ADOT engineers and the I-19 permanent
checkpoint project manager about traffic projections. We also talked
with officials and reviewed planning documents from the Santa Cruz
County Department of Community Development to obtain information on
plans for development in the areas near the proposed checkpoint
location. In addition, we reviewed the recommendations on the design of
the permanent I-19 checkpoint made by the Workgroup on Southern Arizona
Checkpoints, and the Border Patrol's responses to the recommendations.
We also analyzed the Program Advisory for the I-19 permanent
checkpoint, which was prepared by an engineering firm contractor to the
Border Patrol. This document identifies space recommendations based on
an assessment of checkpoint requirements, traffic capacity,
apprehension and holding assessments, checkpoint operations, and number
of staff. We met with the project manager for the I-19 checkpoint
project to discuss these documents and the placement and design of the
checkpoint. The project manager also provided square footage
information for both the proposed I-19 permanent checkpoint and the I-
35 checkpoint in the Laredo sector, which allowed us to compare the
sizes of the two checkpoints. We used the I-35 checkpoint as a basis
for comparison because Border Patrol officials told us that the I-35
checkpoint was used as a frame of reference for the I-19 permanent
checkpoint, and the I-35 checkpoint was also a large, permanent
checkpoint. We also compared plans for the proposed I-19 permanent
checkpoint with other large checkpoints in terms of number of primary
and secondary inspection lanes, and total property size (acreage). We
obtained data on number of inspection lanes and checkpoint size from
the Border Patrol and CBP, and found the data to be sufficiently
reliable for reporting purposes. For other potential variables, such as
number of buildings, total building square footage, and traffic volume,
we found that data were not consistently available and therefore were
not sufficiently reliable for reporting purposes.
To determine if the Border Patrol followed its checkpoint placement
guidelines regarding locating checkpoints in remote areas for the three
checkpoints either constructed or under construction since 2006, we
calculated the distances between each checkpoint and the nearest school
and hospital, as listed in MapInfo's institution data. To determine the
reliability of the institution data for schools, we compared it to the
Department of Education's Common Core Data (CCD) for schools in the
counties surrounding the checkpoints. We determined that the
institution layer supplemented with data from the CCD was sufficiently
reliable for our purposes. To determine the reliability of the
institution data for hospitals, we compared it to a list of Medicare
eligible hospitals in the counties surrounding the checkpoints. We
determined that the institution layer supplemented with the Medicare
Hospital data was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We also used
2000 Census data to estimate the populations within 1 and 5 miles of
each location. Population estimates were calculated by using MapInfo to
draw a circle with a 1-or 5-mile radius around the checkpoint locations
provided by the Border Patrol. These circles were then layered over
2000 Census block group-level population data. For each block group, we
determined the proportion of the area that fell within the 1-or 5-mile
radius of the checkpoint. The Census population for each block group
that fell within the boundary of interest was multiplied by the
proportion as an estimate of what proportion of the population in the
block group lived within 1 or 5 miles of the checkpoint. The estimates
for each block group were then added together to estimate the total
population living around the checkpoint. For the planned I-19 permanent
checkpoint, we calculated distances of four proposed checkpoint
locations from the nearest school and hospital, and we used 2000 Census
data to estimate the populations within 1 and 5 miles of each location.
Community Impacts of Checkpoint Operations:
To assess the extent that the Border Patrol has considered community
impacts in the operation of checkpoints, we reviewed Border Patrol
operational guidance, policy documents, and training materials that
describe Border Patrol standards and processes for monitoring and
responding to circumvention activity. We also met with Border Patrol
officials at the 15 checkpoints we visited to discuss their efforts to
monitor and respond to circumvention activity and how they coordinate
with nearby communities.
To understand the extent that operations from Border Patrol checkpoints
impact surrounding areas, we interviewed state and local law
enforcement, business groups, community leaders, and other members of
communities in the areas we visited to obtain their perspectives on
impacts, if any, experienced by those who live or work within the areas
surrounding checkpoints. In the five Border Patrol sectors we visited,
we met with the following:
Fourteen law enforcement agencies in five sectors:
* Tucson sector: Arizona Department of Public Safety; Pima County
Sheriff's Department; Sahuarita Police Department; Santa Cruz County
Sheriff's Department; and Tucson Police Department.
* San Diego sector: California Highway Patrol; Oceanside Police
Department; San Diego County Sheriff's Department; and Temecula Police
Department.
* Rio Grande Valley sector: Kenedy County Sheriff's Department:
* Laredo sector: Laredo Police Department and Webb County Sheriff's
Department.
* El Paso sector: Alamogordo Department of Public Safety and Doña Ana
County Sheriff's Department.
Business organizations in three sectors:
* Temecula Chamber of Commerce (San Diego sector),
* Kingsville Economic Development Council (Rio Grande Valley sector),
* Tubac Chamber of Commerce and other Chamber of Commerce members who
were participants in the Community Workgroup on Southern Arizona
Checkpoints town hall meeting (Tucson sector).
And ranchers and residents in three sectors (San Diego, Tucson, and
Laredo) that we, or the Border Patrol, identified because they were
landowners, residents, or business owners of the areas surrounding
specific Border Patrol checkpoints.
For each sector we visited, we attempted to identify local community
organizations or community members who could provide insight into the
impacts of checkpoint operations. However, in some cases--such as when
checkpoints were located in areas that were rural and remote--we were
unable to identify appropriate local organizations or community members
that could provide insight on the impacts of checkpoint operations. In
those cases we relied on the perspectives of local law enforcement
officials that patrolled the area of jurisdiction around the
checkpoint. In our meetings with these organizations and community
members, we asked specific questions regarding the impacts from
checkpoint operations and Border Patrol's response to these impacts.
Because the checkpoints and potential interviewees were a
nonprobability sample, the results from our site visits cannot be
generalized to other locations and checkpoints; however, what we
learned from our site visits provided a useful background into the
types of impacts that occur as a result of checkpoint operations.
In the Border Patrol Tucson sector, there was a community group--known
as the Community Workgroup for Southern Arizona Checkpoints--that was
organized around issues relating to the I-19 checkpoint. Chaired by the
Border Patrol sector chief and U.S. Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords,
the mission of the workgroup was to build a better understanding among
southern Arizona communities on checkpoint operations and community
impacts and to make recommendations on issues, concerns, and ideas
regarding the current checkpoint and proposed permanent checkpoints. We
reviewed documents from the workgroup and news articles that reported
concerns of the community. While in the Tucson sector, we held a town
hall style meeting for all workgroup members and others from the
community. The town hall meeting was facilitated with a prepared set of
questions to ensure that we obtained input regarding perceived
community impacts from checkpoint operations. This was the only Border
Patrol sector that had an organized and involved community group that
had been actively discussing Border Patrol checkpoints, as far as we
could determine.
We attempted to determine the extent to which checkpoint operations can
be linked to third-party indicators such as crime, economic, tourism,
and property value data. Based on extensive research and analysis, we
determined there were many limitations to drawing such causal links.
Third-party indicators, such as these, are complex statistics impacted
by numerous factors, many of which have little to do with border
enforcement. It is difficult to further separate checkpoint operations
from overall border enforcement, and data on crime, economic, tourism,
and property values can fluctuate in ways that have no correlation to
checkpoint operations, but may be influenced by other factors, such as
the U.S. and global economies. Additionally, to understand any trends
in these indicators there needs to be a complete set of historical data
to develop a baseline understanding before interpreting factors that
can change the baseline. If checkpoint operations could impact trends,
data should be tracked for several years before and after a checkpoint
is established to understand and control for external variables that
may also be impacting trends. Given the community concerns regarding
the checkpoint on the I-19 highway in the Tucson sector, we collected
some historical data on crime, business, and real estate values for
communities close to the I-19 checkpoint, the checkpoint's surrounding
and nearest counties, and the state of Arizona. Those data are
presented in the report and appendices simply to show overall trends,
without controlling for checkpoint operation or other factors. We are
unable to draw any conclusions from these data and cannot link
checkpoint operations to any of these indicators. We also cannot infer
that real estate values, tourism, or crime trends are better or worse
for nearby communities since the checkpoint on the I-19 highway became
fixed at the KP 42 location in November 2006. We determined that the
property value, economic, tourism, and crime data used within the
report and appendices were sufficiently reliable for providing
historical trends and general descriptions of each of the below
categories. To determine the reliability of these data, we reviewed
existing information about the data systems and interviewed
knowledgeable officials about the data, as available.
Property value data. We obtained and reviewed data on property values
from federal, state, and local agencies. At the federal level we
reviewed available data on property values from several nationwide data
sets, such as Federal Housing Finance Board, U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development, Case-Shiller, National Association of Realtors,
and U.S. Census Bureau, and determined that their level of geographic
reporting was not specific enough to the areas of interest, such as
Tubac and Green Valley. At the state level we reviewed available data
from the Arizona Department of Commerce and the Arizona Tax Research
Association, which provides annual publications on property tax rates
and assessed values. The publication is completed every 2 years and
compiles county-and district-level data on net assessed values for all
properties, which is based on tax rates and levy sheets that are
officially adopted by each of the County Board of Supervisors. The
values provided to the Board of Supervisors comes from each of their
Tax Assessor's offices and are all calculated in the same way. Within
this publication, Tubac is defined by the Tubac Fire District
boundaries. We used available data from the Arizona Tax Research
Association from 2000 to 2008, calculated percentage changes from year
to year, and compiled the data into charts for reporting. At the county
level, we reviewed median property values as provided by the Santa Cruz
County and Pima County Tax Assessor's Offices. Santa Cruz County Tax
Assessor's Office provided annual median property values for the county
and the area of Tubac. Pima County Tax Assessor's Office provided
annual median property values for the county and the area of Green
Valley, as defined by the Green Valley Fire District boundaries. Each
of the offices use guidelines set by the Arizona Department of Revenue
to determine median property value, which is calculated based on sales
for each tax year and have an 18 month lag. For example, for tax year
2008, property sales data analyzed was from the time frame of January 1
through December 31, 2005, and January 1 through June 30, 2006. We used
available data, calculated percentage changes from year to year, and
compiled the data into charts for reporting. We also obtained Multiple
Listing Service (MLS) data from Brasher Real Estate, Inc., a real
estate company located in the Tubac area. MLS data is listings of sales
of land and residential properties within specific geographic areas. We
obtained data on sales in Tubac, Rio Rico, Amado, Nogales, Tumacacori,
and Green Valley. We used available data to calculate quarterly totals
and compiled the data into a chart for reporting. Because real estate
values can be calculated in different ways we reported data on several
indicators to provide a complete picture of property values in the
various geographic areas. With each of these indicators it is important
to note that there has been a significant housing market downturn
nationwide that can affect any and all of these available data sets and
we cannot draw any conclusion between checkpoint operations and the
health of property values in a specific area.
Economic data. We obtained and reviewed data from multiple state and
national agencies, such as Arizona Indicators, Arizona Department of
Commerce, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S.
Census Bureau. Each of these data sets track information by the North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS), which is the system
used to classify establishments by industry by the United States,
Canada, and Mexico. Because art and tourism are important to the
economy of Tubac, and concerns had been expressed regarding the impact
of the Border Patrol checkpoint on the real estate industry in Tubac,
we also collected data on the Accommodation and Food Services, Arts,
Entertainment, and Recreation, and Real Estate and Rental and Leasing
NAICS industries for each of the data sets. One limitation to using any
type of economic data is that it is important to consider the context
of the increases and decreases in percentage changes within the
significant economic downturn faced nationwide. After reviewing
available data sets, we compiled data and calculated the annual
percentage change for each of the indictors:
* U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, County Business
Pattern annual data on annual payroll, number of employees, and number
of establishments, broken down by NAICS category, for the state of
Arizona, Pima County, Santa Cruz County, and the area of Tubac, through
the end of 2006. Data from 2007 were unavailable at the time of our
report. One limitation to using these data is that the variation in
number of establishments over time gives little sense of how big the
establishments or variations are, for example, whether there were
consolidations that reduced the number of establishments but not the
level of economic output.
* U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis annual data
on the number of jobs and personal income, broken down by NAICS
category, for the state of Arizona, Pima County, and Santa Cruz County,
through the end of 2007. Annual state Gross Domestic Product data are
also available through the end of 2007. Data for the Tubac area were
not available.
* U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages quarterly and annual data on wages,
broken down by NAICS category, for the state of Arizona, Pima County,
and Santa Cruz County, through the end of 2007. Data for the Tubac area
were not available.
Although the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of Labor Statistics
data were more current than the U.S. Census Bureau County Business
Pattern data (as data were available for 2007 and 2008), data were not
available at the ZIP code level--only for the county level. Therefore,
we decided not to include those data within our report.
Tourism data. The Arizona Office of Tourism provides data on Arizona's
tourism industry, compiling data at the state and county levels. For
the state of Arizona, Pima County, and Santa Cruz County, we obtained
and reviewed data from 1998 to 2008 on occupancy rates, average daily
rates, and revenue per available room and 2005 through 2008 on lodging
demand and supply. Data for the Tubac area were not available for these
indicators. However, the Arizona State Parks collects data on the total
number of visitors to all Arizona state parks, including a state park
near Tubac. We obtained and reviewed data on total annual number of
visitors from 2001 to 2008 for Tubac Presidio State Historic Park and
Patagonia Lake State Park, which is also in Santa Cruz County. We used
available data to calculate percentage changes from year to year, for
each of the indicators, and compiled the data into various charts for
reporting.
Crime data. We obtained and reviewed 2004 through 2008 crime reporting
from the Arizona Department of Public Safety, Pima County Sheriff's
Department, and Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department. We also
obtained and reviewed 2004 through 2007 annual crime reporting from
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports for Pima
County and the state of Arizona. Pima County and Santa Cruz County
Sheriff's Departments both provided additional district level data for
us to review crimes that occurred within the areas closest to the I-19
checkpoint. We calculated the annual percentage change for major crime
categories and compiled the data into various charts for reporting. We
present the crime data to show overall trends and number of various
types of offenses in the communities near the I-19 checkpoint, but
cannot link any of these crimes to checkpoint operations, due to
several important limitations. First, local law enforcement agencies we
collected data from do not track the citizenship status of those
arrested for crimes and could not identify which crimes were committed
by illegal aliens. They also do not determine whether a crime was
committed by someone attempting to circumvent the checkpoint.
Accordingly, there is no way to determine if a particular criminal act
was committed by an illegal alien that was attempting to circumvent the
checkpoint or if the crime was unrelated to the checkpoint. Second,
local law enforcement agencies we collected data from compile their
crime data by county or by districts, not by a specific geographic
region around checkpoints. As a result, these agencies could not
provide data that would show the number and types of crimes that
occurred within a certain radius around a checkpoint.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Proposed Border Patrol Checkpoint Performance Measures:
In 2006, the Border Patrol convened a working group led by Border
Patrol headquarters officials with participation from field
representatives. This group identified 21 possible performance measures
regarding checkpoint operations. These 21 possible performance measures
were divided into four main groupings:
* At the checkpoint:
* Immediate impact areas:
* At the border:
* Quality of life:
The 21 performance measures and a description of each measure are
listed below.
At the Checkpoints:
1. Ensure the traffic checkpoints are consistently operational in
accordance with national and sector priorities and threat levels: This
measure is to examine the percentage of time traffic checkpoints are
operational compared to non-operational.
2. Maintain compliance with national Border Patrol checkpoint policy:
This measure is to examine the percentage of time for each reason why
traffic checkpoints are non-operational.
3. Determine effectiveness of canines at traffic checkpoints: This
measure is to examine the number of smuggling events, both human and
narcotics, at traffic checkpoints detected by canines compared to the
number of smuggling events detected without canine assists.
4. Identify types of concealment methods used by smugglers at traffic
checkpoints: This measure is to examine the number of apprehensions
made at traffic checkpoints with concealment methods used compared to
apprehensions without concealment methods.
5. Identify the number of aliens in smuggling loads: This measure is to
examine the number of apprehensions in each smuggling load made at
traffic checkpoints.
6. Utilize technologies in support of traffic checkpoint operations to
identify the appropriate technology required for efficient checkpoint
operations: This measure is to examine the number of apprehensions and
seizures attributable to technology support for traffic checkpoint
operations.
7. Examine the effectiveness of sensors on traffic checkpoint
operations: This measure is to examine the number of apprehensions and
seizures attributable to sensor activations when the traffic
checkpoints are operational or non-operational.
8. Examine operating and maintenance cost effectiveness of checkpoint
operations: This measure is to examine the cost effectiveness
associated with operating and maintaining permanent traffic checkpoints
compared to tactical traffic checkpoints. This measure is to also
examine the cost effectiveness associated with the operating and
maintenance of traffic checkpoint operations compared to the overall
budget allocated for border enforcement activities.
Immediate Impact Areas:
9. Evaluate changes in patterns and trends to identify checkpoint
circumvention routes: This measure is to compare the number of
apprehensions at the traffic checkpoint to apprehensions on
circumventing routes.
10. Compare checkpoint apprehensions to apprehensions from
circumventing routes when the checkpoint is operational: The measure is
to compare the number of apprehensions at the traffic checkpoint to
apprehensions on circumventing routes.
11. Compare checkpoint narcotics seizures to narcotic seizures on
circumventing routes when the checkpoint is operational: The measure is
to compare the number of seizures at the traffic checkpoint to seizures
on circumventing routes.
12. Monitor effects of checkpoint operation on other areas: This
measure is to compare the percentage of apprehensions and seizures at
traffic checkpoints to the apprehensions and seizures in adjacent zones
or other zones impacted by checkpoint operations.
13. Examine the impact the operational checkpoint has on transportation
check activities, such as aircraft, bus, or train checks: This measure
is to compare the number of apprehensions from transportation
checkpoints compared to when traffic checkpoints are operational and
non-operational.
14. Examine the impact operational checkpoints have on staging areas
(i.e., stash houses): This measure is to compare the number of
apprehensions at staging areas when traffic checkpoints are operational
or not operational.
At the Border:
15. Compare traffic checkpoint operation apprehensions to other
enforcement activities: This measure is to examine the number of
traffic checkpoint apprehensions compared to all other enforcement
activities.
16. Compare traffic checkpoint operation seizures to other enforcement
activities: This measure is to examine the number of traffic checkpoint
seizures compared to all other enforcement activities.
17. Compare man-hours dedicated to checkpoint operations to man-hours
dedicated to other enforcement activities: This measure is to compare
the percentage of manpower used at traffic checkpoints to the manpower
used at other enforcement activities.
Quality of Life:
18. Examine the reduction of major crimes in areas affected by
checkpoint operations and beyond: This measure is to examine the number
of apprehensions of major crimes in areas affected by traffic
checkpoint operations compared to the number of major crimes in other
border enforcement areas without traffic checkpoint operations.
19. Refer smugglers for prosecution: This measure is to examine the
number of border related cases pertaining to traffic checkpoint
operations referred to the U.S. Attorney (including state, county, and
local attorneys) or not referred.
20. Coordinate with federal, state, local, and tribal agencies to
support and improve border enforcement activities: This measure is to
compare the number and type of events/cases that were referred to or
notified for other agencies that are related to traffic checkpoint
operations.
21. Examine the number and location of apprehensions turned over to the
Border Patrol by other agencies when the checkpoint is operational to
determine effect of operational checkpoint on communities: This measure
is to compare the number of apprehensions turned over to Border Patrol
by other agencies compared to when the traffic checkpoint is
operational and non-operational.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Photographs of Potential Checkpoint Locations on I-19, in
Arizona:
The following figures represent aerial photographs of the four
potential checkpoint locations considered by the Border Patrol, on I-
19, in southern Arizona. These photographs show the interstate, nearby
roads, and the surrounding areas.
Figure 20: KP 41, Looking North, Aerial View, Location Marked:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Depicted on the photograph:
Potential I-19 checkpoint location.
Source: Border Patrol.
[End of figure]
Figure 21: KP 25, Looking South, Aerial View, Location Marked:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Depicted on the photograph:
Potential I-19 checkpoint location.
Source: Border Patrol.
[End of figure]
Figure 22: KP 42, Looking North, Aerial View, Location Marked:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Depicted on the photograph:
Potential I-19 checkpoint location.
Source: Border Patrol.
[End of figure]
Figure 23: KP 42, Looking South, Aerial View, Location Marked:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Depicted on the photograph:
Potential I-19 checkpoint location.
Source: Border Patrol.
[End of figure]
Figure 24: KP 50, Looking South, Aerial View, Location Marked:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Depicted on the photograph:
Potential I-19 checkpoint location.
Source: Border Patrol.
[End of figure]
Figure 25: KP 50, Looking North, Aerial View, Location Marked:
[Refer to PDF for image: photograph]
Depicted on the photograph:
Potential I-19 checkpoint location.
Source: Border Patrol.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Additional Property Value Data for the State of Arizona,
Santa Cruz County, Pima County, and Tubac:
In addition to the median property values that were included earlier in
this report, we identified additional indicators for showing local
trends in property values. We obtained multiple listing service (MLS)
data, from a real estate agency in Tubac, and net assessed values, as
reported by the Arizona Tax Research Association. MLS data provides
listings for residential and land sales at the ZIP code level. The data
show all listings within a ZIP code area, providing the listing prices,
final sale prices, and number of transactions in specific geographic
areas.[Footnote 98] The Arizona Tax Research Association publishes
annual data on the total net assessed values for all properties in the
state of Arizona. Net assessed value is the full cash value, or market
value, of all real property in Arizona.[Footnote 99]
According to MLS data, the median sales price for a home in Tubac has
fluctuated from July 2006 to March 2009, as shown in figure 26. In 2008
the median sales price was approximately $384,000, and in 2007 it was
$375,000.
Figure 26: Median Residential Sales Prices and Number of Sales in
Tubac, July 2006 through March 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: combined vertical bar and line graph]
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2006;
Number of sales: 6;
Median price: $457,500.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2006;
Number of sales: 8;
Median price: $332,500.
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2007;
Number of sales: 3;
Median price: $350,000.
Dates: April 1-June 30, 2007;
Number of sales: 2;
Median price: $550,000.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2007;
Number of sales: 4;
Median price: $399,000.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2007;
Number of sales: 4;
Median price: $307,500.
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2008;
Number of sales: 3;
Median price: $305,000.
Dates: April 1-June 30, 2008;
Number of sales: 3;
Median price: $700,000.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2008;
Number of sales: 2;
Median price: $392,000.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2008;
Number of sales: 2;
Median price: $314,481.
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2009;
Number of sales: 5;
Median price: $365,000.
Source: GAO analysis of Multiple Listing Service (MLS) data provided by
Brasher Real Estate, Inc.
[End of figure]
The net assessed value of properties in Santa Cruz County, Tubac,
[Footnote 100] Pima County, and Green Valley[Footnote 101] have
increased each year from 2000 to 2008, as shown in table 11 and figure
27. The net assessed value of properties in Santa Cruz County increased
by 18 percent from 2007 to 2008, from approximately $341,684,000 to
approximately $404,366,000.
Table 11: Total Net Assessed Values and Percentage Change from Previous
Year (in parenthesis) for Select Areas in Arizona, 2000 through 2008:
Year: 2000;
Arizona: $31,837,391,782;
Pima County: $4,236,070,095;
Green Valley: $142,771,161;
Santa Cruz County: $201,651,947;
Tubac: $40,443,083.
Year: 2001;
Arizona: $34,473,431,135 (8.3%);
Pima County: $4,491,395,307 (6%);
Green Valley: $157,035,701 (10%);
Santa Cruz County: $224,373,276 (11.3%);
Tubac: $43,787,427 (8.3%).
Year: 2002;
Arizona: $36,805,206,912 (6.8%);
Pima County: $4,835,561,219 (7.7%);
Green Valley: $168,439,401 (7.3%);
Santa Cruz County: $235,055,570 (4.8%);
Tubac: $44,889,292 (2.5%).
Year: 2003;
Arizona: $40,839,898,348 (11%);
Pima County: $5,221,270,997 (8%);
Green Valley: $178,073,695 (5.7%);
Santa Cruz County: $246,303,386 (4.8%);
Tubac: $47,213,927 (5.2%).
Year: 2004;
Arizona: $44,461,738,026 (8.9%);
Pima County: $5,620,156,274 (7.6%);
Green Valley: $189,805,249 (6.6%);
Santa Cruz County: $253,681,084 (3%);
Tubac: $48,634,083 (3%).
Year: 2005;
Arizona: $48,931,946,145 (10.1%);
Pima County: $6,050,950,040 (7.7%);
Green Valley: $206,007,295 (8.5%);
Santa Cruz County: $265,933,931 (4.8%);
Tubac: $54,121,934 (11.3%).
Year: 2006;
Arizona: $54,394,761,521 (11.2%);
Pima County: $6,869,955,457 (13.5%);
Green Valley: $244,514,539 (18.7%);
Santa Cruz County: $294,247,098 (10.6%);
Tubac: $64,489,462 (19.2%).
Year: 2007;
Arizona: $71,837,099,233 (32.1%);
Pima County: $8,220,395,835 (19.7%);
Green Valley: $342,015,821 (39.9%);
Santa Cruz County: $341,683,683 (16.1%);
Tubac: $82,974,970 (28.7%).
Year: 2008;
Arizona: $86,090,579,647 (19.8%);
Pima County: $9,594,861,519 (16.7%);
Green Valley: $424,769,584 (24.2%);
Santa Cruz County: $404,365,519 (18.3%);
Tubac: $113,278,840 (36.5%).
Source: Arizona Tax Research Association.
[End of table]
Figure 27: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Net Assessed Values
for Select Areas in Arizona, 2001 through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Year: 2001;
Santa Cruz County: 11.3%;
Pima County: 6.0%;
Tubac: 8.3%;
Green Valley: 10.0%;
Arizona: 8.3%.
Year: 2002;
Santa Cruz County: 4.8%;
Pima County: 7.7%;
Tubac: 2.5%;
Green Valley: 7.3%;
Arizona: 6.8%.
Year: 2003;
Santa Cruz County: 4.8%;
Pima County: 8.0%;
Tubac: 5.2%;
Green Valley: 5.7%;
Arizona: 11%.
Year: 2004;
Santa Cruz County: 3.0%;
Pima County: 7.6%;
Tubac: 3%;
Green Valley: 6.6%;
Arizona: 8.9%.
Year: 2005
Santa Cruz County: 4.8%;
Pima County: 7.7%;
Tubac: 11.3%;
Green Valley: 8.5%;
Arizona: 10.1%.
Year: 2006;
Santa Cruz County: 10.6%;
Pima County: 13.5%;
Tubac: 19.2%;
Green Valley: 18.7%;
Arizona: 11.2%.
Year: 2007;
Santa Cruz County: 16.1%;
Pima County: 19.7%;
Tubac: 28.7%;
Green Valley: 39.9%;
Arizona: 32.1%.
Year: 2008;
Santa Cruz County: 18.3%;
Pima County: 16.7%;
Tubac: 36.5%;
Green Valley: 24.1%;
Arizona: 19.8%.
Source: GAO analysis of Arizona Tax Research Association data.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix V: Additional Economic Data for the State of Arizona, Santa
Cruz County, Pima County, and Tubac:
We identified indicators for showing local economic trends from the
U.S. Census Bureau. The U.S. Census Bureau provides an annual series of
County Business Pattern data available at the national, state, county,
and ZIP code level and tracks the number of establishments, number of
employees, and total payroll across industries. The data are derived
from U.S. Census Bureau business establishment surveys and federal
administrative records. These data are available through the end of
2006.[Footnote 102]
The U.S. Census Bureau County Business Patterns provides subnational
economic data, which covers most of the country's economic activity, is
used for studying the economic activity of small areas and analyzing
economic changes over time, and is available by North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) industry.[Footnote 103] According to the
Arizona Department of Commerce, art and tourism are important to the
economy of Tubac, and concerns had been expressed regarding the impact
of the Border Patrol checkpoint on the real estate industry in Tubac.
Accordingly, the NAICS industries included within the following
analysis are Accommodation and Food Services, Arts, Entertainment, and
Recreation, and Real Estate and Rental and Leasing.[Footnote 104] In
2006, over half of the total 87 establishments[Footnote 105] in
Tubac[Footnote 106] were retail trade and accommodation and food
services, with 38 and 10 establishments, respectively, as shown in
figure 28 and table 12. The four other industries with the highest
numbers of establishments in Tubac are shown in figure 28, other
services (except public administration) with eight establishments and
construction, real estate, rental and leasing, and professional,
scientific and technical services each with seven.
Figure 28: Trends for Top Six Industries in Tubac, by Number of
Establishments, 2000 through 2006:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Year: 2000;
Construction: 5;
Retail trade: 24;
Real estate and rental and leasing: 4;
Professional, scientific, and technical services: 3;
Accommodation and food services: 6;
Other services (except public administration): 4.
Year: 2001;
Construction: 8;
Retail trade: 24;
Real estate and rental and leasing: 3;
Professional, scientific, and technical services: 4;
Accommodation and food services: 6;
Other services (except public administration): 2.
Year: 2002;
Construction: 7;
Retail trade: 29;
Real estate and rental and leasing: 4;
Professional, scientific, and technical services: 4;
Accommodation and food services: 8;
Other services (except public administration): 2.
Year: 2003;
Construction: 6;
Retail trade: 26;
Real estate and rental and leasing: 5;
Professional, scientific, and technical services: 5;
Accommodation and food services: 8;
Other services (except public administration): 3.
Year: 2004;
Construction: 4;
Retail trade: 29;
Real estate and rental and leasing: 7;
Professional, scientific, and technical services: 4;
Accommodation and food services: 11;
Other services (except public administration): 3.
Year: 2005;
Construction: 5;
Retail trade: 32;
Real estate and rental and leasing: 6;
Professional, scientific, and technical services: 4;
Accommodation and food services: 10;
Other services (except public administration): 3.
Year: 2006;
Construction: 7;
Retail trade: 38;
Real estate and rental and leasing: 7;
Professional, scientific, and technical services: 7;
Accommodation and food services: 10;
Other services (except public administration): 8.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
[End of figure]
Table 12: Total Number of Establishments in Tubac, by NAICS Industry,
2000 through 2006:
Industry: Retail trade;
2000: 24;
2001: 24;
2002: 29;
2003: 26;
2004: 29;
2005: 32;
2006: 38.
Industry: Accommodation and food services;
2000: 6;
2001: 6;
2002: 8;
2003: 8;
2004: 11;
2005: 10;
2006: 10.
Industry: Other services (except public administration);
2000: 4;
2001: 2;
2002: 2;
2003: 3;
2004: 3;
2005: 3;
2006: 8.
Industry: Construction;
2000: 5;
2001: 8;
2002: 7;
2003: 6;
2004: 4;
2005: 5;
2006: 7.
Industry: Real estate, rental and leasing;
2000: 4;
2001: 3;
2002: 4;
2003: 5;
2004: 7;
2005: 6;
2006: 7.
Industry: Professional, scientific and technical services;
2000: 3;
2001: 4;
2002: 4;
2003: 5;
2004: 4;
2005: 4;
2006: 7.
Industry: Administrative, support, waste management, and remediation
services;
2000: 0;
2001: 0;
2002: 0;
2003: 0;
2004: 1;
2005: 1;
2006: 2.
Industry: Arts, entertainment and recreation;
2000: 3;
2001: 3;
2002: 3;
2003: 2;
2004: 1;
2005: 1;
2006: 2.
Industry: Unclassified establishments;
2000: 1;
2001: 0;
2002: 1;
2003: 0;
2004: 0;
2005: 2;
2006: 2.
Industry: Utilities;
2000: 3;
2001: 2;
2002: 1;
2003: 1;
2004: 0;
2005: 1;
2006: 1.
Industry: Manufacturing;
2000: 2;
2001: 2;
2002: 2;
2003: 3;
2004: 2;
2005: 3;
2006: 1.
Industry: Educational services;
2000: 1;
2001: 1;
2002: 1;
2003: 1;
2004: 1;
2005: 1;
2006: 1.
Industry: Health care and social assistance;
2000: 0;
2001: 0;
2002: 2;
2003: 2;
2004: 1;
2005: 1;
2006: 1.
Industry: Forestry, fishing, hunting, and agriculture;
2000: 0;
2001: 1;
2002: 2;
2003: 2;
2004: 2;
2005: 2;
2006: 0.
Industry: Wholesale trade;
2000: 3;
2001: 5;
2002: 2;
2003: 2;
2004: 0;
2005: 1;
2006: 0.
Industry: Transportation and warehousing;
2000: 1;
2001: 0;
2002: 1;
2003: 1;
2004: 1;
2005: 1;
2006: 0.
Industry: Finance and insurance;
2000: 1;
2001: 1;
2002: 1;
2003: 0;
2004: 0;
2005: 1;
2006: 0.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
[End of table]
From 2004 to 2006, the total number of establishments in Tubac
increased from 67 to 87, as shown in figure 29. In 2006, the 87
establishments was a 16 percent increase from 2005, compared to a 1.3
percent increase for Santa Cruz County.
Figure 29: Number of Establishments in Tubac and Percentage Change from
Previous Year, Total Number of Establishments for Arizona, Pima County
and Santa Cruz County, 2001 through 2006:
[Refer to PDF for image: combined vertical bar and line graph]
Year: 2001;
Tubac number of establishments: 62;
Arizona percentage change: 1.3%;
Pima County percentage change: 1.1%;
Santa Cruz County percentage change: 1.3%.
Year: 2002;
Tubac number of establishments: 70;
Arizona percentage change: 3%;
Pima County percentage change: 1.7%;
Santa Cruz County percentage change: 0.5%.
Year: 2003;
Tubac number of establishments: 67;
Arizona percentage change: 1.5%;
Pima County percentage change: 0.9%;
Santa Cruz County percentage change: 3%.
Year: 2004;
Tubac number of establishments: 67;
Arizona percentage change: 3.4%;
Pima County percentage change: 2.1%;
Santa Cruz County percentage change: 3.3%.
Year: 2005;
Tubac number of establishments: 75;
Arizona percentage change: 4.7%;
Pima County percentage change: 3.1%;
Santa Cruz County percentage change: 2%.
Year: 2006;
Tubac number of establishments: 87;
Arizona percentage change: 4.7%;
Pima County percentage change: 3.5%;
Santa Cruz County percentage change: 1.3%.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.
[End of figure]
With respect to the number of real estate, rental and leasing
establishments from 2001 to 2006, Tubac consistently had fewer than 10
establishments, and Santa Cruz County ranged between 51 and 65
establishments. However, Pima County followed a similar pattern to the
state of Arizona, as shown in figure 30.
Figure 30: Number of Real Estate, Rental, and Leasing Establishments in
Tubac and Santa Cruz County and Percentage Change from Previous Year
for Arizona and Pima County, 2001 through 2006:
[Refer to PDF for image: combined vertical bar and line graph]
Year: 2001;
Tubac number of establishments: 3;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 51;
Pima County percentage change: 5.5;
Arizona percentage change: 3.1.
Year: 2002;
Tubac number of establishments: 4;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 56;
Pima County percentage change: 6;
Arizona percentage change: 7.9.
Year: 2003;
Tubac number of establishments: 5;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 59;
Pima County percentage change: 3;
Arizona percentage change: 5.1.
Year: 2004;
Tubac number of establishments: 7;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 65;
Pima County percentage change: 7.4;
Arizona percentage change: 9.5.
Year: 2005;
Tubac number of establishments: 6;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 55;
Pima County percentage change: 9.3;
Arizona percentage change: 14.4.
Year: 2006;
Tubac number of establishments: 7;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 58;
Pima County percentage change: 6.4;
Arizona percentage change: 7.3.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.
[End of figure]
Figure 31 shows that in 2006, Tubac had 2 art, entertainment, and
recreation establishments, compared to 305 in Pima County and 1,859 in
the entire state of Arizona.
Figure 31: Number of Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation Establishments
in Tubac and Santa Cruz County and Percentage Change from Previous Year
for Arizona and Pima County, 2001 through 2006:
[Refer to PDF for image: combined vertical bar and line graph]
Year: 2001;
Tubac number of establishments: 3;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 18;
Pima County percentage change: 5%;
Arizona percentage change: 2.5%.
Year: 2002;
Tubac number of establishments: 3;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 14;
Pima County percentage change: 7.2%;
Arizona percentage change: 5.9%.
Year: 2003;
Tubac number of establishments: 2;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 10;
Pima County percentage change: 3.3%;
Arizona percentage change: 2.9%.
Year: 2004;
Tubac number of establishments: 1;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 10;
Pima County percentage change: 4%;
Arizona percentage change: 6.2%.
Year: 2005;
Tubac number of establishments: 1;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 11;
Pima County percentage change: 4.2%;
Arizona percentage change: 5.8%.
Year: 2006;
Tubac number of establishments: 2;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 14;
Pima County percentage change: 1.3%;
Arizona percentage change: 4.3%.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.
[End of figure]
From 2005 to 2006, Santa Cruz County had an increase in the number of
accommodation and food service establishments, from 89 to 96, and Tubac
had no change, with 10 establishments each year. Arizona and Pima
County had percentage increases of 2 and 1 percent respectively, from
2005 to 2006, as shown in figure 32.
Figure 32: Number of Accommodation and Food Service Establishments in
Tubac and Santa Cruz County and Percentage Change from Previous Year
for Arizona and Pima County, 2001 through 2006:
[Refer to PDF for image: combined vertical bar and line graph]
Year: 2001;
Tubac number of establishments: 6;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 91;
Pima County percentage change: 0.2%;
Arizona percentage change: 1.6%.
Year: 2002;
Tubac number of establishments: 8;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 91;
Pima County percentage change: 3.9%;
Arizona percentage change: 5.1%.
Year: 2003;
Tubac number of establishments: 8;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 91;
Pima County percentage change: 2.4%;
Arizona percentage change: 0.8%.
Year: 2004;
Tubac number of establishments: 11;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 93;
Pima County percentage change: 2.4%;
Arizona percentage change: 4.2%.
Year: 2005;
Tubac number of establishments: 10;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 89;
Pima County percentage change: 0.9%;
Arizona percentage change: 2.7%.
Year: 2006;
Tubac number of establishments: 10;
Santa Cruz County number of establishments: 96;
Pima County percentage change: 1.2%;
Arizona percentage change: 2.2%.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.
[End of figure]
In terms of number of employees,[Footnote 107] Tubac saw a decrease
from 2004 to 2005, when compared to Santa Cruz County, Pima County, and
the state of Arizona, as shown in figure 33. From 2005 to 2006, the
number of employees in Tubac increased by 2 percent, while the number
of employees in the state increased by 8 percent.
Figure 33: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Number of Employees
for Tubac, Santa Cruz County, Pima County, and Arizona, 2001 through
2006:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Year: 2001;
Arizona: 1.2%;
Pima County: 0.2%;
Santa Cruz County: 5.8%;
Tubac: 31.3%.
Year: 2002;
Arizona: 0.2%;
Pima County: -0.3%;
Santa Cruz County: -5.4%;
Tubac: 6.9%.
Year: 2003;
Arizona: 2.7%;
Pima County: 1.4%;
Santa Cruz County: 4.2%;
Tubac: 9.2%.
Year: 2004;
Arizona: 2.3%;
Pima County: 3.2%;
Santa Cruz County: 2.9%;
Tubac: 3.4%.
Year: 2005;
Arizona: 5.7%;
Pima County: 2.3%;
Santa Cruz County: 2.9%;
Tubac: -7.2%.
Year: 2006;
Arizona: 8.1%;
Pima County: 6.4%;
Santa Cruz County: 14.4%;
Tubac: 2.4%.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.
[End of figure]
With respect to total annual payroll,[Footnote 108] from 2004 to 2005
Tubac had a 1 percent decrease, while the state and counties had
between 6 to 10 percent increases, as shown in figure 34. However, from
2005 to 2006, Tubac saw a larger percentage increase--19 percent, to
$10,093,000--than the state and counties.
Figure 34: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Total Annual Payroll,
2002 through 2006:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Year: 2002;
Arizona: 1.8%;
Pima County: 4.1%;
Santa Cruz County: 0.7%;
Yubac: -37.8%.
Year: 2003;
Arizona: 5.3%;
Pima County: 3.6%;
Santa Cruz County: 8.1%;
Yubac: 4.5%.
Year: 2004;
Arizona: 7.4%;
Pima County: 7.7%;
Santa Cruz County: 4.5%;
Yubac: 7.5%.
Year: 2005;
Arizona: 10.4%;
Pima County: 5.7%;
Santa Cruz County: 6.8%;
Yubac: -0.9%.
Year: 2006;
Arizona: 11.4%;
Pima County: 8.2%;
Santa Cruz County: 11.5%;
Yubac: 19.3%.
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Additional Tourism Data for the State of Arizona, Santa
Cruz County, and Pima County:
The Arizona Office of Tourism provides information on tourism within
the state and counties. It provides statewide and county data on
occupancy rates, revenue per available room, and lodging supply and
demand, through 2008. However, none of these indicators were available
for the area of Tubac. Overall, occupancy rates for the state of
Arizona, Pima County, and Santa Cruz County have been in a steady
decline since 2006, with Santa Cruz County having the largest
percentage decrease in 2008 occupancy rates, when compared to the
others, as shown in figure 35. According to an Arizona Office of
Tourism representative, the state and county downward trends in tourism
are a part of the downward trends seen in the general economic climate
in Arizona and that the overall demand for tourism has been decreasing,
possibly due to a general downturn in the nationwide economy. In 2008,
Santa Cruz County had a 62 percent occupancy rate for all lodging in
the county.
Figure 35: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Lodging Occupancy
Rates, 2001 through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Year: 2001;
Arizona: -4.7%;
Pima County: -3.3v
Santa Cruz County: -9.3%.
Year: 2002;
Arizona: -0.9%;
Pima County: -3.6%;
Santa Cruz County: 7.1%.
Year: 2003;
Arizona: 2.1%;
Pima County: 2.4v
Santa Cruz County: -1.9%.
Year: 2004;
Arizona: 5.5%;
Pima County: 3.1%;
Santa Cruz County: 7.7%.
Year: 2005;
Arizona: 4.8%;
Pima County: 4.9%;
Santa Cruz County: 4.7%.
Year: 2006;
Arizona: 1.7%;
Pima County: 3.2%;
Santa Cruz County: 7%.
Year: 2007;
Arizona: -0.9%;
Pima County: -2.2%;
Santa Cruz County: -0.1%.
Year: 2008;
Arizona: -8.7%;
Pima County: -6.8%;
Santa Cruz County: -10.4%.
Source: GAO analysis of Smith Travel Research data.
[End of figure]
With respect to revenue per available room, the state of Arizona, Santa
Cruz County, and Pima County followed similar trends from 2006 to 2008.
From 2007 to 2008, all areas saw a decline in revenue per available
room, with Santa Cruz County having the largest percentage decrease, as
shown in figure 36. In 2008, Santa Cruz County was making $45 revenue
per each available room, a decline from $50 the previous year.
Figure 36: Percentage Change from Previous Year, Revenue Per Available
Room, 2001 through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Year: 2001;
Arizona: -6.1%;
Pima County: -3.9%;
Santa Cruz County: -11.3%.
Year: 2002;
Arizona: -3.7%;
Pima County: -5.3%;
Santa Cruz County: 8%.
Year: 2003;
Arizona: 2.8%;
Pima County: -1.2%;
Santa Cruz County: -0.5%.
Year: 2004;
Arizona: 9.3%;
Pima County: 5.2%;
Santa Cruz County: 7.9%.
Year: 2005;
Arizona: 10.8%;
Pima County: 15.8%;
Santa Cruz County: 11%.
Year: 2006;
Arizona: 11.1%;
Pima County: 10.3%;
Santa Cruz County: 12.5%.
Year: 2007;
Arizona: 5.4%;
Pima County: 5.6%;
Santa Cruz County: 7.7%.
Year: 2008;
Arizona: -6.4%;
Pima County: -6.3%;
Santa Cruz County: -10%.
Source: GAO analysis of Smith Travel Research data.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix VII: Additional Crime Data for the State of Arizona, Santa
Cruz County, Pima County, and Tubac:
Regarding crime indicators, we obtained additional data from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR)
program, Pima County Sheriff's Department, and Santa Cruz County
Sheriff's Department. Law enforcement agencies throughout the country-
-at the city, county and state levels--participate in the UCR program
by providing summarized reports on eight major offenses,[Footnote 109]
which include violent crimes[Footnote 110] and property crimes[Footnote
111] known to law enforcement, through the end of 2007, at the state
and jurisdiction level. In addition to these eight crime categories, we
obtained data on all other crimes[Footnote 112] from the Pima County
and Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Departments, which provide information
on the frequency of offenses within the jurisdictions. In our
discussions with each of these agencies, they told us that they do not
attribute any of the below trends to checkpoint specific activities.
Furthermore, the agencies do not track which offenses are committed by
illegal aliens.
According to FBI UCR data, from 2006 to 2007, the state of Arizona has
seen a decline both in violent and property crimes, as shown in figure
37. Data on these crimes within the state of Arizona is presented to
allow for comparisons to the local jurisdiction crime rates. From 2006
to 2007, Arizona's decline in both violent crimes and property crimes
went from approximately 316,000 to 310,000.
Figure 37: Percentage Change from Previous Year for Violent Crimes and
Property Crimes in Arizona, 2005 through 2007:
[Refer to PDF for image: multiple line graph]
Year: 2005;
Violent crimes: 5.27%;
Property rimes: -6.325%;
Total violent and property crimes: -5.325%.
Year: 2006;
Violent crimes: 1.437%;
Property rimes: -0.687%;
Total violent and property crimes: -0.483%.
Year: 2007;
Violent crimes: -1.022%;
Property rimes: -1.953%;
Total violent and property crimes: -1.862%.
Source: GAO analysis of FBI Uniform Crime Reporting data.
[End of figure]
According to offense data provided by Santa Cruz County Sheriff's
Department, total offenses in Santa Cruz County have declined from 2006
to 2008, as shown in figure 38. The Santa Cruz County Sheriff's
Department has three patrol districts: District 1 is the area of Rio
Rico, which includes the I-19 corridor from Nogales to District 2;
District 2 includes the I-19 checkpoint and Tumacacori, Carmen, Tubac,
Amado, and Arivaca; and District 3 includes Sonoita, Elgin, Canelo,
Lochiel, Mowery, and San Rafael Valley. As shown in figure 38, the
majority of crimes in Santa Cruz County occur within District 1, which
is the area of Rio Rico,[Footnote 113] with 2,085 total offenses in
2008, compared to 398 and 219 from Districts 2 and 3, respectively.
From 2007 to 2008, District 1 had a 7 percent decrease in total
offenses, District 2 had a 3 percent decrease, and District 3 had a 0.5
percent increase.
Figure 38: Santa Cruz County Total Offenses, 2004 through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Year: 2004;
Number of offenses, District 1: 3,387;
Number of offenses, District 2: 571;
Number of offenses, District 3: 497;
Number of offenses, Total: 4,455.
Year: 2005;
Number of offenses, District 1: 2,290;
Number of offenses, District 2: 318;
Number of offenses, District 3: 255;
Number of offenses, Total: 2,863.
Year: 2006;
Number of offenses, District 1: 2,319;
Number of offenses, District 2: 396;
Number of offenses, District 3: 239;
Number of offenses, Total: 2,954.
Year: 2007;
Number of offenses, District 1: 2,240;
Number of offenses, District 2: 400;
Number of offenses, District 3: 210;
Number of offenses, Total: 2,850.
Year: 2008;
Number of offenses, District 1: 2,085;
Number of offenses, District 2: 398;
Number of offenses, District 3: 219;
Number of offenses, Total: 2,702.
Source: Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department.
[End of figure]
With regards to violent crimes, from 2005 to 2008 District 2 has seen
an increase each year, while the number of violent crimes within
Districts 1 and 3 have fluctuated, as shown in figure 39. From 2007 to
2008, District 1 had an increase from 40 to 47 offenses, District 2 had
an increase from 10 to 15, and District 3 had a decrease from 5 to 2
violent crime offenses.
Figure 39: Santa Cruz County Number of Violent Crime Offenses by
District, 2004 through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Year: 2004;
District 1: 27;
District 2: 6;
District 3: 3.
Year: 2005;
District 1: 78;
District 2: 6;
District 3: 3.
Year: 2006;
District 1: 47;
District 2: 8;
District 3: 1.
Year: 2007;
District 1: 40;
District 2: 10;
District 3: 5.
Year: 2008;
District 1: 47;
District 2: 15;
District 3: 2.
Source: Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department.
[End of figure]
Property crime offenses increased in Districts 1 and 2 from 2004 to
2008, as shown in figure 40. More recently, between 2007 and 2008
District 1 had an increase from 281 to 303 offenses, District 2 had an
increase from 42 to 58, and District 3 had an increase from 23 to 26.
Figure 40: Santa Cruz County Number of Property Crime Offenses by
District, 2004 through 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Year: 2004;
District 1: 142;
District 2: 25;
District 3: 27.
Year: 2005;
District 1: 257;
District 2: 33;
District 3: 22.
Year: 2006;
District 1: 226;
District 2: 39;
District 3: 20.
Year: 2007;
District 1: 281;
District 2: 42;
District 3: 23.
Year: 2008;
District 1: 303;
District 2: 58;
District 3: 26.
Source: Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department.
[End of figure]
In addition to crime data on districts within Santa Cruz County, we
also obtained crime data for the Pima County Green Valley District,
[Footnote 114] which is adjacent to District 2 of the Santa Cruz County
Sheriff's Department and closest to the I-19 checkpoint. Figures 41,
42, and 43 present various crime data from Santa Cruz County Sheriff's
Department District 2 and Pima County Sheriff's Department Green Valley
District.
From 2005 to 2008, the number of violent crimes within both districts
has fluctuated, with no clear pattern emerging, as shown in figure 41.
Figure 41: Cross-District Comparison of Violent Crime Offenses,
Quarterly from January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 0;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 16.
Dates: Dates: Apr. 1-June 30, 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 1;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 12.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 4;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 11.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 1;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 13.
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 2;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 16.
Dates: April 1-June 30, 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 2;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 19.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 2;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 11.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 2;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 14.
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 7;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 19.
Dates: April 1-June 30, 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 1;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 13.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 1;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 7.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 1;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 8.
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 4;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 11.
Dates: April 1-June 30, 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 5;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 3.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 3;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 9.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 3;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 5.
Source: Pima County and Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Departments.
[End of figure]
With respect to property crime data, the number of crimes within Green
Valley District has varied from 2005 to 2008, while property crimes
within Santa Cruz County District 2 have remained relatively stable
over the same time period, as shown in figure 42. For the most recent
quarter in which data are available, there were 147 property crime
offenses in the Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley
District, compared to 17 in the Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department,
District 2.
Figure 42: Cross-District Comparison of Property Crime Offenses,
Quarterly from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 7;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 118.
Dates: Dates: Apr. 1-June 30, 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 7;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 130.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 14;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 99.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 5;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 99.
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 7;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 130.
Dates: April 1-June 30, 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 15;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 90.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 9;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 130.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 8;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 134.
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 11;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 111.
Dates: April 1-June 30, 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 12;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 103.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 10;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 93.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 9;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 141.
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 10;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 106.
Dates: April 1-June 30, 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 11;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 119.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 20;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 162.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 17;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 147.
Source: Pima County and Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Departments.
[End of figure]
We also obtained cross-district data on criminal damage offenses,
[Footnote 115] which also shows no clear trends in the number of
offenses within each district from 2005 to 2008, as shown in figure 43.
In the last quarter of 2008, there were 37 criminal damage offenses in
the Pima County Sheriff's Department, Green Valley District, compared
to one in the Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2.
Figure 43: Cross-District Comparison of Criminal Damage Offenses,
Quarterly from January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 2;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 33.
Dates: Dates: Apr. 1-June 30, 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 0;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 36.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 0;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 31.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2005;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 0;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 26.
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 0;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 37.
Dates: April 1-June 30, 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 0;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 35.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 0;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 25.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2006;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 0;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 31.
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 1;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 38.
Dates: April 1-June 30, 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 0;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 29.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 2;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 27.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2007;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 1;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 22.
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 0;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 35.
Dates: April 1-June 30, 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 0;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 31.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 0;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 34.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2008;
Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department, District 2: 1;
Pima County Sheriff‘s Department, Green Valley District: 37.
Source: Pima County and Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Departments.
[End of figure]
The number of narcotics and drug related offenses[Footnote 116] in
Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department, District 2, peaked in 2006, and
has declined since then, as shown in figure 44. In 2008, there were a
total of five narcotics and drug related offenses.
Figure 44: Number of Narcotics and Drug Related Offenses in Santa Cruz
County Sheriff's Department, District 2, Quarterly from January 1,
2004, through December 31, 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2004;
Number of offenses: 2.
Dates: Dates: Apr. 1-June 30, 2004;
Number of offenses: 2.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2004;
Number of offenses: 3.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2004;
Number of offenses: 3.
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2005;
Number of offenses: 1.
Dates: April 1-June 30, 2005;
Number of offenses: 2.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2005;
Number of offenses: 0.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2005;
Number of offenses: 2.
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2006;
Number of offenses: 8.
Dates: April 1-June 30, 2006;
Number of offenses: 2.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2006;
Number of offenses: 5.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2006;
Number of offenses: 0.
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2007;
Number of offenses: 6.
Dates: April 1-June 30, 2007;
Number of offenses: 1.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2007;
Number of offenses: 4.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2007;
Number of offenses: 3.
Dates: January 1-March 31, 2008;
Number of offenses: 0.
Dates: April 1-June 30, 2008;
Number of offenses: 3.
Dates: July 1-September 30, 2008;
Number of offenses: 1.
Dates: October 1-December 31, 2008;
Number of offenses: 1.
Source: Santa Cruz County Sheriff‘s Department.
[End of figure]
In addition to data on major crimes, we also obtained data on selected
other offenses and incidents within Santa Cruz County Sheriff's
Department District 2, from 2004 to 2008 (see table 13).
Table 13: Number of Other Offenses or Incidents Reported to Santa Cruz
County Sheriff's Department, District 2, Quarterly from January 1,
2004, through December 31, 2008:
Offense/incident: Jan 1, 2004 - Mar 31, 2004;
Abandoned vehicle: 2;
Assault: 0;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 1;
Livestock offenses: 0;
Threats: 0;
Trespass: 0;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 1;
Property damage reported: 1;
Weapons offense: 0.
Offense/incident: Apr 1, 2004 - Jun 30, 2004;
Abandoned vehicle: 4;
Assault: 0;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 0;
Livestock offenses: 2;
Threats: 0;
Trespass: 0;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 0;
Property damage reported: 1;
Weapons offense: 0.
Offense/incident: Jul 1, 2004 - Sep 30, 2004;
Abandoned vehicle: 4;
Assault: 0;
Attempted theft: 1;
Dead body reported: 4;
Livestock offenses: 0;
Threats: 0;
Trespass: 0;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 0;
Property damage reported: 5;
Weapons offense: 0.
Offense/incident: Oct 1, 2004 - Dec 31, 2004;
Abandoned vehicle: 0;
Assault: 0;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 0;
Livestock offenses: 0;
Threats: 2;
Trespass: 0;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 2;
Property damage reported: 2;
Weapons offense: 0.
Offense/incident: Jan 1, 2005 - Mar 31, 2005;
Abandoned vehicle: 0;
Assault: 1;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 2;
Livestock offenses: 0;
Threats: 0;
Trespass: 0;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 1;
Property damage reported: 6;
Weapons offense: 0.
Offense/incident: Apr 1, 2005 - Jun 30, 2005;
Abandoned vehicle: 6;
Assault: 1;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 2;
Livestock offenses: 0;
Threats: 0; Trespass: 0;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 0;
Property damage reported: 3;
Weapons offense: 1.
Offense/incident: Jul 1, 2005 - Sep 30, 2005;
Abandoned vehicle: 2;
Assault: 2;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 2;
Livestock offenses: 0;
Threats: 1; Trespass: 1;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 0;
Property damage reported: 2;
Weapons offense: 0.
Offense/incident: Oct 1, 2005 - Dec 31, 2005;
Abandoned vehicle: 7;
Assault: 1;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 2;
Livestock offenses: 0;
Threats: 0;
Trespass: 0;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 0;
Property damage reported: 6;
Weapons offense: 0.
Offense/incident: Jan 1, 2006 - Mar 31, 2006;
Abandoned vehicle: 2;
Assault: 1;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 3;
Livestock offenses: 1;
Threats: 0;
Trespass: 1;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 0;
Property damage reported: 7;
Weapons offense: 0.
Offense/incident: Apr 1, 2006 - Jun 30, 2006;
Abandoned vehicle: 3;
Assault: 1;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 1;
Livestock offenses: 0;
Threats: 1;
Trespass: 0;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 0;
Property damage reported: 7;
Weapons offense: 1.
Offense/incident: Jul 1, 2006 - Sep 30, 2006;
Abandoned vehicle: 3;
Assault: 2;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 0;
Livestock offenses: 1;
Threats: 1; Trespass: 1;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 0;
Property damage reported: 5;
Weapons offense: 0.
Offense/incident: Oct 1, 2006 - Dec 31, 2006;
Abandoned vehicle: 1;
Assault: 0;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 3;
Livestock offenses: 0;
Threats: 1;
Trespass: 0;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 0;
Property damage reported: 5;
Weapons offense: 0.
Offense/incident: Jan 1, 2007 - Mar 31, 2007;
Abandoned vehicle: 1;
Assault: 1;
Attempted theft: 1;
Dead body reported: 1;
Livestock offenses: 1;
Threats: 1;
Trespass: 1;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 2;
Property damage reported: 4;
Weapons offense: 1.
Offense/incident: Apr 1, 2007 - Jun 30, 2007;
Abandoned vehicle: 3;
Assault: 0;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 3;
Livestock offenses: 0;
Threats: 1;
Trespass: 0;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 1;
Property damage reported: 6;
Weapons offense: 0.
Offense/incident: Jul 1, 2007 - Sep 30, 2007;
Abandoned vehicle: 3;
Assault: 0;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 1;
Livestock offenses: 0;
Threats: 1;
Trespass: 0;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 1;
Property damage reported: 2;
Weapons offense: 1.
Offense/incident: Oct 1, 2007 - Dec 31, 2007;
Abandoned vehicle: 0;
Assault: 1;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 4;
Livestock offenses: 0;
Threats: 1;
Trespass: 0;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 1;
Property damage reported: 3;
Weapons offense: 1.
Offense/incident: Jan 1, 2008 - Mar 31, 2008;
Abandoned vehicle: 2;
Assault: 1;
Attempted theft: 1;
Dead body reported: 1;
Livestock offenses: 0;
Threats: 0;
Trespass: 0;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 3;
Property damage reported: 3;
Weapons offense: 0.
Offense/incident: Apr 1, 2008 - Jun 30, 2008;
Abandoned vehicle: 2;
Assault: 0;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 1;
Livestock offenses: 0;
Threats: 1;
Trespass: 1;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 2;
Property damage reported: 3;
Weapons offense: 1.
Offense/incident: Jul 1, 2008 - Sep 30, 2008;
Abandoned vehicle: 11;
Assault: 0;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 6;
Livestock offenses: 0;
Threats: 1;
Trespass: 0;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 3;
Property damage reported: 1;
Weapons offense: 2.
Offense/incident: Oct 1, 2008 - Dec 31, 2008;
Abandoned vehicle: 2;
Assault: 0;
Attempted theft: 0;
Dead body reported: 6;
Livestock offenses: 0;
Threats: 0;
Trespass: 0;
Destruct/damage/vandalize property: 1;
Property damage reported: 3;
Weapons offense: 0.
Source: Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
August 24, 2009:
Mr. Richard M. Stana:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Mr. Stana:
Re: Draft Report GAO-09-824, Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to
Border Patrol's Mission, but More Consistent Data Collection and
Performance Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness (GAO Job Code
440736):
The Department of Homeland Security (Department) appreciates the
opportunity to review and comment on the U.S. Government Accountability
Office's (GAO's) draft report referenced above. The Department,
particularly U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) under which the
Border Patrol currently is located, agrees with the six recommendations
contained therein.
GAO found that checkpoints have contributed to the Border Patrol's
ability to seize illegal drugs, apprehend illegal aliens, and screen
potential terrorists; however, several factors have impeded higher
levels of performance. GAO recommends that CBP take four actions to
improve the reliability and accountability of checkpoint performance
results and two actions to ensure that the checkpoint design process
results in checkpoints that are sized and resourced to meet operational
and community needs. CBP's actions to address each recommendation are
described below.
Recommendation 1: Establish milestones for determining the feasibility
of a checkpoint performance model that would allow the Border Patrol to
compare apprehensions and seizures to the level of illegal activity
passing through the checkpoint undetected.
Response: The Border Patrol is interested in establishing a checkpoint
performance model to accurately describe and evaluate the percentage of
illegal traffic that is detected by agents as it moves through
checkpoint inspection areas. While a useful model (COMPEX) exists at
U.S. ports of entry (POE), this same model cannot be applied at
checkpoints due to the differences in statutory authorities between
POEs and checkpoints. POEs have statutory authority to conduct thorough
inspection of individuals, personal items, and vehicles. In contrast,
at a checkpoint, agents have a lower search authority and probable
cause is required to conduct a search on a vehicle, passengers, and all
personal items when consent is not given. It is, at best, a difficult
task to create a model for the checkpoints that will ascertain
checkpoint effectiveness to the extent that the COMPEX model works at
POEs. Nevertheless, the Border Patrol is committed to exploring the
development of a checkpoint model that will allow the Border Patrol to
measure the effectiveness of checkpoints.
The Border Patrol has already taken the first steps toward
accomplishing the goal of creating a model to measure effectiveness.
Members of the Strategic Planning, Policy and Analysis Division met on
June 19, 2009 - the first of four workshops - to explore possible
options. Following this meeting, three possible resources were
identified that could possibly assist in the development of this model.
On July 27, 2009, Border Patrol met with one of these resources, the
Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS), to explore how OIS could assist
them. The second option is to work with the National Center for Border
Security and Immigration (BORDERS). Under a Department grant awarded to
the Centers of Excellence, BORDERS is a consortium of 14 institutions
led by the University of Arizona dedicated to the development of
solutions to meet the changing operational demands of the border. A
meeting is scheduled with this group this month. Should neither of
these free resources be available to provide the desired assistance, a
contract will be considered. If the contract option is pursued, a
statement of work will be completed by the middle of the first quarter
of fiscal year (FY) 2010. The contract should then be awarded within
five months and work should be completed by the contractor halfway
through FY 2011. The model developed by the contractor would then be
implemented by the end of FY 2011. Border Patrol will exercise the
option to contract services only when funding is available.
Recommendation 2: Establish internal controls for management oversight
of the accuracy, consistency, and completeness of checkpoint
performance data.
Response: Solutions to control the accuracy, consistency, and
completeness of checkpoint performance data are currently being
implemented. In April 2009, the Border Patrol convened a workgroup in
Washington, DC consisting of headquarters personnel and subject matter
experts from the field. This group discussed checkpoint data integrity
issues and checkpoint performance measures. To address the data
integrity concerns, the workgroup revised and clarified the checkpoint
definitions to prevent incorrect data entry. The workgroup reviewed and
edited current performance measures to tailor them into more meaningful
performance indicators, creating new measures with metrics previously
not considered, and remodeled and streamlined data collection
procedures to avoid redundancy. With the migration of the Border Patrol
system of record from ENFORCE to e3, Border Patrol can further ensure
data integrity by taking advantage of technology enhancements and the
lessons learned. Initial technological changes are expected near the
end of FY 2009, with final upgrades occurring between the middle and
end of FY 2010. In addition to the aforementioned remedies, a program
manager at headquarters was selected in February 2009 to oversee all
checkpoint data and its collection.
Recommendation 3: Implement the quality of life measures that have been
identified by the Border Patrol to evaluate the impact that checkpoints
have on local communities. Implementing these measures would include
identifying appropriate data sources available at the local, state, or
federal level, and developing guidance for how data should be collected
and used in support of these measures.
Response: One of the primary goals of the checkpoint workgroup that met
in April 2009 was to reevaluate and, if necessary, edit all current and
previously discussed performance measures. In particular, the workgroup
focused on the quality of life measures and discussed the
implementation of these measures. A second workshop is planned for
September 2009 to expound on the results from the April workshop and to
develop standards for the collection of data from outside agencies to
support the quality of life measures. The goal is to eventually present
the entire gamut of checkpoint performance measures, identify the data
source for each of the measures, and to provide guidance on data
collection and reporting. These new performance measures will be
supported by the initial systems changes expected around the end of FY
2009 with final changes occurring between the middle and end of FY
2010.
Recommendation 4: Use the information generated from the quality of
life measures in conjunction with other relevant factors to inform
resource allocations and address identified impacts.
Response: Although Border Patrol has not concluded the series of
workgroup meetings dedicated to reevaluating checkpoint data,
performance measures, and data sources, officials intend to use the
quality of life measures recommended by the workgroup to enable them to
measure not only their impact on the local communities and other law
enforcement agencies, but to aid in resources allocation decisions.
Officials have already begun to better define existing data fields in
the Checkpoint Activity Report (CAR) to ensure data consistency and
integrity for such elements as apprehensions and seizures occurring on
circumvention routes. Further, officials are exploring capturing
performance data in the CAR for previously considered performance
measures such as assisting other law enforcement agencies to determine
how this impacts on Border Patrol projected staffing decisions. By the
end of FY 2010, Border Patrol envisions a new cadre of performance
measures to include quality of life measures which will inform future
resource allocation decisions.
Recommendation 5: Require that current and expected traffic volumes be
considered by the Border Patrol when determining the number of
inspection lanes at new permanent checkpoints, that traffic studies be
conducted and documented, and that these requirements be explicitly
documented in Border Patrol checkpoint design guidelines and standards.
Response: The Border Patrol Design Standard will be updated with an
addendum institutionalizing CBP's requirement to acquire, document, and
utilize traffic study data collected by the individual states'
departments of transportation if such data is available. These traffic
studies will be documented by CBP in the concept planning and site
development phase of permanent checkpoints, and utilized as the
baseline requirement to determine the number of inspection lanes at new
permanent checkpoints. The addendum will be issued by the end of
Calendar Year 2009.
Recommendation 6: In connection with planning for new or upgraded
checkpoints, conduct a workforce planning needs assessment for
checkpoint staffing allocations to determine the resources needed to
address anticipated levels of illegal activity around the checkpoint.
Response: In the recent proposal for construction of a permanent
checkpoint on Interstate 19 in Arizona, a planning needs assessment was
conducted to address future staffing needs as well as future levels of
activity. The precedent has been set to use this type of analysis in
future planning. The checkpoint workgroup to be convened before the end
of this fiscal year will be evaluating current checkpoint policy in
order to clarify and add important information. The policy regarding
the establishment of a new checkpoint or the upgrade of an old
checkpoint will be addressed. In addition, the Border Patrol is
exploring the possibility of not only capturing current work
assignments as seen in the CAR, but also capturing projected manpower
requirements for checkpoints - which includes circumvention
activities - in the Operational Requirements Based Budget Program
(ORBBP). As part of the annual operational planning process, currently
every Border Patrol sector identifies and prioritizes their future
resource needs for personnel, technology, and infrastructure not only
for border zones, but also for Critical Transit Nodes (CTNs). However,
a CTN is a summary category comprised of checkpoints, and bus and train
checks. By capturing checkpoint resource requirements separately,
Border Patrol officials believe they can show a better nexus between
the planning process and justification for future resource needs. They
will be working to modify and update the electronic CTN module during
FY 2010 in preparation for capturing the projected checkpoint resource
requirements beginning with the FY 2011 operational planning process.
This action should address the GAO recommendation.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Michael E. McPoland, for:
Jerald E. Levine:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Richard M. Stana, (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Cindy Ayers, Assistant
Director, and Adam Hoffman, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment.
Ryan MacMaster, Jim Russell, and Amy Sheller made significant
contributions to the work. Michele Fejfar and Chuck Bausell assisted
with design, methodology, and data analysis, and Melinda Cordero
assisted with mapping analysis. Frances Cook and Christine Davis
provided legal support. Pille Anvelt and Karen Burke developed the
report's graphics, and Katherine Davis assisted with report
preparation.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] In addition to persons who enter the United States illegally, the
term "illegal alien" may also encompass persons who entered legally but
are subject to removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. For example, an alien
who entered the country legally may nevertheless be removed once his or
her lawful immigration status expires, or if the alien commits certain
crimes or engages in activities that endanger public safety or national
security. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 for the various classes of deportable
aliens and 8 U.S.C. § 1182 for the various classes of inadmissible
aliens.
[2] At a port of entry location, CBP officers are to secure the flow of
people and cargo into and out of the country, while facilitating
legitimate travel and trade.
[3] The Border Patrol also operates checkpoints on the northern border,
but these checkpoints were outside the scope of this review.
[4] Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993). Under GPRA, federal
agencies are required to develop strategic plans, performance plans,
and performance reports that set long term and annual goals along with
the means for accomplishing the goals and report on achieving them.
[5] GAO, Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest
Differences in Sector Performance, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-435] (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 22,
2005).
[6] The Border Patrol defines operational control as the ability to
detect, respond, and interdict border penetrations in areas deemed as
high priority for threat potential or other national security
objectives.
[7] Border Patrol sectors, led by a Chief Patrol Agent, are further
divided into stations, led by a Patrol Agent in Charge, where each
station is responsible for operations within a specific area of the
sector.
[8] This system has two main components: SBI tactical infrastructure,
which consists of fencing, roads, and lighting between the ports of
entry; and SBInet, which employs radars, sensors, and cameras to
detect, identify, and classify the threat level associated with an
illegal entry. As of May 2009, CBP had completed 629 miles of the
planned 661 miles of vehicle or pedestrian fencing along the southwest
border, and was field testing SBInet technology. See GAO, Secure Border
Initiative Fence Construction Costs, GAO-09-244R (Washington, D.C.:
Jan. 29, 2009).
[9] According to the Border Patrol, in the case of both permanent and
tactical checkpoints, the Border Patrol must obtain operating permits
from the relevant state Department of Transportation. Because it can be
time consuming to obtain the necessary permits from a state Department
of Transportation, tactical checkpoints, like their permanent
counterparts, operate from fixed locations.
[10] U.S. v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976).
[11] Id., at 563-564.
[12] U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-882 (1975).
[13] U.S. v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975).
[14] Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-59 (1998).
[15] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113
Stat. 1501, 1501A-12 (1999); District of Columbia Appropriations Act,
2001, Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762, 2762A-60 (2000); Departments
of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748, 756-57
(2001); Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
7, 117 Stat. 11, 58 (2003); Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137, 1138-39
(2003); Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub.
L. No. 108-334, 118 Stat. 1298, 1300-01 (2004); and Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-90, 119
Stat. 2064, 2066-67 (2005). DHS's fiscal year 2005 appropriations act
required CBP to submit an expenditure plan to the House and Senate
appropriations committees that included location, design, costs, and
benefits of each proposed Tucson sector permanent checkpoint, but the
act maintained the prohibition against obligating funds for
construction of a permanent checkpoint in the Tucson sector.
[16] For fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2006, the Border Patrol was
required to relocate checkpoints in the Tucson sector at least once
every seven days. Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-7, 117 Stat. 11, 58 (2003); Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137, 1138-39
(2003); and Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-90, 119 Stat. 2064, 2066-67 (2005). During fiscal year
2005, the Border Patrol was required to relocate checkpoints in the
Tucson sector at least an average of once every 14 days. Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-334, 118
Stat. 1298, 1300-01 (2004).
[17] Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L.
No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1358-59 (2006); Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2044-45
(2007); and Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2009, 122 Stat. 3574, 3654-55 (2008).
[18] The kilometer post (KP) designations stem from a time when the
metric system was being proposed as an alternative to the English
system of measurement.
[19] H.R. Rep. No. 110-862, at 32 (2008).
[20] "Coyotes" refers to professional people smugglers. A prominent
border security expert reported in 2008 that illegal aliens have
adapted to tighter border enforcement by relying upon the skills and
experience of professional people smugglers (generally known as
coyotes) to guide them across the border and transport them to their
final destination. Today, four out of five undocumented migrants are
relying on coyotes to evade the Border Patrol and reduce the risks of
crossing through remote desert and mountainous areas that pose life-
threatening hazards, according to the report. See Wayne Cornelius,
Reforming the Management of Migration Flows from Latin America to the
United States (Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University
of California-San Diego, Dec. 2008). Border Patrol officials in the
Tucson sector reported that the cost to an illegal alien to be smuggled
across the border--using a coyote--in the sector has increased from
$2,250 in fiscal year 2007 to $2,750 in fiscal year 2008, although the
extent to which these increases are due to checkpoint operation or
other Border Patrol operations, such as line watch or roving patrols,
is unknown.
[21] Zero tolerance policies have been established to various extents
along the southwest border. Studies by the Homeland Security Institute
have shown that prosecution of apprehended aliens who illegally enter
the country provides an effective deterrent against repeated illegal re-
entry. See Homeland Security Institute, Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) Operational Assessment, RP06-51-02 (Arlington, Va.: Mar. 30,
2007).
[22] According to Border Patrol officials, aliens from special interest
countries that have been lawfully admitted into the United States--such
as foreign students studying at U.S. universities or foreign military
personnel undergoing training at U.S. military installations--and later
encountered by agents, are not detained and their information is not
reported to intelligence authorities except in certain circumstances.
These circumstances include probable cause that a violation of U.S. law
has occurred or the alien does not possess the proper immigration
documents to be in or remain in the United States legally at the time
they are encountered.
[23] We could not report the number of encounters with special interest
aliens by each sector, or by specific checkpoints, because this
information is considered Law Enforcement Sensitive.
[24] Prior to the establishment of DHS, which took effect in 2003, the
Border Patrol was a component of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, U.S. Department of Justice.
[25] Office of Policy and Planning, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, U.S. Department of Justice, Evaluation of Traffic Checkpoints
at San Clemente and Temecula, June 1995.
[26] Testimony of the Honorable Terry Goddard, Attorney General for the
State of Arizona, in a joint hearing before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs, and Senate Caucus on
International Narcotics Control, on March 17, 2009.
[27] Border Patrol policy requires that checkpoint operations be
suspended if traffic congestion could affect the safety of agents or
the traveling public. Similarly, Border Patrol policy requires that
checkpoints shut down if there are slick or icy roads, or extreme
weather conditions.
[28] In contrast, Tucson sector's tactical checkpoint on I-19 was
operational for 22 hours per day, on average, in fiscal year 2008.
[29] According to officials from the Rio Grande Valley sector,
checkpoints in the sector have full-time canine coverage.
[30] In United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983), the
Supreme Court determined that probable cause was not necessary for
detection canines to perform an exterior sniff of luggage located in a
public place, because such an investigative technique was not a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
[31] In addition, use of canines at Tucson sector checkpoints was
limited by the lack of infrastructure to provide adequate shelter
during times of extreme temperature. Tucson sector officials said that
multiple canine teams are also needed at checkpoints because drug
smugglers often use decoy vehicles scented with drugs to divert the
canine team to secondary inspection, so that vehicles following with
larger drug loads can pass through the checkpoint undetected.
[32] As of July 15, 2009, there are 631 canines stationed in southwest
border sectors, according to the Border Patrol.
[33] A VACIS uses gamma rays to inspect the contents of a vehicle,
while a backscatter X-ray machine uses lower dose X-rays to screen
vehicles.
[34] Each Border Patrol station is assigned a certain area of
responsibility within a Border Patrol sector. In some sectors,
checkpoints are operated by stations that are not responsible for an
area that includes the international border with Mexico, such as the
Alamogordo and Las Cruces stations in the El Paso sector. In other
sectors, such as the Tucson sector, stations are responsible for
staffing agents to both checkpoints and the international border.
[35] In response to our previous report [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-435], the Border Patrol formed a
working group to identify possible performance measures to evaluate
checkpoints. In April 2006, the working group issued the results of its
work, identifying 21 possible performance measures to use for
checkpoint evaluation.
[36] Homeland Security Institute, Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Operational Assessment, RP06-51-02 (Arlington, Va.: Mar. 30, 2007). In
general, this report assesses various CBP operations and programs,
performance measures for checkpoint operations, and the feasibility of
using third-party indicators as performance measures. The report is
deemed Law Enforcement Sensitive and is therefore not publicly
available.
[37] Checkpoint circumvention routes are identified areas that
experience illegal alien or smuggler traffic attempting to avoid the
checkpoint.
[38] See Homeland Security Institute, Measuring the Effect of the
Arizona Border Control Initiative, (Arlington, Va.: Oct. 18, 2005);
Homeland Security Institute, CBP Apprehensions at the Border, RP05-25f-
04 (Arlington, Va.: June 21, 2006).
[39] Sector and checkpoint officials said that changes in apprehension
and seizure numbers over time can be useful indicators of individual
checkpoint performance. For new checkpoints, officials expect to see a
surge in apprehensions and seizures followed by lower numbers as
illegal aliens and drug smugglers seek to use other routes more likely
to result in successful passage. In the Tucson sector, for example,
officials stated that the number of apprehensions and seizures
increased since the checkpoint became fixed at KP 42 in November 2006.
Tucson sector officials noted that when the permanent checkpoint on I-
19 begins operations, they expect that apprehensions and seizures will
initially increase (due to enhanced operational capabilities), but over
time apprehensions and seizures will likely decrease (as smugglers
attempt to relocate their operations).
[40] CBP and Border Patrol officials said there could be a number of
factors that could influence whether development of a checkpoint
performance model was feasible, including, for example, consideration
of legal issues relating to checkpoint searches.
[41] Project Management Institute, The Standard for Program Management,
(Newtown Square, Pa.: 2006).
[42] GAO, Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid
Foundation for Achieving Results, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-38] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10,
2004).
[43] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1]
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999).
[44] The Border Patrol operates a total of 71 permanent and tactical
checkpoints on the southwest border. We received responses from 60
checkpoints. Based on the response rate, we determined that the
responses were reliable for the purposes of this report. See appendix I
for more information on the data collection instrument.
[45] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[46] S. Rep. No. 103-58 (1993).
[47] Formerly called ENFORCE, E-3 is the system of record used by the
Border Patrol that tracks an apprehended individual from initial arrest
to disposition. An illegal alien or drug smuggler is processed into E-
3 as soon as the arrest occurs and the individual is fingerprinted.
[48] For nine key attributes of successful performance measures, see
GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing
Season Performance Measures, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143] (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22,
2002).
[49] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[50] GAO, Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1008G] (Washington, D.C.: Aug.
2001).
[51] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-435].
[52] The Border Patrol has taken steps to identify operations and
maintenance costs for checkpoints, establishing baseline data for
fiscal year 2008, and can determine the number of agents staffed at
checkpoints using the checkpoint activity report.
[53] Border Patrol agent assignments and hours were captured in the
Performance and Analysis System when the Border Patrol was under the
auspices of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service,
according to the Border Patrol.
[54] The Border Patrol's guidelines for checkpoint placement are
documented primarily in Border Patrol's facility design guide, which
has a section on checkpoint design, and checkpoint policy documents.
According to the Border Patrol, "The Design Guide contains criteria and
concepts for the planning and design of Border Patrol facilities...The
Guide identifies general architectural design issues, defines
operations, describes design concepts, categorizes space, and provides
specific technical criteria on building materials and systems...The
operational and architectural information contained in the Guide should
be viewed as DHS Border Patrol policy, applicable to the design of all
new facilities."
[55] The I-35 and U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoints were relocated to adapt
to changing conditions, according to Border Patrol officials. The I-35
checkpoint was relocated because a newly constructed toll road would
have allowed vehicles to avoid the old checkpoint. The new checkpoint
was built north of the interchange of the toll road with I-35, and
close to the confluence of two or more significant roads leading away
from the border, per checkpoint placement criteria. The U.S. Route 62/
180 checkpoint was relocated 3 miles from where it had been previously
to allow for a larger, off-highway facility that could accommodate
heavy traffic volume and increase safety for agents and the traveling
public. On U.S. Route 83, a new permanent checkpoint is replacing a
tactical checkpoint.
[56] This is defined as a relatively flat, straight stretch of highway,
which provides sufficient advance warning to drivers that they are
approaching a checkpoint.
[57] Although population density is not identified in the Border
Patrol's checkpoint placement guidelines, we used it as a proxy measure
for the Border Patrol's "remote location" guideline.
[58] The federal review process was governed by the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat.
852 (1970), which requires agencies to evaluate the likely
environmental effects of projects they are proposing using an
environmental assessment or, if the projects likely would significantly
affect the environment, a more detailed environmental impact statement.
[59] Other factors include those related to hazardous waste, biological
and cultural resources, soils, and environmental justice.
[60] The Border Patrol and CBP's Office of Facilities Management and
Engineering are responsible for approving an environmental assessment
for a checkpoint, which in effect certifies that the environmental
assessments were complete and accurate. Other agencies, such as the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, may be involved in conducting an
environmental assessment.
[61] If adverse environmental impacts are found during the assessment
process, CBP officials told us they will work to mitigate the impact.
If the impact cannot be mitigated, then CBP issues an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) for public comment. Under NEPA, an agency can
employ certain mitigation measures that will lower the otherwise
significant impacts of an activity on the environment to a level of
insignificance. In this way, the agency can avoid preparing an EIS. For
example, see Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235, 241 (5th Cir. 2003).
[62] The draft environmental assessments were made available for public
review for 30 days, with public notification provided through a
prominent local newspaper. A notarized statement of the newspaper
submission was included in the assessment package.
[63] According to Tucson sector officials, locating a checkpoint near
KP 50 would negate the need to operate a separate checkpoint on Arivaca
Road. Currently, the Border Patrol operates a checkpoint on Arivaca
Road, north of the I-19 checkpoint, because that road can be used to
avoid the I-19 checkpoint. Officials stated that the KP 25 location did
not offer tactical advantages, but was considered as a possible
location because a temporary checkpoint had previously been located
there when the I-19 checkpoint rotated between KP 42 and KP 25 in
response to congressional direction not to have a fixed location.
[64] Santa Cruz County zoning maps show that although KP 41 is
surrounded by rural zoning, there is an area zoned for residential use
within one-half mile of the proposed checkpoint location. The town of
Amado, located near the KP 41 location, is considered a growth area.
The corridor near KP 25--from Rio Rico to Nogales--is intended to be
the core of the county's commerce activities.
[65] The length of the inspection lanes is also determined by criteria
related to traffic volume and safety. For example, space is needed for
the inspection lanes to ensure traffic does not back up onto the
highway, and that the entry and exit ramps are not too steep for safe
movement on and off highway.
[66] CBP officials stated that a traffic study for the I-35 checkpoint
may have been conducted under legacy INS--as the checkpoint design
project was initiated under INS--but CBP has no record of it. Regarding
the U.S. Route 83 checkpoint, CBP officials stated that a traffic study
was not conducted because the checkpoint was replacing the existing
facility. CBP officials did not explain why a traffic study was not
conducted for the U.S. Route 62/180 checkpoint.
[67] Texas Department of Transportation calculates traffic volumes at
specific mile markers. We obtained data on traffic volumes at the mile
marker closest to the location of the checkpoint. Future traffic
projections were not available from the Texas Department of
Transportation.
[68] The Community Workgroup on Southern Arizona Checkpoints was co-
chaired by the Border Patrol Chief for the Tucson sector and the
cognizant U.S. Congresswoman. Members included community
representatives from the business community (13), local citizens (11),
government representatives, including law enforcement (5), and a local
religious leader. According to the workgroup, more than 500 citizens
participated in the four workgroup meetings, including citizens from a
range of communities such as Nogales, Amado, Arivaca. Rio Rico, Tubac,
Green Valley, and Tucson. The workgroup split into two subcommittees.
The Interim/Permanent Checkpoint Subcommittee identified areas where
the Border Patrol can make operational and nonoperational adjustments
to the checkpoint facility to improve enforcement and expedite
legitimate travelers, based on the footprint and resources at the I-35
checkpoint near Laredo. The Options Subcommittee identified
alternatives to an interim or permanent checkpoint in southern Arizona.
[69] Pima County, Arizona, has a dark night sky ordinance, which
imposes requirements on outdoor illumination devices in order to
protect visibility of the dark night sky.
[70] According to Tucson sector officials, I-19 checkpoint agents
allowed traffic to pass through the checkpoint without undergoing
inspection on nine occasions in fiscal year 2008.
[71] CBP is also planning to expand the Mariposa port of entry in the
next few years, which is expected to significantly increase the volume
of commercial traffic from Mexico on the I-19 corridor. According to
the Arizona Department of Transportation, the traffic projections did
not include the port expansion, because when the traffic projections
were conducted, the port expansion had not been finalized.
[72] Specifically, the engineer estimates that wait times will be less
than 2 minutes for 20 hours per day, on average, and that a wait time
of 8 to 10 minutes will occur for three hours per day, starting at 8
a.m., 3 p.m., and 6 p.m., and a wait of just over 2 minutes at 8 p.m.,
due to a higher volume of traffic at these times.
[73] According to Tucson sector officials, the current I-19 checkpoint
is generally staffed with 8 agents per shift. Sector officials plan to
staff the permanent checkpoint with between 33 and 39 agents during the
peak shift (with all inspection lanes open), and fewer agents during
off-peak times.
[74] The administration area allows for the supervision of checkpoint
operations and staff, and performing of administrative duties, such as
scheduling, fiscal management, and reporting to the patrol station or
sector headquarters. The processing area provides a secure area where
detainees can be interviewed and processed. Detention facilities
provide a secure area where detainees can be held until transported
offsite.
[75] Tucson sector officials intend for the I-19 checkpoint to serve as
an apprehension and processing hub for multiple areas of enforcement
between Tucson and Nogales. The Tucson station and the Nogales station
apprehend 200 to 300 aliens per day, according to Tucson sector
officials.
[76] Ranchers reported that increased security expenses related to
hiring additional security staff, purchasing night vision goggles and
other equipment for ranch staff, time and materials to repair property
damage, and operational delays in ranch business when incidents occur.
[77] According to the Border Patrol, an apprehension or seizure made
circumventing the I-19 checkpoint is defined as an arrest made within
grid 80, a square of 7.4 miles by 7.4 miles with the checkpoint close
to the center. This grid contains the communities of Amado and Arivaca.
[78] The policy states that for a single lane checkpoint, there is a
minimum requirement of one agent assigned to back-up or roving patrol,
but that staffing may need to be increased depending on the
circumstances, such as the number of circumvention routes.
[79] I-19 checkpoint officials stated that agents patrol the
circumvention routes on horseback and on all-terrain vehicles.
[80] SBInet towers are equipped with radar, cameras, and communications
systems.
[81] GAO, A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-373SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar.
2002).
[82] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-435].
[83] GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/GGD-96-118] (Washington, D.C.: June
1996).
[84] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-03-143].
[85] Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department District 2 covers the area
from Rio Rico to the south up to the Pima County line on the north,
including the areas of Tubac, Tumacacori, Carmen, Amado, and Arivaca.
[86] Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department tracks all agency assists
in one category. According to the Santa Cruz County Sheriff's
Department, approximately 75 percent of all agency assists are
incidents where the individual is turned over to the Border Patrol.
[87] Pima County Sheriff's Department Green Valley Patrol District
covers the area from the Santa Cruz County line on the south to
approximately KP 80 on I-19 on the north.
[88] Homeland Security Institute, Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Operational Assessment, RP06-51-02 (Arlington, Va.: Mar. 30, 2007) and
Homeland Security Institute, Measuring the Effect of the Arizona Border
Control Initiative (Arlington, Va.: Oct. 18, 2005).
[89] We used data on tourism, rather than business activity, because
U.S. Census Bureau data on business activity trends for 2007 and 2008
were not available at the time of completing this report. Business
trend data from the U.S. Census Bureau can be found in appendix V.
[90] According to the Arizona Department of Revenue, all counties are
required to have 18-month lag data and the sales data are adjusted
based off current market trends.
[91] We used data on the number of visitors to the state parks because
other tourism data from the Arizona Office of Tourism were unavailable
below the county level. These county-level tourism data, such as
revenue per available room and occupancy rates, are included in
appendix VI.
[92] Officials from Santa Cruz and Pima County Sheriff's Departments
said that data are not available in their information systems to
identify if any of these crimes were committed by illegal aliens.
[93] The Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department does not track crime
data for the Tubac community specifically. Tubac is not an incorporated
city and does not have its own police department but is included within
the Santa Cruz County Sheriff's Department District 2.
[94] See, for example, GAO, Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder
Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-895T] (Washington, D.C.: June 19,
2006).
[95] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-435].
[96] Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993).
[97] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[98] MLS data does not hold constant the mix of properties that sell
from one period to the next.
[99] Although the full cash value is synonymous with market value, the
value established by the tax assessors may be equal to, or less than,
the actual market value. These lower values are the result of adjusting
all sale prices for mass appraisal error, creative financing, personal
property, and time on the market.
[100] Tubac was defined by the boundaries of the Tubac Fire District.
[101] Green Valley was defined by the boundaries of the Green Valley
Fire District.
[102] Data for 2007 were not available at the time of our report. Other
economic indicator data are publicly available, such as data on
employment, wages, and establishments from the U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Although these data are available for 2007,
the smallest geographic area for reporting is at the county level,
rather than for the Tubac area.
[103] The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is the
system used to classify establishments by industry by the United
States, Canada, and Mexico and is the standard used by federal
statistical agencies in classifying business establishments for the
purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data
related to the U.S. business economy.
[104] The other NAICS sectors available include Agriculture, Forestry,
Fishing, and Hunting; Mining; Manufacturing; Utilities; Transportation
and Warehousing; Wholesale Trade; Retail Trade; Finance and Insurance;
Information; Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services;
Administrative and Support, Waste Management and Remediation Services;
Educational Services; Health Care and Social Assistance; Management of
Companies and Enterprises; and Other Services (Except Public
Administration).
[105] According to the U.S. Census Bureau, an establishment is defined
as a single physical location where business is conducted or where
services are performed.
[106] Tubac, Arizona, was searched using ZIP code 85646.
[107] According to the Census Bureau, the number of employees consists
of the number of paid full and part-time employees, including salaried
officers and executives of corporations, who (for all sectors except
Construction and Manufacturing) were on the payroll during the pay
period. Included are employees on paid sick leave, paid holidays, and
paid vacations; not included are proprietors or partners of
unincorporated businesses.
[108] Annual payroll includes the gross earnings of all employees
during the calendar year and includes all forms of compensation, such
as salaries, wages, commissions, dismissal pay, bonuses, vacation and
sick leave pay, and compensation in kind, prior to such deductions as
employees' social security contributions, withholding taxes, group
insurance, union dues, and savings bonds. U.S. Census Bureau follows
the definition of payroll used for calculating the federal withholding
tax and recommended to all federal statistical agencies by the Office
of Management and Budget.
[109] The committee that created the Uniform Crime Reporting program
identified eight categories of offenses as the most appropriate measure
of the Nation's criminality, which are (1) murder and nonnegligent
manslaughter, (2) forcible rape, (3) robbery, (4) aggravated assault,
(5) burglary, (6) larceny-theft, (7) motor vehicle theft, and (8)
arson. The committee also formulated standardized offense definitions,
for the eight offenses, to provide nationwide uniformity in crime
reporting.
[110] Violent crimes are defined in the UCR program as those offenses
which involve force or threat of force and include murder and
nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated
assault.
[111] According to the UCR, property crimes include the offenses of
burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. The object of
the theft-type offenses is the taking of money or property, but there
is no force or threat of force against the victims, according to the
UCR.
[112] The UCR program divides offenses into two groups--Part I and Part
II. The Part I offenses include the eight violent and property crimes.
Part II offenses are all crime classifications other than those defined
as Part I.
[113] Rio Rico (pop 10,413) is a planned community located 57 miles
south of Tucson and 12 miles north of the international border.
[114] Pima County Sheriff's Department is split into several patrol
districts. The Green Valley District covers the area from the Santa
Cruz County line on the south to approximately kilometer post 80 on I-
19 on the north.
[115] In Arizona, criminal damage generally involves crimes that result
in damage to or defacement of private or public property. Ariz. Rev.
Stat. §§ 13-1602, 13-1604. Criminal littering or polluting is also a
crime in Arizona. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1603.
[116] The narcotics and drug related offense data we received include
the following crime categories: Narcotics, Possession/Marijuana for
sale, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, Possession of Marijuana, and
Possession/Sale/Transportation of Marijuana.
[End of section]
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