Bureau of Prisons
Evaluating the Impact of Protective Equipment Could Help Enhance Officer Safety
Gao ID: GAO-11-410 April 8, 2011
The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) manages more than 209,000 inmates, up 45 percent between fiscal years 2000 and 2010. As the prison population grows, so do concerns about correctional officer safety. As requested, GAO examined the (1) equipment that BOP and selected state departments of corrections (DOC) provide to protect officers, and the officers' and other correctional practitioners' opinions of this equipment; (2) extent to which BOP has evaluated the effectiveness of this equipment, and factors correctional equipment experts consider important to the acquisition of new equipment; and (3) institutional factors correctional accrediting experts reported as impacting officer safety, and the extent to which BOP has evaluated the effectiveness of the steps it has taken in response. GAO reviewed BOP policies and procedures; interviewed BOP officials and officers within BOP's six regions, selected based on such factors as the level of facility overcrowding; interviewed officials at 14 of the 15 largest state DOCs; and surveyed 21 individuals selected for their expertise in corrections. The results of the interviews cannot be generalized, but provide insight into issues affecting officer safety.
BOP and 14 state DOCs included in GAO's review provide a variety of protective equipment to officers, but BOP officers and management have different views on equipment. BOP generally provides officers with radios, body alarms, keys, flashlights, handcuffs, gloves, and stab-resistant vests while on duty, but prohibits them from storing personal firearms on BOP property, with limited exceptions. DOC officials in 14 states GAO interviewed provided examples of equipment they allow officers to carry while on duty that BOP does not--such as pepper spray--and officials in 9 of the 14 states reported allowing officers to store personal firearms on state DOC property. BOP and states provide similar equipment to protect officers in an emergency, such as an inmate riot or attack. Most BOP officers with whom GAO spoke reported that carrying additional equipment while on duty and commuting would better protect officers, while BOP management largely reported that officers did not need to carry additional equipment to better protect them. BOP has not evaluated the effectiveness of equipment it provides in ensuring officer safety, and correctional equipment experts report that BOP needs to consider a variety of factors in acquisition decisions. Neither the officials nor the experts with whom GAO spoke reported that they were aware of or had conducted evaluations of the effectiveness of equipment in ensuring officer safety, although BOP tracks information necessary to do so in its data systems. By using information in these existing systems, BOP could analyze the effectiveness of the equipment it distributes in ensuring officer safety, thus helping it determine additional actions, if any, to further officer safety and better target limited resources. All of the correctional equipment experts GAO spoke with reported that BOP would need to consider factors such as training, replacement, maintenance, and liability, as well as whether the equipment met performance standards, if it acquired new equipment. These experts suggested that any decision must first be based upon a close examination of the benefits and risk of using certain types of equipment. For example, while state officials reported that pepper spray is inexpensive and effective, a majority of the BOP management officials we spoke with stated that it could be taken by inmates and used against officers. Correctional accrediting experts most frequently cited control over the inmate population, officer training, inmate gangs, correctional staffing and inmate overcrowding as the institutional factors--beyond equipment--most impacting officer safety. These experts suggested various strategies to address these factors, and BOP reported taking steps to do so, such as conducting annual training on BOP policies, identifying and separating gang members, and converting community space into inmate cells. BOP has assessed the effectiveness of steps it has taken in improving officer safety. For instance, a 2001 BOP study found that inmates who participated in BOP's substance abuse treatment program were less likely than a comparison group to engage in misconduct for the remainder of their sentence following program completion. BOP utilizes such studies to inform its decisions, such as eliminating programs found to be ineffective. GAO recommends that BOP's Director assess whether the equipment intended to improve officer safety has been effective. BOP concurred with this recommendation
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director:
David C. Maurer
Team:
Government Accountability Office: Homeland Security and Justice
Phone:
(202) 512-9627
GAO-11-410, Bureau of Prisons: Evaluating the Impact of Protective Equipment Could Help Enhance Officer Safety
This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-11-410
entitled 'Bureau of Prisons: Evaluating the Impact of Protective
Equipment Could Help Enhance Officer Safety' which was released on
April 8, 2011.
This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as
part of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility.
Every attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data
integrity of the original printed product. Accessibility features,
such as text descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes
placed at the end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters,
are provided but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format
of the printed version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an
exact electronic replica of the printed version. We welcome your
feedback. Please E-mail your comments regarding the contents or
accessibility features of this document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
April 2010:
Bureau of Prisons:
Evaluating the Impact of Protective Equipment Could Help Enhance
Officer Safety:
GAO-11-410:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-410, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Department of Justice‘s (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
manages more than 209,000 inmates, up 45 percent between fiscal years
2000 and 2010. As the prison population grows, so do concerns about
correctional officer safety. As requested, GAO examined the (1)
equipment that BOP and selected state departments of corrections (DOC)
provide to protect officers, and the officers‘ and other correctional
practitioners‘ opinions of this equipment; (2) extent to which BOP has
evaluated the effectiveness of this equipment, and factors
correctional equipment experts consider important to the acquisition
of new equipment; and (3) institutional factors correctional
accrediting experts reported as impacting officer safety, and the
extent to which BOP has evaluated the effectiveness of the steps it
has taken in response. GAO reviewed BOP policies and procedures;
interviewed BOP officials and officers within BOP‘s six regions,
selected based on such factors as the level of facility overcrowding;
interviewed officials at 14 of the 15 largest state DOCs; and surveyed
21 individuals selected for their expertise in corrections. The
results of the interviews cannot be generalized, but provide insight
into issues affecting officer safety.
What GAO Found:
BOP and 14 state DOCs included in GAO‘s review provide a variety of
protective equipment to officers, but BOP officers and management have
different views on equipment. BOP generally provides officers with
radios, body alarms, keys, flashlights, handcuffs, gloves, and stab-
resistant vests while on duty, but prohibits them from storing
personal firearms on BOP property, with limited exceptions. DOC
officials in 14 states GAO interviewed provided examples of equipment
they allow officers to carry while on duty that BOP does not”such as
pepper spray”and officials in 9 of the 14 states reported allowing
officers to store personal firearms on state DOC property. BOP and
states provide similar equipment to protect officers in an emergency,
such as an inmate riot or attack. Most BOP officers with whom GAO
spoke reported that carrying additional equipment while on duty and
commuting would better protect officers, while BOP management largely
reported that officers did not need to carry additional equipment to
better protect them.
BOP has not evaluated the effectiveness of equipment it provides in
ensuring officer safety, and correctional equipment experts report
that BOP needs to consider a variety of factors in acquisition
decisions. Neither the officials nor the experts with whom GAO spoke
reported that they were aware of or had conducted evaluations of the
effectiveness of equipment in ensuring officer safety, although BOP
tracks information necessary to do so in its data systems. By using
information in these existing systems, BOP could analyze the
effectiveness of the equipment it distributes in ensuring officer
safety, thus helping it determine additional actions, if any, to
further officer safety and better target limited resources. All of the
correctional equipment experts GAO spoke with reported that BOP would
need to consider factors such as training, replacement, maintenance,
and liability, as well as whether the equipment met performance
standards, if it acquired new equipment. These experts suggested that
any decision must first be based upon a close examination of the
benefits and risk of using certain types of equipment. For example,
while state officials reported that pepper spray is inexpensive and
effective, a majority of the BOP management officials we spoke with
stated that it could be taken by inmates and used against officers.
Correctional accrediting experts most frequently cited control over
the inmate population, officer training, inmate gangs, correctional
staffing and inmate overcrowding as the institutional factors”beyond
equipment”most impacting officer safety. These experts suggested
various strategies to address these factors, and BOP reported taking
steps to do so, such as conducting annual training on BOP policies,
identifying and separating gang members, and converting community
space into inmate cells. BOP has assessed the effectiveness of steps
it has taken in improving officer safety. For instance, a 2001 BOP
study found that inmates who participated in BOP‘s substance abuse
treatment program were less likely than a comparison group to engage
in misconduct for the remainder of their sentence following program
completion. BOP utilizes such studies to inform its decisions, such as
eliminating programs found to be ineffective.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that BOP‘s Director assess whether the equipment
intended to improve officer safety has been effective. BOP concurred
with this recommendation.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-410] or key
components. For more information, contact David Maurer at (202) 512-
9627 or maurerd@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
BOP and Selected States Provide a Variety of Protective Equipment to
Officers, but Opinions on Impact of Equipment on Officer Safety Are
Mixed:
BOP Has Not Evaluated the Effectiveness of Its Equipment in Ensuring
Officer Safety and Correctional Equipment Experts Suggest Several
Factors to Consider in Making Equipment Acquisition Decisions:
Correctional Accrediting Experts Cited Inmate Management and Officer
Training among the Institutional Factors Most Impacting Officer
Safety, and BOP Has Evaluated the Effectiveness of Its Efforts in
Ensuring Officer Safety:
Conclusions:
Recommendation for Executive Action:
Agency Comments:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Trends in BOP Inmate Characteristics:
Appendix III: Characteristics of State Inmates:
Appendix IV: Survey Sent to American Correctional Association (ACA)
Audit Chairs:
Appendix V: Institutional Factors That Impact Officer Safety and
Examples of Mitigating Strategies Either Used by BOP or State DOCs or
Suggested by Correctional Accrediting Experts:
Appendix VI: Comments from the Bureau of Prisons:
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: Percentage of Inmates Incarcerated in BOP Institutions, by
Institutional Security Level, Fiscal Year 2010:
Table 2: Type of Equipment BOP Officers Routinely Carry within
Facilities' Secure Perimeters and Number of Selected States Reporting
Availability:
Table 3: Selected States' Policies Regarding Officer Storage of
Personal Weapons at Work:
Table 4: Type of Equipment BOP Makes Available in Cases of Emergency
and Number of States Also Reporting Availability:
Table 5: Benefits and Risks of Less-Than-Lethal Weapons Cited by BOP
and State Officials:
Table 6. Inmate Populations by State as of December 31, 2009:
Table 7: Institutional Factors Affecting Officer Safety and Examples
of Strategies to Address Them:
Figures:
Figure 1: Trend in BOP's Inmate Population from Fiscal Year 2000
through 2010:
Figure 2: BOP's Incident Reporting Process for Assaults on Staff in
Its SENTRY System:
Figure 3: Serious and Less Serious Assaults on BOP Staff from Fiscal
Year 2000 through 2010:
Figure 4: Personal Weapons Locker at Guaynabo MDC:
Figure 5: Opinions Regarding Whether Additional Equipment Provided to
Officers While on Duty Would Enhance Their Safety:
Figure 6: Opinions Regarding Whether Safety While Commuting to and
from Work is a Concern for Officers:
Figure 7: Opinions Regarding Whether Permission to Store Personal
Firearms on BOP Property While on Duty Would Enhance Officer Safety:
Figure 8: Trend in Average Age of BOP Inmates from Fiscal Year 2000
through 2010:
Figure 9: Trends in Percentage of Inmates by Race and Ethnicity from
Fiscal Year 2000 through 2010:
Figure 10: Trends in Inmates by Gender from Fiscal Year 2000 through
2010:
Figure 11: Trends in Types of Offenses Committed by BOP Inmates from
Fiscal Year 2000 through 2010:
Figure 12: Trends in Length of Sentence Imposed on Inmates from Fiscal
Year 2000 through 2010:
Figure 13: Trend in Percentage of Inmates Affiliated with a Security
Threat Group from Fiscal Year 2000 through 2010:
Figure 14: Estimated Percentage of Sentenced Prisoners under State
Jurisdiction by Race and Hispanic Origin from December 31, 2000
through 2009:
Figure 15: Estimated Percentage of Sentenced Prisoners under State
Jurisdiction by Gender from December 31, 2000 through 2009:
Figure 16: Estimated Percentage of Sentenced Prisoners under State
Jurisdiction by Type of Offense at Year End 2008:
Abbreviations:
ACA: American Correctional Association:
ADX: Administrative Maximum:
AFGE: Association of Federal Government Employees:
ASCA: Association of State Correctional Administrators:
BOP: Federal Bureau of Prisons:
CPL: Council of Prison Locals:
DCT: Disturbance Control Team:
DOC: Department of Corrections:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
FCC: Federal Correctional Complex:
FDC: Federal Detention Center:
LEOSA: Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004:
MDC: Metropolitan Detention Center:
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding:
NIC: National Institute of Corrections:
NIJ: National Institute of Justice:
NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology:
NLECTC: National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center:
OJP: Office of Justice Programs:
ORE: Office of Research and Evaluation:
SHU: Special Housing Unit:
SMU: Special Management Unit:
SORT: Special Operations Response Team:
STG: Security Threat Group:
TASER: Thomas A. Swift's Electric Rifle:
USP: U.S. Penitentiary:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
[End of section]
April 8, 2011:
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy:
Chairman:
Committee on the Judiciary:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Dennis Cardoza:
House of Representatives:
The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
operates and manages 116 federal prisons and oversees more than
209,000 federal inmates--a population that grew by 45 percent from
fiscal year 2000 through 2010. According to its vision statement, BOP
seeks to provide a workplace in which staff perform their duties
without fear of injury or assault; however, as the prison population
grows, so do concerns over inmate aggression and correctional officer
(officer) safety. From fiscal year 2000 through 2010, assaults on
staff in BOP facilities increased from 1,188 to 1,696. During this
same period, the number of inmates per BOP staff member increased from
4.13 in fiscal year 2000 to 4.82 in fiscal year 2010.
In response to your request, this report describes the equipment
available to protect officers--as well as other institutional factors,
such as inmate overcrowding and staffing shortages--that affect
officer safety. Specifically, the report addresses the following
questions:
* What equipment do BOP and selected states provide to protect
officers and what are the opinions of BOP officers and other
correctional practitioners regarding this equipment?
* To what extent has BOP evaluated the effectiveness of its equipment
in ensuring officer safety, and what do correctional equipment experts
report as important factors when considering the purchase of new
equipment?
* What institutional factors do correctional accrediting experts
report as most impacting officer safety, and to what extent has BOP
evaluated the effectiveness of the steps it has taken to address these
factors?
To address our objectives, we reviewed BOP policies and procedures and
interviewed BOP central management, including officials from the
Correctional Services Branch, who have primary responsibility for
security issues, including protective equipment, as well as officials
from BOP's Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE), who produce
reports and research on corrections-related topics. During these
interviews, we discussed BOP's existing officer safety practices and
the institutional factors they report as affecting officer safety,
among other topics. We compared BOP's mechanisms for evaluating the
effectiveness of its practices in ensuring officer safety to BOP's and
DOJ's mission statements and Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government.[Footnote 1] Further, we visited eight BOP
institutions spread across BOP's six regions and interviewed BOP
officials and 68 officers about the institutional factors they report
as affecting officer safety. In selecting these institutions, we
considered factors such as their location, staff-to-inmate ratio, and
level of overcrowding. In addition, we interviewed officials at 14 of
the 15 state departments of correction (DOC) with the largest inmate
populations to discuss institutional factors they reported as
affecting officer safety, measures implemented to address these
factors, equipment used to protect officers, and their reported
effectiveness.[Footnote 2] We also interviewed union officials
representing BOP officers at the national and local level, as well as
officials from a variety of correctional organizations. During our
work, we also met with correctional equipment experts from DOJ's
National Institute of Justice (NIJ), NIJ's National Law Enforcement
and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC), and the Department of
Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
During these interviews, we obtained the officials' perspectives on
the factors BOP would need to consider if it acquired equipment for
its officers. The views of these various institutions, officials, and
organizations are not generalizable, but provide valuable insights
into issues affecting officer safety. In addition, we surveyed a panel
of 30 correctional accrediting experts who advise the American
Correctional Association's Commission on Accreditation and obtained 21
responses on the institutional factors that most affect officer safety
and cost effective strategies to address these factors.
We conducted this work from June 2010 to April 2011 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. See appendix I for further
information on our objectives, scope, and methodology.
Background:
BOP's Institutions and Inmate Population:
A component of DOJ, BOP has obligations to confine offenders in a
controlled, safe, and humane prison environment, while providing a
safe workplace where officers can perform their duties without fear of
injury or assault. In fiscal year 2010, $6.2 billion was appropriated
for BOP to carry out its mission.[Footnote 3] For all 116 of its
institutions, BOP has dedicated an average of almost $17 million
annually from fiscal year 2000 through 2010 to expenditures that
include protective equipment for its officers.[Footnote 4]
In fiscal year 2010, BOP oversaw more than 209,000 inmates, housing
more than 170,000 of these inmates in its 116 institutions. In
addition, BOP utilizes privately managed secure facilities;
residential re-entry centers--also known as halfway houses; bed space
secured through agreements with state and local entities; and home
confinement to house inmates. In fiscal year 2010, more than 22,000
inmates--or about 11 percent of the 209,000 inmates overseen by BOP--
were housed in privately managed facilities, while more than 14,000--
or about 7 percent--were housed in residential re-entry centers, bed
space secured through agreements with state or local entities, or home
confinement.
BOP's 116 institutions generally have one of four security level
designations: minimum, low, medium, and high. The designations depend
on the level of security and staff supervision the institution is able
to provide, such as the presence of security towers; perimeter
barriers; the type of inmate housing, including dormitory, cubicle, or
cell-type housing; and the staff-to-inmate ratio. Further, BOP
designates some of its institutions as administrative institutions,
which specifically serve inmates awaiting trial, or those with
intensive medical or mental health conditions, regardless of the level
of supervision these inmates require.
To determine the institution in which an inmate is confined, BOP
considers the level of security and supervision the inmate requires
and that the institution is able to provide; the inmate's
rehabilitation needs; the level of overcrowding at the institution;
and any recommendations from the court at the inmate's sentencing.
Table 1 depicts the percentage of inmates incarcerated in BOP
institutions, by security level of the institution in fiscal year 2010.
Table 1: Percentage of Inmates Incarcerated in BOP Institutions, by
Institutional Security Level, Fiscal Year 2010:
Inmates incarcerated[A]:
Minimum security: 13.23%;
Low security: 36.75%;
Medium security: 29.48%;
High security: 10.86%;
Administrative: 9.68%.
Source: GAO analysis of BOP data.
[A] These data do not include inmates in residential re-entry centers,
as these do not have security level assignments.
[End of table]
Since fiscal year 2000, BOP's inmate population has grown by 45
percent, as shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: Trend in BOP's Inmate Population from Fiscal Year 2000
through 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2000;
BOP inmate population: 144,750.
Fiscal year: 2001;
BOP inmate population: 156,011.
Fiscal year: 2002;
BOP inmate population: 162,893.
Fiscal year: 2003;
BOP inmate population: 171,981.
Fiscal year: 2004;
BOP inmate population: 179,412.
Fiscal year: 2005;
BOP inmate population: 186,912.
Fiscal year: 2006;
BOP inmate population: 191,876.
Fiscal year: 2007;
BOP inmate population: 199,517.
Fiscal year: 2008;
BOP inmate population: 201,176.
Fiscal year: 2009;
BOP inmate population: 208,350.
Fiscal year: 2010;
BOP inmate population: 209,400.
Source: GAO analysis of BOP data.
See appendix II for information on the characteristics of BOP's inmate
population.
BOP's Systems and Processes for Reporting Assaults on Staff:
BOP tracks information related to inmate assaults on staff in two data
systems: SENTRY and TRUINTEL.
First created in 1974, BOP's SENTRY system maintains most of BOP's
operational and management information, such as inmate data and
property management data, among others. According to the Acting
Director of BOP's Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE), SENTRY was
updated in 1997 to capture reports of inmate incidents, including
assaults on staff. Assaults on staff can include a variety of violent
acts. For instance, BOP officials with whom we spoke provided examples
of assaults, such as stabbing a staff member with a homemade weapon,
punching or kicking staff, or throwing bodily fluids on a staff
member. Assaults are classified as serious or less serious based upon
the injury sustained or intended as a result of the assault. For
instance, officials at one BOP institution reported that they would
classify an assault in which an inmate threw food at an officer as a
less serious assault, but an assault in which the officer was stabbed
as a serious assault.
To report an inmate assault on a BOP staff member in SENTRY, BOP
instructs its personnel to follow the procedures for incident
reporting and investigations described in BOP's Program Statement on
Inmate Discipline and Special Housing Units. Figure 2 depicts this
process.
Figure 2: BOP's Incident Reporting Process for Assaults on Staff in
Its SENTRY System:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Inmate assault on BOP staff:
BOP staff who witnessed the assault submits an incident report to the
shift lieutenant describing the incident, the staff and inmate(s)
involved, and the immediate action taken by BOP staff;
BOP investigative staff at the institution conduct an investigation;
An institution‘s Unit Discipline Committee considers the outcome of
the investigation and administers punishment to the inmate;
Assaults requiring more serious sanctions:
A regional Disciplinary Hearing Officer conducts an administrative
fact-finding hearing and decides whether the inmate is guilty and the
type of sanction the inmate will receive;
Description of inmate assault incident and the disciplinary hearing
outcome and case disposition is submitted in SENTRY.
Source: GAO analysis of BOP documents.
[End of figure]
In addition to the information captured in SENTRY, BOP's TRUINTEL
system--created in October 2009--provides BOP with a number of
capabilities, including an intelligence gathering function that
provides real-time information on assaults on staff. Unlike SENTRY,
Correctional Services Branch officials reported that TRUINTEL captures
only data from the initial incident report, and is not updated based
on the subsequent investigation or hearings related to the assault.
According to these officials, TRUINTEL allows managers at BOP
institutions to see trends in incidents, including assaults, across
BOP institutions.
The Correctional Services Branch officials stated that if an assault
on an officer occurs, an individual at the institution--generally the
lieutenant on duty--completes a Form 583 Report of Incident (Form 583)
in the TRUINTEL system, indicating that the incident was an assault on
staff. The lieutenant also records information on the incident's
cause, such as alcohol or a disrespect issue; the inmate(s) involved
in the assault; whether restraints were applied to the inmate; and
whether any lethal or less-than-lethal weapons were used to resolve
the incident.[Footnote 5] The officer involved in the assault may also
submit a description of the incident, which is entered into the Form
583. After the lieutenant completes the Form 583, the institution's
captain generally reviews the report before it is reviewed and
finalized by the institution's warden. Once the warden finalizes the
Form 583, managers across BOP institutions can view the information in
the TRUINTEL system. Further, following any incident involving an
officer's use of force against an inmate, such as the use of a less-
than-lethal weapon, BOP requires that a Form 586 After Action Review
Report be completed in TRUINTEL. To complete this report, an after
action review committee first meets to review the incident. The
facility's warden, the associate warden responsible for correctional
services, the health services administrator, and the captain comprise
this review committee and their purpose is to assess the rationale for
why the staff involved took the actions or used the equipment they
did. The committee also determines if these actions, including the use
of any equipment, were appropriate given BOP policy.
Since BOP's inmate population changes each year, BOP calculates the
rate of inmate assaults--both of a serious and less serious nature--
per 5,000 inmates incarcerated based on the information submitted in
its SENTRY system. For example, in fiscal year 2010, the total number
of assaults on staff was almost 1,700, for a rate of about 49 serious
and less serious assaults per 5,000 inmates.[Footnote 6] Figure 3
displays the serious and less serious assaults on BOP staff, as
recorded in SENTRY from fiscal year 2000 through 2010. As the trends
illustrate, less serious assaults have followed a generally upward
trend, while serious assaults have experienced fewer fluctuations over
time.
Figure 3: Serious and Less Serious Assaults on BOP Staff from Fiscal
Year 2000 through 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 multiple line graphs]
Serious and less serious assaults on staff:
Year: 2000;
Serious assaults on staff: 89;
Less serious assaults on staff: 1,099.
Year: 2001;
Serious assaults on staff: 98;
Less serious assaults on staff: 1,130.
Year: 2002;
Serious assaults on staff: 137;
Less serious assaults on staff: 1,220.
Year: 2003;
Serious assaults on staff: 127;
Less serious assaults on staff: 1,343.
Year: 2004;
Serious assaults on staff: 108;
Less serious assaults on staff: 1,347.
Year: 2005;
Serious assaults on staff: 119;
Less serious assaults on staff: 1,257.
Year: 2006;
Serious assaults on staff: 104;
Less serious assaults on staff: 1,219.
Year: 2007;
Serious assaults on staff: 70;
Less serious assaults on staff: 1,161.
Year: 2008;
Serious assaults on staff: 94;
Less serious assaults on staff: 1,392.
Year: 2009;
Serious assaults on staff: 110;
Less serious assaults on staff: 1,640.
Year: 2010;
Serious assaults on staff: 73;
Less serious assaults on staff: 1,623.
Serious and less serious assaults on staff per 5,000 inmates:
Year: 2000;
Serious assaults on staff: 4;
Less serious assaults on staff: 45.
Year: 2001;
Serious assaults on staff: 4;
Less serious assaults on staff: 44.
Year: 2002;
Serious assaults on staff: 5;
Less serious assaults on staff: 46.
Year: 2003;
Serious assaults on staff: 4;
Less serious assaults on staff: 47.
Year: 2004;
Serious assaults on staff: 4;
Less serious assaults on staff: 45.
Year: 2005;
Serious assaults on staff: 4;
Less serious assaults on staff: 40.
Year: 2006;
Serious assaults on staff: 3;
Less serious assaults on staff: 38.
Year: 2007;
Serious assaults on staff: 2;
Less serious assaults on staff: 35.
Year: 2008;
Serious assaults on staff: 3;
Less serious assaults on staff: 42.
Year: 2009;
Serious assaults on staff: 3;
Less serious assaults on staff: 49.
Year: 2010;
Serious assaults on staff: 2;
Less serious assaults on staff: 47.
Source: GAO analysis of SENTRY data.
[End of figure]
According to BOP officials from the Correctional Services Branch,
upward trends in assault data may be influenced by a number of
factors, including the number of inmates affiliated with gangs, the
staff-to-inmate ratio in the institutions experiencing assaults, or
the opening of additional BOP institutions because inmates
incarcerated in these new institutions are not familiar with each
other, which can lead to initial tension between the inmates.
Correspondingly, the officials explained that the decrease in assaults
may be a result of the inmate population at a new institution
stabilizing and becoming less tense. In addition, the officials
reported that the downward trend in assaults from 2009 to 2010 may be
related to BOP creating Special Management Units (SMU) to house
inmates who present unique security and management concerns, such as
those who participated or had a leadership role in gang activity, by
removing them from other BOP facilities.
Correctional Officer Safety While Off Duty in Public Settings:
While these data systems track inmate assaults on staff while staff
are on duty, officers may also encounter former inmates or inmates'
families or associates while in the community, including while
commuting to and from work. In part due to these potential threats to
officers' safety in their communities, the Law Enforcement Officers
Safety Act of 2004 (LEOSA) was passed.[Footnote 7] LEOSA exempts
qualified law enforcement officers and qualified retired law
enforcement officers from state and local laws that prohibit carrying
concealed firearms.[Footnote 8] BOP staff who have primary and
secondary law enforcement status are "qualified law enforcement
officers" as defined by statute and qualify to carry concealed
firearms.[Footnote 9] However, with limited exceptions, BOP prohibits
anyone, including officers, from storing personal firearms carried
while commuting to and from work on institution property.[Footnote 10]
The Role of Other Entities in Officer Safety:
In addition to BOP, other federal government and nongovernmental
organizations also engage in activities that relate to officer safety.
* The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) is DOJ's research,
development, and evaluation component. In addition to awarding grants
and cooperative agreements to research, develop, and evaluate criminal
justice programs, NIJ coordinates various technical working groups
comprised of subject matter experts who work in the field of criminal
justice to address a variety of law enforcement issues. Three of NIJ's
technical working groups relevant to officer safety in correctional
settings are: Institutional Corrections, Personal Protective
Equipment, and Less Lethal Technologies. Further, NIJ funds the
National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC),
which assists state, local, tribal, and federal correctional agencies,
as well as law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, in
addressing technology needs and challenges, which can help address
officer safety.
* In addition, BOP's National Institute of Corrections (NIC) provides
training, technical assistance, information services, and policy and
program development assistance to federal, state, and local
correctional agencies. The NIC also maintains an extensive library of
research and evaluations related to corrections, including those
related to officer safety.
* Further, the Office of Law Enforcement Standards within the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), an agency of the
Department of Commerce, helps criminal justice, public safety,
emergency responder, and homeland security agencies make decisions,
primarily by developing performance standards, measurement tools,
operating procedures and equipment guidelines. For instance, NIST has
conducted research on the long-term durability of body armor, which is
worn by correctional officers to ensure their safety.
* The American Correctional Association's (ACA) Commission on
Accreditation provides all accreditations for BOP institutions. The
ACA's standards provide guidance to all correctional organizations on
correctional issues such as programming, officer staffing, and officer
safety. In order for a correctional institution to be accredited by
the ACA, the institution must show compliance in key areas, including
officer safety.
* Additionally, the Council of Prison Locals (CPL) is the union that
represents employees within BOP's bargaining unit, which includes
correctional officers. The CPL is a part of the Association of Federal
Government Employees (AFGE), a union that represents federal
government employees. There are 105 local CPL branches nationwide that
represent employees from BOP's 116 facilities, and advocate for the
interests of their constituents, including officer safety issues.
State Departments of Corrections:
In addition to BOP's role in ensuring the safety of federal
correctional officers, state departments of corrections work to ensure
the safety of correctional officers working in state institutions. All
50 states have agencies that are responsible for housing the state's
inmate populations. See appendix III for the inmate populations and
characteristics in these states as of December 31, 2009.
BOP and Selected States Provide a Variety of Protective Equipment to
Officers, but Opinions on Impact of Equipment on Officer Safety Are
Mixed:
BOP and the selected states with whom we spoke provide their officers
with a variety of equipment to protect them. BOP generally requires
officers working within the secure perimeter of its institutions to
carry a radio, body alarm, and keys while on duty.[Footnote 11] BOP
also provides officers with the option to carry flashlights and wear
stab-resistant vests. This policy regarding the equipment worn or
carried by officers is largely consistent across BOP facilities.
Further, with limited exceptions, BOP prohibits anyone, including
officers, from storing personal firearms the officers carried while
commuting to and from work on facility property. States have
discretion over the equipment they make available to their officers,
and officials in the 14 states with whom we spoke provided examples of
three types of equipment they allow their officers to carry while on
duty that BOP generally does not, including pepper spray and batons.
In addition, officials from 9 of the 14 states reported that they
allow their officers to store personal firearms that they have carried
when commuting to and from work on facility property, which BOP
generally does not. However, BOP and states provide similar equipment
and weapons--such as less-than-lethal launchers, shotguns, or rubber
bullets--to protect their officers in an emergency situation, which
can include responding to an inmate riot or attack, removing a
noncompliant inmate from a cell, or capturing an escaping inmate. Most
BOP officers and union officials with whom we spoke reported that
carrying additional equipment while on duty and while commuting to and
from work would better protect officers, while BOP management largely
reported that officers did not need to carry additional equipment in
order to better ensure their safety.
[Side bar: Photograph: Personal pepper spray. Canister of personal
pepper spray, carried by officers in some states. Source: GAO. End of
side bar]
Some States Allow Officers to Carry Different Equipment While on Duty
than BOP and to Store Personal Firearms on Facility Property, but BOP
and States Largely Provide Similar Equipment and Weapons to Officers
in Cases of Emergency:
[Side bar: Photograph: Batons. Rapid rotation batons carried by
officers at the ADX in Florence, Colorado. End of side bar]
BOP officers working within the secure perimeter of a BOP institution
are generally required to carry a radio, body alarm, and keys while on
duty. In addition, officers have the option to carry a flashlight,
handcuffs, latex or leather gloves, or a stab-resistant vest.[Footnote
12] These policies are largely consistent across BOP institutions,
although officers in certain posts carry additional equipment beyond
what the typical officer carries. For instance, officers in armed
posts carry a lethal weapon and have the option to wear a ballistic
vest while on duty.[Footnote 13] Further, institutions can request
waivers to permit their officers to carry or wear additional
equipment. According to BOP officials in the Correctional Services
Branch, such waivers are granted when the institution demonstrates
that it has a unique need to deviate from BOP's national policy. For
example, BOP approved a waiver for officers working at BOP's
Administrative Maximum (ADX) institution in Florence, Colorado, which
houses inmates requiring the tightest controls in BOP, to carry batons
while on duty. Similarly, officers working with inmates in SMUs, which
house inmates that present unique security and management concerns,
such as those who participated or had a leadership role in gang
activity, were also granted a waiver to carry batons while on duty.
According to BOP, it has granted 5 institutions waivers related to
officers carrying additional equipment. These waivers include
permitting officers in the ADX and SMUs to carry batons inside the
institutions. In addition, BOP granted waivers allowing officers
patrolling the perimeter of 3 institutions located in downtown areas
to carry smaller canisters of pepper spray than those in BOP's
inventory because the larger size was too cumbersome. Further, BOP
reported that it has granted waivers to 25 institutions permitting
them to store less-than-lethal munitions closer to, or in some cases
inside, Special Housing Units (SHU) in order to provide officers more
rapid access to the equipment.[Footnote 14]
State DOCs determine the type of equipment their officers carry, and
officials in the 14 states with whom we spoke provided examples of
three types of equipment that they made available to their officers
working within the secure perimeter of the institution to carry or
wear while on duty that BOP generally does not. For example, officials
from 10 states reported that their officers were permitted to carry
pepper spray. In the case of pepper spray and other equipment, state
officials told us that it may be carried or worn by all officers in
the state; optional for officers; or dependent on the security level
of the institution in which the officer works, the officer's post, or
the warden's discretion. Table 2 displays the equipment that BOP
routinely provides to the majority of its officers to carry or wear
while on duty, and the number of officials from the 14 states
reporting that their officers carry or wear this equipment.
Table 2: Type of Equipment BOP Officers Routinely Carry within
Facilities' Secure Perimeters and Number of Selected States Reporting
Availability:
Type of equipment: Radio or body alarm;
Routinely carried by or available to majority of BOP officers?: Yes;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting that their
officers carry or wear equipment: 14.
Type of equipment: Protective gear[A];
Routinely carried by or available to majority of BOP officers?: Yes;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting that their
officers carry or wear equipment: 11.
Type of equipment: Handcuffs;
Routinely carried by or available to majority of BOP officers?: Yes;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting that their
officers carry or wear equipment: 8.
Type of equipment: Keys;
Routinely carried by or available to majority of BOP officers?: Yes;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting that their
officers carry or wear equipment: 4.
Type of equipment: Flashlights;
Routinely carried by or available to majority of BOP officers?: Yes;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting that their
officers carry or wear equipment: 3.
Type of equipment: Pepper spray;
Routinely carried by or available to majority of BOP officers?: No;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting that their
officers carry or wear equipment: 10.
Type of equipment: Batons;
Routinely carried by or available to majority of BOP officers?: No[B];
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting that their
officers carry or wear equipment: 7.
Type of equipment: Conducted energy device, such as an electronic
restraint device or TASER[C];
Routinely carried by or available to majority of BOP officers?: No;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting that their
officers carry or wear equipment: 2.
Source: GAO analysis based on BOP documents and interviews with BOP
management and state officials.
[A] The protective gear that BOP provides includes stab-resistant
vests and gloves. The protective gear that states provide includes
gloves, stab-resistant or ballistic vests, face and mouth shields, or
gas or CPR masks.
[B] As previously noted, officers working at BOP's ADX institution in
Florence, Colorado and in SMUs carry batons while on duty.
[C] TASER is an acronym for Thomas A. Swift's Electric Rifle.
[End of table]
According to BOP officials with whom we spoke, officers carry limited
equipment while on duty because BOP stresses the importance of
officers communicating with inmates to ensure officer safety. For
instance, management officials at one BOP institution explained that,
regardless of the amount of equipment officers carry, inmates will
always outnumber officers. Therefore, the officers' ability to manage
the inmates through effective communication, rather than the use of
equipment, is essential to ensuring officer safety. BOP officials
reported that carrying additional equipment would impede this
communication. For example, according to officials from the
Correctional Services Branch, if officers carried equipment in
addition to what BOP currently provides, the officers may rely more on
this equipment than on their communication with inmates to resolve a
situation.
Further, officials in 9 of the 14 states with whom we spoke reported
that they allow their officers to store personal firearms that they
have carried while commuting to and from work on facility property,
while BOP, with limited exceptions, does not allow its officers to
store such personal weapons. Specifically, BOP policy prohibits
anyone, including officers, from bringing personal firearms into or
onto the grounds of any BOP institution without the knowledge or
consent of the warden, or storing personal firearms in any vehicle
parked on BOP property. According to an official from the Correctional
Services Branch, BOP does not permit officers to store personal
weapons on BOP property because visitors or inmates working on the
institution grounds may be able to gain access to the weapon, which
would threaten the security of all individuals at the institution. See
table 3 for the state department of corrections' policies pertaining
to personal firearms storage on facility property.
Table 3: Selected States' Policies Regarding Officer Storage of
Personal Weapons at Work:
State: Alabama;
Does state DOC permit officers to store personal firearms on DOC
property while on duty?: Yes;
If yes, where are personal firearms stored?: Personal vehicle's trunk.
State: Arizona;
Does state DOC permit officers to store personal firearms on DOC
property while on duty?: Yes;
If yes, where are personal firearms stored?: Lockers at facility's
controlled point of entry.
State: California;
Does state DOC permit officers to store personal firearms on DOC
property while on duty?: Yes;
If yes, where are personal firearms stored?: Secure area inside
facility's armory, outside secure perimeter.
State: Florida;
Does state DOC permit officers to store personal firearms on DOC
property while on duty?: Yes;
If yes, where are personal firearms stored?: Behind two locks in
personal vehicle.
State: Louisiana;
Does state DOC permit officers to store personal firearms on DOC
property while on duty?: Yes;
If yes, where are personal firearms stored?: Inside safe in facility's
control center.
State: Missouri;
Does state DOC permit officers to store personal firearms on DOC
property while on duty?: Yes;
If yes, where are personal firearms stored?: In a personal vehicle if
vehicle is locked and the firearm is in an enclosed, secure area of
the vehicle and is concealed from view of any person outside the
vehicle.
State: New York;
Does state DOC permit officers to store personal firearms on DOC
property while on duty?: Yes;
If yes, where are personal firearms stored?: Inside arsenal in
facility.
State: North Carolina;
Does state DOC permit officers to store personal firearms on DOC
property while on duty?: Yes;
If yes, where are personal firearms stored?: Inside locked compartment
in locked vehicle.
State: Texas;
Does state DOC permit officers to store personal firearms on DOC
property while on duty?: Yes;
If yes, where are personal firearms stored?: Inside locked personal
vehicle.
State: Illinois;
Does state DOC permit officers to store personal firearms on DOC
property while on duty?: No.
State: Michigan;
Does state DOC permit officers to store personal firearms on DOC
property while on duty?: No.
State: Ohio;
Does state DOC permit officers to store personal firearms on DOC
property while on duty?: No.
State: Pennsylvania;
Does state DOC permit officers to store personal firearms on DOC
property while on duty?: No.
State: Virginia;
Does state DOC permit officers to store personal firearms on DOC
property while on duty?: No.
Source: GAO analysis of state DOC interviews.
[End of table]
BOP's policy prohibiting officers from storing personal firearms on
BOP property is largely consistent across its institutions; however,
there are limited exceptions to this policy. For instance, BOP policy
permits wardens to allow officers to bring personal firearms onto BOP
grounds. As such, in 1995, the warden at BOP's Metropolitan Detention
Center (MDC) in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico issued a local policy permitting
officers to store personal firearms in a personal weapons locker
outside the facility's secure perimeter while on duty. According to
the policy, to store a personal firearm in the MDC's gun locker,
officers must first submit a request to the MDC's security officer
through the MDC's captain. The request must contain the brand,
caliber, and serial number of each weapon to be stored, as well as the
number and expiration date of the officer's permit to carry a firearm.
Once the request is approved, the officer receives a key to a locked
box within the personal weapons locker. To access the personal weapons
locker, the officer must first be identified by staff in the MDC's
control room on a camera located outside the personal weapons locker.
Once identified, the officer is granted access to the personal weapons
locker and must log his or her entry in and out of the locker in a log
book located inside the locker. Figure 4 depicts the MDC's personal
weapons locker and an open locker.
Figure 4: Personal Weapons Locker at Guaynabo MDC:
[Refer to PDF for image: 2 photographs]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
According to officials at the Guaynabo MDC, the policy was enacted
when the MDC was constructing an armory and requested approval to
build the personal weapons locker attached to the armory; the policy
is reviewed annually. The officials reported that officers at the MDC
at the time were concerned for their safety due to criminal activity
surrounding the institution. For instance, the officials reported that
an associate warden at the institution was the victim of an attempted
car jacking when leaving work.
In addition, officers residing in housing located on BOP property--
known as reservation housing--are prohibited from storing personal
firearms in their housing, and are instead required to place personal
firearms in the institution's armory for safekeeping. According to
BOP, as of January 2011, 32 of its 116 institutions have reservation
housing available, and officers at 14 of these 32 institutions store
personal firearms in the institution's armory. The number of firearms
stored in the armories at these 14 institutions ranges from 1 to 32,
with an average of about 10.
Moreover, BOP has leased parking space for its officers on non-BOP
property at 5 of BOP's institutions, on which BOP's policy prohibiting
the storage of personal weapons does not apply. Depending on the laws
of the state in which the officers work, they may legally be able to
store their personal firearms in their cars while on duty.
[Side bar: photograph: Lethal weapons in an institution‘s armory.
Source: GAO. End of side bar]
In contrast to what officers carry on a routine basis, in cases of
emergency, such as an inmate riot or attack, BOP provides officers
with access to a variety of equipment that is largely consistent with
what our selected state departments of corrections provide. This
equipment includes less-than-lethal weapons, protective gear, and
lethal weapons. The equipment is located in specific locations
throughout the institutions, such as in secure control rooms,
watchtowers in the institutions' yards, or in the institutions'
armories outside the secure perimeter. Table 4 shows the type of
equipment that BOP makes available to its officers in an emergency and
the number of officials in the 14 states with whom we spoke who also
reported making it available.
[Side bar: photograph: Ballistic vest. A ballistic vest in a BOP
secure storage room. Source: GAO. End of side bar]
Table 4: Type of Equipment BOP Makes Available in Cases of Emergency
and Number of States Also Reporting Availability:
Type of equipment: Chemical agent munitions,[A] such as canisters of
pepper spray or pepper spray and tear gas grenades that can be
dispersed into a crowd;
Present at BOP?: Yes;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting
availability: 14.
Type of equipment: Lethal weapons, including handguns, shotguns,[B]
rifles, and submachine guns;
Present at BOP?: Yes;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting
availability: 12.
Type of equipment: Devices to deploy less-than-lethal munitions, such
as less-than-lethal launchers which shoot a variety of less-than-
lethal munitions;
Present at BOP?: Yes;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting
availability: 11.
Type of equipment: Protective gear, such as helmets, shields, stab-
resistant or ballistic vests, gas masks, and gloves;
Present at BOP?: Yes;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting
availability: 10.
Type of equipment: Impact munitions, such as rubber bullets with which
to hit inmates to obtain compliance;
Present at BOP?: Yes;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting
availability: 7.
Type of equipment: Batons;
Present at BOP?: Yes;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting
availability: 7.
Type of equipment: Restraint devices, such as handcuffs;
Present at BOP?: Yes;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting
availability: 7.
Type of equipment: Conducted energy devices, such as stun belts, which
are placed around an inmate's waist and can produce an electric shock;
electronic stun guns;
or stun shields, which produce an electric current across the body of
the shield;
Present at BOP?: Yes[C];
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting
availability: 7.
Type of equipment: Distraction devices, such as devices that produce a
loud sound to obtain inmates' attention;
Present at BOP?: Yes;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting
availability: 4.
Type of equipment: Communication devices, such as radios or bullhorns;
Present at BOP?: Yes;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting
availability: 4.
Type of equipment: Canines, used to keep inmates in a straight line
during inmate movements through the institution, detect drugs, or
track an escaping inmate;
Present at BOP?: Yes[D];
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting
availability: 2.
Type of equipment: Barricade removal devices, such as bolt cutters;
Present at BOP?: Yes;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting
availability: 2.
Type of equipment: Metal detectors;
Present at BOP?: Yes;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting
availability: 1.
Type of equipment: Device to regulate the level of gases in the air;
Present at BOP?: No;
Number of the 14 selected states with officials reporting
availability: 1.
Source: GAO analysis of BOP documentation and interviews with state
and BOP officials.
[A] A munition as described by BOP is any projectile that is deployed
from less-than-lethal weapons including gas products deployed from
grenades or gas canisters.
[B] Shotguns can be used to shoot lethal ammunition or less-than-
lethal munitions.
[C] BOP makes stun belts but not electronic stun guns or stun shields
available to officers.
[D] BOP does not provide canines to its institutions, but has its
institutions enter into memoranda of understanding (MOU) with local
law enforcement agencies to utilize canines for contraband detection,
when needed. According to officials from the Correctional Services
Branch, institutions utilize these canines about every quarter to
conduct contraband searches through these MOUs.
[End of table]
BOP Officers and BOP Management Officials Had Different Opinions
Regarding Whether Additional Equipment Would Better Protect Officers:
The 68 officers, officials from six unions, and management officials
from BOP's Correctional Services Branch and the eight BOP institutions
with whom we spoke had different opinions about whether additional
equipment would better protect officers. As shown in figure 5, most
officers and all the union officials with whom we spoke reported that
additional equipment would enhance officer safety, while most
management officials reported that additional equipment would not
enhance officer safety.
Figure 5: Opinions Regarding Whether Additional Equipment Provided to
Officers While on Duty Would Enhance Their Safety:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Officers, N=68:
Would not enhance at all: 26%;
Mixed opinions: 0%;
Enhance in certain cases: 7%;
Enhance in all cases: 66%.
Unions, N=9:
Would not enhance at all: 0%;
Mixed opinions: 0%;
Enhance in certain cases: 0%;
Enhance in all cases: 100%.
BOP management, N=9:
Would not enhance at all: 89%;
Mixed opinions: 11%;
Enhance in certain cases: 0%;
Enhance in all cases: 0%.
Source: GAO analysis of opinions of BOP officers and BOP and union
officials.
Note: The samples of officers, union officials and BOP management
officials are nonprobablity samples. In a nonprobability sample, some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample. Therefore, the views
these individuals expressed provide insight, but are not generalizable
to all officers, union officials, and BOP management officials.
[End of figure]
These officers and officials who said that carrying additional
equipment would better ensure safety reported that officer safety
would be enhanced if officers carried pepper spray (41 of 45 officers,
all union officials, and management officials from one BOP
institution); batons (15 of 45 officers); TASERs (4 of 45 officers);
or a portable phone (1 officer). Moreover, the officers and officials
cited a number of safety benefits to this additional equipment. For
instance, 9 officers, officials from four unions, and management at
one BOP facility reported that carrying additional equipment would
allow officers to defend themselves in case of an attack by an inmate.
Four officers reported that carrying additional equipment would help
officers deter inmates from engaging in disruptive behavior. For
example, 1 officer stated that if an inmate saw an officer carrying a
baton, the inmate would be less likely to do something wrong. Further,
4 officers reported that carrying additional equipment could help
officers to prevent injuries to inmates, as they could break up fights
between inmates more quickly with the additional equipment on hand.
However, 7 officers and officials from two unions expressed the need
for officers to be trained on the additional equipment in order to
enhance their safety.
Five officers also reported that the need to carry additional
equipment would depend on the situation. Specifically, 4 of the 5
noted that it could particularly aid officers whose posts included
open recreational yards where inmates congregate and the potential for
fighting or misconduct was greater.
Eighteen officers and eight BOP management officials that reported
that carrying additional equipment would not enhance officer safety
cited concerns with the additional equipment. Specifically, officers
most frequently cited concerns that the equipment could be taken from
the officer and used against him or her by an inmate. BOP management
officials most frequently reported that carrying additional equipment
might hinder officers' communication with inmates either because the
officer would be more likely to utilize the equipment to prevent an
inmate from engaging in misconduct than talk with the inmate, or the
inmate would perceive officers carrying additional equipment as more
threatening and be less willing to engage in communication with
officers.
Similarly, the 68 officers, officials from six unions, and management
officials from BOP's Correctional Services Branch and the eight BOP
institutions with whom we spoke had different opinions about whether
safety is a concern for officers while they are commuting to and from
work. As displayed in figure 6, all of the union officials with whom
we spoke reported that safety is a concern for officers when commuting
to and from work, most BOP management officials reported that it was
not, and the officers with whom we spoke were evenly split regarding
safety concerns while commuting to and from work.
Figure 6: Opinions Regarding Whether Safety While Commuting to and
from Work is a Concern for Officers:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Officers, N=66[A]:
Not concern: 50%;
Concern: 50%.
Unions, N=9:
Not concern: 0%;
Concern: 100%.
BOP management, N=9:
Not concern: 89%;
Concern: 11%.
[A] An additional 2 officers did not provide their views on safety
concerns while commuting to and from work.
Source: GAO analysis of opinions of BOP officers and BOP and union
officials.
Note: The samples of officers, union officials and BOP management
officials are nonprobablity samples. In a nonprobability sample, some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample. Therefore, the views
these individuals expressed provide insight, but are not generalizable
to all officers, union officials, and BOP management officials.
[End of figure]
The officers and officials reporting safety concerns most frequently
cited the presence of former inmates, inmates' families, or associates
of inmates in the communities in which officers work who may wish to
harm the officers. For instance, one officer explained that he has
confiscated contraband from inmates during visiting hours, then later
saw the visitors in the community and felt concerned that the visitors
might retaliate. In addition, 2 officers and officials from two unions
reported that officers' safety may be at risk when they are wearing
their uniforms, either because they are recognized as a BOP officer or
other law enforcement personnel. Further, 4 officers, officials from
one union and BOP management officials from one institution cited
crime in the community or the lack of security in the employee parking
lot as a safety concern for officers while commuting to and from work.
The 33 officers who reported that safety while commuting to and from
work was not a concern cited a number of reasons, including living in
close proximity to the institution in which they work; working in an
institution that is in a quiet, non-urban setting; the local
community's positive perception of officers; and officers' good
relationship with inmates. Management officials also reported that
officers often change out of their uniforms when commuting to and from
work, which mitigates safety concerns during the commute.
Given the varying opinions regarding officer safety concerns while
commuting to and from work, the officers, union officials, and BOP
management officials with whom we spoke also reported different
opinions about whether allowing officers to carry personal firearms to
and from work and store them on BOP property would enhance officer
safety. As shown in figure 7, most officers and all union officials
reported that being permitted to store personal firearms on BOP
property would enhance officer safety, while most BOP management
officials reported that doing so would not enhance officer safety.
Figure 7: Opinions Regarding Whether Permission to Store Personal
Firearms on BOP Property While on Duty Would Enhance Officer Safety:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Officers, N=64[A]:
Would not enhance at all: 11%;
Enhance at other institutions: 11%;
Enhance in all cases: 78%.
Unions, N=9;:
Would not enhance at all: 0%;
Enhance at other institutions: 0%;
Enhance in all cases: 100%.
BOP management, N=7[B]:
Would not enhance at all: 86%;
Enhance at other institutions: 0%;
Enhance in all cases: 14%.
[A] One additional officer reported that he was indifferent about
allowing officers to store weapons on BOP property, and an additional
three officers did not provide their views.
[B] Management officials at two additional BOP institutions did not
provide a response or were not asked for their views.
Note: The samples of officers, union officials, and BOP management
officials are nonprobablity samples. In a nonprobability sample, some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample. Therefore, the views
these individuals expressed provide insight, but are not generalizable
to all officers, union officials, and BOP management officials.
[End of figure]
Of the 50 officers reporting that allowing officers to store personal
firearms on BOP property would enhance their safety, 7 told us that
they would not take advantage of this policy if it were instituted,
though they did not elaborate, and another 2 expressed the need for
additional training on the firearms before the policy is implemented.
The 7 officers who indicated to us that allowing officers to store
personal firearms on BOP property would enhance officer safety at
another institution reported that having the ability to carry a
personal firearm to work and store it on BOP property was not
necessary to ensure their safety at the current institution at which
they work. However, these 7 officers stated that such a policy would
better ensure the safety of other officers, such as those working at
institutions in large cities.
The 7 officers and six BOP management officials who told us that
allowing officers to store personal firearms on BOP property would not
enhance officer safety explained their reasons. These reasons included
officers not needing to carry firearms during their commute because
danger is minimal if non existent, officers having the potential to
misuse firearms if not properly trained, and inmates potentially
obtaining the firearms if stored in officers' cars or carried into the
facility.
Further, 2 officers at one BOP institution and 2 officers and union
officials at a second BOP institution cited additional safety measures
that would enhance officer safety while officers are commuting to and
from work that did not involve authorization to carry weapons while
commuting. Three of these officers and the union officials reported
that increased monitoring of the parking lot and checks on visitors'
cars would improve officer safety. One of these three officers and the
union officials also stated that posting a guard at the entrance to an
institution would enhance officer safety. Finally, one officer told us
that staggering officers' shifts with visiting hours would help
improve safety because it would help ensure that visitors would not be
able to identify the officers' cars and then follow them while the
officers are off duty.
BOP Has Not Evaluated the Effectiveness of Its Equipment in Ensuring
Officer Safety and Correctional Equipment Experts Suggest Several
Factors to Consider in Making Equipment Acquisition Decisions:
BOP and states provide a variety of equipment to their officers to
ensure their safety; however, none of the BOP officials, state
correctional officials, and correctional experts with whom we spoke
reported that they were aware of or had conducted evaluations of the
effectiveness of equipment in ensuring officer safety. If BOP were to
acquire new equipment, correctional equipment experts from the
National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC),
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) reported to us that BOP would need
to consider factors such as training, replacement, and maintenance
costs; potential liability issues; whether the equipment met technical
performance standards; and the benefits and risks of using the
equipment.
BOP Has Not Evaluated How Effectively Its Equipment Helps Ensure
Officer Safety:
BOP officials from the Correctional Services Branch and BOP's Office
of Security Technology--which is responsible for identifying and
evaluating new security-related equipment--reported that their offices
had not assessed whether the equipment BOP provides to its officers
has improved the officers' safety. Similarly, officials from NIJ,
DOJ's research, development, and evaluation agency, told us that NIJ
has not conducted any evaluations of the effectiveness of the set of
equipment that BOP uses in ensuring the safety of its officers.
Moreover, BOP's NIC, which provides technical assistance, training,
and information to BOP and state and local correctional agencies,
found no record of studies related to officer safety. In addition,
officials from BOP's Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE), which
conducts research and evaluations on behalf of BOP, reported that ORE
had not conducted such studies.
According to BOP's mission statement, BOP protects society by
confining offenders in prisons that are, among other things, safe,
cost-efficient, and appropriately secure. Further, BOP states in its
vision statement that it will know that it has realized these goals
when, among other things, the workplace is safe and staff perform
their duties without fear of injury or assault and BOP is a model of
cost-efficient correctional operations. In addition, DOJ stresses the
importance of evidence based knowledge in achieving its mission. For
instance, when soliciting federally funded research in crime and
justice, DOJ's Office of Justice Programs (OJP) states that it
supports DOJ's mission by sponsoring research to provide objective,
independent, evidence based knowledge to meet the challenges of crime
and justice. According to OJP, practices are evidence based when their
effectiveness has been demonstrated by causal evidence, generally
obtained through outcome evaluations, which documents a relationship
between an intervention--including technology--and its intended
outcome, while ruling out, to the extent possible, alternative
explanations for the outcome. Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government state that managers need to compare actual
performance to planned or expected results throughout the organization
and analyze significant differences, as well as that program managers
need both operational and financial data to determine whether they are
meeting their agencies' strategic and annual performance plans and
meeting their goals for accountability for effective and efficient use
of resources.[Footnote 15]
Given that BOP's SENTRY and TRUINTEL systems maintain data on inmates
and related incidents, including assaults on officers and the
equipment officers utilize in instances where they use force against
an inmate, ORE officials reported that such data would allow them to
assess the effectiveness of equipment in ensuring officer safety, even
though they told us that this assessment may be time intensive.
Further, BOP officials from the Office of Security Technology reported
that, while they do not assess the impact of equipment on officer
safety, they obtain information about the equipments' performance by
obtaining feedback on equipment from those using it at their
facilities, such as during a pilot test, and testing whether the
equipment performs in accordance with the manufacturer's intent. While
information obtained from these methods helps inform the officials
about staff perspectives on the usefulness of the equipment and the
equipment's performance, these methods do not provide information
about the equipment's impact on officer safety. Given BOP's rising
inmate population and the increasing number of inmates per BOP staff
member, assessing the effectiveness of officer equipment in a range of
scenarios and settings could help BOP better understand which of the
equipment it currently provides--or could provide to officers--
improves officer safety. For instance, such an assessment might
indicate whether the use of a certain piece of equipment appears to
prevent injuries, or whether one type of equipment appears to have a
greater impact on reducing assaults on officers than another.
Conducting such an assessment also could better position BOP to
achieve its goal of operating in a cost-efficient manner by
effectively targeting limited resources to those equipment investments
that clearly demonstrate protective benefit.
Correctional Equipment Experts Report Equipment Costs Such as
Training, Maintenance, and Liability, among Other Factors, to Be
Important Considerations in Purchasing New Equipment:
Officials from the NLECTC, NIST, and NIJ reported that BOP would need
to consider factors such as training, replacement, and maintenance
costs; potential liability issues; and whether the equipment met
technical performance standards if it acquired new equipment, as well
as the price of new equipment. Additionally, these organizations
suggested that any decision must first be based on a close examination
of the benefits and risks of using certain types of equipment.
Officials from the NLECTC emphasized the need to examine other costs
related to equipment acquisition, such as new officer training related
to the equipment, and costs related to the frequency of replacing
equipment, such as canisters of pepper spray that must be replaced
once used or other munitions with contents that must be refilled to
maintain their potency. The NLECTC also explained that there are
liability issues a facility or a state can incur if officers misuse
equipment, are subsequently sued by inmates for their actions, and
compelled to pay for associated legal expenses. Officials from NIST
stated that it is important to ensure that any new equipment
considered meets the technical performance standards, if any,
associated with certain types of equipment. For example, officials
noted that adherence to standards when purchasing bulletproof vests is
critical to ensuring that the materials used in vests have been proven
to stop bullets. In addition, experts from NIJ's Institutional
Corrections Technology Working Group suggested assessing where in the
field of corrections less-than-lethal weapons have been used and
whether the benefits of using certain less-than-lethal weapons
outweigh the risks. Table 5 provides examples of what officials from
BOP and the 14 state DOCs included in this review cited as benefits
and risks associated with the use of specific types of less-than-
lethal weapons.
Table 5: Benefits and Risks of Less-Than-Lethal Weapons Cited by BOP
and State Officials:
Less-than-lethal weapons: Personal pepper spray canister;
Benefits reported by BOP or state DOCs:
* Inexpensive;
* Effective in the control of inmates;
* It can be a deterrence to violence if seen by inmates;
* Evidence from one state suggests that the use of this weapon by
officers may reduce officer or inmate-on-inmate assault rates;
* The benefit greatly outweighs the risk of the inmate taking from,
and using the pepper spray against, an officer;
Risks reported by BOP or state DOCs:
* Inmates could take the pepper spray from officers;
* Potential exists for officers to rely more on pepper spray and less
on effective communication with inmates;
* Some officers may be unintentionally exposed to pepper spray when it
is used against inmates.
Less-than-lethal weapons: 37 mm launcher;
Benefits reported by BOP or state DOCs:
* Provides a deterrent to inmates when they can see the launcher;
Risks reported by BOP or state DOCs:
* If fired at a part of an individual's body other than the center of
the body's mass--such as the head--the launchers and their less-than-
lethal munitions can cause injury or death.
Less-than-lethal weapons: Stun shields;
Benefits reported by BOP or state DOCs:
* A mere demonstration of the electric charge to inmates is typically
all that is required to gain inmate compliance during difficult cell
extractions;
* Evidence from one state suggests that staff injury rates decline as
a result of use when forcibly removing a noncompliant inmate from a
cell;
Risks reported by BOP or state DOCs:
* Can be hazardous if used on inmates who have health problems, such
as heart conditions.
Less-than-lethal weapons: Pepper ball gun[A];
Benefits reported by BOP or state DOCs:
* Compared to other impact weapons, pepper balls provide a lower
impact when aimed at the center of the body's mass;
Risks reported by BOP or state DOCs:
* If the pepper balls do not land near or on the inmate, the effect of
the powder is reduced.
Source: GAO analysis of interviews with state and BOP officials.
[A] A pepper ball gun is considered an impact and gas weapon. The gun
launches small rubber balls that contain a powder with similar effects
to pepper spray.
[End of table]
BOP officials from the Correctional Services Branch stated that they
first establish whether new or additional equipment is needed through
a variety of means. For example, officials said they obtain
information from BOP's Office of Security Technology about the
performance of the equipment, such as through a pilot test; identify
trends related to incidents in institutions' data; and also review
feedback from officers and other BOP staff on how well the current
inventory of equipment is meeting their needs. Officials stated that
the next steps involve reviewing factors such as equipment benefits,
risks, and costs related to training and maintenance. Officials also
noted that before they acquire new equipment it must undergo a legal
review by BOP's Office of General Counsel.
Correctional Accrediting Experts Cited Inmate Management and Officer
Training among the Institutional Factors Most Impacting Officer
Safety, and BOP Has Evaluated the Effectiveness of Its Efforts in
Ensuring Officer Safety:
Equipment available to officers is one important part of officer
safety; however, there are other factors--such as those related to the
movement of inmates throughout the facility and the skills and
training of prison personnel--that impact both officers' safety and
the overall safety of the institution. BOP has conducted evaluations
to measure the impact of several efforts it has undertaken to address
such institutional factors on officer safety, among other outcomes,
and officials report using these evaluations to inform BOP operations.
Correctional Accrediting Experts Reported That Five Factors Most
Impact Officer Safety, and Cited a Number of Mitigating Efforts They
Perceive as Cost Effective:
[Side bar: photograph: Controlled Movement. At one BOP facility we
visited, lines are painted on the floor on both sides of a corridor to
distinguish the area where inmates walk from the area designated for
staff. End of side bar]
Throughout our audit work, we asked BOP and state correctional
officials with whom we spoke to identify institutional factors that
impact officer safety, as well as efforts they have made to mitigate
these factors' consequences. We then analyzed their responses and
found 14 common institutional factors the BOP and state officials
identified. In order to determine which of the 14 factors have the
greatest impact on officer safety, we surveyed 30 correctional
accrediting experts at the ACA and asked them to rank which of the
factors--if they existed in an institution--would pose the greatest
threat to officer safety.[Footnote 16] We received responses from 21
experts who also provided examples of efforts to address these factors
that they believe to be cost effective--that is, efforts that strike a
balance between their effectiveness in addressing the factor and their
implementation costs. See appendix IV for a copy of our survey and
appendix V for a full description of each of the 14 factors identified
by BOP and state correctional officials.[Footnote 17] These experts
most frequently reported that the existence of ineffective inmate
management, insufficient officer training, inmate gangs, correctional
officer understaffing, and inmate overcrowding in an institution would
most affect officers' safety.
Ineffective Inmate Management: Inmate management refers to the various
strategies employed to control and manage the inmate population within
a facility. For example, if inmates are not managed effectively, there
could be instances where groups of inmates are allowed to congregate,
which could lead to increased tension and violence. In one BOP
facility a race riot between the Aryan Brotherhood and African-
American inmates broke out in the recreation yard on Adolf Hitler's
birthday in April 2008, resulting in injuries and two inmate deaths.
After putting up fences that separated the recreation yard into
sections, the warden reported that assaults decreased.
Fifteen of 21 correctional experts reported that ineffective inmate
management is one of the most important factors that could jeopardize
officer safety. Further, these experts identified examples of
potential cost-effective efforts to manage inmates effectively. One
expert reported that managers should assess the risk of housing
certain inmates together. Once it assesses its population, management
can control inmates' movement accordingly. Another suggested that
institutions utilize video cameras and a "pass" system, which allows
only those authorized to enter or exit (i.e., pass through) a certain
area, to improve monitoring of inmates' movement. Further, 1 expert
stated that institutions should control inmate movement times, and
only allow inmates to move when authorized, such as at the top of the
hour, while restricting all other movement unless an inmate is
accompanied by an escort or otherwise authorized in advance.
BOP and state officials reported making efforts to address inmate
management. For instance, BOP employs a direct supervision strategy
where officers interact and communicate frequently with inmates, and
officials from 3 of the 14 states with whom we spoke reported that
they also employ direct supervision over inmates. Officials from
another 2 of the 14 states reported that they employ an indirect
supervision strategy that minimizes the interaction between officers
and inmates by having the supervision take place in a centralized
control center within the housing unit. A lieutenant at a facility in
one of these states explained that because the facility houses a large
number of violent inmates, the state has chosen to apply a less direct
supervisory approach to minimize inmate and officer contact. See
appendix III for characteristics of state inmates, including types of
offenses.
Insufficient Correctional Training: Insufficient correctional training
refers to a level of training that does not adequately prepare
officers to fulfill their duties at their assigned post or other
collateral duties they may be asked to perform. For example, one
officer we spoke with stated that he felt that officers did not
receive enough self defense training, which he indicated would have
prevented some of the assaults on staff in his facility since officers
would not have to depend on equipment or the backup from other staff
to protect themselves.
[Side bar: Crisis management training BOP‘s Special Operations
Response Teams (SORT) attend Crisis Management Training, which is an
intensive full-time, weeklong program that trains officers in certain
specialized skills, such as escorting high risk inmates, conducting
hostage negotiations, and breaching prison doors and fences, among
other skills.
Source: GAO. End of side bar]
Seven of 21 correctional experts reported that inadequate officer
training--if it exists within an institution--is one of the most
important factors jeopardizing officer safety because it could result
in officers not having the knowledge and skills to perform their
duties safely and effectively. These experts identified some examples
of potential cost-effective efforts to address insufficient
correctional officer training when it exists in an institution. Two
experts emphasized the need to leverage training provided by local law
enforcement agencies, or training provided at no cost to the facility,
such as curricula offered through NIC. Another expert recommended that
institutions call upon the local law enforcement community for
assistance or sharing of training needs. Both this expert and 2 others
recommended the use of computer-based training to expand staff access
to resources, make training available "anytime," and combat officer
complacency.
Officials from BOP and the 14 state DOCs all agreed on the importance
of training. However, none of the officials identified their officer
training programs as being insufficient. In addition, 8 of the 68
officers we spoke with expressed criticisms over the training they
receive. To ensure that their officers receive adequate training, BOP
and the 14 state DOCs included in our review require that officers
must complete some form of training prior to working with inmates in a
facility. Such training is usually conducted through an academy that
can last from 2 to 16 weeks, depending on the prison system. BOP's
training courses at the academy include self defense, "use of force"
policies, and gang control in addition to any required firearms
certification, and officers also receive training at the facility in
which they will be working. In addition, in BOP and 9 of the 14 states
with whom we spoke, officers benefit from on-the-job training
programs, usually conducted through a shadowing program with a more
experienced officer or supervisor. Officials from 2 states with whom
we spoke reported that they have such a program and that it has helped
them address staffing issues because officers in training provide
additional support on a given shift. BOP officers are also required to
complete some form of refresher training annually. Further, officers
that are members of their institution's Disturbance Control Team (DCT)
or Special Operations Response Teams (SORT) receive additional
training on a more frequent basis. Both BOP and state institutions
have such teams of officers that are responsible for various duties.
Inmate Gangs: Inmate gangs are the organized factions of inmates
inside a prison which can be based on an inmate's race, religion, or
geographic origin, commonly referred to in corrections as security
threat groups (STG). Many STGs parallel existing street gangs, such as
the Bloods and the Crips.[Footnote 18] These STGs exist primarily to
offer protection to their members from other STGs and to transport and
distribute drugs. For example, the warden at one BOP facility told us
that gang participation often encourages inmates to be violent and
defiant towards staff and other inmates in order to gain respect from
other gang members.
Seven of the 21 correctional experts reported that the presence of
inmate gangs in prisons is one of the most important factors impacting
officer safety, and identified some examples of potential cost-
effective efforts to address inmate gangs. According to one expert,
institutions should employ the use of phone systems that allow inmates
to call a hotline to talk about gangs; track and manage gang activity
and provide this information to hotline staff; and provide training to
staff receiving this information or observing suspicious activities.
Further, another expert suggested the use of computer assisted
tracking of whom the gang leaders are calling and whom they are
writing. According to the expert, this electronic mapping of community
linkages (prison to the streets) can assist prison staff and law
enforcement in monitoring illegal activity and possibly disrupting it.
Another expert stated that proper supervision and staff training are
critical to controlling gangs, and that gangs cannot be tolerated. In
addition, one expert reported that institutions must not allow any
type of gang displays, and should transfer gang members to different
institutions frequently in order to disrupt gang organization.
Officials at two of the eight BOP institutions and 3 of the 14 states
with whom we spoke described specific efforts to identify and manage
STGs that are important in order to enhance officer safety and prevent
prison violence. For instance, both BOP and the California state
prison system reported that they identify STG members when they enter
the system through clothing insignia, tattoos, or peer associations,
and note if the inmate is identified as a member. One California
official reported that the state strives to segregate inmate STG
members from other members of their own STGs or rival STGs, to the
extent possible. Further, an official from 1 state reported that some
of that state's institutions have a housing unit program dedicated
solely for STG members, where they offer assistance aimed to
rehabilitate the inmates and draw them away from STGs. Officials in
another state prison system with whom we spoke reported that they
manage their STG population by segregating the gang members.
Correctional Officer Understaffing: Correctional officer understaffing
is the level of staffing of officers that is perceived to be
inadequate to prevent violence and maintain a safe facility, usually
measured by the inmate-to-staff ratio. Specifically, BOP's ORE
conducted a study in 2005 entitled "The Effects of Changing Crowding
and Staffing Levels in Federal Prisons on Inmate Violence Rates,"
which found that lower inmate-to-staff ratios are correlated with
increases in the level of inmate violence in BOP institutions.
However, not all officers and officials we spoke with agreed that
understaffing impacted officer safety at BOP institutions. For
instance, the officers we spoke with most frequently reported
understaffing as a factor impacting their safety (39 of 68 officers),
with many citing concerns about staffing levels during the evening and
night shifts when there is no other support staff present in the unit,
while management at two of the eight BOP institutions we visited
reported that the current staffing levels at their institutions are
adequate to maintain a safe facility.
[Side bar: Staffing post analysis Texas has evaluated the staff levels
and duty posts at each facility across its system, allowing it to look
at how many staff each facility has, where these staff are located, and
ask whether the staff are posted where they are needed, given inmate
movements during daily operations. As a result, Texas was able to
identify some posts that it no longer needed and to add posts it
needed but did not have.
Source: GAO. [End of side bar]
Despite the potential variation in perceptions, 8 of 21 correctional
experts reported that officer understaffing is one of the most
important factors jeopardizing officer safety and identified some
examples of potential cost-effective efforts to address correctional
officer understaffing. One expert commented that prisons need to
embrace technologies like cameras on walls, and utilize better designs
to eliminate blind spots. Another expert stated that in many
facilities, correctional officers perform support functions, such as
paperwork, that may be effectively done by other staff earning lower
salaries. However, the expert commented that hiring too many support
staff to perform these functions could affect the ability of a
correctional organization to hire more officers. In addition, another
expert stated that having officers work 12 hour shifts would increase
the staff on each shift. Another expert opined that the most effective
strategy is a careful analysis of the institutional officer posts that
involves key stakeholders, such as management and officers, and
establishes mandatory minimum post numbers, adding more posts only as
staffing levels permit.
Officials at two of the eight BOP institutions and 4 of the 14 states
with whom we spoke reported employing efforts to address officer
understaffing. For example, according to BOP management officials at
one institution that has multiple facilities in one location, called a
complex, management has implemented a staffing plan referred to as
consolidation, which allows them to fill in staffing shortages in one
facility with officers from another facility within a complex. BOP
management at this institution cited consolidation as an economical
strategy to fill critical need posts because they do not have to pay
officers overtime. However, BOP union officials at two complexes we
visited and 4 out of 68 officers we spoke with expressed unease
specifically over the consolidation policy, voicing concerns that at
times, they feel less safe if sent to work in facilities where they
were not as familiar with the inmates. For example, at one complex we
visited, an officer reported that he was transferred from a medium
security facility to cover shifts at the high security facility. This
officer shared concerns that because he does not work with high
security inmates on a regular basis, he lacks the opportunity to
become familiar with various inmates who pose a greater security
threat.
Inmate Overcrowding: Inmate overcrowding exists when the number of
inmates housed in a facility exceeds the rated capacity of a
particular facility. BOP defines rated capacity as the number of
prisoners that the institution is built to house safely and securely
and with adequate access to services providing necessities for daily
living and programs designed to support prisoners' crime-free return
to the community. In testimony before the House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies in
2009, the BOP Director stated that correctional administrators agree
that overcrowding contributes to greater tension, frustration, and
anger among the inmate population, which leads to conflict and
violence as the inmates' ability to access basic services are
hindered.[Footnote 19] Further, as BOP described in its 2005 study,
where overcrowded conditions exist, more inmates share cells and other
living units, and are thus brought together for longer periods with
more high risk, violent inmates, creating more potential victims.
According to this report, BOP found that an increase in the inmate
population as a percentage of a facility's rated capacity directly
correlates with an increase in inmate violence.
Seven of the 21 correctional experts reported that overcrowding is one
of the most important factors jeopardizing officer safety. These
experts identified some examples of potential cost-effective efforts
to address inmate overcrowding. For instance, one expert recommended
that inmate programs be carried out in shifts, from the early morning
to the late evening, in order to split the amount of inmates between
idle time and program time.
To address overcrowding, officials from one of the BOP institutions
and 3 of the 14 states with whom we spoke reported converting
community space, such as television rooms, into inmate cells to
accommodate a larger inmate population. This has resulted in trade-
offs--to make room in existing housing units to accommodate growing
inmate populations, the number of televisions inmates have available
to watch has been reduced, which can increase tensions and threaten
safety. Further, officials from three of the eight BOP institutions
and 3 of the 14 states with whom we spoke stated that they have
resorted to double or even triple bunking cells to accommodate the
increasing inmate population. This occurs not only within units that
house inmates from the general population, but also in the special
housing units where inmates are sent for administrative detention or
disciplinary segregation. According to BOP, the tradeoff for
accommodating a growing population by double and triple bunking cells
is the increased level of stress and conflict among inmates that
results from living in such close quarters with others.
However, not all prison systems are experiencing overcrowding; in fact
some states, such as Michigan, are experiencing a reduction in their
inmate populations. States have employed a variety of mechanisms to
reduce their inmate populations in order to alleviate overcrowding,
such as reviewing inmates that may be eligible for parole or
considering sentence reductions. An official in Michigan with whom we
spoke attributed the decline in inmate population in his state to the
success of the state's re-entry programs for inmates, which has
reduced recidivism and violations of parole or probation that often
bring former inmates back to jail.[Footnote 20]
BOP Has Evaluated Several Efforts to Address Institutional Factors
That Affect Officer Safety and Utilizes the Results of These
Evaluations to Inform Operations:
BOP's ORE has conducted evaluations to measure the impact of several
efforts on officer safety, among other outcomes, and officials report
using these evaluations to inform BOP operations. For instance, in
2001, ORE conducted a study empirically evaluating BOP's substance
abuse treatment program's effectiveness in reducing prisoner
misconduct, which is closely related to officer safety. The study
found that treatment program graduates were 74 percent less likely to
engage in misconduct between program graduation and release from
prison than a comparison group. In addition, in a 2008 study of BOP's
pilot faith-based residential program called Life Connections, BOP's
ORE found that Life Connections participants were less likely to
engage in serious misconduct while in the program. Further, ORE has
recently begun collecting data for a study to measure the impact of
its SMUs--separate housing for inmates presenting unique security and
management concerns, such as those who participated or had a
leadership role in gang activity--on misconduct rates at both the
institutions from which the inmates were removed as well as the SMUs
into which they were placed.
According to the Deputy Assistant Director of BOP's Information,
Policy, and Public Affairs Division, ORE provides interim data and its
final evaluations to the BOP Director and executive staff members, as
well as NIC--whose director is a member of BOP's executive staff--and
other DOJ components, such as OJP. Further, ORE requires its staff to
publish their work to make it available publicly to the larger
correctional community. This official reported that BOP's Director and
executive staff use information from ORE for a variety of purposes,
including operational decision-making and budget formulation. For
example, this official reported that ORE provides the BOP Director and
the executive staff with interim information related to its ongoing
SMU evaluation, which provides BOP management with real-time
information to guide its decisions related to the SMUs. In addition,
in its 2011 Budget Justification, BOP cited its findings from ORE's
study on the Life Connections Program, which demonstrated reductions
in serious inmate misconduct, when providing its rationale for funding
for inmate programs. Further, the official reported that, when faced
with budget constraints, BOP decided to eliminate its intensive
confinement centers--or "boot camps"--after an ORE study found that
BOP's boot camps were not effective at reducing re-arrest.
Conclusions:
With an increasing inmate population in BOP institutions, officer
safety is continuously at risk. To protect officers from a range of
threats, BOP has taken steps, such as providing additional equipment
to officers to access in an emergency and routinely conducting officer
training to enhance on-the-job responsiveness. Further, in limited
cases, BOP has obtained information about the performance of equipment
through pilot tests, officer surveys, and comparisons to manufacturer
specifications. In addition, BOP has conducted studies looking at
whether its efforts to address institutional factors have impacted
inmate violence. However, it is difficult for BOP to determine the
impact on officer safety of the equipment it provides because it has
not used the data it already collects for this evaluative purpose. By
conducting evidence-based evaluative research in what equipment
effectively protects officers, BOP could be better positioned to
dedicate resources to equipment that has the greatest impact on safety.
Recommendation for Executive Action:
To capitalize on the data BOP already collects and to further DOJ's
evaluation efforts, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the
Director of BOP to leverage existing BOP data systems, such as
TRUINTEL and SENTRY, as well as the institutional expertise available
through NIJ and NIC, as appropriate, to assess the impact of the
equipment BOP has provided or could provide to its officers to better
protect them in a range of scenarios and settings.
Agency Comments:
We received written comments on a draft of this report from BOP, which
are reproduced in full in appendix VI. BOP concurred with our
recommendation and stated that, with the assistance of NIJ and/or NIC,
it will conduct a study to evaluate the impact of protective equipment
on officer safety. BOP and NIJ also provided technical comments on the
report, which we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General and
interested congressional committees. In addition, this report will be
available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report,
please contact David Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or by email at
maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points from our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII.
Signed by:
David C. Maurer:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
In this report, we describe the equipment available to protect
officers as well as other institutional factors, such as inmate
overcrowding and staffing shortages, that affect officer safety.
Specifically, this report addresses the following questions:
* What equipment do the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and selected states
provide to protect officers and what are the opinions of BOP officers
and other correctional practitioners regarding this equipment?
* To what extent has BOP evaluated the effectiveness of its equipment
in ensuring officer safety, and what do correctional equipment experts
report as important factors when considering the purchase of new
equipment?
* What institutional factors do correctional accrediting experts
report as most impacting officer safety, and to what extent has BOP
evaluated the effectiveness of the steps it has taken to address these
factors?
To address all of our objectives, we reviewed existing BOP policies
and procedures, such as BOP Program Statements and institution-
specific policies, to catalogue the equipment BOP provides to officers
and the measures it has implemented to address institutional factors
affecting officer safety system-wide. We also interviewed BOP central
management, such as officials from the Correctional Services Branch,
who help ensure that national policies and procedures are in place
that provide a safe, secure institutional environment for inmates and
staff, and the Office of Security Technology, who identify and
evaluate new security-related equipment. In addition, we interviewed
officials from the Office of Research and Evaluation, who produce
reports and also research corrections-related topics. During these
interviews, we discussed BOP's existing officer safety practices; the
institutional factors they report as affecting officer safety; their
views on the effectiveness of the equipment BOP provides, and the
measures it has implemented to address these institutional factors;
and their mechanisms for evaluating the effectiveness. We compared
BOP's mechanisms for evaluating the effectiveness of its practices in
ensuring officer safety to BOP's and DOJ's mission statements and
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.[Footnote 21]
Further, we visited a total of eight BOP institutions in each of BOP's
six regions. During these visits, we interviewed BOP institutional
management officials and observed officer safety practices so that we
could accurately reflect BOP management views on officer safety. To
obtain the views of officers regarding their safety, we also conducted
semistructured interviews with 68 officers who were on duty at the
time of our visit. The officers were chosen at random, but were
generally posted to the institutions' housing units or yard. In
selecting the institutions to visit, we considered factors such as
their location, staff-to-inmate ratio, level of overcrowding, number
of assaults on staff, and the security level of the institution. These
institutions included Atwater U.S. Penitentiary (USP) and Victorville
Federal Correctional Complex (FCC) in California; Florence FCC in
Colorado; Allenwood FCC in Pennsylvania; Guaynabo Metropolitan
Detention Center (MDC) in Puerto Rico; Beaumont FCC and Houston
Federal Detention Center (FDC) in Texas; and Lee USP in Virginia.
Because we used a nonprobability sample, our results are not
generalizable to all BOP institutions; however, our interviews
provided us with insights into the perspectives of management
officials and officers at BOP institutions regarding officer safety.
In addition, we contacted the 15 state DOCs with the largest inmate
populations and conducted semi-structured interviews with 14 of these
15 DOCs. These states included Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia.[Footnote 22] During
these interviews, state DOC officials identified equipment their
officers use and their perceptions of the equipment's effectiveness in
protecting their officers. In connection with our BOP site visits, we
also visited state institutions in 5 of these states: Corcoran State
Prison in California, Central Florida Reception Center in Florida,
Graterford State Correctional Institution in Pennsylvania, Darrington
Unit in Texas, and Coffeewood Correctional Center in Virginia. Due to
the overall number of correctional organizations in the United States,
we conducted nonprobability sampling, which limits the ability to
extrapolate the findings in this report to all correctional
organizations. However, this information provided useful insight into
state correctional practices.
We also interviewed union officials from the Council of Prison Locals,
representing BOP officers, including officials at the national union
as well as local union officials at five of the eight BOP institutions
we visited, in order to obtain their perspectives about the
institutional factors they report as affecting officer safety, the
measures in place to address these factors, and the equipment BOP uses
to protect officers.[Footnote 23] In addition, we interviewed
officials from correctional organizations to determine the
institutional factors they report as affecting officer safety, and
their perspectives on the equipment used to protect officers and the
effectiveness of this equipment and BOP and state officer safety
practices. These organizations included the American Correctional
Association (ACA), BOP's National Institute of Corrections (NIC), and
the Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA). We
selected these organizations based on recommendations from the
correctional officials with whom we spoke, including BOP and state
officials. As we selected a nonprobability sample of the officials at
correctional organizations, these opinions are not generalizable.
However, they provided important insights into BOP and state
correctional practices. In addition, we conducted a literature search
to identify and obtain evaluations of the effectiveness of BOP or
state officer safety practices, such as those conducted by the states'
or DOJ's inspectors general.
In addition, to further address our second objective, we interviewed
correctional equipment experts from the DOJ's National Institute of
Justice (NIJ), NIJ's National Law Enforcement and Corrections Training
Center (NLECTC), and the Department of Commerce's National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST). Officials from these organizations
were chosen because of their expertise in correctional equipment.
During these interviews, we obtained the officials' perspectives on
the factors BOP would need to consider if it acquired additional
personal protective equipment for its officers. As we selected a
nonprobabilty sample of correctional equipment experts, these
perspectives are not generalizable. However, they provided valuable
insights into equipment considerations.
In order to further develop our third objective, we identified 14
institutional factors that BOP, state DOCs, and correctional experts
reported as most affecting officer safety. We then surveyed a panel of
30 correctional accrediting experts who serve as audit chairs for the
ACA's Commission on Accreditation concerning the list of 14
institutional factors that BOP and state DOC officials perceived as
affecting officer safety. The ACA audit chairs ranked which of these
factors most affect officer safety when the factors exist in a
correctional institution. The ACA audit chairs also provided a list of
cost effective strategies that could be used to address these
strategies. The ACA audit chairs were selected based upon their
expertise in advising the ACA Accrediting Commission as to which
correctional institutions in the United States should be accredited,
including BOP institutions. The e-mail-based survey was launched on
December 10, 2010, and by the close of the survey on December 22,
2010, we had received 21 responses from the 30 experts, for a response
rate of 70 percent. We sent one follow up e-mail to the experts on
December 16, 2010.
Because our survey was not a sample survey, there are no sampling
errors; however, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey
may introduce nonsampling errors. For example, differences in how a
particular question is interpreted, the sources of information
available to respondents, or the types of people who do not respond
can introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We
included steps in both the data collection and data analysis stages
for the purpose of minimizing such nonsampling errors. In addition, we
collaborated with a social science survey specialist to design the
survey instrumentation, and the survey was pretested with a subject
matter expert at ACA with over 30 years of experience in corrections.
From this pretest, we made revisions as necessary. See appendix IV for
a copy of our survey.
We conducted this work from June 2010 to April 2011 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings
and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the
evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Trends in BOP Inmate Characteristics:
The figures below depict trends in the characteristics of the Bureau
of Prisons' (BOP) total inmate population, including inmates housed in
privately managed or contracted facilities, in each fiscal year, from
fiscal year 2000 through 2010.
As figure 8 illustrates, the average inmate age increased by more than
2 years from fiscal year 2000 through 2010.
Figure 8: Trend in Average Age of BOP Inmates from Fiscal Year 2000
through 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2000;
Average age of inmate: 36.0.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Average age of inmate: 36.3.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Average age of inmate: 36.5.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Average age of inmate: 36.5.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Average age of inmate: 37.0.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Average age of inmate: 36.9.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Average age of inmate: 37.2.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Average age of inmate: 37.4.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Average age of inmate: 37.6.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Average age of inmate: 37.7.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Average age of inmate: 38.1.
Source: GAO analysis of BOP data.
[End of figure]
As shown in figures 9 and 10, the percentage of inmates by race,
ethnicity, and gender has remained relatively constant throughout this
period.
Figure 9: Trends in Percentage of Inmates by Race and Ethnicity from
Fiscal Year 2000 through 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2000;
White Non-Hispanic: 28%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 37%;
Asian: 2%;
Hispanic: 32%;
Native American: 2%.
Fiscal year: 2001;
White Non-Hispanic: 26%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 39%;
Asian: 2%;
Hispanic: 32%;
Native American: 2%.
Fiscal year: 2002;
White Non-Hispanic: 27%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 39%;
Asian: 2%;
Hispanic: 32%;
Native American: 2%.
Fiscal year: 2003;
White Non-Hispanic: 27%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 38%;
Asian: 2%;
Hispanic: 32%;
Native American: 2%.
Fiscal year: 2004;
White Non-Hispanic: 26%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 38%;
Asian: 2%;
Hispanic: 32%;
Native American: 2%.
Fiscal year: 2005;
White Non-Hispanic: 26%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 38%;
Asian: 2%;
Hispanic: 32%;
Native American: 2%.
Fiscal year: 2006;
White Non-Hispanic: 27%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 39%;
Asian: 2%;
Hispanic: 31%;
Native American: 2%.
Fiscal year: 2007;
White Non-Hispanic: 27%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 38%;
Asian: 2%;
Hispanic: 31%;
Native American: 2%.
Fiscal year: 2008;
White Non-Hispanic: 27%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 38%;
Asian: 2%;
Hispanic: 32%;
Native American: 2%.
Fiscal year: 2009;
White Non-Hispanic: 27%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 37%;
Asian: 2%;
Hispanic: 32%;
Native American: 2%.
Fiscal year: 2010;
White Non-Hispanic: 27%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 37%;
Asian: 2%;
Hispanic: 32%;
Native American: 2%.
Source: GAO analysis of BOP data.
[End of figure]
Figure 10: Trends in Inmates by Gender from Fiscal Year 2000 through
2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2000;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Source: GAO analysis of BOP data.
[End of figure]
As depicted in figure 11, the types of offenses for which BOP inmates
are incarcerated have also remained relatively constant, with drug
offenses comprising more than half the offenses each fiscal year from
2000 through 2010.
Figure 11: Trends in Types of Offenses Committed by BOP Inmates from
Fiscal Year 2000 through 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Fiscal year: 2000;
Other offenses: 13%;
Robbery offenses: 7%;
Fraud, bribery, extortion: 5%;
Immigration offenses: 10%;
Weapons, explosives, arson: 9%;
Drug offenses: 55%.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Other offenses: 15%;
Robbery offenses: 7%;
Fraud, bribery, extortion: 5%;
Immigration offenses: 11%;
Weapons, explosives, arson: 9%;
Drug offenses: 54%.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Other offenses: 152%;
Robbery offenses: 6%;
Fraud, bribery, extortion: 5%;
Immigration offenses: 10%;
Weapons, explosives, arson: 10%;
Drug offenses: 54%.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Other offenses: 12%;
Robbery offenses: 7%;
Fraud, bribery, extortion: 5%;
Immigration offenses: 11%;
Weapons, explosives, arson: 11%;
Drug offenses: 55%.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Other offenses: 12%;
Robbery offenses: 6%;
Fraud, bribery, extortion: 4%;
Immigration offenses: 11%;
Weapons, explosives, arson: 12%;
Drug offenses: 54%.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Other offenses: 12%;
Robbery offenses: 6%;
Fraud, bribery, extortion: 4%;
Immigration offenses: 11%;
Weapons, explosives, arson: 13%;
Drug offenses: 53%.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Other offenses: 12%;
Robbery offenses: 6%;
Fraud, bribery, extortion: 4%;
Immigration offenses: 11%;
Weapons, explosives, arson: 14%;
Drug offenses: 54%.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Other offenses: 12%;
Robbery offenses: 5%;
Fraud, bribery, extortion: 5%;
Immigration offenses: 11%;
Weapons, explosives, arson: 14%;
Drug offenses: 54%.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Other offenses: 12%;
Robbery offenses: 5%;
Fraud, bribery, extortion: 5%;
Immigration offenses: 11%;
Weapons, explosives, arson: 15%;
Drug offenses: 52%.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Other offenses: 12%;
Robbery offenses: 5%;
Fraud, bribery, extortion: 5%;
Immigration offenses: 11%;
Weapons, explosives, arson: 15%;
Drug offenses: 52%.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Other offenses: 13%;
Robbery offenses: 4%;
Fraud, bribery, extortion: 5%;
Immigration offenses: 11%;
Weapons, explosives, arson: 15%;
Drug offenses: 51%.
Source: GAO analysis of BOP data.
Note: "Other offenses" include homicide, aggravated assault,
kidnapping, burglary, larceny, property crimes, banking and insurance
crime, counterfeiting, embezzlement, court and corrections violations,
sex offenses, national security crimes, felonies in the District of
Columbia, miscellaneous offenses, and continuing criminal enterprises.
[End of figure]
As figure 12 illustrates, the length of the sentence imposed on BOP
inmates has been generally stable, with a slight increase in longer
sentences from fiscal year 2000 through 2010.
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
[End of figure]
Figure 12: Trends in Length of Sentence Imposed on Inmates from Fiscal
Year 2000 through 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image]
Fiscal year: 2000;
Less than 1 year: 3%;
1 to 3 years: 16%;
3 to 5 years: 16%;
5 to 10 years: 29%;
10 to 15 years: 18%;
15 to 20 years: 8%;
20 or more years: 9%;
Life sentence: 3%;
Death sentence: 0%.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Less than 1 year: 3%;
1 to 3 years: 15%;
3 to 5 years: 16%;
5 to 10 years: 28%;
10 to 15 years: 17%;
15 to 20 years: 8%;
20 or more years: 9%;
Life sentence: 3%;
Death sentence: 0%.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Less than 1 year: 2%;
1 to 3 years: 15%;
3 to 5 years: 16%;
5 to 10 years: 29%;
10 to 15 years: 17%;
15 to 20 years: 8%;
20 or more years: 9%;
Life sentence: 3%;
Death sentence: 0%.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Less than 1 year: 2%;
1 to 3 years: 15%;
3 to 5 years: 16%;
5 to 10 years: 29%;
10 to 15 years: 17%;
15 to 20 years: 8%;
20 or more years: 9%;
Life sentence: 3%;
Death sentence: 0%.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Less than 1 year: 2%;
1 to 3 years: 15%;
3 to 5 years: 16%;
5 to 10 years: 29%;
10 to 15 years: 18%;
15 to 20 years: 8%;
20 or more years: 9%;
Life sentence: 3%;
Death sentence: 0%.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Less than 1 year: 2%;
1 to 3 years: 14%;
3 to 5 years: 16%;
5 to 10 years: 29%;
10 to 15 years: 18%;
15 to 20 years: 8%;
20 or more years: 9%;
Life sentence: 3%;
Death sentence: 0%.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Less than 1 year: 2;
1 to 3 years: 13%;
3 to 5 years: 16%;
5 to 10 years: 29%;
10 to 15 years: 19%;
15 to 20 years: 9%;
20 or more years: 10%;
Life sentence: 3%;
Death sentence: 0%.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Less than 1 year: 2%;
1 to 3 years: 12%;
3 to 5 years: 15%;
5 to 10 years: 30%;
10 to 15 years: 19%;
15 to 20 years: 9%;
20 or more years: 10%;
Life sentence: 3%;
Death sentence: 0%.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Less than 1 year: 2%;
1 to 3 years: 12%;
3 to 5 years: 15%;
5 to 10 years: 30%;
10 to 15 years: 20%;
15 to 20 years: 9%;
20 or more years: 10%;
Life sentence: 3%;
Death sentence: 0%.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Less than 1 year: 2%;
1 to 3 years: 12%;
3 to 5 years: 15%;
5 to 10 years: 30%;
10 to 15 years: 20%;
15 to 20 years: 9%;
20 or more years: 10%;
Life sentence: 3%;
Death sentence: 0%.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Less than 1 year: 2%;
1 to 3 years: 12%;
3 to 5 years: 14%;
5 to 10 years: 30%;
10 to 15 years: 21%;
15 to 20 years: 9%;
20 or more years: 10%;
Life sentence: 3%;
Death sentence: 0%.
Source: GAO analysis of BOP data.
[End of figure]
As shown in figure 13, the percentage of inmates associated with a
Security Threat Group has fluctuated from fiscal year 2000 through
2010. Specifically, it was generally constant from fiscal year 2000
through 2002, declined slightly in fiscal year 2003, and then steadily
increased until fiscal year 2008 when it began to decline in fiscal
year 2009 and then again in fiscal year 2010.[Footnote 24]
Figure 13: Trend in Percentage of Inmates Affiliated with a Security
Threat Group from Fiscal Year 2000 through 2010:
[Refer to PDF for image: line graph]
Fiscal year: 2000;
Inmates Affiliated with a Security Threat Group: 10%.
Fiscal year: 2001;
Inmates Affiliated with a Security Threat Group: 10%.
Fiscal year: 2002;
Inmates Affiliated with a Security Threat Group: 10%.
Fiscal year: 2003;
Inmates Affiliated with a Security Threat Group: 9%.
Fiscal year: 2004;
Inmates Affiliated with a Security Threat Group: 10%.
Fiscal year: 2005;
Inmates Affiliated with a Security Threat Group: 10%.
Fiscal year: 2006;
Inmates Affiliated with a Security Threat Group: 11%.
Fiscal year: 2007;
Inmates Affiliated with a Security Threat Group: 12%.
Fiscal year: 2008;
Inmates Affiliated with a Security Threat Group: 14%.
Fiscal year: 2009;
Inmates Affiliated with a Security Threat Group: 13%.
Fiscal year: 2010;
Inmates Affiliated with a Security Threat Group: 8%.
Source: GAO analysis of BOP data.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix III: Characteristics of State Inmates:
State departments of corrections are responsible for housing the
states' inmate populations. The table and figures that follow depict
the characteristics of state inmates.
Inmate populations in the 50 states vary in size from each other.
Table 6 displays the inmate populations in each state.
Table 6: Inmate Populations by State as of December 31, 2009:
1. State: California;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 171,275.
2. State: Texas;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 171,249.
3. State: Florida;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 103,915.
4. State: New York;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 58,687.
5. State: Georgia[A];
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 53,371.
6. State: Ohio;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 51,606.
7. State: Pennsylvania;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 51,429.
8. State: Michigan;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 45,478.
9. State: Illinois;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 45,161.
10. State: Arizona[A];
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 40,627.
11. State: North Carolina;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 39,860.
12. State: Louisiana;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 39,780.
13. State: Virginia;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 38,092.
14. State: Alabama;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 31,874.
15. State: Missouri;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 30,563.
16. State: Indiana;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 28,808.
17. State: Tennessee;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 26,965.
18. State: Oklahoma;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 26,397.
19. State: New Jersey;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 25,382.
20. State: South Carolina;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 24,288.
21. State: Wisconsin;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 23,153.
22. State: Colorado;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 22,795.
23. State: Maryland;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 22,255.
24. State: Kentucky;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 21,683.
25. State: Mississippi;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 21,482.
26. State: Connecticut[B];
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 19,716.
27. State: Washington;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 18,233.
28. State: Arkansas;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 15,208.
29. State: Oregon;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 14,403.
30. State: Nevada;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 12,482.
31. State: Massachusetts;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 11,316.
32. State: Minnesota;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 9,986.
33. State: Iowa;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 8,813.
34. State: Kansas;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 8,641.
35. State: Idaho;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 7,400.
36. State: Delaware[B];
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 6,794.
37. State: Utah;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 6,533.
38. State: New Mexico;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 6,519.
39. State: West Virginia;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 6,367.
40. State: Hawaii[B];
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 5,891.
41. State: Alaska[B];
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 5,285.
42. State: Nebraska;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 4,474.
43. State: Rhode Island[B];
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 3,674.
44. State: Montana;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 3,605.
45. State: South Dakota;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 3,434.
46. State: New Hampshire;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 2,731.
47. State: Vermont[B];
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 2,220.
48. State: Maine;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 2,206.
49. State: Wyoming;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 2,075.
50. State: North Dakota;
Number of prisoners under state jurisdiction: 1,486.
Source: DOJ Bureau of Justice Statistics Data.
[A] Prison population based on custody counts.
[B] In this state, jails--which are correctional facilities that
confine persons before or after adjudication and are usually operated
by local law enforcement authorities--and prisons form one integrated
system. Data include total jail and prison populations.
[End of table]
Figure 14 presents DOJ Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates of
sentenced prisoners under state jurisdiction by race and Hispanic
origin. As figure 14 shows, the percentage of Hispanic inmates and
inmates of "other" races--including American Indians, Alaska Natives,
Native Hawaiians, other Pacific Islanders, and persons identifying as
two or more races--under state jurisdiction has been increasing from
calendar year 2000 to 2009, while the percentage of black and white
inmates has decreased or stayed about the same.
Figure 14: Estimated Percentage of Sentenced Prisoners under State
Jurisdiction by Race and Hispanic Origin from December 31, 2000
through 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Year: 2000;
White Non-Hispanic: 36%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 46%;
Hispanic: 16%;
Other: 2%.
Year: 2001;
White Non-Hispanic: 36%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 46%;
Hispanic: 16%;
Other: 2%.
Year: 2002;
White Non-Hispanic: 34%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 45%;
Hispanic: 18%;
Other: 3%.
Year: 2003;
White Non-Hispanic: 35%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 44%;
Hispanic: 19%;
Other: 2%.
Year: 2004;
White Non-Hispanic: 34%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 41%;
Hispanic: 19%;
Other: 6%.
Year: 2005;
White Non-Hispanic: 35;
Black Non-Hispanic: 39;
Hispanic: 20;
Other: 6%.
Year: 2006;
White Non-Hispanic: 35%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 37%;
Hispanic: 21%;
Other: 7%.
Year: 2007;
White Non-Hispanic: 34%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 38%;
Hispanic: 21%;
Other: 7%.
Year: 2008;
White Non-Hispanic: 35%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 38%;
Hispanic: 20%;
Other: 7%.
Year: 2009;
White Non-Hispanic: 34%;
Black Non-Hispanic: 38%;
Hispanic: 21%;
Other: 7%.
Source: GAO analysis of Bureau of Justice Statistics data.
Note: Other races include American Indians, Alaska Natives, Native
Hawaiians, other Pacific Islanders, and persons identifying as two or
more races. Totals are based on prisoners with a sentence of more than
1 year.
[End of figure]
Figure 15 presents DOJ Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates of
sentenced prisoners under state jurisdiction by gender from December
31, 2000 through December 31, 2009. As depicted in figure 15, the
gender breakdown has remained largely stable over this time period.
Figure 15: Estimated Percentage of Sentenced Prisoners under State
Jurisdiction by Gender from December 31, 2000 through 2009:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Calendar year: 2000;
Male: 94%;
Female: 6%.
Calendar year: 2001;
Male: 94%;
Female: 6%.
Calendar year: 2002;
Male: 94%;
Female: 6%.
Calendar year: 2003;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Calendar year: 2004;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Calendar year: 2005;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Calendar year: 2006;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Calendar year: 2007;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Calendar year: 2008;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Calendar year: 2009;
Male: 93%;
Female: 7%.
Source: GAO analysis of Bureau of Justice Statistics data.
Note: Totals are based on prisoners with a sentence of more than 1
year.
[End of figure]
Figure 16 shows the DOJ Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates of the
sentenced inmate population under state jurisdiction by the type of
offense for which they were convicted, as of the end of 2008, the most
currently available data.
Figure 16: Estimated Percentage of Sentenced Prisoners under State
Jurisdiction by Type of Offense at Year End 2008:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-chart]
Violent: 52%;
Drug: 18%;
Property: 18%;
Other: 11%.
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics data.
Notes: Year end 2008 data are the most currently available.
Percentages do not add to 100 due to rounding.
Violent offenses include murder, manslaughter, rape, other sexual
assault, robbery, assault, and other violent crimes. Property crimes
include burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, fraud, and other
property crimes. Other offenses include public-order crimes, which
includes weapons, drunk driving, court offenses, commercialized vice,
morals and decency offenses, liquor law violations, and other public-
order offenses, as well as other, unspecified offenses, including
juveniles offenses. Totals are based on prisoners with a sentence of
more than 1 year.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Survey Sent to American Correctional Association (ACA)
Audit Chairs:
Based on responses from Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and state correctional
officials with whom we spoke, we identified 14 common institutional
factors that impact officer safety. In order to determine which of the
14 factors have the greatest impact on officer safety, we sent the
survey below to 30 correctional accrediting experts at the American
Correctional Association (ACA) and asked them to rank which of the
factors--if they exist in an institution--would pose the greatest
threat to officer safety. These experts are the audit chairs for the
ACA's Commission on Accreditation, who advise the commission as to
which federal, state, and local correctional institutions should be
accredited and were therefore selected based on this knowledge. We
received responses from 21 experts, who also provided examples of
efforts to address these factors that they believed to be cost
effective.
1. Which of the following corrections-related positions do you hold?
Please check one answer.
[End of section]
Corrections management:
Corrections practitioner, non-management;
Corrections management: Corrections researcher;
Corrections management: Other (please explain below.
2. In general, how much, if at all, does each of the following affect
the safety of correctional officers or of other staff performing
corrections duties? Please check one answer for each row.
a. Ineffective inmate management (e.g., lack of controlled inmate
movement; insufficient supervision of inmates):
Not at all:
Slightly:
Moderately:
Significantly:
Don't know:
b. Insufficient information sharing among managers and staff within
institutions;
Not at all:
Slightly:
Moderately:
Significantly:
Don't know:
c. Inmate overcrowding;
Not at all:
Slightly:
Moderately:
Significantly:
Don't know:
d. Corrections officer under-staffing;
Not at all:
Slightly:
Moderately:
Significantly:
Don't know:
e. Insufficient inmate programming (e.g., prison industries, drug
rehabilitation,; education, recreation);
Not at all:
Slightly:
Moderately:
Significantly:
Don't know:
f. Corrections officer complacency;
Not at all:
Slightly:
Moderately:
Significantly:
Don't know:
g. Insufficient corrections training;
Not at all:
Slightly:
Moderately:
Significantly:
Don't know:
h. Insufficient discipline of inmates following a violation;
Not at all:
Slightly:
Moderately:
Significantly:
Don't know:
i. Intoxicated inmates as a result of inmate-manufactured alcohol;
Not at all:
Slightly:
Moderately:
Significantly:
Don't know:
j. Disruptive inmate behavior due to the sale and use of illegal drugs;
Not at all:
Slightly:
Moderately:
Significantly:
Don't know:
k. Inmate possession and use of unauthorized communication devices,
including cell phones;
Not at all:
Slightly:
Moderately:
Significantly:
Don't know:
l. Inmate gangs;
Not at all:
Slightly:
Moderately:
Significantly:
Don't know:
m. Inmates dissatisfied with food service;
Not at all:
Slightly:
Moderately:
Significantly:
Don't know:
n. Population of inmates with characteristics that may lead to
increased violent; behavior (e.g., younger age, longer sentences, lack
of parole opportunities);
Not at all:
Slightly:
Moderately:
Significantly:
Don't know:
3.If you would like to elaborate on any of the factors above, please
do so in the box below. The box will expand as you type.
4. Which three of the following factors do you believe most affect
corrections officer safety? Please check three and no more than three
factors in the list below.
a. Ineffective inmate management (e.g. lack of controlled inmate
movement, insufficient supervision of inmates):
b. Insufficient information sharing among managers and staff within
institutions:
c. Inmate overcrowding:
d. Corrections officer under-staffing:
e. Insufficient inmate programming (e.g., prison industries, drug
rehabilitation,; education, recreation):
f. Corrections officer complacency:
g. Insufficient corrections training:
h. Insufficient discipline of inmates following a violation:
i. Intoxicated inmates as a result of inmate-manufactured alcohol:
j. Disruptive inmate behavior due to the sale and use of illegal drugs:
k. Inmate possession and use of unauthorized communication devices,
including; cell phones:
l. Inmate gangs:
m. Inmates dissatisfied with food service:
n. Population of inmates with characteristics that may lead to
increased violent; behavior (e.g. younger age, longer sentences, lack
of parole opportunities):
5. Besides the factors listed above, if there are any other
significant factors affecting corrections officer safety please
describe them in the box below. The box will expand as you type.
6. The next questions ask you to provide examples(s) of strategies to
address each factor that you believe to be cost-effective. Please
answer as many as you can.
a. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address
Ineffective inmate management (e.g., lack of controlled inmate
movement, insufficient supervision of inmates)? The box will expand as
you type.
b. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address
Insufficient information sharing among managers and staff within
institutions? The box will expand as you type.
c. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Inmate
overcrowding? The box will expand as you type.
d. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address
Corrections officer under-staffing? The box will expand as you type.
e. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address
Insufficient inmate programming (e.g., prison industries, drug
rehabilitation, education, recreation)? The box will expand as you
type.
f. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address
Corrections officer complacency? The box will expand as you type.
g. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address
Insufficient corrections training? The box will expand as you type.
h. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address
Insufficient discipline of inmates following a violation? The box will
expand as you type.
i. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address
Intoxicated inmates as a result of inmate-manufactured alcohol? The
box will expand as you type.
j. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address
Disruptive inmate behavior due to the sale and use of illegal drugs?
The box will expand as you type.
k. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Inmate
possession and use of unauthorized communication devices, including
cell phones? The box will expand as you type.
l. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Inmate
gangs? The box will expand as you type.
m. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address Inmates
dissatisfied with food service? The box will expand as you type.
n. What are example(s) of cost effective strategies to address
Population of inmates with characteristics that may lead to increased
violent behavior (e.g., younger age, longer sentences, lack of parole
opportunities)? The box will expand as you type.
7. If you have any additional comments concerning correctional officer
safety, please type them in the box below. The box will expand as you
type.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Institutional Factors That Impact Officer Safety and
Examples of Mitigating Strategies Either Used by BOP or State DOCs or
Suggested by Correctional Accrediting Experts:
Table 7 lists the institutional factors that the officers and
officials with whom we spoke reported impacted officer safety. It also
provides examples of strategies to mitigate these factors that BOP or
state officials reported using or that correctional accrediting
experts we surveyed suggested.
Table 7: Institutional Factors Affecting Officer Safety and Examples
of Strategies to Address Them:
Factors affecting officer safety: Insufficient inmate programming;
Examples of strategies to address factors:
* In its institutions, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) makes a variety of
programming available to inmates, including employment opportunities
in the Federal Prison Industries Program, and educational programming,
such as coursework to obtain a General Educational Development
certificate;
* An official from one state reported that its department offers a
variety of inmate programming, including educational classes, drug
rehabilitation programs, cooking classes, and vocational training,
including a barber program. In addition, the department provides
inmates with employment opportunities in its correctional enterprises,
which manufacture all of the department's furniture, cleaning
supplies, and soap, and the officers' uniforms and inmates' clothing;
* One expert suggested using volunteers and community service programs
to provide inmate programming, providing education programs by
correspondence courses, and shifting assets to programs that reach a
larger portion of the inmate population.
Factors affecting officer safety: Population of inmates with
characteristics that may lead to more violent behavior;
Examples of strategies to address factors:
* Officials at one BOP institution reported that they train their
officers in how to relate to their inmate population, which is now
younger, less educated, and unused to structure in their lives;
* One expert stressed the need to improve the inmate classification
process so that inmates are placed in facilities that are equipped to
handle their behavior, as well as enhanced staff training.
Factors affecting officer safety: Correctional officer complacency;
Examples of strategies to address factors:
* Officials at one BOP institution reported that, after finding that
officers were not routinely performing required duties, such as pat
searches, they placed a greater emphasis on training and staff
development, and worked to make their training more practical for
staff by clearing out housing units in order to allow staff to
participate in mock scenarios in a more real-world setting;
* An official from one state told us that the department has
established a maximum ceiling on the number of years that an officer
can retain the same post, and provides officers with the opportunity
to trade posts with another officer to "stay fresh" by taking on a new
post. Further, the department allows officers to shadow another
officer before taking on a new position alone so that the officer can
become better acquainted with the facility and the inmates before
working independently;
* One expert suggested conducting regular "vulnerability tests" in
which officers are tested with real-world situations to see how they
perform. If the officers do not perform well, the expert stated that
this should be used as a learning opportunity. Further, the expert
suggested that officers should rotate posts, particularly if the
duties of the post may lead to officer boredom.
Factors affecting officer safety: Insufficient discipline of inmates
following a violation;
Examples of strategies to address factors:
* An official from one state reported that the department provides
inmates with the sanctions of potential violations in writing to make
inmates aware that their actions will have consequences. Further, the
department refers many assaults committed by inmates for criminal
prosecution, and takes such assaults very seriously;
* One expert stated that correctional organizations should create
disciplinary procedures that are easier to enact, and create a
"ticket" scenario in which the officer and inmate involved in a
violation can officially, but simply, resolve the violation and agree
on the appropriate discipline without having to go through the
institution disciplinary process.
Factors affecting officer safety: Intoxicated inmates as a result of
inmate manufactured alcohol;
Examples of strategies to address factors:
* Officials at two BOP institutions reported that they conduct
shakedowns of inmates to search for homemade alcohol and punish the
inmates who are caught with it. One of these institutions also
conducts breathalyzer tests on the inmates;
* One expert suggested that facilities should identify the materials
that inmates are using to make the intoxicants and then take steps to
regulate the availability of these materials.
Factors affecting officer safety: Insufficient information sharing
among managers and staff within institutions;
Examples of strategies to address factors:
* The warden at one BOP institution stated that the institution
developed a "Bus Report" to improve its information sharing among
staff regarding new inmates. This report provides staff with
information on all new inmates arriving at the facility;
* One expert reported that placing a large television screen on which
critical information is posted in locations that officers access is a
relatively inexpensive way to ensure that officers at each shift can
obtain updated information.
Factors affecting officer safety: Inmate possession of unauthorized
communication devices;
Examples of strategies to address factors:
* Officials at one BOP institution reported that the institution's use
of body orifice scanners--which detect anything metal on the
individual sitting in the chair attached to the scanner--have helped
identify contraband cell phones in the facility;
* An official from one state identified a number of strategies the
department has taken to identify contraband cell phones at its
facilities, including the use of employee and visitor searches, the
installation of additional metal detectors, and the use of dogs to
detect cell phones. In addition, the state has recently passed a
statute making it illegal to bring a cell phone into a prison;
* One expert emphasized the need to conduct proper searches of staff,
visitors, volunteers, mail, and packages entering a facility. In
addition, the expert state that staff must monitor the visiting
process, and screen both visitors and inmates during visitation.
Factors affecting officer safety: Disruptive inmate behavior due to
the sale and use of illegal drugs;
Examples of strategies to address factors:
* BOP officials reported that BOP utilizes machines that can detect
drug residue as well as canines to detect drugs, conducts contraband
searches and shakedowns, and administers breathalyzer tests;
* An official from one state reported that the department conducts
random drug testing, and scans entrants into the facility with
machines that can detect drug residue;
* One expert suggested the use of a drug offender classification
program modeled on one developed by the Pennsylvania DOC which would
identify and classify inmates involved in the sale and use of illegal
drugs, place them in a separate drug offender program that includes
sanctions and rewards for their behavior, and conduct intensive drug
testing.
Factors affecting officer safety: Inmates dissatisfied with food
service;
Examples of strategies to address factors:
* BOP employs a standardized national menu at all of its institutions
so that all inmates receive the same food;
* One expert stated that the facility staff should obtain inmate input
about the food, and that facility management should eat the meals the
inmates eat on a weekly basis. The expert also stated that the
facility could supplement its meals with farm produce occasionally.
Factors affecting officer safety: Ineffective inmate management;
Examples of strategies to address factors:
* At one BOP facility we visited, lines are painted on the floor on
both sides of a corridor to distinguish the area where inmates walk
from the area designated for staff;
* An official from one state explained that the department employs a
"rule of five" strategy in which officers immediately separate inmates
if more than five members of the same security threat group are
congregated together. In addition, the department staggers the times
at which inmates utilize the recreation yard and the dining facilities;
* One expert reported that institutions should utilize video cameras
and a "pass" system, which allows only those authorized to enter or
exit (i.e., pass through) a certain area, to improve monitoring of
inmates' movement.
Factors affecting officer safety: Inmate overcrowding;
Examples of strategies to address factors:
* Officials from one of the BOP institution and 3 of the 14 states
with whom we spoke reported converting community space, such as
television rooms, into inmate cells to accommodate a larger inmate
population;
* One state official reported that the department has added temporary
beds in its facilities, contracted with private prisons to obtain bed
space, and put up tents at its low security facility to house inmates;
* One expert recommended that inmate programs be carried out in
shifts, from the early morning to the late evening, in order to split
the amount of inmates between idle time and program time.
Factors affecting officer safety: Correctional officer understaffing;
Examples of strategies to address factors:
* Officials at one BOP institution that has multiple facilities in one
location, called a complex, have implemented a staffing plan referred
to as consolidation, which allow them to fill in staffing shortages in
one facility with officers from another facility within the complex;
* Officials from one state told us that the department has recently
created a "correctional trainee" employment classification so that
these trainees can be hired and placed in a facility prior to the
start of the next correctional academy class, thus reducing the lag
time between when the officer is hired and when he or she reports to
work at a facility. While in the trainee classification, these
officers are required to work alongside another officer;
however, the officials explained that the trainees still provide
additional "eyes and ears" at the facility;
* One expert reported that prisons need to embrace technologies like
cameras on walls, and utilize better designs to eliminate blind spots,
so that additional staff are not needed for monitoring.
Factors affecting officer safety: Insufficient correctional training;
Examples of strategies to address factors:
* BOP's Special Operations Response Teams (SORT) attend Crisis
Management Training, which is an intensive full-time, weeklong program
that trains officers in certain specialized skills, such as escorting
high risk inmates, conducting hostage negotiations, and breaching
prison doors and fences, among other skills;
* An official from one state reported that state law requires that its
officers receive 8 weeks of training at a correctional academy,
followed by eight weeks of on-the-job training in which the officer
shadows a more experienced officer before the new officer can begin
work;
* One expert recommended that institutions call upon the local law
enforcement community for assistance or sharing of training needs.
Factors affecting officer safety: Inmate gangs;
Examples of strategies to address factors:
* To manage inmate gangs in one BOP facility, the warden met directly
with the leadership of rival security threat groups to discuss their
integration into the general population and received assurances that
the integration would go smoothly. During our visit, institution
management indicated that so far the groups had not had any
altercations;
* An official in one state explained that the department operates a
special unit that rehabilitates gang members;
* One expert reported that institutions must not allow any type of
gang displays, and should transfer gang members to different
institutions frequently in order to disrupt gang organization.
Source: GAO analysis of interviews with BOP and state officials, and
surveys of accrediting experts.
[End of table]
[End of section]
Appendix VI: Comments from the Bureau of Prisons:
U.S, Department of Justice:
Federal Bureau of Prisons:
Washington, DC 20534:
April 5, 2011:
David C. Maurer, Director:
Homeland Security & Justice Issues:
Government Accountability Office:
Seattle, WA 98104:
Dear Mr. Maurer:
The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) appreciates the opportunity to
formally respond to the Government Accountability Office's draft
report entitled Bureau of Prisons: Evaluating the Impact of
Protective Equipment Could Help Enhance Officer Safety.
We have completed our review of the draft report. Our response to
the Recommendation for Executive Action is as follows:
Recommendation: To capitalize on the data BOP already collects and
to further DOJ's evaluation efforts, we recommend that the Attorney
General direct the Director of BOP to leverage existing BOP data
systems, such as TRUINTEL and SENTRY, as well as the institutional
expertise available through NIJ and NIC, as appropriate, to assess the
impact of the equipment BOP has provided or could provide to its
officers in better protecting them in a range of scenarios and
settings.
Response: The Bureau concurs with this recommendation and with the
assistance of NIJ and or NIC, will conduct a study to evaluate the
impact of protective equipment on officer safety.
If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact H.
J. Marberry, Assistant Director, Program Review Division, at (202)353-
2302.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
K.M. White, for:
Harley G. Lappin:
Director:
cc: Richard Theis, Assistant Director:
Audit Liaison Group, JMD:
[End of section]
Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
David C. Maurer, (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov:
Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this
report were Joy Gambino, Assistant Director; Jill Evancho, Analyst-In-
Charge; Christian Montz, Julia Becker Vieweg, and Miriam Rosenau.
Michele Fejfar assisted with design and methodology; Willie Commons
III provided legal support; Pedro Almoguera provided economic
expertise; and Katherine Davis provided assistance in report
preparation.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.:
November 1999).
[2] One state did not respond to our requests for an interview.
[3] We previously reported on BOP's budget process. See GAO, Bureau of
Prisons: Methods for Cost Estimation Largely Reflect Best Practices,
but Quantifying Risks Would Enhance Decision Making, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-94] (Washington, D.C.: November 10,
2009).
[4] This amount includes all nonsalary obligations for the
Correctional Services Branch, which includes the armory and such items
as safety equipment, office supplies, and batteries, as well as the
initial inventory and equipment provided for new facilities during
their activation. This also includes spending on safety shoes provided
to all uniformed institution staff, including officers, as well as
stab-resistant vests, which BOP began purchasing for officers in
fiscal year 2008.
[5] The term less-than-lethal is used to describe an array of weapons
that is not fundamentally designed to kill or cause serious bodily
injury, such as pepper spray.
[6] The data on assaults on staff do not include assaults in privately
managed facilities, as these facilities do not employ BOP staff.
[7] Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-277,
118 Stat. 865 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. §§ 926B and 926C).
[8] Under 18 U.S.C. § 926B, "qualified law enforcement officers" means
an employee of a governmental agency who is authorized by law to
engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or
prosecution of, or the incarceration of any person for any violation
of the law, and has statutory powers of arrest; is authorized by the
agency to carry a firearm; is not the subject of any disciplinary
action by the agency which could result in suspension or loss of
police powers; meets standards, if any, established by the agency
which require the employee to regularly qualify in the use of a
firearm; is not under the influence of alcohol or another intoxicating
or hallucinatory drug or substance; and is not prohibited by federal
law from receiving a firearm. Under 18 U.S.C. § 926C, an individual
who is a "qualified retired law enforcement officer," as defined by
statute, and is carrying the proper identification is permitted to
carry a concealed firearm.
[9] Primary position means a position whose primary duties are
investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals suspected or
convicted of offenses against the criminal laws of the United States.
Secondary position means a position that is clearly in the law
enforcement field; is in an organization having a law enforcement
mission; and is either supervisory (for example, a position whose
primary duties are as a first-level supervisor of law enforcement
officers in primary positions) or administrative (for example, an
executive, managerial, technical, semiprofessional, or professional
position for which experience in a primary law enforcement position,
or equivalent experience outside the Federal government, is a
prerequisite).
[10] 28 C.F.R. §§ 511.11 and 511.12. Federal Bureau of Prisons,
Searching, Detaining, or Arresting Visitors To Bureau Grounds and
Facilities, Program Statement No. 5510.12 (Jan. 15, 2008).
[11] The secure perimeter describes only those areas within a prison
complex--exclusive of security towers--that authorized individuals and
inmates can access after passing through specific security procedures.
A body alarm is a device that officers can sound in case of an
emergency or that, for certain models of the alarms, will sound if the
officer is in the prone position.
[12] Officers in certain posts, such as compound officers who control
inmate movement, are required to carry handcuffs.
[13] These armed posts include buses, towers, mobile patrol, fog
patrol, and hospital escorted trips.
[14] SHUs are separate units within existing facilities that house
inmates who must be removed from the general inmate population because
of serious violations of BOP rules, or because their continued
presence within the general population would pose a serious threat to
life, property, self, staff or other inmates, or to the security and
operation of the institution.
[15] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1].
[16] These experts--the audit chairs for the ACA's Commission on
Accreditation--routinely advise the commission as to which federal,
state, and local correctional institutions should be accredited and
were therefore selected based on this knowledge.
[17] These 14 factors are: ineffective inmate management, insufficient
information sharing among managers and staff within institutions,
inmate overcrowding, correctional officer understaffing, insufficient
inmate programming, correctional officer complacency, insufficient
correctional training, insufficient discipline of inmates following a
violation, intoxicated inmates as a result of inmate-manufactured
alcohol, disruptive inmate behavior due to the sale and use of illegal
drugs, inmate possession and use of unauthorized communication
devices, inmate gangs, inmates dissatisfied with food service, and
population of inmates with characteristics that may lead to increased
violent behavior.
[18] The Bloods and the Crips are two Los Angeles-based gangs. The
Crips originated in the late 1960s and the Bloods formed to defend
against the Crips.
[19] Statement of Harley G. Lappin, Director, Federal Bureau of
Prisons, on March 10, 2009 during a hearing before the Subcommittee on
Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies of the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Appropriations; related to Federal
Prisoner Reentry and the Second Chance Act (March 10, 2009).
[20] The re-entry concept is the use of programs targeted at promoting
the effective reintegration of offenders back to communities upon
release from prison and jail.
[21] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] (Washington, D.C.:
November 1999).
[22] Georgia did not respond to our requests for an interview.
[23] We were unable to obtain contact information for union officials
at the remaining three institutions.
[24] Security Threat Groups refer to inmate gangs, or the organized
factions of inmates inside a prison which can be based on an inmate's
race, religion, or geographic origin.
[End of section]
GAO's Mission:
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance
and accountability of the federal government for the American people.
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability.
Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony:
The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]
and select "E-mail Updates."
Order by Phone:
The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO‘s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO‘s Web site,
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm].
Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537.
Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional
information.
To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs:
Contact:
Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]:
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov:
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470:
Congressional Relations:
Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4400:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7125:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Public Affairs:
Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov:
(202) 512-4800:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street NW, Room 7149:
Washington, D.C. 20548: