Law Enforcement Coordination
DOJ Could Improve Its Process for Identifying Disagreements among Agents Gao ID: GAO-11-314 April 7, 2011According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), an estimated 1.3 million violent crimes occurred nationwide in 2009. The Department of Justice (DOJ) law enforcement components--the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Drug Enforcement Administration; FBI, and U.S. Marshals Service--have overlapping jurisdiction over violent crime investigations, specifically when they involve illegal drugs, gang violence, firearms, explosives, arson, and fugitive apprehension. As requested, GAO assessed the extent to which selected agents are clear on their agencies' roles and responsibilities, and how components determine and coordinate roles and responsibilities to avoid unnecessary use of resources. GAO reviewed documents such as department directives and interviewed DOJ component officials in headquarters and nine cities, which were selected based on population and the presence of all DOJ components. GAO also surveyed a randomly selected, nongeneralizable sample of 315 field agents. The results provide valuable information about the range of perspectives of surveyed agents.
The majority of agents who responded to GAO's survey reported that they are very clear about their components' roles and responsibilities in the six investigative areas where they share jurisdiction--drugs, firearms, fugitives, gangs, arson, and explosives--and that mechanisms DOJ has in place to coordinate and clarify roles and responsibilities, such as memorandums of understanding, are somewhat effective. Agents who responded to GAO's survey most frequently reported using interpersonal outreach and communication to clarify roles and responsibilities, such as relying on task force experience and conferring with agents with other components when jurisdictions overlapped on particular investigations. Though the majority of agents reported being clear on their agency's roles and responsibilities, over one-third of survey respondents reported experiencing disagreements over the past 5 years with another DOJ component when determining roles and responsibilities during an investigation. Of the agents who reported disagreements, 78 percent reported that these disagreements negatively affected the investigation to some degree, for example, by prolonging investigations, calling for unnecessary use of resources, and causing low morale. Although the DOJ components have mechanisms in place to monitor how well components are coordinating, the scope of these mechanisms limits DOJ's ability to identify some problems. DOJ components conduct inspections of field offices every 3 to 6 years, which cover areas such as working relationships, operational programs, leadership, and management. However, officials from three of four component inspection divisions GAO interviewed said that they rely on interviews with senior management, such as the highest official in the field office, to gauge coordination and the working relationships among the DOJ law enforcement components, and do not solicit input from agents. Though, considering that field office managers are not likely aware of all disagreements that occur among agents and survey respondents reported that disagreements and poor working relationships negatively affected investigations and morale, soliciting input from field agents may put DOJ in a better position to determine why disagreements are occurring and how to address them so as to limit their impact on agents and investigations. GAO recommends that DOJ assess options to better identify and diagnose disagreements in the field and take action to limit the negative impacts from disagreements over jurisdictional overlap for some criminal investigations. DOJ agreed with GAO's recommendation.
RecommendationsOur recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director: Eileen R. Larence Team: Government Accountability Office: Homeland Security and Justice Phone: (202) 512-6510GAO-11-314, Law Enforcement Coordination: DOJ Could Improve Its Process for Identifying Disagreements among Agents
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United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
Report to Congressional Requesters:
April 2011:
Law Enforcement Coordination:
DOJ Could Improve Its Process for Identifying Disagreements among
Agents:
GAO-11-314:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-11-314, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), an estimated
1.3 million violent crimes occurred nationwide in 2009. The Department
of Justice (DOJ) law enforcement components”the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Drug Enforcement Administration;
FBI, and U.S. Marshals Service”have overlapping jurisdiction over
violent crime investigations, specifically when they involve illegal
drugs, gang violence, firearms, explosives, arson, and fugitive
apprehension. As requested, GAO assessed the extent to which selected
agents are clear on their agencies‘ roles and responsibilities, and
how components determine and coordinate roles and responsibilities to
avoid unnecessary use of resources. GAO reviewed documents such as
department directives and interviewed DOJ component officials in
headquarters and nine cities, which were selected based on population
and the presence of all DOJ components. GAO also surveyed a randomly
selected, nongeneralizable sample of 315 field agents. The results
provide valuable information about the range of perspectives of
surveyed agents.
What GAO Found:
The majority of agents who responded to GAO‘s survey reported that
they are very clear about their components‘ roles and responsibilities
in the six investigative areas where they share jurisdiction”drugs,
firearms, fugitives, gangs, arson, and explosives”and that mechanisms
DOJ has in place to coordinate and clarify roles and responsibilities,
such as memorandums of understanding, are somewhat effective. Agents
who responded to GAO‘s survey most frequently reported using
interpersonal outreach and communication to clarify roles and
responsibilities, such as relying on task force experience and
conferring with agents with other components when jurisdictions
overlapped on particular investigations. Though the majority of agents
reported being clear on their agency‘s roles and responsibilities,
over one-third of survey respondents reported experiencing
disagreements over the past 5 years with another DOJ component when
determining roles and responsibilities during an investigation. Of the
agents who reported disagreements, 78 percent reported that these
disagreements negatively affected the investigation to some degree,
for example, by prolonging investigations, calling for unnecessary use
of resources, and causing low morale. Although the DOJ components have
mechanisms in place to monitor how well components are coordinating,
the scope of these mechanisms limits DOJ‘s ability to identify some
problems. DOJ components conduct inspections of field offices every 3
to 6 years, which cover areas such as working relationships,
operational programs, leadership, and management. However, officials
from three of four component inspection divisions GAO interviewed said
that they rely on interviews with senior management, such as the
highest official in the field office, to gauge coordination and the
working relationships among the DOJ law enforcement components, and do
not solicit input from agents. Though, considering that field office
managers are not likely aware of all disagreements that occur among
agents and survey respondents reported that disagreements and poor
working relationships negatively affected investigations and morale,
soliciting input from field agents may put DOJ in a better position to
determine why disagreements are occurring and how to address them so
as to limit their impact on agents and investigations.
Figure: Percentages of Agents Who Reported on Negative Consequences of
Disagreements:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked horizontal bar graph]
Negative consequences of disagreements (percentage):
Prolonged investigations (95);
Yes: 73%;
No: 18%;
Don‘t know: 9%.
Blue on blue (94);
Yes: 6%;
No: 83%;
Don‘t know: 11%.
Low morale (95);
Yes: 64%;
No: 23%;
Don‘t know: 13%.
Fugitive not apprehended (94)
Yes: 24%;
No: 56%;
Insufficient evidence collected for prosecution (94);
Yes: 31%;
No: 50%;
Don‘t know: 19%.
Unwillingness of components to work with each other (96);
Yes: 73%;
No: 19%;
Don‘t know: 8%.
Unnecessary use of resources (96);
Yes: 64%;
No: 26%;
Don‘t know: 11%.
Source: GAO analysis of survey responses.
[End of figure]
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommends that DOJ assess options to better identify and diagnose
disagreements in the field and take action to limit the negative
impacts from disagreements over jurisdictional overlap for some
criminal investigations. DOJ agreed with GAO‘s recommendation.
View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-314] or key
components. For more information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-
6510 or larencee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Background:
Most Agents Reported Being Very Clear about Their Component's Roles
and Responsibilities, but Over One-Third Reported Disagreements, Which
DOJ Components Could Better Address:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Law Enforcement Coordination Survey Results:
Appendix III: Extent to Which Survey Respondents Reported Being Clear
on Their Component's Roles and Responsibilities in Each Area of Shared
Jurisdiction:
Appendix IV: Survey Respondents' Perspectives regarding Their
Component's Working Relationship with Other DOJ Components:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Justice:
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Tables:
Table 1: USAO Offices and Police Departments Visited in Nine Selected
Localities:
Table 2: Counts of Special Agents and Deputy Marshals by Location and
Component:
Table 3: Percentages of Respondents from the Nine Cities Who Reported
Very Good or Good Working Relationships with Other Components:
Figures:
Figure 1: Jurisdictions Shared by DOJ Agencies:
Figure 2: Percentages of Agents Who Responded to the Survey Who
Reported Being Very Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear about Their
Component's Roles and Responsibilities:
Figure 3: Percentages of Agents Who Responded to the Survey Who
Reported Using Certain Methods to Determine Roles and Responsibilities:
Figure 4: Percentages of Selected Agents Who Responded That Various
Clarification Methods Were Very Effective, Somewhat Effective, or Not
Effective:
Figure 5: Percentages of Agents Who Reported Having Disagreements with
Another Component over Roles and Responsibilities over the Past 5
Years, by City:
Figure 6: Percentages of Agents Who Responded to the Survey Who
Reported Disagreements with Certain Components:
Figure 7: Percentages of Agents Who Reported on Negative Consequences
of Disagreements:
Figure 8: Percentages of Agents Who Reported on the Nature of Their
Component's Working Relationship with ATF, DEA, the FBI, and USMS:
Figure 9: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and
Responsibilities in Arson Investigations--Overall, by Component, and
by City:
Figure 10: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and
Responsibilities in Explosives Investigations--Overall, by Component,
and by City:
Figure 11: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and
Responsibilities in Gang Investigations--Overall, by Component, and by
City:
Figure 12: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and
Responsibilities in Firearms Investigations--Overall, by Component,
and by City:
Figure 13: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and
Responsibilities in Fugitives Investigations--Overall, by Component,
and by City:
Figure 14: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and
Responsibilities in Drug Investigations--Overall, by Component, and by
City:
Abbreviations:
AGCC: Anti-Gang Coordination Committee:
ASAC: assistant special agent-in-charge:
ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives:
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
DOJ: Department of Justice:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
IG: Office of the Inspector General:
JTTF: Joint Terrorism Task Force:
MOU: memorandum of understanding:
USAO: United States Attorney's Office:
USMS: U.S. Marshals Service:
[End of section]
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
April 7, 2011:
The Honorable Lamar Smith:
Chairman:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley:
Ranking Member:
Committee on the Judiciary:
United States Senate:
An estimated 1.3 million violent crimes occurred nationwide in 2009.
[Footnote 1] These crimes inflict a heavy toll on communities across
the United States and have dramatic effects on the welfare of citizens
and the economy. The responsibility for combating violent crimes rests
with both state and local law enforcement but the federal government
also has important responsibilities. Fighting violent crime is a key
objective of the Department of Justice (DOJ), whose role includes
combating gang and gun violence as well as halting the distribution of
illegal drugs. DOJ's primary investigative agencies for violent crimes
are the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI); and the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). Because of
overlapping investigative jurisdiction, multiple agencies may be
involved in an investigation, specifically when it involves illegal
drugs, gang violence, illegal use of firearms and explosives, arson,
and fugitive apprehension. For example, in a drug investigation
involving a suspect who may be illegally procuring a large cache of
firearms to protect the drugs, the FBI and DEA, which both have
jurisdiction over illegal drugs, as well as ATF, which is responsible
for regulating firearms, may be involved. Similarly, the FBI has
responsibilities for combating violent crime and investigating all
crimes involving terrorist activities or acts in preparation of
terrorist activities occurring within the United States. Thus, if an
investigation involves the illegal use of explosives or arson, either
ATF or the FBI could be involved, depending on the link to terrorism
or other circumstances.
In cases such as these, effective coordination with regard to
investigations, seizures of illegal drugs and fugitive and criminal
apprehensions is paramount. A lack of coordination can lead to
confusion, frustration, and a waste of law enforcement resources; pose
a risk to law enforcement personnel; and limit the overall
effectiveness of the federal effort.
Given the importance of coordination in areas of overlapping
jurisdiction, you asked us to review DOJ's efforts to determine roles
and responsibilities when more than one DOJ component is involved. As
agreed with your office, we analyzed the extent to which roles and
responsibilities are clearly delineated and coordinated among ATF,
DEA, the FBI, and USMS (hereafter referred to as DOJ law enforcement
components). Specifically, this report addresses the following
question: In areas of overlapping investigative jurisdiction, to what
extent are DOJ law enforcement agents responsible for investigations
clear on their component's roles and responsibilities, and to what
extent do they reach agreement on roles and responsibilities with
other components?
To answer this question, we analyzed statutory provisions as well as
DOJ and component law enforcement strategic plans to determine the
extent to which jurisdiction to investigate crimes is shared among the
components. Our analysis focused on six crime areas--firearms, illegal
drugs, gangs, explosives, arson, and fugitives--that may involve ATF,
DEA, the FBI, and USMS because multiple components share jurisdiction
in these areas. To understand how the department's law enforcement
components coordinate investigations among themselves, we analyzed
department directives, component interagency agreements, and
deconfliction databases. We also reviewed the reports from two studies
conducted by the DOJ Office of the Inspector General about federal law
enforcement coordination. We found the conclusions and recommendations
drawn in each report to be appropriate based on the methodologies
used. In addition, we also examined data from the Executive Office for
United States Attorneys, FBI, and USMS. To assess the reliability of
the data we obtained, we discussed the sources of the data with agency
officials and determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for
the purposes of this report. We interviewed officials from each
component's headquarters located in Washington, D.C., and managers
such as special agents-in-charge or assistant special agents-in-charge
from nine field office locations: (1) Houston, Texas; (2) Los Angeles,
California; (3) Minneapolis, Minnesota; (4) New York, New York (5)
Orlando, Florida; (6) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; (7) Seattle,
Washington; (8) Tulsa, Oklahoma; and (9) Washington, D.C. In each of
these nine locations, we also interviewed officials from local law
enforcement agencies and U.S. Attorney Offices to obtain an outside
perspective on the working relationships among the DOJ law enforcement
components because they work with the components on a daily basis. We
selected these locations (1) to include cities of varying size, (2)
because all four DOJ components were present, and (3) to obtain
geographic dispersion.
In addition to obtaining the perspectives of field office managers, we
also solicited input from agents in the field through a survey. We
planned to conduct a survey that would allow us to generalize
responses across the 36 field offices--the offices for each of the
four components in each of the nine cities. However, because of DOJ's
concerns about providing us access to contact information for such a
large number of agents, we instead were limited to selecting a
nongeneralizable sample of agents across the cities. Nevertheless, the
results provide us with an indication of the range of views held by
field agents and deputy marshals who responded. To conduct the survey,
we selected nonsupervisory field agents and deputy marshals in each
DOJ component in the nine cities to obtain additional perspectives on
law enforcement roles and responsibilities in areas of shared
jurisdiction. Each component compiled a list of its agents in each of
the nine offices. We requested that each list contain all agents in
the field office classified as non-supervisory 1811 investigators and
who had investigated crimes in at least one of the six jurisdictional
areas covered in our review.[Footnote 2] Once the lists were compiled,
our survey population contained 1,563 special agents and deputy
marshals. To limit disruptions to field office operations, we
restricted the size of our sample and randomly selected 10 agents from
each office. If an office had 10 or fewer eligible agents, we selected
all of them. In total, we selected and surveyed 315 field agents and
deputy marshals (hereafter referred to as agents) from June 17, 2010
through August 25, 2010. We obtained responses from 260 agents (an
overall response rate of 83 percent) on questions related to issues
such as clarity of roles and responsibilities, disagreements over
roles and responsibilities, and working relationships with other DOJ
components. The response rates for individual components were 77
percent (65 of 84) for ATF, 83 percent (70 of 84) for DEA, 86 percent
(69 of 80) for the FBI, and 84 percent (56 of 67) for USMS. The survey
results presented in this report are only attributable to the agents
who responded to our survey and cannot be projected to all DOJ agents.
The numbers of agents who responded to survey questions varied
depending on skip instructions contained in the survey questionnaire.
Also, agents may have chosen not to answer certain questions. The
survey results we provide in our report depend on these factors.
Percentages are based on the number of agents who responded to
specific survey questions. More detailed information on our scope and
methodology is provided in appendix I, and the frequency of responses
for each survey question can be found in appendix II.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2009 through February
2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards.[Footnote 3] Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
Background:
DOJ plays a key role in federal efforts to investigate and prosecute
violent crime through its four law enforcement components: ATF, DEA,
the FBI, and USMS. The FBI serves as a federal investigative body with
jurisdiction over violations of numerous categories of federal
criminal law, among other things. The FBI's mandate is established in
28 U.S.C. § 533, which authorizes the Attorney General to "appoint
officials to detect and prosecute crimes against the United States."
The Attorney General delegated broad investigative authority to the
FBI.[Footnote 4] As a result, the Director of the FBI is responsible
for investigating violations of laws--including criminal drug laws--of
the United States and collecting evidence in cases in which the United
States is or may be a party in interest, except in cases in which such
responsibility is by statute or otherwise exclusively assigned to
another investigative authority. Because of the FBI's broad
responsibilities for investigating many of the violations of the laws
of the United States, in a number of instances, the FBI's
investigative jurisdiction overlaps with that of the other DOJ law
enforcement components. Figure 1 illustrates the shared jurisdiction
for illegal drugs, gangs, firearms, explosives, arson, and fugitives.
Figure 1: Jurisdictions Shared by DOJ Agencies:
[Refer to PDF for image: illustration]
Gangs:
DEA;
ATF;
USMS;
FBI.
Fugitives:
USMS;
FBI.
Drugs:
DEA;
FBI.
Firearms: Arson and explosives:
ATF;
FBI.
Source: GAO analysis of DOJ information.
[End of figure]
Gangs. All four DOJ components focus on different aspects of gang
enforcement as part of their broader missions. Within DOJ, the FBI
focuses primarily on investigating violent, multijurisdictional gangs
whose activities constitute criminal enterprises by identifying,
investigating, and prosecuting the leadership and key members of
violent gangs; disrupting or dismantling gangs' criminal enterprise;
and recovering illegal assets through seizures and forfeitures. ATF
primarily focuses on efforts to reduce the occurrence of firearms,
arson, and explosives-related crime, including such crimes committed
by gang members. The primary focus of DEA's enforcement efforts is on
the links between gangs and drug trafficking. USMS's role is to
apprehend gang members who have been criminally charged but not
arrested.
Fugitives. USMS is the lead federal law enforcement agency responsible
for the apprehension of federal fugitives. USMS executes federal
arrests, parole violator warrants, and other warrants as directed.
[Footnote 5] USMS's investigative mission focuses primarily on the
location and arrest of violent fugitive felons, and provides
assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies in the
apprehension of their violent fugitives. The FBI is the lead agency
for any federal fugitive arising from an FBI investigation and any
warrants obtained by the FBI. The FBI and USMS also have authority to
pursue and arrest both federal and state fugitives who have violated
18 U.S.C. § 1073, which prohibits persons from moving or traveling in
interstate commerce in order to avoid prosecution, confinement, or
service of process. In addition, all DOJ law enforcement components
have the authority to investigate and, in some cases, arrest fugitive
felons when there is a reasonable basis to believe that doing so will
detect or prevent the commission of any federal crime.
Drugs. DEA is the nation's lead federal agency dedicated to drug law
enforcement and works to disrupt and dismantle the leadership,
command, control, and financial infrastructure of major drug-
trafficking organizations. DEA uses a multifaceted approach that
includes investigating narcotics cases and preparing them for
prosecution; managing a national drug intelligence program to collect,
analyze, and disseminate drug intelligence; enforcing counternarcotics
laws involving the diversion of legally produced substances for
illegal purposes; and coordinating with and leveraging the resources
of international, federal, state, and local partners. The FBI
investigates violations of the laws, including criminal drug laws, of
the United States. The FBI Director's authority to investigate
violations of and collect evidence in cases involving the criminal
drug laws of the United States is concurrent with the authority of the
Administrator of the DEA. ATF also has a defined role focusing on the
firearms aspect of counternarcotics investigations, which facilitates
collaboration with DEA. ATF's mission includes, among other things,
enforcing U.S. laws regulating firearms and explosives, and suspects
involved in firearms-trafficking cases often are involved in or have
links to drug-trafficking organizations. As such, firearms
investigations often evolve to incorporate a narcotics component.
Firearms. ATF is responsible for the regulation of the firearms
industry, including efforts to combat arms trafficking within and from
the United States.[Footnote 6] ATF seeks to enforce firearms laws to
remove violent offenders from communities, stop illegal firearms
trafficking, and prevent prohibited persons from possessing firearms.
ATF also regulates and partners with the firearms industry to promote
compliance, to prevent diversion, and to detect those criminals who
bring violence to communities. The FBI has been delegated broad
authority to investigate violations of the laws of the United States,
including in the areas of organized crime, violent crime and major
thefts, and firearms offenses. The FBI has underlying authority to
participate in investigations of weapons, explosives, and firearms as
a result of the FBI being the lead agency for the investigation of
terrorism as well.
Explosives and arson. The ATF and the FBI share jurisdiction for
investigating the criminal use of explosives. The FBI investigates
several federal crimes that may be committed with explosives and
through arson, such as bank robberies, hate crimes (i.e., church fires
and bombings), and organized crime. In 1990, the Attorney General
assigned the FBI lead responsibility for investigating all crimes for
which it has primary or concurrent jurisdiction and which involve
domestic terrorist activities, such as crimes committed by
environmental or revolutionary groups. ATF is the chief enforcer of
explosives laws and regulations in the United States and is
responsible for licensing and regulating explosives manufacturers,
importers, dealers, and users.
In addition to sharing investigative jurisdiction among themselves,
DOJ law enforcement components also partner with, and provide
resources to, local law enforcement agencies to combat violent crime.
DOJ provides resources to local agencies primarily through task forces
and training. Task forces target a particular criminal activity and
include federal, state, and local law enforcement. These task forces
provide local law enforcement agencies with overtime pay, conduct
wiretaps, and purchase vehicles for surveillance and undercover
operations, among other things. For example, DEA partners with state
and local law enforcement agencies to leverage the manpower and
intelligence that they provide, while supplying them with
counternarcotics training and other support, such as intelligence
about drug-trafficking organizations that operate across
jurisdictional boundaries. In regard to explosives, local law
enforcement bomb squad units are the first responders to explosive
incidents and work with federal law enforcement to secure scenes and
collect evidence.
Most Agents Reported Being Very Clear about Their Component's Roles
and Responsibilities, but Over One-Third Reported Disagreements, Which
DOJ Components Could Better Address:
Fifty-eight to 70 percent of DOJ agents who responded to our survey
reported being very clear about their component's roles and
responsibilities in a particular area of shared jurisdiction--drugs,
firearms, fugitives, gangs, arson, and explosives. The level of
agents' clarity varied based on the extent of their components'
involvement in a particular investigative area and geographic
location. For example, agents generally reported being very clear
about their component's roles and responsibilities in the
investigative area that is specifically related to their component's
mission, and least often reported being very clear in the area for
which there is the most jurisdictional overlap--gangs. DOJ has several
mechanisms in place to enhance clarity about roles and
responsibilities, and agents who reported using these mechanisms
primarily characterized them as somewhat effective. More than one-
third (37 percent or 97 of 259) of survey respondents reported
experiencing disagreements over the past 5 years with another DOJ
component when determining roles and responsibilities during an
investigation.[Footnote 7] Seventy-eight percent (76 of 97) of the
agents who reported having these disagreements indicated that they had
negative impacts on the investigations sometimes, often or always.
These negative impacts included prolonged investigations and
unnecessary use of resources. In addition, the majority of agents (53
of 96) who reported experiencing disagreements also reported that they
did not always or often reach consensus following disagreements. DOJ
components have taken action to address some of these disagreements
and monitor how well components are coordinating, but these actions do
not ensure that the types of disagreements agents reported are
identified consistently and resolved.
Most Survey Respondents Reported Being Very Clear on Their Component's
Roles and Responsibilities, but the Level of Clarity Varied by
Components' Level of Involvement in Each Investigative Area and
Location:
As shown in figure 2, the percentage of agents responding to our
survey who reported being very clear on their own component's roles
and responsibilities in a particular investigative area ranged from 58
percent (142 of 243) for gangs to 70 percent (176 of 251) for drugs.
The percentage of agents who reported that they are not clear on their
own component's roles and responsibilities ranged from 4 percent for
drugs and firearms to 11 percent for explosives.[Footnote 8]
Figure 2: Percentages of Agents Who Responded to the Survey Who
Reported Being Very Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear about Their
Component's Roles and Responsibilities:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Drugs (251):
Not clear: 4%;
Somewhat clear: 26%;
Very clear: 70%.
Fugitives (239):
Not clear: 6%;
Somewhat clear: 25%;
Very clear: 69%.
Firearms (249):
Not clear: 4%;
Somewhat clear: 28%;
Very clear: 67%.
Gangs (243):
Not clear: 7%;
Somewhat clear: 35%;
Very clear: 58%.
Explosives (214):
Not clear: 11%;
Somewhat clear: 28%;
Very clear: 62%.
Arson 206):
Not clear: 10%;
Somewhat clear: 24%;
Very clear: 66%.
Source: GAO analysis of survey responses.
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of agents who
answered about that particular investigative area. Percentages do not
include agents who indicated "no basis to judge." See responses to
question 10 in appendix II for the number of agents who indicated "no
basis to judge" or did not answer the question. Percentages may not
sum to 100 because of rounding.
[End of figure]
Generally, agents reported being very clear about their component's
roles and responsibilities in investigative areas specifically related
to their component's mission. For example, ATF agents reported the
greatest level of clarity for firearms and arson investigations, DEA
agents reported the greatest level of clarity for drug investigations,
and USMS agents reported the greatest level of clarity for fugitive
investigations.[Footnote 9] In contrast, in each investigative area,
with the exception of gangs, FBI agents were least likely to report
being very clear about their component's roles and responsibilities.
Although explosives investigations are directly related to ATF's
mission, the percentage of ATF agents who reported being very clear in
this area was lower than all other components except the FBI.
Based on our analysis of our survey results and investigation data,
when multiple components are increasingly involved in a particular
investigative area, agents who work in those areas may be less clear
about their components' roles and responsibilities. For example, 10 of
the 36 managers we interviewed[Footnote 10] said that roles and
responsibilities with regard to drug and fugitive investigations have
become clearer in recent years because following the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks, FBI has focused less on these areas and more
on terrorism-related cases. Specifically, FBI referred 30 percent
fewer drug cases for prosecution in fiscal year 2009 than it did in
fiscal year 2001 (from 2,994 to 2,103), compared to DEA, which
referred 13 percent fewer drug cases (from 9,907 to 8,578). Similarly,
FBI opened 85 percent fewer fugitive investigations in fiscal year
2009 than it did in fiscal year 2001 (from 9,256 to 1,421). According
to USMS, from fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2009, the number of
state and local fugitive investigations conducted by USMS increased by
361 percent (27,256 to 125,751). In addition, of all the investigative
areas we included in our review, gangs is the only one for which all
four components share jurisdiction, and the percentage of agents who
reported being very clear on their roles and responsibilities was
lowest in this area.[Footnote 11] Thus, when there is overlap,
clarification of roles and responsibilities is important.
In addition to variation based on the extent of components'
involvement in a certain investigative area, the survey results also
show variation based on agents' geographic location. For example, as
shown in appendix III, 96 percent of agents in Orlando (27 of 28) who
responded to our survey reported being very clear on their component's
roles and responsibilities related to drugs, but 50 percent of agents
in Tulsa (8 of 16) who responded to our survey reported being very
clear in this area. In general, Orlando and Philadelphia had the
highest percentages of respondents to report being very clear on roles
and responsibilities across the six investigative areas, and the
cities that had the lowest percentage of respondents to report being
very clear varied among Washington, D.C., Tulsa, Seattle, and Los
Angeles--these areas included arson, explosives and gangs. DOJ
components did not offer perspectives on possible reasons for these
patterns.
DOJ Has Various Mechanisms in Place to Clarify Components' Roles and
Responsibilities, and Agents Surveyed Primarily Reported That These
Mechanisms Were Somewhat Effective:
DOJ and its components have several mechanisms in place to help agents
clarify their roles and responsibilities during investigations. These
mechanisms include policy directives, task forces, deconfliction
databases, and interpersonal communication, which agents who responded
to our survey reported using to varying extents.
Policy directives. Policy directives such as agent manuals provide
guidance and instruction on DOJ's and components' policies and
procedures. For example, the ATF agent manual outlines ATF firearms,
explosives, and arson enforcement authority. In addition, it outlines
ATF's cooperation policy, which discusses how ATF should coordinate
its investigations with federal, state, and local law enforcement. DOJ
components also use memorandums of understanding (MOU) among
themselves to outline roles and responsibilities in areas of shared
jurisdiction. These MOUs cover a wide variety of areas, including
fugitive apprehensions and explosives and drug investigations. For
example, since 1973 the FBI has established 12 MOUs with ATF, 10 with
DEA, and 6 with USMS with regard to coordinating investigations in the
areas of fugitive apprehension, drug investigations and canine
programs, among other things. In addition, USMS has MOUs with ATF and
DEA that outline how ATF and DEA can delegate fugitive apprehension
responsibility for the subject of any of their criminal
investigations. In addition, USMS and the FBI both have fugitive
apprehension authority to include state and local fugitives. The MOU
between FBI and USMS states that FBI will notify USMS when it plans to
pursue state and local fugitives.
Task forces. DOJ components have also established task forces to
target a particular criminal activity in geographical locations. They
combine resources, intelligence, and the manpower of multiple law
enforcement agencies to focus on a particular problem. These task
forces include DOJ law enforcement components, other federal law
enforcement agencies, and state and local police departments. For
example, the FBI's Violent Gang Safe Streets Task Force includes
members from other DOJ components and local law enforcement. The
mission is to pursue violent gangs through sustained, proactive,
coordinated investigations to obtain prosecutions under Titles 18 and
21 of the U.S. Code, including prosecutions for violations such as
racketeering, drug conspiracy, and firearms violations.
Deconfliction databases. DOJ law enforcement components also have
deconfliction databases that are to be used to determine roles and
responsibilities and to coordinate investigations to ensure that
agents are not pursuing the same targets. Deconfliction databases
contain information on cases that involve multi-jurisdictional
investigations and are available for information sharing among law
enforcement agencies. If an agent discovers that another component is
investigating the same target, the database is to provide the agent
with the information needed to make a contact with the other component
to discuss the case. For example, 28 regions across the United States
have been designated as High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. Each
area provides one-stop access to numerous federal, state, and local
law enforcement databases, and also provides an event deconfliction
service.[Footnote 12] In addition, the National Crime Information
Center, maintained by the FBI, is a database that allows federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies access to make inquiries and
is to be used for prompt disclosure of information from other law
enforcement agencies about crimes and criminals. This information is
to assist in apprehending fugitives, locating missing persons, and
locating and returning stolen property, as well as in protecting the
law enforcement officers encountering the individuals described in the
system. In addition, DOJ components use local deconfliction databases.
For example, in Tulsa, Oklahoma, DOJ components use Oklahoma's Bureau
of Narcotics deconfliction system.
Interpersonal communication. Agents can contact agents from other
components, or their supervisors, such as group supervisors or the
assistant special agent-in-charge (ASAC), to resolve questions about
roles and responsibilities during specific investigations.
Agents who responded to our survey most frequently reported using
interpersonal outreach and communication to determine roles and
responsibilities when jurisdictions overlapped on particular
investigations over the past 5 years, as shown in figure 3. Survey
respondents most frequently reported that they conferred with agents
from other components (85 percent or 220 of 258), sought direction
from superiors (85 percent or 216 of 255), or relied on their task
force experience (79 percent or 200 of 254) to help determine roles
and responsibilities. In response to an open-ended question, one DEA
agent stated that at the investigation level, friendships and good
working relationships are formed that help agents delineate clear
roles and responsibilities when they share jurisdiction for an
investigation. The agent also said that it is by working together that
levels of trust are formed and information is shared among the
components that can help to resolve overlapping jurisdiction. A USMS
agent wrote that task forces allow all resources of DOJ to be combined
with those of state and local authorities and that this creates a very
streamlined and effective atmosphere for investigations.
Figure 3: Percentages of Agents Who Responded to the Survey Who
Reported Using Certain Methods to Determine Roles and Responsibilities:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Methods used to determine roles and responsibilities:
Method: Conferred with agents from other components;
Yes: 85%;
No: 13%;
Don't know: 2%.
Method: Sought direction from superiors;
Yes: 85%;
No: 13%;
Don't know: 2%.
Method: Task force experience;
Yes: 79%;
No: 17%;
Don't know: 4%.
Method: Deconfliction database;
Yes: 65%;
No: 30%;
Don't know: 5%.
Method: Consulted my components policy directives;
Yes: 62%;
No: 32%;
Don't know: 6%.
Method: Consulted MOUs;
Yes: 53%;
No: 40%;
Don't know: 7%.
Source: GAO analysis of survey responses.
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of agents who
answered about each method. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of
rounding.
[End of figure]
In addition to our survey responses, managers from the 36 component
field offices we interviewed also reported that they rely on outreach
with managers in other components and with agents, among other
mechanisms, to determine roles and responsibilities. For example,
managers from 22 of these 36 field offices stated that they conduct
meetings with other component managers to determine what roles each
component will play in addressing particular types of crime. In
addition to interpersonal outreach, 65 percent (168 of 259) of agents
who responded to our survey reported using deconfliction databases to
determine roles and responsibilities.[Footnote 13] Agents also
reported using, but less frequently, components' policy directives and
MOUs, 62 percent and 53 percent, respectively.
For each method, agents who reported using the method generally
characterized it as somewhat effective. The methods agents most
frequently reported as being very effective were also the same three
methods agents reported most frequently using to help determine roles
and responsibilities--conferring with agents from other components,
seeking direction from supervisors, and relying on their experience
from working with task forces, as shown in figure 4. Task force
experience was most frequently reported as being very effective (49
percent or 98 of 198).
Figure 4: Percentages of Selected Agents Who Responded That Various
Clarification Methods Were Very Effective, Somewhat Effective, or Not
Effective:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Method: Task force experience (198);
49%;
48%;
2%.
Method: Conferred with agents from other components (220)'
40%;
57%;
3%.
Method: Sought direction from superiors (213);
36%;
59%;
6%.
Method: Consulted my component‘s policy directives (156);
29%;
65%;
6%.
Method: Deconfliction database (166);
29%;
60%;
11%.
Method: Consulted MOUs (134);
23%;
67%;
10%.
Source: GAO analysis of survey responses.
Notes: A particular method was not applicable to all respondents. The
numbers in parentheses are the numbers of agents who answered about
the effectiveness of each method. Percentages may not sum to 100
because of rounding.
[End of figure]
Agents' responses to open-ended questions on effectiveness identified
both the benefits and limitations of the clarification mechanisms.
Some of the reported benefits of these mechanisms were that task
forces result in the development of good contacts and partnerships at
other agencies that help to determine roles and responsibilities,
conferring with agents from other components results in new leads that
assist in locating and apprehending fugitives, and consulting with
superiors allows agents to utilize their supervisor's experience and
training to gain access to new resources. Some of the reasons why
agents reported certain methods as not effective in determining roles
and responsibilities included that not all DOJ components use
deconfliction databases, not all agencies follow MOUs, and policy
directives are difficult to navigate through and they tend to be vague
and subject to interpretation. FBI officials stated that the existence
of policy directives, MOUs, joint task forces and deconfliction
databases is a more reliable indicator of how well the four components
are cooperating than the agents' perspectives about these mechanisms.
However, it is our view that the existence of these mechanisms, alone,
does not show how well the components are cooperating; rather, it is
the effectiveness of these mechanisms and how frequently they are used
and referred to that affect cooperation. We chose to rely on
testimonial data--that is, the perspectives of selected agents for
whom these mechanisms were developed. We recognize that these
perspectives are not generalizable, but at a minimum they provide
indications of how useful the agents who responded to our survey found
the clarification mechanisms.
Over One-Third of Agents Who Responded to the Survey Reported
Disagreements with Other Components, Which Negatively Affected
Investigations:
Sixty-three percent of agents (162 of 259) who responded to our survey
reported that they did not experience disagreements with another DOJ
component when determining roles and responsibilities during
particular investigations over the past 5 years. On the other hand, 37
percent of selected agents (97 of 259) who responded to our survey
reported that they had experienced such disagreements. In response to
an open-ended survey question on why disagreements occurred, 92 of the
97 agents provided reasons for disagreements, and they most frequently
reported unclear roles and responsibilities and the lack of
information sharing related to their investigations as the cause.
Specifically, 58 percent (53 of 92) cited unclear roles and
responsibilities with other components as the cause. For example, in
response to an open-ended question, a FBI agent stated that
disagreements usually occur between the FBI and DEA when they are both
targeting the same subject. The agent further wrote that the
disagreements are related to how the case should progress and who
should take the lead. Similarly, our analysis of the survey results
shows that selected agents who reported having disagreements also more
frequently reported lack of clarity regarding roles and
responsibilities than did agents who reported not having had a
disagreement. Specifically, 29 percent (28 of 96) of agents who
reported having disagreements also said that they sometimes or rarely
understand their roles and responsibilities in investigations with
shared jurisdiction, compared to 12 percent (19 of 162) of agents who
reported not having disagreements.
In addition to unclear roles and responsibilities, 28 percent (26 of
92) of the surveyed agents who reported having had a disagreement
wrote in narrative responses to an open-ended question that not
receiving relevant information from other components that were
conducting similar investigations was the cause for disagreements. For
example, a DEA agent cited concerns that information sharing was not
always reciprocated with the other DOJ components. Relatedly, in
response to a question we asked all agents, 27 percent (68 of 254)
reported that within the past 5 years they had become aware of
instances, either during or after an investigation, where they did not
receive relevant information from another DOJ law enforcement
component related to the investigation.
Component Involvement in Disagreements:
Similar to the level of agents' clarity, the extent to which surveyed
agents reported disagreements varied by component and location.
Specifically, 46 percent of ATF agents (30 of 65), 45 percent of DEA
agents (31 of 69) agents, 32 percent of USMS agents (18 of 56), and 26
percent of FBI agents (18 of 69) reported having a disagreement with
another component within the past 5 years regarding roles and
responsibilities. Also, as shown in figure 5, the percentage of these
surveyed agents in each city who reported having disagreements ranged
from 18 percent (6 of 34) in Houston to 63 percent (10 of 16) in Tulsa.
Figure 5: Percentages of Agents Who Reported Having Disagreements with
Another Component over Roles and Responsibilities over the Past 5
Years, by City:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
City: Tulsa, Oklahoma (16);
Percentage of disagreements: 63%.
City: New York, New York (36);
Percentage of disagreements: 58%.
City: Los Angeles, California (28);
Percentage of disagreements: 39%.
City: Orlando, Florida (28);
Percentage of disagreements: 39%.
City: Seattle, Washington (28);
Percentage of disagreements: 39%.
City: Minneapolis, Minnesota (31);
Percentage of disagreements: 35%.
City: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (28);
Percentage of disagreements: 29%.
City: Washington, District of Columbia (28);
Percentage of disagreements: 25%.
City: Houston, Texas (34);
Percentage of disagreements: 18%.
Source: GAO analysis of survey responses.
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of agents who
answered the question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of
rounding.
[End of figure]
Additionally, the extent to which survey respondents indicated
experiencing disagreements with agents in specific components varied.
Agents who indicated having had a disagreement over the past 5 years
most frequently reported rarely or never having had one with ATF, DEA,
and USMS; however, they most frequently reported always or often
having disagreements with the FBI, as shown in figure 6. The FBI has
more jurisdictional overlap than any of the other DOJ components,
which allows for more opportunities for disagreements. Nevertheless,
FBI agents were the least likely to report having a disagreement with
other components, and when FBI agents reported disagreements, the
agents most frequently indicated the disagreements were always or
often with ATF and USMS.
Figure 6: Percentages of Agents Who Responded to the Survey Who
Reported Disagreements with Certain Components:
[Refer to PDF for image: stacked vertical bar graph]
Frequency of disagreements:
DOJ Component: ATF (54);
Always/often: 24%;
Sometimes: 28%;
Rarely/never: 48%.
DOJ Component: DEA (51);
Always/often: 10%;
Sometimes: 27%;
Rarely/never: 63%.
DOJ Component: FBI (66);
Always/often: 58%;
Sometimes: 32%;
Rarely/never: 11%.
DOJ Component: USMS (61);
Always/often: 18%;
Sometimes: 21%;
Rarely/never: 61%.
Source: GAO analysis of survey responses.
Notes: The responses to the question about each component exclude
agents who worked in the component. The numbers in parentheses are the
numbers of survey respondents upon which the percentages are based.
Percentages do not include agents who indicated "not applicable"
choices. See appendix II for the number of agents who indicated "not
applicable" or did not answer the question. Percentages may not sum to
100 because of rounding.
[End of figure]
Extent to Which Components Reach Consensus on Roles and
Responsibilities Following Disagreements:
Surveyed agents who had indicated having had a disagreement with
another component over the past 5 years differed on how often
consensus was reached following a disagreement. Specifically, 39
percent of agents (37 of 96) who reported having disagreements said
that they were always or often able to reach consensus, 32 percent (31
of 96) reported that they sometimes reached consensus, and 23 percent
(22 of 96) reported that they rarely or never reached
consensus.[Footnote 14] In addition, 89 percent (71 of 80) of agents
reported that they most commonly resolved disagreements at the agent
level. In response to an open-ended question, one agent stated that
going to management to help resolve an issue between components only
slows down the investigation. The agent further added that ultimately,
all agents are working towards a common mission and service to the
public, and that disagreements are a waste of time and should be
resolved expeditiously.
Impact of Disagreements on Investigations:
Seventy-eight percent (76 of 97) of the agents who reported having
disagreements with another component, reported that these
disagreements sometimes, often, or always negatively impacted the
investigations. While only 6 percent of agents (6 of 94) reporting
disagreements indicated that they had resulted in "blue on blue"
incidents,[Footnote 15] 73 percent (69 of 95) reported that the
disagreements had resulted in prolonged investigations, 73 percent (70
of 96) reported that they had resulted in an unwillingness of
components wanting to work with each other, 64 percent (61 of 95) said
they had resulted in low morale, and 64 percent (60 of 94) said they
resulted in unnecessary use of resources, as shown in figure 7.
Figure 7: Percentages of Agents Who Reported on Negative Consequences
of Disagreements:
[Refer to PDF for image: vertical bar graph]
Negative consequences of disagreements:
Prolonged investigations (95):
Yes: 73%;
No: 18%;
Don't know: 9%.
Blue on blue (94):
Yes: 6%;
No: 83%;
Don't know: 11%.
Low morale (95):
Yes: 64%;
No: 23%;
Don't know: 13%.
Fugitive not apprehended (94):
Yes: 24%;
No: 56%;
Don't know: 19%.
Insufficient evidence collected for prosecution (94):
Yes: 31%;
No: 50%;
Don't know: 19%.
Unwillingness of components to work with each other (96):
Yes: 73%;
No: 19%;
Don't know: 8%.
Unnecessary use of resource (96):
Yes: 64%;
No: 26%;
Don't know: 11%.
Source: GAO analysis of survey responses.
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of agents who
answered about each negative consequence. Percentages may not sum to
100 because of rounding.
[End of figure]
In elaborating on an open-ended question on the negative consequences
of disagreements, one agent said that they delay prosecution, cause
contentious relationships, and disrupt clear communication, which
result in both a reduction in the quality of the evidence gathered and
a delay of arrest. Another agent said that if agencies do not share
information or work together, fugitives can sometimes escape. The
agent further stated that if an agent has a disagreement with another
component, it is less likely that the agent will want to work with
that component.
Working Relationships among Components:
We also asked all agents we surveyed to characterize their component's
overall working relationships with other components over the past 5
years. Agents who responded reported most frequently that their
component had good or very good working relationships with ATF, DEA,
and USMS, as shown in figure 8; however, 29 percent of non-FBI agents
(52 of 182) characterized their component's working relationship with
the FBI as good or very good, and 28 percent (51 of 182) characterized
the relationship as poor or very poor.
Figure 8: Percentages of Agents Who Reported on the Nature of Their
Component's Working Relationship with ATF, DEA, the FBI, and USMS:
[Refer to PDF for image: 4 pie-charts]
DEA, FBI, and USMS working relationship with ATF (190):
Very good/good: 68%;
Adequate: 17%;
Poor/very poor: 7%;
Don't know: 8%.
ATF, FBI, and USMS working relationship with DEA (187):
Very good/good: 68%;
Adequate: 18%;
Poor/very poor: 4%;
Don't know: 11%.
ATF, DEA, and USMS working relationship with FBI (182):
Very good/good: 29%;
Adequate: 35%;
Poor/very poor: 28%;
Don't know: 8%.
ATF, DEA, and FBI working relationship with USMS (200):
Very good/good: 74%;
Adequate: 17%;
Poor/very poor: 5%;
Don't know: 5%.
Source: GAO analysis of survey responses.
Notes: The responses to the question about each component exclude
agents who worked in the component. The numbers in parentheses are the
numbers of agents who answered about each component. Percentages may
not sum to 100 due to rounding.
[End of figure]
The extent to which agents reported their components having positive
working relationships with other components varied by geographic
location. However, for each city, with the exception of Philadelphia,
agents reported their component to have the least favorable working
relationship with the FBI compared to other components.[Footnote 16]
The FBI offered possible explanations for the agents' responses
regarding disagreements over roles and responsibilities and working
relationships among the components. First, the FBI stated that the
survey results could be measuring agents' dissatisfaction with
overlapping jurisdiction and the way in which responsibilities are
assigned, such that agents may have a negative perspective if they
feel they were ruled "against" or were on the "losing" end when roles
and responsibilities were determined. Second, the FBI stated that
because it has the greatest opportunity for jurisdictional overlap
among the four components, the results regarding "poor" working
relationships may have been confounded--that is, because the FBI has
more overlap than any other component, and there may be inherent
frustration with jurisdictional overlap, there is a greater chance
that more agents would report "poor" working relationships with the
FBI than with other components. Third, the FBI pointed out that the
cases for which it has overlapping jurisdiction account for a small
percentage of all of the work conducted by the FBI. We agree that
there could be several explanations for why agents responded as they
did, but considering that respondents reported that disagreements and
poor working relationships negatively affect investigations and
morale, determining how agents, beyond those in our nongeneralizable
sample, view their roles and responsibilities and cooperation with
other components is important and could help component managers
improve policy and operational effectiveness.
The perspectives of senior officials, such as police chiefs and their
deputies, in the local law enforcement agencies in the cities included
in our study were generally positive with regard to relationships
among the DOJ components, but some of these officials had observed
conflicts. Specifically, senior officials in five of the nine cities
stated that they had not observed or were not aware of any conflicts
among the DOJ components and that the components seemed to work well
with one another. On the other hand, senior officials in three cities
stated that the working relationships among DOJ components have
improved, but acknowledged that some problems remain.[Footnote 17] For
example, one police chief stated that the FBI and ATF do not get along
well in that particular city, but that the relationships between the
FBI and DEA have improved. Another chief stated that there continue to
be some turf battles and tension among the DOJ components, but the
attitude towards coordination has improved since the September 11th
attacks. A third chief stated that the DOJ components work well
together, but there is some competition among them because of
overlapping task forces.
One official stated that if there are any issues related to shared
jurisdiction, they are mostly resolved at the operational level, and
if not, the issues would go to the U.S. Attorney's Office (USAO).
[Footnote 18] Overall, the USAO officials we interviewed stated that
there were rarely any conflicts among the DOJ components and that they
observed good working relationships among them. For example, one USAO
official stated that he could think of no examples of jurisdictional
dispute in his 10 years of experience. He further stated that he
thought that the lack of conflict may be due to the fact that there is
a heavy workload for all components in terms of the amount of crime in
his city. Another USAO official stated that there had been disputes
between two components regarding roles and responsibilities related to
gang investigations. However, the components, along with the USAO,
worked together to determine which gangs each component would be
responsible for investigating.
DOJ Has Opportunities to Better Monitor Component Coordination and
Collaboration:
In addition to the mechanisms that are in place to clarify roles and
responsibilities, DOJ has also taken action to address issues that
have arisen regarding roles and responsibilities in specific crime
areas and to assess component coordination and collaboration, in
general. However, these efforts do not ensure that the types of
disagreements agents reported are identified consistently and
resolved. As previously discussed, ATF and the FBI share jurisdiction
for explosives investigations. Since 2004, DOJ has taken actions
intended to address confusion over roles and responsibilities during
explosives investigations. DOJ issued two MOUs, in 2004 and 2008, to
clarify which component should have lead jurisdiction, as well as
other issues related to explosives investigations, such as training
and information sharing. In 2009, the DOJ Office of the Inspector
General (IG) reported that ATF and the FBI were not adequately
coordinating their explosives-related operations, allocation of
investigative authority between the two agencies was unclear, and
jurisdictional disputes occurred between ATF and the FBI, delaying
explosives investigations and resulting in a disjointed federal
response to explosives incidents, some of which involved terrorist
incidents.[Footnote 19] During our review, we also found that the FBI
and ATF continue to experience disagreements over explosives
investigations. For example, ATF and FBI field agents we interviewed
in one city said that the local police department called ATF and the
FBI to a scene where pipe bombs had detonated on a college campus.
Both agents stated that the two agencies disagreed about which agency
was to take the lead in the investigation, primarily because it was
not yet clear whether the pipe bomb was intended for use in a
terrorist act. As a result of incidents such as these, the IG made 15
recommendations to improve explosives-related coordination, including
implementing a new department directive that clearly defined
jurisdiction between the agencies. In response to the IG findings, in
August 2010, the Acting Deputy Attorney General issued a protocol to
resolve the dispute by outlining factors that are indicative of a
connection to terrorism to clarify roles and responsibilities. Also,
according to DOJ officials in November 2010, ATF and the FBI submitted
plans to DOJ that address the IG's recommendation that included joint
training and new information-sharing policies, among other things. In
our March 2011 report regarding overlap, duplication, and
fragmentation, we reported that while these proposed actions should
address most of these issues, given that the components did not follow
through on past efforts to achieve these same objectives, it will be
important for the Congress and DOJ to continually monitor and evaluate
the components' actions to ensure that the plans have their intended
effect and are enforced.[Footnote 20]
In addition to disputes over explosives investigations, a 2007 DOJ IG
report on coordination by DOJ violent crime task forces found that
agents in some cities failed to use information-sharing systems such
as deconfliction databases, which resulted in duplicative
investigations. The report recommended that DOJ require each component
to use national and local information-sharing and deconfliction
systems to coordinate investigations and protect officer safety. As a
result of this recommendation, the Deputy Attorney General issued a
memorandum requiring areas where there are multiple DOJ violent crime
task forces to coordinate and deconflict. Further, the memorandum
required each component to issue requirements for information sharing
and coordination, which each component complied with in 2007. While
the components issued these requirements, agents who responded to our
survey less frequently reported using deconfliction databases than
using some other methods, and this method was one of the three methods
least likely to have been indicated as very effective by reported
users. In addition, agents reported a lack of information sharing as a
reason for disagreements over roles and responsibilities, and also
reported that it resulted in negative consequences. Therefore, our
survey results indicate that additional actions by DOJ could help
address these issues.
In addition to actions taken in response to conflicts that have arisen
regarding explosives and violent crime task forces, DOJ also has a
mechanism in place--periodic field office inspections--to ensure
better collaboration and coordination among components. However, the
scope of the inspections may limit DOJ's ability to identify some
problems. Each DOJ law enforcement component conducts inspections of
its field offices every 3 to 6 years. These inspections cover areas
such as working relationships, operational programs, leadership,
management, and administrative programs. The inspection teams--which
consist of members of the components' inspection teams, as well as
supervisory agents from the field--interview managers from other DOJ
components in the region as well as USAO, local police departments,
and other federal partners. However, three of the four components do
not solicit input from line agents--who are the ones collaborating
with agents from other components on a daily basis. For example, we
reviewed portions of the inspection reports related to working
relationships and found that ATF inspection teams only solicited input
from ATF field managers and field managers from other components, but
did not include agents. DEA solicited input from its own agents, but
did not solicit input from agents in the other components. Although we
did not interview and survey a generalizable sample of DOJ component
managers and agents, we found that the managers and agents we did
contact had varying perspectives on clarity of roles and
responsibilities, disagreements, and working relationships. For
example, an ASAC we interviewed in one field office said that he was
not aware of any disagreements among DOJ components in that particular
city; however, most of the agents (10 of 16) from the same field
office who responded to our survey reported having had disagreements
with another DOJ component in the past 5 years. Our survey results
also suggest that managers may not be aware of agent disagreements
because 89 percent of agents (71 of 80) who reported having
experienced disagreements also reported that when disagreements are
resolved, it is typically done so at the agent level. However, not all
disagreements are resolved, and according to 45 percent of the agents
who reported having had a disagreement (43 of 95), there are some
disagreements that because of their severity or frequency, need to be
addressed. For example one FBI agent said in response to an open-ended
question that DEA, ATF, FBI, USMS, and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement within the Department of Homeland Security all work drug,
gang, and firearms violations. The agent further stated that the roles
are not clear, which has led to duplication of efforts. One USMS agent
said that fugitive apprehension issues with the FBI need to be
addressed.
In addition to the inspection process, FBI officials stated that they
conduct an annual climate survey of all FBI employees, including field
agents, which solicits employees' input on collaboration with other
DOJ components as well as other federal agencies. While the FBI's
efforts to solicit employee feedback are to be commended, most of the
coordination-related questions on the survey are specific to
information sharing within the intelligence community, and the
questions that relate specifically to law enforcement coordination do
not explicitly address clarity of roles and responsibilities,
disagreements with other components, or the quality of working
relationships. Officials from the other three components could not
think of any mechanisms in place, beyond the inspection process, to
obtain feedback from agents on working relationships and coordination.
Our work on effective interagency collaboration has shown that federal
agencies engaged in collaborative efforts need to create the means to
monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas
for improvement. Reporting on these activities can help key decision
makers within the agencies, as well as clients and stakeholders, to
obtain feedback for improving both policy and operational
effectiveness. Moreover, according to DOJ's strategic plan, the
internal inspection and review process is designed to foster improved
operations, among other things. However, as currently designed, the
components' inspection processes are limited in the extent to which
they can help DOJ achieve these goals. Assessing options such as
changing the inspections process or developing some other mechanism,
such as an agent survey, to help identify and resolve jurisdictional
disputes could help components limit the negative impacts from
jurisdictional disputes over investigations in the field.
Conclusions:
The majority of agents who responded to our survey indicated they were
clear about their component's roles and responsibilities when there is
jurisdictional overlap, and the mechanisms in place to provide clarity
and share information are somewhat effective. However, over one-third
of the agents who responded to our survey reported that over the past
5 years they have experienced disagreements with other components over
roles and responsibilities during an investigation, primarily because
of lack of clarity and lack of information sharing. Such disagreements
were reported to have negatively affected investigations and working
relationships among components, yet DOJ's efforts to identify and
address these issues can be strengthened. It is important that DOJ
better identify when disagreements occur and diagnose why they are
occurring so it can improve both policy and operational effectiveness.
This information could be used to decide if and how to make
improvements in the mechanisms available to agents to clarify roles
and responsibilities. For example, additional data could help DOJ
identify issues with the use of deconfliction mechanisms that are
intended to resolve problems with information sharing among agents and
determine roles and responsibilities. By considering options for
better gauging, diagnosing, and addressing the reasons for
disagreements in the field--such as effectively soliciting agents'
perspectives during the inspection process or periodically surveying
agents and managers--DOJ could be better positioned to limit the
potential for negative impact on its investigations and resources.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We recommend that the Attorney General, the ATF Director, the DEA
Administrator, the FBI Director, and the Director of USMS assess the
feasibility of options they could take to better determine the extent
to which agents are clear on their roles and responsibilities and have
experienced disagreements with other components in areas of shared
jurisdiction. Actions taken from such an assessment could provide the
data necessary to determine why disagreements are occurring and
whether and how they could improve clarity, avoid negative impacts on
investigations, and enhance the working relationships among components.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
On March 28, 2011, DOJ provided written comments on a draft of this
report, which are reprinted in appendix V.
DOJ agreed with our recommendation that the Attorney General and the
directors and administrators of the four DOJ law enforcement
components should assess the feasibility of options they could take to
better determine the extent to which agents are clear on their roles
and responsibilities and experience disagreements. In addition, DOJ
recognized that it must continue its efforts to work on conflicts as
they arise. DOJ also offered two other perspectives about our report.
First, DOJ stated that it believes our report should have included
more information highlighting the department's on-going efforts to
enhance working relationships and collaboration among the law
enforcement components. Second, DOJ stated that it believes we should
have relied less on our survey results in part because they are
nongeneralizable.
In its letter, DOJ stated that it provided us access to documentation
of mechanisms--specifically, policy directives, MOUs, task forces, and
deconfliction databases--used by DOJ law enforcement components to
collaborate and resolve jurisdictional misunderstandings, but
suggested that we could have discussed these mechanisms in greater
detail in the report. DOJ asserted in its letter that MOUs and
deconfliction databases are proven mechanisms of collaboration. We
appreciate the documentation that DOJ provided to us and found it very
useful in identifying the various mechanisms DOJ has in place to
clarify components' roles and responsibilities. We carefully reviewed
and assessed the information DOJ provided to gain an understanding of
these mechanisms and summarized each of them in our report. We
acknowledge that these mechanisms may help to improve coordination
among the DOJ components. However, we also think that it is important
to go beyond describing the mechanisms to determining to what extent
agents themselves think the mechanisms are effective at clarifying
roles and responsibilities and use them to coordinate investigations.
We discuss these perspectives in our report to help provide DOJ with
information it can consider as it assesses the effectiveness of these
mechanisms.
With regard to coordination between ATF and the FBI on explosives
investigations, DOJ commented that the survey results cited in the
report were obtained prior to when the Deputy Attorney General issued
Explosives Protocols on August 3, 2010. DOJ suggested that if survey
responses were solicited now, the results regarding explosives
investigations would be more positive. While the new protocols are a
positive step that if implemented effectively should lead to more
efficient approaches to explosives investigations, as we reported in
March 2011, the components have not fully followed through on past
efforts to achieve these same objectives.[Footnote 21] Therefore, we
will continue to monitor the components' actions to ensure that the
plans have their intended effect and are enforced.
Finally, DOJ also stated that it believes the report could have relied
less on the opinions of agents, since the survey's results were
nongeneralizable. Because our objective was to determine the extent to
which agents were clear on their components' roles and
responsibilities in areas of shared investigative jurisdiction, we
thought it important to obtain the perspectives about these issues
from agents who work investigations with overlapping jurisdiction on a
daily basis. Our original proposal to DOJ was to conduct a
generalizable survey of agents who had investigated crimes in at least
one of the six investigative areas in the nine cities we selected.
However, because of DOJ's concerns about providing us access to
contact information for such a large number of agents, we had to
modify our approach and conduct a nongeneralizable survey. DOJ was
aware of this throughout the course of our review. We believe that the
results we obtained provide us and DOJ with valuable information about
the views of agents on important issues, such as how clear they are
about their roles and how well they collaborate on investigations. We
were also very careful throughout the report to discuss how we
conducted our survey and any limitations that were created, as well as
what results we obtained and what the results mean based on our agent
sample. To help validate and enrich these survey results, we also
solicited and reported on the perspectives of field office managers
for each of the components in the nine cities we visited regarding
clarity of roles and responsibilities. We disagree with DOJ's
perspective that the report overstated the frequency and negative
effect of disagreements between the law enforcement components. For
each key statistic and survey result we report, we include data on the
percentage and number of agents who provided a response on that issue,
as well as the total number of agents who answered the question. We
believe the results of our work provide DOJ with important information
on agents' as well as field office managers' perspectives about how
well coordination with other components in areas of shared
investigative jurisdiction is working. We acknowledge that it is DOJ's
responsibility to determine to what extent the department believes the
disagreements and negative consequences reported by surveyed agents,
such as prolonged investigations and unnecessary use of resources,
warrant further study and corrective actions.
As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the
Department of Justice and other interested parties. The report also
will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI.
Signed by:
Eileen Regan Larence:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Our review focused on the six crime areas in which two or more
Department of Justice (DOJ) components have legal jurisdiction to
conduct investigations. We analyzed statutory provisions as well as
DOJ and component law enforcement strategic plans to determine the
extent to which jurisdiction to investigate crimes is shared among the
components. We determined these areas to be: arson, drugs, explosives,
gangs, guns, and fugitives, based on our review of laws and
regulations. Our approach to evaluating the methods used to clarify
roles and responsibilities, and the extent to which the components are
clear on their roles and responsibilities was comprised various
methods, including reviews of DOJ and component guidance and
documentation, site visits, an agent survey, and interviews with
officials. For our site visits and field office interviews, we
selected a non-probability sample of nine field office locations based
on (1) a range of city sizes; (2) the presence of all four DOJ
components; and (3) geographic dispersion.[Footnote 22] The nine
cities selected were: (1) Houston, Texas; (2) Los Angeles, California;
(3) Minneapolis, Minnesota; (4) New York, New York; (5) Orlando,
Florida; (6) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; (7) Seattle, Washington; (8)
Tulsa, Oklahoma and (9) Washington, D.C.
In each of the nine selected cities, we interviewed each component's
management and obtained the component's perspective on the clarity of
roles and responsibilities in the areas of jurisdiction under review,
methods used to clarify roles and responsibilities, and the frequency
of disagreements. In addition, we interviewed Assistant U.S. Attorneys
to obtain their perspectives on the clarity of roles and
responsibilities among the components, and the working relationship of
the four components, as well as the U.S. Attorneys Office's (USAO)
role in coordination. Also, we interviewed police chiefs from the nine
selected cities to obtain their views on the clarity of DOJ
components' roles and responsibilities and the methods used to
coordinate investigations, as well as their knowledge of the extent to
which DOJ components had disagreements about roles and
responsibilities during investigations with shared jurisdiction. Table
1 lists the USAOs and police departments we visited in each location.
Table 1: USAO Offices and Police Departments Visited in Nine Selected
Localities:
Locality: Houston, Texas;
USAO office: Texas, Southern District;
Local law enforcement agency: Houston Police Department.
Locality: Los Angeles, California;
USAO office: California, Central District;
Local law enforcement agency: Los Angeles Police Department.
Locality: Minneapolis, Minnesota;
USAO office: Minnesota, Minnesota District;
Local law enforcement agency: Minneapolis Police Department.
Locality: New York, New York;
USAO office: New York, Southern District;
Local law enforcement agency: New York Police Department.
Locality: Orlando, Florida;
USAO office: Florida, Middle District;
Local law enforcement agency: Orlando Police Department.
Locality: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania;
USAO office: Pennsylvania, Eastern District;
Local law enforcement agency: Philadelphia Police Department.
Locality: Seattle, Washington;
USAO office: Washington, Western District;
Local law enforcement agency: Seattle Police Department.
Locality: Tulsa, Oklahoma;
USAO office: Oklahoma, Northern District;
Local law enforcement agency: Tulsa Police Department.
Locality: Washington, DC.;
USAO office: District of Columbia District;
Local law enforcement agency: Metropolitan Police Department.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
DOJ agents, particularly those at the special agent and deputy marshal
level, work investigations on a daily basis where jurisdictions
overlap. We therefore decided to survey them to obtain their
perspectives on the level of clarity about roles and responsibilities
in the six investigative areas, and the methods used to achieve this
clarity. We planned to conduct a survey that would allow us to
generalize responses from agents across the 36 field offices--the
offices for each of the four components in each of the nine cities.
However, because of DOJ's concerns about providing us access to
contact information for such a large number of agents, we were limited
to conducting a survey with a nongeneralizable sample of agents across
the cities. Each component compiled a list of its agents in that
office. We requested that each list contain all agents in the field
office classified as non-supervisory 1811 investigators and who had
investigated crimes in at least one of the six jurisdictional areas
covered in our review.[Footnote 23] The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) did not include agents involved in the Joint
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) or agents involved in intelligence matters
because of national security concerns. Because of DOJ's concerns about
GAO maintaining agent's contact information in its work papers, DOJ
maintained control of the lists at all times. Once the lists were
compiled, DOJ provided us with a count of the total number of agents
in each of the 36 offices. Table 2 contains a summary of these survey
population counts.
Table 2: Counts of Special Agents and Deputy Marshals by Location and
Component:
City: Houston;
ATF: 45;
DEA: 102;
FBI: 124;
USMS: 15;
Total: 286.
City: Los Angeles;
ATF: 31;
DEA: 134;
FBI: 80;
USMS: 14;
Total: 259.
City: Minneapolis;
ATF: 7;
DEA: 14;
FBI: 100;
USMS: 13;
Total: 134.
City: New York;
ATF: 31;
DEA: 238;
FBI: 79;
USMS: 10;
Total: 358.
City: Orlando;
ATF: 11;
DEA: 19;
FBI: 7;
USMS: 5;
Total: 42.
City: Philadelphia;
ATF: 31;
DEA: 89;
FBI: 83;
USMS: 6;
Total: 209.
City: Seattle;
ATF: 14;
DEA: 29;
FBI: 39;
USMS: 4;
Total: 86.
City: Tulsa;
ATF: 7;
DEA: 4;
FBI: 3;
USMS: 2;
Total: 16.
City: DC;
ATF: 21;
DEA: 55;
FBI: 64;
USMS: 33;
Total: 173.
City: Total;
ATF: 198;
DEA: 684;
FBI: 579;
USMS: 102;
Total: 1,563.
Sources: ATF, DEA, FBI, and USMS.
[End of table]
Our nongeneralizable sample of agents was selected to limit
disruptions to field office operations. We restricted the size of our
sample and randomly selected 10 agents from each office. If an office
had 10 or fewer eligible agents, we selected all of them. In total, we
selected 315 agents. We do not generalize the survey results to all
non-supervisory 1811 investigators who had investigated crimes in at
least one of the six jurisdictional areas in each city. However, we
believe the survey results we obtained provide us with valuable
information about the range of views concerning their roles and
responsibilities and experiences in the investigative areas with
shared jurisdiction held by federal agents who responded.
Our survey period was from June 17, 2010 through August 25, 2010. The
questionnaires were sent by GAO via Federal Express from the DOJ to a
point of contact in each of the 36 offices, and the contact person
distributed survey packets--including a cover letter, copy of the
questionnaire, and postage-paid return envelope--to selected agents.
Following the same process, we sent one follow-up survey packet to
each nonrespondent. In all, we received responses from 260 of the 315
agents for an overall 83 percent response rate. The response rates for
the individual components were 77 percent for the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) (65 of 84 agents); 83 percent
for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) (70 of 84 agents); 86
percent for the FBI (69 of 80 agents); and 84 percent for U.S. Marshal
Services) (USMS (56 of 67 marshals). The numbers of agents who
responded to survey questions varied depending on skip instructions
contained in the survey questionnaire. Also, agents may have chosen
not to answer certain questions. The survey results we provide in our
report depend on these factors. Percentages are based on the number of
agents who responded to specific survey questions.
For the survey, the practical difficulties of conducting such surveys
may introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For
example, difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, the
sources of information available to respondents, or how data are
entered into databases or analyzed can introduce unwanted variability
into the survey results. We took steps in the development of the
questionnaires to minimize these nonsampling errors. For example, a
social science survey specialist designed the questionnaire in
collaboration with GAO staff with subject matter expertise. The
questionnaire contained a combination of open-ended and close-ended
questions, and it asked agents about their experiences with their
component in their current location over a period of reference of up
to 5 years. We pretested the questionnaire in person with agents in
each component in each of two locations. During the pretests, we asked
the agents questions to determine whether (1) the survey questions
were clear, (2) the terms used were precise, (3) the questionnaire
placed an undue burden on the respondents, and (4) the questions were
unbiased. We made changes to the content and format of the final
questionnaire based on the pretests and reviews of the draft
questionnaire by DOJ management. All data from the returned
questionnaires were double key-entered into an electronic file in
batches (that is, the entries were 100 percent verified), and a random
sample of each batch was selected for further verification for
completeness and accuracy. Computer analyses were also performed to
identify any inconsistencies in response patterns or other indications
of errors. All computer syntax was reviewed and verified by a separate
programmer to ensure that the syntax had been written and executed
correctly.
In addition to the survey and management interviews, we used various
other methods to identify mechanisms used to clarify roles and
responsibilities in areas of shared jurisdiction. We analyzed
memorandums of understanding, descriptions of de-confliction
databases, components' inspection reports from selected cities, DOJ
working group papers, and task force membership. We also reviewed the
reports from two studies conducted by the DOJ Office of the Inspector
General's Office about federal law enforcement coordination. We found
the conclusions and recommendations drawn in each report to be
appropriate based on the methodologies used. In addition, we also
examined data from the Executive Office of the U.S. Attorneys, FBI,
and USMS. To assess the reliability of the data we obtained, we
discussed the sources of the data with agency officials and determined
that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this
report.
We conducted this performance audit from March 2009 through February
2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence provides a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Law Enforcement Coordination Survey Results:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GA0:
GAO Survey of ATF, DEA, FBI, and U.S. Marshals Service Law Enforcement
Agents:
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), an agency of the
Congress, has been asked to assess how DOJ law enforcement agents
determine their roles and responsibilities when addressing crimes that
involve guns, drugs, gangs, explosives, arson, and fugitives, for
which there is shared jurisdiction among DOJ law enforcement
components. As part of this review, GAO is surveying field agents with
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) in 9 field office locations.
This review is limited to DOJ components and does not include
components of the Department of Homeland Security.
GAO has randomly chosen you to receive this survey. We would like you
to respond based on your experiences with your component in your
current location over the past 5 years. If you have less than 5 years
experience in your current location, please answer about the time
you have worked there.
Please do not disclose the following information in your narrative
responses:
* Law enforcement sensitive information;
* Information about on-going investigations;
* Information on counterterrorism or other national intelligence
matters;
* Any work related to a Joint Terrorism Task Force (However, you may
describe investigations into criminal explosive incidents that were
determined to be unrelated to terrorism.)
GAO will present the aggregate results of this survey in our report to
Congress. Although in some cases individual survey responses may be
discussed, the report will not include any information that could be
used to identify individual respondents. Identifying information will
be kept confidential and will not be released outside GAO, unless
compelled by law or pursuant to a Congressional request.
Please complete this questionnaire and return it within two weeks of
receipt. A pre-addressed postage-paid envelope has been included in
which to return this questionnaire. Please do not include your name on
the return envelope. If you have any questions, please contact:
Background:
Notes: The number in parentheses is the number of respondents who
answered a question.
Missing is the number of eligible respondents who did not answer a
question.
1. With which DOJ component are you employed? (Check one.)
ATF: 25% (65);
DEA: 27% (70);
FBI: 27% (69);
USMS: 22% (56).
Notes: Percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Missing = 0.
2. In what city are you currently located? (Check one.)
Washington, DC: 11% (29);
Philadelphia: 11% (28);
New York: 14% (36);
Seattle: 11% (28);
Los Angeles: 11% (28);
Tulsa: 6% (16);
Orlando: 11% (28);
Minneapolis: 12% (31);
Houston: 13% (34).
Note: Missing = 2.
3. What is your current title?
(258).
Missing = 2.
4. How many years have you been working for this component in your
current location?
0 years: 1% (2);
1 to 5 years: 40% (104);
6 to 10 years: 36% (92);
11 to 15 years: 14% (36);
16 to 20 years: 5% (13);
21 to 30 years: 4% (10).
Notes: Responses were grouped into the above age categories.
Missing = 3.
5. How many years in total have you been employed by this DOJ
component?
0 years: less than 1% (1);
1 to 5 years: 20% (51);
6 to 10 years: 33% (86);
11 to 15 years: 25% (66);
16 to 20 years: 12% (30);
21 to 30 years: 10% (25).
Notes: Responses were grouped into the above yearly categories.
Missing = 1.
6. In your current location over the past 5 years, have you been
assigned to any task forces either led by your component or other DOJ
components?
Yes: 69% (180): Continue with question 7.
No: 31% (80): Go to the Roles and Responsibilities section on page 3.
Note: Missing = 0.
7. If you checked "Yes" to question 6, to which task forces have you
been assigned? (Check one box in each row.)
a. USMS Fugitive Task Force:
Yes: 67% (59);
No: 33% (29).
b. FBI Safe Streets Task Force:
Yes: 42% (29);
No: 58% (40).
c. Project Safe Neighborhood Task Force:
Yes: 20% (11);
No: 80% (45).
d. ATF Violent Crime Impact Team (VCIT):
Yes: 34% (23);
No: 66% (44).
e. DEA Mobile Enforcement Team (MET):
Yes: 13% (7);
No: 87% (47).
f. Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF):
Yes: 44% (29);
No: 56% (37).
g. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA):
Yes: 54% (41);
No: 46% (35).
h. Other (Specify):
Yes: 68% (48);
No: 32% (23).
Notes: Percentages in rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Missing: a = 92, b = 111, c= 124, d = 113, e = 126, f = 114, g = 104,
h= 109.
Roles and Responsibilities:
In responding to the following questions, please consider your
experiences in your current location over the past 5 years.
8. Approximately what percentage of your investigations involved the
following crimes as the principal investigative focus? (Because
investigations can involve more than one type of crime, percentages do
not need to sum to 100%)
a. Guns:
Percentage of investigations: Ave. = 40% (172).
b. Drugs:
Percentage of investigations: Ave. = 59% (207).
c. Gangs:
Percentage of investigations: Ave. = 32% (142).
d. Explosives:
Percentage of investigations: Ave. = 8% (100).
e. Arson:
Percentage of investigations: Ave. = 8% (94).
f. Fugitives:
Percentage of investigations: Ave. = 39% (154).
g. Other:
Percentage of investigations: Ave. = 31% (115).
Note: Missing: a = 88, b = 53, c= 118, d = 160, e = 166, f = 106, g =
145.
9. In your experience, how often have you had a clear understanding
regarding your roles and responsibilities on investigations where
there is shared jurisdiction among DOJ law enforcement components
(ATF, DEA, FBI, and USMS)? (Check one.)
Always: 45% (115);
Often: 35% (90);
Sometimes: 14% (35);
Rarely: 5% (12);
Never: 0;
Don't know: 2% (6).
Notes: Percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Missing = 2.
10. Listed below are investigative areas where DOJ law enforcement
components share jurisdiction. How clear are you on your agency's
roles and responsibilities in each of these investigative areas?
(Check one box in each row.)
a. Guns:
Very clear: 67% (168)
Somewhat clear: 28% (70)
Not clear: 4% (11)
No basis to judge[A]: 9.
b. Drugs:
Very clear: 70% (176)
Somewhat clear: 26% (64)
Not clear: 4% (11)
No basis to judge[A]: 7.
c. Gangs:
Very clear: 58% (142)
Somewhat clear: 35% (84)
Not clear: 7% (17)
No basis to judge[A]: 13.
d. Explosives:
Very clear: 62% (132)
Somewhat clear: 28% (59)
Not clear: 11% (23)
No basis to judge[A]: 42.
e. Arson:
Very clear: 66% (136)
Somewhat clear: 24% (50)
Not clear: 10% (20)
No basis to judge[A]: 50.
f. Fugitives:
Very clear: 69% (166)
Somewhat clear: 25% (59)
Not clear: 6% (14)
No basis to judge[A]: 17.
Note: Percentages in rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Missing:a=2, b=2, c=4, d=4, e=4, f=4.
[A] Responses not included in the calculation of percentages.
11. In your current location over the past 5 years, did you use any of
the following methods to determine your roles and responsibilities
when working on an investigation where there was shared jurisdiction
between your and another DOJ component?
a. Accessed a deconfliction database:
Yes: 65% (168);
No: 30% (77);
Don't know: 5% (14);
Note: Missing = 1.
12. In your experience, how effective was this method in helping you
to determine your roles and responsibilities? (from 11.a, Yes)
Very effective: 29% (48);
Somewhat effective: 60% (100);
Not effective: 11% (18);
Note: Missing = 2.
If you checked "No" for item a, please explain why you did not use the
method.
(72); Missing = 5.
If you checked "Very effective" or "Not effective" for item a, please
explain why you felt the method was very effective or not effective.
(49); Missing = 17.
b. Conferred with agents from other components when initiating the
investigation:
Yes: 85% (220);
No: 13% (33);
Don't know: 2% (5);
Note: Missing = 2.
From 11.b, Yes:
Very effective: 40% (89);
Somewhat effective: 57% (125);
Not effective: 3% (6)
Note: Missing = 0.
If you checked "No" for item b, please explain why you did not use the
method.
(32); Missing = 1.
If you checked "Very effective" or "Not effective" for item b, please
explain why you felt the method was very effective or not effective.
(70); Missing = 25.
c. Sought direction from superiors:
Yes: 85% (216);
No: 13% (34);
Don't know: 2% (5);
Note: Missing = 5.
From c. Yes:
Very effective: 36% (76);
Somewhat effective: 59% (125);
Not effective: 6% (12);
Note: Missing = 3.
If you checked "No" for item c, please explain why you did not use the
method.
(32); Missing = 2.
If you checked "Very effective" or "Not effective" for item c, please
explain why you felt the method was very effective or not effective.
(65); Missing = 23.
d. Consulted Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs):
Yes: 53% (135)
No: 40% (103)
Don't know: 7% (17)
Note: Missing = 5.
From d. Yes:
Very effective: 23% (31)
Somewhat effective: 67% (90)
Not effective: 10% (13)
Note: Missing = 1.
If you checked "No' for item d, please explain why you did not use the
method.
(86); Missing = 17.
If you checked "Very effective" or "Not effective" for item d, please
explain why you felt the method was very effective or not effective.
(34); Missing = 10.
e. Relied on my experience from working with task forces:
Yes 79% (200);
No 17% (44);
Don't know. 4% (10);
Note: Missing = 6.
From e. Yes:
Very effective: 49% (98);
Somewhat effective: 48% (96);
Not effective: 2% (4);
Note: Missing = 2.
If you checked "No" for item e, please explain why you did lot use the
method.
(39); Missing = 5.
If you checked 'Very effective" or Not effective" for item e, please
explain why you felt the method was very effective or not effective.
(76); Missing = 26.
f. Consulted my component's policy directives, such as the agent
manual:
Yes: 62% (157);
No: 32% (80);
Don't know: 6% (16);
Note: Missing = 1.
From f. Yes:
Very effective: 29% (45);
Somewhat effective: 65% (102);
Not effective: 6% (9);
Note: Missing = 7.
If you checked "No' for item f, please explain why you did lot use the
method.
(83); Missing = 17
If you checked "Very effective" or "Not effective" for item f, please
explain why you felt the method was very effective or not effective.
(42); Missing = 12.
g. Other (Specify):
Yes: 36% (45);
No: 64% (81);
Don't know: 0;
Note: Missing = 134.
From g. Yes:
Very effective: 49% (22);
Somewhat effective: 49% (22);
Not effective: 2% (1);
Note: Missing = 0.
If you checked "Very effective" or Not effective" for item g, please
explain why you felt the method was very effective or not effective.
(18); Missing = 5.
Note: Percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
13.ln your current location over the past 5 years, have you
experienced disagreements with another DOJ component (ATF, DEA, FBI,
and USMS) when determining roles and responsibilities during an
investigation where there was shared jurisdiction?
Yes: 37% (97): Continue with question 14;
No: 63% (162) 0: Go to question 24.
Note: Missing = 1.
14. If you checked "Yes" to question 13, how often have you
experienced disagreements with any of the following components over
roles and responsibilities in areas of shared jurisdiction? (Check one
box in each row.)
a. ATF:
Have not worked with this component while in this office[A]: 4;
Not applicable, I work in this component[A]: 28;
Always: 9% (5);
Often: 15% (8);
Sometimes: 28% (15);
Rarely: 22% (12);
Never: 26% (14).
b. DEA:
Have not worked with this component while in this office[A]: 8;
Not applicable, I work in this component[A]: 18;
Always: 0;
Often: 10% (5);
Sometimes: 27% (14);
Rarely: 35% (18);
Never: 27% (14).
c. FBI:
Have not worked with this component while in this office[A]: 4;
Not applicable, I work in this component[A]: 12;
Always: 9% (6);
Often: 48% (32);
Sometimes: 32% (21);
Rarely: 6% (4);
Never: 5% (3).
d. USMS:
Have not worked with this component while in this office[A]: 6;
Not applicable, I work in this component[A]: 12;
Always: 5% (3);
Often: 13% (8);
Sometimes: 21% (13);
Rarely: 26% (16);
Never: 34% (21).
Notes: Percentages in rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Missing:
a = 11 (includes 2 ATF agents who provided either a response other
than Not applicable" or did not provide any answer).
b = 20 (includes 13 DEA agents who provided either a response other
than Not applicable" or did not provide any answer).
c = 15 (includes 7 FBI agents who provided either a response other
than Not applicable" or did not provide any answer).
d = 18 (includes 7 USMS deputy marshals who did not provide any
answer).
[A] Responses not included in the calculation of percentages.
15. What were some of the reasons for these disagreements? (Please
provide examples to illustrate your answer)
(92); Missing =5.
16. In your experience, what were are the most effective methods used
to resolve disagreements?
(88); Missing = 9.
17.To the extent of your knowledge, what are the top three levels at
which disagreements are most commonly resolved? (Place a "1" in the
space next to the level where disagreements are most commonly
resolved, followed by a "2" and "3" for those that follow. Please
enter "1",'2", and "3" only once each.)
a. Agent to Agent (Deputy US Marshal):
Three most common levels: 89% (71).
b. Group Supervisor/Supervisory Deputy Marshal:
Three most common levels: 84% (67).
c. ASAC/Assistant Chief US Marshal:
Three most common levels: 59% (47).
d. SAC/US Marshal:
Three most common levels: 26% (21).
e. USAO:
Three most common levels: 31% (25).
f. Your component's headquarters:
Three most common levels: 10% (8).
g. DOJ headquarters:
Three most common levels: 6% (5).
Check "Don't know" if you feel you do not have enough information to
answer this question.
Don't know: (11).
Note: Missing = 6.
18.In your experience, how often have the components involved reached a
consensus on roles and responsibilities following a disagreement?
(Check one.)
Always: 7% (7);
Often: 31% (30);
Sometimes: 32% (31);
Rarely: 20% (19);
Never: 3% (3);
Don't know: 6% (6).
Notes: Percentages do not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Missing = 1.
19. How often has the disagreement negatively affected the
investigation? (Check one.)
Always: 7% (7);
Often: 31% (30);
Sometimes: 40% (39);
Rarely: 21% (20);
Never: 1% (1);
Don't know: 0;
Note: Missing = 0.
20. Have any of the disagreements you have experienced with other DOJ
law enforcement components (ATF, DEA, FBI, and USMS) about roles and
responsibilities, resulted in any of the following negative
consequences? (Check one box in each row.)
a. Prolonged investigation:
Yes: 73% (69);
No: 18% (17);
Don't know: 9% (9).
b. "Blue on Blue" incidents:
Yes: 6% (6);
No: 83% (78);
Don't know: 11% (10).
c. Low morale:
Yes: 64% (61);
No: 23% (22);
Don't know: 13% (12).
d. Fugitive not apprehended:
Yes: 24% (23);
No: 56% (53);
Don't know: 19% (18).
e. Insufficient evidence collected for prosecution:
Yes: 31% (29);
No: 50% (47);
Don't know: 19% (18).
f. Unwillingness of components to work with each other:
Yes: 73% (70);
No: 19% (18);
Don't know: 8% (8).
g. Unnecessary use of resources (i.e., technical equipment, agents'
time and efforts):
Yes: 64% (60);
No: 26% (24);
Don't know: 11% (10).
h. Other (Specify):
Yes: 33% (7);
No: 29% (6);
Don't know: 38% (8).
Notes: Percentages in rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Missing: a = 2, b = 3 ,c = 2, d = 3, e = 3, f = 1,g = 3, h =76.
21. If you checked "Yes" to any of the items in question 20, please
identify the item and explain why you answered "Yes".
(79); Missing = 7.
22. In your experience, have there been any disagreements regarding
roles and responsibilities among the DOJ components that, because of
their severity or frequency, need to be addressed?
Yes: 45% (43): Continue with question 23.
No: 55% (52): Go to question 24.
Note: Missing = 2.
23. If you checked "Yes" to question 22, please provide an example of
such disagreements.
(42); Missing = 1.
24. Within the past 5 years, did you become aware - either during or
after an investigation - of any instances where you did not receive
relevant information from another DOJ law enforcement component (ATF,
DEA, FBI, and USMS) related to one of your investigations?
Yes: 27% (68): Continue with question 25.
No: 73% 186): Go to question 26.
Note: Missing = 6.
25. If you checked "Yes" to question 24, did not receiving this
information result in any of the following negative consequences?
(Check one box in each row.)
a. Prolonged investigation:
Yes: 78% (49);
No: 17% (11);
Don't know: 5% (3).
b. "Blue on Blue" incidents:
Yes: 9% (5);
No: 82% (45);
Don't know: 9% (5).
c. Low morale:
Yes: 60% (35);
No: 28% (16);
Don't know: 12% (7).
d. Fugitive not apprehended:
Yes: 33% (19);
No: 53% (30);
Don't know: 14% (8).
e. Insufficient evidence collected for prosecution:
Yes: 26% (15);
No: 53% (30);
Don't know: 21% (12).
f. Unwillingness to work with other components:
Yes: 65% (39);
No: (32% (19);
Don't know: 3% (2).
g. Unnecessary use of resources (i.e., technical equipment, agents'
time and efforts):
Yes: 72% (44);
No: 20% (12);
Don't know: 8% (5).
h. Other (Specify):
Yes: 10% (2);
No: 60% (12);
Don't know: 30% (6).
Notes: Percentages in rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Missing: a = 5, b = 13, c = 10, d = 11, e = 11, f = 8, g = 7, h = 48.
26. Based on your experience in your current location over the past 5
years, overall how would you characterize your agency's working
relationship with each of the following DOJ components? (Check one box
in each row.)
a. ATF:
Not applicable, I work in this component[A]: 64;
Very good: 39% (75);
Good: 28% (54);
Adequate: 17% (32);
Poor: 4% (7);
Very poor: 4% (7);
Don't know: 8% (15).
b. DEA:
Not applicable, I work in this component[A]: 51;
Very good: 37% (69);
Good: 31% (58);
Adequate: 18% (33);
Poor: 3% (5);
Very poor: 1% (2);
Don't know: 11% (20).
c. FBI:
Not applicable, I work in this component[A]: 55;
Very good: 10% (19);
Good: 18% (33);
Adequate: 35% (64);
Poor: 19% (34);
Very poor: 9% (17);
Don't know: 8% (15).
d. USMS:
Not applicable, I work in this component[A]: 38;
Very good: 39% (77);
Good: 35% (70);
Adequate: 17% (33);
Poor: 4% (7);
Very poor: 2% (3);
Don't know: 5% (10).
Notes: Percentages in rows may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Missing: a = 6 (includes 3 ATF agents who provided either a response
other than Not applicable" or did not provide any answer);
b = 22 (includes 19 DEA agents who provided either a response other
than Not applicable" or did not answer);
c = 23 (includes 16 FBI agents who provided either a response other
than Not applicable" or did not provide any answer);
d = 22 (includes 19 USMS deputy marshals who provided either a response
other than Not applicable" or did not provide any answer)
[A] Responses not included in the calculation of percentages.
27. What additional comments or suggestions would you like to share
about your component's roles and responsibilities in areas of shared
jurisdiction with other DOJ components?
(91); Missing = 169.
Thank you very much for your cooperation!
[End of section]
Appendix III: Extent to Which Survey Respondents Reported Being Clear
on Their Component's Roles and Responsibilities in Each Area of Shared
Jurisdiction:
Figures 9 through 14 show the extent to which respondents to our
survey reported being clear on their component's roles and
responsibilities in each shared jurisdiction area.
Figure 9: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and
Responsibilities in Arson Investigations--Overall, by Component, and
by City:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-char and 2 stacked vertical bar graphs]
Overall responses (206):
Very clear: 66%;
Somewhat clear: 24%;
Not clear: 10%.
Responses by agency:
ATF (61):
Very clear: 74%;
Somewhat clear: 25%;
Not clear: 2%.
DEA (47):
Very clear: 70%;
Somewhat clear: 11%;
Not clear: 19%.
FBI (53):
Very clear: 43%;
Somewhat clear: 43%;
Not clear: 13%.
USMS (45):
Very clear: 78%;
Somewhat clear: 16%;
Not clear: 7%.
Responses by city:
Houston, Texas (23):
Very clear: 65%;
Somewhat clear: 30%;
Not clear: 4%.
Los Angeles, California (20):
Very clear: 70%;
Somewhat clear: 25%;
Not clear: 5%.
Minneapolis, Minnesota (27):
Very clear: 63%;
Somewhat clear: 15%;
Not clear: 22%.
New York, New York (28):
Very clear: 64%;
Somewhat clear: 25%;
Not clear: 11%.
Orlando, Florida (27):
Very clear: 78%;
Somewhat clear: 15%;
Not clear: 7%.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (21):
Very clear: 76%;
Somewhat clear: 19%;
Not clear: 5%.
Seattle, Washington (22):
Very clear: 59%;
Somewhat clear: 41%;
Not clear: 0.
Tulsa, Oklahoma (16):
Very clear: 75%;
Somewhat clear: 13%;
Not clear: 13%.
Washington, DC (20):
Very clear: 50%;
Somewhat clear: 35%;
Not clear: 15%.
Source: GAO analysis of survey responses.
Notes: The number in parentheses is the number of agents who responded
to the question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
[End of figure]
Figure 10: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and
Responsibilities in Explosives Investigations--Overall, by Component,
and by City:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-char and 2 stacked vertical bar graphs]
Overall responses (214):
Very clear: 62%;
Somewhat clear: 28%;
Not clear: 11%.
Responses by agency:
ATF (62):
Very clear: 61%;
Somewhat clear: 34%;
Not clear: 5%.
DEA (50):
Very clear: 64%;
Somewhat clear: 14%;
Not clear: 22%.
FBI (55):
Very clear: 45%;
Somewhat clear: 42%;
Not clear: 13%.
USMS (47):
Very clear: 79%;
Somewhat clear: 17%;
Not clear: 4%.
Responses by city:
Houston, Texas (25):
Very clear: 68%;
Somewhat clear: 32%;
Not clear: 0.
Los Angeles, California (20):
Very clear: 55%;
Somewhat clear: 35%;
Not clear: 10%.
Minneapolis, Minnesota (28):
Very clear: 54%;
Somewhat clear: 29%;
Not clear: 18%.
New York, New York (29):
Very clear: 79%;
Somewhat clear: 14%;
Not clear: 7%.
Orlando, Florida (28):
Very clear: 78%;
Somewhat clear: 15%;
Not clear: 7%.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (22):
Very clear: 73%;
Somewhat clear: 27%;
Not clear: 0.
Seattle, Washington (24):
Very clear: 54%;
Somewhat clear: 42%;
Not clear: 4%.
Tulsa, Oklahoma (16):
Very clear: 63%;
Somewhat clear: 19%;
Not clear: 19%.
Washington, DC (20):
Very clear: 45%;
Somewhat clear: 40%;
Not clear: 15%.
Source: GAO analysis of survey responses.
Notes: The number in parentheses is the number of agents who responded
to the question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
[End of figure]
Figure 11: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and
Responsibilities in Gang Investigations--Overall, by Component, and by
City:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-char and 2 stacked vertical bar graphs]
Overall responses (243):
Very clear: 58%;
Somewhat clear: 35%;
Not clear: 7%.
Responses by agency:
ATF (62):
Very clear: 60%;
Somewhat clear: 31%;
Not clear: 10%.
DEA (65):
Very clear: 51%;
Somewhat clear: 42%;
Not clear: 8%.
FBI (64):
Very clear: 61%;
Somewhat clear: 33%;
Not clear: 6%.
USMS (52):
Very clear: 63%;
Somewhat clear: 33%;
Not clear: 4%.
Responses by city:
Houston, Texas (30):
Very clear: 63%;
Somewhat clear: 33%;
Not clear: 3%.
Los Angeles, California (25):
Very clear: 56%;
Somewhat clear: 44%;
Not clear: 0.
Minneapolis, Minnesota (29):
Very clear: 45%;
Somewhat clear: 38%;
Not clear: 17%.
New York, New York (36):
Very clear: 67%;
Somewhat clear: 31%;
Not clear: 3%.
Orlando, Florida (28):
Very clear: 75%;
Somewhat clear: 21%;
Not clear: 4%.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (26):
Very clear: 69%;
Somewhat clear: 23%;
Not clear: 8%.
Seattle, Washington (25):
Very clear: 52%;
Somewhat clear: 32%;
Not clear: 16%.
Tulsa, Oklahoma (16):
Very clear: 44%;
Somewhat clear: 44%;
Not clear: 13%.
Washington, DC (26):
Very clear: 50%;
Somewhat clear: 46%;
Not clear: 4%.
Source: GAO analysis of survey responses.
Notes: The number in parentheses is the number of agents who responded
to the question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
[End of figure]
Figure 12: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and
Responsibilities in Firearms Investigations--Overall, by Component,
and by City:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-char and 2 stacked vertical bar graphs]
Overall responses (249):
Very clear: 67%;
Somewhat clear: 28%;
Not clear: 4%.
Responses by agency:
ATF (64):
Very clear: 89%;
Somewhat clear: 11%;
Not clear: 0.
DEA (66):
Very clear: 59%;
Somewhat clear: 32%;
Not clear: 9%.
FBI (66):
Very clear: 52%;
Somewhat clear: 44%;
Not clear: 5%.
USMS (53):
Very clear: 72%;
Somewhat clear: 25%;
Not clear: 4%.
Responses by city:
Houston, Texas (32):
Very clear: 69%;
Somewhat clear: 28%;
Not clear: 3%.
Los Angeles, California (26):
Very clear: 54%;
Somewhat clear: 52%;
Not clear: 4%.
Minneapolis, Minnesota (30):
Very clear: 57%;
Somewhat clear: 37%;
Not clear: 7%.
New York, New York (36):
Very clear: 69%;
Somewhat clear: 31%;
Not clear: 0.
Orlando, Florida (28):
Very clear: 82%;
Somewhat clear: 18%;
Not clear: 0.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (27):
Very clear: 78%;
Somewhat clear: 19%;
Not clear: 4%.
Seattle, Washington (26):
Very clear: 65%;
Somewhat clear: 27%;
Not clear: 8%.
Tulsa, Oklahoma (16):
Very clear: 69%;
Somewhat clear: 13%;
Not clear: 19%.
Washington, DC (26):
Very clear: 69%;
Somewhat clear: 27%;
Not clear: 4%.
Source: GAO analysis of survey responses.
Notes: The number in parentheses is the number of agents who responded
to the question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
[End of figure]
Figure 13: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and
Responsibilities in Fugitives Investigations--Overall, by Component,
and by City:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-char and 2 stacked vertical bar graphs]
Overall responses (239):
Very clear: 62%;
Somewhat clear: 25%;
Not clear: 6%.
Responses by agency:
ATF (54):
Very clear: 65%;
Somewhat clear: 20%;
Not clear: 15%.
DEA (64):
Very clear: 63%;
Somewhat clear: 31%;
Not clear: 6%.
FBI (65):
Very clear: 58%;
Somewhat clear: 38%;
Not clear: 3%.
USMS (56):
Very clear: 95%;
Somewhat clear: 5%;
Not clear: 0.
Responses by city:
Houston, Texas (28):
Very clear: 82%;
Somewhat clear: 18%;
Not clear: 0.
Los Angeles, California (24):
Very clear: 67%;
Somewhat clear: 29%;
Not clear: 4%.
Minneapolis, Minnesota (29):
Very clear: 62%;
Somewhat clear: 24%;
Not clear: 14%.
New York, New York (35):
Very clear: 66%;
Somewhat clear: 9%;
Not clear: 6%.
Orlando, Florida (28):
Very clear: 75%;
Somewhat clear: 25%;
Not clear: 0.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (27):
Very clear: 81%;
Somewhat clear: 11%;
Not clear: 7%.
Seattle, Washington (24):
Very clear: 58%;
Somewhat clear: 29%;
Not clear: 13%.
Tulsa, Oklahoma (16):
Very clear: 69%;
Somewhat clear: 25%;
Not clear: 6%.
Washington, DC (26):
Very clear: 69%;
Somewhat clear: 31%;
Not clear: 0.
Source: GAO analysis of survey responses.
Notes: The number in parentheses is the number of agents who responded
to the question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
[End of figure]
Figure 14: Percentages of Survey Respondents Who Reported Being Very
Clear, Somewhat Clear, and Not Clear regarding Roles and
Responsibilities in Drug Investigations--Overall, by Component, and by
City:
[Refer to PDF for image: pie-char and 2 stacked vertical bar graphs]
Overall responses (251):
Very clear: 70%;
Somewhat clear: 26%;
Not clear: 4%.
Responses by agency:
ATF (63):
Very clear: 59%;
Somewhat clear: 35%;
Not clear: 6%.
DEA (68):
Very clear: 91%;
Somewhat clear: 9%;
Not clear: 0.
FBI (66):
Very clear: 56%;
Somewhat clear: 36%;
Not clear: 8%.
USMS (54):
Very clear: 74%;
Somewhat clear: 22%;
Not clear: 4%.
Responses by city:
Houston, Texas (31):
Very clear: 65%;
Somewhat clear: 32%;
Not clear: 3%.
Los Angeles, California (27):
Very clear: 78%;
Somewhat clear: 19%;
Not clear: 4%.
Minneapolis, Minnesota (30):
Very clear: 63%;
Somewhat clear: 27%;
Not clear: 10%.
New York, New York (36):
Very clear: 67%;
Somewhat clear: 33%;
Not clear: 0.
Orlando, Florida (28):
Very clear: 96%;
Somewhat clear: 4%;
Not clear: 0.
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (27):
Very clear: 74%;
Somewhat clear: 19%;
Not clear: 7%.
Seattle, Washington (27):
Very clear: 63%;
Somewhat clear: 33%;
Not clear: 4%.
Tulsa, Oklahoma (16):
Very clear: 50%;
Somewhat clear: 38%;
Not clear: 13%.
Washington, DC (27):
Very clear: 67%;
Somewhat clear: 30%;
Not clear: 4%.
Source: GAO analysis of survey responses.
Notes: The number in parentheses is the number of agents who responded
to the question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
[End of figure]
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Survey Respondents' Perspectives regarding Their
Component's Working Relationship with Other DOJ Components:
Table 3 shows the percentage of respondents from the nine cities we
surveyed who reported very good or good working relationships with
agents from other components.
Table 3: Percentages of Respondents from the Nine Cities Who Reported
Very Good or Good Working Relationships with Other Components:
City: Houston, TX;
ATF: 79; (19 of 24);
DEA: 83; (20 of 24);
FBI: 48; (11 of 23);
USMS: 77; (20 of 26).
City: Los Angeles, CA;
ATF: 71; (15 of 21);
DEA: 55; (11 of 20);
FBI: 11; (2 of 19);
USMS: 71; (17 of 24).
City: Minneapolis, MN;
ATF: 69; (18 of 26);
DEA: 55; (12 of 22);
FBI: 22; (5 of 23);
USMS: 86; (18 of 21).
City: New York, NY;
ATF: 74; (20 of 27);
DEA: 85; (22 of 26);
FBI: 30; (7 of 23);
USMS: 70; (19 of 27).
City: Orlando, FL;
ATF: 65; (13 of 20);
DEA: 94; (17 of 18);
FBI: 13; (3 of 23);
USMS: 83; (19 of 23).
City: Philadelphia, PA;
ATF: 53; (9 of 17);
DEA: 73; (16 of 22);
FBI: 68; (13 of 19);
USMS: 55; (12 of 22).
City: Seattle, WA;
ATF: 68; (15 of 22);
DEA: 60; (12 of 20);
FBI: 17; (3 of 18);
USMS: 75; (18 of 24).
City: Tulsa, OK;
ATF: 33; (3 of 9);
DEA: 33; (4 of 12);
FBI: 23; (3 of 13);
USMS: 79; (11 of 14).
City: Washington, DC;
ATF: 68; (15 of 22);
DEA: 57; (13 of 23);
FBI: 16; (3 of 19);
USMS: 76; (13 of 17).
Cities: Overall;
ATF: 68; (127 of 188);
DEA: 68; (127 of 187);
FBI: 28; (50 of 180);
USMS: 74; (147 of 198).
Source: GAO analysis of survey responses.
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the numbers of agents who
answered the question.
[End of table]
Also of interest are the responses provided by agents in certain
cities that have at least a 20 percentage point difference from
agents' overall responses regarding working relationships. For
example, the percentages of agents in Tulsa who reported good or very
good relationships with ATF and DEA were lower than the percentages of
agents who reported favorable relationships with these components in
other cities. On the other hand, the percentages of agents in Orlando
who reported having a favorable working relationship with DEA and in
Philadelphia who reported having a favorable working relationship with
the FBI are higher than the percentages reported by agents in other
cities. DOJ components did not have perspectives on possible reasons
for these patterns.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Justice:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Justice Management Division:
Washington. D.C. 20530:
March 28, 2011:
Ms. Eileen Larence:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms. Larence:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report entitled "Law Enforcement
Coordination: DOJ Could Improve Its Progress for Identifying
Disagreements among Agents" (GA0-11-314). The draft was reviewed by
participating Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) components.
The Department shares some of the overarching conclusions presented in
the draft. Further, the Department appreciates those GAO observations
that will help the Department in its continuing efforts to limit
disagreements over jurisdictional boundaries between our law
enforcement components (LECs) when they collaborate on investigations.
This letter constitutes the Department's formal comments and I request
that the GAO include this letter in the final report.
The Department agrees with the reports' two main premises: (1)
personnel from the Department's LECs should effectively coordinate on
joint investigations; and (2) the Department should ensure that its
guidance continues to promote cooperation and collaboration. As
explained in the report, the GAO attempted to assess the extent to
which agents are clear on their agencies' roles and responsibilities,
and how our LECs determine and coordinate roles and responsibilities
to avoid unnecessary use of resources. We were gratified to learn that
"the majority of agents who responded to the GAO's survey reported
that they are very clear about their components' roles and
responsibilities in the six investigative areas where they share
jurisdiction-drugs, firearms, fugitives, gangs, arson, and explosives-
and that mechanisms DOJ has in place to coordinate and clarify roles
and responsibilities, such as memorandums of understanding, are
somewhat effective."
Our LECs regularly work in concert to keep this country safe from
those who attempt to do us harm. Given the complexity and dimensions
of certain crimes, multiple law enforcement components may potentially
be involved in aspects of the same case or investigation. Our priority
is to have clear roles and responsibilities in such circumstances.
Where there are disagreements or lack of clarity, the Department
employs various deconfliction techniques to resolve disagreements
before they can compromise our law enforcement activities.
Additionally, it is important to recognize that to the extent we have
some overlapping or complementary response capabilities, these help
avoid gaps in response and ensure that we do not rely on single points
of success which can also result in a single point of failure.
The GAO Report Could Have Done More to Highlight Existing Department
Strategies to Address and Resolve Conflicts:
Even though we agree with the report's overarching conclusion that the
majority of Department agents clearly understand their
responsibilities and roles, the Department believes the GAO could have
better highlighted the Department's on-going efforts to enhance
working relationships among the LECs as well as the ongoing and
significant collaboration between the LECs that presently exists.
The GAO was given access to documents that govern collaboration among
LECs, descriptions of many of the Department's tools to resolve
interagency law enforcement differences, and documentation showing how
differences have been resolved. For example, the FBI provided the GAO
with access to documentation about the FBI's policy directives,
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), Joint Task Forces, and Deconfliction
Databases (collectively, "mechanisms of collaboration") that currently
exist. This information could have been discussed this information in
greater detail as they provide a significant means of collaboration
and are used to resolve jurisdictional misunderstandings of the type
mentioned in the report.
The Department and the LECs use Policy Directives to tell employees
about the operational procedures they should follow. Memoranda of
Understanding are non-contractual agreements between operational
units, sometimes between the Department's LECs, that document the
responsibilities, functions, and understandings of two or more parties
regarding a matter of mutual interest. Over the years, the negotiation
of MOUs has proven to be among the most effective mechanisms for
reaching executive level consensus on how different LECs can mesh the
strategies and techniques they employee to eliminate jurisdictional
and operational overlap. The Department gave the GAO access to many
MOUs governing joint law enforcement activities. The task force model
is another extensively used and productive mechanism that builds
collaboration. Task forces bring together law enforcement agents of
diverse skills and expertise, and the resources of numerous law
enforcement entities. Agents who participate learn techniques that
increase collaboration and information sharing. Also, they learn to
appreciate their distinct roles and responsibilities and how to avoid
conflicts over jurisdiction. Moreover, task force members create
lasting relationships and partnerships that can maximize the
likelihood of successful collaborations in the future.
Deconfliction databases are another important and proven mechanism of
collaboration. A deconfliction database is a clearinghouse of law
enforcement information used to avoid conflicts. For example, by
running a subject's name through a deconfliction database, a law
enforcement officer can determine whether another agency is
investigating the same subject. The GAO report talks about
deconfliction databases in passing but does not mention the Special
Operations Division (SOD), a multi-agency, DEA-led operational
coordination and deconfliction center. SOD has participation from over
20 agencies, and has a proven record of successfully coordinating some
of the largest multi-agency law enforcement initiatives. The DEA
recently developed capability to provide non-DEA agents direct access
to the deconfliction capability at SOD through an Internet-based
system linked to SOD's deconfliction system (prior to the development
of this capability, non-DEA users deconflicted through their agency
representatives at SOD). When a jurisdictional or operational overlap
is reported, SOD notifies users and provides them with contact
information for their colleagues. SOD then assists in the coordination
among the users so they can share information and expand or restrict
their investigations as appropriate to avoid overlap.
The Department and its LECs, over the past half dozen years, have
written many guidance documents about interagency conflict and
distributed them to agents and their supervisors. Also, the LECs have
helped refine that guidance, have prepared their own policy directives
that promote collaboration, and have negotiated, at the executive
level, memoranda that improve the investigative interrelationships
among the LECs.
We note the survey results cited in the report resulted from
interviews taken prior to the Explosives Protocols issued by the
Deputy Attorney General on August 3, 2010, and the Department's
efforts since then to implement the Protocols. We expect the clarity
provided by the Deputy's protocols would result in improved survey
responses today since the Department has addressed the roles and
responsibilities of ATF and FBI agents during explosives
investigations.
The Protocols provide clear guidance to ATF and FBI on how to better
coordinate explosives jurisdiction, training, information sharing and
laboratory services. Also, the Protocols provide a framework for how
each law enforcement component will respond to incidents involving the
criminal and terrorist misuse of explosives. Since the issuance of the
Protocols, ATF and FBI formed working groups that met regularly to
ensure the Protocols are effectively implemented. In the process, ATF
and FBI forged a closer alliance as to how they will better cooperate
and leverage each other's unique capabilities. Both law enforcement
components have reported unprecedented cooperation between each
organization concerning explosives-related matters since the issuance
of the clarified guidance.
The Department's efforts to minimize unnecessary or unproductive
overlap and its consequences began years ago, remain active today, and
will continue going forward.
The GAO Report Could Have Relied Less on Opinion Surveys:
Even though the Department appreciates the rationale behind the GAO's
survey methodology, the survey was limited and Department believes the
GAO could have more thoroughly explored the actual mechanisms of
collaboration and their effectiveness, particularly since this
survey's results were "non-generalizable" according to the report.
Finally, it also would have been beneficial if the report had more
fully discussed the extent to which disagreements interfered with the
Department's performance. For example, in response to one set of
questions, one third of respondents reported experiencing
disagreements with another DOJ component over the last five years. Of
those who responded, more than half reported that the disagreements
were not so severe or frequent that they needed to be addressed. The
report, however, emphasizes the opinion of the minority (16.6%) who
did believe that such disagreements were severe or frequent. As a
result the report can be read to overstate the frequency and negative
effect of disagreements between the LECs. And, as noted above, some of
the survey responses that indicated disagreement appeared to date from
the timeframe prior to the Department's issuance of the new explosives
protocol, and we believe that timing influenced the results seen by
GAO.
Conclusion:
We understand that conducting business as a multi-entity Department
entails an expected number of conflict and coordination issues. The
Department and its LECs have a number of mechanisms in place to reduce
investigative conflicts. The Department meets regularly with the LECs
to ensure coordination and effective management of our law enforcement
activities. We will continue, as a matter of course, to work on
conflicts as they arise to minimize the disruption of investigations.
If you have any questions, you or your staff may contact Richard
Theis, Audit Liaison Group, on (202) 514-0469.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Lee J. Lofthus:
Assistant Attorney General for Administration:
cc: Richard Theis, MPS, JMD.
[End of section]
Appendix VI: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Eileen R. Larence, (202) 512-6510 or larencee@gao.gov:
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, Kristy N. Brown, Assistant
Director, and Martene Bryan, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this
assignment. David Alexander, Nick Benne, Billy Commons, Linda Miller
and Jan Montgomery made significant contributions to this report.
Gregory Borecki, Sandra Burrell, Theresa Canjar, Stuart Kaufman, Mark
Ramage, Christine San, Daren Sweeney and Adam Vogt also provided
valuable assistance.
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in
the United States 2009 (September 2010), [hyperlink,
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_01.html] (accessed Feb.
18, 2011). The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime
Reporting program defines violent crime as those offenses that involve
force or threat of force.
[2] The 1811 investigators are criminal investigators.
[3] The length of this review reflects extensive outreach with DOJ on
the process by which we would select agents to participate in the
survey and how we would pretest and administer the survey, and
significant delays in administering the survey due to the time needed
to address DOJ's concerns.
[4] 28 C.F.R. § 0.85.
[5] 28 C.F. R. § 0.111(a).
[6] ATF authority to combat firearms trafficking stems from the Gun
Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213.
[7] The numbers of agents who responded to survey questions varied
depending on skip instructions contained in the survey questionnaire.
Also, agents may have chosen not to answer certain questions. The
survey results we provide in our report depend on these factors.
Percentages are based on the number of agents who responded to
specific survey questions.
[8] We report separately the percentage of agents who report being
"very clear" versus "somewhat clear" because we consider "very clear"
to be a positive response, whereas "somewhat clear" is neither
positive nor negative.
[9] See appendix III for additional analysis of survey results
regarding agent clarity.
[10] We visited each component in nine field locations.
[11] In 2009, we reported on coordination efforts between DOJ and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) when investigating and taking
enforcement action on gang violence. DOJ and DHS have key roles in
federal law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute gang-
related crimes. We reported a lack of differentiated roles and
responsibilities among DOJ components in the department's efforts to
combat gangs, which resulted in a lack of coordination among all
federal partners during gang investigations. We recommended that DOJ,
in consultation with DHS, direct its law enforcement agencies that
have headquarters-based anti-gang initiatives to reexamine and reach
consensus on their roles and responsibilities, including identifying
and addressing gaps and unnecessary overlap. DOJ agreed and stated
that the Attorney General's Anti-Gang Coordination Committee (AGCC)
continues to meet at least quarterly to identify and address gaps and
unnecessary overlaps. In recognition of DHS' important role and to
ensure coordination across departments, DHS's U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement regularly participates in these meetings and has
formally been a member of the AGCC since July 17, 2009. See GAO,
Combating Gangs: Better Coordination and Performance Measurement Would
Help Clarify Roles of Federal Agencies and Strengthen Assessment of
Efforts, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-708]
(Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2009).
[12] Event deconfliction services maintain data on planned law
enforcement events and alert affected agencies and officers of
potential events occurring in the same area.
[13] Of the 30 percent (77 of 259) of agents who reported not using
deconfliction databases, some said they preferred interpersonal
communication, they did not have deconfliction databases in their
region, or that they are not needed when clear on roles and
responsibilities. Five percent of the agents who responded did not
know if they had accessed a deconfliction database over the past 5
years.
[14] Six percent (6 of 96) of agents who responded to the question
answered "don't know."
[15] "Blue on Blue" are incidents in which the failure to deconflict
events resulted in agents being misidentified as criminals.
[16] See appendix IV for further details on working relationships
among components across the nine cities.
[17] The police chief in the ninth city did not comment on the
relationship among the DOJ components.
[18] DOJ law enforcement components refer cases to the USAO for
prosecution of cases.
[19] See Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General,
Evaluation and Inspections Division, Explosives Investigation
Coordination Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, Audit Report 10-
01 (Washington, D.C., October 2009), and Memorandum for the Attorney
General and Deputy Attorney General: Top Management and Performance
Challenges in the Department of Justice-2009 (Washington, D.C.,
November 2009).
[20] GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government
Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-318SP] (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1,
2011).
[21] [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-318SP].
[22] These offices included division offices, field offices, and
resident agencies.
[23] The 1811 investigators are criminal investigators.
[End of section]
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